ML24142A446

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Enclosure 2: Hope Creek Generating Station Improved Technical Specifications Conversion - Volume 3
ML24142A446
Person / Time
Site: Hope Creek PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 05/20/2024
From:
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML24142A428 List:
References
LR-N24-0029, LAR H24-02
Download: ML24142A446 (1)
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ENCLOSURE 2 VOLUME 3 HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CONVERSION ITS CHAPTER 1.0 USE AND APPLICATION Revision 0

LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

1.

ITS Chapter 1.0, Definitions

ATTACHMENT 1 ITS Chapter 1.0, Definitions

Current Technical Specifications (CTS) Markup and Discussion of Changes (DOCs)

SECTION 1.0 DEFINITIONS A01 ITS 1.0

A01 1.0 DEFINITIONS The following terms are defined so that uniform interpretation of these specifications may be achieved. The defined terms appear in capitalized type and shall be applicable throughout these Technical Specifications.

ACTION 1.1 ACTION shall be that part of a Specification which prescribes remedial measures required under designated conditions.

1.2 DELETED AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE 1.3 The AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR) shall be applicable to a specific planar height and is equal to the sum of the LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATES for all the fuel rods in the specified bundle at the specified height divided by the number of fuel rods in the fuel bundle at that height.

CHANNEL CALIBRATION 1.4 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be the adjustment, as necessary, of the channel output such that it responds with the necessary range and accuracy to known values of the parameter which the channel monitors. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall encompass the entire channel, including the required sensor, alarm, display, and trip functions, and shall include the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. Calibration of instrument channels with resistance temperature detector (RTD) or thermocouple sensors may consist of an inplace qualitative assessment of sensor behavior and normal calibration of the remaining adjustable devices in the channel. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION may be performed by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel steps, and each step must be performed within the Frequency in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program for the devices included in the step.

CHANNEL CHECK 1.5 A CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment of channel behavior during operation by observation. This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of the channel indication and/or status with other indications and/or status derived from independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter.

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST 1.6 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be:

a.

Analog channels - the injection of a simulated signal into the channel as close to the sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions and channel failure trips.

b.

Bistable channels - the injection of a simulated signal into the sensor to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions.

The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel steps, and each step must be performed within the Frequency in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program for the devices included in the step.

HOPE CREEK 1-1 Amendment No.223 ITS 1.0 Definitions 1.1 A01 ITS 1.1 and Bases of this section are S

NOTE ACTIONS within specified Completion Times that Required Actions to be taken (APLHGR)

LHGRs in that all devices in the channel required for channel OPERABILITY and

, by observation, to AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)

CHANNEL CALIBRATION CHANNEL CHECK CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST or actual of all devices in the channel required for channel OPERABILITY.

L01 A02 A03 A04 the means of 1.0 USE AND APPLICATION

A01 Moved to MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR) DEFINITION DEFINITIONS CORE ALTERATION 1.7 CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement of any fuel, sources, or reactivity control components, within the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. The following exceptions are not considered to be CORE ALTERATIONS:

a.

Movement of source range monitors, local power range monitors, intermediate range monitors, traversing incore probes, or special movable detectors (including undervessel replacement), and

b.

Control rod movement, provided there are no fuel assemblies in the associated core cell.

Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

1.8 DELETED CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT 1.9 The CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT is the unit-specific document that provides core operating limits for the current operating reload cycle. These cycle-specific core operating limits shall be determined for each reload cycle in accordance with Specification 6.9.1.9. Plant operation within these limits is addressed in individual specifications.

CRITICAL POWER RATIO 1.10 The CRITICAL POWER RATIO (CPR) shall be the ratio of that power in the assembly which is calculated by application of the applicable NRC-approved critical power correlation to cause some point in the assembly to experience boiling transition, divided by the actual assembly operating power.

DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 1.11 DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 shall be that concentration of I-131, microcuries per gram, which alone would produce the same thyroid dose as the quantity and isotopic mixture of I-131, I-132, I-133, I-134, and I-135 actually present. The thyroid dose conversion factors used for this calculation shall be those listed in Table III of TID-14844, "Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites. "

HOPE CREEK 1-2 Amendment No. 213 CORE ALTERATION CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT ITS 1.0 Definitions 1.1 A01 ITS 1.1 (COLR)

COLR cycle specific parameter 5.6.3 A05 is that (s) appropriate

)

(

/

that DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 when inhaled as the combined activities of iodine isotopes determination of DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 shall be performed using Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE) or Committed Effective Dose Equivalent (CEDE) dose conversion factors from Table 2.1 of EPA Federal Guidance Report No. 11.

A17 A17

A01 DEFINITIONS DRAIN TIME 1.11.1 The DRAIN TIME is the time it would take for the water inventory in and above the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) to drain to the top of the active fuel (TAF) seated in the RPV assuming:

a)

The water inventory above the TAF is divided by the limiting drain rate; b)

The limiting drain rate is the larger of the drain rate through a single penetration flow path with the highest flow rate, or the sum of the drain rates through multiple penetration flow paths susceptible to a common mode failure for all penetration flow paths below the TAF except:

1.

Penetration flow paths connected to an intact closed system, or isolated by manual or automatic valves that are closed and administratively controlled in the closed position, blank flanges, or other devices that prevent flow of reactor coolant through the penetration flow paths;

2.

Penetration flow paths capable of being isolated by valves that will close automatically without offsite power prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF when actuated by RPV water level isolation instrumentation; or

3.

Penetration flow paths with isolation devices that can be closed prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF by a dedicated operator trained in the task, who in continuous communication with the control room, is stationed at the controls, and is capable of closing the penetration flow path isolation device without offsite power.

c)

The penetration flow paths required to be evaluated per paragraph b) are assumed to open instantaneously and are not subsequently isolated, and no water is assumed to be subsequently added to the RPV water inventory; d)

No additional draining events occur; and e)

Realistic cross-sectional areas and drain rates are used.

A bounding DRAIN TIME may be used in lieu of a calculated value.

-AVERAGE DISINTEGRATION ENERGY 1.12 shall be the average, weighted in proportion to the concentration of each radionuclide in the reactor coolant at the time of sampling, of the sum of the average beta and gamma energies per disintegration, in MeV, for isotopes, with half lives greater than 15 minutes, making up at least 95% of the total non-iodine activity in the coolant.

HOPE CREEK 1-2a Amendment No. 227 ITS 1.0 Definitions 1.1 A01 ITS 1.1 A06 DRAIN TIME

A01 drywell DEFINITIONS EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (ECCS) RESPONSE TIME 1.13 The EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (ECCS) RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its ECCS actuation setpoint at the channel sensor until the ECCS equipment is capable of performing its safety function, i.e., the valves travel to their required positions, pump discharge pressures reach their required values, etc. Times shall include diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays where applicable. The response time may be measured by any series of sequential, overlapping or total steps such that the entire response time is measured.

END-OF-CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME 1.14 The END-OF-CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval to complete suppression of the electric arc between the fully open contacts of the recirculation pump circuit breaker from initial movement of the associated:

a. Turbine stop valves, and
b. Turbine control valves.

The response time may be measured by any series of sequential, overlapping or total steps such that the entire response time is measured.

1.15 DELETED 1.16 DELETED FREQUENCY NOTATION 1.17 The FREQUENCY NOTATION specified for the performance of Surveillance Requirements shall correspond to the intervals defined in Table 1.1.

IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE 1.18 IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE shall be:

a.

Leakage into collection systems, such as pump seal or valve packing leaks, that is captured and conducted to a sump or collecting tank, or

b.

Leakage into the containment atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of the leakage detection systems or not to be PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE.

INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM 1.18.1 The INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM is the licensee program that fulfills the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(f).

ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME 1.19 The ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its isolation actuation setpoint at the channel sensor until the isolation valves travel to their required positions. Times shall include diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays where applicable. The response time may be measured by any series of sequential, overlapping or total steps such that the entire response time is measured.

HOPE CREEK 1-3 Amendment No. 205 END OF CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP (EOC RPT) SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME ITS 1.0 Definitions 1.1 A01 ITS 1.1 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (ECCS)

RESPONSE

TIME

).

so means of INSERT 1 (EOC RPT)

EOC RPT initiation

(

L02

a. Identified LEAKAGE the drywell that from s

initiation so INSERT 1 L02 means of not

1.
2.

see CTS 1.49 Markup see CTS 1.31 Markup

b. Unidentified LEAKAGE
d. Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE A07 LEAKAGE INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM ISOLATION SYSTEM

RESPONSE

TIME INSERT 2 A01 A06 A07 INSERT 3 LA01 means of so

ITS 1.0 Insert Page 1-3 INSERT 1 In lieu of measurement, response time may be verified for selected components provided that the components and methodology for verification have been previously reviewed and approved by the NRC.

INSERT 2 from initial signal generation by the associated turbine stop valve limit switch or from when the turbine control valve hydraulic oil control oil pressure drops below the pressure switch setpoint INSERT 3

c. Total LEAKAGE Sum of the identified and unidentified LEAKAGE; and L02 A01 A07

A01 DEFINITIONS LIMITING CONTROL ROD PATTERN 1.20 A LIMITING CONTROL ROD PATTERN shall be a pattern which results in the core being on a thermal hydraulic limit, i.e., operating on a limiting value for APLHGR, LHGR, or MCPR.

LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE 1.21 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR) shall be the heat generation per unit length of fuel rod. It is the integral of the heat flux over the heat transfer area associated with the unit length.

LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST 1.22 A LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be a test of all logic components, i.e., all relays and contacts, all trip units, solid state logic elements, etc, of a logic circuit, from sensor through and including the actuated device, to verify OPERABILITY. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping or total system steps such that the entire logic system is tested.

1.23 DELETED 1.24 Not Used MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO 1.25 The MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR) shall be the smallest CPR which exists in the core.

OFF-GAS RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM 1.26 An OFF-GAS RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM is any system designed and installed to reduce radioactive gaseous effluents by collecting reactor coolant system offgases from the main condenser evacuation system and providing for delay or holdup for the purpose of reducing the total radioactivity prior to release to the environment.

OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL 1.27 The OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATIONAL MANUAL (ODCM) shall contain the methodology and parameters used in the calculation of offsite doses resulting from radioactive gaseous and liquid effluents, in the calculation of gaseous and liquid effluent monitoring Alarm/Trip Setpoints, and in the conduct of the Environmental Radiological Monitoring Program. The ODCM shall also contain (1) the Radioactive Effluent Controls and Radiological Environmental Monitoring Programs required by Section 6.8.4 and (2) descriptions of the information that should be included in the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report and the Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report required by Specifications 6.9.1.6 and 6.9.1.7.

HOPE CREEK 1-4 Amendment No. 230 ITS 1.0 Definitions 1.1 A01 ITS 1.1 critical power ratio

)

(

Insert CPR definition 1.10 markup from Page 1-2.

A06 (LHGR)

The required for OPERABILITY of a logic circuit, from as close to the sensor as practicable up to, but not including, A08 means of so (MCPR)

A06 See ITS 5.5.1 that LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR)

LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)

A05

A01 Moved to LEAKAGE DEFINITION part d.

DEFINITION S OPERABLE - OPERABILITY 1.28 A system, subsystem, train, component or device shall be OPERABLE or have OPERABILITY when it is capable of performing its specified function(s) and when all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, electrical power, cooling or seal water, lubrication or other auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, train, component or device to perform its function(s) are also capable of performing their related support function(s).

OPERATIONAL CONDITION - CONDITION 1.29 An OPERATIONAL CONDITION, i.e., CONDITION, shall be any one inclusive combination of mode switch position and average reactor coolant temperature as specified in Table 1.2.

PHYSICS TESTS 1.30 PHYSICS TESTS shall be those tests performed to measure the fundamental nuclear characteristics of the reactor core and related instrumentation and 1) described in Chapter 14 of the FSAR, 2) authorized under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59, or 3) otherwise approved by the Commission.

PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE LIMITS REPORT (PTLR) 1.30-1 The PTLR is the specific document that provides the reactor vessel pressure and temperature limits, including heatup and cooldown rates, for the current vessel fluence period. The pressure and temperature limits shall be determined for each fluence period in accordance with Specification 6.9.1.10.

PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE 1.31 PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE shall be leakage through a non-isolable fault in a reactor coolant system component body, pipe wall or vessel wall.

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY 1.32 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist when:

a. All primary containment penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:
1. Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE primary containment automatic isolation system, or
2. Closed by at least one manual valve, blind flange, or deactivated automatic valve secured in its closed position, except for valves that are opened under administrative control as permitted by Specification 3.6.3.
b. All primary containment equipment hatches are closed and sealed.
c. Each primary containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3.
d. The primary containment leakage rates are within the limits of Specification 3.6.1.2.
e. The suppression chamber is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.2.1.
f. The sealing mechanism associated with each primary containment penetration; e.g., welds, bellows or 0-rings, is OPERABLE.

HOPE CREEK 1-5 Amendment No. 209 ITS 1.0 Definitions 1.1 A01 ITS 1.1 LEAKAGE past seals, packing, and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE.

(RCS)

d.

A13 A14 MODE correspond to

, and reactor vessel head closure bolt tensioning specified in Table 1.1-1 with fuel in the reactor vessel OPERABLE -

OPERABILITY PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE LIMITS REPORT (PTLR) unit 5.6.4 division safety normal or emergency and division specified safety A10 A11 A12 A09 A09

, and These MODE A06

A01 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS)

RESPONSE

TIME DEFINITIONS PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM 1.33 The PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM (PCP) shall contain the current formulas, sampling, analyses, test, and determinations to be made to ensure that processing and packing of solid radioactive wastes based on demonstrated processing of actual or simulated wet solid wastes will be accomplished in such a way as to assure compliance with 10 CFR Parts 20, 61, and 71, State regulations, burial ground requirements, and other requirements governing the disposal of solid radioactive waste.

PURGE - PURGING 1.34 PURGE or PURGING shall be the controlled process of discharging air or gas from a confinement to maintain temperature, pressure, humidity, concentration or other operating condition, in such manner that replacement air or gas is required to purify the confinement.

RATED THERMAL POWER 1.35 RATED THERMAL POWER shall be a total reactor core heat transfer rate to the reactor coolant of 3902 MWt.

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME 1.36 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be the time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its trip setpoint at the channel sensor until de-energization of the scram pilot valve solenoids. The response time may be measured by any series of sequential, overlapping or total steps such that the entire response time is measured.

REPORTABLE EVENT 1.37 A REPORTABLE EVENT shall be any of those conditions specified in Section 50.73 to 10 CFR Part 50.

ROD DENSITY 1.38 ROD DENSITY shall be the number of control rod notches inserted as a fraction of the total number of control rod notches. All rods fully inserted is equivalent to 100% ROD DENSITY.

HOPE CREEK 1-6 Amendment No. 212 ITS 1.0 Definitions 1.1 A01 ITS 1.1 A06 A06 A06 A06 (RTP)

RTP RATED THERMAL POWER (RTP)

The RPS RPS means of so INSERT 4 L02 (RPS) that

ITS 1.0 Insert Page 1-6 INSERT 4 In lieu of measurement, response time may be verified for selected components provided that the components and methodology for verification have been previously reviewed and approved by the NRC.

