ML20311A542
| ML20311A542 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 11/06/2017 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| References | |
| Download: ML20311A542 (274) | |
Text
1Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 1 of 4 Hatch 2 Initiating Events Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Surveillance Testing on some Reactor Protection System Relays.
Technical Specification Surveillance SR 3.3.1.1.16 requires the relays which actuate the "B" trip system of the reactor protection system upon sensing a turbine stop valve closure be tested for time response every 18 months. On September 9, 2001, two relays were identified that had not been tested for time response since 1995, as described in the licensee corrective action program Reference CR 2001007192 and CR 2001007276.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation MULTIPLE FAILURES OF MAIN CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONERS A non-cited violation (NCV) was identified for the licensee's failure to place the main control room air conditioning system in Maintenance Rule (MR) (a)(1) status as required by licensee procedure 40AC-ENG-020-0S and 10 CFR 50.65. The licensee had identified one maintenance preventable functional failure (MPFF) in October 2000 and three MPFFs between December 22, 2000, and January 14, 2001. The performance criteria established for this system was 1 (MPFF) per 36 months. The licensee was aware of the repetitive MPFFs, but had not assessed the system for potential escalation to MR (a)(1) status until identified by the inspectors in March 2001. Following an assessment in March 2001, the licensee concluded that the system should have been placed in MR (a)(1) status on January 1, 2001.
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: May 04, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding RISK FOR MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES NOT ADEQUATELY CONSIDERED The licensee had not adequately considered the effects of removing the Unit 2 condensate pump area cooler from service. However, the operator's quick response to the annunciator and recovery of the system resulted in no challenge to the condensate system or plant operations. Therefore, this issue was evaluated to be of very low significance by the Significance Determination Process and no regulatory requirements were violated.
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Prevent Recurrence of Emergency Bus Undervoltage Relay Setpoint Drift.
A non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, criterion XVI [Corrective Actions] was identified by the inspectors for the licensee's failure to identify repetitive calibration problems and prevent recurrence of a setpoint drift problem associated with 4 kv emergency bus undervoltage relays.
The finding was of very low safety significance because the setpoint drift would not result in the failure of the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) to provide emergency power to the bus, but would only result in a delay of the automatic start feature of the EDG. Additionally, this problem would have to occur in multiple relays simultaneously before the auto start feature of the EDG would be affected. The inspectors reviewed the past 11 years and did not identify any examples where the problem occurred in multiple relays simultaneously.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
1Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 2 of 4 Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation The Increase in Risk Associated with Maintenance on the Upstream Traveling Water Screen was not Assessed.
10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requires, in part, that before maintenance is performed on systems shown to be risk significant, the licensee shall assess and manage the increase in risk that may result from the proposed maintenance activity. On September 13, 2001, the increase in risk associated with maintenance on the upstream traveling water screen was not assessed, as described in the licensee corrective action program Reference CR 2001007635.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Sep 29, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Record the as-found Main Steam Isolation Valve Limit Switch Settings as Required by Technical Specification and Sureveillance Procedures.
Technical Specification Surveillance SR 3.3.1.1.13 requires that a channel calibration of Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) limit switches be conducted every 18 months. Procedure 52SV-B21-001-0S, MSIV Limit Switch Inspection, Rev. 4, Ed. 3, implements this requirement, in part, by recording the as found MSIV limit switch settings. It was determined on August 31, 2001, that the as found MSIV limit switch settings were not being recorded as described in the licensee corrective action program Reference CR 2001006969.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Separation of Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) Cables.
A Non-Cited Violation (NCV) was identified for the licensee's failure to provide separation of redundant Unit 2 RHRSW pump motor cables as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, subsection III.G.2. The cables were located in the same fire area and were needed to achieve and maintain a hot shutdown condition. The finding was of very low safety significance because of the minimal ignition sources and combustible loading in the area and a low initiating event frequency coupled with the remaining fire suppression capability for a fire in this area Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding A change to the intake structure was completed by lifting and bolting maintenance plugs in each side of the common roof structure to provide additional cooling.
A change to the intake structure was completed by lifting and bolting maintenance plugs in each side of the common roof structure to provide additional cooling. This modification performed periodically since 1993, by temporary modification and then by procedure, left the residual heat removal service water pumps susceptible to a tornado-generated missile. Because of the relatively low probability of a tornado-generated missile traversing the gap between the intake structure roof and maintenance plug, this finding was considered of very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: N/A Jun 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate 50.59 Evaluation for Modification to Intake Structure.
A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.59 was identified for an inadequate evaluation associated with the licensee's change to the river intake structure. Specifically, the 10 CFR 50.59 safety analyses associated with lifting and bolting maintenance plugs in the roof of the intake structure, by temporary modification and then by procedure, did not provide an adequate technical basis to support the determination that an unreviewed safety question did not exist. The evaluation failed to address the consequences of a postulated loss of one or two pumps of the residual heat removal service water due to tornado-generated missiles passing through the gap caused by raising the maintenance plug. This condition existed periodically since 1993.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2001
1Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 3 of 4 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: FIN Finding THE 2C 600 VOLT EMERGENCY BUS TRIPPED DUE TO PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE THAT RESULTED IN AN ELECTRICAL SHORT CIRCUIT DURING A RELAY CALIBRATION A finding was identified for the loss of the 2C 600 Volt emergency bus due to personnel performance that resulted in an electrical short circuit during a relay calibration. After removing the relay for calibration, a technician inappropriately placed the relay connection paddle back inside the relay case and caused the short. The 2C bus supplies power to multiple risk significant systems in the mitigation systems cornerstone including; safety injection, decay heat removal and long term heat removal systems. Balance-of-plant equipment associated with potential plant transient initiators were also affected. In this case, an automatic power reduction transient began and a loss of condenser vacuum was initiated. However, the event was mitigated by the quick and appropriate response by plant operators so the event was determined to be of very low significance by the Significance Determination Process.
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Perform Corrective Maintenance or Implement Compensatory Measures for Degraded Primary Meteorological Tower Atmospheric Temperature Instruments.
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the licensee's failure to perform corrective maintenance or implement compensatory measures for degraded primary meteorological tower atmospheric temperature instruments that impaired the ability to assess offsite dose during a plant emergency. The finding has very low safety significance because the secondary meteorological tower instruments were available for use and no release of radioactivity that required a prompt offsite dose assessment occurred. There was no actual public safety consequence.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Physical Protection Significance: Mar 17, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Apparent security violation - intrusion detection The licensee failed to detect an unauthorized penetration into the protected area during testing.
Inspection Report# : 2000007(pdf)
1Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 4 of 4 Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Nov 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) Inspection Results The inspectors determined that the licensee's threshold for identifying problems remained sufficiently low and that the licensee was effective at evaluating problems and developing corrective action. No findings of significance were identified. General improvement was noted since the last NRC Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) inspection, which was documented in IR 50-321/01-02 and 50-366/01-02, dated March 16, 2001. Since then, the licensee had implemented a new corrective action program (CAP) which strengthened the implementing procedures, increased department management involvement, and established a separate group to manage the CAP as a full-time function. Particularly noteworthy was establishment of a dedicated Trend Coordinator position and a Corrective Action Program Coordinator (CAPCO) position for each department. The Trend Coordinator was responsible for monitoring the CAP and identifying adverse trends. The CAPCO's were responsible for coordinating the resolution of condition reports assigned to their department. Although the new CAP had only been in place since August, 2001, the inspectors also noted improvement with the consistency of the problem evaluation and resolution. However, the inspectors did find that previous issues with identification of repetitive problems and departmental self-assessments continued, and that there were minor deficiencies with the implementing procedures.
Inspection Report# : 2001009(pdf)
Significance: Jul 23, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Perform Preventative Maintenance on Traveling Water Screen System Instruments that Affected the Performance of Plant Service Water.
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the licensee's failure to perform preventative maintenance on traveling water screen (TWS) system instruments that affected the performance of the Plant Service Water (PSW) system. As a result, the screens became clogged with debris and the intake structure water level decreased causing fluctuations in PSW flow and pressure. Operators reduced power to 85% on Unit 1 and 90% on Unit 2 in response to the problem and dispatched operators to start the TWS locally. Quick response of the operators prevented further degradation of PSW as well as any adverse impact on mitigating systems. The finding has very low safety significance because prompt operator response and performance demonstrated that the procedures in place were satisfactory and the operators were properly trained to perform the evolution.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: N/A Feb 16, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding RESULTS OF PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION The inspectors determined that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, and corrected. A very low threshold for self-identification was demonstrated. Significant problems were adequately addressed. Minor problems were noted involving corrective actions not being documented within the corrective action program, timeliness of evaluations and documentation of repetitive problems, timeliness of corrective actions, corrective actions which were unclear or incomplete, and severity level classification of condition reports.
Inspection Report# : 2001002(pdf)
Last modified : April 01, 2002
2Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 1 of 4 Hatch 2 Initiating Events Significance: May 04, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding RISK FOR MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES NOT ADEQUATELY CONSIDERED The licensee had not adequately considered the effects of removing the Unit 2 condensate pump area cooler from service. However, the operator's quick response to the annunciator and recovery of the system resulted in no challenge to the condensate system or plant operations. Therefore, this issue was evaluated to be of very low significance by the Significance Determination Process and no regulatory requirements were violated.
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Surveillance Testing on some Reactor Protection System Relays.
Technical Specification Surveillance SR 3.3.1.1.16 requires the relays which actuate the "B" trip system of the reactor protection system upon sensing a turbine stop valve closure be tested for time response every 18 months. On September 9, 2001, two relays were identified that had not been tested for time response since 1995, as described in the licensee corrective action program Reference CR 2001007192 and CR 2001007276.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation MULTIPLE FAILURES OF MAIN CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONERS A non-cited violation (NCV) was identified for the licensee's failure to place the main control room air conditioning system in Maintenance Rule (MR) (a)(1) status as required by licensee procedure 40AC-ENG-020-0S and 10 CFR 50.65. The licensee had identified one maintenance preventable functional failure (MPFF) in October 2000 and three MPFFs between December 22, 2000, and January 14, 2001. The performance criteria established for this system was 1 (MPFF) per 36 months. The licensee was aware of the repetitive MPFFs, but had not assessed the system for potential escalation to MR (a)(1) status until identified by the inspectors in March 2001. Following an assessment in March 2001, the licensee concluded that the system should have been placed in MR (a)(1) status on January 1, 2001.
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation The Increase in Risk Associated with Maintenance on the Upstream Traveling Water Screen was not Assessed.
10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requires, in part, that before maintenance is performed on systems shown to be risk significant, the licensee shall assess and manage the increase in risk that may result from the proposed maintenance activity. On September 13, 2001, the increase in risk associated with maintenance on the upstream traveling water screen was not assessed, as described in the licensee corrective action program Reference CR 2001007635.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: NRC
2Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 2 of 4 Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Prevent Recurrence of Emergency Bus Undervoltage Relay Setpoint Drift.
A non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, criterion XVI [Corrective Actions] was identified by the inspectors for the licensee's failure to identify repetitive calibration problems and prevent recurrence of a setpoint drift problem associated with 4 kv emergency bus undervoltage relays.
The finding was of very low safety significance because the setpoint drift would not result in the failure of the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) to provide emergency power to the bus, but would only result in a delay of the automatic start feature of the EDG. Additionally, this problem would have to occur in multiple relays simultaneously before the auto start feature of the EDG would be affected. The inspectors reviewed the past 11 years and did not identify any examples where the problem occurred in multiple relays simultaneously.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Sep 29, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Record the as-found Main Steam Isolation Valve Limit Switch Settings as Required by Technical Specification and Sureveillance Procedures.
Technical Specification Surveillance SR 3.3.1.1.13 requires that a channel calibration of Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) limit switches be conducted every 18 months. Procedure 52SV-B21-001-0S, MSIV Limit Switch Inspection, Rev. 4, Ed. 3, implements this requirement, in part, by recording the as found MSIV limit switch settings. It was determined on August 31, 2001, that the as found MSIV limit switch settings were not being recorded as described in the licensee corrective action program Reference CR 2001006969.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Separation of Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) Cables.
A Non-Cited Violation (NCV) was identified for the licensee's failure to provide separation of redundant Unit 2 RHRSW pump motor cables as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, subsection III.G.2. The cables were located in the same fire area and were needed to achieve and maintain a hot shutdown condition. The finding was of very low safety significance because of the minimal ignition sources and combustible loading in the area and a low initiating event frequency coupled with the remaining fire suppression capability for a fire in this area Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding A change to the intake structure was completed by lifting and bolting maintenance plugs in each side of the common roof structure to provide additional cooling.
A change to the intake structure was completed by lifting and bolting maintenance plugs in each side of the common roof structure to provide additional cooling. This modification performed periodically since 1993, by temporary modification and then by procedure, left the residual heat removal service water pumps susceptible to a tornado-generated missile. Because of the relatively low probability of a tornado-generated missile traversing the gap between the intake structure roof and maintenance plug, this finding was considered of very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: N/A Jun 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate 50.59 Evaluation for Modification to Intake Structure.
