ML21098A166

PDEP and EAL License Amendment Approval

ML21098A166
Person / Time
Site:	Duane Arnold
Issue date:	04/28/2021
From:	Marlayna Vaaler Doell Reactor Decommissioning Branch
To:	Moul D Florida Power & Light Co
Doell M
References
EPID L-2020-LLA-0113
Download: ML21098A166 (38)

Text

April 28, 2021 Mr. Don Moul Executive Vice President, Nuclear Division, and Chief Nuclear Officer Florida Power & Light Company Mail Stop: EX/JB 700 Universe Boulevard Juno Beach, FL 33408

SUBJECT:

DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 313 REGARDING CHANGES TO THE EMERGENCY PLAN TO REFLECT THE PERMANENTLY DEFUELED CONDITION AND MAKE CHANGES TO THE EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL SCHEME (EPID L-2020-LLA-0113)

Dear Mr. Moul:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Commission) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 313 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-49 for the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) in response to your application dated May 15, 2020, as supplemented by letters dated October 29 and December 1, 2020.

The amendment revises the site emergency plan and emergency action level scheme to reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of DAEC. The amendment is effective 10 months following the permanent cessation of power operations at DAEC, which is June 10, 2021, and shall be implemented within 90 days of the effective date.

A copy of the related safety evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commissions monthly Federal Register notice.

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 2.390 of the NRCs Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure, a copy of this letter will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.

D. Moul If you have any questions concerning the above, please contact me at (301) 415-3178 or via email at marlayna.doell@nrc.gov.

Sincerely, Signed by Doell, Marlayna on 04/28/21 Marlayna V. Doell, Project Manager Reactor Decommissioning Branch Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery and Waste Programs Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Docket No. 50-331

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 313 to Renewed License No. DPR-49

2. Safety Evaluation cc: Duane Arnold Listserv

NEXTERA ENERGY DUANE ARNOLD, LLC DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER DOCKET NO. 50-331 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 313 Renewed License No. DPR-49

1. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment by NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC, dated May 15, 2020, as supplemented by letters dated October 29 and December 1, 2020, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations set forth in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR)

Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

Enclosure 1

2. Accordingly, by Amendment No. 313, Renewed Facility License No. DPR-49 is hereby amended to authorize revisions to the Duane Arnold Energy Center Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme as set forth in the application dated May 15, 2020, as supplemented by letters dated October 29 and December 1, 2020, and as evaluated in the NRC staffs safety evaluation issued with this amendment.

3. This license amendment is effective 10 months following the permanent cessation of power operations and shall be implemented within 90 days of the effective date.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Signed by Lubinski, John on 04/28/21 John W. Lubinski, Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Date of Issuance:

April 28, 2021

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 313 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-49 NEXTERA ENERGY DUANE ARNOLD, LLC DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER DOCKET NO. 50-331

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated May 15, 2020 (Reference 1), as supplemented by letters dated October 29 and December 1, 2020 (References 2 and 3, respectively), NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC (NEDA, the licensee), requested changes to the site emergency plan and emergency action level (EAL) scheme for the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC). The proposed amendment would revise the DAEC Emergency Plan, referred to hereafter as the permanently defueled emergency plan (PDEP), and the DAEC EAL scheme to be consistent with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) staffs approval of associated emergency preparedness and planning exemptions. The granting of these EP exemptions is based on the Commissions approval, as documented in the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) to SECY-21-0006, Request by NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC for Exemptions From Certain Emergency Planning Requirements for the Duane Arnold Energy Center (Reference 4).

The licensees letter dated May 15, 2020, contained a copy of the proposed PDEP and EAL scheme, including a description and evaluation of the proposed changes and a comparison to the NRC-endorsed EAL scheme provided in the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) document NEI 99-01, Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors, Revision 6, dated November 2012 (Reference 5).

The supplemental letters dated October 29 and December 1, 2020, provided additional information that clarified the application, but did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, or change the NRCs original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the Federal Register (FR) on July 14, 2020 (85 FR 42438).

1.1 Background

The DAEC site is located on the western side of a north-south branch of the Cedar River, approximately 2.5 miles north-northeast of the Village of Palo in Linn County, Iowa. The closest city is Cedar Rapids, which has its outer boundary 8 miles to the southeast of the DAEC site.

Enclosure 2

By letter dated January 18, 2019 (Reference 6), in accordance with paragraph (a)(1)(i) of section 50.82, Termination of license, to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR),

NEDA certified to the NRC that it planned to permanently cease power operations at DAEC in the fourth quarter of 2020. By letter dated March 2, 2020 (Reference 7), NEDA updated its timeline and certified to the NRC that it planned to permanently cease power operations at DAEC on October 30, 2020. Subsequently, by letter dated August 27, 2020 (Reference 8),

NEDA certified, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i), that DAEC permanently ceased power operations on August 10, 2020. By letter dated October 12, 2020 (Reference 9), NEDA certified, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(ii), that fuel had been permanently removed from the DAEC reactor vessel and placed in the spent fuel pool (SFP) as of October 12, 2020. Upon docketing of these certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the DAEC reactor vessel, as specified in 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2), the renewed facility operating license (DPR-49) for DAEC no longer authorizes operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel.

The licensee submitted the proposed DAEC PDEP and EAL scheme to the NRC in accordance with paragraph (q)(4) of 10 CFR 50.54, Conditions of licenses, contingent on the NRCs prior approval of certain exemptions from specific emergency planning and preparedness (EP) requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, Emergency plans, and Appendix E, Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities, to 10 CFR Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities. By letter dated April 13, 2021 (Reference 10), the NRC staff granted NEDA exemptions from certain EP requirements in 10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, Specific exemptions.

In granting the requested EP exemptions, the NRC primarily relied on the DAEC site-specific analyses, which provided reasonable assurance that: (1) an offsite radiological release would not exceed the early phase protective action guides (PAGs) provided in the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), EPA-400/R-17/001, PAG Manual: Protective Action Guides and Planning Guidance for Radiological Incidents, dated January 2017 (Reference 11), at the sites exclusion area boundary for the remaining design-basis accident (DBA) applicable to the DAEC facility in its permanently shutdown and defueled condition; and (2) in the highly unlikely event of a severe beyond-DBA resulting in a loss of all cooling to the spent fuel stored in the DAEC SFP, there would be a significant amount of time between the initiating event and the possible onset of conditions that could result in a zirconium cladding fire. This time provides a substantial opportunity for event mitigation. The DAEC licensee is required to maintain effective strategies, sufficient resources, and adequately trained personnel to mitigate such an event.

While a beyond DBA is unlikely, if State or local governmental officials determine that offsite protective actions are warranted, then sufficient time and capability would also be available for offsite response organizations (OROs) to implement these measures using a comprehensive emergency management plan (CEMP) or all-hazards approach.1 The Commissions approval of the requested EP exemptions is documented in the SRM to SECY-21-0006. Upon the NRCs approval of the DAEC EP exemptions, NEDA stated that the proposed DAEC PDEP will continue to meet the remaining planning standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements in Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, as exempted.

1 A CEMP in this context, also referred to as an emergency operations plan, is addressed in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101, Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans, Version 2.0, dated November 2010 (Reference 12).

In addition to the proposed changes to the DAEC PDEP, NEDA is proposing to change the EAL scheme to reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of DAEC. In accordance with Section IV.B.2 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, the licensee must receive NRC approval before implementing a change to the entire EAL scheme. The licensee stated that the changes to the EAL scheme are consistent with the methodology recommended for permanently shutdown and defueled reactors, as provided in the NRC-endorsed NEI 99-01, Revision 6.

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

2.1 Emergency Plan Section 50.47 of 10 CFR sets forth the emergency plan requirements for nuclear power reactors. Specifically, 10 CFR 50.47(a)(1)(i) states, in part:

no initial operating license for a nuclear power reactor will be issued unless a finding is made by the NRC that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.

Paragraph 50.47(b) of 10 CFR establishes the standards that onsite and offsite emergency response plans must meet in order for the NRC staff to make a positive finding that there is reasonable assurance that the licensee can and will take adequate protective measures in the event of a radiological emergency.

Appendix E,Section IV, Content of Emergency Plans, to 10 CFR Part 50 provides the requirements for the content of a licensees emergency plan.

In addition, 10 CFR 50.72(a)(3) states:

The licensee shall notify the NRC immediately after notification of the appropriate State or local agencies and not later than one hour after the time the licensee declares one of the Emergency Classes.

The EP regulations contained in 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 apply to both operating nuclear power reactors and permanently shutdown and defueled nuclear power reactors. However, the EP regulations are silent regarding the fact that once a nuclear power reactor permanently ceases operation and removes fuel from the reactor vessel, the risks of credible emergency accident scenarios at the facility are greatly reduced. Therefore, the consistent practice for permanently shutdown and defueled nuclear power reactors has been for the licensees to request exemptions under 10 CFR 50.12, which allow changes to the facilitys emergency plan commensurate with the credible, site-specific risks that are present during decommissioning. Such EP exemptions generally recognize the reduction in radiological risk as spent fuel ages and the preclusion of accidents that are strictly applicable to operating reactors.

The practice of granting exemptions from the Commissions EP regulations is a well-established part of the NRC regulatory process. This process allows licensees to address site-specific situations or implement alternative approaches in response to circumstances that are not necessarily contemplated in regulations that are generally intended for operating nuclear power reactors. The exemption process, which allows the NRC to provide relief in appropriate circumstances where safety and security continue to be assured, is not unique to the decommissioning of nuclear power reactors or to the specific EP technical areas. The Commission makes decisions regarding exemption requests on a site-specific, case-by-case

basis, following an established process that includes the NRC staffs detailed technical assessment of individual exemption requests. According to 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may grant exemptions from the requirements of its regulations, which (1) are authorized by law, (2) will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, (3) are consistent with the common defense and security, and (4) present special circumstances.