L02

A01 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)

DEFINITIONS SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY 1.39 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist when:

a.

All secondary containment penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:

1.

Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE secondary containment automatic isolation system, or

2.

Closed by at least one manual valve, blind flange, or deactivated automatic valve or damper, as applicable secured in its closed position, except as provided in Table 3.6.5.2-1 of Specification 3.6.5.2.

b.

All secondary containment hatches and blowout panels are closed and sealed.

c.

The filtration, recirculation and ventilation system is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.5.3.

d.

For double door arrangements, at least one door in each access to the secondary containment is closed, except when the access opening is being used for entry and exit.

e.

For single door arrangements, the door in each access to the secondary containment is closed, except for normal entry and exit.

f.

The sealing mechanism associated with each secondary containment penetration, e.g., welds, bellows or O-rings, is OPERABLE.

g.

The pressure within the secondary containment is less than or equal to the value required by Specification 4.6.5.1.a, except as indicated by the footnote for Specification 4.6.5.1.a.

SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) 1.40 SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be the amount of reactivity by which the reactor is subcritical or would be subcritical throughout the cycle assuming that:

a.

The reactor is xenon free;

b.

The moderator temperature is 68°F, corresponding to the most reactive state; and

c.

All control rods are fully inserted except for the single control rod of highest reactivity worth, which is assumed to be fully withdrawn. With control rods not capable of being fully inserted, the reactivity worth of these control rods must be accounted for in the determination of SDM.

1.41 Not Used HOPE CREEK 1-7 Amendment No. 230 ITS 1.0 Definitions 1.1 A01 ITS 1.1 A14 SDM operating

A01 DEFINITIONS SOLIDIFICATION 1.42 Not used.

SOURCE CHECK 1.43 A SOURCE CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment of channel response when the channel sensor is exposed to a source of increased radioactivity.

SPIRAL RELOAD 1.44 A SPIRAL RELOAD is a core loading methodology employed to refuel the core after a complete core unload. During a SPIRAL RELOAD the fuel is to be loaded into individual control cells (four bundles surrounding a control blade) in a spiral fashion centered on an SRM moving outward. Before initiating a SPIRAL RELOAD, up to four bundles may be loaded in the four bundle locations immediately surrounding each of the four SRMs to obtain the required channel count rate.

1.45 A SPIRAL UNLOAD is a core unloading methodology employed to defuel when the complete core is to be unloaded. The core unload is performed by first removing the fuel from the outermost control cells (four bundles surrounding a control blade). Unloading continues in a spiral fashion by removing fuel from the outermost periphery to the interior of the core, symmetric about the SRMs, except for the four bundles around each of the four SRMs. When sixteen or less fuel bundles are in the core, four around each of the four SRMs, there is no need to maintain the required channel count rate.

STAGGERED TEST BASIS 1.46 A STAGGERED TEST BASIS shall consist of:

a.

A test schedule for n systems, subsystems, trains or other designated components obtained by dividing the specified test interval into n equal subintervals.

b.

The testing of one system, subsystem, train or other designated component at the beginning of each subinterval.

THERMAL POWER 1.47 THERMAL POWER shall be the total reactor core heat transfer rate to the reactor coolant.

HOPE CREEK 1-8 Amendment No. 121 ITS 1.0 Definitions 1.1 A01 ITS 1.1 A06 A06 A06 A06 THERMAL POWER

A01 Moved to LEAKAGE DEFINITION part b.

DEFINITIONS TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME 1.48 The TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME consists of two separate time intervals: a) time from initial movement of the main turbine stop valve or control valve until 80% of the turbine bypass capacity is established, and b) the time from initial movement of the main turbine stop valve or control valve until initial movement of the turbine bypass valve. Either response time may be measured by any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps such that the entire response time is measured.

UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE 1.49 UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE shall be all leakage which is not IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE.

1.50 Not Usedv VENTILATION EXHAUST TREATMENT SYSTEM 1.51 A VENTILATION EXHAUST TREATMENT SYSTEM shall be any system designed and installed to reduce gaseous radioiodine or radioactive material in particulate form in effluents by passing ventilation or vent exhaust gases through charcoal adsorbers and/or HEPA filters for the purpose of removing iodines or particulates from the gaseous exhaust stream prior to the release to the environment. Such a system is not considered to have any effect on noble gas effluents. Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) atmospheric cleanup systems are not considered to be VENTILATION EXHAUST TREATMENT SYSTEM components.

VENTING 1.52 VENTING shall be the controlled process of discharging air or gas from a confinement to maintain temperature, pressure, humidity, concentration or other operating condition, in such a manner that replacement air or gas is not provided or required during VENTING.

Vent, used in system names, does not imply a VENTING process.

HOPE CREEK 1-9 Amendment No. 230 ITS 1.0 Definitions 1.1 A01 ITS 1.1 into the drywell that

b.

A07 A06 A06 components

. The means of so The TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM

RESPONSE

TIME

A01 TABLE 1.1 SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY NOTATION NOTATION FREQUENCY S

At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

D At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

W At least once per 7 days.

M At least once per 31 days.

Q At least once per 92 days.

SA At least once per 184 days.

A At least once per 366 days.

R At least once per 18 months (550 days).

S/U Prior to each reactor startup.

P Prior to each radioactive release.

Z During startup, prior to exceeding 30% of RATED THERMAL POWER, if not performed within the previous 7 days N.A.

Not applicable.

HOPE CREEK 1-10 Amendment No. 18 ITS 1.0 Definitions 1.1 A01 ITS LA01

A01 TABLE 1.2 OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS MODE SWITCH AVERAGE REACTOR CONDITION POSITION COOLANT TEMPERATURE

1. POWER OPERATION Run Any temperature
2. STARTUP Startup/Hot Standby Any temperature
3. HOT SHUTDOWN Shutdown#,***

> 200°F

4. COLD SHUTDOWN Shutdown#,##,***

200°``F+

5. REFUELING*

Shutdown or Refuel**,#

140°F

  1. The reactor mode switch may be placed in the Run, Startup/Hot Standby, or Refuel position to test the switch interlock functions and related instrumentation provided that the control rods are verified to remain fully inserted by a second licensed operator or other technically qualified member of the unit technical staff. If the reactor mode switch is placed in the Refuel position, the one-rod-out interlock shall be OPERABLE.
    1. The reactor mode switch may be placed in the Refuel position while a single control rod drive is being removed from the reactor pressure vessel per Specification 3.9.10.1.
  • Fuel in the reactor vessel with the vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned or with the head removed.
    • See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.1 and 3.10.3.
      • The reactor mode switch may be placed in the Refuel position while a single control rod is being recoupled or withdrawn provided that the one-rod-out interlock is OPERABLE.

+See Special Test Exception 3.10.8.

HOPE CREEK 1-11 Amendment No. 69 ITS 1.0 Definitions 1.1 A01 ITS MODES REACTOR MODE TITLE

°F NA NA NA (a)

(b)

(a)

Refuel (a) or See ITS 3.10.2 See ITS 3.10.4 See ITS 3.10.3 ITS 3.10.4 A15 A15 A12 (b) One or more reactor A12 (a) All reactor vessel head closure bolts fully tensioned.

Add proposed ITS Sections 1.2 Logical Connectors 1.3 Completion Times 1.4 Frequency A16 A12 Table 1.1-1 1.1-1 Table 1.1-1 Note (a)

Table 1.1-1 Note (b)

A01 ITS 1.0 INDEX

A01 ITS 1.0 DEFINITIONS SECTION 1.0 DEFINITIONS................................................................................................................................ PAGE 1.1 ACTION............................................................................................................................................... 1-1 1.2 DELETED............................................................................................................................................ 1-1 1.3 AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE............................................................... 1-1 1.4 CHANNEL CALIBRATION.................................................................................................................. 1-1 1.5 CHANNEL CHECK............................................................................................................................. 1-1 1.6 CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST......................................................................................................... 1-1 1.7 CORE ALTERATION.......................................................................................................................... 1-2 1.8 DELETED............................................................................................................................................ 1-2 1.9 CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT............................................................................................... 1-2 1.10 CRITICAL POWER RATIO................................................................................................................ 1-2 1.11 DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131................................................................................................................ 1-2 1.11.1 DRAIN TIME................................................................................................................................. 1-2a 1.12 E-AVERAGE DISINTEGRATION ENERGY.................................................................................... 1-2a 1.13 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (ECCS) RESPONSE TIME........................................... 1-3 1.14 END-OF-CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME.............................. 1-3 1.15 DELETED........................................................................................................................................... 1-3 1.16 DELETED........................................................................................................................................... 1-3 1.17 FREQUENCY NOTATION................................................................................................................. 1-3 1.18 IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE..................................................................................................................... 1-3 1.18.1 INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM................................................................................................ 1-3 1.19 ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME......................................................................................... 1-3 1.20 LIMITING CONTROL ROD PATTERN.............................................................................................. 1-3 1.21 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE................................................................................................ 1-4 1.22 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST.............................................................................................. 1-4 1.23 DELETED........................................................................................................................................... 1-4 1.24 Not Used 1.25 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO............................................................................................... 1-4 HOPE CREEK i

Amendment No. 230

A01 ITS 1.0 INDEX DEFINITIONS SECTION DEFINITIONS (Continued)

PAGE 1.26 OFF-GAS RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM.................................................................. 1-4 1.27 OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL......................................................................... 1-4 1.28 OPERABLE - OPERABILITY.................................................................................................

1-5 1.29 OPERATIONAL CONDITION - CONDITION........................................................................ 1-5 1.30 PHYSICS TESTS..................................................................................................................1-5 1.30-1 PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE LIMITS REPORT (PTLR)..........................................1-5 1.31 PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE...................................................................................

1-5 1.32 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY..............................................................................

1-5 1.33 PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM......................................................................................

1-6 1.34 PURGE-PURGING...............................................................................................................

1-6 1.35 RATED THERMAL POWER.................................................................................................

1-6 1.36 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME.....................................................1-6 1.37 REPORTABLE EVENT.........................................................................................................

1-6 1.38 ROD DENSITY.....................................................................................................................1-6 1.39 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY....................................................................... 1-7 1.40 SHUTDOWN MARGIN......................................................................................................... 1-7 1.41 Not Used 1.42 Not Used...............................................................................................................................

1-8 1.43 SOURCE CHECK.................................................................................................................

1-8 1.44 SPIRAL RELOAD.................................................................................................................1-8 1.45 SPIRAL UNLOAD.................................................................................................................

1-8 1.46 STAGGERED TEST BASIS................................................................................................. 1-8 1.47 THERMAL POWER..............................................................................................................

1-8 1.48 TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME................................................................1-9 HOPE CREEK ii Amendment No. 230

A01 ITS 1.0 INDEX DEFINITIONS SECTION DEFINITIONS (Continued)

PAGE 1.49 UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE............................................................................ 1-9 1.50 Not Used 1.51 VENTILATION EXHAUST TREATMENT SYSTEM........................................ 1-9 1.52 VENTING....................................................................................................... 1-9 TABLE 1.1, SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY NOTATION.......................................... 1-10 TABLE 1.2, OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS............................................................. 1-11 HOPE CREEK iii Amendment No. 230

A01 ITS 1.0 INDEX SAFETY LIMITS AND LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS SECTION PAGE 2.1 SAFETY LIMITS THERMAL POWER, Low Pressure or Low Flow...................... 2-1 THERMAL POWER, High Pressure and High Flow.................. 2-1 Reactor Coolant System Pressure............................. 2-1 Reactor Vessel Water Level................................... 2-2 2.2 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS Reactor Protection System Instrumentation Setpoints.......... 2-3 Table 2.2.1-1 Reactor Protection System Instrumentation Setpoints................................. 2-4 BASES 2.1 SAFETY LIMITS THERMAL POWER, Low Pressure or Low Flow..................... B 2-1 THERMAL POWER, High Pressure and High Flow.................. B 2-2 Reactor Coolant System Pressure............................. B 2-5 Reactor Vessel Water Level.................................. B 2-5 2.2 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS Reactor Protection System Instrumentation Setpoints......... B 2-6 HOPE CREEK iv Amendment No. 126

A01 ITS 1.0 INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.0 APPLICABILITY..............................................................................................

3/4 0-1 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN...................................................................................

3/4 1-1 3/4.1.2 REACTIVITY ANOMALIES.............................................................................

3/4 1-2 3/4.1.3 CONTROL RODS Control Rod Operability...................................................................................

3/4 1-3 Control Rod Maximum Scram Insertion Times................................................

3/4 1-6 Control Rod Scram Insertion Times................................................................

3/4 1-7 Four Control Rod Group Scram Insertion Times (Deleted)..............................

3/4 1-8 Control Rod Scram Accumulators...................................................................

3/4 1-9 Control Rod Drive Coupling.............................................................................

3/4 1-11 Control Rod Position Indication.......................................................................

3/4 1-13 Control Rod Drive Housing Support................................................................

3/4 1-15 3/4.1.4 CONTROL ROD PROGRAM CONTROLS Rod Worth Minimizer......................................................................................

3/4 1-16 Rod Sequence Control System (Deleted).......................................................

3/4 1-17 Rod Block Monitor..........................................................................................

3/4 1-18 3/4.1.5 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM.......................................................

3/4 1-19 Figure 3.1.5-1 Sodium Pentaborate Solution Volume/Concentration Requirements......................................

3/4 1-21 3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/4.2.1 AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE...........................

