NG-20-0022, License Amendment Request (TSCR-185): Application to Revise Operating License to Remove Cyber Security Plan Requirements

License Amendment Request (TSCR-185): Application to Revise Operating License to Remove Cyber Security Plan Requirements

ML20136A374
Person / Time
Site:	Duane Arnold
Issue date:	05/15/2020
From:	Dean Curtland NextEra Energy Duane Arnold
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NG-20-0022
Download: ML20136A374 (19)

Text

NEXTeraM ENERGY~

DUANE ARNOLD May 15, 2020 NG-20-0022 10 CFR 50.90 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Duane Arnold Energy Center Docket No. 50-331 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-49 License Amendment Request (TSCR-185) : Application to Revise Operating License to Remove Cyber Security Plan Requirements Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC (NEDA) is submitting a request for an amendment to the Renewed Facility Operating License (OL) for the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC). Specifically, this license amendment request (LAR) proposes the removal of the existing Cyber Security Plan (CSP) requirements contained in License Condition 2.C(5) of the DAEC license. __,.

By letter dated March 2, 2020 (Accession No. ML20062E489), NEDA provided formal notification to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1 )(i) and 10 CFR 50.4(b)(8) of the intention to permanently cease power operations at the DAEC on October 30, 2020.

After the certifications of permanent cessation of power operation and of permanent removal of fuel from the DAEC reactor vessel are docketed, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1 )(i) and (ii) respectively, and pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2), the 10 CFR 50 license will no longer authorize reactor operation or emplacement or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel. With fuel permanently removed from the reactor vessel, spent fuel will be stored onsite in the spent fuel pool (SFP) and/or in the independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

In a 2016 NRC Memorandum (ML16172A284), the Staff determined that 10 CFR 73.54, "Protection of digital computer and communication systems and networks," does not apply to reactor licensees that have submitted certifications of permanent cessation of power operations and permanent removal of fuel under 10 CFR 50 .82(a)(1 ), and whose certifications have been docketed by the NRC, once sufficient time has passed such that the spent fuel stored in the SFP cannot reasonably heat up to clad ignition temperature within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.

NextEra En ergy Duane Arnold , LL C, 3277 DAEC Ro ad, Palo, IA 5232 4

Document Control Desk NG-20-0022 Page 2 of 2 The Enclosure to this letter provides NEDA's evaluation of the proposed change. The regulatory and technical evaluations included in this LAR are consistent with recent NRG guidance on cyber security requirements for decommissioning facilities. In addition, the NRG staff has approved similar amendment requests, as listed in the Enclosure. Attachment 1 to the Enclosure provides markups of the Renewed OL pages showing the proposed changes, and Attachment 2 provides the clean Renewed OL pages containing the proposed changes.

NEDA requests approval of the proposed license amendment by June 1, 2021 . NEDA requests that the approved amendment become effective following docketing of the certifications required by 10 CFR 50 .82(a)(1 )(i) and (ii) and once sufficient time has passed such that the spent fuel in the SFP cannot reasonably heat up to clad ignition temperature within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />. On April 2, 2020, NEDA submitted a site-specific zirconium-fire analysis (ADAMS Accession No. ML20101M779) which determined this period to be 10 months. The amendment will be implemented within 60 days of its effective date.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, a copy of this application with Enclosure is being provided to the designated State of Iowa official.

As discussed in the Enclosure, the proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration pursuant to 10 CFR 50.92, and there are no significant environmental impacts associated with the change. The DAEC Onsite Review Group has reviewed the proposed license amendment.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Michael Davis, Licensing Manager, at 319-851-7032.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on May /-5 , 2020 Dean Curtland Site Director NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC Enclosure cc: Regional Administrator, USNRC, Region Ill, Project Manager, USNRC, Duane Arnold Energy Center Resident Inspector, USNRC, Duane Arnold Energy Center A. Leek (State of Iowa)

Enclosure NEXTERA ENERGY DUANE ARNOLD, LLC DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER NG-20-0022 LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST (TSCR-185)

DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES Page 1 of 11

Duane Arnold Energy Center Docket No. 50-331 License Amendment Request Enclosure to NG-20-0022 Page 2 of 11 NEXTERA ENERGY DUANE ARNOLD, LLC DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER License Amendment Request (TSCR-185): Application to Revise Operating License to Remove Cyber Security Plan Requirements EVALUATION OF PROPOSED CHANGE 1.0 Summary Description 2.0 Detailed Description 3.0 Technical Evaluation 4.0 Regulatory Evaluation 4.1 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria 4.2 Precedent 4.3 No Significant Hazards Consideration 4.4 Conclusions 5.0 Environmental Considerations 6.0 References - Proposed Renewed Facility Operating License Changes (Mark-Up) - Revised Renewed Facility Operating License Pages (Clean, with Proposed Changes)

Duane Arnold Energy Center Docket No. 50-331 License Amendment Request Enclosure to NG-20-0022 Page 3 of 11 1.0

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION By letter dated March 2, 2020 (Accession No. ML20062E489), NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC (NEDA) provided formal notification to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRG) pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and 10 CFR 50.4(b)(8) of the intention to permanently cease power operations at the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) on October 30, 2020.

After the certifications of permanent cessation of power operation and of permanent removal of fuel from the DAEC reactor vessel are docketed, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) respectively, and pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2), the 10 CFR 50 license will no longer authorize reactor operation or emplacement or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel. With fuel permanently removed from the reactor vessel, spent fuel will be stored onsite in the spent fuel pool (SFP) and/or in the independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

In NRG Memorandum from the Executive Director for Operations to NRG Commissioners, "Cyber Security Requirements for Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants, dated December 5, 2016(ML16172A284), the NRG determined that 10 CFR 73.54, "Protection of digital computer and communication systems and networks," does not apply to reactor licensees that have submitted certifications of permanent cessation of power operations and permanent removal of fuel under 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1), and whose certifications have been docketed by the NRG, once sufficient time has passed such that the spent fuel stored in the SFP cannot reasonably heat up to clad ignition temperature within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, NEDA is submitting a request for an amendment to the Renewed Facility Operating License (OL) for the DAEC. Specifically, this license amendment request (LAR) proposes the removal of the existing Cyber Security Plan (CSP) requirements contained in license condition 2.C(5) of the DAEC license. The proposed changes would become effective following docketing of the certifications required by 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and after sufficient time has passed such that the spent fuel in the SFP cannot reasonably heat up to clad ignition temperature within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.

2.0 DETAILED DESCRIPTION Implementation of the DAEC Cyber-Security Plan (CSP) was completed by December 31, 2017. The cyber security requirements are described in the second paragraph of license condition 2.C(5), as follows:

NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved Duane Arnold Energy Center/NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC Cyber Security Plan (CSP), including changes made pursuant to the

Duane Arnold Energy Center Docket No. 50-331 License Amendment Request Enclosure to NG-20-0022 Page 4 of 11 authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The Duane Arnold Energy Center!NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC CSP was approved by License Amendment No. 278, as supplemented by changes approved by license Amendment No. 284 and Amendment 291.

In Attachment 2 of the Reference 1 exemption request, NEDA provided the NRC with a DAEC site-specific analysis (Calculation CAL-M 19-001, Revision 1, Adiabatic Heatup Analysis of Drained Spent Fuel Pool (Zirconium Fire)) supporting DAEC's Zirconium-Fire Window, i.e., the period after which sufficient time has passed such that the spent fuel in the SFP cannot reasonably heat up to clad ignition temperature within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.

The DAEC site-specific zirconium-fire analysis submitted with Reference 1 determined a Zirconium-Fire Window of 10 months after permanent cessation of power operation to be sufficient. The 10-month Zirconium-Fire Window is contingent on NRC approval of the Reference 1 exemption request. Should the NRC, upon granting the Reference 1 exemption, require a Zirconium-Fire Window greater than 10 months, then this License Amendment will become effective after the time period granted in the exemption.

To support the decommissioning of DAEC, this LAR is being submitted to remove the existing cyber security requirements from license condition 2.C(5), after the DAEC reactor has been permanently shut down for no less than the duration of the Zirconium-Fire Window, and prior to the completion of transfer of spent fuel stored in the SFP to the ISFSI. The evaluations included in this LAR are consistent with recent NRC guidance on cyber security requirements for decommissioning facilities (ML16172A284).

