ML21075A012
| ML21075A012 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | SHINE Medical Technologies |
| Issue date: | 03/16/2021 |
| From: | Jim Costedio SHINE Medical Technologies |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 2021-SMT-0031, EPID L-2019-NEW-0004 | |
| Download: ML21075A012 (17) | |
Text
101 E. Milwaukee St., Suite 600 l Janesville, WI 53545 l P (608) 210-1060 l F (608) 210-2504 l www.shinemed.com March 16, 2021 2021-SMT-0031 10 CFR 50.30 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
References:
(1) SHINE Medical Technologies, LLC letter to the NRC, SHINE Medical Technologies, LLC Application for an Operating License, dated July 17, 2019 (ML19211C143)
(2) NRC letter to SHINE Medical Technologies, LLC, Issuance of Request for Additional Information Related to the SHINE Medical Technologies, LLC Operating License Application (EPID No. L-2019-NEW-0004), dated October 16, 2020 (3) SHINE Medical Technologies, LLC letter to the NRC, SHINE Medical Technologies, LLC Operating License Application Supplement No. 6 and Response to Request for Additional Information, dated December 15, 2020 SHINE Medical Technologies, LLC Application for an Operating License Revision 1 of SHINE Response to Request for Additional Information 2.4-1 Pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50.30, SHINE Medical Technologies, LLC (SHINE) submitted an application for an operating license for a medical isotope production facility to be located in Janesville, WI (Reference 1). The NRC staff determined that additional information was required to enable the staffs continued review the SHINE operating license application (Reference 2).
SHINE provided the response to the NRC staffs request for additional information (RAI) via Reference (3).
SHINE has determined that the SHINE Response to RAI 2.4-1, provided via Reference (3),
required revision to address the NRC staffs request in full.
provides Revision 1 of the SHINE Response to RAI 2.4-1. Revision 1 supersedes the previously provided SHINE Response to RAI 2.4-1, provided via Reference (3), in its entirety.
If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Jeff Bartelme, Director of Licensing, at 608/210-1735.
Document Control Desk Page 2 I declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on March 16, 2021.
Very truly yours, James Costedio Vice President of Regulatory Affairs and Quality SHINE Medical Technologies, LLC Docket No. 50-608 Enclosure cc:
Project Manager, USNRC SHINE General Counsel Supervisor, Radioactive Materials Program, Wisconsin Division of Public Health
Page 1 of 3 ENCLOSURE 1 SHINE MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC SHINE MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC APPLICATION FOR AN OPERATING LICENSE REVISION 1 OF SHINE RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 2.4-1 The NRC staff determined that additional information was required to enable the staffs continued review of the SHINE Medical Technologies, LLC (SHINE) operating license application (Reference 1). SHINE provided the response to the NRC staffs request for additional information (RAI) via Reference (2). SHINE has determined that the SHINE Response to RAI 2.4-1, provided via Reference (2), required revision to address the NRC staffs request in full. Revision 1 of the SHINE Response to RAI 2.4-1 is provided below.
Chapter 2 - Site Characteristics RAI 2.4-1 The evaluation findings in NUREG-1537, Part 2, Section 2.4 state that the information provided by an applicant should be sufficient to support a finding that hydrologic events of credible frequency and consequence have been considered for the site. Additionally, credible hydrologic events have been considered in the development of the design bases for the facility to mitigate or avoid significant damage so that safe operation and shutdown of the facility would not be precluded by a hydrologic event.
Additionally, SHINE Design Criterion 2, Natural Phenomena Hazards, states that [t]he facility structure supports and protects safety-related SSCs and is designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsunami, and seiches as necessary to prevent the loss of capability of safety-related SSCs to perform their safety functions.
Section 2.4.2.3, Effect of Local Intense Precipitation (LIP), of the SHINE FSAR states that the site is designed to withstand the effects of a local probable maximum precipitation (PMP) 100-year event, and that the maximum water levels due to local PMP were determined near the safety-related structures of the facilities.