3/4 2-1 HOPE CREEK v

Amendment No. 183

A01 ITS 1.0 INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4 2.2 DELETED................................................. 3/4 2-2 3/4.2.3 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO............................ 3/4 2-3 3/4.2.4 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE............................. 3/4 2-5 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION............... 3/4 3-1 Table 3.3.1-1 Reactor Protection System Instrumentation......................... 3/4 3-2 Figure 4.3.1.1-1 Reactor Protection System Surveillance Requirements............ 3/4 3-7 3/4.3.2 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION..................... 3/4 3-9 Table 3.3.2-1 Isolation Actuation Instrumentation..... 3/4 3-11 Table 3.3.2-2 Isolation Actuation Instrumentation Setpoints................................ 3/4 3-22 Table 4.3.2.1-1 Isolation Actuation Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements.............. 3/4 3-28 HOPE CREEK vi Amendment No. 163

A01 ITS 1.0 INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION.. 3/4 3-32 Table 3.3.3-1 Emergency Core Cooling System Actuation Instrumentation.......................... 3/4 3-33 Table 3.3.3-2 Emergency Core Cooling System Actuation Instrumentation Setpoints................ 3/4 3-36 Table 4.3.3.1-1 Emergency Core Cooling System Actuation Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements........................... 3/4 3-39 3/4.3.4 RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION ATWS Recirculation Pump Trip System Instrumentation...... 3/4 3-41 Table 3.3.4.1-1 ATWS Recirculation Pump Trip System Instrumentation........................ 3/4 3-42 Table 3.3.4.1-2 ATWS Recirculation Pump Trip System Instrumentation Setpoints.............. 3/4 3-43 Table 4.3.4.1-1 ATWS Recirculation Pump Trip Actuation Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements........................... 3/4 3-44 End-of-Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip System Instrumentation......................................... 3/4 3-45 Table 3.3.4.2-1 End-of-Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip System Instrumentation................. 3/4 3-47 Table 3.3.4.2-2 End-of-Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip Setpoints.............................. 3/4 3-48 Table 3.3.4.2-3 End-of-Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip System Response Time................... 3/4 3-49 Table 4.3.4.2.1-1 End-of-Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip System Surveillance Requirements..... 3/4 3-50 3/4.3.5 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION.......................................... 3/4 3-51 HOPE CREEK vii Amendment No. 123

A01 ITS 1.0 INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE Table 3.3.5-1 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Actuation Instrumentation....................3/4 3-52 Table 3.3.5-2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Actuation Instrumentation Setpoints..........3/4 3-54 Table 4.3.5.1-1 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Actuation Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements...............................3/4 3-55 3/4.3.6 CONTROL ROD BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION...........................3/4 3-56 Table 3.3.6-1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation............3/4 3-57 Table 3.3.6-2 Control Rod Block Instrumentation Setpoints....................................3/4 3-59 Table 4.3.6-1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements....................3/4 3-60 3/4.3.7 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation........................3/4 3-62 Table 3.3.7.1-1 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation.......3/4 3-63 Table 4.3.7.1-1 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements..................3/4 3-66 Remote Shutdown System......................................3/4 3-74 HOPE CREEK viii Amendment No. 217

A01 ITS 1.0 INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE Accident Monitoring Instrumentation.....

3/4 3-84 Table 3.3.7.5-1 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation.....

3/4 3-85 Table 4.3.7.5-1 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements..........

3/4 3-87 Source Range Monitors............

3/4 3-88 3/4.3.8 DELETED.................

3/4 3-103 3/4.3.9 FEEDWATER/MAIN TURBINE TRIP SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION..........................3/4 3-105 Table 3.3.9-1 Feedwater/Main Turbine Trip System Actuation Instrumentation........

3/4 3-106 HOPE CREEK ix Amendment No. 217

A01 ITS 1.0 INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE Table 3.3.9-2 Feedwater/Main Turbine Trip System Actuation Instrumentation Setpoints... 3/4 3-107 Table 4.3.9.1-1 Feedwater/Main Turbine Trip System Actuation Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements.......................... 3/4 3-108 3/4.3.10 MECHANICAL VACUUM PUMP TRIP INSTRUMENTATION.............. 3/4 3-109 3/4.3.11 Deleted.................................................. 3/4 3-110 3/4.3.12 REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL (RPV) WATER INVENTORY CONTROL INSTRUMENTATION.......................................... 3/4 3-111 Table 3.3.12-1 RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation........................................ 3/4 3-112 Table 3.3.12-2 RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation Setpoints.............................. 3/4 3-114 Table 4.3.12.1-1 RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements.............. 3/4 3-115 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.1 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM Recirculation Loops...................................... 3/4 4-1 Figure 3.4.1.1-1 DELETED............................... 3/4 4-3 Jet Pumps................................................ 3/4 4-4 Recirculation Loop Flow.................................. 3/4 4-5 Idle Recirculation Loop Startup.......................... 3/4 4-6 3/4.4.2 SAFETY/RELIEF VALVES Safety/Relief Valves..................................... 3/4 4-7 Safety/Relief Valves Low-Low Set Function................ 3/4 4-9 3/4.4.3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE Leakage Detection Systems................................ 3/4 4-10 Operational Leakage...................................... 3/4 4-11 Table 3.4.3.2-1 Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valves...................... 3/4 4-13 Table 3.4.3.2-2 Reactor Coolant System Interface Valves Leakage Pressure Monitors...... 3/4 4-14 3/4.4.4 DELETED.................................................. 3/4 4-15 3/4.4.5 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY........................................ 3/4 4-18 Table 4.4.5-1 Primary Coolant Specific Activity Sample and Analysis Program.................. 3/4 4-20 HOPE CREEK x

Amendment No. 213

A01 ITS 1.0 INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.4.6 PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS Reactor Coolant System.

3/4 4-21 Figure 3.4.6.1-1 (Deleted) 3/4 4-23 Figure 3.4.6.1-2 (Deleted) 3/4 4-23a Figure 3.4.6.1-3 (Deleted) 3/4 4-23b Table 4.4.6.1.3-1 (Deleted) 3/4 4-24 Reactor Steam Dome 3/4 4-25 3/4.4.7 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES 3/4 4-26 3/4.4.8 DELETED 3/4 4-27 3/4.4.9 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL Hot Shutdown 3/4 4-28 Cold Shutdown 3/4 4-29 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL 3/4.5.1 ECCS - OPERATING 3/4 5-1 3/4.5.2 RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL 3/4 5-6 3/4.5.3 SUPPRESSION CHAMBER 3/4 5-8 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT Primary Containment Integrity 3/4 6-1 Primary Containment Leakage 3/4 6-2 Primary Containment Air Locks 3/4 6-5 Primary Containment Structural Integrity 3/4 6-8 Drywell and Suppression Chamber Internal Pressure 3/4 6-9 HOPE CREEK xi Amendment No. 213

A01 ITS 1.0 INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE Drywell Average Air Temperature........................ 3/4 6-10 Drywell and Suppression Chamber Purge System........... 3/4 6-11 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEMS Suppression Chamber.................................... 3/4 6-12 Suppression Pool Spray................................. 3/4 6-15 Suppression Pool Cooling............................... 3/4 6-16 3/4.6.3 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES................... 3/4 6-17 Table 3.6.3-1 Primary Containment Isolation Valves... 3/4 6-19 3/4.6.4 VACUUM RELIEF Suppression Chamber - Drywell Vacuum Breakers.......... 3/4 6-43 Reactor Building - Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers............................................. 3/4 6-45 3/4.6.5 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT Secondary Containment Integrity........................ 3/4 6-47 Secondary Containment Automatic Isolation Dampers...... 3/4 6-49 Table 3.6.5.2-1 Secondary Containment Ventilation System Automatic Isolation Dampers Isolation Group No. 19............... 3/4 6-50 Filtration, Recirculation and Ventilation System....... 3/4 6-51 3/4.6.6 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CONTROL Containment Hydrogen Recombiner Systems................ 3/4 6-54 Drywell and Suppression Chamber Oxygen Concentration... 3/4 6-55 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS Safety Auxiliaries Cooling System...................... 3/4 7-1 Station Service Water System........................... 3/4 7-3 Ultimate Heat Sink..................................... 3/4 7-5 3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM SYSTEMS Control Room Emergency Filtration System............... 3/4 7-6 Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) System............. 3/4 7-8a HOPE CREEK xii Amendment No.191

A01 ITS 1.0 INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.7.3 DELETED............................................... 3/4 7-9 3/4.7.4 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM................. 3/4 7-11 3/4.7.5 DELETED 3/4.7.6 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION........................... 3/4 7-19 3/4.7.7 MAIN TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM............................ 3/4 7-21 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES A.C. Sources-Operating................................ 3/4 8-1 Table 4.8.1.1.2-1 Diesel Generator Test Schedule.... 3/4 8-10 A.C. Sources-Shutdown................................. 3/4 8-11 3/4.8.2 D.C. SOURCES D.C. Sources-Operating................................ 3/4 8-12 Table 4.8.2.1-1 Battery Surveillance Requirements... 3/4 8-15 D.C. Sources Shutdown................................. 3/4 8-17 3/4.8.3 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS Distribution - Operating.............................. 3/4 8-18 Distribution - Shutdown............................... 3/4 8-21 3/4.8.4 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Primary Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices.................................. 3/4 8-24 Table 3.8.4.1-1 Primary Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices...... 3/4 8-26 Motor Operated Valve Thermal Overload Protection (Bypassed)........................................... 3/4 8-30 HOPE CREEK xiii Amendment No. 196

A01 ITS 1.0 INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE Motor Operated Valve Thermal Overload Protection (Not Bypassed)........................................ 3/4 8-38 Table 3.8.4.3-1 Motor Operated Valves-Thermal Overload Protection (Not Bypassed)............. 3/4 8-39 Reactor Protection System Electric Power Monitoring..... 3/4 8-40 Class 1E Isolation Breaker Overcurrent Protection Devices (Breaker Tripped by LOCA Signal).............. 3/4 8-41 Table 3.8.4.5-1 Class 1E Isolation Breaker Overcurrent Protective Devices (Breaker Tripped by a LOCA Signal)............................... 3/4 8-42 Power Range Neutron Monitoring System Electric Power Monitoring............................................ 3/4 8-44 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.1 REACTOR MODE SWITCH..................................... 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION......................................... 3/4 9-3 3/4.9.3 CONTROL ROD POSITION.................................... 3/4 9-5 3/4.9.4 DELETED................................................. 3/4 9-6 3/4.9.5 DELETED................................................. 3/4 9-7 3/4.9.6 DELETED................................................. 3/4 9-8 3/4.9.7 DELETED................................................. 3/4 9-10 3/4.9.8 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL............................ 3/4 9-11 3/4.9.9 WATER LEVEL - SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL................... 3/4 9-12 3/4.9.10 CONTROL ROD REMOVAL Single Control Rod Removal.............................. 3/4 9-13 Multiple Control Rod Removal............................ 3/4 9-15 HOPE CREEK xiv Amendment No. 137

A01 ITS 1.0 INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.9.11 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION High Water Level............................

3/4 9-17 Low Water Level.............................

3/4 9-18 3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY................

3/4 10-1 3/4.10.2 ROD WORTH MINIMIZER..........................

3/4 10-2 3/4.10.3 SHUTDOWN MARGIN DEMONSTRATIONS...............

3/4 10-3 3/4.10.4 RECIRCULATION LOOPS..........................

3/4 10-4 3/4.10.5 OXYGEN CONCENTRATION.........................

3/4 10-5 3/4.10.6 TRAINING STARTUPS............................

3/4 10-6 3/4.10.7 SPECIAL INSTRUMENTATION - INITIAL CORE LOADING................................. 3/4 10-7 3/4.10.8 INSERVICE LEAK AND HYDROSTATIC TESTING.......

3/4 10-8 3/4.11 RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS 3/4.11.1 LIQUID EFFLUENTS Liquid Holdup Tanks..........................

3/4 11-2 3/4.11.2 GASEOUS EFFLUENTS Main Condenser................................

3/4 11-17 HOPE CREEK xv Amendment No. 121

A01 ITS 1.0 INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.11.3 Deleted................................. 3/4 11-18 3/4.11.4 Deleted................................. 3/4 11-18 3/4.12 RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING 3/4.12.1 Deleted................................. 3/4 12-1 3/4.12.2 Deleted................................. 3/4 12-1 3/4.12.3 Deleted................................. 3/4 12-1 HOPE CREEK xvi Amendment No. 121

A01 ITS 1.0 INDEX BASES SECTION PAGE 3/4.0 APPLICABILITY............................................ B 3/4 0-1 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN................................ B 3/4 1-1 3/4.1.2 REACTIVITY ANOMALIES........................... B 3/4 1-1 3/4.1.3 CONTROL RODS................................... B 3/4 1-2 3/4.1.4 CONTROL ROD PROGRAM CONTROLS................... B 3/4 1-3 3/4.1.5 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM.................. B 3/4 1-4 3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/4.2.1 AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE..... B 3/4 2-1 3/4.2.2 DELETED........................................ B 3/4 2-1 3/4.2.3 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO................... B 3/4 2-2 3/4.2.4 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE.................... B 3/4 2-3 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION...... B 3/4 3-1 3/4.3.2 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION............ B 3/4 3-2 3/4.3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION................................ B 3/4 3-2 3/4.3.4 RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION................................ B 3/4 3-3 3/4.3.5 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION................................ B 3/4 3-4 3/4.3.6 CONTROL ROD BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION.............. B 3/4 3-4 3/4.3.7 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation........... B 3/4 3-5 HOPE CREEK xvii Amendment No. 206 INDEX

A01 ITS 1.0 BASES SECTION PAGE INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

Remote Shutdown Monitoring Instrumentation and Controls........................................... B 3/4 3-5 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation...................... B 3/4 3-5 Source Range Monitors.................................... B 3/4 3-5 3/4.3.8 DELETED.................................................. B 3/4 3-7 3/4.3.9 FEEDWATER/MAIN TURBINE TRIP SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION.......................................... B 3/4 3-7 Figure B3/4 3-1 Reactor Vessel Water Level............. B 3/4 3-8 3/4.3.10 MECHANICAL VACUUM PUMP TRIP INSTRUMENTATION.............. B 3/4 3-9 3/4.3.11 DELETED.................................................. B 3/4 3-13 3/4.3.12 RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL INSTRUMENTATION.............. B 3/4 3-13 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.1 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM..................................... B 3/4 4-1 3/4.4.2 SAFETY/RELIEF VALVES..................................... B 3/4 4-2 3/4.4.3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE Leakage Detection Systems................................ B 3/4 4-3 Operational Leakage...................................... B 3/4 4-3 3/4.4.4 CHEMISTRY................................................ B 3/4 4-3 3/4.4.5 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY........................................ B 3/4 4-4 3/4.4.6 PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS.............................. B 3/4 4-5 HOPE CREEK xviii Amendment No. 213

A01 ITS 1.0 INDEX BASES SECTION PAGE 3/4.4.7 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES........... B 3/4 4-6 3/4.4.8 DELETED.................................... B 3/4 4-6 3/4.4.9 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL...................... B 3/4 4-6 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL 3/4.5.1 ECCS - OPERATING........................... B 3/4 5-1 3/4.5.2 RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL................