A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.59 was identified for an inadequate evaluation associated with the licensee's change to the river intake structure. Specifically, the 10 CFR 50.59 safety analyses associated with lifting and bolting maintenance plugs in the roof of the intake structure, by temporary modification and then by procedure, did not provide an adequate technical basis to support the determination that an unreviewed safety question did not exist. The evaluation failed to address the consequences of a postulated loss of one or two pumps of the residual heat removal service water due to tornado-generated missiles passing through the gap caused by raising the maintenance plug. This condition existed periodically since 1993.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2001 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: FIN Finding
2Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 3 of 4 THE 2C 600 VOLT EMERGENCY BUS TRIPPED DUE TO PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE THAT RESULTED IN AN ELECTRICAL SHORT CIRCUIT DURING A RELAY CALIBRATION A finding was identified for the loss of the 2C 600 Volt emergency bus due to personnel performance that resulted in an electrical short circuit during a relay calibration. After removing the relay for calibration, a technician inappropriately placed the relay connection paddle back inside the relay case and caused the short. The 2C bus supplies power to multiple risk significant systems in the mitigation systems cornerstone including; safety injection, decay heat removal and long term heat removal systems. Balance-of-plant equipment associated with potential plant transient initiators were also affected. In this case, an automatic power reduction transient began and a loss of condenser vacuum was initiated. However, the event was mitigated by the quick and appropriate response by plant operators so the event was determined to be of very low significance by the Significance Determination Process.
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Perform Corrective Maintenance or Implement Compensatory Measures for Degraded Primary Meteorological Tower Atmospheric Temperature Instruments.
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the licensee's failure to perform corrective maintenance or implement compensatory measures for degraded primary meteorological tower atmospheric temperature instruments that impaired the ability to assess offsite dose during a plant emergency. The finding has very low safety significance because the secondary meteorological tower instruments were available for use and no release of radioactivity that required a prompt offsite dose assessment occurred. There was no actual public safety consequence.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Physical Protection Significance: Mar 17, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Apparent security violation - intrusion detection The licensee failed to detect an unauthorized penetration into the protected area during testing.
Inspection Report# : 2000007(pdf)
Miscellaneous
2Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 4 of 4 Significance: N/A Nov 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) Inspection Results The inspectors determined that the licensee's threshold for identifying problems remained sufficiently low and that the licensee was effective at evaluating problems and developing corrective action. No findings of significance were identified. General improvement was noted since the last NRC Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) inspection, which was documented in IR 50-321/01-02 and 50-366/01-02, dated March 16, 2001. Since then, the licensee had implemented a new corrective action program (CAP) which strengthened the implementing procedures, increased department management involvement, and established a separate group to manage the CAP as a full-time function. Particularly noteworthy was establishment of a dedicated Trend Coordinator position and a Corrective Action Program Coordinator (CAPCO) position for each department. The Trend Coordinator was responsible for monitoring the CAP and identifying adverse trends. The CAPCO's were responsible for coordinating the resolution of condition reports assigned to their department. Although the new CAP had only been in place since August, 2001, the inspectors also noted improvement with the consistency of the problem evaluation and resolution. However, the inspectors did find that previous issues with identification of repetitive problems and departmental self-assessments continued, and that there were minor deficiencies with the implementing procedures.
Inspection Report# : 2001009(pdf)
Significance: Jul 23, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Perform Preventative Maintenance on Traveling Water Screen System Instruments that Affected the Performance of Plant Service Water.
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the licensee's failure to perform preventative maintenance on traveling water screen (TWS) system instruments that affected the performance of the Plant Service Water (PSW) system. As a result, the screens became clogged with debris and the intake structure water level decreased causing fluctuations in PSW flow and pressure. Operators reduced power to 85% on Unit 1 and 90% on Unit 2 in response to the problem and dispatched operators to start the TWS locally. Quick response of the operators prevented further degradation of PSW as well as any adverse impact on mitigating systems. The finding has very low safety significance because prompt operator response and performance demonstrated that the procedures in place were satisfactory and the operators were properly trained to perform the evolution.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: N/A Feb 16, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding RESULTS OF PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION The inspectors determined that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, and corrected. A very low threshold for self-identification was demonstrated. Significant problems were adequately addressed. Minor problems were noted involving corrective actions not being documented within the corrective action program, timeliness of evaluations and documentation of repetitive problems, timeliness of corrective actions, corrective actions which were unclear or incomplete, and severity level classification of condition reports.
Inspection Report# : 2001002(pdf)
Last modified : April 01, 2002
3Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 1 of 4 Hatch 2 Initiating Events Significance: May 04, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding RISK FOR MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES NOT ADEQUATELY CONSIDERED The licensee had not adequately considered the effects of removing the Unit 2 condensate pump area cooler from service. However, the operator's quick response to the annunciator and recovery of the system resulted in no challenge to the condensate system or plant operations. Therefore, this issue was evaluated to be of very low significance by the Significance Determination Process and no regulatory requirements were violated.
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Surveillance Testing on some Reactor Protection System Relays.
Technical Specification Surveillance SR 3.3.1.1.16 requires the relays which actuate the "B" trip system of the reactor protection system upon sensing a turbine stop valve closure be tested for time response every 18 months. On September 9, 2001, two relays were identified that had not been tested for time response since 1995, as described in the licensee corrective action program Reference CR 2001007192 and CR 2001007276.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation MULTIPLE FAILURES OF MAIN CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONERS A non-cited violation (NCV) was identified for the licensee's failure to place the main control room air conditioning system in Maintenance Rule (MR) (a)(1) status as required by licensee procedure 40AC-ENG-020-0S and 10 CFR 50.65. The licensee had identified one maintenance preventable functional failure (MPFF) in October 2000 and three MPFFs between December 22, 2000, and January 14, 2001. The performance criteria established for this system was 1 (MPFF) per 36 months. The licensee was aware of the repetitive MPFFs, but had not assessed the system for potential escalation to MR (a)(1) status until identified by the inspectors in March 2001. Following an assessment in March 2001, the licensee concluded that the system should have been placed in MR (a)(1) status on January 1, 2001.
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Prevent Recurrence of Emergency Bus Undervoltage Relay Setpoint Drift.
A non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, criterion XVI [Corrective Actions] was identified by the inspectors for the licensee's failure to identify repetitive calibration problems and prevent recurrence of a setpoint drift problem associated with 4 kv emergency bus undervoltage relays.
The finding was of very low safety significance because the setpoint drift would not result in the failure of the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) to provide emergency power to the bus, but would only result in a delay of the automatic start feature of the EDG. Additionally, this problem would have to occur in multiple relays simultaneously before the auto start feature of the EDG would be affected. The inspectors reviewed the past 11 years and did not identify any examples where the problem occurred in multiple relays simultaneously.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
3Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 2 of 4 Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation The Increase in Risk Associated with Maintenance on the Upstream Traveling Water Screen was not Assessed.
10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requires, in part, that before maintenance is performed on systems shown to be risk significant, the licensee shall assess and manage the increase in risk that may result from the proposed maintenance activity. On September 13, 2001, the increase in risk associated with maintenance on the upstream traveling water screen was not assessed, as described in the licensee corrective action program Reference CR 2001007635.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Sep 29, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Record the as-found Main Steam Isolation Valve Limit Switch Settings as Required by Technical Specification and Sureveillance Procedures.
Technical Specification Surveillance SR 3.3.1.1.13 requires that a channel calibration of Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) limit switches be conducted every 18 months. Procedure 52SV-B21-001-0S, MSIV Limit Switch Inspection, Rev. 4, Ed. 3, implements this requirement, in part, by recording the as found MSIV limit switch settings. It was determined on August 31, 2001, that the as found MSIV limit switch settings were not being recorded as described in the licensee corrective action program Reference CR 2001006969.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Separation of Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) Cables.
A Non-Cited Violation (NCV) was identified for the licensee's failure to provide separation of redundant Unit 2 RHRSW pump motor cables as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, subsection III.G.2. The cables were located in the same fire area and were needed to achieve and maintain a hot shutdown condition. The finding was of very low safety significance because of the minimal ignition sources and combustible loading in the area and a low initiating event frequency coupled with the remaining fire suppression capability for a fire in this area Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding A change to the intake structure was completed by lifting and bolting maintenance plugs in each side of the common roof structure to provide additional cooling.
A change to the intake structure was completed by lifting and bolting maintenance plugs in each side of the common roof structure to provide additional cooling. This modification performed periodically since 1993, by temporary modification and then by procedure, left the residual heat removal service water pumps susceptible to a tornado-generated missile. Because of the relatively low probability of a tornado-generated missile traversing the gap between the intake structure roof and maintenance plug, this finding was considered of very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: N/A Jun 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate 50.59 Evaluation for Modification to Intake Structure.
A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.59 was identified for an inadequate evaluation associated with the licensee's change to the river intake structure. Specifically, the 10 CFR 50.59 safety analyses associated with lifting and bolting maintenance plugs in the roof of the intake structure, by temporary modification and then by procedure, did not provide an adequate technical basis to support the determination that an unreviewed safety question did not exist. The evaluation failed to address the consequences of a postulated loss of one or two pumps of the residual heat removal service water due to tornado-generated missiles passing through the gap caused by raising the maintenance plug. This condition existed periodically since 1993.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2001
3Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 3 of 4 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: FIN Finding THE 2C 600 VOLT EMERGENCY BUS TRIPPED DUE TO PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE THAT RESULTED IN AN ELECTRICAL SHORT CIRCUIT DURING A RELAY CALIBRATION A finding was identified for the loss of the 2C 600 Volt emergency bus due to personnel performance that resulted in an electrical short circuit during a relay calibration. After removing the relay for calibration, a technician inappropriately placed the relay connection paddle back inside the relay case and caused the short. The 2C bus supplies power to multiple risk significant systems in the mitigation systems cornerstone including; safety injection, decay heat removal and long term heat removal systems. Balance-of-plant equipment associated with potential plant transient initiators were also affected. In this case, an automatic power reduction transient began and a loss of condenser vacuum was initiated. However, the event was mitigated by the quick and appropriate response by plant operators so the event was determined to be of very low significance by the Significance Determination Process.
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Perform Corrective Maintenance or Implement Compensatory Measures for Degraded Primary Meteorological Tower Atmospheric Temperature Instruments.
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the licensee's failure to perform corrective maintenance or implement compensatory measures for degraded primary meteorological tower atmospheric temperature instruments that impaired the ability to assess offsite dose during a plant emergency. The finding has very low safety significance because the secondary meteorological tower instruments were available for use and no release of radioactivity that required a prompt offsite dose assessment occurred. There was no actual public safety consequence.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Physical Protection Significance: Mar 17, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Apparent security violation - intrusion detection The licensee failed to detect an unauthorized penetration into the protected area during testing.
Inspection Report# : 2000007(pdf)
3Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 4 of 4 Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Nov 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) Inspection Results The inspectors determined that the licensee's threshold for identifying problems remained sufficiently low and that the licensee was effective at evaluating problems and developing corrective action. No findings of significance were identified. General improvement was noted since the last NRC Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) inspection, which was documented in IR 50-321/01-02 and 50-366/01-02, dated March 16, 2001. Since then, the licensee had implemented a new corrective action program (CAP) which strengthened the implementing procedures, increased department management involvement, and established a separate group to manage the CAP as a full-time function. Particularly noteworthy was establishment of a dedicated Trend Coordinator position and a Corrective Action Program Coordinator (CAPCO) position for each department. The Trend Coordinator was responsible for monitoring the CAP and identifying adverse trends. The CAPCO's were responsible for coordinating the resolution of condition reports assigned to their department. Although the new CAP had only been in place since August, 2001, the inspectors also noted improvement with the consistency of the problem evaluation and resolution. However, the inspectors did find that previous issues with identification of repetitive problems and departmental self-assessments continued, and that there were minor deficiencies with the implementing procedures.
Inspection Report# : 2001009(pdf)
Significance: Jul 23, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Perform Preventative Maintenance on Traveling Water Screen System Instruments that Affected the Performance of Plant Service Water.
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the licensee's failure to perform preventative maintenance on traveling water screen (TWS) system instruments that affected the performance of the Plant Service Water (PSW) system. As a result, the screens became clogged with debris and the intake structure water level decreased causing fluctuations in PSW flow and pressure. Operators reduced power to 85% on Unit 1 and 90% on Unit 2 in response to the problem and dispatched operators to start the TWS locally. Quick response of the operators prevented further degradation of PSW as well as any adverse impact on mitigating systems. The finding has very low safety significance because prompt operator response and performance demonstrated that the procedures in place were satisfactory and the operators were properly trained to perform the evolution.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: N/A Feb 16, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding RESULTS OF PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION The inspectors determined that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, and corrected. A very low threshold for self-identification was demonstrated. Significant problems were adequately addressed. Minor problems were noted involving corrective actions not being documented within the corrective action program, timeliness of evaluations and documentation of repetitive problems, timeliness of corrective actions, corrective actions which were unclear or incomplete, and severity level classification of condition reports.
Inspection Report# : 2001002(pdf)
Last modified : March 29, 2002
4Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 1 of 4 Hatch 2 Initiating Events Significance: May 04, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding RISK FOR MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES NOT ADEQUATELY CONSIDERED The licensee had not adequately considered the effects of removing the Unit 2 condensate pump area cooler from service. However, the operator's quick response to the annunciator and recovery of the system resulted in no challenge to the condensate system or plant operations. Therefore, this issue was evaluated to be of very low significance by the Significance Determination Process and no regulatory requirements were violated.
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Surveillance Testing on some Reactor Protection System Relays.