Revision 1 to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 (NUREG-0654), Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, dated November 1980 (Reference 13), provides guidance for the format and content of an emergency plan, which can be applied to meet the planning standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b). NUREG-0654, which the current DAEC Emergency Plan is based on, therefore provides an acceptable method for nuclear power reactor licensees to use in developing radiological emergency response plans. In addition, Attachment 1, Staff Guidance for Evaluation of Permanently Defueled Emergency Plans, to Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) document NSIR/DPR-ISG-02, Emergency Planning Exemption Requests for Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants, dated May 11, 2015 (Reference 14), provides an acceptable method for the NRC staffs review of PDEPs for sites undergoing decommissioning, and was developed to ensure decommissioning facilities continue to meet the remaining applicable evaluation criteria in Section II, Planning Standards and Evaluation Criteria, to NUREG-0654.

2.2 Emergency Action Level Scheme Paragraph 50.47(b)(4) of 10 CFR, as exempted for DAEC (exempted language indicated by strikeout and bolded text), requires that a licensees emergency response plan contain:

A standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters, is in use by the nuclear facility licensee, and State and local response plans call for reliance on information provided by facility licensees for determinations of minimum initial offsite response measures.

This requirement emphasizes the use of a standard emergency classification and action level scheme, thereby assuring that implementation methods are relatively consistent throughout the industry for a given reactor and containment design, while simultaneously providing an opportunity for a licensee to modify its EAL scheme as necessary to address plant-specific design considerations or operational preferences.

Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, as exempted for DAEC (exempted language indicated by strikeout and bolded text), states:

1. The means to be used for determining the magnitude of, and for continually assessing the impact of, the release of radioactive materials shall be described, including emergency action levels that are to be used as criteria for determining the need for notification and participation of local and State agencies, the Commission, and other Federal agencies, and the emergency action levels that are to be used for determining when and what type of protective measures should be considered within and outside the site boundary to protect health and safety. The emergency action levels shall be based on in-plant conditions and instrumentation in addition to onsite and offsite monitoring. By June 20, 2012, for nuclear power reactor licensees, these action levels must include hostile action that may

adversely affect the nuclear power plant. The initial emergency action levels shall be discussed and agreed on by the applicant or licensee and state and local governmental authorities and approved by the NRC.

Thereafter, emergency action levels shall be reviewed with the State and local governmental authorities on an annual basis.

2. A licensee desiring to change its entire emergency action level scheme shall submit an application for an amendment to its license and receive NRC approval before implementing the change. Licensees shall follow the change process in § 50.54(q) for all other emergency action level changes.

The NRC staffs emergency classification and action level scheme review is based upon a revision to the DAEC EAL scheme provided in the licensees letter dated May 15, 2020, as supplemented by letters dated October 29 and December 1, 2020. As part of this review, the NRC staff assessed the site-specific modifications made by DAEC as they relate to the guidance provided in NEI 99-01, Revision 6. The NRC endorsed the NEI 99-01 methodology by letter dated March 28, 2013 (Reference 15), as an acceptable method for developing the EALs required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4),Section IV.B.1 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, and the associated planning standard evaluation criteria in Section II.D of NUREG-0654. In addition, the NEI 99-01 methodology also provides guidance for permanently shutdown and defueled nuclear power reactors for the development of a site-specific emergency classification scheme.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

3.1 Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan Pursuant to DAECs certifications of permanent cessation of operations and removal of fuel from the reactor vessel, no power reactor operations can take place and NEDA is prohibited from moving fuel from the SFP to the reactor vessel. Consequently, the proposed PDEP describes the licensees response to emergencies that may arise at the DAEC facility while it is in a permanently shutdown and defueled configuration. Recognizing that there are no longer any credible DBAs that would result in offsite dose consequences large enough to require offsite radiological emergency preparedness (REP) plans in accordance with 44 CFR Part 350, Review and Approval of State and Local Radiological Emergency Plans and Preparedness, the PDEP no longer specifies the requirements for formal offsite REP planning. Additionally, the onsite EP activities contained in the DAEC PDEP are reduced in scope. The DAEC PDEP specifically implements the planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements in Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, as exempted by the NRCs letter to NEDA dated April 13, 2021.

This safety evaluation summarizes the NRC staffs technical evaluation of the proposed DAEC PDEP, based on the planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements in Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, as exempted for DAEC, and using the remaining applicable evaluation criteria provided in NUREG-0654, as outlined in Attachment 1 to NSIR/DPR-ISG-02.

The proposed changes, as exempted for DAEC, are shown in bold with a strikethrough of the current wording associated with the regulations.

3.1.1 Assignment of Responsibility (Organizational Control)

Paragraph 50.47(b)(1) of 10 CFR, as exempted for DAEC, states:

Primary responsibilities for emergency response by the nuclear facility licensee and by State and local organizations within the Emergency Planning Zones have been assigned, the emergency responsibilities of the various supporting organizations have been specifically established, and each principal response organization has staff to respond and to augment its initial response on a continuous basis.

The DAEC PDEP identifies that the Shift Manager position is staffed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day. This position is the senior management position at the facility during off-hours and is responsible for monitoring facility conditions and approving onsite activities. The Shift Manager has the authority, management ability, and technical knowledge to classify and declare a facility emergency and assume the role of Emergency Director.

In addition to the Shift Manager, designated on-shift staff positions include two (2) Non-Certified Operators (NCO) and a Health Physics Technician, along with security personnel. The DAEC Emergency Response Organization (ERO) is activated at the declaration of an Alert classification level and will augment the on-shift staff within approximately two hours of the declaration of an Alert classification level. However, the ERO may be activated, in part or in whole, at the discretion of the Shift Manager / Emergency Director for a Notification of Unusual Event (Unusual Event) classification level.

The normal on-shift staff complement provides the initial response to an emergency. This group is trained to handle emergency situations, including implementation of the DAEC PDEP and making initial accident assessments, emergency classifications, notifications, and protective action recommendations until ERO augmentation has occurred. The minimum staff required to conduct routine and immediate emergency mitigation is maintained at the facility. The designated on-shift personnel are those positions required to direct or perform the site-specific mitigation strategies required for a loss of SFP inventory.

Arrangements are in place with OROs through letters of agreement for ambulance services, treatment of contaminated and injured patients, fire support services, and law enforcement response as requested by the facility. Evidence of these agreements with participating local services is listed in Appendix 2, Letters of Agreement, of the DAEC PDEP.

OROs that may respond onsite, as requested, at the DAEC facility include:

Medical Support Organizations and Personnel o Mercy Medical Center in Cedar Rapids o The Hiawatha Fire and Rescue Department (emergency rescue and transportation services for injured and/or contaminated personnel)

Firefighting Organizations o Palo Volunteer Fire Department Law Enforcement Agencies o Linn County Sheriffs Office

Based on the NRC staffs review of the DAEC PDEP, as described above, the NRC staff finds that the proposed PDEP meets the applicable evaluation criteria of NUREG-0654, as outlined in to NSIR/DPR-ISG-02. The DAEC PDEP adequately describes the concept of operations for individuals and organizations responsible for responding to emergencies at the site, identifies the position of Shift Manager / Emergency Director as the individual in charge of the emergency response, and identifies the minimum staff on duty at the plant during all shifts to provide emergency response. Additional personnel are available on an on-call basis to respond to facility emergencies. Based on this review, the NRC staff concludes that the planning standard at 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), as well as the requirements of Sections IV.A.1, A.2, A.4, and A.7 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, as exempted for DAEC, pertaining to the assignment of responsibility (organization control), are addressed in an acceptable manner in the DAEC PDEP, considering the permanently shutdown and defueled status of the facility.

3.1.2 Onsite Emergency Organization Paragraph 50.47(b)(2) of 10 CFR states:

On-shift facility licensee responsibilities for emergency response are unambiguously defined, adequate staffing to provide initial facility accident response in key functional areas is maintained at all times, timely augmentation of response capabilities is available and the interfaces among various onsite response activities and offsite support and response activities are specified.

The DAEC PDEP identifies that the DAEC facility has designated personnel on-shift at all times, including a designated Shift Manager, two NCOs, and one Health Physics Technician, who would provide the initial response to an event. The Shift Manager is the on-shift individual who initially declares an emergency classification and assumes the role of Emergency Director. The Shift Manager has the authority to immediately and unilaterally initiate any emergency actions.

The DAEC PDEP also specifies the non-delegable and delegable responsibilities related to the Emergency Director position.

As an extension of their normal duties, DAEC personnel will be available during emergencies and will receive duty-specific training to perform emergency response activities. This includes facility on-shift personnel, maintenance, radiation protection (RP), and security personnel.

Designated members of the on-shift staff fulfill roles within the ERO appropriate to their training and experience. The on-shift staffing assignments include the roles and responsibilities for their emergency response functions. The relationship between normal and emergency response positions for the shift personnel is unchanged when an event occurs.

The on-shift and augmented ERO positions that fulfill emergency staffing capabilities are depicted in Table B.1, On-Shift and Staff Augmentation Assignments, of the DAEC PDEP.

This table, along with Figure B.1, Emergency Response Organization (On-Shift and Augmented Staffing), provide a graphical representation of the functional responsibilities for designated on-shift staff and the augmented positions that fulfill emergency staffing capabilities.

The DAEC ERO, when mobilized, augments the normal on-shift organization to respond to declared emergencies. ERO personnel are trained and assigned to a position based on job qualifications or by being specifically trained to fill the position. The ERO is activated at the declaration of an Alert classification level or at the discretion of the Emergency Director. The designated on-shift and augmented ERO staff are capable of continuous (24-hour) operations for a protracted period. Upon the initial declaration of an emergency classification, the Shift

Manager assumes the responsibilities of the Emergency Director position, and mobilization of the ERO will be conducted at the direction of the Emergency Director. Plans and procedures are in place to ensure the timely activation of the ERO. The minimum augmented staff is a Technical and Engineering Supervisor and a Site RP Coordinator.