The NRC staff notes that SHINE uses the 1-in-100-year rainfall event in its LIP flood analysis to evaluate the effects of onsite flooding. The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) defines probable maximum precipitation as the greatest depth of precipitation for a given duration meteorologically possible for a design watershed or a given storm area at a particular time of year. PMP depth in general is larger than that of 1-in-100-year rainfall. However, it is unclear to the NRC whether SHINE is applying this WMO definition of PMP to its LIP flood analysis and how this relates to a 1-in-100-year rainfall event.
Confirm the definition of PMP SHINE uses in its LIP flood analysis and describe how this relates to a 1-in-100-year rainfall event. Revise FSAR Section 2.4.2.3 and Table 2.4-7, as necessary to reflect SHINEs definition of PMP.
Page 2 of 3 This information is necessary for the NRC staff to confirm that the SHINE facility is designed to withstand the effects of floods to prevent the loss of capability of safety-related SSCs to perform their safety-related functions, consistent with SHINE Design Criterion 2. This information is also necessary for the NRC staff to conclude that no credible predicted hydrologic event or condition would render the SHINE site unsuitable for operation or safe shutdown of the facility, consistent with the evaluation findings in NUREG-1537, Part 2, Section 2.4. Additionally, this information is necessary to demonstrate that SHINE has performed the appropriate evaluations required to show that safety functions will be accomplished by equipment that would be potentially impacted by floods consistent with 10 CFR 50.34(b)(2).
SHINE Response Applicable application guidance (References 3 and 4) does not specify a return interval to be used in defining the credible frequency and consequence of precipitation events, nor does the application guidance endorse the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) definition of probable maximum precipitation in defining the credible frequency and consequence of precipitation events. Therefore, SHINE chose to apply the rainfall values and intensities associated with a 1-in-100-year rainfall event in defining the design basis rainfall event and did not apply the WMO definition of probable maximum precipitation. This design basis rainfall event is used in the local intense precipitation (LIP) flood analysis for the SHINE site, as described in Subsection 2.4.2.3 of the FSAR.
Design of the stormwater drainage system to carry runoff from the site up to a 1-in-100-year rainfall event is consistent with the performance standards described in Sec.32-103 of the Code of General Ordinances of the City of Janesville, Wisconsin, for the design of stormwater management features. Additionally, use of the 100-year return interval in defining the design basis rainfall event is consistent with the return intervals specified in Part 1 of NUREG-1537 (Reference 3) for estimating local climatic considerations (i.e., wind speeds and snowpack) in establishing the design basis of site structures.
The LIP flood analysis for the SHINE site determined that the design basis rainfall event depth does not exceed the finished foundation elevation of the main production facility. As described in Section 3.3 of the FSAR, the design basis rainfall event results in a design basis precipitation level at grade. The main production facility finished foundation elevation is at least 4 inches above grade; therefore, water will not infiltrate the main production facility in the case of a design basis rainfall event.
SHINE has revised Section 2.4, Section 3.3, and Section 3.4 of the FSAR to clarify the use of the design basis rainfall event in the LIP flood analysis and to remove the misleading reference to a probable maximum precipitation (PMP) event in reference to the LIP flood analysis. A mark-up of the FSAR incorporating these changes is provided as Attachment 1.
Page 3 of 3 References (1) NRC letter to SHINE Medical Technologies, LLC, Issuance of Request for Additional Information Related to the SHINE Medical Technologies, LLC Operating License Application (EPID No. L-2019-NEW-0004), dated October 16, 2020 (2) SHINE Medical Technologies, LLC letter to the NRC, SHINE Medical Technologies, LLC Operating License Application Supplement No. 6 and Response to Request for Additional Information, dated December 15, 2020 (3) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors: Format and Content," NUREG-1537, Part 1, February 1996 (ML042430055)
(4) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors: Standard Review Plan and Acceptance Criteria,"
NUREG 1537, Part 2, February 1996 (ML042430048)
11 pages follow ENCLOSURE 1 ATTACHMENT 1 SHINE MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC SHINE MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC APPLICATION FOR AN OPERATING LICENSE REVISION 1 OF SHINE RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 2.4-1 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT CHANGES NON-PUBLIC VERSION (MARK-UP)
Chapter 2 - Site Characteristics Hydrology SHINE Medical Technologies 2.4-7 Rev. 2 elevations for the unnamed tributary to the Rock River, for the reach just south of the site (Table 2.4-6), are well below the facility ground floor elevation.