Accordingly, per the provisions of 10 CFR 50.4 and 10 CFR 50.90, NEDA is submitting this request to amend the DAEC Renewed Facility Operating License to remove the existing cyber security requirements from license condition 2.C(5).

The proposed change has been evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.91 (a)(1) using the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and it has been determined that the proposed change involves no significant hazards consideration, as discussed in Section 4.3 below. contains the marked-up DAEC Renewed Facility Operating License pages for the proposed change to license condition 2.C(5), and Attachment 2 provides the clean DAEC Renewed Facility Operating License pages containing the proposed change to license condition 2.C(5).

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

The proposed license amendment to remove the CSP requirements from license condition 2.C(5) is based on the significantly reduced risks for a nuclear power facility that has permanently ceased operations, has removed all fuel from the reactor vessel, and where spent fuel has had sufficient time to cool down such that the spent fuel

Duane Arnold Energy Center Docket No. 50-331 License Amendment Request Enclosure to NG-20-0022 Page 5 of 11 stored in the SFP cannot reasonably heat up to clad ignition temperature within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />. Compared to an operating nuclear power reactor, for a decommissioning facility with a permanently defueled reactor, the spectrum of possible accidents is significantly reduced, and the risk of an offsite radiological release is significantly lower.

Correspondingly, cyber security risk is reduced due, in part, to the fact that there are significantly fewer critical digital assets (CDAs) needed to protect against and assess radiological events at a decommissioning facility than in comparison to the number at an operating reactor.

DAEC will permanently cease power operation on October 30, 2020 and all fuel will be removed from the reactor vessel shortly thereafter. The digital computer and communication systems, and networks that require cyber protection are primarily those associated with security and emergency preparedness functions, and the functioning of safety systems that support operation of the SFP. Once the recently irradiated spent fuel that is stored in the SFP has sufficiently decayed, however, the potential consequences of a cyber-attack are significantly reduced.

The only beyond-design-basis accident scenario that progresses to a condition where a significant offsite release might occur involves the very unlikely (beyond-design-basis) event where the SFP drains in such a way that all modes of cooling or heat transfer are assumed to be unavailable, which is postulated to result in an adiabatic heat-up of the spent fuel. The analysis for this event was previously submitted to the NRC staff in support of requested exemptions from specific requirements of 10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 for certain emergency planning requirements as appropriate for a decommissioning facility (Reference 1). This DAEC site-specific zirconium-fire analysis determined the Zirconium-Fire Window, i.e., the period after which sufficient time has passed such that the spent fuel in the SFP will have decayed to a point where a fire in the zirconium fuel cladding following a postulated beyond-design-basis event involving the loss of SFP water inventory cannot reasonably heat up to clad ignition temperature within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />, to be 10 months after shutdown. 1O hours provides sufficient time for mitigative actions to be taken to prevent spent fuel damage.

The rationale to remove the cyber security requirements after the Zirconium-Fire Window is similar to rationale used to justify a reduction of emergency preparedness requirements during decommissioning, as documented in the DAEC submittal associated with the decommissioning plant emergency preparedness exemption request (Reference 1).

A summary of the zirconium-fire analysis and conclusions is as follows:

1. The analysis conservatively assumes that there is no air cooling of the assemblies (adiabatic heat-up); the flow paths that would provide natural circulation cooling are assumed to be blocked.

Duane Arnold Energy Center Docket No. 50-331 License Amendment Request Enclosure to NG-20-0022 Page 6 of 11

2. The analysis conservatively assumes that the heat-up time starts when the SFP has been completely drained. This is conservative as it does not include the period of time from the postulated initiating event causing a loss of SFP water inventory until all cooling means are lost, and it is likely that site personnel will start to respond to an incident when drain-down starts.

3. Due to the slow rate of SFP water boil-off, adequate time will be available to restore cooling or makeup, either through restoration of normal systems or through readily available mitigation measures, without significant radiological consequences for plant workers in the reactor building.