Based on the NRC staffs review of the DAEC PDEP, as described above, the NRC staff finds that the proposed PDEP meets the applicable evaluation criteria of NUREG-0654, as outlined in to NSIR/DPR-02. The DAEC PDEP identifies: (1) the onsite ERO and its relationship to the normal shift complement; (2) the on-shift individual responsible for emergency response as the Shift Manager, who has the authority and responsibility to initiate the functional responsibilities for emergency response; (3) adequate staffing to provide initial facility accident response in key functional areas; (4) that timely augmentation of response capabilities is available; (5) that local services are identified with letters of agreement in place; and (6) that arrangements for the treatment and transportation of contaminated injured personnel are in place. Based on this review, the NRC staff concludes that the planning standard at 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), as well as the requirements of Sections IV.A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4, A.9, and C.1 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, as exempted for DAEC, pertaining to the onsite emergency organization, are addressed in an acceptable manner in the DAEC PDEP, considering the permanently shutdown and defueled status of the facility.

3.1.3 Emergency Response Support and Resources Paragraph 50.47(b)(3) of 10 CFR, as exempted for DAEC, states:

Arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources have been made, arrangements to accommodate State and local staff at the licensees Emergency Operations Facility have been made, and other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response have been identified.

The DAEC PDEP identifies that radiological emergency preplanning is not required for the State of Iowa or the surrounding Linn County. State and County response to an emergency will be performed in accordance with each organizations CEMP (all-hazard) plans and procedures and will be commensurate with the hazard posed by the emergency.

The Emergency Director is authorized to request assistance as needed, including offsite fire, ambulance, and local law enforcement response. Letters of agreement are in place for those local agencies that would respond to the site if requested, as well as for the local hospitals that may be required to treat a contaminated injured individual from the site, as designated in the PDEP. These letters of agreement are discussed in Section 3.1.1 of this safety evaluation.

Based on the NRC staffs review of the DAEC PDEP, as described above, the NRC staff finds that the proposed PDEP meets the applicable evaluation criteria of NUREG-0654, as outlined in to NSIR/DPR-02. The PDEP adequately describes the arrangements for requesting assistance from other organizations or individuals in an emergency, and that this assistance is supported by letters of agreement. Based on this review, the NRC staff concludes that the planning standard at 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3), as well as the requirements of Section IV.A.7 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, as exempted for DAEC, pertaining to emergency response support and resources, are addressed in an acceptable manner in the DAEC PDEP, considering the permanently shutdown and defueled status of the facility.

3.1.4 Emergency Classification System Paragraph 50.47(b)(4) of 10 CFR, as exempted for DAEC, states:

A standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters, is in use by the nuclear facility licensee, and State and local response plans call for reliance on information provided by facility licensees for determinations of minimum initial offsite response measures.

The DAEC PDEP identifies that the emergency classification system covers a spectrum of possible radiological and non-radiological emergencies at DAEC, considering the permanently shutdown and defueled status of the facility. A graded scale of response for distinct classifications of emergency conditions, actions appropriate for those classifications, and criteria for escalation to a more severe classification are provided. The revised EAL scheme categorizes accidents and/or emergency situations into one of two emergency classification levels (ECLs) depending on emergency conditions at the time of the incident. The ECLs applicable at DAEC considering the permanently shutdown and defueled status of the facility, in order of increasing severity, will be an Unusual Event and an Alert. The classification of emergencies up to an Alert is consistent with the regulations for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) in 10 CFR 72.32(a)(3), as well as the exemptions granted to Section IV.C.1 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, which eliminated the Site Area and General emergency classification levels, as described in the NRCs letter dated April 13, 2021.

The DAEC EAL scheme, which specifies ECLs of Unusual Event and Alert, is based on NEI 99-01, Revision 6, as applied to a permanently shutdown and defueled nuclear power reactor with fuel stored onsite in the SFP and an ISFSI. When indications are available to on-shift personnel that an EAL threshold has been met, the event is assessed and the corresponding ECL is declared. DAEC maintains the capability to assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition within 30 minutes after the availability of indications that an EAL threshold has been reached, consistent with Section IV.C.2 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, as exempted, which removed the requirement to classify a condition within 15 minutes.

Emergency classifications are to be made as soon as conditions are present and recognizable for the classification in accordance with the applicable EALs, but within 30 minutes in all cases after the availability of indications to operators that an EAL threshold has been reached. The initiating conditions, their corresponding EALs, and the technical bases for each classifiable EAL threshold, are contained in Attachment 3, Permanently Defueled Emergency Action Level Bases Document, to the licensees letter dated May 15, 2020, as supplemented by letters dated October 29 and December 1, 2020.

Based on the NRC staffs review of the DAEC PDEP, as described above, the NRC staff finds that the proposed PDEP meets the applicable evaluation criteria of NUREG-0654, as outlined in to NSIR/DPR-02. The PDEP adequately identifies: (1) that the emergency classification system covers a spectrum of possible radiological and non-radiological emergencies at DAEC; (2) a graded scale of response for distinct classifications of emergency conditions; (3) actions appropriate for those classifications; and (4) criteria for escalation to a more severe classification. The specific instruments, parameters, or equipment status are described for each ECL in the EAL scheme. Based on this review, the NRC staff concludes that the planning standard at 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), as well as the requirements of Sections IV.B.1, B.2, C.1, and C.2 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, as exempted for DAEC, pertaining to the

emergency classification system, are addressed in an acceptable manner in the DAEC PDEP, considering the permanently shutdown and defueled status of the facility.

3.1.5 Notification Methods and Procedures Paragraph 50.47(b)(5) of 10 CFR, as exempted for DAEC, states:

Procedures have been established for notification, by the licensee, of State and local response organizations and for notification of emergency personnel by all organizations; the content of initial and follow-up messages to response organizations and the public has been established; and means to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone have been established.

The DAEC PDEP identifies the Emergency Director position, which is assumed by the Shift Manager, as responsible for initiating notification to the State of Iowa, Linn County, and the NRC, as well as initiating corrective and mitigative actions. Onsite staff within the DAEC Protected Area are notified via the Emergency or Fire Alarm and a public address system message. If required, personnel outside the Protected Area are notified by public address systems installed in the buildings outside the Protected Area. Site Security personnel may assist in the notification of all other personnel on DAEC property. If personnel required to staff ERO positions are not onsite at the time an emergency is declared, they may be contacted by commercial telephone using land lines and/or wireless devices capable of receiving telephone calls and text messages. Mobilization of the DAEC ERO will be conducted under the direction of the Emergency Director, according to personnel assignments and telephone numbers maintained in various site and public telephone directories.

Notification to the responsible State and County authorities is required within 60 minutes of the emergency classification. The commercial telephone network serves as the primary means to provide emergency notification to State and County agencies. It is used to provide initial and updated notifications and for general information flow between these agencies. DAEC, in coordination with the State of Iowa and Linn County, has established the contents of the initial messages to be sent from the site in the event an emergency is declared. These messages contain such information as the class of emergency and whether a release is taking place.

In the event the commercial telephone system is unavailable, wireless communications can be used to make emergency notifications. In addition, electronic means may be used to transmit the notification messages. Follow-up messages incorporate elements as determined necessary by the State of Iowa. These messages are transmitted by telephone or facsimile. Updated messages are sent at least every 60 minutes. The frequency of updates may be modified during ongoing events if requested by the State and if the status of the event has not changed.

The NRC will be notified as soon as possible after the State and County notifications and within 60 minutes of event classification or change in classification. The NRC Event Notification System (ENS) is a dedicated telephone system used to notify the NRC Operations Center of an emergency. In the event the ENS fails, commercial phone lines will be used to notify the NRC.

Based on the NRC staff's review of the DAEC PDEP, as described above, the NRC staff finds that the proposed PDEP meets the applicable evaluation criteria of NUREG-0654, as outlined in to NSIR/DPR-02. The PDEP adequately describes the process for initiating notifications to the NRC and State and local officials, as well as the contents of the emergency

messages to be sent. The licensee, in cooperation with the State of Iowa and Linn County, has established mutually agreeable methods and procedures for notification of OROs consistent with the approved EAL scheme and the contents of message form. Follow-up reports are provided as additional information describing the emergency becomes available, and on an as-needed basis, until such time that the emergency condition has been terminated. Based on this review, the NRC staff concludes that the planning standard at 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), as well as the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(a)(3) and Sections IV.A.6, A.7, C.1, C.2, D.1, D.3, and E of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, as exempted for DAEC, pertaining to notification methods and procedures, are addressed in an acceptable manner in the DAEC PDEP, considering the permanently shutdown and defueled status of the facility.

3.1.6 Emergency Communications Paragraph 50.47(b)(6) of 10 CFR, as exempted for DAEC, states:

Provisions exist for prompt communications among principal response organizations to emergency personnel and to the public.

The DAEC PDEP identifies that various modes of communication are available to facility staff to transmit information within DAEC and to various locations offsite during normal and emergency conditions. There are provisions for 24-hour per day notification to State and county authorities, and the NRC, for activating the DAEC ERO personnel, and for periodic testing of the emergency communication systems. The Emergency Director is responsible for the notification of State and county agencies, and the NRC, and for initiating corrective and mitigative actions when an emergency declaration has been made by DAEC.

The licensee has extensive and reliable communication systems installed at DAEC. Examples of the communication systems may include the Protected Area Paging System (Gai-tronics),

portable radios, and the commercial telephone system, including land lines and/or wireless devices capable of receiving telephone calls and text messages. Gai-tronics also provides a means of intra-plant communications. Stations on this system provide access to the paging system and to intercom lines. These stations and speakers are placed throughout the DAEC facility, including in the Control Room. Buildings outside the DAEC Protected Area also have public address announcing capabilities. Access to the public address system in both locations can be accomplished via the sites telephone system. This system can be used to notify personnel throughout the facility of an emergency.