Technical Specification Surveillance SR 3.3.1.1.16 requires the relays which actuate the "B" trip system of the reactor protection system upon sensing a turbine stop valve closure be tested for time response every 18 months. On September 9, 2001, two relays were identified that had not been tested for time response since 1995, as described in the licensee corrective action program Reference CR 2001007192 and CR 2001007276.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation MULTIPLE FAILURES OF MAIN CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONERS A non-cited violation (NCV) was identified for the licensee's failure to place the main control room air conditioning system in Maintenance Rule (MR) (a)(1) status as required by licensee procedure 40AC-ENG-020-0S and 10 CFR 50.65. The licensee had identified one maintenance preventable functional failure (MPFF) in October 2000 and three MPFFs between December 22, 2000, and January 14, 2001. The performance criteria established for this system was 1 (MPFF) per 36 months. The licensee was aware of the repetitive MPFFs, but had not assessed the system for potential escalation to MR (a)(1) status until identified by the inspectors in March 2001. Following an assessment in March 2001, the licensee concluded that the system should have been placed in MR (a)(1) status on January 1, 2001.
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation The Increase in Risk Associated with Maintenance on the Upstream Traveling Water Screen was not Assessed.
10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requires, in part, that before maintenance is performed on systems shown to be risk significant, the licensee shall assess and manage the increase in risk that may result from the proposed maintenance activity. On September 13, 2001, the increase in risk associated with maintenance on the upstream traveling water screen was not assessed, as described in the licensee corrective action program Reference CR 2001007635.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: NRC
4Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 2 of 4 Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Prevent Recurrence of Emergency Bus Undervoltage Relay Setpoint Drift.
A non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, criterion XVI [Corrective Actions] was identified by the inspectors for the licensee's failure to identify repetitive calibration problems and prevent recurrence of a setpoint drift problem associated with 4 kv emergency bus undervoltage relays.
The finding was of very low safety significance because the setpoint drift would not result in the failure of the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) to provide emergency power to the bus, but would only result in a delay of the automatic start feature of the EDG. Additionally, this problem would have to occur in multiple relays simultaneously before the auto start feature of the EDG would be affected. The inspectors reviewed the past 11 years and did not identify any examples where the problem occurred in multiple relays simultaneously.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Sep 29, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Record the as-found Main Steam Isolation Valve Limit Switch Settings as Required by Technical Specification and Sureveillance Procedures.
Technical Specification Surveillance SR 3.3.1.1.13 requires that a channel calibration of Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) limit switches be conducted every 18 months. Procedure 52SV-B21-001-0S, MSIV Limit Switch Inspection, Rev. 4, Ed. 3, implements this requirement, in part, by recording the as found MSIV limit switch settings. It was determined on August 31, 2001, that the as found MSIV limit switch settings were not being recorded as described in the licensee corrective action program Reference CR 2001006969.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Separation of Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) Cables.
A Non-Cited Violation (NCV) was identified for the licensee's failure to provide separation of redundant Unit 2 RHRSW pump motor cables as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, subsection III.G.2. The cables were located in the same fire area and were needed to achieve and maintain a hot shutdown condition. The finding was of very low safety significance because of the minimal ignition sources and combustible loading in the area and a low initiating event frequency coupled with the remaining fire suppression capability for a fire in this area Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding A change to the intake structure was completed by lifting and bolting maintenance plugs in each side of the common roof structure to provide additional cooling.
A change to the intake structure was completed by lifting and bolting maintenance plugs in each side of the common roof structure to provide additional cooling. This modification performed periodically since 1993, by temporary modification and then by procedure, left the residual heat removal service water pumps susceptible to a tornado-generated missile. Because of the relatively low probability of a tornado-generated missile traversing the gap between the intake structure roof and maintenance plug, this finding was considered of very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: N/A Jun 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate 50.59 Evaluation for Modification to Intake Structure.
A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.59 was identified for an inadequate evaluation associated with the licensee's change to the river intake structure. Specifically, the 10 CFR 50.59 safety analyses associated with lifting and bolting maintenance plugs in the roof of the intake structure, by temporary modification and then by procedure, did not provide an adequate technical basis to support the determination that an unreviewed safety question did not exist. The evaluation failed to address the consequences of a postulated loss of one or two pumps of the residual heat removal service water due to tornado-generated missiles passing through the gap caused by raising the maintenance plug. This condition existed periodically since 1993.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2001 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: FIN Finding
4Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 3 of 4 THE 2C 600 VOLT EMERGENCY BUS TRIPPED DUE TO PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE THAT RESULTED IN AN ELECTRICAL SHORT CIRCUIT DURING A RELAY CALIBRATION A finding was identified for the loss of the 2C 600 Volt emergency bus due to personnel performance that resulted in an electrical short circuit during a relay calibration. After removing the relay for calibration, a technician inappropriately placed the relay connection paddle back inside the relay case and caused the short. The 2C bus supplies power to multiple risk significant systems in the mitigation systems cornerstone including; safety injection, decay heat removal and long term heat removal systems. Balance-of-plant equipment associated with potential plant transient initiators were also affected. In this case, an automatic power reduction transient began and a loss of condenser vacuum was initiated. However, the event was mitigated by the quick and appropriate response by plant operators so the event was determined to be of very low significance by the Significance Determination Process.
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Perform Corrective Maintenance or Implement Compensatory Measures for Degraded Primary Meteorological Tower Atmospheric Temperature Instruments.
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the licensee's failure to perform corrective maintenance or implement compensatory measures for degraded primary meteorological tower atmospheric temperature instruments that impaired the ability to assess offsite dose during a plant emergency. The finding has very low safety significance because the secondary meteorological tower instruments were available for use and no release of radioactivity that required a prompt offsite dose assessment occurred. There was no actual public safety consequence.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Physical Protection Significance: Mar 17, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Apparent security violation - intrusion detection The licensee failed to detect an unauthorized penetration into the protected area during testing.
Inspection Report# : 2000007(pdf)
Miscellaneous
4Q/2000 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 4 of 4 Significance: N/A Nov 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) Inspection Results The inspectors determined that the licensee's threshold for identifying problems remained sufficiently low and that the licensee was effective at evaluating problems and developing corrective action. No findings of significance were identified. General improvement was noted since the last NRC Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) inspection, which was documented in IR 50-321/01-02 and 50-366/01-02, dated March 16, 2001. Since then, the licensee had implemented a new corrective action program (CAP) which strengthened the implementing procedures, increased department management involvement, and established a separate group to manage the CAP as a full-time function. Particularly noteworthy was establishment of a dedicated Trend Coordinator position and a Corrective Action Program Coordinator (CAPCO) position for each department. The Trend Coordinator was responsible for monitoring the CAP and identifying adverse trends. The CAPCO's were responsible for coordinating the resolution of condition reports assigned to their department. Although the new CAP had only been in place since August, 2001, the inspectors also noted improvement with the consistency of the problem evaluation and resolution. However, the inspectors did find that previous issues with identification of repetitive problems and departmental self-assessments continued, and that there were minor deficiencies with the implementing procedures.
Inspection Report# : 2001009(pdf)
Significance: Jul 23, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Perform Preventative Maintenance on Traveling Water Screen System Instruments that Affected the Performance of Plant Service Water.
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the licensee's failure to perform preventative maintenance on traveling water screen (TWS) system instruments that affected the performance of the Plant Service Water (PSW) system. As a result, the screens became clogged with debris and the intake structure water level decreased causing fluctuations in PSW flow and pressure. Operators reduced power to 85% on Unit 1 and 90% on Unit 2 in response to the problem and dispatched operators to start the TWS locally. Quick response of the operators prevented further degradation of PSW as well as any adverse impact on mitigating systems. The finding has very low safety significance because prompt operator response and performance demonstrated that the procedures in place were satisfactory and the operators were properly trained to perform the evolution.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: N/A Feb 16, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding RESULTS OF PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION The inspectors determined that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, and corrected. A very low threshold for self-identification was demonstrated. Significant problems were adequately addressed. Minor problems were noted involving corrective actions not being documented within the corrective action program, timeliness of evaluations and documentation of repetitive problems, timeliness of corrective actions, corrective actions which were unclear or incomplete, and severity level classification of condition reports.
Inspection Report# : 2001002(pdf)
Last modified : March 28, 2002
1Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 1 of 4 Hatch 2 Initiating Events Significance: Mar 31, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation MULTIPLE FAILURES OF MAIN CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONERS A non-cited violation (NCV) was identified for the licensee's failure to place the main control room air conditioning system in Maintenance Rule (MR) (a)(1) status as required by licensee procedure 40AC-ENG-020-0S and 10 CFR 50.65. The licensee had identified one maintenance preventable functional failure (MPFF) in October 2000 and three MPFFs between December 22, 2000, and January 14, 2001. The performance criteria established for this system was 1 (MPFF) per 36 months. The licensee was aware of the repetitive MPFFs, but had not assessed the system for potential escalation to MR (a)(1) status until identified by the inspectors in March 2001. Following an assessment in March 2001, the licensee concluded that the system should have been placed in MR (a)(1) status on January 1, 2001.
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: May 04, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding RISK FOR MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES NOT ADEQUATELY CONSIDERED The licensee had not adequately considered the effects of removing the Unit 2 condensate pump area cooler from service. However, the operator's quick response to the annunciator and recovery of the system resulted in no challenge to the condensate system or plant operations. Therefore, this issue was evaluated to be of very low significance by the Significance Determination Process and no regulatory requirements were violated.
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Surveillance Testing on some Reactor Protection System Relays.
Technical Specification Surveillance SR 3.3.1.1.16 requires the relays which actuate the "B" trip system of the reactor protection system upon sensing a turbine stop valve closure be tested for time response every 18 months. On September 9, 2001, two relays were identified that had not been tested for time response since 1995, as described in the licensee corrective action program Reference CR 2001007192 and CR 2001007276.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 31, 2001 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: FIN Finding THE 2C 600 VOLT EMERGENCY BUS TRIPPED DUE TO PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE THAT RESULTED IN AN ELECTRICAL SHORT CIRCUIT DURING A RELAY CALIBRATION A finding was identified for the loss of the 2C 600 Volt emergency bus due to personnel performance that resulted in an electrical short circuit during a relay calibration. After removing the relay for calibration, a technician inappropriately placed the relay connection paddle back inside the relay case and caused the short. The 2C bus supplies power to multiple risk significant systems in the mitigation systems cornerstone including; safety injection, decay heat removal and long term heat removal systems. Balance-of-plant equipment associated with potential plant transient initiators were also affected. In this case, an automatic power reduction transient began and a loss of condenser vacuum was initiated. However, the event was mitigated by the quick and appropriate response by plant operators so the event was determined to be of very low significance by the Significance Determination Process.
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
1Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 2 of 4 Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Prevent Recurrence of Emergency Bus Undervoltage Relay Setpoint Drift.
A non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, criterion XVI [Corrective Actions] was identified by the inspectors for the licensee's failure to identify repetitive calibration problems and prevent recurrence of a setpoint drift problem associated with 4 kv emergency bus undervoltage relays.
The finding was of very low safety significance because the setpoint drift would not result in the failure of the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) to provide emergency power to the bus, but would only result in a delay of the automatic start feature of the EDG. Additionally, this problem would have to occur in multiple relays simultaneously before the auto start feature of the EDG would be affected. The inspectors reviewed the past 11 years and did not identify any examples where the problem occurred in multiple relays simultaneously.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation The Increase in Risk Associated with Maintenance on the Upstream Traveling Water Screen was not Assessed.
10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requires, in part, that before maintenance is performed on systems shown to be risk significant, the licensee shall assess and manage the increase in risk that may result from the proposed maintenance activity. On September 13, 2001, the increase in risk associated with maintenance on the upstream traveling water screen was not assessed, as described in the licensee corrective action program Reference CR 2001007635.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Sep 29, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Record the as-found Main Steam Isolation Valve Limit Switch Settings as Required by Technical Specification and Sureveillance Procedures.
Technical Specification Surveillance SR 3.3.1.1.13 requires that a channel calibration of Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) limit switches be conducted every 18 months. Procedure 52SV-B21-001-0S, MSIV Limit Switch Inspection, Rev. 4, Ed. 3, implements this requirement, in part, by recording the as found MSIV limit switch settings. It was determined on August 31, 2001, that the as found MSIV limit switch settings were not being recorded as described in the licensee corrective action program Reference CR 2001006969.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Separation of Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) Cables.
A Non-Cited Violation (NCV) was identified for the licensee's failure to provide separation of redundant Unit 2 RHRSW pump motor cables as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, subsection III.G.2. The cables were located in the same fire area and were needed to achieve and maintain a hot shutdown condition. The finding was of very low safety significance because of the minimal ignition sources and combustible loading in the area and a low initiating event frequency coupled with the remaining fire suppression capability for a fire in this area Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding A change to the intake structure was completed by lifting and bolting maintenance plugs in each side of the common roof structure to provide additional cooling.
A change to the intake structure was completed by lifting and bolting maintenance plugs in each side of the common roof structure to provide additional cooling. This modification performed periodically since 1993, by temporary modification and then by procedure, left the residual heat removal service water pumps susceptible to a tornado-generated missile. Because of the relatively low probability of a tornado-generated missile traversing the gap between the intake structure roof and maintenance plug, this finding was considered of very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: N/A Jun 15, 2001
1Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 3 of 4 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate 50.59 Evaluation for Modification to Intake Structure.