2.4.2.3 Effect of Local Intense Precipitation The effect of the local probable maximum precipitation (PMP)design basis rainfall event on the areas adjacent to safety-related structures of the facility, including the drainage from the roofs of the structures, was evaluated. The maximum water levels due to local PMPthe design basis rainfall event were estimated near the safety-related structures of the facility based on the site topographic survey map.
All elevations in this subsection are referenced to the NAVD 88.
A drainage system designed to carry runoff from the site up to a 100-year precipitationrainfall event consists of conveying water from roofs, as well as runoff from the site and adjacent areas, to peripheral ditches. The facility is surrounded by berms with interior ditches along the berms.
The plant site is graded such that the high point of grade is set at Elevation 827 ft. (252.1 m). The grade around the structures slopes towards the peripheral ditches. The storm water drains into the peripheral ditches. A plan showing the delineated off-site drainage area is presented in Figure 2.4-11. Peripheral diversion swales and berms north and east of the site are provided to divert the off-site runoff around the facility area. During a local PMP100-year rainfall event, the storm water drainage system is conservatively assumed to be not functional. No active surface water drainage waterway exists which flows towards the site. PMP rRunoff from the off-site area northeast of the site flows towards the site. The off-site area is relatively flat.
The finished site grade elevation is approximately 825 ft. (251.46 m), and the top of the finished foundation elevation is at least 4 inches (in.) above grade; therefore, water will not infiltrate the door openings in the case of a local PMPdesign basis rainfall event.
The site is designed to withstand the effects of a local probable maximum precipitation (PMP)design basis rainfall event, defined as the rainfall values and intensities associated with a 1-in-100-year rainfall event. The PMP values and intensities associated with a 1-in-100-year rainfall event are provided in Table 2.4-7. The values and intensities were determined from the 100-year rainfall intensity-duration-frequency curve for Madison, Wisconsin (WDOT, 1979)
(Figure 2.4-10).
The effect of the PMP event on the areas adjacent to safety-related structures of the facility, including the drainage from the roofs of the structures, was evaluated. The maximum water levels due to local PMP were determined near the safety-related structures of the facility based on site topographic survey maps.
The site is protected from PMP flooding by a developed drainage channel on the north and east sides of the site and an existing drainage channel east and southeast of the site (Figure 2.4-11)
(Figure 2.4-12). Off-site runoff approaches the site from the north or northeast (Figure 2.4-11).
The developed drainage channel on the north and east sides of the facility directs off-site runoff away from the facility. Off-site runoff that flows from the north towards the site is captured by the channel which directs flow to an uncontrolled sub-basin on the west side of the site (Figure 2.4-11). The runoff flow rate was calculated as 42 cfs. The upstream bank elevation of the channel is 827 ft. The channel is approximately 1100 ft. long with a 0.8% slope. In the event
Chapter 2 - Site Characteristics Hydrology SHINE Medical Technologies 2.4-8 Rev. 2 of a 100-year storm, the water surface elevation at the upstream end of the channel reaches a maximum height of 826.3 ft., which is below the bank height.
Off-site runoff that flows from the northeast towards the site is captured by an existing channel southeast of the site that flows to an unnamed tributary approximately one mile south of the site (Figure 2.4-1) (Table 2.4-6). The unnamed tributary flows east-to-west and meets the Rock River approximately two miles south of the site. To determine the maximum water depth in the existing channel from PMPthe 100-year rainfall event drainage, runoff from the entire 91 acre site was conservatively evaluated as conveyed by the existing channel. The runoff flow rate was calculated as 197 cfs. The maximum surface water elevation in the existing channel from a 100-year storm does not rise above the elevation of the banks. The water reaches an elevation of 826 ft. at the upstream end, below its bank elevation of 827 ft., and has an elevation of 818.5 ft.
on its downstream end (south of the site), below its downstream bank elevation of 819.5 ft.