B 3/4 5-2a 3/4.5.3 SUPPRESSION CHAMBER........................ B 3/4 5-3 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT Primary Containment Integrity.............. B 3/4 6-1 Primary Containment Leakage................ B 3/4 6-1 Primary Containment Air Locks.............. B 3/4 6-1 Primary Containment Structural Integrity... B 3/4 6-2 Drywell and Suppression Chamber Internal Pressure B 3/4 6-2 Drywell Average Air Temperature............ B 3/4 6-2 Drywell and Suppression Chamber Purge System B 3/4 6-2 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEMS................... B 3/4 6-3 3/4.6.3 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES....... B 3/4 6-5 3/4.6.4 VACUUM RELIEF.............................. B 3/4 6-5 3/4.6.5 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT...................... B 3/4 6-5 3/4.6.6 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CONTROL..... B 3/4 6-6 HOPE CREEK xix Amendment No. 213

A01 ITS 1.0 INDEX BASES SECTION PAGE 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS............................ B 3/4 7-1 3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM SYSTEMS............................. B 3/4 7-1 3/4.7.3 DELETED.......................................... B 3/4 7-1b 3/4.7.4 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM............ B 3/4 7-1c 3/4.7.5 DELETED 3/4.7.6 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION...................... B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.7 MAIN TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM....................... B 3/4 7-4 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.1, 3/4.8.2 and 3/4.8.3 A.C. SOURCES, D.C. SOURCES and ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS............................. B 3/4 8-1 3/4.8.4 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES.......... B 3/4 8-3 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.1 REACTOR MODE SWITCH.............................. B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION.................................. B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.3 CONTROL ROD POSITION............................. B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.4 DELETED.......................................... B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.5 DELETED.......................................... B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.6 DELETED.......................................... B 3/4 9-2 3/4.9.7 DELETED.......................................... B 3/4 9-2 3/4.9.8 and 3/4.9.9 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL and WATER LEVEL - SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL........ B 3/4 9-2 3/4.9.10 CONTROL ROD REMOVAL.............................. B 3/4 9-2 3/4.9.11 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION.... B 3/4 9-2 HOPE CREEK xx Amendment No. 196

A01 ITS 1.0 INDEX BASES SECTION PAGE 3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY............................ B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.2 ROD WORTH MINIMIZER...................................... B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.3 SHUTDOWN MARGIN DEMONSTRATIONS........................... B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.4 RECIRCULATION LOOPS...................................... B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.5 OXYGEN CONCENTRATION..................................... B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.6 TRAINING STARTUPS........................................ B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.7 SPECIAL INSTRUMENTATION -

INITIAL CORE LOADING................................ B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.8 INSERVICE LEAK AND HYDROSTATIC TESTING................... B 3/4 10-2 3/4.11 RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS 3/4.11.1 LIQUID EFFLUENTS Liquid Holdup Tanks................................. B 3/4 11-1 3/4.11.2 GASEOUS EFFLUENTS Main Condenser...................................... B 3/4 11-1 3/4.11.3 Deleted................................................ B 3/4 11-2 3/4.11.4 Deleted.................................................. B 3/4 11-2 HOPE CREEK xxi Amendment No. 121

A01 ITS 1.0 INDEX BASES SECTION PAGE 3/4.12 RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING 3/4.12.1 Deleted................... B 3/4 12-1 3/4.12.2 Deleted................... B 3/4 12-1 3/4.12.3 Deleted................... B 3/4 12-1 HOPE CREEK xxii Amendment No. 121

A01 ITS 1.0 INDEX DESIGN FEATURES SECTION PAGE 5.1 SITE LOCATION................................................................................................ 5-1 5.2 CONTAINMENT Configuration................................................................................................ 5-1 Design Temperature and Pressure.............................................................. 5-1 Secondary Containment............................................................................... 5-1 5.3 REACTOR CORE Fuel Assemblies.......................................................................................... 5-4 Control Rod Assemblies............................................................................... 5-4 5.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM Design Pressure and Temperature.............................................................. 5-4 Volume......................................................................................................... 5-5 5.5 DELETED............................................................................................................... 5-5 5.6 FUEL STORAGE Criticality....................................................................................................... 5-5 Drainage....................................................................................................... 5-5 Capacity....................................................................................................... 5-5 5.7 COMPONENT CYCLIC OR TRANSIENT LIMIT.................................................... 5-5 Table 5.7.1 1 Component Cyclic or Transient Limits.................................... 5-6 HOPE CREEK xxiii Amendment No. 234

A01 ITS 1.0 INDEX ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS SECTION PAGE 6.1 RESPONSIBILITY.......................................

6-1 6.2 ORGANIZATION.........................................

6-1 6.2.1 ONSITE AND OFFSITE ORGANIZATIONS................

6-1 6.2.2 UNIT STAFF......................................

6-1 Figure 6.2.1-1 (Deleted)............................

6-3 Figure 6.2.2-1 (Deleted)............................

6-4 Table 6.2.2-1 Minimum Shift Crew Composition Single Unit Facility..................

6-5 6.2.3 SHIFT TECHNICAL ADVISOR.........................

6-6 6.3 UNIT STAFF QUALIFICATIONS............................

6-6 6.4 TRAINING.............................................

6-6 6.5 REVIEW AND AUDIT (THIS SECTION DELETED).............

6-6 6.6 REPORTABLE EVENT ACTION..............................

6-14 6.7 SAFETY LIMIT VIOLATION...............................

6-14 6.8 PROCEDURES AND PROGRAMS..............................

6-15 6.9 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS...............................

6-17 6.9.1 ROUTINE REPORTS....................................

6-17 STARTUP REPORT.....................................

6-17 ANNUAL REPORTS.....................................

6-17 ANNUAL RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL OPERATING REPORT.

6-18 ANNUAL RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORT.........

6-19 MONTHLY OPERATING REPORTS..........................

6-20 CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT.......................

6-20 PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE LIMITS....................... 6-20 6.9.2 SPECIAL REPORTS....................................

6-21 HOPE CREEK xxiv Amendment No. 209

A01 ITS 1.0 INDEX ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS SECTION...................................................................PAGE 6.10 RECORD RETENTION....................................................6-21 6.11 RADIATION PROTECTION PROGRAM........................................6-23 6.12 HIGH RADIATION AREA.................................................6-24 6.13 PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM (PCP).......................................6-25 6.14 OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL (ODCM)..............................6-25 6.15 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) BASES CONTROL PROGRAM..................6-26 6.16 CONTROL ROOM ENVELOPE HABITABILITY PROGRAM...........................6-26 HOPE CREEK xxv Amendment No.173

DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS 1.0, USE AND APPLICATIONS Hope Creek Page 1 of 10 ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES A01 In the conversion of the Hope Creek Generating Station (HCGS) Current Technical Specifications (CTS) to the plant specific Improved Technical Specifications (ITS), certain changes (wording preferences, editorial changes, reformatting, revised numbering, etc.) are made to obtain consistency with NUREG-1433, Rev. 5.0, "Standard Technical Specifications-General Electric BWR/4 Plants" (ISTS).

These changes are designated as administrative changes and are acceptable because they do not result in technical changes to the CTS.

A02 CTS 1.0 states, "The defined terms appear in capitalized type and shall be applicable throughout these Technical Specifications." The Note for ITS Section 1.1 states, "The defined terms of this section appear in capitalized type and are applicable throughout these Technical Specifications and Bases." The ITS Note adds a clarification phrase that the defined terms also apply to the Bases.

The ITS Section 1.0 Note serves the same purpose as the CTS 1.0 statement.

ITS Section 1.1 Note clarifies that the defined terms also apply to the Bases. This change is consistent with formatting requirements in the ISTS and is consistent with the current use. This change is designated as administrative because it does not represent a technical change to the Technical Specifications.

A03 The CTS 1.4 definition states, "The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall encompass the entire channel including the required sensor, alarm, display, and trip functions, and shall include the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST." The ITS states, "The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall encompass all devices in the channel required for channel OPERABILITY and the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST." This changes the CTS by replacing the CTS statement shall encompass the entire channel including the required sensor, alarm, display, and trip functions, and shall include the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST with the ITS statement shall encompass all devices in the channel required for channel OPERABILITY and the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

This change is acceptable because the statements are equivalent in that both require that all needed portions of the channel be tested. The ITS definition reflects the CTS understanding that the CHANNEL CALIBRATION includes only those portions of the channel needed to perform the safety function including the required devices associated with the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

These changes are designated as administrative because they do not result in a technical change to the Technical Specifications.

A04 CTS 1.6 defines CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, in part, as "the injection of a simulated signal into the channel as close to the sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions and channel failure trips."

ITS defines it as "the injection of a simulated or actual signal into the channel as close to the sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY of all devices in the channel required for channel OPERABILITY. This changes the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST by stating that the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may

DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS 1.0, USE AND APPLICATIONS Hope Creek Page 2 of 10 include the injection of a simulated or actual signal and that it applies to all devices in the channel required for OPERABILITY. The addition of use of an actual signal is discussed in Discussion of Changes (DOC) L01. This changes the CTS by replacing the CTS statement shall encompass the entire channel including the sensor and alarm and/or trip functions with the ITS statement shall encompass all devices in the channel required for channel OPERABILITY.

This change is acceptable because the statements are equivalent in that both require verification of channel OPERABILITY. The CTS and the ITS use different examples of what is included in a channel, but this does not change the intent of the requirement. The ITS use of the phrase "all devices in the channel required for channel OPERABILITY" reflects the CTS understanding that the test includes only those portions of the channel needed to perform the specified safety function(s).

These changes are designated as administrative because they do not result in a technical change to the Technical Specifications.

A05 CTS 1.6, Critical Power Ratio (CPR) definition has been incorporated into the definition of Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR). The term CPR is not used in the ITS. This change is acceptable because it results in no technical changes to the Technical Specifications.

This change is designated as administrative because it rearranges existing definitions, with no change in intent.

A06 CTS Section 1.0 includes the following definitions:

-AVERAGE DISINTEGRATION ENERGY FREQUENCY NOTATION LIMITING CONTROL ROD PATTERN OFF-GAS RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM (PCP)

PHYSICS TEST PURGE - PURGING REPORTABLE EVENT ROD DENSITY SOURCE CHECK SPIRAL RELOAD SPIRAL UNLOAD STAGGERED TEST BASIS VENTILATION EXHAUST TREATMENT SYSTEM VENTING The ITS does not use this terminology and ITS Section 1.1 does not contain these definitions. The FREQUENCY NOTATION definition deletion and Table 1.1, Surveillance Frequency Notation, deletion is discussed in DOC LA01.

These changes are acceptable because the terms are not used as defined terms in the ITS. Discussions of any technical changes related to the deletion of these

DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS 1.0, USE AND APPLICATIONS Hope Creek Page 3 of 10 terms are included in the DOCs for the CTS sections in which the terms are used. These changes are designated as administrative because they eliminate defined terms that are no longer used.

A07 CTS Section 1.0 provides definitions for IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE, PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, and UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE. ITS Section 1.1 includes these requirements in one definition called LEAKAGE (which includes three categories: identified LEAKAGE, unidentified LEAKAGE, and pressure boundary LEAKAGE). This changes the CTS by incorporating the definitions into the ITS LEAKAGE definition with no technical changes. The ITS definitions of each of the subcategories of LEAKAGE are consistent with the CTS definitions.

Additionally, the BWR ISTS, NUREG 1433, Rev 5, definition for "Total Leakage" has been included for clarity and completeness.

The CTS description of identified leakage as the " leakage into collection systems" is intended to include only the leakage into those collection systems in the drywell space and the term leakage is considered to mean leakage into the drywell. Therefore, the ITS uses the term " leakage into the drywell," instead of "

leakage into collection systems," to more accurately reflect the intent. The definition continues to refer to IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE as also being captured and conducted to a sump or collecting tank."

This change is acceptable because it results in no technical changes to the Technical Specifications. This change is designated an administrative change in that it rearranges existing definitions, with no change in intent.

A08 CTS 1.22, Logic System Functional Test, states that the test shall be a test of all logic components, i.e., all relays and contacts, all trip units, solid state logic elements, etc, of a logic circuit, from sensor through and including the actuated device, to verify OPERABILITY. ITS states that the test shall be a test of all logic components required for OPERABILITY of a logic circuit, from as close to the sensor as practicable up to, but not including, the actuated device, to verify OPERABILITY. This changes the CTS by allowing the injection of the signal into the channel to be injected "in the channel as close to the sensor as practicable" instead of "from sensor" and by excluding the actuated device from the test. This change allows the logic system functional test to be performed by injecting a signal "as close to the sensor as practicable." Injecting a signal at the sensor would, in some cases, involve significantly increased probabilities of initiating undesired circuits during the test. Allowing initiation of the signal close to the sensor in lieu of at the sensor provides a complete test of the logic channel while significantly reducing the probability of undesired initiation. In addition, the sensor is still being checked during a channel calibration and the system function is still being checked using the system functional test.

Additionally, the Logic System Functional Test definition is modified to exclude the actuated device. The actuated device will be tested as part of a system channel functional test specified in the Specification for each system. Deleting the actuated device from the Logic System Functional Test definition eliminates the confusion as to whether a previously performed Logic System Functional Test is rendered invalid if the actuated device is discovered to be inoperable because of another Surveillance.

DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS 1.0, USE AND APPLICATIONS Hope Creek Page 4 of 10 These changes are acceptable because they result in no technical changes to the Technical Specifications. This change is designated an administrative change because the logic system functions continue to be fully tested.

A09 The CTS Section 1.0 definition of OPERABLE - OPERABILITY requires that "A system, subsystem, train, component, or device shall be OPERABLE or have OPERABILITY when it is capable of performing its specified function(s) and when all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, electrical power, cooling or seal water, lubrication or other auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, train, component or device to perform its function(s) are also capable of performing their related support function(s)." The ITS Section 1.1 definition of OPERABLE - OPERABILITY will replace the phrase "specified function(s)" with "specified safety functions."

The CTS Section 1.0 definition of OPERABLE - OPERABILITY requires a system, subsystem, train, component, or device to be capable of performing its "specified function(s)" and all necessary support systems to also be capable of performing their "function(s)." The ITS Section 1.1 definition of OPERABLE -

OPERABILITY requires the system, subsystem, train, component, or device to be capable of performing the "specified safety function(s)," and requires all necessary support systems that are required for the system, subsystem, train, component, or device to perform its "specified safety function(s)" to also be capable of performing their related support functions. This changes the CTS by altering the requirement to be able to perform "specified functions" to a requirement to be able to perform "specified safety functions."

The purpose of the CTS and ITS definitions of OPERABLE - OPERABILITY are to ensure that the safety analysis assumptions regarding equipment and variables are valid. This change is acceptable because the intent of both the CTS and ITS definitions is to address the safety function(s) assumed in the accident analysis and not encompass other non-safety functions a system may also perform. These non-safety functions are not assumed in the safety analysis and are not needed in order to protect the public health and safety. This change is consistent with the current interpretation and use of the terms OPERABLE and OPERABILITY. This change is designated as administrative as it does not change the current use and application of the Technical Specifications.

A10 The CTS 1.28 definition of OPERABLE - OPERABILITY requires that all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, electrical power, cooling or seal water, lubrication or other auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, train, component or device to perform its function(s) are also capable of performing their related support function(s). The ITS definition of OPERABLE

- OPERABILITY will replace the phrase electrical power" with "normal or emergency electrical power." This changes the CTS definition of OPERABLE -

OPERABILITY by allowing a device to be considered OPERABLE with either normal or emergency power available.

The OPERABILITY requirements for normal and emergency power sources are addressed in CTS Section 3/4.8. These requirements allow only the normal or the emergency electrical power source to be OPERABLE, provided its redundant

DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS 1.0, USE AND APPLICATIONS Hope Creek Page 5 of 10 system(s), subsystem(s), train(s), component(s), and device(s) (redundant to the systems, subsystems, trains, components, and devices with an inoperable power source) are OPERABLE. Therefore, the ITS definition uses the words "normal or emergency" consistent with CTS Section 3/4.8. This change is designated administrative since the ITS definition is effectively the same as the CTS definition.