A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.59 was identified for an inadequate evaluation associated with the licensee's change to the river intake structure. Specifically, the 10 CFR 50.59 safety analyses associated with lifting and bolting maintenance plugs in the roof of the intake structure, by temporary modification and then by procedure, did not provide an adequate technical basis to support the determination that an unreviewed safety question did not exist. The evaluation failed to address the consequences of a postulated loss of one or two pumps of the residual heat removal service water due to tornado-generated missiles passing through the gap caused by raising the maintenance plug. This condition existed periodically since 1993.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Perform Corrective Maintenance or Implement Compensatory Measures for Degraded Primary Meteorological Tower Atmospheric Temperature Instruments.
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the licensee's failure to perform corrective maintenance or implement compensatory measures for degraded primary meteorological tower atmospheric temperature instruments that impaired the ability to assess offsite dose during a plant emergency. The finding has very low safety significance because the secondary meteorological tower instruments were available for use and no release of radioactivity that required a prompt offsite dose assessment occurred. There was no actual public safety consequence.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Physical Protection Significance: Mar 17, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Apparent security violation - intrusion detection The licensee failed to detect an unauthorized penetration into the protected area during testing.
Inspection Report# : 2000007(pdf)
Miscellaneous
1Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 4 of 4 Significance: N/A Feb 16, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding RESULTS OF PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION The inspectors determined that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, and corrected. A very low threshold for self-identification was demonstrated. Significant problems were adequately addressed. Minor problems were noted involving corrective actions not being documented within the corrective action program, timeliness of evaluations and documentation of repetitive problems, timeliness of corrective actions, corrective actions which were unclear or incomplete, and severity level classification of condition reports.
Inspection Report# : 2001002(pdf)
Significance: N/A Nov 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) Inspection Results The inspectors determined that the licensee's threshold for identifying problems remained sufficiently low and that the licensee was effective at evaluating problems and developing corrective action. No findings of significance were identified. General improvement was noted since the last NRC Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) inspection, which was documented in IR 50-321/01-02 and 50-366/01-02, dated March 16, 2001. Since then, the licensee had implemented a new corrective action program (CAP) which strengthened the implementing procedures, increased department management involvement, and established a separate group to manage the CAP as a full-time function. Particularly noteworthy was establishment of a dedicated Trend Coordinator position and a Corrective Action Program Coordinator (CAPCO) position for each department. The Trend Coordinator was responsible for monitoring the CAP and identifying adverse trends. The CAPCO's were responsible for coordinating the resolution of condition reports assigned to their department. Although the new CAP had only been in place since August, 2001, the inspectors also noted improvement with the consistency of the problem evaluation and resolution. However, the inspectors did find that previous issues with identification of repetitive problems and departmental self-assessments continued, and that there were minor deficiencies with the implementing procedures.
Inspection Report# : 2001009(pdf)
Significance: Jul 23, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Perform Preventative Maintenance on Traveling Water Screen System Instruments that Affected the Performance of Plant Service Water.
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the licensee's failure to perform preventative maintenance on traveling water screen (TWS) system instruments that affected the performance of the Plant Service Water (PSW) system. As a result, the screens became clogged with debris and the intake structure water level decreased causing fluctuations in PSW flow and pressure. Operators reduced power to 85% on Unit 1 and 90% on Unit 2 in response to the problem and dispatched operators to start the TWS locally. Quick response of the operators prevented further degradation of PSW as well as any adverse impact on mitigating systems. The finding has very low safety significance because prompt operator response and performance demonstrated that the procedures in place were satisfactory and the operators were properly trained to perform the evolution.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Last modified : March 28, 2002
2Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 1 of 4 Hatch 2 Initiating Events Significance: Mar 31, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation MULTIPLE FAILURES OF MAIN CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONERS A non-cited violation (NCV) was identified for the licensee's failure to place the main control room air conditioning system in Maintenance Rule (MR) (a)(1) status as required by licensee procedure 40AC-ENG-020-0S and 10 CFR 50.65. The licensee had identified one maintenance preventable functional failure (MPFF) in October 2000 and three MPFFs between December 22, 2000, and January 14, 2001. The performance criteria established for this system was 1 (MPFF) per 36 months. The licensee was aware of the repetitive MPFFs, but had not assessed the system for potential escalation to MR (a)(1) status until identified by the inspectors in March 2001. Following an assessment in March 2001, the licensee concluded that the system should have been placed in MR (a)(1) status on January 1, 2001.
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Surveillance Testing on some Reactor Protection System Relays.
Technical Specification Surveillance SR 3.3.1.1.16 requires the relays which actuate the "B" trip system of the reactor protection system upon sensing a turbine stop valve closure be tested for time response every 18 months. On September 9, 2001, two relays were identified that had not been tested for time response since 1995, as described in the licensee corrective action program Reference CR 2001007192 and CR 2001007276.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: May 04, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding RISK FOR MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES NOT ADEQUATELY CONSIDERED The licensee had not adequately considered the effects of removing the Unit 2 condensate pump area cooler from service. However, the operator's quick response to the annunciator and recovery of the system resulted in no challenge to the condensate system or plant operations. Therefore, this issue was evaluated to be of very low significance by the Significance Determination Process and no regulatory requirements were violated.
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Jun 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Separation of Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) Cables.
A Non-Cited Violation (NCV) was identified for the licensee's failure to provide separation of redundant Unit 2 RHRSW pump motor cables as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, subsection III.G.2. The cables were located in the same fire area and were needed to achieve and maintain a hot shutdown condition. The finding was of very low safety significance because of the minimal ignition sources and combustible loading in the area and a low initiating event frequency coupled with the remaining fire suppression capability for a fire in this area Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC
2Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 2 of 4 Item Type: FIN Finding A change to the intake structure was completed by lifting and bolting maintenance plugs in each side of the common roof structure to provide additional cooling.
A change to the intake structure was completed by lifting and bolting maintenance plugs in each side of the common roof structure to provide additional cooling. This modification performed periodically since 1993, by temporary modification and then by procedure, left the residual heat removal service water pumps susceptible to a tornado-generated missile. Because of the relatively low probability of a tornado-generated missile traversing the gap between the intake structure roof and maintenance plug, this finding was considered of very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: N/A Jun 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate 50.59 Evaluation for Modification to Intake Structure.
A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.59 was identified for an inadequate evaluation associated with the licensee's change to the river intake structure. Specifically, the 10 CFR 50.59 safety analyses associated with lifting and bolting maintenance plugs in the roof of the intake structure, by temporary modification and then by procedure, did not provide an adequate technical basis to support the determination that an unreviewed safety question did not exist. The evaluation failed to address the consequences of a postulated loss of one or two pumps of the residual heat removal service water due to tornado-generated missiles passing through the gap caused by raising the maintenance plug. This condition existed periodically since 1993.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2001 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: FIN Finding THE 2C 600 VOLT EMERGENCY BUS TRIPPED DUE TO PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE THAT RESULTED IN AN ELECTRICAL SHORT CIRCUIT DURING A RELAY CALIBRATION A finding was identified for the loss of the 2C 600 Volt emergency bus due to personnel performance that resulted in an electrical short circuit during a relay calibration. After removing the relay for calibration, a technician inappropriately placed the relay connection paddle back inside the relay case and caused the short. The 2C bus supplies power to multiple risk significant systems in the mitigation systems cornerstone including; safety injection, decay heat removal and long term heat removal systems. Balance-of-plant equipment associated with potential plant transient initiators were also affected. In this case, an automatic power reduction transient began and a loss of condenser vacuum was initiated. However, the event was mitigated by the quick and appropriate response by plant operators so the event was determined to be of very low significance by the Significance Determination Process.
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Prevent Recurrence of Emergency Bus Undervoltage Relay Setpoint Drift.
A non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, criterion XVI [Corrective Actions] was identified by the inspectors for the licensee's failure to identify repetitive calibration problems and prevent recurrence of a setpoint drift problem associated with 4 kv emergency bus undervoltage relays.
The finding was of very low safety significance because the setpoint drift would not result in the failure of the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) to provide emergency power to the bus, but would only result in a delay of the automatic start feature of the EDG. Additionally, this problem would have to occur in multiple relays simultaneously before the auto start feature of the EDG would be affected. The inspectors reviewed the past 11 years and did not identify any examples where the problem occurred in multiple relays simultaneously.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation The Increase in Risk Associated with Maintenance on the Upstream Traveling Water Screen was not Assessed.
10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requires, in part, that before maintenance is performed on systems shown to be risk significant, the licensee shall assess and manage the increase in risk that may result from the proposed maintenance activity. On September 13, 2001, the increase in risk associated with maintenance on the upstream traveling water screen was not assessed, as described in the licensee corrective action program Reference CR 2001007635.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
2Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 3 of 4 Significance: Sep 29, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Record the as-found Main Steam Isolation Valve Limit Switch Settings as Required by Technical Specification and Sureveillance Procedures.
Technical Specification Surveillance SR 3.3.1.1.13 requires that a channel calibration of Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) limit switches be conducted every 18 months. Procedure 52SV-B21-001-0S, MSIV Limit Switch Inspection, Rev. 4, Ed. 3, implements this requirement, in part, by recording the as found MSIV limit switch settings. It was determined on August 31, 2001, that the as found MSIV limit switch settings were not being recorded as described in the licensee corrective action program Reference CR 2001006969.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Perform Corrective Maintenance or Implement Compensatory Measures for Degraded Primary Meteorological Tower Atmospheric Temperature Instruments.
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the licensee's failure to perform corrective maintenance or implement compensatory measures for degraded primary meteorological tower atmospheric temperature instruments that impaired the ability to assess offsite dose during a plant emergency. The finding has very low safety significance because the secondary meteorological tower instruments were available for use and no release of radioactivity that required a prompt offsite dose assessment occurred. There was no actual public safety consequence.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Physical Protection Significance: Mar 17, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Apparent security violation - intrusion detection The licensee failed to detect an unauthorized penetration into the protected area during testing.
Inspection Report# : 2000007(pdf)
2Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 4 of 4 Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Feb 16, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding RESULTS OF PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION The inspectors determined that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, and corrected. A very low threshold for self-identification was demonstrated. Significant problems were adequately addressed. Minor problems were noted involving corrective actions not being documented within the corrective action program, timeliness of evaluations and documentation of repetitive problems, timeliness of corrective actions, corrective actions which were unclear or incomplete, and severity level classification of condition reports.
Inspection Report# : 2001002(pdf)
Significance: N/A Nov 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) Inspection Results The inspectors determined that the licensee's threshold for identifying problems remained sufficiently low and that the licensee was effective at evaluating problems and developing corrective action. No findings of significance were identified. General improvement was noted since the last NRC Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) inspection, which was documented in IR 50-321/01-02 and 50-366/01-02, dated March 16, 2001. Since then, the licensee had implemented a new corrective action program (CAP) which strengthened the implementing procedures, increased department management involvement, and established a separate group to manage the CAP as a full-time function. Particularly noteworthy was establishment of a dedicated Trend Coordinator position and a Corrective Action Program Coordinator (CAPCO) position for each department. The Trend Coordinator was responsible for monitoring the CAP and identifying adverse trends. The CAPCO's were responsible for coordinating the resolution of condition reports assigned to their department. Although the new CAP had only been in place since August, 2001, the inspectors also noted improvement with the consistency of the problem evaluation and resolution. However, the inspectors did find that previous issues with identification of repetitive problems and departmental self-assessments continued, and that there were minor deficiencies with the implementing procedures.
Inspection Report# : 2001009(pdf)
Significance: Jul 23, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Perform Preventative Maintenance on Traveling Water Screen System Instruments that Affected the Performance of Plant Service Water.
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the licensee's failure to perform preventative maintenance on traveling water screen (TWS) system instruments that affected the performance of the Plant Service Water (PSW) system. As a result, the screens became clogged with debris and the intake structure water level decreased causing fluctuations in PSW flow and pressure. Operators reduced power to 85% on Unit 1 and 90% on Unit 2 in response to the problem and dispatched operators to start the TWS locally. Quick response of the operators prevented further degradation of PSW as well as any adverse impact on mitigating systems. The finding has very low safety significance because prompt operator response and performance demonstrated that the procedures in place were satisfactory and the operators were properly trained to perform the evolution.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Last modified : March 27, 2002
3Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 1 of 4 Hatch 2 Initiating Events Significance: Mar 31, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation MULTIPLE FAILURES OF MAIN CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONERS A non-cited violation (NCV) was identified for the licensee's failure to place the main control room air conditioning system in Maintenance Rule (MR) (a)(1) status as required by licensee procedure 40AC-ENG-020-0S and 10 CFR 50.65. The licensee had identified one maintenance preventable functional failure (MPFF) in October 2000 and three MPFFs between December 22, 2000, and January 14, 2001. The performance criteria established for this system was 1 (MPFF) per 36 months. The licensee was aware of the repetitive MPFFs, but had not assessed the system for potential escalation to MR (a)(1) status until identified by the inspectors in March 2001. Following an assessment in March 2001, the licensee concluded that the system should have been placed in MR (a)(1) status on January 1, 2001.
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Surveillance Testing on some Reactor Protection System Relays.
Technical Specification Surveillance SR 3.3.1.1.16 requires the relays which actuate the "B" trip system of the reactor protection system upon sensing a turbine stop valve closure be tested for time response every 18 months. On September 9, 2001, two relays were identified that had not been tested for time response since 1995, as described in the licensee corrective action program Reference CR 2001007192 and CR 2001007276.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: May 04, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding RISK FOR MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES NOT ADEQUATELY CONSIDERED The licensee had not adequately considered the effects of removing the Unit 2 condensate pump area cooler from service. However, the operator's quick response to the annunciator and recovery of the system resulted in no challenge to the condensate system or plant operations. Therefore, this issue was evaluated to be of very low significance by the Significance Determination Process and no regulatory requirements were violated.