4. Due to the slow rate of the event scenario and because the duties of the on-shift personnel at a decommissioning reactor facility are not as complicated and diverse as those for an operating reactor, significant time is available to complete actions necessary to mitigate the event.

5. A temperature of 900°C is the temperature associated with rapid fuel cladding oxidation used to assess the potential onset of fission product release.

6. Adiabatic heat-up analysis of the limiting fuel assembly for decay heat shows that, after 10 months following shutdown, the time for the limiting fuel assembly to reach 900°C is 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> after the assemblies have been uncovered.

7. Therefore, due to the length of time it would take for the adiabatic heat-up to occur, once all the spent fuel has decayed for at least 10 months following shutdown, there is ample time to respond to any drain down event that might cause such an occurrence by restoring cooling or makeup or providing spray. As a result, the likelihood that such a scenario would progress to a zirconium fire is not deemed credible.

Therefore, based on there being (1) no design basis events (i.e., FHA) that could result in an offsite radiological release exceeding the EPA PAG limits and consequently a significant reduction in radiological risk including consequences of a potential cyber-attack, and (2) sufficient time (at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />) to take prompt mitigative actions in response to a postulated zirconium fire accident scenario in the SFP, the elimination of the cyber security requirements from license condition 2.C(5) is appropriate for DAEC.

This rationale is similar to that used to justify a reduction in emergency preparedness requirements during decommissioning, that has been submitted to the NRG in a Reference 1.

4.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

4.1 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria

Duane Arnold Energy Center Docket No. 50-331 License Amendment Request Enclosure to NG-20-0022 Page 7 of 11 The NEDA CSP for DAEC was approved by Amendment No. 278, as supplemented by changes approved by Amendment No. 284 and Amendment 291. Implementation of the DAEC CSP was completed by December 31, 2017.

10 CFR 73.54, "Protection of digital computer and communication systems and networks," establishes the requirements for licensees to maintain and implement a Cyber Security Program (CSP). Specifically, 10 CFR 73.54 states" ... each licensee currently licensed to operate a nuclear power plant under part 50 of this chapter shall submit, as specified in§ 50.4 and § 50.90 of this chapter, a cyber-security plan that satisfies the requirements of this section for Commission review and approval." In accordance with 10 CFR 50.54, "Conditions of licenses," upon approval, the CSP becomes a condition in the operating license. DAEC has an approved CSP as described in the DAEC operating license condition 2.C(5).

NEDA will permanently cease power operations at DAEC on October 30, 2020. After the certifications of permanent cessation of power operation and of permanent removal of fuel from the DAEC reactor vessel are docketed, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) respectively, and pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2), the 10 CFR 50 license will no longer authorize reactor operation or emplacement or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel.

When the final rule for 10 CFR 73.54 was issued in March 2009, neither ISFSl-only facilities nor other facilities that were in the process of decommissioning were required to comply with the cyber security requirements. The NRC specifically limited cyber security requirements to a "licensee currently licensed to operate a nuclear power plant under part 50."

Additionally, the NRC staff has previously concluded in a December 5, 2016 NRC Memorandum, "Cyber Security Requirements for Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants" (ML16172A284), that 10 CFR 73.54 does not apply to reactor licensees that have submitted certifications of permanent removal of fuel under 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1), and whose certifications have been docketed by the NRC, once sufficient time has passed such that the spent fuel stored in the SFP cannot reasonably heat up to clad ignition temperature within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.

Duane Arnold Energy Center Docket No. 50-331 License Amendment Request Enclosure to NG-20-0022 Page 8 of 11 4.2 Precedent The proposed change is consistent with NRG-approved license amendment requests to delete the cyber security license condition from the Crystal River Nuclear Plant, Unit 3 (ML17096A280), Fort Calhoun Station Unit 1 (ML18047A661), Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (ML18145A208) and Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (ML19276C420).

4.3 No Significant Hazards Consideration NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC (NEDA), pursuant to 50.90, requests an amendment to the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) Renewed Facility Operating License to remove license condition 2.C(5) as it relates to the Cyber Security Plan (CSP). This license condition requires DAEC to fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission approved CSP, including changes made pursuant to the authority or 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). Specifically, the proposed change is to amend license condition 2.C(5) to remove cyber security requirements.