A11 CTS 1.28 definition uses the term OPERATIONAL CONDITION - CONDITION.

ITS definition uses the term MODE. The CTS term Operational Condition -

Condition is replaced by the ITS defined term MODE. This terminology is used so that ITS will be consistent with BWR ISTS, NUREG 1433, Rev 5. Since the terms are defined and the change is made consistently throughout the ITS, this change is designated as administrative because it does not result in a technical change to the Technical Specifications.

A12 CTS Table 1.2 contains Note

  • that states, "Fuel in the reactor vessel with the vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned or with the head removed."

ITS Section 1.1 and Table 1.1-1, "MODES," changes the CTS MODE definitions in the following ways:

The CTS Table 1.2 Note

  • condition "fuel in the vessel" is moved to the ITS MODE definition.

This change is acceptable because it moves information within the Technical Specifications with no change in intent. Each MODE in the Table includes fuel in the vessel.

CTS Table 1.2, Note

  • in part states, "with the vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned or with the head removed." ITS splits this portion of the Note into two Notes, Notes (a), and (b). ITS Note (a) states, "All reactor vessel head closure bolts fully tensioned," while Note (b) states, "One or more reactor vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned." This change simplifies what CTS is stating by clearly defining when the reactor is in a refueling condition instead of a shutdown condition.

This change is acceptable because the revised phrase is consistent with the current interpretation and usage. MODE 5 is currently declared when the first vessel head closure bolt is detensioned. This change also eliminates a redundant phrase. The reactor vessel head cannot be removed unless the reactor vessel head closure bolts are unbolted and they cannot be unbolted unless they are detensioned. Since vessel head closure bolts less then fully tensioned is already specified in the CTS Note, including or with the reactor head removed is unnecessary.

ITS Table 1.1-1 contains a new Note (a), which applies to MODES 2, 3, and

4. Note (a) states "All reactor vessel head closure bolts fully tensioned." This Note is the opposite of CTS Note
  • and ITS Table 1.1-1 Note (b).

This change is acceptable because it avoids a conflict between the definition of MODE 5 and the other MODES should RCS temperature increase above

DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS 1.0, USE AND APPLICATIONS Hope Creek Page 6 of 10 the CTS MODE 5 average reactor coolant temperature. The ITS Note (b) limit of one or more reactor vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned is included only for clarity. It is consistent with the current use of MODES 4 and 5 and does not result in any technical change to the application of the MODES.

Additionally, CTS Table 1.2 average reactor coolant temperature upper limit of 140°F is deleted and is not an ITS MODE 5, Refueling, condition. This change is acceptable because it eliminates a conflict in the CTS MODE Table. If the average coolant temperature exceeds the upper limit with the reactor vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned, the CTS Table could be misinterpreted as no MODE being applicable. This is not the intent of the CTS or ITS MODE 5 definitions. By removing the temperature reference, this ambiguity is eliminated and sufficiently conservative restrictions will be applied by the applicable LCOs during all fueled conditions with the vessel head bolts detensioned.

For consistency with the Notes in ITS Table 1.1-1, the ITS definition of MODE adds, "reactor vessel head closure bolt tensioning" to the list of characteristics that define a MODE. Currently, the CTS definition does not include this clarification.

This change is acceptable because the definition of MODE should be consistent with the MODE table in order to avoid confusion. This change is made only for consistency and results in no technical changes to the Technical Specifications.

These changes are designated as administrative because they clarify the application of the MODES and no technical changes to the MODE definitions are made. The clarifications are consistent with the current use and application of the MODES.

A13 CTS 1.31, PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, states that PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE shall be leakage through a non-isolable fault in a reactor coolant system component body, pipe wall or vessel wall. ITS defines Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE as LEAKAGE through a fault in a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) component body, pipe wall, or vessel wall. LEAKAGE past seals, packing, and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE. This changes the CTS by revising the pressure boundary LEAKAGE definition to delete the word non-isolable and adding the sentence LEAKAGE past seals, packing, and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE.

These changes are consistent with Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) traveler TSTF-554, Revision 1, Revise Reactor Coolant Leakage Requirements (ADAMS Accession No. ML20016A233) As stated in the NRC Safety Evaluation (SE) accompanying TSTF-554, deletion of the word nonisolable does not alter the fundamental meaning that pressure boundary leakage represents degradation that could ultimately result in a loss of structural integrity. The NRC concluded that deleting the word nonisolable provides a clearer definition of pressure boundary leakage and does not conflict with the reactor coolant pressure boundary definition in 10 CFR 50.2. Additionally, the sentence

DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS 1.0, USE AND APPLICATIONS Hope Creek Page 7 of 10 LEAKAGE past seals, packing, and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE, is consistent with the discussion in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.45 that pressure boundary leakage is not leakage from seals, gaskets, or packing. That considered, the changes to the definition of pressure boundary leakage are acceptable.

TSTF traveler TSTF-554 incorporated changes to the Standard Technical Specifications (STSs) under the consolidated line item improvement process (CLIIP). TSTF-554 was approved for use by the NRC as documented in the accompanying SE dated December 18, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20322A361, ML20322A024). HCGS has reviewed the NRC SE and concluded that the justification presented in TSTF-554 and the SE prepared by the NRC staff are applicable to HCGS and justify this change. TSTF-554 revised the technical specifications related to the LEAKAGE definition. Related changes are made to ITS 3.4.4, RCS Operational LEAKAGE, as discussed in ITS 3.4.4 Discussion of Changes.

This change is designated as administrative because it provides clarification and does not represent a technical change to the Technical Specifications.

A14 CTS 1.32, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY and CTS 1.39, SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY definitions are deleted since these definitions are not included in the ITS 1.1 Definitions. This change is acceptable because the Primary Containment Integrity and Secondary Containment Integrity definitions duplicate requirements that are appropriately contained in ITS Specifications.

The change is designated as administrative because the requirements contained in the CTS definitions are addressed in ITS Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) and associated Surveillance Requirements for the ITS 3.6, Containment Systems.

A15 CTS Table 1.2 footnote ** states See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.1 and 3.10.3. CTS Table 1.2 footnote + states See Special Test Exception 3.10.8.

The footnotes referencing Special Test Exceptions have been deleted. The purpose of the footnote references is to alert the user that a Special Test Exception exists that may modify the Applicability of the Specification. It is an ITS convention to not include these types of footnotes or cross-references. This change is designated as administrative as it incorporates an ITS convention with no technical change to the CTS.

A16 ITS Sections 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 contain information that is not in the CTS. This change to the CTS adds explanatory information on ITS usage that is not applicable to the CTS. The added sections are:

Section 1.2 - Logical Connectors Section 1.2 provides specific examples of the logical connectors "AND" and "OR" and the numbering sequence associated with their use.

DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS 1.0, USE AND APPLICATIONS Hope Creek Page 8 of 10 Section 1.3 - Completion Times Section 1.3 provides guidance on the proper use and interpretation of Completion Times. The section also provides specific examples that aid in the use and understanding of Completion Times Section 1.4 - Frequency Section 1.4 provides guidance on the proper use and interpretation of Surveillance Frequencies. The section also provides specific examples that aid in the use and understanding of Surveillance Frequency.

This change is acceptable because it aids in the understanding and use of the format and presentation style of the ITS. The addition of these sections does not add or delete technical requirements and will be discussed specifically in those Technical Specifications where application of the added sections results in a change. This change is designated as administrative because it does not result in a technical change to the Technical Specifications.

A17 CTS 1.11, DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 definition states, in part that The dose conversion factors used for this calculation shall be those listed in Table III of TID-14844, "Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites."

The ITS DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 definition provides thyroid dose conversion factors that may be used but does not include Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE) or Committed Effective Dose Equivalent (CEDE) dose conversion factors from Table 2.1 of EPA Federal Guidance Report No. 11, which should be used for plants licensed to 10 CFR 50.67.

HCGS plant is licensed to 10 CFR 50.67 (License Amendment No. 134, ADAMS Accession No. ML012600176) and the dose conversion factors used at HCGS are in accordance with Table 2.1, "Exposure-to-Dose Conversion Factors for Inhalation," of EPA Federal Guidance Report No. 11 (reference UFSAR Chapter 15 safety analysis dose conversion assumptions). Historically, HCGS previously used Table III of TID-14844. This changes the CTS DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 definition by adding The determination of DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 shall be performed using Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE) or Committed Effective Dose Equivalent (CEDE) dose conversion factors from Table 2.1 of EPA Federal Guidance Report No. 11," and clarifying that the thyroid dose is equivalent to the inhaled combined activities of the specified iodine isotopes.

This change aligns the DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 definition with the current licensing basis and is designated as administrative.

MORE RESTRICTIVE CHANGES None

DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS 1.0, USE AND APPLICATIONS Hope Creek Page 9 of 10 RELOCATED SPECIFICATIONS None REMOVED DETAIL CHANGES LA01 (Type 4 - Removal of LCO, SR, or other TS requirement to the TRM, UFSAR, ODCM, QAP, CLRT Program, IST Program, ISI Program, or Surveillance Frequency Control Program). CTS 1.17, FREQUENCY NOTATION and CTS Table 1.1, SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY NOTATION state FREQUENCY NOTATION specified for the performance of Surveillance Requirements in the CTS. The ITS state periodic Frequency as "In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program." The CTS have implemented the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. This changes the CTS by deleting the FREQUENCY NOTATION definition and moving the SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY NOTATION Table to the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

The removal of FREQUENCY NOTATION specified for the performance of Surveillance Requirements from the Technical Specifications is acceptable because this type of information is not necessary to be included in the Technical Specifications to provide adequate protection of public health and safety. The ITS retains the requirement by stating "In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. This change is acceptable because these types of procedural details will be adequately controlled in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. This change is designated as a less restrictive removal of detail change because the FREQUENCY NOTATION specified for the performance of Surveillance Frequencies is being removed from the Technical Specifications and placed in a licensee control document.

LESS RESTRICTIVE CHANGES L01 CTS Section 1.0 definition of CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST requires the use of a simulated signal when performing the test. ITS Section 1.1 allows the use of a simulated or actual signal when performing the test. This changes the CTS by allowing the use of unplanned actuations to perform the Surveillance based on the collection of sufficient information to satisfy the surveillance test requirements.

This change is acceptable because the channel itself cannot discriminate between an "actual" or "simulated" signal. Therefore, the results of the testing are unaffected by the type of signal used to initiate the test. This change is designated as less restrictive because it allows an actual signal to be credited for Surveillance where only a simulated signal was previously allowed.

L02 CTS Section 1.0 definition of EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (ECCS)

RESPONSE TIME, ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME and REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) RESPONSE TIME require that in lieu of measurement, response time may be verified for selected components provided

DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS 1.0, USE AND APPLICATIONS Hope Creek Page 10 of 10 that the components and methodology for verification have been previously reviewed and approved by the NRC. ITS Section 1.1 allows components to be evaluated in accordance with an NRC approved methodology.

The change revises the CTS definition for ECCS Response Time, Isolation System Response Time and RPS Response Time that are referenced in Surveillance Requirements (SRs), hereafter referred to as response time testing (RTT). The definitions are revised to add the statement In lieu of measurement, response time may be verified for selected components provided that the components and methodology for verification have been previously reviewed and approved by the NRC at the end of the last sentence in the definitions. The changes are based on Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) traveler TSTF-332, Revision 1, ECCS Response Time Testing, dated September 25, 2000 (ADAMS Accession No. ML003751434). The NRC did not separately document their approval of TSTF-332, Revision 1 with a model Safety Evaluation. However, the TS changes associated with this Traveler were incorporated into NUREG-1433 Revision 2. HCGS has reviewed TSTF-332, Revision 1 and has determined that the proposed change and associated justification are applicable to HCGS. HCGS is not proposing any variations from the TS changes described in TSTF-332, Revision 1. These changes are consistent with the ECCS Response Time, Isolation System Response Time and RPS Response Time definitions presented in NUREG 1433, Standard Technical Specifications - General Electric BWR/4 Plants.

This change is acceptable because the changes are based on TSTF-332-A, Revision 1 and the corresponding ECCS Response Time, Isolation System Response Time and RPS Response Time definitions presented in NUREG 1433, Standard Technical Specifications - General Electric BWR/4 Plants. There are no proposed variations from the TS changes described in TSTF-332, Revision 1.

This change is designated as less restrictive because it allows use of additional NRC approved methodology for evaluation of RTT.

Improved Standard Technical Specifications (ISTS) Markup and Justification for Deviations (JFDs)

Definitions 1.1 General Electric BWR/4 STS 1.1-1 Rev. 5.0 CTS Hope Creek Amendment XXX 1

1.0 USE AND APPLICATION 1.1 Definitions

NOTE-----------------------------------------------------------

The defined terms of this section appear in capitalized type and are applicable throughout these Technical Specifications and Bases.

Term Definition ACTIONS ACTIONS shall be that part of a Specification that prescribes Required Actions to be taken under designated Conditions within specified Completion Times.

AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR The APLHGR shall be applicable to a specific planar height HEAT GENERATION RATE and is equal to the sum of the [LHGRs] [heat generation rate (APLHGR) per unit length of fuel rod] for all the fuel rods in the specified bundle at the specified height divided by the number of fuel rods in the fuel bundle [at the height].

CHANNEL CALIBRATION A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be the adjustment, as necessary, of the channel output such that it responds within the necessary range and accuracy to known values of the parameter that the channel monitors. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall encompass all devices in the channel required for channel OPERABILITY and the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. Calibration of instrument channels with resistance temperature detector (RTD) or thermocouple sensors may consist of an inplace qualitative assessment of sensor behavior and normal calibration of the remaining adjustable devices in the channel. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION may be performed by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel steps[, and each step must be performed within the Frequency in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program for the devices included in the step].

CHANNEL CHECK A CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment, by observation, of channel behavior during operation. This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of the channel indication and status to other indications or status derived from independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter.

1.1 1.3 1.4 1.5 2

2 2

Definitions 1.1 General Electric BWR/4 STS 1.1-2 Rev. 5.0 CTS Hope Creek Amendment XXX 1

1.1 Definitions CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be the injection of a simulated or actual signal into the channel as close to the sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY of all devices in the channel required for channel OPERABILITY. The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel steps[, and each step must be performed within the Frequency in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program for the devices included in the step].

CORE ALTERATION CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement of any fuel, sources, or reactivity control components, within the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel.

The following exceptions are not considered to be CORE ALTERATIONS:

a.

Movement of source range monitors, local power range monitors, intermediate range monitors, traversing incore probes, or special movable detectors (including undervessel replacement), and

b.

Control rod movement, provided there are no fuel assemblies in the associated core cell.

Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

CORE OPERATING LIMITS The COLR is the unit specific document that provides cycle REPORT (COLR) specific parameter limits for the current reload cycle. These cycle specific limits shall be determined for each reload cycle in accordance with Specification 5.6.3. Plant operation within these limits is addressed in individual Specifications.

DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 shall be that concentration of I-131 (microcuries/gram) that alone would produce the same thyroid dose as the quantity and isotopic mixture of I-131, I-132, I-133, I-134, and I-135 actually present. The thyroid dose conversion factors used for this calculation shall be those listed in

[Table III of TID-14844, AEC, 1962, "Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites" or those listed in Table E-7 of Regulatory Guide 1.109, Rev. 1, NRC, 1977, or ICRP 30, Supplement to Part 1, page 192-212, Table titled, "Committed Dose Equivalent in Target Organs or Tissues per Intake of Unit Activity"].

1.6 1.7 1.9 1.11 3

2 when inhaled as the combined activities of iodine isotopes determination of DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 shall be performed using Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE) or Committed Effective Dose Equivalent (CEDE) dose conversion factors from Table 2.1 of EPA Federal Guidance Report No. 11.

2

Definitions 1.1 General Electric BWR/4 STS 1.1-3 Rev. 5.0 CTS Hope Creek Amendment XXX 1

1.1 Definitions DRAIN TIME The DRAIN TIME is the time it would take for the water inventory in and above the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) to drain to the top of the active fuel (TAF) seated in the RPV assuming:

a)

The water inventory above the TAF is divided by the limiting drain rate; b)

The limiting drain rate is the larger of the drain rate through a single penetration flow path with the highest flow rate, or the sum of the drain rates through multiple penetration flow paths susceptible to a common mode failure, for all penetration flow paths below the TAF except:

1.

Penetration flow paths connected to an intact closed system, or isolated by manual or automatic valves that are closed and administratively controlled in the closed position, blank flanges, or other devices that prevent flow of reactor coolant through the penetration flow paths;

2.

Penetration flow paths capable of being isolated by valves that will close automatically without offsite power prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF when actuated by RPV water level isolation instrumentation; or

3.

Penetration flow paths with isolation devices that can be closed prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF by a dedicated operator trained in the task, who in continuous communication with the control room, is stationed at the controls, and is capable of closing the penetration flow path isolation device without offsite power.

c)

The penetration flow paths required to be evaluated per paragraph b) are assumed to open instantaneously and are not subsequently isolated, and no water is assumed to be subsequently added to the RPV water inventory; d)

No additional draining events occur; and e)

Realistic cross-sectional areas and drain rates are used.

A bounding DRAIN TIME may be used in lieu of a calculated value.

1.11.1

Definitions 1.1 General Electric BWR/4 STS 1.1-4 Rev. 5.0 CTS Hope Creek Amendment XXX 1

1.13 1.14 1.18.1 1.19 1.1 Definitions EMERGENCY CORE COOLING The ECCS RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval from SYSTEM (ECCS) RESPONSE when the monitored parameter exceeds its ECCS initiation TIME setpoint at the channel sensor until the ECCS equipment is capable of performing its safety function (i.e., the valves travel to their required positions, pump discharge pressures reach their required values, etc.). Times shall include diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays, where applicable. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured. In lieu of measurement, response time may be verified for selected components provided that the components and methodology for verification have been previously reviewed and approved by the NRC.

END OF CYCLE RECIRCULA-The EOC RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that time TION PUMP TRIP (EOC RPT) interval from initial signal generation by [the associated turbine SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME stop valve limit switch or from when the turbine control valve hydraulic oil control oil pressure drops below the pressure switch setpoint] to complete suppression of the electric arc between the fully open contacts of the recirculation pump circuit breaker. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured, [except for the breaker arc suppression time, which is not measured but is validated to conform to the manufacturer's design value].

INSERVICE TESTING The INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM is the licensee PROGRAM program that fulfills the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(f).

ISOLATION SYSTEM The ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that RESPONSE TIME time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its isolation initiation setpoint at the channel sensor until the isolation valves travel to their required positions. Times shall include diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays, where applicable. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured. In lieu of measurement, response time may be verified for selected components provided that the components and methodology for verification have been previously reviewed and approved by the NRC.

2 2

Definitions 1.1 General Electric BWR/4 STS 1.1-5 Rev. 5.0 CTS Hope Creek Amendment XXX 1

1.18 1.31 1.49 1.21 1.22 DOC A07 1.1 Definitions LEAKAGE LEAKAGE shall be:

a.

Identified LEAKAGE

1.

LEAKAGE into the drywell, such as that from pump seals or valve packing that is captured and conducted to a sump or collecting tank; or

2.

LEAKAGE into the drywell atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known to not interfere with the operation of leakage detection systems;

b.

Unidentified LEAKAGE All LEAKAGE into the drywell that is not identified LEAKAGE;

c.

Total LEAKAGE Sum of the identified and unidentified LEAKAGE; and

d.

Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE LEAKAGE through a fault in a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) component body, pipe wall, or vessel wall.

LEAKAGE past seals, packing, and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE.

[ LINEAR HEAT GENERATION The LHGR shall be the heat generation rate per unit length of RATE (LHGR) fuel rod. It is the integral of the heat flux over the heat transfer area associated with the unit length. ]

LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL A LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be a test of all TEST logic components required for OPERABILITY of a logic circuit, from as close to the sensor as practicable up to, but not including, the actuated device, to verify OPERABILITY. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total system steps so that the entire logic system is tested.

[ MAXIMUM FRACTION OF The MFLPD shall be the largest value of the fraction of limiting LIMITING POWER DENSITY power density in the core. The fraction of limiting power (MFLPD) density shall be the LHGR existing at a given location divided by the specified LHGR limit for that bundle type. ]

2 2

Definitions 1.1 General Electric BWR/4 STS 1.1-6 Rev. 5.0 CTS Hope Creek Amendment XXX 1

1.25 1.10 1.28 1.29 1.30-1 1.35 1.1 Definitions MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER The MCPR shall be the smallest critical power ratio (CPR) that RATIO (MCPR) exists in the core [for each class of fuel]. The CPR is that power in the assembly that is calculated by application of the appropriate correlation(s) to cause some point in the assembly to experience boiling transition, divided by the actual assembly operating power.

MODE A MODE shall correspond to any one inclusive combination of mode switch position, average reactor coolant temperature, and reactor vessel head closure bolt tensioning specified in Table 1.1-1 with fuel in the reactor vessel.

OPERABLE - OPERABILITY A system, subsystem, division, component, or device shall be OPERABLE or have OPERABILITY when it is capable of performing its specified safety function(s) and when all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, normal or emergency electrical power, cooling and seal water, lubrication, and other auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, division, component, or device to perform its specified safety function(s) are also capable of performing their related support function(s).

PHYSICS TESTS PHYSICS TESTS shall be those tests performed to measure the fundamental nuclear characteristics of the reactor core and related instrumentation.5 These tests are:

a.

Described in Chapter [14, Initial Test Program] of the

FSAR,
b.

Authorized under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59, or

c.

Otherwise approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

PRESSURE AND The PTLR is the unit specific document that provides the TEMPERATURE LIMITS reactor vessel pressure and temperature limits, including REPORT (PTLR) heatup and cooldown rates, for the current reactor vessel fluence period. These pressure and temperature limits shall be determined for each fluence period in accordance with Specification 5.6.4.

RATED THERMAL POWER RTP shall be a total reactor core heat transfer rate to the (RTP) reactor coolant of [2436] MWt.

3902 2

2 5

Definitions 1.1 General Electric BWR/4 STS 1.1-7 Rev. 5.0 CTS Hope Creek Amendment XXX 1

1.36 1.40 1.47 1.1 Definitions REACTOR PROTECTION The RPS RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval from SYSTEM (RPS) RESPONSE when the monitored parameter exceeds its RPS trip setpoint at TIME the channel sensor until de-energization of the scram pilot valve solenoids. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured. In lieu of measurement, response time may be verified for selected components provided that the components and methodology for verification have been previously reviewed and approved by the NRC.

SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)

SDM shall be the amount of reactivity by which the reactor is subcritical or would be subcritical throughout the operating cycle assuming that:

a.

The reactor is xenon free,

b.

The moderator temperature is 68°F, corresponding to the most reactive state; and

c.

All control rods are fully inserted except for the single control rod of highest reactivity worth, which is assumed to be fully withdrawn. With control rods not capable of being fully inserted, the reactivity worth of these control rods must be accounted for in the determination of SDM.

[ STAGGERED TEST BASIS A STAGGERED TEST BASIS shall consist of the testing of one of the systems, subsystems, channels, or other designated components during the interval specified by the Surveillance Frequency, so that all systems, subsystems, channels, or other designated components are tested during n Surveillance Frequency intervals, where n is the total number of systems, subsystems, channels, or other designated components in the associated function. ]

THERMAL POWER THERMAL POWER shall be the total reactor core heat transfer rate to the reactor coolant.

2

Definitions 1.1 General Electric BWR/4 STS 1.1-8 Rev. 5.0 CTS Hope Creek Amendment XXX 1

1.48 1.1 Definitions

[ TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM The TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME consists RESPONSE TIME of two components:

a.

The time from initial movement of the main turbine stop valve or control valve until 80% of the turbine bypass capacity is established and

b.

The time from initial movement of the main turbine stop valve or control valve until initial movement of the turbine bypass valve.

The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured. ]

2

Definitions 1.1 General Electric BWR/4 STS 1.1-9 Rev. 5.0 CTS Hope Creek Amendment XXX 1

Table 1.1-1 (page 1 of 1)

MODES MODE TITLE REACTOR MODE SWITCH POSITION AVERAGE REACTOR COOLANT TEMPERATURE

(°F) 1 Power Operation Run NA 2

Startup Refuel(a) or Startup/Hot Standby NA 3

Hot Shutdown(a)

Shutdown

> [200]

4 Cold Shutdown(a)

Shutdown

[200]

5 Refueling(b)

Shutdown or Refuel NA (a) All reactor vessel head closure bolts fully tensioned.

(b) One or more reactor vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned.

2 2

Logical Connectors 1.2 General Electric BWR/4 STS 1.2-1 Rev. 5.0 Hope Creek Amendment XXX 1

1.0 USE AND APPLICATION 1.2 Logical Connectors PURPOSE The purpose of this section is to explain the meaning of logical connectors.

Logical connectors are used in Technical Specifications (TS) to discriminate between, and yet connect, discrete Conditions, Required Actions, Completion Times, Surveillances, and Frequencies. The only logical connectors that appear in TS are AND and OR. The physical arrangement of these connectors constitutes logical conventions with specific meanings.

BACKGROUND Several levels of logic may be used to state Required Actions. These levels are identified by the placement (or nesting) of the logical connectors and by the number assigned to each Required Action. The first level of logic is identified by the first digit of the number assigned to a Required Action and the placement of the logical connector in the first level of nesting (i.e., left justified with the number of the Required Action).

The successive levels of logic are identified by additional digits of the Required Action number and by successive indentions of the logical connectors.

When logical connectors are used to state a Condition, Completion Time, Surveillance, or Frequency, only the first level of logic is used, and the logical connector is left justified with the statement of the Condition, Completion Time, Surveillance, or Frequency.

EXAMPLES The following examples illustrate the use of logical connectors.

Logical Connectors 1.2 General Electric BWR/4 STS 1.2-2 Rev. 5.0 Hope Creek Amendment XXX 1

1.2 Logical Connectors EXAMPLES (continued)

EXAMPLE 1.2-1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. LCO not met.

A.1 Verify...

AND A.2 Restore...

In this example the logical connector AND is used to indicate that when in Condition A, both Required Actions A.1 and A.2 must be completed.

Logical Connectors 1.2 General Electric BWR/4 STS 1.2-3 Rev. 5.0 Hope Creek Amendment XXX 1

1.2 Logical Connectors EXAMPLES (continued)

EXAMPLE 1.2-2 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. LCO not met.

A.1 Trip...

OR A.2.1 Verify...

AND A.2.2.1 Reduce...

OR A.2.2.2 Perform...

OR A.3 Align...

This example represents a more complicated use of logical connectors.

Required Actions A.1, A.2, and A.3 are alternative choices, only one of which must be performed as indicated by the use of the logical connector OR and the left justified placement. Any one of these three Actions may be chosen. If A.2 is chosen, then both A.2.1 and A.2.2 must be performed as indicated by the logical connector AND. Required Action A.2.2 is met by performing A.2.2.1 or A.2.2.2. The indented position of the logical connector OR indicates that A.2.2.1 and A.2.2.2 are alternative choices, only one of which must be performed.

Completion Times 1.3 General Electric BWR/4 STS 1.3-1 Rev. 5.0 Hope Creek Amendment XXX 1

1.0 USE AND APPLICATION 1.3 Completion Times PURPOSE The purpose of this section is to establish the Completion Time convention and to provide guidance for its use.

BACKGROUND Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) specify minimum requirements for ensuring safe operation of the unit. The ACTIONS associated with an LCO state Conditions that typically describe the ways in which the requirements of the LCO can fail to be met. Specified with each stated Condition are Required Action(s) and Completion Time(s).

DESCRIPTION The Completion Time is the amount of time allowed for completing a Required Action. It is referenced to the time of discovery of a situation (e.g., inoperable equipment or variable not within limits) that requires entering an ACTIONS Condition unless otherwise specified, providing the unit is in a MODE or specified condition stated in the Applicability of the LCO.

Unless otherwise specified, the Completion Time begins when a senior licensed operator on the operating shift crew with responsibility for plant operations makes the determination that an LCO is not met and an ACTIONS Condition is entered. The "otherwise specified" exceptions are varied, such as a Required Action Note or Surveillance Requirement Note that provides an alternative time to perform specific tasks, such as testing, without starting the Completion Time. While utilizing the Note, should a Condition be applicable for any reason not addressed by the Note, the Completion Time begins. Should the time allowance in the Note be exceeded, the Completion Time begins at that point. The exceptions may also be incorporated into the Completion Time. For example, LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating," Required Action B.2, requires declaring required feature(s) supported by an inoperable diesel generator, inoperable when the redundant required feature(s) are inoperable. The Completion Time states, "4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> from discovery of Condition B concurrent with inoperability of redundant required feature(s)." In this case the Completion Time does not begin until the conditions in the Completion Time are satisfied.

Required Actions must be completed prior to the expiration of the specified Completion Time. An ACTIONS Condition remains in effect and the Required Actions apply until the Condition no longer exists or the unit is not within the LCO Applicability.

If situations are discovered that require entry into more than one Condition at a time within a single LCO (multiple Conditions), the Required Actions for each Condition must be performed within the

Completion Times 1.3 General Electric BWR/4 STS 1.3-2 Rev. 5.0 Hope Creek Amendment XXX 1

1.3 Completion Times DESCRIPTION (continued) associated Completion Time. When in multiple Conditions, separate Completion Times are tracked for each Condition starting from the discovery of the situation that required entry into the Condition, unless otherwise specified.

Once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition, unless specifically stated. The Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply to each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition, unless otherwise specified.

However, when a subsequent division, subsystem, component, or variable expressed in the Condition is discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, the Completion Time(s) may be extended. To apply this Completion Time extension, two criteria must first be met. The subsequent inoperability:

a.

Must exist concurrent with the first inoperability and

b.

Must remain inoperable or not within limits after the first inoperability is resolved.