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 29, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Record the as-found Main Steam Isolation Valve Limit Switch Settings as Required by Technical Specification and Sureveillance Procedures.
Technical Specification Surveillance SR 3.3.1.1.13 requires that a channel calibration of Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) limit switches be conducted every 18 months. Procedure 52SV-B21-001-0S, MSIV Limit Switch Inspection, Rev. 4, Ed. 3, implements this requirement, in part, by recording the as found MSIV limit switch settings. It was determined on August 31, 2001, that the as found MSIV limit switch settings were not being recorded as described in the licensee corrective action program Reference CR 2001006969.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2001
3Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 2 of 4 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Separation of Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) Cables.
A Non-Cited Violation (NCV) was identified for the licensee's failure to provide separation of redundant Unit 2 RHRSW pump motor cables as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, subsection III.G.2. The cables were located in the same fire area and were needed to achieve and maintain a hot shutdown condition. The finding was of very low safety significance because of the minimal ignition sources and combustible loading in the area and a low initiating event frequency coupled with the remaining fire suppression capability for a fire in this area Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding A change to the intake structure was completed by lifting and bolting maintenance plugs in each side of the common roof structure to provide additional cooling.
A change to the intake structure was completed by lifting and bolting maintenance plugs in each side of the common roof structure to provide additional cooling. This modification performed periodically since 1993, by temporary modification and then by procedure, left the residual heat removal service water pumps susceptible to a tornado-generated missile. Because of the relatively low probability of a tornado-generated missile traversing the gap between the intake structure roof and maintenance plug, this finding was considered of very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: N/A Jun 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate 50.59 Evaluation for Modification to Intake Structure.
A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.59 was identified for an inadequate evaluation associated with the licensee's change to the river intake structure. Specifically, the 10 CFR 50.59 safety analyses associated with lifting and bolting maintenance plugs in the roof of the intake structure, by temporary modification and then by procedure, did not provide an adequate technical basis to support the determination that an unreviewed safety question did not exist. The evaluation failed to address the consequences of a postulated loss of one or two pumps of the residual heat removal service water due to tornado-generated missiles passing through the gap caused by raising the maintenance plug. This condition existed periodically since 1993.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2001 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: FIN Finding THE 2C 600 VOLT EMERGENCY BUS TRIPPED DUE TO PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE THAT RESULTED IN AN ELECTRICAL SHORT CIRCUIT DURING A RELAY CALIBRATION A finding was identified for the loss of the 2C 600 Volt emergency bus due to personnel performance that resulted in an electrical short circuit during a relay calibration. After removing the relay for calibration, a technician inappropriately placed the relay connection paddle back inside the relay case and caused the short. The 2C bus supplies power to multiple risk significant systems in the mitigation systems cornerstone including; safety injection, decay heat removal and long term heat removal systems. Balance-of-plant equipment associated with potential plant transient initiators were also affected. In this case, an automatic power reduction transient began and a loss of condenser vacuum was initiated. However, the event was mitigated by the quick and appropriate response by plant operators so the event was determined to be of very low significance by the Significance Determination Process.
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Prevent Recurrence of Emergency Bus Undervoltage Relay Setpoint Drift.
A non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, criterion XVI [Corrective Actions] was identified by the inspectors for the licensee's failure to identify repetitive calibration problems and prevent recurrence of a setpoint drift problem associated with 4 kv emergency bus undervoltage relays.
The finding was of very low safety significance because the setpoint drift would not result in the failure of the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) to provide emergency power to the bus, but would only result in a delay of the automatic start feature of the EDG. Additionally, this problem would have to occur in multiple relays simultaneously before the auto start feature of the EDG would be affected. The inspectors reviewed the past 11 years and did not identify any examples where the problem occurred in multiple relays simultaneously.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
3Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 3 of 4 Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation The Increase in Risk Associated with Maintenance on the Upstream Traveling Water Screen was not Assessed.
10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requires, in part, that before maintenance is performed on systems shown to be risk significant, the licensee shall assess and manage the increase in risk that may result from the proposed maintenance activity. On September 13, 2001, the increase in risk associated with maintenance on the upstream traveling water screen was not assessed, as described in the licensee corrective action program Reference CR 2001007635.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Perform Corrective Maintenance or Implement Compensatory Measures for Degraded Primary Meteorological Tower Atmospheric Temperature Instruments.
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the licensee's failure to perform corrective maintenance or implement compensatory measures for degraded primary meteorological tower atmospheric temperature instruments that impaired the ability to assess offsite dose during a plant emergency. The finding has very low safety significance because the secondary meteorological tower instruments were available for use and no release of radioactivity that required a prompt offsite dose assessment occurred. There was no actual public safety consequence.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Physical Protection Significance: Mar 17, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Apparent security violation - intrusion detection The licensee failed to detect an unauthorized penetration into the protected area during testing.
Inspection Report# : 2000007(pdf)
Miscellaneous
3Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 4 of 4 Significance: Jul 23, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Perform Preventative Maintenance on Traveling Water Screen System Instruments that Affected the Performance of Plant Service Water.
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the licensee's failure to perform preventative maintenance on traveling water screen (TWS) system instruments that affected the performance of the Plant Service Water (PSW) system. As a result, the screens became clogged with debris and the intake structure water level decreased causing fluctuations in PSW flow and pressure. Operators reduced power to 85% on Unit 1 and 90% on Unit 2 in response to the problem and dispatched operators to start the TWS locally. Quick response of the operators prevented further degradation of PSW as well as any adverse impact on mitigating systems. The finding has very low safety significance because prompt operator response and performance demonstrated that the procedures in place were satisfactory and the operators were properly trained to perform the evolution.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: N/A Feb 16, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding RESULTS OF PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION The inspectors determined that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, and corrected. A very low threshold for self-identification was demonstrated. Significant problems were adequately addressed. Minor problems were noted involving corrective actions not being documented within the corrective action program, timeliness of evaluations and documentation of repetitive problems, timeliness of corrective actions, corrective actions which were unclear or incomplete, and severity level classification of condition reports.
Inspection Report# : 2001002(pdf)
Significance: N/A Nov 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) Inspection Results The inspectors determined that the licensee's threshold for identifying problems remained sufficiently low and that the licensee was effective at evaluating problems and developing corrective action. No findings of significance were identified. General improvement was noted since the last NRC Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) inspection, which was documented in IR 50-321/01-02 and 50-366/01-02, dated March 16, 2001. Since then, the licensee had implemented a new corrective action program (CAP) which strengthened the implementing procedures, increased department management involvement, and established a separate group to manage the CAP as a full-time function. Particularly noteworthy was establishment of a dedicated Trend Coordinator position and a Corrective Action Program Coordinator (CAPCO) position for each department. The Trend Coordinator was responsible for monitoring the CAP and identifying adverse trends. The CAPCO's were responsible for coordinating the resolution of condition reports assigned to their department. Although the new CAP had only been in place since August, 2001, the inspectors also noted improvement with the consistency of the problem evaluation and resolution. However, the inspectors did find that previous issues with identification of repetitive problems and departmental self-assessments continued, and that there were minor deficiencies with the implementing procedures.
Inspection Report# : 2001009(pdf)
Last modified : March 26, 2002
4Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 1 of 4 Hatch 2 Initiating Events Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Surveillance Testing on some Reactor Protection System Relays.
Technical Specification Surveillance SR 3.3.1.1.16 requires the relays which actuate the "B" trip system of the reactor protection system upon sensing a turbine stop valve closure be tested for time response every 18 months. On September 9, 2001, two relays were identified that had not been tested for time response since 1995, as described in the licensee corrective action program Reference CR 2001007192 and CR 2001007276.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation MULTIPLE FAILURES OF MAIN CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONERS A non-cited violation (NCV) was identified for the licensee's failure to place the main control room air conditioning system in Maintenance Rule (MR) (a)(1) status as required by licensee procedure 40AC-ENG-020-0S and 10 CFR 50.65. The licensee had identified one maintenance preventable functional failure (MPFF) in October 2000 and three MPFFs between December 22, 2000, and January 14, 2001. The performance criteria established for this system was 1 (MPFF) per 36 months. The licensee was aware of the repetitive MPFFs, but had not assessed the system for potential escalation to MR (a)(1) status until identified by the inspectors in March 2001. Following an assessment in March 2001, the licensee concluded that the system should have been placed in MR (a)(1) status on January 1, 2001.
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: May 04, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding RISK FOR MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES NOT ADEQUATELY CONSIDERED The licensee had not adequately considered the effects of removing the Unit 2 condensate pump area cooler from service. However, the operator's quick response to the annunciator and recovery of the system resulted in no challenge to the condensate system or plant operations. Therefore, this issue was evaluated to be of very low significance by the Significance Determination Process and no regulatory requirements were violated.
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Prevent Recurrence of Emergency Bus Undervoltage Relay Setpoint Drift.
A non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, criterion XVI [Corrective Actions] was identified by the inspectors for the licensee's failure to identify repetitive calibration problems and prevent recurrence of a setpoint drift problem associated with 4 kv emergency bus undervoltage relays.
The finding was of very low safety significance because the setpoint drift would not result in the failure of the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) to provide emergency power to the bus, but would only result in a delay of the automatic start feature of the EDG. Additionally, this problem would have to occur in multiple relays simultaneously before the auto start feature of the EDG would be affected. The inspectors reviewed the past 11 years and did not identify any examples where the problem occurred in multiple relays simultaneously.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation The Increase in Risk Associated with Maintenance on the Upstream Traveling Water Screen was not Assessed.
10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requires, in part, that before maintenance is performed on systems shown to be risk significant, the licensee shall assess and manage the increase in risk that may result from the proposed maintenance activity. On September 13, 2001, the increase in risk associated with maintenance on the upstream traveling water screen was not assessed, as described in the licensee corrective action program Reference CR
4Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 2 of 4 2001007635.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Sep 29, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Record the as-found Main Steam Isolation Valve Limit Switch Settings as Required by Technical Specification and Sureveillance Procedures.
Technical Specification Surveillance SR 3.3.1.1.13 requires that a channel calibration of Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) limit switches be conducted every 18 months. Procedure 52SV-B21-001-0S, MSIV Limit Switch Inspection, Rev. 4, Ed. 3, implements this requirement, in part, by recording the as found MSIV limit switch settings. It was determined on August 31, 2001, that the as found MSIV limit switch settings were not being recorded as described in the licensee corrective action program Reference CR 2001006969.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Separation of Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) Cables.
A Non-Cited Violation (NCV) was identified for the licensee's failure to provide separation of redundant Unit 2 RHRSW pump motor cables as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, subsection III.G.2. The cables were located in the same fire area and were needed to achieve and maintain a hot shutdown condition. The finding was of very low safety significance because of the minimal ignition sources and combustible loading in the area and a low initiating event frequency coupled with the remaining fire suppression capability for a fire in this area Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance: N/A Jun 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate 50.59 Evaluation for Modification to Intake Structure.
A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.59 was identified for an inadequate evaluation associated with the licensee's change to the river intake structure. Specifically, the 10 CFR 50.59 safety analyses associated with lifting and bolting maintenance plugs in the roof of the intake structure, by temporary modification and then by procedure, did not provide an adequate technical basis to support the determination that an unreviewed safety question did not exist. The evaluation failed to address the consequences of a postulated loss of one or two pumps of the residual heat removal service water due to tornado-generated missiles passing through the gap caused by raising the maintenance plug. This condition existed periodically since 1993.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: Jun 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding A change to the intake structure was completed by lifting and bolting maintenance plugs in each side of the common roof structure to provide additional cooling.
A change to the intake structure was completed by lifting and bolting maintenance plugs in each side of the common roof structure to provide additional cooling. This modification performed periodically since 1993, by temporary modification and then by procedure, left the residual heat removal service water pumps susceptible to a tornado-generated missile. Because of the relatively low probability of a tornado-generated missile traversing the gap between the intake structure roof and maintenance plug, this finding was considered of very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2001 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: FIN Finding THE 2C 600 VOLT EMERGENCY BUS TRIPPED DUE TO PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE THAT RESULTED IN AN ELECTRICAL SHORT CIRCUIT DURING A RELAY CALIBRATION A finding was identified for the loss of the 2C 600 Volt emergency bus due to personnel performance that resulted in an electrical short circuit during a relay calibration. After removing the relay for calibration, a technician inappropriately placed the relay connection paddle back inside the relay case and caused the short. The 2C bus supplies power to multiple risk significant systems in the mitigation systems cornerstone including; safety injection, decay heat removal and long term heat removal systems. Balance-of-plant equipment associated with potential plant transient initiators were also affected. In this case, an automatic power reduction transient began and a loss of condenser vacuum was initiated. However, the event was mitigated by the quick and appropriate response by plant operators so the event was determined to be of very low significance by the Significance Determination Process.
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
4Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 3 of 4 Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Perform Corrective Maintenance or Implement Compensatory Measures for Degraded Primary Meteorological Tower Atmospheric Temperature Instruments.
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the licensee's failure to perform corrective maintenance or implement compensatory measures for degraded primary meteorological tower atmospheric temperature instruments that impaired the ability to assess offsite dose during a plant emergency. The finding has very low safety significance because the secondary meteorological tower instruments were available for use and no release of radioactivity that required a prompt offsite dose assessment occurred. There was no actual public safety consequence.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Physical Protection Significance: Mar 17, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Apparent security violation - intrusion detection The licensee failed to detect an unauthorized penetration into the protected area during testing.