NEDA has evaluated whether a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of amendment," as discussed below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No Following cessation of power operations and removal of all spent fuel from the reactor, spent fuel at DAEC will be stored in the SFP and ISFSI. In this configuration, the spectrum of possible transients and accidents is significantly reduced compared to an operating nuclear power reactor. The only design basis accident that could potentially result in an offsite radiological release at DAEC is the FHA, which is predicated on spent fuel being stored in the SFP. An analysis has been performed that concludes that once DAEC has been permanently shut down for 10 months, there is no longer any possibility of an offsite radiological release from a design basis accident that could exceed the EPA's PAGs. The results of this analysis have been previously submitted to the NRG (ADAMS Accession No. ML20101M779) (Reference 1). With the significant reduction in radiological risk based on DAEC being shut down for no less than 10 months, the consequences of a cyber-attack are also significantly reduced.

• Duane Arnold Energy Center Docket No. 50-331 License Amendment Request Enclosure to NG-20-0022 Page 9 of 11 This proposed change does not alter previously evaluated accident assumptions, introduce or alter any initiators, or affect the function of facility structures, systems, and components (SSCs) relied upon to prevent or mitigate any previously evaluated accident or the manner in which these SSCs are operated, maintained, modified tested, or inspected. The proposed change does not involve any facility modifications which affect the performance capability of any SSCs relied upon to prevent or mitigate the consequences of any previously evaluated accidents.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No The proposed change does not alter accident assumptions, introduce or alter any initiators, or affect the function of facility SSCs relied upon to prevent or mitigate any previously evaluated accident, or the manner in which these SSCs are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The proposed change does not involve any facility modifications which affect the performance capability of any SSCs relied upon to mitigate the consequences of previously evaluated accidents and does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Additionally, per NRC Memorandum, Executive Director for Operations to NRC Commissioners, "Cyber Security Requirements for Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants," dated December 5, 2016(ML16172A284), the NRC determined that 10 CFR 73.54 does not apply to reactor licensees that have submitted certifications of permanent cessation of power operations and permanent removal of fuel under 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1), and whose certifications have been docketed by the NRC, once sufficient time has passed such that the spent fuel stored in the SFP cannot reasonably heat up to clad ignition temperature within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />. DAEC will permanently shut down on October 30, 2020, and move all fuel from the reactor to the SFP shortly thereafter. NEDA provided the NRC with a DAEC site-specific analysis (Calculation CAL-M 19-001, Revision 1, Adiabatic Heatup Analysis of Drained Spent Fuel Pool (Zirconium Fire))

(Reference 1) that demonstrates that sufficient time will have passed prior to the requested implementation date such that the spent fuel stored in the

Duane Arnold Energy Center Docket No. 50-331 License Amendment Request Enclosure to NG-20-0022 Page 10 of 11 SFP cannot reasonably heat up to clad ignition temperature within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.

Therefore, the proposed change, as supplemented, does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No The proposed change does not involve modifications to any SSCs which are relied upon to provide a margin of safety. Because there is no change to established safety margins as a result of this proposed change, no significant reduction in a margin of safety is involved.

Therefore, the proposed changes, as supplemented, have no impact to the margin of safety.

Based on the above, NEDA concludes that the proposed change, presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, and, accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.

4.4 Conclusions Based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

S NEDA has evaluated the proposed amendment, as supplemented, for environmental considerations. The review has determined that the proposed amendment, as supplemented, would change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, or would change an inspection or surveillance requirement.

However, the proposed amendment, as supplemented, does not involve (i) a

Duane Arnold Energy Center Docket No. 50-331 License Amendment Request Enclosure to NG-20-0022 Page 11 of 11 significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluent that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

Accordingly, the proposed amendment, as supplemented, meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set for in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).

In addition, the proposed change involves changes to recordkeeping, reporting, or administrative procedures or requirements. Accordingly, the proposed amendment, meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(10).

Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment, as supplemented.