The total Completion Time allowed for completing a Required Action to address the subsequent inoperability shall be limited to the more restrictive of either:

a.

The stated Completion Time, as measured from the initial entry into the Condition, plus an additional 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or

b.

The stated Completion Time as measured from discovery of the subsequent inoperability.

The above Completion Time extensions do not apply to those Specifications that have exceptions that allow completely separate re-entry into the Condition (for each division, subsystem, component, or variable expressed in the Condition) and separate tracking of Completion Times based on this re-entry. These exceptions are stated in individual Specifications.

Completion Times 1.3 General Electric BWR/4 STS 1.3-3 Rev. 5.0 Hope Creek Amendment XXX 1

1.3 Completion Times DESCRIPTION (continued)

The above Completion Time extension does not apply to a Completion Time with a modified "time zero." This modified "time zero" may be expressed as a repetitive time (i.e., "once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />," where the Completion Time is referenced from a previous completion of the Required Action versus the time of Condition entry) or as a time modified by the phrase "from discovery..."

EXAMPLES The following examples illustrate the use of Completion Times with different types of Conditions and changing Conditions.

EXAMPLE 1.3-1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.

B.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND B.2 Be in MODE 4.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 36 hours Condition B has two Required Actions. Each Required Action has its own separate Completion Time. Each Completion Time is referenced to the time that Condition B is entered.

The Required Actions of Condition B are to be in MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> AND in MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. A total of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is allowed for reaching MODE 3 and a total of 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> (not 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />) is allowed for reaching MODE 4 from the time that Condition B was entered. If MODE 3 is reached within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, the time allowed for reaching MODE 4 is the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> because the total time allowed for reaching MODE 4 is 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

If Condition B is entered while in MODE 3, the time allowed for reaching MODE 4 is the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

Completion Times 1.3 General Electric BWR/4 STS 1.3-4 Rev. 5.0 Hope Creek Amendment XXX 1

1.3 Completion Times EXAMPLES (continued)

EXAMPLE 1.3-2 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One pump inoperable.

A.1 Restore pump to OPERABLE status.

7 days B. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.

B.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND B.2 Be in MODE 4.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 36 hours When a pump is declared inoperable, Condition A is entered. If the pump is not restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days, Condition B is also entered and the Completion Time clocks for Required Actions B.1 and B.2 start. If the inoperable pump is restored to OPERABLE status after Condition B is entered, Conditions A and B are exited, and therefore, the Required Actions of Condition B may be terminated.

When a second pump is declared inoperable while the first pump is still inoperable, Condition A is not re-entered for the second pump.

LCO 3.0.3 is entered, since the ACTIONS do not include a Condition for more than one inoperable pump. The Completion Time clock for Condition A does not stop after LCO 3.0.3 is entered, but continues to be tracked from the time Condition A was initially entered.

While in LCO 3.0.3, if one of the inoperable pumps is restored to OPERABLE status and the Completion Time for Condition A has not expired, LCO 3.0.3 may be exited and operation continued in accordance with Condition A.

While in LCO 3.0.3, if one of the inoperable pumps is restored to OPERABLE status and the Completion Time for Condition A has expired, LCO 3.0.3 may be exited and operation continued in accordance with Condition B. The Completion Time for Condition B is tracked from the time the Condition A Completion Time expired.

Completion Times 1.3 General Electric BWR/4 STS 1.3-5 Rev. 5.0 Hope Creek Amendment XXX 1

1.3 Completion Times EXAMPLES (continued)

On restoring one of the pumps to OPERABLE status, the Condition A Completion Time is not reset, but continues from the time the first pump was declared inoperable. This Completion Time may be extended if the pump restored to OPERABLE status was the first inoperable pump. A 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> extension to the stated 7 days is allowed, provided this does not result in the second pump being inoperable for > 7 days.

EXAMPLE 1.3-3 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One Function X subsystem inoperable.

A.1 Restore Function X subsystem to OPERABLE status.

7 days B. One Function Y subsystem inoperable.

B.1 Restore Function Y subsystem to OPERABLE status.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> C. One Function X subsystem inoperable.

AND One Function Y subsystem inoperable.

C.1 Restore Function X subsystem to OPERABLE status.

OR C.2 Restore Function Y subsystem to OPERABLE status.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> 72 hours When one Function X subsystem and one Function Y subsystem are inoperable, Condition A and Condition B are concurrently applicable. The Completion Times for Condition A and Condition B are tracked separately

Completion Times 1.3 General Electric BWR/4 STS 1.3-6 Rev. 5.0 Hope Creek Amendment XXX 1

1.3 Completion Times EXAMPLES (continued) for each subsystem starting from the time each subsystem was declared inoperable and the Condition was entered. A separate Completion Time is established for Condition C and tracked from the time the second subsystem was declared inoperable (i.e., the time the situation described in Condition C was discovered).

If Required Action C.2 is completed within the specified Completion Time, Conditions B and C are exited. If the Completion Time for Required Action A.1 has not expired, operation may continue in accordance with Condition A. The remaining Completion Time in Condition A is measured from the time the affected subsystem was declared inoperable (i.e., initial entry into Condition A).

It is possible to alternate between Conditions A, B, and C in such a manner that operation could continue indefinitely without ever restoring systems to meet the LCO. However, doing so would be inconsistent with the basis of the Completion Times. Therefore, there shall be administrative controls to limit the maximum time allowed for any combination of Conditions that result in a single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the LCO. These administrative controls shall ensure that the Completion Times for those Conditions are not inappropriately extended.

EXAMPLE 1.3-4 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more valves inoperable.

A.1 Restore valve(s) to OPERABLE status.

4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> B. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.

B.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND B.2 Be in MODE 4.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 36 hours A single Completion Time is used for any number of valves inoperable at the same time. The Completion Time associated with Condition A is based on the initial entry into Condition A and is not tracked on a per

Completion Times 1.3 General Electric BWR/4 STS 1.3-7 Rev. 5.0 Hope Creek Amendment XXX 1

1.3 Completion Times EXAMPLES (continued) valve basis. Declaring subsequent valves inoperable, while Condition A is still in effect, does not trigger the tracking of separate Completion Times.

Once one of the valves has been restored to OPERABLE status, the Condition A Completion Time is not reset, but continues from the time the first valve was declared inoperable. The Completion Time may be extended if the valve restored to OPERABLE status was the first inoperable valve. The Condition A Completion Time may be extended for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> provided this does not result in any subsequent valve being inoperable for > 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

If the Completion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> (plus the extension) expires while one or more valves are still inoperable, Condition B is entered.

EXAMPLE 1.3-5 ACTIONS

NOTE--------------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each inoperable valve.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more valves inoperable.

A.1 Restore valve to OPERABLE status.

4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> B. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.

B.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND B.2 Be in MODE 4.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 36 hours The Note above the ACTIONS Table is a method of modifying how the Completion Time is tracked. If this method of modifying how the Completion Time is tracked was applicable only to a specific Condition, the Note would appear in that Condition rather than at the top of the ACTIONS Table.

Completion Times 1.3 General Electric BWR/4 STS 1.3-8 Rev. 5.0 Hope Creek Amendment XXX 1

1.3 Completion Times EXAMPLES (continued)

The Note allows Condition A to be entered separately for each inoperable valve, and Completion Times tracked on a per valve basis. When a valve is declared inoperable, Condition A is entered and its Completion Time starts. If subsequent valves are declared inoperable, Condition A is entered for each valve and separate Completion Times start and are tracked for each valve.

If the Completion Time associated with a valve in Condition A expires, Condition B is entered for that valve. If the Completion Times associated with subsequent valves in Condition A expire, Condition B is entered separately for each valve and separate Completion Times start and are tracked for each valve. If a valve that caused entry into Condition B is restored to OPERABLE status, Condition B is exited for that valve.

Since the Note in this example allows multiple Condition entry and tracking of separate Completion Times, Completion Time extensions do not apply.

EXAMPLE 1.3-6 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One channel inoperable.

A.1 Perform SR 3.x.x.x.

OR A.2 Reduce THERMAL POWER to 50% RTP.

Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> 8 hours B. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.

B.1 Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />

Completion Times 1.3 General Electric BWR/4 STS 1.3-9 Rev. 5.0 Hope Creek Amendment XXX 1

1.3 Completion Times EXAMPLES (continued)

Entry into Condition A offers a choice between Required Action A.1 or A.2. Required Action A.1 has a "once per" Completion Time, which qualifies for the 25% extension, per SR 3.0.2, to each performance after the initial performance. The initial 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> interval of Required Action A.1 begins when Condition A is entered and the initial performance of Required Action A.1 must be complete within the first 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> interval. If Required Action A.1 is followed and the Required Action is not met within the Completion Time (plus the extension allowed by SR 3.0.2),

Condition B is entered. If Required Action A.2 is followed and the Completion Time of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> is not met, Condition B is entered.

If after entry into Condition B, Required Action A.1 or A.2 is met, Condition B is exited and operation may then continue in Condition A.

EXAMPLE 1.3-7 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One subsystem inoperable.

A.1 Verify affected subsystem isolated.

AND A.2 Restore subsystem to OPERABLE status.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> AND Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> B. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.

B.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND B.2 Be in MODE 4.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 36 hours

Completion Times 1.3 General Electric BWR/4 STS 1.3-10 Rev. 5.0 Hope Creek Amendment XXX 1

1.3 Completion Times EXAMPLES (continued)

Required Action A.1 has two Completion Times. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time begins at the time the Condition is entered and each "Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter" interval begins upon performance of Required Action A.1.

If after Condition A is entered, Required Action A.1 is not met within either the initial 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or any subsequent 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> interval from the previous performance (plus the extension allowed by SR 3.0.2), Condition B is entered. The Completion Time clock for Condition A does not stop after Condition B is entered, but continues from the time Condition A was initially entered. If Required Action A.1 is met after Condition B is entered, Condition B is exited and operation may continue in accordance with Condition A, provided the Completion Time for Required Action A.2 has not expired.

Reviewer's Note ----------------------- --------------

Example 1.3-8 is only applicable to plants that have adopted the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.

[ EXAMPLE 1.3-8 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One subsystem inoperable.

A.1 Restore subsystem to OPERABLE status.

7 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program B. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.

B.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND B.2 Be in MODE 4.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 36 hours 2

4

Completion Times 1.3 General Electric BWR/4 STS 1.3-11 Rev. 5.0 Hope Creek Amendment XXX 1

1.3 Completion Times EXAMPLES (continued)

When a subsystem is declared inoperable, Condition A is entered. The 7 day Completion Time may be applied as discussed in Example 1.3-2.

However, the licensee may elect to apply the Risk Informed Completion Time Program which permits calculation of a Risk Informed Completion Time (RICT) that may be used to complete the Required Action beyond the 7 day Completion Time. The RICT cannot exceed 30 days. After the 7 day Completion Time has expired, the subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within the RICT or Condition B must also be entered.

The Risk Informed Completion Time Program requires recalculation of the RICT to reflect changing plant conditions. For planned changes, the revised RICT must be determined prior to implementation of the change in configuration. For emergent conditions, the revised RICT must be determined within the time limits of the Required Action Completion Time (i.e., not the RICT) or 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after the plant configuration change, whichever is less.

If the 7 day Completion Time clock of Condition A has expired and subsequent changes in plant condition result in exiting the applicability of the Risk Informed Completion Time Program without restoring the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status, Condition B is also entered and the Completion Time clocks for Required Actions B.1 and B.2 start.

If the RICT expires or is recalculated to be less than the elapsed time since the Condition was entered and the inoperable subsystem has not been restored to OPERABLE status, Condition B is also entered and the Completion Time clocks for Required Actions B.1 and B.2 start. If the inoperable subsystems are restored to OPERABLE status after Condition B is entered, Condition A is exited, and therefore, the Required Actions of Condition B may be terminated. ]

IMMEDIATE When "Immediately" is used as a Completion Time, the Required Action COMPLETION TIME should be pursued without delay and in a controlled manner.

2 4

Frequency 1.4 General Electric BWR/4 STS 1.4-1 Rev. 5.0 Hope Creek Amendment XXX 1

1.0 USE AND APPLICATION 1.4 Frequency PURPOSE The purpose of this section is to define the proper use and application of Frequency requirements.

DESCRIPTION Each Surveillance Requirement (SR) has a specified Frequency in which the Surveillance must be met in order to meet the associated LCO. An understanding of the correct application of the specified Frequency is necessary for compliance with the SR.

The "specified Frequency" is referred to throughout this section and each of the Specifications of Section 3.0.2, Surveillance Requirement (SR)

Applicability. The "specified Frequency" consists of the requirements of the Frequency column of each SR as well as certain Notes in the Surveillance column that modify performance requirements.

Sometimes special situations dictate when the requirements of a Surveillance are to be met. They are "otherwise stated" conditions allowed by SR 3.0.1. They may be stated as clarifying Notes in the Surveillance, as part of the Surveillance, or both.

Situations where a Surveillance could be required (i.e., its Frequency could expire), but where it is not possible or not desired that it be performed until sometime after the associated LCO is within its Applicability, represent potential SR 3.0.4 conflicts. To avoid these conflicts, the SR (i.e., the Surveillance or the Frequency) is stated such that it is only "required" when it can be and should be performed. With an SR satisfied, SR 3.0.4 imposes no restriction.

The use of "met" or "performed" in these instances conveys specific meanings. A Surveillance is "met" only when the acceptance criteria are satisfied. Known failure of the requirements of a Surveillance, even without a Surveillance specifically being "performed," constitutes a Surveillance not "met." "Performance" refers only to the requirement to specifically determine the ability to meet the acceptance criteria.

Some Surveillances contain notes that modify the Frequency of performance or the conditions during which the acceptance criteria must be satisfied. For these Surveillances, the MODE-entry restrictions of SR 3.0.4 may not apply. Such a Surveillance is not required to be performed prior to entering a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of the associated LCO if any of the following three conditions are satisfied:

Frequency 1.4 General Electric BWR/4 STS 1.4-2 Rev. 5.0 Hope Creek Amendment XXX 1

1.4 Frequency DESCRIPTION (continued)

a.

The Surveillance is not required to be met in the MODE or other specified condition to be entered; or

b.

The Surveillance is required to be met in the MODE or other specified condition to be entered, but has been performed within the specified Frequency (i.e., it is current) and is known not to be failed; or

c.

The Surveillance is required to be met, but not performed, in the MODE or other specified condition to be entered, and is known not to be failed.

Examples 1.4-3, 1.4-4, 1.4-5, and 1.4-6 discuss these special situations.

EXAMPLES The following examples illustrate the various ways that Frequencies are specified. In these examples, the Applicability of the LCO (LCO not shown) is MODES 1, 2, and 3.

EXAMPLE 1.4-1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Perform CHANNEL CHECK.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Example 1.4-1 contains the type of SR most often encountered in the Technical Specifications (TS). The Frequency specifies an interval (12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />) during which the associated Surveillance must be performed at least one time. Performance of the Surveillance initiates the subsequent interval. Although the Frequency is stated as 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, an extension of the time interval to 1.25 times the interval specified in the Frequency is allowed by SR 3.0.2 for operational flexibility. The measurement of this interval continues at all times, even when the SR is not required to be met per SR 3.0.1 (such as when the equipment is inoperable, a variable is outside specified limits, or the unit is outside the Applicability of the LCO).