The commercial telephone system provides the emergency notification system between DAEC and State and county agencies. It will be used to provide initial and follow-up notifications, as well as for general information flow between these agencies. If personnel required to staff ERO positions are not onsite at the time an emergency is declared, they may be contacted by commercial telephone, which includes land lines and/or wireless devices capable of receiving telephone calls and text messages. Communications with the NRC Operations Center will be performed via the NRC ENS circuit or commercial telephone line. This line will be used for event notification and status updates. The NRC ENS utilizes the Federal Telecommunications System (FTS) telephone network for emergency communications. The FTS line exists between the NRC Operations Center and the DAEC Control Room.

Radio communication equipment used during normal facility operations will also be used in an emergency to communicate with mobile units and to provide backup to the telephone system.

Periodic testing of the emergency communications system is described in Section N.1.2.6, Communication Tests, of the DAEC PDEP.

Based on the NRC staffs review of the DAEC PDEP, as described above, the NRC staff finds that the proposed PDEP meets the applicable evaluation criteria of NUREG-0654, as outlined in to NSIR/DPR-02. The PDEP adequately identifies that provisions exist for prompt communications among principal response organizations to emergency personnel. The communication methods provide a reliable primary and backup means of onsite communication, as well as plant-to-offsite communications with Federal, State, and local agencies. Based on this review, the NRC staff concludes that the planning standard at 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), as well as the requirements of Sections IV.C.1, D.1, D.3, and E of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, as exempted for DAEC, pertaining to emergency communications, are addressed in an acceptable manner in the PDEP, considering the permanently shutdown and defueled status of the facility.

3.1.7 Public Education and Information Paragraph 50.47(b)(7) of 10 CFR, as exempted for DAEC, states:

Information is made available to the public on a periodic basis on how they will be notified and what their initial actions should be in an emergency (e.g., listening to a local broadcast station and remaining indoors), [T]he principal points of contact with the news media for dissemination of information during an emergency (including the physical location or locations) are established in advance, and procedures for coordinated dissemination of information to the public are established.

The DAEC PDEP identifies that the spokesperson function during an emergency condition would typically be performed by NEDA communications personnel. However, the function could also be performed by facility or corporate management. The spokesperson monitors media activity and coordinates with senior management to address rumors and disseminate information to the public. The spokesperson will participate in news conferences conducted from the site or at other locations, as appropriate, with Federal, State, and local EROs, as necessary. The spokesperson is available for media inquiries and the positional duties include maintaining liaison with local media and coordinating with Federal, State, and local EROs to disseminate appropriate information regarding an emergency at DAEC. As part of its normal corporate structure, DAEC maintains a corporate communications office that can be called to provide additional resources, as necessary.

Based on the NRC staffs review of the DAEC PDEP, as described above, the NRC staff finds that the proposed PDEP meets the applicable evaluation criteria of NUREG-0654, as outlined in to NSIR/DPR-02. The PDEP adequately identifies a communications position that would serve as the licensees designated spokesperson should an emergency be declared at DAEC. The spokesperson is available for media inquiries, and the positional duties include maintaining liaison with local media and coordinating with Federal, State, and local response organizations to disseminate appropriate information regarding an emergency condition at DAEC. Based on this review, the NRC staff concludes that the planning standard at 10 CFR Part 50.47(b)(7), as exempted for DAEC, pertaining to public education and information, are addressed in an acceptable manner in the DAEC PDEP, considering the permanently shutdown and defueled status of the facility.

3.1.8 Emergency Facilities and Equipment Paragraph 50.47(b)(8) of 10 CFR states:

Adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response are provided and maintained.

The DAEC PDEP identifies that following the declaration of an emergency, the activities of the ERO will be coordinated from the Control Room. Control Room personnel will assess facility conditions, evaluate the magnitude and potential consequences of abnormal conditions, initiate preventative, mitigating, and corrective actions, and perform onsite and offsite notifications as appropriate. When activated, the ERO reports to the Control Room.

Due to the limited radiological consequences associated with postulated events at a permanently shutdown and defueled power reactor, and the limited offsite resources considered necessary for an emergency at the site, a designated facility to accommodate State and local staff is no longer required. An onsite facility will continue to provide a place for effective direction and control in an emergency. The licensee designated the Control Room as that onsite facility. This is consistent with Section IV.E.8.a of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, as exempted, which eliminated the requirements for a separate licensee onsite technical support center, onsite operations support center, and emergency operations facility.

Annunciator and computer alarms are provided for a variety of important parameters, including the SFP and associated systems to indicate SFP level and temperature. The manner in which the plants process monitors are used for accident recognition and classification is detailed in DAECs Permanently Defueled EALs. Radiation monitors and monitoring systems provide continuous radiological surveillance. These monitors, which include Control Room readout and alarm functions, exist so that appropriate action can be initiated to limit fuel damage and/or contain radioactive material. The system warns personnel of potential radiological health hazards, gives early warning of certain equipment malfunctions that might lead to a radiological hazard or facility damage, and prevents or minimizes the effects of inadvertent releases of radioactivity. Plant instrumentation also provides Control Room personnel with area radiation levels and gaseous and liquid effluent monitor readings to perform dose assessment and determine the magnitude of a potential release. In addition to installed monitoring systems, onsite portable radiation and contamination monitoring equipment is available.

Meteorological data for the area surrounding the DAEC site is available in the Control Room.

The data is used to determine the projected path and radiological consequences in the event of an accidental release of radioactivity to the environment. In addition, the National Weather Service (NWS) provides meteorological information on a twenty-four hour per day basis. Upon request, the NWS can provide DAEC with additional meteorological conditions, including predicted temperature inversions, precipitation, and wind patterns and velocity.

Section P.1.2, Inventory and Maintenance of Emergency Equipment, of the DAEC PDEP discusses that the periodic inventory, testing, and calibration of emergency medical response equipment and supplies are conducted in accordance with approved facility procedures. This equipment includes, but is not limited to, portable radiation monitoring equipment, emergency medical response equipment, dosimeters, and portable radios.

Based on the NRC staffs review of the DAEC PDEP, as described above, the NRC staff finds that the proposed PDEP meets the applicable evaluation criteria of NUREG-0654, as outlined in

Attachment 1 to NSIR/DPR-02. The PDEP adequately identifies the facilities, equipment, and ERO personnel, which report to the Emergency Director, that are available to assess conditions, evaluate the magnitude and potential consequences of abnormal conditions, initiate preventative, mitigating, and corrective actions, and perform onsite and offsite notifications as appropriate to the emergency condition. Based on this review, the NRC staff concludes that the planning standard at 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), as well as the requirements of Sections IV.E and G of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, as exempted for DAEC, pertaining to emergency facilities and equipment, are addressed in an acceptable manner in the DAEC PDEP, considering the permanently shutdown and defueled status of the facility.

3.1.9 Accident Assessment Paragraph 50.47(b)(9) of 10 CFR, as exempted for DAEC, states:

Adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition are in use.

The DAEC PDEP identifies that station procedures provide for preventative and/or corrective actions to mitigate the consequences of events. Instrumentation, control systems, and radiation monitoring systems provide indications related to the safe and orderly implementation of corrective actions. These systems specifically provide indication of SFP storage inventory (level), temperature, cooling, and supporting systems status.

DAEC maintains a number of procedures and strategies for the movement of any necessary portable equipment that will be relied upon for mitigating a loss of water from the SFP. These diverse strategies provide defense in-depth and ample time to provide makeup water or spray prior to the onset of zirconium cladding ignition, when considering the very low probability of beyond-design-basis events affecting the SFP, as described in the NRC letter of April 13, 2021.

DAEC maintains and operates the onsite monitoring systems needed to provide data that is essential for initiating emergency measures and performing accident assessment, including dose assessment and assessing the magnitude of a release. Initial dose assessment is performed by qualified on-shift personnel, under the direction of the Emergency Director. When the ERO is augmented, the Site RP Coordinator assumes dose assessment responsibilities.

Based on the NRC staffs review of the DAEC PDEP, as described above, the NRC staff finds that the proposed PDEP meets the applicable evaluation criteria of NUREG-0654, as outlined in to NSIR/DPR-ISG-02. The PDEP adequately identifies the onsite capabilities and resources available to provide initial and continuing information for accident assessment throughout the course of an event. Based on this review, the NRC staff concludes that planning the standard at 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), as well as the requirements of Sections IV.A.4, B.1, C.2, and E of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, as exempted for DAEC, pertaining to accident assessment and monitoring, are addressed in an acceptable manner in the DAEC PDEP, considering the permanently shutdown and defueled status of the facility.

3.1.10 Protective Response Paragraph 50.47(b)(10) of 10 CFR, as exempted for DAEC, states:

A range of protective actions has been developed for the plume exposure pathway EPZ for emergency workers and the public. In developing this range

of actions, consideration has been given to evacuation, sheltering, and, as a supplement to these, the prophylactic use of potassium iodide (KI), as appropriate. Evacuation time estimates have been developed by applicants and licensees. Licensees shall update the evacuation time estimates on a periodic basis. Guidelines for the choice of protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are developed and in place, and protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ appropriate to the locale have been developed.

The DAEC PDEP identifies the protective actions for station personnel, contractors, and visitors (members of the public) located onsite, and addresses accountability and site egress methods.

Station procedures also provide protective actions to protect personnel during hostile actions.

The DAEC PDEP states that personnel accountability should be considered and used as a protective action whenever a site-wide risk to health and safety exists and prudence dictates. If personnel accountability is required, at the direction of the Emergency Director, all individuals at the site (including non-essential employees, visitors, and contractor personnel) shall be notified by sounding the facility alarm and making announcements over the Public Address System.

Following announcement of an emergency declaration, and when accountability has been requested, facility personnel are responsible for reporting to designated areas and aiding security personnel in the accountability process. Accountability of all personnel on the site should be accomplished within 60 minutes of the accountability announcement. If personnel are unaccounted for, teams shall be dispatched to locate the missing personnel. Personnel accountability may be modified or suspended if the safety of personnel may be jeopardized by a security event or other event hazardous to personnel.