6.0 REFERENCES

6.1 Letter, D. Curtland (NEDA) to NRG, "Request for Exemption from Portions of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR 50 Appendix E," NG-19-0142, Dated April 2, 2020 (ML20101M779)

LIST OF ATTACHMENTS - Proposed Renewed Facility Operating License Changes (Mark-Up) - Revised Renewed Facility Operating Pages (Clean, with Proposed Changes)

Duane Arnold Energy Center Docket No. 50-331 License Amendment Request NG-20-0022 Enclosure, Attachment 1 Page 1 of 3 ATTACHMENT 1 PROPOSED RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE CHANGES (MARK-UP)

C. This renewed operating license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the following Commission regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I; Part 20, Section 30.34 of Part 30, Section 40.41 of Part 40, Sections 50.54 and 50.59 of Part 50, and Section 70.32 of Part 70; is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject-to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:

(1) Maximum Power Level NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC is authorized to operate the Duane Arnold Energy Center at steady state reactor core power levels not in excess of 1912 megawatts (thermal) .

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. JG+, are hereby incorporated in the license. NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

(a) For Surveillance Requirements (SRs) whose acceptance criteria are modified, either directly or indirectly, by the increase in authorized maximum power level in 2.C.(1) above, in accordance with Amendment No. 243 to Facility Operating License DPR-49, those SRs are not required to be performed until their next scheduled performance, which is due at the end of the first surveillance interval that begins on the date the Surveillance was last performed prior to implementation of Amendment No. 243.

(b) Deleted.

(3) Fire Protection Program NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program that comply with 10 CFR 50.48(a) and 10 CFR 50.48(c), as specified in the licensee amendment request dated August 5, 2011 (and supplements dated October 14, 2011, April 23, 2012, May 23, 2012, July 9, 2012, October 15, 2012, January 11, 2013, February 12, 2013, March 6, 2013, May 1, 2013, May 29, 2013, two supplements dated July 2, 2013, and supplements dated August 5, 2013 and August 28, 2013) and as approved in the safety evaluation report dated September 10, 2013. Except where NRC approval for changes or deviations is required by 10 CFR 50.48(c), and provided no other regulation, technical specification, license condition or requirement would require prior NRC approval, the licensee may make changes to the fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission if those changes satisfy the provisions set forth in 10 CFR 50.48(a) and 10 CFR 50.48(c), the change does not require a change to a technical specification or a license condition, and the criteria listed below are satisfied.

Renewed License No. DPR-49 Amendment JG+

and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822) and to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50 .54(p). The combined set of plans, which contains Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 73.21 , is entitled: "Duane Arnold Energy Center Physical Security Plan," submitted by letter dated May 16, 2006.

NmctEra Energy Duane Arnold , LLC shall fully implement and maintain in effeot all provisions of the Commission approved Duane Arnold Energy Center/NmctE:ra Energy Duane Arnold , LLC Cyber 8eourity Plan (C8P) , inoluding ohanges made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR §0.90 and 10 CFR §0.§4(p) . The Duane Arnold Energy CenteFl~JmctE:ra Energy Duane Arnold , LLC C8P was approved by Lioense Amendment No. 278, as supplemented by ohanges approved by lioense J....

Amendment ~fo . 284 and Amendment 291 . -1 (6) Deleted (7) Additional Conditions The Additional Conditions contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 279, are hereby incorporated into this license. NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Additional Conditions .

(8) The licensee is authorized to revise the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report by deleting the footnote for Section 9.1.4.4.5 which states: "*The NRC has not endorsed the reactor building crane as single-failure proof (Reference 9), " and by deleting Reference 9 of the references for Section 9.1 .

(9) Mitigation Strategy License Condition Develop and maintain strategies for addressing large fires and explosions and that include the following key areas:

(a) Fire fighting response strategy with the following elements:

1. Pre-defined coordinated fire response strategy and guidance

2. Assessment of mutual aid fire fighting assets

3. Designated staging areas for equipment and materials

4. Command and control

5. Training of response personnel (b) Operations to mitigate fuel damage considering the following :

1. Protection and use of personnel assets

2. Communications

3. Minimizing fire spread

4. Procedures for implementing integrated fire response strategy

5. Identification of readily-available pre-staged equipment

6. Training on integrated fire response strategy

7. Spent fuel pool mitigation measures (c) Actions to minimize release to include consideration of:

1. Water spray scrubbing

2. Dose to onsite responders (10) The licensee shall implement and maintain all Actions required by Attachment 2 to NRC Order EA-06-137, issued June 20, 2006, except the last action that requires incorporation of the strategies into the site security plan, contingency plan, emergency plan and/or guard training and qualification plan, as appropriate.