If the interval specified by SR 3.0.2 is exceeded while the unit is in a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of the LCO, and the performance of the Surveillance is not otherwise modified (refer to Examples 1.4-3 and 1.4-4), then SR 3.0.3 becomes applicable.

Frequency 1.4 General Electric BWR/4 STS 1.4-3 Rev. 5.0 Hope Creek Amendment XXX 1

1.4 Frequency EXAMPLES (continued)

If the interval as specified by SR 3.0.2 is exceeded while the unit is not in a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of the LCO for which performance of the SR is required, then SR 3.0.4 becomes applicable. The Surveillance must be performed within the Frequency requirements of SR 3.0.2, as modified by SR 3.0.3, prior to entry into the MODE or other specified condition or the LCO is considered not met (in accordance with SR 3.0.1) and LCO 3.0.4 becomes applicable.

EXAMPLE 1.4-2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Verify flow is within limits.

Once within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after 25% RTP AND 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> thereafter Example 1.4-2 has two Frequencies. The first is a one time performance Frequency, and the second is of the type shown in Example 1.4-1. The logical connector "AND" indicates that both Frequency requirements must be met. Each time reactor power is increased from a power level

< 25% RTP to 25% RTP, the Surveillance must be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

The use of "once" indicates a single performance will satisfy the specified Frequency (assuming no other Frequencies are connected by "AND").

This type of Frequency does not qualify for the 25% extension allowed by SR 3.0.2. "Thereafter" indicates future performances must be established per SR 3.0.2, but only after a specified condition is first met (i.e., the "once" performance in this example). If reactor power decreases to

< 25% RTP, the measurement of both intervals stops. New intervals start upon reactor power reaching 25% RTP.

Frequency 1.4 General Electric BWR/4 STS 1.4-4 Rev. 5.0 Hope Creek Amendment XXX 1

1.4 Frequency EXAMPLES (continued)

EXAMPLE 1.4-3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY

NOTE----------------------------

Not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after 25% RTP.

Perform channel adjustment.

7 days The interval continues, whether or not the unit operation is < 25% RTP between performances.

As the Note modifies the required performance of the Surveillance, it is construed to be part of the "specified Frequency." Should the 7 day interval be exceeded while operation is < 25% RTP, this Note allows 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after power reaches 25% RTP to perform the Surveillance.

The Surveillance is still considered to be within the "specified Frequency."

Therefore, if the Surveillance were not performed within the 7 day interval (plus the extension allowed by SR 3.0.2), but operation was < 25% RTP, it would not constitute a failure of the SR or failure to meet the LCO.

Also, no violation of SR 3.0.4 occurs when changing MODES, even with the 7 day Frequency not met, provided operation does not exceed 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> (plus the extension allowed by SR 3.0.2) with power 25% RTP.

Once the unit reaches 25% RTP, 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> would be allowed for completing the Surveillance. If the Surveillance were not performed within this 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> interval (plus the extension allowed by SR 3.0.2), there would then be a failure to perform a Surveillance within the specified Frequency, and the provisions of SR 3.0.3 would apply.

Frequency 1.4 General Electric BWR/4 STS 1.4-5 Rev. 5.0 Hope Creek Amendment XXX 1

1.4 Frequency EXAMPLES (continued)

EXAMPLE 1.4-4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY

NOTE----------------------------

Only required to be met in MODE 1.

Verify leakage rates are within limits.

24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Example 1.4-4 specifies that the requirements of this Surveillance do not have to be met until the unit is in MODE 1. The interval measurement for the Frequency of this Surveillance continues at all times, as described in Example 1.4-1. However, the Note constitutes an "otherwise stated" exception to the Applicability of this Surveillance. Therefore, if the Surveillance were not performed within the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> interval (plus the extension allowed by SR 3.0.2), but the unit was not in MODE 1, there would be no failure of the SR nor failure to meet the LCO. Therefore, no violation of SR 3.0.4 occurs when changing MODES, even with the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Frequency exceeded, provided the MODE change was not made into MODE 1. Prior to entering MODE 1 (assuming again that the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Frequency were not met), SR 3.0.4 would require satisfying the SR.

EXAMPLE 1.4-5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY

NOTE----------------------------

Only required to be performed in MODE 1.

Perform complete cycle of the valve.

7 days The interval continues, whether or not the unit operation is in MODE 1, 2, or 3 (the assumed Applicability of the associated LCO) between performances.

Frequency 1.4 General Electric BWR/4 STS 1.4-6 Rev. 5.0 Hope Creek Amendment XXX 1

1.4 Frequency EXAMPLES (continued)

As the Note modifies the required performance of the Surveillance, the Note is construed to be part of the "specified Frequency." Should the 7 day interval be exceeded while operation is not in MODE 1, this Note allows entry into and operation in MODES 2 and 3 to perform the Surveillance. The Surveillance is still considered to be performed within the "specified Frequency" if completed prior to entering MODE 1.

Therefore, if the Surveillance were not performed within the 7 day (plus the extension allowed by SR 3.0.2) interval, but operation was not in MODE 1, it would not constitute a failure of the SR or failure to meet the LCO. Also, no violation of SR 3.0.4 occurs when changing MODES, even with the 7 day Frequency not met, provided operation does not result in entry into MODE 1.

Once the unit reaches MODE 1, the requirement for the Surveillance to be performed within its specified Frequency applies and would require that the Surveillance had been performed. If the Surveillance were not performed prior to entering MODE 1, there would then be a failure to perform a Surveillance within the specified Frequency, and the provisions of SR 3.0.3 would apply.

EXAMPLE 1.4-6 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY

NOTE----------------------------

Not required to be met in MODE 3.

Verify parameter is within limits.

24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Example 1.4-[6] specifies that the requirements of this Surveillance do not have to be met while the unit is in MODE 3 (the assumed Applicability of the associated LCO is MODES 1, 2, and 3). The interval measurement for the Frequency of this Surveillance continues at all times, as described in Example 1.4-1. However, the Note constitutes an "otherwise stated" exception to the Applicability of this Surveillance. Therefore, if the Surveillance were not performed within the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> interval (plus the extension allowed by SR 3.0.2), and the unit was in MODE 3, there would be no failure of the SR nor failure to meet the LCO. Therefore, no violation of SR 3.0.4 occurs when changing MODES to enter MODE 3, 6

Frequency 1.4 General Electric BWR/4 STS 1.4-7 Rev. 5.0 Hope Creek Amendment XXX 1

1.4 Frequency EXAMPLES (continued) even with the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Frequency exceeded, provided the MODE change does not result in entry into MODE 2. Prior to entering MODE 2 (assuming again that the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Frequency were not met), SR 3.0.4 would require satisfying the SR.

JUSTIFICATION FOR DEVIATIONS ITS 1.0, USE AND APPLICATION Hope Creek Page 1 of 1

1. Changes are made (additions, deletions, and/or changes) to the ISTS that reflect the plant specific nomenclature, number, reference, system description, analysis, licensing basis, or licensing basis description.
2. The ISTS contains bracketed information and/or values that are generic to all General Electric BWR/4 vintage plants. The brackets are removed, and the proper plant specific information/value is provided. This is acceptable since the information/value is changed to reflect the current licensing basis.
3. Hope Creek Generating Station (HCGS) is licensed to 10 CFR 50.67 (License Amendment No. 134, ADAMS Accession No. ML012600176) and the dose conversion factors used at HCGS are in accordance with Table 2.1 of EPA Federal Guidance Report No. 11 (reference UFSAR Chapter 15 safety analysis dose conversion assumptions). The ITS DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 definition is modified to refer to the Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE) or Committed Effective Dose Equivalent (CEDE) dose conversion factors from Table 2.1 of EPA Federal Guidance Report No. 11 instead of Table III of TID-14844. This deviation is consistent with the guidance of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.183, "Alternative Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors," which specifies Table 2.1 of EPA Federal Guidance Report No. 11 for calculating CEDE dose conversion factors.
4. Example 1.3-8 Reviewers Note states that Example 1.3-8 is only applicable to plants that have adopted the Risk Informed Completion Time Program. HCGS has not adopted the Risk Informed Completion Time Program, therefore, Example 1.3-8 is deleted.
5. The ISTS definition of PHYSICS TESTS is not included in the ITS since no ITS Specification uses this term. The only ISTS Specification using this term is ISTS 3.10.9, "Recirculation Loops - Testing," which is not adopted in the HCGS ITS.
6. ISTS Example 1.4-6 description is changed to remove the brackets from Example 1-4[6].

This change is an administrative correction to the NUREG presentation.

Specific No Significant Hazards Considerations (NSHCs)

DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS ITS 1.0, USE AND APPLICATION Hope Creek Page 1 of 5 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR LESS RESTRICTIVE CHANGE L01 PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG) is converting Hope Creek Generating Station (HCGS) to the Improved Technical Specifications (ITS) as outlined in NUREG-1433, Rev. 5, "Standard Technical Specifications, General Electric BWR/4 Plants." The proposed change involves making the Current Technical Specifications (CTS) less restrictive.

Below is the description of this less restrictive change and the determination of no significant hazards considerations for conversion to NUREG-1433.

The CTS Section 1.0 definition of CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST requires the use of a simulated signal when performing the test. ITS Section 1.1 allows the use of a simulated or actual signal when performing the test. This changes the CTS by allowing the use of unplanned actuations to perform the Surveillance based on the collection of sufficient information to satisfy the surveillance test requirements.

PSEG has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed generic change by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of Amendment," as discussed below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change adds an allowance that an actual as well as a simulated signal can be credited during the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. This change allows taking credit for unplanned actuations if sufficient information is collected to satisfy the surveillance test requirements. This change is acceptable because the channel itself cannot discriminate between an "actual" or "simulated signal, and the proposed requirement does not change the technical content or validity of the test.

This change will not affect the probability of an accident. The source of the signal sent to components during a Surveillance is not assumed to be an initiator of any analyzed event. The consequence of an accident is not affected by this change.

The results of the testing, and, therefore, the likelihood of discovering an inoperable component, are unaffected. As a result, the assurance that equipment will be available to mitigate the consequences of an accident is unaffected.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change adds an allowance that an actual as well as a simulated signal can be credited during the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. This change will not

DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS ITS 1.0, USE AND APPLICATION Hope Creek Page 2 of 5 physically alter the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed).

The change does not require any new or revised operator actions.

Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

The proposed change adds an allowance that an actual as well as a simulated signal can be credited during the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. The margin of safety is not affected by this change. This change allows taking credit for unplanned actuations if sufficient information is collected to satisfy the surveillance test requirements. This change is acceptable because the channel itself cannot discriminate between an "actual" or "simulated signal. As a result, the proposed requirement does not change the technical content or validity of the test.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on the above, PSEG concludes that the proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.

DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS ITS 1.0, USE AND APPLICATION Hope Creek Page 3 of 5 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR LESS RESTRICTIVE CHANGE L02 PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG) is converting Hope Creek Generating Station (HCGS) to the Improved Technical Specifications (ITS) as outlined in NUREG-1433, Rev. 5, "Standard Technical Specifications, General Electric BWR/4 Plants." The proposed change involves making the Current Technical Specifications (CTS) less restrictive.

Below is the description of this less restrictive change and the determination of no significant hazards considerations for conversion to NUREG-1433.

The change revises the CTS definition for ECCS Response Time, Isolation System Response Time and RPS Response Time that are referenced in Surveillance Requirements (SRs), hereafter referred to as response time testing (RTT). The definitions are revised to add the statement In lieu of measurement, response time may be verified for selected components provided that the components and methodology for verification have been previously reviewed and approved by the NRC at the end of the last sentence in the definitions. The changes are based on Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) traveler TSTF-332, Revision 1, ECCS Response Time Testing, dated September 25, 2000 (ADAMS Accession No. ML003751434). The NRC did not separately document their approval of TSTF-332, Revision 1 with a model Safety Evaluation. However, the TS changes associated with this Traveler were incorporated into NUREG-1433 Revision 2. HCGS has reviewed TSTF-332, Revision 1 and has determined that the proposed change and associated justification are applicable to HCGS. HCGS is not proposing any variations from the TS changes described in TSTF-332, Revision 1.

PSEG has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed generic change by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of Amendment," as discussed below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change revises the CTS definition of RPS, Isolation System and ECCS instrumentation response time to permit PSEG to evaluate using an NRC-approved methodology and apply a bounding response time for some components in lieu of measurement. The requirement for the instrumentation to actuate within the response time assumed in the accident analysis is unaffected.

The response time associated with the RPS, Isolation System and ESF instrumentation is not an initiator of any accident. Therefore, the proposed change has no significant effect on the probability of any accident previously evaluated.

The affected RPS, Isolation System and ESF instrumentation are assumed to actuate their respective components within the required response time to mitigate accidents previously evaluated. Revising the TS definition for RPS, Isolation System

DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS ITS 1.0, USE AND APPLICATION Hope Creek Page 4 of 5 and ESF instrumentation response times to allow an NRC-approved methodology for verifying response time for some components does not alter the surveillance requirements that verify the RPS, Isolation System and ESF instrumentation response times are within the required limits. As such, the TS will continue to assure that the RPS, Isolation System and ESF instrumentation actuate their associated components within the specified response time to accomplish the required safety functions assumed in the accident analyses.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change revises the CTS definition of RPS, Isolation System and ESF instrumentation response time to permit PSEG to evaluate using an NRC-approved methodology and apply a bounding response time for some components in lieu of measurement. The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the plant (i.e., no new or different type of equipment will be installed). The proposed change does not alter any assumptions made in the safety analyses. The proposed change does not alter the limiting conditions for operation for the RPS, Isolation System or ESF instrumentation, nor does it change the Surveillance Requirement to verify the RPS, Isolation System and ESF instrumentation response times are within the required limits. As such, the proposed change does not alter the operability requirements for the RPS, Isolation System and ESF instrumentation, and therefore, does not introduce any new failure modes.

Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

The proposed change revises the CTS definition of RPS, Isolation System and ESF instrumentation response time to permit the licensee to evaluate using an NRC-approved methodology and apply a bounding response time for some components in lieu of measurement. The proposed change has no effect on the required RPS, Isolation System and ESF instrumentation response times or setpoints assumed in the safety analyses and the TS requirements to verify those response times and setpoints. The proposed change does not alter any Safety Limits or analytical limits in the safety analysis. The proposed change does not alter the TS operability requirements for the RPS and ESF instrumentation. The RPS, Isolation System and ESF instrumentation actuation of the required systems and components at the required setpoints and within the specified response times will continue to accomplish the design basis safety functions of the associated systems and components in the same manner as before. As such, the RPS, Isolation System and ESF instrumentation will continue to perform the required safety functions as assumed in the safety analyses for all previously evaluated accidents.

DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS ITS 1.0, USE AND APPLICATION Hope Creek Page 5 of 5 Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

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