Stormwater inside the site boundary (e.g., paved areas) is directed to a stormwater management system (Figure 2.4-11). The facility design includes two infiltration cells that collect site runoff for the purpose of controlling total suspended solids (Figure 2.4-11). Infiltration cell #1 collects drainage, and at 810 ft. elevation, flows via a spillway to infiltration cell #2. The infiltration cells have a peak water surface elevation of 810 ft. during a 100-year storm event and will not pose a site flooding concern.
Site low points surrounding the main production facility were conservatively analyzed for maximum flood depth from the 100-year PMPrainfall event (Figure 2.4-12). The maximum depth in all low points from impounded water is below the ground floor elevations of the main production facility and material staging building, with margin.
PMP rRunoff flow rates for channel drainage were calculated using the Soil Conservation Service (SCS) methodology. Runoff, Qin, for the 100-year storm event:
Equation 2.4-1 Where:
Q is the Runoff (in.)
P is the Rainfall (in., 24-hour period)
S is the Potential maximum retention after runoff beings (in.)
Equation 2.4-2 Where:
CN is the Runoff Curve Number Equation 2.4-3 Where:
qp is the Peak Discharge (cfs) qu is the Unit Peak Discharge (csm/in.)
Qin P
0.2S
2 P
0.0S
+
2
=
S 1000 CN 10
=
qp qu Am
Qin
Fp
=
Chapter 2 - Site Characteristics Hydrology SHINE Medical Technologies 2.4-9 Rev. 2 Am is the Drainage area (mi2)
Qin is the Runoff (inches)
Fp is the Pond and Swamp Adjustment Factor PMP rRunoff flow rates for evaluating site impounded areas were calculated using the Rational Dekalb method:
Equation 2.4-4 Where:
Q100 is the 100-year event runoff in cubic feet per second (cfs)
C is the Runoff coefficient I is the Intensity in inches/hour (in./hr)
A is the Area, in acres 2.4.2.4 River or Stream Flooding The PMF is calculated in Subsection 2.4.3 and corresponds to a flow of 133,000 cfs (3766 m3/sec) on the Rock River. The main production facility ground elevation is at approximately 825 ft. (251 m) NAVD 88, which is approximately 51 ft. (15 m) above the calculated PMF shown in Table 2.4-9. The vertical separation between the PMF water level and the facility ground elevation precludes potential inundation at the site and provides sufficient margin to prevent wind generated waves from reaching the site. Inundation and wind induced waves are not a credible threat to the facility.
As discussed in Subsection 2.4.2.8, seismically induced dam failure is not a credible risk for creating flooding greater than that calculated for the PMF.
Ice jams were considered as part of the PMF. Given the substantial vertical margin between the site elevation and the PMF elevation, ice jams are not a credible threat to the facility.
2.4.2.5 Surges The site is not adjacent to a sea coast subject to hurricanes. Consequently, surge due to probable maximum hurricane (PMH) is not a credible threat to the facility. Similarly, PMH wind and maximum windstorm-induced (non-hurricane) wave action is also not applicable to the site.
Given the substantial margin that exists between the facility ground floor and the PMF elevation, surges due to wave action on the Rock River are not a credible threat.
2.4.2.6 Seiches The site is approximately 63 mi. (101 km) from the nearest large body of water (Lake Michigan)
(USGS, 1971). Consequently, meteorologically induced seiches in inland lakes, coastal harbors, and embayments are not a credible threat to the facility. The maximum seiche reported for Lake Michigan (Hughes, 1965) is approximately 2 to 4 ft. (0.6 to 1.2 m) high.