Renewed License No. DPR-49 Amendment ~

Duane Arnold Energy Center Docket No. 50-331 License Amendment Request NG-20-0022 Enclosure, Attachment 2 Page 1 of 3 ATTACHMENT 2 REVISED RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE PAGES (CLEAN, WITH PROPOSED CHANGES)

C. This renewed operating license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the following Commission regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I; Part 20, Section 30.34 of Part 30, Section 40.41 of Part 40, Sections 50.54 and 50.59 of Part 50, and Section 70.32 of Part 70; is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:

(1) Maximum Power Level NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC is authorized to operate the Duane Arnold Energy Center at steady state reactor core power levels not in excess of 1912 megawatts (thermal).

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. , are hereby incorporated in the license. NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

(a) For Surveillance Requirements (SRs) whose acceptance criteria are modified, either directly or indirectly, by the increase in authorized maximum power level in 2.C.(1) above, in accordance with Amendment No. 243 to Facility Operating License DPR-49, those SRs are not required to be performed until their next scheduled performance, which is due at the end of the first surveillance interval that begins on the date the Surveillance was last performed prior to implementation of Amendment No. 243.

(b) Deleted.

(3) Fire Protection Program NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program that comply with 10 CFR 50.48(a) and 10 CFR 50.48( c), as specified in the licensee amendment request dated August 5, 2011 (and supplements dated October 14, 2011, April 23, 2012, May 23, 2012, July 9, 2012, October 15, 2012, January 11, 2013, February 12, 2013, March 6, 2013, May 1, 2013, May 29, 2013, two supplements dated July 2, 2013, and supplements dated August 5, 2013 and August 28, 2013) and as approved in the safety evaluation report dated September 10, 2013. Except where NRG approval for changes or deviations is required by 10 CFR 50.48( c), and provided no other regulation, technical specification, license condition or requirement would require prior NRG approval, the licensee may make changes to the fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission if those changes satisfy the provisions set forth in 10 CFR 50.48(a) and 10 CFR 50.48(c), the change does not require a change to a technical specification or a license condition, and the criteria listed below are satisfied.

Renewed License No. DPR-49 Amendment

and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822) and to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The combined set of plans, which contains Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 73.21, is entitled: "Duane Arnold Energy Center Physical Security Plan," submitted by letter dated May 16, 2006.

(6) Deleted (7) Additional Conditions The Additional Conditions contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 279, are hereby incorporated into this license. NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Additional Conditions.

(8) The licensee is authorized to revise the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report by deleting the footnote for Section 9.1.4.4.5 which states: "*The NRC has not endorsed the reactor building crane as single-failure proof (Reference 9)," and by deleting Reference 9 of the references for Section 9.1.

(9) Mitigation Strategy License Condition Develop and maintain strategies for addressing large fires and explosions and that include the following key areas:

(a) Fire fighting response strategy with the following elements:

1. Pre-defined coordinated fire response strategy and guidance

2. Assessment of mutual aid fire fighting assets

3. Designated staging areas for equipment and materials

4. Command and control

5. Training of response personnel (b) Operations to mitigate fuel damage considering the following:

1. Protection and use of personnel assets

2. Communications

3. Minimizing fire spread

4. Procedures for implementing integrated fire response strategy

5. Identification of readily-available pre-staged equipment

6. Training on integrated fire response strategy

7. Spent fuel pool mitigation measures (c) Actions to minimize release to include consideration of:

1. Water spray scrubbing

2. Dose to onsite responders (10) The licensee shall implement and maintain all Actions required by Attachment 2 to NRC Order EA-06-137, issued June 20, 2006, except the last action that requires incorporation of the strategies into the site security plan, contingency plan, emergency plan and/or guard training and qualification plan, as appropriate.

Renewed License No. DPR-49 Amendment