Inspection Report# : 2000007(pdf)
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Nov 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) Inspection Results The inspectors determined that the licensee's threshold for identifying problems remained sufficiently low and that the licensee was effective at evaluating problems and developing corrective action. No findings of significance were identified. General improvement was noted since the last NRC Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) inspection, which was documented in IR 50-321/01-02 and 50-366/01-02, dated March 16, 2001. Since then, the licensee had implemented a new corrective action program (CAP) which strengthened the implementing procedures, increased department management involvement, and established a separate group to manage the CAP as a full-time function. Particularly noteworthy was establishment of a dedicated Trend Coordinator position and a Corrective Action Program Coordinator (CAPCO) position for each department. The Trend Coordinator was responsible for monitoring the CAP and identifying adverse trends. The CAPCO's were responsible for coordinating the resolution of condition reports assigned to their department. Although the new CAP had only been in place since August, 2001, the inspectors also noted improvement with the consistency of the problem evaluation and resolution. However, the inspectors did find that previous issues with identification of repetitive problems and departmental self-assessments continued, and that there were minor deficiencies with the implementing procedures.
Inspection Report# : 2001009(pdf)
Significance: Jul 23, 2001 Identified By: NRC
4Q/2001 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 4 of 4 Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Perform Preventative Maintenance on Traveling Water Screen System Instruments that Affected the Performance of Plant Service Water.
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the licensee's failure to perform preventative maintenance on traveling water screen (TWS) system instruments that affected the performance of the Plant Service Water (PSW) system. As a result, the screens became clogged with debris and the intake structure water level decreased causing fluctuations in PSW flow and pressure. Operators reduced power to 85% on Unit 1 and 90% on Unit 2 in response to the problem and dispatched operators to start the TWS locally. Quick response of the operators prevented further degradation of PSW as well as any adverse impact on mitigating systems. The finding has very low safety significance because prompt operator response and performance demonstrated that the procedures in place were satisfactory and the operators were properly trained to perform the evolution.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: N/A Feb 16, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding RESULTS OF PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION The inspectors determined that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, and corrected. A very low threshold for self-identification was demonstrated. Significant problems were adequately addressed. Minor problems were noted involving corrective actions not being documented within the corrective action program, timeliness of evaluations and documentation of repetitive problems, timeliness of corrective actions, corrective actions which were unclear or incomplete, and severity level classification of condition reports.
Inspection Report# : 2001002(pdf)
Last modified : March 01, 2002
1Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 1 of 4 Hatch 2 Initiating Events Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Surveillance Testing on some Reactor Protection System Relays.
Technical Specification Surveillance SR 3.3.1.1.16 requires the relays which actuate the "B" trip system of the reactor protection system upon sensing a turbine stop valve closure be tested for time response every 18 months. On September 9, 2001, two relays were identified that had not been tested for time response since 1995, as described in the licensee corrective action program Reference CR 2001007192 and CR 2001007276.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation MULTIPLE FAILURES OF MAIN CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONERS A non-cited violation (NCV) was identified for the licensee's failure to place the main control room air conditioning system in Maintenance Rule (MR) (a)(1) status as required by licensee procedure 40AC-ENG-020-0S and 10 CFR 50.65. The licensee had identified one maintenance preventable functional failure (MPFF) in October 2000 and three MPFFs between December 22, 2000, and January 14, 2001. The performance criteria established for this system was 1 (MPFF) per 36 months. The licensee was aware of the repetitive MPFFs, but had not assessed the system for potential escalation to MR (a)(1) status until identified by the inspectors in March 2001. Following an assessment in March 2001, the licensee concluded that the system should have been placed in MR (a)(1) status on January 1, 2001.
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: May 04, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding RISK FOR MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES NOT ADEQUATELY CONSIDERED The licensee had not adequately considered the effects of removing the Unit 2 condensate pump area cooler from service. However, the operator's quick response to the annunciator and recovery of the system resulted in no challenge to the condensate system or plant operations. Therefore, this issue was evaluated to be of very low significance by the Significance Determination Process and no regulatory requirements were violated.
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Prevent Recurrence of Emergency Bus Undervoltage Relay Setpoint Drift.
A non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, criterion XVI [Corrective Actions] was identified by the inspectors for the licensee's failure to identify repetitive calibration problems and prevent recurrence of a setpoint drift problem associated with 4 kv emergency bus undervoltage relays. The finding was of very low safety significance because the setpoint drift would not result in the failure of the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) to provide emergency power to the bus, but would only result in a delay of the automatic start feature of the EDG. Additionally, this problem would have to occur in multiple relays simultaneously before the auto start feature of the EDG would be affected. The inspectors reviewed the past 11 years and did not identify any examples where the problem occurred in multiple relays simultaneously.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
1Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 2 of 4 Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation The Increase in Risk Associated with Maintenance on the Upstream Traveling Water Screen was not Assessed.
10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requires, in part, that before maintenance is performed on systems shown to be risk significant, the licensee shall assess and manage the increase in risk that may result from the proposed maintenance activity. On September 13, 2001, the increase in risk associated with maintenance on the upstream traveling water screen was not assessed, as described in the licensee corrective action program Reference CR 2001007635.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Sep 29, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Record the as-found Main Steam Isolation Valve Limit Switch Settings as Required by Technical Specification and Sureveillance Procedures.
Technical Specification Surveillance SR 3.3.1.1.13 requires that a channel calibration of Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) limit switches be conducted every 18 months. Procedure 52SV-B21-001-0S, MSIV Limit Switch Inspection, Rev. 4, Ed. 3, implements this requirement, in part, by recording the as found MSIV limit switch settings. It was determined on August 31, 2001, that the as found MSIV limit switch settings were not being recorded as described in the licensee corrective action program Reference CR 2001006969.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Separation of Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) Cables.
A Non-Cited Violation (NCV) was identified for the licensee's failure to provide separation of redundant Unit 2 RHRSW pump motor cables as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, subsection III.G.2. The cables were located in the same fire area and were needed to achieve and maintain a hot shutdown condition. The finding was of very low safety significance because of the minimal ignition sources and combustible loading in the area and a low initiating event frequency coupled with the remaining fire suppression capability for a fire in this area Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding A change to the intake structure was completed by lifting and bolting maintenance plugs in each side of the common roof structure to provide additional cooling.
A change to the intake structure was completed by lifting and bolting maintenance plugs in each side of the common roof structure to provide additional cooling. This modification performed periodically since 1993, by temporary modification and then by procedure, left the residual heat removal service water pumps susceptible to a tornado-generated missile. Because of the relatively low probability of a tornado-generated missile traversing the gap between the intake structure roof and maintenance plug, this finding was considered of very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: N/A Jun 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate 50.59 Evaluation for Modification to Intake Structure.
A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.59 was identified for an inadequate evaluation associated with the licensee's change to the river intake structure. Specifically, the 10 CFR 50.59 safety analyses associated with lifting and bolting maintenance plugs in the roof of the intake structure, by temporary modification and then by procedure, did not provide an adequate technical basis to support the determination that an unreviewed safety question did not exist. The evaluation failed to address the consequences of a postulated loss of one or two pumps of the residual heat removal service water due to tornado-generated missiles passing through the gap caused by raising the maintenance plug. This condition existed periodically since 1993.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
1Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 3 of 4 Significance: Mar 31, 2001 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: FIN Finding THE 2C 600 VOLT EMERGENCY BUS TRIPPED DUE TO PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE THAT RESULTED IN AN ELECTRICAL SHORT CIRCUIT DURING A RELAY CALIBRATION A finding was identified for the loss of the 2C 600 Volt emergency bus due to personnel performance that resulted in an electrical short circuit during a relay calibration. After removing the relay for calibration, a technician inappropriately placed the relay connection paddle back inside the relay case and caused the short. The 2C bus supplies power to multiple risk significant systems in the mitigation systems cornerstone including; safety injection, decay heat removal and long term heat removal systems. Balance-of-plant equipment associated with potential plant transient initiators were also affected. In this case, an automatic power reduction transient began and a loss of condenser vacuum was initiated. However, the event was mitigated by the quick and appropriate response by plant operators so the event was determined to be of very low significance by the Significance Determination Process.
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Significance: Jul 23, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failed to promptly declare a Notification of Unusual Event in accordance with procedure 73EP-EIP-001-0S.
On July 23, 2001, the licensee failed to promptly declare a Notification of Unusual Event in accordance with 73EP-EIP-001-0S after information (low water level at the plant intake) was available to Control Room personnel that applicable emergency classification criteria had been exceeded. 10 CFR 50.54(q) requires that nuclear power plant licensees follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b). Planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) specifies the use of a "standard emergency classification and action level scheme", which was delineated in the licensee's emergency plan and implemented via procedure 73EP-EIP-001-0S, Emergency Classification and Initial Actions. This has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR 2001006308.
Inspection Report# : 2001008(pdf)
Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Perform Corrective Maintenance or Implement Compensatory Measures for Degraded Primary Meteorological Tower Atmospheric Temperature Instruments.
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the licensee's failure to perform corrective maintenance or implement compensatory measures for degraded primary meteorological tower atmospheric temperature instruments that impaired the ability to assess offsite dose during a plant emergency. The finding has very low safety significance because the secondary meteorological tower instruments were available for use and no release of radioactivity that required a prompt offsite dose assessment occurred. There was no actual public safety consequence.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
1Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 4 of 4 Physical Protection Significance: Mar 17, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Apparent security violation - intrusion detection The licensee failed to detect an unauthorized penetration into the protected area during testing.
Inspection Report# : 2000007(pdf)
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Nov 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) Inspection Results The inspectors determined that the licensee's threshold for identifying problems remained sufficiently low and that the licensee was effective at evaluating problems and developing corrective action. No findings of significance were identified. General improvement was noted since the last NRC Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) inspection, which was documented in IR 50-321/01-02 and 50-366/01-02, dated March 16, 2001. Since then, the licensee had implemented a new corrective action program (CAP) which strengthened the implementing procedures, increased department management involvement, and established a separate group to manage the CAP as a full-time function. Particularly noteworthy was establishment of a dedicated Trend Coordinator position and a Corrective Action Program Coordinator (CAPCO) position for each department. The Trend Coordinator was responsible for monitoring the CAP and identifying adverse trends. The CAPCO's were responsible for coordinating the resolution of condition reports assigned to their department. Although the new CAP had only been in place since August, 2001, the inspectors also noted improvement with the consistency of the problem evaluation and resolution. However, the inspectors did find that previous issues with identification of repetitive problems and departmental self-assessments continued, and that there were minor deficiencies with the implementing procedures.
Inspection Report# : 2001009(pdf)
Significance: Jul 23, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Perform Preventative Maintenance on Traveling Water Screen System Instruments that Affected the Performance of Plant Service Water.
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the licensee's failure to perform preventative maintenance on traveling water screen (TWS) system instruments that affected the performance of the Plant Service Water (PSW) system. As a result, the screens became clogged with debris and the intake structure water level decreased causing fluctuations in PSW flow and pressure. Operators reduced power to 85% on Unit 1 and 90% on Unit 2 in response to the problem and dispatched operators to start the TWS locally. Quick response of the operators prevented further degradation of PSW as well as any adverse impact on mitigating systems. The finding has very low safety significance because prompt operator response and performance demonstrated that the procedures in place were satisfactory and the operators were properly trained to perform the evolution.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: N/A Feb 16, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding RESULTS OF PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION The inspectors determined that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, and corrected. A very low threshold for self-identification was demonstrated. Significant problems were adequately addressed. Minor problems were noted involving corrective actions not being documented within the corrective action program, timeliness of evaluations and documentation of repetitive problems, timeliness of corrective actions, corrective actions which were unclear or incomplete, and severity level classification of condition reports.
Inspection Report# : 2001002(pdf)
Last modified : July 22, 2002
2Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 1 of 6 Hatch 2 Initiating Events Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Surveillance Testing on some Reactor Protection System Relays.
Technical Specification Surveillance SR 3.3.1.1.16 requires the relays which actuate the "B" trip system of the reactor protection system upon sensing a turbine stop valve closure be tested for time response every 18 months. On September 9, 2001, two relays were identified that had not been tested for time response since 1995, as described in the licensee corrective action program Reference CR 2001007192 and CR 2001007276.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation MULTIPLE FAILURES OF MAIN CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONERS A non-cited violation (NCV) was identified for the licensee's failure to place the main control room air conditioning system in Maintenance Rule (MR) (a)(1) status as required by licensee procedure 40AC-ENG-020-0S and 10 CFR 50.65. The licensee had identified one maintenance preventable functional failure (MPFF) in October 2000 and three MPFFs between December 22, 2000, and January 14, 2001. The performance criteria established for this system was 1 (MPFF) per 36 months. The licensee was aware of the repetitive MPFFs, but had not assessed the system for potential escalation to MR (a)(1) status until identified by the inspectors in March 2001. Following an assessment in March 2001, the licensee concluded that the system should have been placed in MR (a)(1) status on January 1, 2001.
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: May 04, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding RISK FOR MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES NOT ADEQUATELY CONSIDERED The licensee had not adequately considered the effects of removing the Unit 2 condensate pump area cooler from service. However, the operator's quick response to the annunciator and recovery of the system resulted in no challenge to the condensate system or plant operations. Therefore, this issue was evaluated to be of very low significance by the Significance Determination Process and no regulatory requirements were violated.