All visitors and unnecessary contractors are evacuated from the DAEC facility at the discretion of the Emergency Director. In the event of a suspected radiological release, personnel are monitored for radioactive contamination prior to leaving the Protected Area. Portable radiation survey meters are available to monitor for potential contamination.

Based on the NRC staffs review of the DAEC PDEP, as described above, the NRC staff finds that the proposed PDEP meets the applicable evaluation criteria of NUREG-0654, as outlined in to NSIR/DPR-ISG-02. The PDEP adequately identifies the protective actions for onsite personnel, including station personnel, contractors, and visitors (members of the public),

and provides that protective equipment and supplies are maintained to support an emergency response. The PDEP also describes that facility evacuees are monitored for radioactive contamination prior to leaving the DAEC Protected Area. Based on this review, the NRC staff concludes that the planning standard at 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), as well as the requirements of Sections IV.C.1, E, and I of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, as exempted for DAEC, pertaining to protective response, are addressed in an acceptable manner in the DAEC PDEP, considering the permanently shutdown and defueled status of the facility.

3.1.11 Radiological Exposure Control Paragraph 50.47(b)(11) of 10 CFR states:

Means for controlling radiological exposures, in an emergency, are established for emergency workers. The means for controlling radiological exposures shall include exposure guidelines consistent with EPA Emergency Worker and Lifesaving Activity Protective Action Guides.

The DAEC PDEP identifies that all reasonable measures are taken to control the radiation exposure to emergency response personnel providing rescue, first aid, decontamination, emergency transportation, medical treatment services, or corrective or assessment actions to remain within the applicable limits specified in 10 CFR Part 20, Standards for Protection Against Radiation. The Shift Manager / Emergency Director has the responsibility to authorize emergency dose commitments in excess of the 10 CFR Part 20 limits. This authorization is coordinated with the assistance of the Site RP Coordinator. Table K.1, Emergency Exposure Criteria, to the DAEC PDEP contains the guidelines for emergency exposure criteria, which is consistent with Table 3-1, Emergency Worker Guidelines, provided in the EPA PAG Manual.

Individuals authorized to enter radiological control areas (RCAs) at DAEC are required to have dosimetry capable of measuring a dose received from external sources of ionizing radiation.

Emergency workers are issued permanent reading dosimeters (e.g., a dosimeter of legal record) as a means of recording radiation exposure for the permanent record prior to entering an RCA. Additionally, personnel may be issued electronic alarming dosimetry capable of measuring dose and dose rate on a real time basis. Dose records are maintained in accordance with facility procedures. All reasonable measures shall be taken to control the radiation exposure to emergency response personnel providing rescue, first aid, decontamination, emergency transportation, medical treatment services, corrective actions, and assessment actions to remain within the applicable limits specified in 10 CFR Part 20.

During emergency conditions, DAEC maintains normal plant decontamination and contamination control measures as closely as possible. However, these measures may be modified by the Emergency Director should conditions warrant. Contamination control measures are maintained to address access control, drinking water and food supplies, and the return of areas and items to normal use in accordance with proper radiation and contamination control techniques. DAECs contamination control criteria for returning areas and items to normal use are contained in the facility procedures. Protective clothing is maintained in the Control Room and additional sets are available. Monitoring and issuance of respiratory protection equipment will be conducted in accordance with facility procedures.

Based on the NRC staffs review of the DAEC PDEP, as described above, the NRC staff finds that the proposed PDEP meets the applicable evaluation criteria of NUREG-0654, as outlined in to NSIR/DPR-ISG-02. The PDEP adequately identifies the means for controlling radiological exposures to emergency workers. Emergency worker dose limits are established for designated activities and under specific conditions. Based on this review, the NRC staff concludes that the planning standard at 10 CFR 50.47(b)(11), as well as the requirements of Section IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, as exempted for DAEC, pertaining to radiological exposure control, are addressed in an acceptable manner in the DAEC PDEP, considering the permanently shutdown and defueled status of the facility.

3.1.12 Medical and First Aid Support Paragraph 50.47(b)(12) of 10 CFR states:

Arrangements are made for medical services for contaminated injured individuals.

The DAEC PDEP identifies that the licensee maintains on-shift personnel and equipment to provide first aid for personnel working at the site. First aid equipment and supplies are located in the First Aid Room. In addition, trauma and primary response kits are available throughout the facility and are inspected and maintained in accordance with approved facility procedures.

Arrangements are in place with the agencies listed in Appendix 2 of the PDEP for prompt ambulance transport of persons with injuries involving radioactivity to designated hospitals.

Such service is available on a 24-hour a day basis by letter of agreement, and can be contacted directly through commercial phone lines from the DAEC Control Room. Local ambulance services are available to transport seriously ill, injured, or radioactively contaminated injured personnel. Patients can also be transported to the hospital via medical ambulance helicopters.

Agreements are in place with Mercy Medical Center in Cedar Rapids for medical treatment of patients from DAEC who have injuries complicated by radioactive contamination. Mercy Medical Center has trained personnel and detailed procedures for handling radioactively contaminated patients from DAEC. Mercy Medical Center uses the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center / Training Site (REAC/TS), which is a U.S. Department of Energy asset for emergency medical response related to radiological and nuclear incident support. Subject matter experts at REAC/TS are on-call and ready to deploy (as well as available for phone advice and consultation) 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day, seven days a week.

Based on the NRC staffs review of the DAEC PDEP, as described above, the NRC staff finds that the proposed PDEP meets the applicable evaluation criteria of NUREG-0654, as outlined in to NSIR/DPR-ISG-02. The PDEP adequately identifies that arrangements are maintained for hospital and medical services located in the vicinity of the station, as well as for prompt ambulance transport of persons with injuries involving radiological contamination to the designated hospital. The licensee also maintains onsite first aid supplies and the equipment necessary for the treatment of injured personnel with radiological contamination or over-exposures. Based on this review, the NRC staff concludes that the planning standard at 10 CFR 50.47(b)(12), as well as the requirements of Sections IV.A.6 and E of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, as exempted for DAEC, pertaining to medical and first aid support, including for contaminated individuals, are addressed in an acceptable manner in the DAEC PDEP, considering the permanently shutdown and defueled status of the facility.

3.1.13 Recovery and Reentry Paragraph 50.47(b)(13) of 10 CFR states:

General plans for recovery and reentry are developed.

The DAEC PDEP identifies that planning for recovery after an accident or emergency condition involves the development of general principles and an organizational capability that can be adapted to any emergency. Upon termination of an emergency and transition to the recovery phase, the Emergency Director assembles the recovery organization to address the specific emergency circumstances of the terminated event.

The Emergency Director directs the recovery organization and is responsible for:

Ensuring the facility is maintained in a safe condition; Managing onsite recovery activities during the initial recovery phase; and Keeping corporate support apprised of recovery activities and requirements.

The remainder of the recovery phase is accomplished using the normal facility organization and emergency organizations, as necessary, to provide radiological and technical expertise to the

Emergency Director in order to restore the plant to normal conditions. The recovery organizations responsibilities include:

Maintaining comprehensive radiological surveillance of the facility to assure continuous control and recognition of problems; Controlling access to the area and exposure to workers; Decontaminating affected areas and/or equipment; Conducting clean-up and restoration activities; Isolating and repairing damaged systems; and Documenting all proceedings of the event and reviewing the effectiveness of the emergency organization in reducing public hazard and/or facility damage.

When facility conditions allow a transition from the emergency phase to the recovery phase, the Emergency Director conducts a plant emergency management meeting to discuss the recovery organization. The actions taken by this organization concerning termination of the emergency proceeds in accordance with a recovery plan developed specifically for the accident conditions.

Based on the NRC staffs review of the DAEC PDEP, as described above, the NRC staff finds that the proposed PDEP meets the applicable evaluation criteria of NUREG-0654, as outlined in to NSIR/DPR-ISG-02. The PDEP adequately identifies the general goals for plant recovery and the organizational structure responsible for coordinating response and recovery from emergency conditions at the facility. The licensees recovery organization will be based on the DAEC ERO. Based on this review, the NRC staff concludes that the planning standard at 10 CFR 50.47(b)(13), as well as the requirements of Section IV.H. of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, as exempted for DAEC, pertaining to facility recovery and reentry, are addressed in an acceptable manner in the DAEC PDEP, considering the permanently shutdown and defueled status of the facility.

3.1.14 Exercises and Drills Paragraph 50.47(b)(14) of 10 CFR states:

Periodic exercises are (will be) conducted to evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities, periodic drills are (will be) conducted to develop and maintain key skills, and deficiencies identified as a result of exercises or drills are (will be) corrected.

The DAEC PDEP identifies periodic exercises and drills that will be conducted to evaluate major portions of the licensees emergency response capabilities, as well as to develop and maintain key emergency response skills. Emergency exercises and drills are conducted to test and evaluate the adequacy of emergency facilities, equipment, procedures, communication channels, actions of emergency response personnel, and coordination between offsite organizations and the DAEC facility.

In addition, biennial exercises shall be conducted to test the timing and content of the DAEC implementing procedures and methods, as well as to ensure that emergency personnel are familiar with their duties. OROs are offered the opportunity to participate in the DAEC biennial exercises to the extent assistance would be expected during an emergency declaration.

The DAEC PDEP also identified the following periodic emergency response drills and tests, which can be performed as part of any drill or exercise:

• Augmentation Capability Drills: An off-hour, unannounced ERO augmentation drill will be conducted semiannually to estimate emergency response personnel response times. No actual travel is required. Participants provide an estimated time of arrival to their designated ERO position.

• Fire Drills and Security Drills: Drills are conducted in accordance with the respective DAEC plans and procedures.

• Medical Drills: A medical emergency drill shall be conducted annually. The drill involves a simulated radiologically contaminated injury. Local support services are invited to participate in an annual exercise and/or scheduled drill(s) to demonstrate and practice the receipt and treatment of radiologically contaminated patients.