2.4.2.7 Tsunami Tsunami hazards would theoretically originate from Lake Michigan, located approximately 63 mi.
(101 km) to the east of the site. The elevation of the lake in the Kenosha area is approximately Q100 C
I
A
=
Chapter 2 - Site Characteristics Hydrology SHINE Medical Technologies 2.4-26 Rev. 2 Table 2.4 100-Year PMPRainfall Event Values and Intensities at the SHINE Site(a) a) The values presented in this table are used for determination of water levels at the safety-related structure resulting from the local PMPdesign basis rainfall event.
Reference:
Figure 2.4-10, PMP Rainfall Intensity-Duration-Frequency Curve.
PMPRainfall Duration (minutes) 5 15 30 60 120 180 360 720 1440 PMPRainfall Value (inches) 0.67 1.5 2.25 3
3.8 4.5 4.8 5.4 6
PMPRainfall intensity (inches/hr) 8 6
4.5 3
1.9 1.5 0.8 0.45 0.25
Chapter 2 - Site Characteristics Hydrology SHINE Medical Technologies 2.4-44 Rev. 2 Figure 2.4 PMP Rainfall Intensity - Duration - Frequency Curve(a) a) State of Wisconsin Department of Transportation, Facilities Development Manual, Chapter 13, Drainage, Attachment 5.4, Rainfall Intensity-Duration-Frequency Curves
Chapter 2 - Site Characteristics Hydrology SHINE Medical Technologies 2.4-45 Rev. 2 Figure 2.4 PMP Site Drainage Area Tsc Tch Ts Tsc Ts Tch Tch Tch Tsc WaA WaA WaA WaA WaA WaA WaA WaA WaB WaB WaB WaB WaB WaB WaB WaB LoC2 LoC2 LoC2 LoC2 WaB N. RIVERSIDE DRIVE -
SOUTH US HWY 51 Tch POI 1 Tch Ts Tsc EXISTING CHANNEL
Chapter 2 - Site Characteristics Hydrology SHINE Medical Technologies 4b.2-11 Rev. 2 Figure 4b.2 PMP 100-Year Event Facility Drainagea
- a. Figure displays location of (sSix) localized low points (inlets 3A, 6, 12, and 13 and trench drains 8 and 9) are subject to impoundment if drainage is assumed blocked. Surface elevation of impounded areas during a 100-year PMPrainfall event remains below the ground floor elevation of the main production facility and material staging building.
12 6
9 3A 8
823.00 822.19 824.30 823.60 824.10 820.66 821.10 818.61 819.10 822.70 823.30
Chapter 3 - Design of Structures, Systems, and Components Water Damage SHINE Medical Technologies 3.3-1 Rev. 2 3.3 WATER DAMAGE The design basis precipitation, flood levels, and ground water levels for the main production facility are as follows:
Design basis flood level: 50 feet (ft.) (15.2 meters [m]) below grade.
Design basis precipitation level: at grade.
Maximum ground water level: 50 ft. (15.2 m) below grade.
Per Subsection 2.4.2.3, a local probable maximum precipitation (PMP)design basis rainfall event creates a water level about level with grade. The first floor of the building is at least 4 inches (in.)
(10.2 centimeters [cm]) above grade; therefore, water will not infiltrate the door openings in the case of a local PMPdesign basis rainfall event.
Per Subsection 2.4.3, a local probable maximum flood (PMF) event creates a water level approximately 50 ft. (15.2 m) below grade. The water elevation for the PMF is derived from FEMA flood profiles. The lowest point of the facility is 26 ft. (7.9 m) below grade; therefore, flooding does not cause any structural loading in the case of a local PMF event.
The impact of internal flooding is determined by the maximum flow rate and the volume of water available to feed the flood. No active response is assumed to terminate the flow and the entire volume of available water is assumed to spill into the main production facility. For water sources outside the building (fire water), automatic or operator actions are required to terminate the flow.
Berms and ramps are used within the facility to:
Capture and contain water collected in the RCA resulting from postulated water system ruptures or fire system discharges above grade.
Prevent water intrusion into the uranium receipt and storage system (URSS) and target solution preparation system (TSPS) rooms.