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Mitigating Systems file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\HAT2\hat2_pim.html 07/03/2003
2Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 2 of 6 Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Prevent Recurrence of Emergency Bus Undervoltage Relay Setpoint Drift.
A non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, criterion XVI [Corrective Actions] was identified by the inspectors for the licensee's failure to identify repetitive calibration problems and prevent recurrence of a setpoint drift problem associated with 4 kv emergency bus undervoltage relays. The finding was of very low safety significance because the setpoint drift would not result in the failure of the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) to provide emergency power to the bus, but would only result in a delay of the automatic start feature of the EDG. Additionally, this problem would have to occur in multiple relays simultaneously before the auto start feature of the EDG would be affected. The inspectors reviewed the past 11 years and did not identify any examples where the problem occurred in multiple relays simultaneously. The licensee documented this violation in CR 2001005805.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation The Increase in Risk Associated with Maintenance on the Upstream Traveling Water Screen was not Assessed.
10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requires, in part, that before maintenance is performed on systems shown to be risk significant, the licensee shall assess and manage the increase in risk that may result from the proposed maintenance activity. On September 13, 2001, the increase in risk associated with maintenance on the upstream traveling water screen was not assessed, as described in the licensee corrective action program Reference CR 2001007635.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Sep 29, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Record the as-found Main Steam Isolation Valve Limit Switch Settings as Required by Technical Specification and Sureveillance Procedures.
Technical Specification Surveillance SR 3.3.1.1.13 requires that a channel calibration of Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) limit switches be conducted every 18 months. Procedure 52SV-B21-001-0S, MSIV Limit Switch Inspection, Rev. 4, Ed. 3, implements this requirement, in part, by recording the as found MSIV limit switch settings. It was determined on August 31, 2001, that the as found MSIV limit switch settings were not being recorded as described in the licensee corrective action program Reference CR 2001006969.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Separation of Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) Cables.
A Non-Cited Violation (NCV) was identified for the licensee's failure to provide separation of redundant Unit 2 RHRSW pump motor cables as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, subsection III.G.2. The cables were located in the same fire area and were needed to achieve and maintain a hot shutdown condition. The finding was of very low safety significance because of the minimal ignition sources and combustible loading in the area and a low initiating event frequency coupled with the remaining fire suppression capability for a fire in this area file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\HAT2\hat2_pim.html 07/03/2003
2Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 3 of 6 Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding A change to the intake structure was completed by lifting and bolting maintenance plugs in each side of the common roof structure to provide additional cooling.
A change to the intake structure was completed by lifting and bolting maintenance plugs in each side of the common roof structure to provide additional cooling. This modification performed periodically since 1993, by temporary modification and then by procedure, left the residual heat removal service water pumps susceptible to a tornado-generated missile. Because of the relatively low probability of a tornado-generated missile traversing the gap between the intake structure roof and maintenance plug, this finding was considered of very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: N/A Jun 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate 50.59 Evaluation for Modification to Intake Structure.
A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.59 was identified for an inadequate evaluation associated with the licensee's change to the river intake structure. Specifically, the 10 CFR 50.59 safety analyses associated with lifting and bolting maintenance plugs in the roof of the intake structure, by temporary modification and then by procedure, did not provide an adequate technical basis to support the determination that an unreviewed safety question did not exist. The evaluation failed to address the consequences of a postulated loss of one or two pumps of the residual heat removal service water due to tornado-generated missiles passing through the gap caused by raising the maintenance plug. This condition existed periodically since 1993.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2001 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: FIN Finding THE 2C 600 VOLT EMERGENCY BUS TRIPPED DUE TO PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE THAT RESULTED IN AN ELECTRICAL SHORT CIRCUIT DURING A RELAY CALIBRATION A finding was identified for the loss of the 2C 600 Volt emergency bus due to personnel performance that resulted in an electrical short circuit during a relay calibration. After removing the relay for calibration, a technician inappropriately placed the relay connection paddle back inside the relay case and caused the short. The 2C bus supplies power to multiple risk significant systems in the mitigation systems cornerstone including; safety injection, decay heat removal and long term heat removal systems. Balance-of-plant equipment associated with potential plant transient initiators were also affected. In this case, an automatic power reduction transient began and a loss of condenser vacuum was initiated. However, the event was mitigated by the quick and appropriate response by plant operators so the event was determined to be of very low significance by the Significance Determination Process.
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Barrier Integrity file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\HAT2\hat2_pim.html 07/03/2003
2Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 4 of 6 Significance: Apr 11, 2002 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Loss of Secondary Containment Integrity Technical Specification 3.6.4.1 requires that secondary containment be operable during Modes 1, 2, and 3. Secondary containment alignment was established by procedure 34SO-T22-001-0S, Secondary Containment Alignment, Rev. 5.6 and maintained by a clearance established per procedure 30AC-OPS-001-0S, Control of Equipment Clearance and Tags, Rev. 23. On April 11, 2002, secondary containment integrity was lost when valve 1T41-F032A, Unit 1 Standby Gas Treatment Suction Damper, which was gagged shut under the clearance, failed open following the transfer of a vital electrical power supply. This violation was entered into licensee's corrective action program as CR 2002003930.
This is being treated as a Non Cited Violation.
Inspection Report# : 2002003(pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Significance: Jul 23, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failed to promptly declare a Notification of Unusual Event in accordance with procedure 73EP-EIP-001-0S.
On July 23, 2001, the licensee failed to promptly declare a Notification of Unusual Event in accordance with 73EP-EIP-001-0S after information (low water level at the plant intake) was available to Control Room personnel that applicable emergency classification criteria had been exceeded. 10 CFR 50.54(q) requires that nuclear power plant licensees follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b).
Planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) specifies the use of a "standard emergency classification and action level scheme", which was delineated in the licensee's emergency plan and implemented via procedure 73EP-EIP-001-0S, Emergency Classification and Initial Actions. This has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR 2001006308.
Inspection Report# : 2001008(pdf)
Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Jun 29, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate SCBA Training Procedure Green. A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 20.1703(c)(4)(ii) was identified for the failure of the licensee to implement a self-contained breathing apparatus training program that required all designated SCBA users to demonstrate proficiency in the change out of SCBA air bottles. This finding was of very low safety significance because it involved a failure to meet a regulatory requirement but did not involve the failure to implement or meet an emergency preparedness planning standard and because no actual event required emergency response workers to change self contained breathing apparatus air bottles. This finding been entered into the licensee corrective action program as CR2002006279.
file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\HAT2\hat2_pim.html 07/03/2003
2Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 5 of 6 Inspection Report# : 2002003(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Perform Corrective Maintenance or Implement Compensatory Measures for Degraded Primary Meteorological Tower Atmospheric Temperature Instruments.
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the licensee's failure to perform corrective maintenance or implement compensatory measures for degraded primary meteorological tower atmospheric temperature instruments that impaired the ability to assess offsite dose during a plant emergency. The finding has very low safety significance because the secondary meteorological tower instruments were available for use and no release of radioactivity that required a prompt offsite dose assessment occurred. There was no actual public safety consequence. [The finding] did not constitute a violation of regulatory requirements.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Physical Protection Significance: Mar 17, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Apparent security violation - intrusion detection The licensee failed to detect an unauthorized penetration into the protected area during testing.
Inspection Report# : 2000007(pdf)
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Nov 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) Inspection Results The inspectors determined that the licensee's threshold for identifying problems remained sufficiently low and that the licensee was effective at evaluating problems and developing corrective action. No findings of significance were identified. General improvement was noted since the last NRC Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) inspection, which was documented in IR 50-321/01-02 and 50-366/01-02, dated March 16, 2001. Since then, the licensee had implemented a new corrective action program (CAP) which strengthened the implementing procedures, increased department management involvement, and established a separate group to manage the CAP as a full-time function. Particularly noteworthy was establishment of a dedicated Trend Coordinator position and a Corrective Action Program Coordinator (CAPCO) position for each department. The Trend Coordinator was responsible for monitoring file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\HAT2\hat2_pim.html 07/03/2003
2Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 6 of 6 the CAP and identifying adverse trends. The CAPCO's were responsible for coordinating the resolution of condition reports assigned to their department. Although the new CAP had only been in place since August, 2001, the inspectors also noted improvement with the consistency of the problem evaluation and resolution. However, the inspectors did find that previous issues with identification of repetitive problems and departmental self-assessments continued, and that there were minor deficiencies with the implementing procedures.
Inspection Report# : 2001009(pdf)
Significance: Jul 23, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Perform Preventative Maintenance on Traveling Water Screen System Instruments that Affected the Performance of Plant Service Water.
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the licensee's failure to perform preventative maintenance on traveling water screen (TWS) system instruments that affected the performance of the Plant Service Water (PSW) system. As a result, the screens became clogged with debris and the intake structure water level decreased causing fluctuations in PSW flow and pressure. Operators reduced power to 85% on Unit 1 and 90% on Unit 2 in response to the problem and dispatched operators to start the TWS locally. Quick response of the operators prevented further degradation of PSW as well as any adverse impact on mitigating systems. The finding has very low safety significance because prompt operator response and performance demonstrated that the procedures in place were satisfactory and the operators were properly trained to perform the evolution. The licensee documented the finding in CR 2001005748. The finding did not constitute a violation of regulatory requirements.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: N/A Feb 16, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding RESULTS OF PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION The inspectors determined that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, and corrected. A very low threshold for self-identification was demonstrated. Significant problems were adequately addressed. Minor problems were noted involving corrective actions not being documented within the corrective action program, timeliness of evaluations and documentation of repetitive problems, timeliness of corrective actions, corrective actions which were unclear or incomplete, and severity level classification of condition reports.
Inspection Report# : 2001002(pdf)
Last modified : August 29, 2002 file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\HAT2\hat2_pim.html 07/03/2003
3Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 1 of 6 Hatch 2 Initiating Events Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Surveillance Testing on some Reactor Protection System Relays.
Technical Specification Surveillance SR 3.3.1.1.16 requires the relays which actuate the "B" trip system of the reactor protection system upon sensing a turbine stop valve closure be tested for time response every 18 months. On September 9, 2001, two relays were identified that had not been tested for time response since 1995, as described in the licensee corrective action program Reference CR 2001007192 and CR 2001007276.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation MULTIPLE FAILURES OF MAIN CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONERS A non-cited violation (NCV) was identified for the licensee's failure to place the main control room air conditioning system in Maintenance Rule (MR) (a)(1) status as required by licensee procedure 40AC-ENG-020-0S and 10 CFR 50.65. The licensee had identified one maintenance preventable functional failure (MPFF) in October 2000 and three MPFFs between December 22, 2000, and January 14, 2001. The performance criteria established for this system was 1 (MPFF) per 36 months. The licensee was aware of the repetitive MPFFs, but had not assessed the system for potential escalation to MR (a)(1) status until identified by the inspectors in March 2001. Following an assessment in March 2001, the licensee concluded that the system should have been placed in MR (a)(1) status on January 1, 2001.
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Significance: May 04, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding RISK FOR MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES NOT ADEQUATELY CONSIDERED The licensee had not adequately considered the effects of removing the Unit 2 condensate pump area cooler from service. However, the operator's quick response to the annunciator and recovery of the system resulted in no challenge to the condensate system or plant operations. Therefore, this issue was evaluated to be of very low significance by the Significance Determination Process and no regulatory requirements were violated.
Inspection Report# : 2000003(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Prevent Recurrence of Emergency Bus Undervoltage Relay Setpoint Drift.
A non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, criterion XVI [Corrective Actions] was identified by the
3Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 2 of 6 inspectors for the licensee's failure to identify repetitive calibration problems and prevent recurrence of a setpoint drift problem associated with 4 kv emergency bus undervoltage relays. The finding was of very low safety significance because the setpoint drift would not result in the failure of the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) to provide emergency power to the bus, but would only result in a delay of the automatic start feature of the EDG. Additionally, this problem would have to occur in multiple relays simultaneously before the auto start feature of the EDG would be affected. The inspectors reviewed the past 11 years and did not identify any examples where the problem occurred in multiple relays simultaneously. The licensee documented this violation in CR 2001005805.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation The Increase in Risk Associated with Maintenance on the Upstream Traveling Water Screen was not Assessed.
10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requires, in part, that before maintenance is performed on systems shown to be risk significant, the licensee shall assess and manage the increase in risk that may result from the proposed maintenance activity. On September 13, 2001, the increase in risk associated with maintenance on the upstream traveling water screen was not assessed, as described in the licensee corrective action program Reference CR 2001007635.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Sep 29, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Record the as-found Main Steam Isolation Valve Limit Switch Settings as Required by Technical Specification and Sureveillance Procedures.
Technical Specification Surveillance SR 3.3.1.1.13 requires that a channel calibration of Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) limit switches be conducted every 18 months. Procedure 52SV-B21-001-0S, MSIV Limit Switch Inspection, Rev. 4, Ed. 3, implements this requirement, in part, by recording the as found MSIV limit switch settings. It was determined on August 31, 2001, that the as found MSIV limit switch settings were not being recorded as described in the licensee corrective action program Reference CR 2001006969.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Separation of Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) Cables.
A Non-Cited Violation (NCV) was identified for the licensee's failure to provide separation of redundant Unit 2 RHRSW pump motor cables as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, subsection III.G.2. The cables were located in the same fire area and were needed to achieve and maintain a hot shutdown condition. The finding was of very low safety significance because of the minimal ignition sources and combustible loading in the area and a low initiating event frequency coupled with the remaining fire suppression capability for a fire in this area Inspection Report# : 2001003(pdf)
Significance: Jun 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding A change to the intake structure was completed by lifting and bolting maintenance plugs in each side of the common roof structure to provide additional cooling.