Involvement by hospital personnel and medical transport services may be included as part of any drill or exercise.

• Health Physics Drills: Drills will be conducted semiannually involving response to, and analysis of, simulated elevated in-facility airborne and liquid effluent samples and direct radiation measurements in the environment.

• Accountability Drills: Drills will be conducted annually and include identifying the locations of all onsite personnel.

• Communication Drills: A drill will be conducted annually with the NRC, State, and local governments to verify that communication equipment is operable, that contact information is appropriate and current, and that the content of notification messages is adequate and understood. The ENS, used to communicate with the NRC, is tested monthly. NEDA states that other communication systems are used on a frequent basis, as detailed in Section F.1.2, Communication Systems, of the DAEC PDEP, and periodic testing of these systems is not considered necessary.

An Exercise / EP Coordinator is responsible for the overall development of the accident or emergency response scenario package. A scenario development team is assembled (if needed) by the Exercise / EP Coordinator to create the various segments of the scenario which include, but are not limited to, the following:

• Objective(s);

• Date, time period, place, and participating organizations;

• Simulation lists;

• Timeline of real and simulated events;

• A narrative summary; and

• List of controllers and participants.

The DAEC PDEP states that the final accident or emergency response scenario shall be approved by a designated member of senior facility management. Drill and/or exercise confidentiality must be maintained prior to enacting the scenario.

As soon as possible following the conclusion of each accident or emergency response drill or exercise, a critique, including participants, controllers, and evaluators, is conducted to evaluate the ability of the participants to meet the performance objectives. Deficiencies are identified and entered into the DAEC corrective action system. A written report is prepared, including the evaluation of designated drill or exercise objectives. The report evaluates and documents the participants response to the emergency. The report will also contain reference to corrective actions and recommendations resulting from the drill or exercise.

Based on the NRC staffs review of the DAEC PDEP, as described above, the NRC staff finds that the proposed PDEP meets the applicable evaluation criteria of NUREG-0654, as outlined in to NSIR/DPR-ISG-02. The PDEP adequately identifies the general goals for exercises and drills, the intent of exercise scenarios, and that exercise and drill performance objectives are evaluated against measurable demonstration criteria. Based on this review, the NRC staff concludes that the planning standard at 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), as well as the requirements of Sections IV.E.9 and F of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, as exempted for DAEC, pertaining to exercises and drills, are addressed in an acceptable manner in the DAEC PDEP, considering the permanently shutdown and defueled status of the facility.

3.1.15 Radiological Emergency Response Training Paragraph 50.47(b)(15) of 10 CFR states:

Radiological emergency response training is provided to those who may be called on to assist in an emergency.

The DAEC PDEP identifies that radiological emergency response training is provided to those who may be called on to assist in an emergency. The training program for ERO personnel is based on applicable requirements of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and position-specific responsibilities as defined in the PDEP. DAEC management is responsible to ensure that members of the ERO receive the required initial training and continuing training as needed.

The DAEC PDEP states that Shift Managers / Emergency Directors, Technical and Engineering Supervisors, and Site RP Coordinators will have training conducted such that proficiency is maintained on topics listed below. These topics should be covered annually at minimum:

• EAL classification;

• Dose assessment;

• Federal, State, and local notification procedures;

• ERO augmentation;

• Emergency exposure control;

• Mitigating strategies for a catastrophic loss of SFP inventory; and

• Recovery.

DAEC personnel will be available during emergencies to perform emergency response activities, and as an extension of their normal duties receive duty-specific training. This includes facility on-shift personnel, maintenance, radiation protection, and security personnel. Personnel assigned to liaise with offsite fire departments are trained in accordance with the DAEC Fire

Protection Program, including mitigating strategies required for a catastrophic loss of SFP inventory. Personnel assigned the responsibility of on-shift first aid shall attend first aid training.

An overview of the PDEP is given to all personnel allowed unescorted access into the DAEC Protected Area. Personnel receive this information during initial training and are requalified on an annual basis. This training includes identification of the emergency alarm and the fire alarm, as well as the steps to follow for a plant and site evacuation.

Training is offered annually to offsite organizations which may provide specialized services responding onsite during an emergency at DAEC (e.g., firefighting, medical services, transport of contaminated and/or injured personnel, etc.). The training shall be structured to meet the needs of that organization with respect to the nature of their support. Topics involving event notification, site access, basic radiation protection, and interface activities are included in the training. The DAEC procedures outline the process to document training of the DAEC ERO.

Based on the NRC staffs review of the DAEC PDEP, as described above, the NRC staff finds that the proposed PDEP meets the applicable evaluation criteria of NUREG-0654, as outlined in to NSIR/DPR-ISG-02. The PDEP adequately identifies the level and depth of the emergency preparedness training program to which individuals are to be trained. Based on this review, the NRC staff concludes that the planning standard at 10 CFR 50.47(b)(15), as well as the requirements of Section IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, as exempted for DAEC, pertaining to radiological emergency response training, are addressed in an acceptable manner in the DAEC PDEP, considering the permanently shutdown and defueled status of the facility.

3.1.16 Emergency Plan Development and Review Paragraph 50.47(b)(16) of 10 CFR states:

Responsibilities for plan development and review and for distribution of emergency plans are established, and planners are properly trained.

The DAEC PDEP identifies that senior facility leadership is responsible for the implementation of actions required to periodically exercise the PDEP and the emergency plan implementing procedures (EPIPs), as well as for maintaining an effective ERO staff. Senior facility leadership is responsible for final approval of the PDEP and the EPIP used for emergency classification, and for maintaining an effective emergency response capability at DAEC. The DAEC Emergency Planning organization is responsible for the development, administration, and maintenance of the PDEP and EPIPs, as well as review and approval of all EPIP changes (with the exception of the EPIP used for emergency classification), planner training, the overall development and implementation of the DAEC ERO Training and Qualification Program, and coordination of offsite emergency organization activities.

The DAEC PDEP, Permanently Defueled EAL Technical Bases, and the procedures included in Appendix 3, Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures, of the DAEC PDEP are reviewed on a semiannual basis and updated as needed. All proposed EP changes will be reviewed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q) to ensure that the change would not compromise the effectiveness of any other EPIP or degrade the effectiveness of the PDEP.

The DAEC PDEP provides that letters of agreement with offsite support agencies shall be reviewed annually. The agreements will be revised or recertified as appropriate. Recertification may include a recertification letter or memorandum, purchase order, email, documented

telephone conversation, or other correspondence. In addition, the emergency classification system and the EALs are reviewed with the State of Iowa and Linn County on an annual basis.

The DAEC Emergency Telephone Directory will also be maintained and updated quarterly.

The DAEC PDEP provides that periodic inventory, testing, and calibration of emergency equipment and supplies will be conducted in accordance with approved facility procedures.

This equipment includes, but is not limited to, portable radiation monitoring equipment, emergency medical response equipment, dosimeters, and portable radios. Emergency equipment and instrumentation will be inventoried, inspected, and operationally checked periodically, as indicated by the procedure, as well as after each use. The DAEC PDEP states that sufficient reserves of equipment and instrumentation will be stocked to replace emergency equipment and instrumentation removed from service for calibration and/or repair.

Based on the NRC staffs review of the DAEC PDEP, as described above, the NRC staff finds that the proposed PDEP meets the applicable evaluation criteria of NUREG-0654, as outlined in to NSIR/DPR-ISG-02. The PDEP adequately identifies responsibility for the issuance, control, and revision or updating of the PDEP, EPIPs, and support documents. Based on this review, the NRC staff concludes that the planning standard at 10 CFR 50.47(b)(16), as well as the requirements of Section IV.G of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, as exempted for DAEC, pertaining to emergency plan development and review, are addressed in an acceptable manner in the PDEP, considering the permanently shutdown and defueled status of the facility.

3.2 Emergency Action Level Scheme The licensee currently utilizes an EAL scheme based on NEI 99-01, Revision 6, with DAEC site-specific modifications due to design issues and/or licensee preference. The licensee is revising its current EAL scheme using the guidance in Section 8, ISFSI ICs [Initiating Conditions]/EALs, and Appendix C, Permanently Defueled Station ICs/EALs, of NEI 99-01, Revision 6, as applied to a permanently shutdown and defueled nuclear power reactor with fuel stored onsite in the DAEC SFP, as well as in the ISFSI located at the DAEC facility.

As discussed in the NRC staffs safety evaluation associated with the exemptions granted to DAEC from certain EP planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47 and requirements of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, there are no longer any DBAs at DAEC that can result in a radiological release exceeding the EPA early phase PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. Therefore, the NRC staffs assessment of the risks and consequences of a radiological release at DAEC, based on the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of the facility, concluded that, per Section IV.C.1 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, as exempted, the risks and consequences are insufficient to warrant the Site Area Emergency or General Emergency classification levels. As a result, the only ECLs applicable to the DAEC facility are an Unusual Event or an Alert.

In its letter dated May 15, 2020, as supplemented by letters dated October 29 and December 1, 2020, NEDA submitted its proposed EAL scheme for DAEC to reflect a permanently shutdown and defueled condition, along with its technical basis for the EALs and the EAL numbering scheme. The proposed EAL scheme is unique to DAEC, as it contains site-specific designations and descriptions.

The NRC staff verified that the proposed EAL scheme is consistent with the guidance provided in Section 8 and Appendix C to NEI 99-01, Revision 6, to ensure that the EAL scheme meets the planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and requirements of Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, as exempted, for a permanently shutdown and defueled nuclear power reactor with spent fuel stored onsite in the SFP as well as in an ISFSI. The NRC staff reviewed

the proposed EAL scheme, technical basis, comparison matrix, and all additional information provided and found that the proposed EAL scheme has site-specific modifications from the NEI 99-01, Revision 6, guidance due to specific plant designs and licensee preference.