Prevent a release of water from the RCA due to the postulated failure of the radioisotope process chilled water system (RPCS) room, the process chilled water system (PCHS), or the facility demineralized water system (FDWS).
Prevent bulk release of water into the radioactive drain system (RDS) sump tanks thereby overfilling the sump collection piping.
Safety-related equipment vulnerable to water damage is protected by locating it in flood-protective compartments and/or installing it above flood elevation.
3.3.1 FLOOD PROTECTION This subsection discusses the flood protection measures that are applicable to safety-related SSCs for both external flooding and postulated flooding from failures of facility components containing liquid.
Analyses of the worst flooding due to pipe and tank failures and their consequences are performed in this subsection.
Chapter 3 - Design of Structures, Systems, and Components Water Damage SHINE Medical Technologies 3.3-2 Rev. 2 3.3.1.1 Flood Protection Measures for Structures, Systems, and Components Postulated flooding from component failures in the building compartments is prevented from adversely affecting plant safety or posing any hazard to the public. Exterior or access openings and penetrations into the main production facility are above the maximum postulated flooding level and thus do not require protection against flooding.
3.3.1.1.1 Flood Protection from External Sources Safety-related components located below the design (PMP) flood level are protected using the hardened protection approach described below. The safety-related systems and components are flood-protected because they are enclosed in a reinforced concrete safety-related structure, which has the following features:
a.
Exterior walls below flood level are not less than 2 ft. (0.61 m) thick.
b.
Water stops are provided in construction joints below flood level.
c.
Waterproofing is applied to external surfaces exposed to flood level.
d.
Roofs are designed to prevent pooling of large amounts of water.
Waterproofing of foundations and walls of Seismic Category I structures below grade is accomplished principally by the use of water stops at construction joints.
In addition to water stops, waterproofing of the main production facility is provided up to 4 in.
(10.2 cm) above the plant ground level to protect the external surfaces from exposure to water.
There is no fire protection piping in the RCA general area.
3.3.1.1.2 Flood Protection from Internal Sources Fire suppression systems within the RCA consist of manual discharge via fire hoses from dry standpipes, except in those areas of the RCA in which gaseous fire suppression is provided, as described in Section 9a2.3. The total discharge from the fire protection discharge consists of the combined volume from any firefighting hoses. In accordance with National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 801, Section 5.10 (NFPA, 2008), the credible volume of discharge is sized for a manual fire-fighting flow rate of 500 gallons per minute (1893 liters per minute) for a duration of 30 minutes (min.). Therefore, the total discharge volume is 15,000 gallons (56,782 liters). The resulting flooded water depth in the RCA from fire protection discharge is less than 2 in. This bounds the total water available in the PCHS and RPCS cooling systems that could cause internal flooding. When the total discharge volume of fire water is distributed over the entire RCA, the depth is less than 2 in. (5.1 cm). When the total discharge volume of fire water is distributed only over the minimum open floor area in the irradiation facility (IF), the depth is less than 12 in. (30.5 cm).
The safety-related function(s) of systems within the RCA that are subject to the effects of a discharge of the fire suppression system are appropriately protected by redundancy and separation. Where redundant equipment is unable to be effectively separated, fire response plans are established to ensure redundant trains of water sensitive safety-related equipment are not both subject to damage due to discharge of the fire suppression system. The floors of the URSS/TSPS rooms are elevated to prevent water intrusion in the event of an internal flood.
Water sensitive safety-related equipment is raised from the floor 8a minimum of 12 in. (230.35
Chapter 3 - Design of Structures, Systems, and Components Water Damage SHINE Medical Technologies 3.3-3 Rev. 2 cm) in the RCA, with the exception of the RPCS room, where water sensitive safety-related equipment is raised a minimum of 24 in. (61.0 cm) from the floor to provide defense in depth.
Therefore, the depth of water due to fire protection discharge is less than the elevation that water sensitive safety-related equipment is raised from the floor.
Outside of the RCA there is limited water discharge from fire protection systems. The safety-related function(s) of systems outside the RCA that are subject to the effects of a discharge of the fire suppression system are appropriately protected by redundancy and separation. The uninterruptible electrical power supply system (UPSS) has two trains to provide redundancy.