The NRC staff verified that the instrumentation and setpoints derived for the proposed EAL scheme are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme. Although the DAEC EALs must be plant-specific, to ensure consistency and regulatory stability, the NRC staff reviewed the proposed EAL scheme with respect to the key characteristics, listed below, of an effective EAL scheme, which are found in the NRC-endorsed guidance contained in NEI 99-01, Revision 6:

• Consistency, including standardization of intent, if not in actual wording (i.e., the EALs would lead to similar decisions under similar circumstances at different plants);

• Human factors engineering and user friendliness;

• Potential for ECL upgrade only when there is an increasing threat or risk to public health and safety;

• Ease of upgrading and downgrading the ECL;

• Thoroughness in addressing and disposing of the issues of completeness and accuracy raised in Appendix 1, Emergency Action Level Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plants, to NUREG-0654 (i.e., the EALs are unambiguous and are based on site-specific indicators);

• Technical completeness for each ECL;

• Logical progression in classification for multiple events; and

• The use of objective and observable values.

The DAEC EAL technical basis document is an integral part of the EAL scheme. The material in this document supports proper emergency classification decision-making by providing background and development information in a readily accessible format, which can be referred to in training situations and when making an actual emergency classification, if necessary. The document is also useful for establishing configuration management controls for emergency preparedness-related equipment and explaining emergency classifications to offsite authorities.

To aid in understanding the nomenclature used in this safety evaluation, the proposed EAL scheme for DAEC includes two ECLs: Unusual Event (U) and Alert (A). Initiating conditions (ICs) for entry into each of the two ECLs are specified for conditions relating to:

• Abnormal Radiation Levels / Radiological Effluents: PD-A (PD-R at DAEC. A is replaced with R to better signify a radiological event and to maintain continuity with the previous DAEC EAL scheme);

• Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety: PD-H;

• System Malfunctions: PD-S; and

• Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting the ISFSI: E-H.

This safety evaluation uses the numbering system from the proposed plant-specific EAL scheme, which is consistent with the numbering system from the generic EAL scheme development guidance contained in NEI 99-01, Revision 6. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression, and ease of upgrading or downgrading for these EALs are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address

the plant-specific implementation strategies provided. The plant-specific EAL scheme is, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

For each IC, specific EAL threshold values are identified that would require the declaration of an ECL. The EAL scheme is intended to provide multiple and diverse threshold values for an Unusual Event and Alert to ensure accurate classification and timely declaration.

DAEC made changes to the generic EAL scheme throughout the proposed EALs, as follows:

• Changed Notification of Unusual Event to Unusual Event to maintain consistency with the previous DAEC EAL scheme;

• Removed operating mode applicability as it does not apply to a permanently defueled condition;

• Revised references from plant to facility to indicate that DAEC is no longer an operating nuclear power plant;

• Removed Example from EALs since they are no longer examples; and

• Added site-specific basis information.

The NRC staff determined that these changes are administrative in nature, and therefore acceptable since they do not impact the overall EAL scheme. An evaluation of the acceptability of the proposed EAL scheme is provided in the following sections of this safety evaluation.

3.2.1 Category PD-R: Abnormal Radiation Levels / Radiological Effluents 3.2.1.1 EAL PD-RU1, Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity greater than 2 times the ODAM [Offsite Dose Assessment Manual] limits for 60 minutes or longer This EAL addresses a potential or actual decrease in the level of safety of the facility, as indicated by a low-level radiological release that exceeds regulatory commitments for an extended period of time (e.g., an uncontrolled release). It includes any gaseous or liquid radiological release, monitored or unmonitored, including those for which a radioactivity discharge permit is normally prepared.

The NRC staff verified that the DAEC implementation of this EAL, except for the site-specific changes identified below, is consistent with the guidance provided in Appendix C to NEI 99-01, Revision 6. The licensee made the following site-specific changes to the generic EAL scheme:

• AU1 is replaced with RU1 to better signify a radiological event and to maintain continuity with the previous DAEC EAL scheme;

• Used generic term Event instead of Unusual Event in the notes information to maintain continuity with the previous DAEC EAL scheme; and

• Inserted ODAM as the site-specific effluent release controlling document.

For the site-specific change to reference the ODAM as the site-specific effluent release controlling document, the NRC staff verified that DAEC implemented the developer notes for identifying the site-specific effluent release controlling document contained in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, as the basis for this specific EAL. The site-specific changes to the generic EAL scheme are administrative and do not affect the applicability of the EAL.

Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (as identified in Section 3.2 of this safety evaluation) and meets the planning standard of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and the requirements of Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this DAEC EAL acceptable.

3.2.1.2 EAL PD-RA1, Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 10 mRem [millirem] TEDE [total effective dose equivalent] or 50 mRem thyroid CDE [committed dose equivalent]

This EAL addresses a release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity that results in projected or actual offsite doses greater than or equal to 1 percent of the EPA early phase PAGs. It includes both monitored and unmonitored releases. Releases of this magnitude represent an actual or potential substantial degradation to the level of safety of the facility as indicated by a radiological release that significantly exceeds regulatory limits (e.g., a significant, uncontrolled release).

The NRC staff verified that the DAEC implementation of this EAL, except for the site-specific changes identified below, is consistent with the guidance provided in Appendix C to NEI 99-01, Revision 6. The licensee made the following site-specific changes to the generic EAL scheme:

• AA1 is replaced with RA1 to better signify a radiological event and to maintain continuity with the previous DAEC EAL scheme;

• Used generic term Event instead of Unusual Event in the notes information to maintain continuity with the previous DAEC EAL scheme;

• Used the specified time limit instead of 15 minutes in the notes information to maintain continuity with the previous DAEC EAL scheme;

• Added a site-specific monitor list and table with threshold values; and

• Added Site Boundary as the site-specific dose receptor point.

The site-specific changes to the generic EAL scheme are administrative and do not affect the applicability of the EAL. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (as identified in Section 3.2 of this safety evaluation) and meets the planning standard of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and the requirements of Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this DAEC EAL acceptable.

3.2.1.3 EAL PD-RU2, UNPLANNED rise in facility radiation levels This EAL addresses elevated facility radiation levels caused by a decrease in water level above irradiated (spent) fuel or other unplanned events. The increased radiation levels are indicative of a minor loss in the ability to control radioactive materials or radiation levels within the facility.

Either condition is a potential degradation to the level of safety of the facility.

The NRC staff verified that the DAEC implementation of this EAL, except for the site-specific changes identified below, is consistent with the guidance provided in Appendix C to NEI 99-01, Revision 6. The licensee made the following site-specific changes to the generic EAL scheme:

• AU2 is replaced with RU2 to better signify a radiological event and to maintain continuity with the previous DAEC EAL scheme;

• Added a site-specific monitor list and threshold values; and

• Added site-specific references.

The site-specific changes to the generic EAL scheme are administrative and do not affect the applicability of the EAL. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (as identified in Section 3.2 of this safety evaluation) and meets the planning standard of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and the requirements of Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this DAEC EAL acceptable.

3.2.1.4 EAL PD-RA2, UNPLANNED rise in plant radiation levels that impedes plant access required to maintain spent fuel integrity This EAL addresses increased radiation levels that impede necessary access to areas containing equipment that must be operated manually or that require local monitoring in order to maintain systems needed to preserve spent fuel integrity. As used here, impede includes hindering or interfering, provided that the interference or delay is sufficient to significantly threaten necessary facility access. It is this impaired access that results in the actual or potential substantial degradation to the level of safety of the facility.

The NRC staff verified that the DAEC implementation of this EAL, except for the site-specific changes identified below, is consistent with the guidance provided in Appendix C to NEI 99-01, Revision 6. The licensee made the following site-specific changes to the generic EAL scheme:

AA2 is replaced with RA2 to better signify a radiological event and to maintain continuity with the previous DAEC EAL scheme; and Added site-specific areas.

The site-specific changes to the generic EAL scheme are administrative and do not affect the applicability of the EAL. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (as identified in Section 3.2 of this safety evaluation) and meets the planning standard of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and the requirements of Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this DAEC EAL acceptable.

3.2.2 Category PD-H: Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety 3.2.2.1 EAL PD-HU1, Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION or threat This EAL is based upon any security-related event listed in the approved DAEC Security Contingency Plan that constitutes a threat or compromise to site security, a threat or risk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of safety of the facility. A security condition does not involve a Hostile Action.

The NRC staff verified that the DAEC implementation of this EAL, except for the site-specific changes identified below, is consistent with the guidance provided in Appendix C to NEI 99-01, Revision 6. The licensee made the following site-specific changes to the generic EAL scheme:

DAEC Security Shift Supervision is identified as the site-specific security shift supervision; Added site-specific definitions; and Added the site-specific procedure for security events.

The site-specific changes to the generic EAL scheme are administrative and do not affect the applicability of the EAL. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (as identified in Section 3.2 of this safety evaluation) and meets the planning standard of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and the requirements of Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this DAEC EAL acceptable.

3.2.2.2 EAL PD-HA1, HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne attack threat within 30 minutes This EAL addresses the occurrence of a hostile action within the Owner Controlled Area or notification of an aircraft attack threat. This event will require rapid response and assistance due to the possibility of the attack progressing to the Protected Area, or the need to prepare the facility and staff for a potential aircraft impact.

The NRC staff verified that the DAEC implementation of this EAL, except for the site-specific changes identified below, is consistent with the guidance provided in Appendix C to NEI 99-01, Revision 6. The licensee made the following site-specific changes to the generic EAL scheme:

DAEC Security Shift Supervision is identified as the site-specific security shift supervision; Added site-specific definitions; and Added the site-specific procedure for security events.

The site-specific changes to the generic EAL scheme are administrative and do not affect the applicability of the EAL. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (as identified in Section 3.2 of this safety evaluation) and meets the planning standard of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and the requirements of Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this DAEC EAL acceptable.

3.2.2.3 EAL PD-HU2, Hazardous event affecting equipment necessary for spent fuel cooling This EAL is based upon the effect that natural and destructive hazards may have on at least one train of a safety system needed for spent fuel cooling. The damage must be of sufficient magnitude that the system(s) train cannot, or potentially cannot, perform its design function.

This condition reduces the margin to a loss, or potential loss, of the fuel clad barrier and, therefore, represents a potential degradation to the level of safety of the facility.

The NRC staff verified that the DAEC implementation of this EAL, except for the site-specific changes identified below, is consistent with the guidance provided in Appendix C to NEI 99-01, Revision 6. The licensee made the following site-specific changes to the generic EAL scheme:

• Inserted Table H-1, Hazardous Events;

• Removed Safety System as the term is not applicable in the permanently shut down and defueled condition;

• Added site-specific definitions; and

• Replaced Safety System with equipment.

The site-specific changes to the generic EAL scheme are administrative and do not affect the applicability of the EAL. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (as identified in Section 3.2 of this safety evaluation) and meets the planning standard of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and the requirements of Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this DAEC EAL acceptable.

3.2.2.4 EAL PD-HU3, Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of an Unusual Event This EAL addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere, but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the ECL description for an Unusual Event.

The NRC staff verified that the DAEC implementation of this EAL, except for the site-specific change identified below, is consistent with the guidance provided in Appendix C to NEI 99-01, Revision 6. The licensee made the following site-specific change to the generic EAL scheme:

• Replaced Safety Systems with systems needed to maintain spent fuel cooling.

The site-specific changes to the generic EAL scheme are administrative and do not affect the applicability of the EAL. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (as identified in Section 3.2 of this safety evaluation) and meets the planning standard of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and the requirements of Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this DAEC EAL acceptable.

3.2.2.5 EAL PD-HA3, Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of an Alert This EAL addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere, but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the ECL description for an Alert.

The NRC staff verified that the DAEC implementation of this EAL, except for the site-specific change identified below, is consistent with the guidance provided in Appendix C to NEI 99-01, Revision 6. The licensee made the following site-specific change to the generic EAL scheme:

• Added site-specific definitions.

The site-specific changes to the generic EAL scheme are administrative and do not affect the applicability of the EAL. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (as identified in Section 3.2 of this safety evaluation) and meets the planning

standard of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and the requirements of Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this DAEC EAL acceptable.

3.2.3 Category PD-S: System Malfunctions 3.2.3.1 EAL PD-SU1, UNPLANNED spent fuel pool temperature rise This EAL is based upon a loss of the ability to maintain SFP cooling and addresses a condition that is a precursor to a more serious event, which represents a potential degradation to the level of safety of the facility. If uncorrected, boiling could occur and result in a loss of SFP water inventory and increased radiation levels.

The NRC staff verified that the DAEC implementation of this EAL, except for the site-specific change identified below, is consistent with the guidance provided in Appendix C to NEI 99-01, Revision 6. The licensee made the following site-specific change to the generic EAL scheme:

• Added the site-specific DAEC fuel pool temperature number (150°F).

The site-specific changes to the generic EAL scheme are administrative and do not affect the applicability of the EAL. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (as identified in Section 3.2 of this safety evaluation) and meets the planning standard of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and the requirements of Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this DAEC EAL acceptable.

3.2.4 Category E: Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting the ISFSI 3.2.4.1 E-HU1, Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY This EAL addresses an event that results in damage to the confinement boundary of a storage cask containing spent fuel. It applies to irradiated fuel that is licensed for dry storage, beginning at the point that the loaded storage cask is sealed. The issues of concern are:

Creation of a potential or actual release path to the environment; Degradation of one or more fuel assemblies due to environmental factors; and Configuration changes, which could cause challenges in removing the cask or fuel from storage.

A spent fuel storage license contains technical requirements and operating conditions (fuel specifications, cask leak testing, surveillance, and other requirements) for the ISFSI and specifies what the licensee is authorized to store at the site.

The NRC staff verified that the DAEC implementation of this EAL, except for the site-specific changes identified below, is consistent with the guidance provided in Section 8 of NEI 99-01, Revision 6. The licensee made the following site-specific change to the generic EAL scheme:

• Included the site-specific technical specifications values; and

• Added site-specific definitions.

The site-specific changes to the generic EAL scheme are administrative and do not affect the applicability of the EAL. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (as identified in Section 3.2 of this safety evaluation) and meets the planning standard of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and the requirements of Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this DAEC EAL acceptable.

3.3 Conclusions 3.3.1 PDEP Conclusions Based on the NRC staffs review of the proposed DAEC PDEP, as described in Section 3.1 of this safety evaluation, the NRC staff finds that the proposed PDEP meets the emergency planning and preparedness standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements in Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, as exempted. The DAEC PDEP provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at DAEC, considering the permanently shutdown and defueled status of the facility. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the proposed DAEC PDEP, as provided in Attachment 2 to the licensees letter dated May 15, 2020, as supplemented by letters dated October 29 and December 1, 2020, is acceptable.

3.3.2 EAL Scheme Conclusions The NRC staff has reviewed (1) the technical basis for the proposed EAL scheme for DAEC in the permanently shutdown and defueled condition; (2) the proposed modifications from NEI 99-01, Revision 6; and (3) the licensees evaluation of the proposed changes. The licensee chose, in part, to modify its EAL scheme from the generic EAL scheme development guidance provided in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, in order to adopt a format more in alignment with its currently approved EAL scheme, as well as to maintain alignment with licensee-specific writers guides and preferences. The NRC staff determined that these modifications are administrative in nature and do not alter the intent of any specific EAL within an EAL, EAL category, or within the entire EAL scheme as stated in NEI 99-01, Revision 6.

The NRC staff determined that the proposed DAEC EAL scheme uses objective and observable values, is worded in a manner that addresses human factors engineering and user friendliness concerns, follows logical progression for escalating events, and allows for event downgrading and upgrading based upon the potential risk to the public health and safety. Risk assessments were appropriately used to set the boundaries of the ECLs and ensure that all EALs that trigger emergency classification are in the same range of relative risk.

Based on the above, as described in Section 3.2 of this safety evaluation, the NRC staff has determined that the proposed changes meet the guidance in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, the emergency planning and preparedness standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and the requirements in Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, as exempted for DAEC. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the proposed EAL scheme, as provided in Attachment 3 to the licensees letter dated May 15, 2020, as supplemented by letters dated October 29 and December 1, 2020, is acceptable, and provides reasonable assurance that the licensee can and will take adequate protective measures in the event of a radiological emergency.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commissions regulations, the State of Iowa official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment on April 7, 2021. The state official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The proposed DAEC PDEP amendment relates, in part, to changes in recordkeeping, reporting, or administrative procedures or requirements. The amendment also relates, in part, to changing requirements with respect to the installation or use of facility components located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR Part 20, because the amendment approves an acceptable EAL scheme, which is required for operation of the facility. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding published in the Federal Register on July 14, 2020 (85 FR 42438). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9) and 51.22(c)(10). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the DAEC emergency planning and preparedness considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

7.0 REFERENCES

1. Curtland, D., NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC, letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, License Amendment Request (TSCR-187): Proposed Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan and Permanently Defueled Emergency Action Level Scheme, dated May 15, 2020 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML20136A438).

2. Curtland, D., NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC, letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Supplement to License Amendment Request (TSCR-187): Proposed Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan and Permanently Defueled Emergency Action Level Scheme, dated October 29, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20303A073).

3. Hansen, P., NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC, letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Response to Request for Additional Information Relating to License Amendment Request (TSCR-187): Proposed Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan and Permanently Defueled Emergency Action Level Scheme, dated December 1, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20337A147).

4. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Staff Requirements - SECY-21-0006, Request by NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC for Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning Requirements for the Duane Arnold Energy Center, dated February 11, 2021 (ADAMS Accession No. ML21042A030).

5. Nuclear Energy Institute, NEI 99-01, Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors, Revision 6, dated November 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12326A805).

6. Nazar, M., NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC, letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Certification of Permanent Cessation of Power Operations, dated January 18, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19023A196).

7. Curtland, D., NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC, letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Certification of Permanent Cessation of Power Operations, dated March 2, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20062E489).

8. Curtland, D., NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC, letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Certification of Permanent Cessation of Power Operations, dated August 27, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20240A067).

9. Curtland, D., NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC, letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Certification of Permanent Removal of Fuel from the Reactor Vessel for Duane Arnold Energy Center, dated October 12, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20286A317).

10. Doell, M., U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, letter to Don Moul, NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC, Duane Arnold Energy Center - Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning Requirements and Related Safety Evaluation (EPID L-2020-LLE-0023), dated April 13, 2021 (ADAMS Accession No. ML21097A141).

11. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA-400/R-17/001, PAG Manual: Protective Action Guides and Planning Guidance for Radiological Incidents, dated January 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17044A073).

12. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101, Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans, Version 2.0, dated November 2010 (http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/divisions/npd/CPG_101_V2.pdf).

13. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Federal Emergency Management Agency, NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, dated November 1980 (ADAMS Accession No. ML040420012).

14. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NSIR/DPR-ISG-02, Interim Staff Guidance, Emergency Planning Exemption Requests for Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants, dated May 11, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14106A057).

15. Thaggard, M., U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, letter to Susan Perkins-Grew, Nuclear Energy Institute, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Review and

Endorsement of NEI 99-01, Revision 6, dated November 2012 (TAC No. D92368),

dated March 28, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12346A463).

Principal Contributor: Jeannette Arce, NSIR/DPR Date of Issuance:

April 28, 2021

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/LLWPB NAME MDoell MD BWittick BW JQuichocho JQ BWatson BW DATE Apr 15, 2021 Apr 15, 2021 Apr 15, 2021 Apr 15, 2021 OFFICE OGC/NLO NMSS/DUWP NMSS/PMDA/OMT NMSS NAME TJones TJ PHolahan PH LMoorin LM JLubinski JL DATE Apr 15, 2021 Apr 20, 2021 Apr 21, 2021 Apr 28, 2021 NMSS/DUWP OFFICE

/LLWPB NAME MDoell MD DATE Apr 28, 2021