These trains are isolated from each other to prevent one train from being damaged by discharge of the fire protection system in the vicinity of the other train. Any water sensitive safety-related equipment outside the RCA is installed a minimum of 8 in. (20.3 cm) above the floor slab at grade.
Flood scenarios have been considered for the pipe trenches and vaults. Process piping, vessels, and tanks containing special nuclear material (SNM) or radioactive liquids are seismically qualified. There is no high-energy piping within these areas. Any pipe or tank rupture in the radioisotope production facility (RPF) vaults is routed to the radioactive drain system (RDS). The RDS is sized for the maximum postulated pipe or tank failure as described in Subsection 9b.7.6.
The design of the shield plugs over the pipe trenches and vaults prevents bulk leakage of liquid into the vaults from postulated flooding events within the remainder of the RCA.
The light water pool in the irradiation unit cell (IU) is filled to an elevation approximately equal to the top of the surrounding area floor slab. Given the robust design of the light water pool (approximately 4 ft. thick reinforced concrete) and the stainless steel liner, loss of a significant amount of pool water is not credible.
3.3.1.2 Permanent Dewatering System There is no permanent dewatering system provided for the flood design.
3.3.2 STRUCTURAL DESIGN FOR FLOODING Since the design PMPbasis rainfall event elevation is at the finished plant grade and the PMF elevation is approximately 50 ft. (15.2 m) below grade, there is no dynamic force due to precipitation or flooding.
The load from build-up of water due to discharge of fire water in the RCA is supported by slabs on grade, with the exception of the mezzanine floor. Openings that are provided in the mezzanine ensure that the mezzanine slab is not significantly loaded. The mezzanine floor slab is designed to a live load of 250 pounds per square foot (1221 kilograms per square meter).
Therefore, the mezzanine floor slab is capable of withstanding temporary water collection that may occur while water is draining from the mezzanine floor.
Chapter 3 - Design of Structures, Systems, and Components Seismic Damage SHINE Medical Technologies 3.4-8 Rev. 4 3.4.2.6.3.3 Maximum Flood Level Section 2.4 describes the probable maximum precipitation (PMP)design basis rainfall event.
Section 2.4 describes the probable maximum flood (PMF).
3.4.2.6.3.4 Snow Load Snow load: 30 psf (1.44 kPa) (50-year recurrence interval).
A factor of 1.22 is used to account for the 100-year recurrence interval required.
3.4.2.6.3.5 Design Temperatures The winter dry-bulb temperature (-7°F [-22°C]).
The summer dry bulb temperature (88°F [31°C]).
3.4.2.6.3.6 Seismology SSE peak ground acceleration (PGA): 0.20 g (for both horizontal and vertical directions).
SSE response spectra: per Regulatory Guide 1.60 (USNRC, 2014a).
SSE time history: envelope SSE response spectra in accordance with SRP Section 3.7.1 (USNRC, 2014b).
3.4.2.6.3.7 Extreme Wind Basic wind speed for Wisconsin: 90 miles per hour (mph) (145 kilometers per hour [kph])
(50-year recurrence interval).
A factor of 1.07 is used to account for the 100-year recurrence interval required.
Exposure Category C.
3.4.2.6.3.8 Tornado Maximum tornado wind speed (Region 1): 230 mph (370 kph).
Maximum tornado rotational speed (Region 1): 184 mph (82 m/s).
Maximum tornado translational speed (Region 1): 46 mph (21 m/s).
Radius of maximum rotational speed: 150 ft. (45.7 m).
Tornado differential pressure: 1.2 pounds per square inch (psi) (8.3 kPa).
Rate of tornado differential pressure: 0.5 psi/s (3.7 kPa/s).
Missile Spectrum: see Table 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.76 (USNRC, 2007a).
3.4.2.6.3.9 Rainfall The main production facility's sloped roof and building configuration preclude accumulation of rainwater; therefore, rain loads are not considered in this evaluation.