A change to the intake structure was completed by lifting and bolting maintenance plugs in each side of the common roof structure to provide additional cooling. This modification performed periodically since 1993, by temporary
3Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 3 of 6 modification and then by procedure, left the residual heat removal service water pumps susceptible to a tornado-generated missile. Because of the relatively low probability of a tornado-generated missile traversing the gap between the intake structure roof and maintenance plug, this finding was considered of very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: N/A Jun 15, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate 50.59 Evaluation for Modification to Intake Structure.
A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.59 was identified for an inadequate evaluation associated with the licensee's change to the river intake structure. Specifically, the 10 CFR 50.59 safety analyses associated with lifting and bolting maintenance plugs in the roof of the intake structure, by temporary modification and then by procedure, did not provide an adequate technical basis to support the determination that an unreviewed safety question did not exist. The evaluation failed to address the consequences of a postulated loss of one or two pumps of the residual heat removal service water due to tornado-generated missiles passing through the gap caused by raising the maintenance plug. This condition existed periodically since 1993.
Inspection Report# : 2001004(pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2001 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: FIN Finding THE 2C 600 VOLT EMERGENCY BUS TRIPPED DUE TO PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE THAT RESULTED IN AN ELECTRICAL SHORT CIRCUIT DURING A RELAY CALIBRATION A finding was identified for the loss of the 2C 600 Volt emergency bus due to personnel performance that resulted in an electrical short circuit during a relay calibration. After removing the relay for calibration, a technician inappropriately placed the relay connection paddle back inside the relay case and caused the short. The 2C bus supplies power to multiple risk significant systems in the mitigation systems cornerstone including; safety injection, decay heat removal and long term heat removal systems. Balance-of-plant equipment associated with potential plant transient initiators were also affected. In this case, an automatic power reduction transient began and a loss of condenser vacuum was initiated. However, the event was mitigated by the quick and appropriate response by plant operators so the event was determined to be of very low significance by the Significance Determination Process.
Inspection Report# : 2000006(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Significance: Jul 23, 2001 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failed to promptly declare a Notification of Unusual Event in accordance with procedure 73EP-EIP-001-0S.
On July 23, 2001, the licensee failed to promptly declare a Notification of Unusual Event in accordance with 73EP-EIP-001-0S after information (low water level at the plant intake) was available to Control Room personnel that applicable emergency classification criteria had been exceeded. 10 CFR 50.54(q) requires that nuclear power plant licensees follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b).
Planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) specifies the use of a "standard emergency classification and action level scheme", which was delineated in the licensee's emergency plan and implemented via procedure 73EP-EIP-001-0S,
3Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 4 of 6 Emergency Classification and Initial Actions. This has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR 2001006308.
Inspection Report# : 2001008(pdf)
Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Jun 29, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate SCBA Training Procedure Green. A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 20.1703(c)(4)(ii) was identified for the failure of the licensee to implement a self-contained breathing apparatus training program that required all designated SCBA users to demonstrate proficiency in the change out of SCBA air bottles. This finding was of very low safety significance because it involved a failure to meet a regulatory requirement but did not involve the failure to implement or meet an emergency preparedness planning standard and because no actual event required emergency response workers to change self contained breathing apparatus air bottles. This finding been entered into the licensee corrective action program as CR2002006279.
Inspection Report# : 2002003(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Significance: Oct 17, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Perform Corrective Maintenance or Implement Compensatory Measures for Degraded Primary Meteorological Tower Atmospheric Temperature Instruments.
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the licensee's failure to perform corrective maintenance or implement compensatory measures for degraded primary meteorological tower atmospheric temperature instruments that impaired the ability to assess offsite dose during a plant emergency. The finding has very low safety significance because the secondary meteorological tower instruments were available for use and no release of radioactivity that required a prompt offsite dose assessment occurred. There was no actual public safety consequence. [The finding] did not constitute a violation of regulatory requirements.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Physical Protection Significance: Mar 17, 2000 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Apparent security violation - intrusion detection The licensee failed to detect an unauthorized penetration into the protected area during testing.
Inspection Report# : 2000007(pdf)
3Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 5 of 6 Miscellaneous Significance: Sep 28, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Meet Conditions of License for Requalification Examinations A Green non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 5.2.2.f was identified for allowing the Operations Manager to continue to perform his normal duties without a current license. He failed to complete a requalification program within the two year training cycle as required by 10 CFR 55.53(h) and 10 CFR 55.59(a).
Inspection Report# : 2002004(pdf)
Significance: N/A Nov 30, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) Inspection Results The inspectors determined that the licensee's threshold for identifying problems remained sufficiently low and that the licensee was effective at evaluating problems and developing corrective action. No findings of significance were identified. General improvement was noted since the last NRC Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) inspection, which was documented in IR 50-321/01-02 and 50-366/01-02, dated March 16, 2001. Since then, the licensee had implemented a new corrective action program (CAP) which strengthened the implementing procedures, increased department management involvement, and established a separate group to manage the CAP as a full-time function. Particularly noteworthy was establishment of a dedicated Trend Coordinator position and a Corrective Action Program Coordinator (CAPCO) position for each department. The Trend Coordinator was responsible for monitoring the CAP and identifying adverse trends. The CAPCO's were responsible for coordinating the resolution of condition reports assigned to their department. Although the new CAP had only been in place since August, 2001, the inspectors also noted improvement with the consistency of the problem evaluation and resolution. However, the inspectors did find that previous issues with identification of repetitive problems and departmental self-assessments continued, and that there were minor deficiencies with the implementing procedures.
Inspection Report# : 2001009(pdf)
Significance: Jul 23, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Perform Preventative Maintenance on Traveling Water Screen System Instruments that Affected the Performance of Plant Service Water.
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the licensee's failure to perform preventative maintenance on traveling water screen (TWS) system instruments that affected the performance of the Plant Service Water (PSW) system. As a result, the screens became clogged with debris and the intake structure water level decreased causing fluctuations in PSW flow and pressure. Operators reduced power to 85% on Unit 1 and 90% on Unit 2 in response to the problem and dispatched operators to start the TWS locally. Quick response of the operators prevented further degradation of PSW as well as any adverse impact on mitigating systems. The finding has very low safety significance because prompt operator response and performance demonstrated that the procedures in place were satisfactory and the operators were properly trained to perform the evolution. The licensee documented the finding in CR 2001005748. The finding did not constitute a violation of regulatory requirements.
Inspection Report# : 2001005(pdf)
Significance: N/A Feb 16, 2001 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding RESULTS OF PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION
3Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 6 of 6 The inspectors determined that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, and corrected. A very low threshold for self-identification was demonstrated. Significant problems were adequately addressed. Minor problems were noted involving corrective actions not being documented within the corrective action program, timeliness of evaluations and documentation of repetitive problems, timeliness of corrective actions, corrective actions which were unclear or incomplete, and severity level classification of condition reports.
Inspection Report# : 2001002(pdf)
Last modified : December 02, 2002
4Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 1 of 3 Hatch 2 Initiating Events Significance: Sep 28, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Meet Conditions of License for Requalification Examinations Green. A non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 5.2.2.f was identified for allowing the Operations Manager to continue in his normal duties without a current license in that he did not complete a requalification program within the two year training cycle as required by 10 CFR 55.53(h) and 10 CFR 55.59(a). The finding was more than minor because the Operations Manager was permitted to continue his daily duties, including directing day-to-day plant operation by licensed operators. The finding was of very low safety significance because the individual did not actually perform any licensed operator duties. Although not suitable for Significance Determination Process (SDP) analysis in the Operator Requalification or Reactor SDP, the issue was determined by management review to be of Green significance. (Section 1R11.2)
Inspection Report# : 2002004(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Dec 31, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Corrective Action for Missing Penetration Seals The licensee had not taken prompt corrective action for missing RHR Service Water (RHRSW) piping penetration seals at the intake structure.
A non-cited violation of 10CFR50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI was identified. This finding is more than minor because the lack of penetration seals could have permitted the Plant Service Water (PSW) valve pit to flood and effected the mitigating systems cornerstone. Because flooding of the PSW valve pit had not occurred nor were flooding conditions present, this failure to promptly correct a condition adverse to quality is of very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2002005(pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Calculation Error Results in Incorrect Steam Line High Flow Setpoints An incorrect calculation constant resulted in a non-conservative setpoint for the Unit 1 main steam line flow - high isolation setpoint. A self-revealing non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) table 3.3.6.1-1 was identified. This finding is greater than minor because the actual setpoint exceeded the TS allowable value and the analytical limit, as a result of the error. However, the violation is of very low significance because the increased steam released due to the higher setpoint would not significantly impact offsite radiological dose during a main steam line break accident.
Inspection Report# : 2002005(pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Operability Assessment of Main Steam Safety Relief Valve The licensee did not promptly identify the cause of a failed safety relief valve (SRV). An operability evaluation written in response to the failure was not timely and did not adequately support a determination that the remaining SRV's were operable. Consequently, this significant condition adverse to quality was not promptly corrected and adequate measures were not taken to preclude repetition. A non-cited violation of 10CFR50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI was identified. This finding is greater than minor because the licensee's operability assessment was not timely and relied primarily on unsupported engineering judgement for a determination of operable for the remaining SRV's. It also required multiple revisions when inconsistencies were identified by the inspectors. This finding was of very low significance because no loss of SRV
4Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 2 of 3 function occurred.
Inspection Report# : 2002005(pdf)
Significance: Oct 24, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Consider Vortexing in the Calculation for CST Level for Automatic Switchover of the HPCI Pump Suction Green. A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified for inadequate design control of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system suction source from the condensate storage tank (CST). Vortexing in the CST was not accounted for when the licensee calculated the CST level setpoint specified in the Technical Specifications (TS) for automatic HPCI system suction switchover from the CST to the suppression pool. Vortexing could cause air ingestion into the HPCI system suction from the CST and the air could then damage the HPCI pump. This finding was of very low safety significance because licensee use of the non-safety CST as a HPCI pump suction source with the CST at low levels was unlikely since the reactor vessel or suppression pool would generally reach a high level first, where the HPCI pump would be automatically stopped or its suction would be automatically switched to the safety-related suppression pool. In addition, alternate core cooling methods would normally be available, including reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) as well as automatic depressurization system (ADS) and low pressure coolant injection (LPCI).
Inspection Report# : 2002006(pdf)
Significance: Oct 24, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate RCIC System Operating Procedure Green. A non-cited violation of TS 5.4.1, Procedures, was identified for an inadequate RCIC system operating procedure. The section of the procedure for local manual operation of RCIC, if followed exactly as written, would have resulted in overspeeding the RCIC pump with no water flow through the pump and with no cooling water to the pump. This finding was of very low safety significance because the likelihood of losing Division I direct current (DC) power was low; consequently the potential need for local manual operation of RCIC was low. In addition, other core cooling methods would normally be available, including HPCI as well as ADS and LPCI.
Inspection Report# : 2002006(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Jun 29, 2002 Identified By: Licensee Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Loss of Secondary Containment Integrity Technical Specification 3.6.4.1 requires that secondary containment be operable during Modes 1, 2, and 3. Secondary containment alignment was established by procedure 34SO-T22-001-0S, Secondary Containment Alignment, Rev. 5.6 and maintained by a clearance established per procedure 30AC-OPS-001-0S, Control of Equipment Clearance and Tags, Rev. 23. On April 11, 2002, secondary containment integrity was lost when valve 1T41-F032A, Unit 1 Standby Gas Treatment Suction Damper, which was gagged shut under the clearance, failed open following the transfer of a vital electrical power supply. This violation was entered into licensee's corrective action program as CR 2002003930. This is being treated as a Non Cited Violation.
Inspection Report# : 2002003(pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Jun 29, 2002
4Q/2002 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 3 of 3 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate SCBA Training Procedure Green. A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 20.1703(c)(4)(ii) was identified for the failure of the licensee to implement a self-contained breathing apparatus training program that required all designated SCBA users to demonstrate proficiency in the change out of SCBA air bottles. This finding was of very low safety significance because it involved a failure to meet a regulatory requirement but did not involve the failure to implement or meet an emergency preparedness planning standard and because no actual event required emergency response workers to change self contained breathing apparatus air bottles. This finding been entered into the licensee corrective action program as CR2002006279.
Inspection Report# : 2002003(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Miscellaneous Last modified : March 25, 2003
1Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 1 of 3 Hatch 2 1Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Sep 28, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Meet Conditions of License for Requalification Examinations Green. A non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 5.2.2.f was identified for allowing the Operations Manager to continue in his normal duties without a current license in that he did not complete a requalification program within the two year training cycle as required by 10 CFR 55.53(h) and 10 CFR 55.59(a). The finding was more than minor because the Operations Manager was permitted to continue his daily duties, including directing day-to-day plant operation by licensed operators. The finding was of very low safety significance because the individual did not actually perform any licensed operator duties. Although not suitable for Significance Determination Process (SDP) analysis in the Operator Requalification or Reactor SDP, the issue was determined by management review to be of Green significance. (Section 1R11.2)
Inspection Report# : 2002004(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Dec 31, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Corrective Action for Missing Penetration Seals The licensee had not taken prompt corrective action for missing RHR Service Water (RHRSW) piping penetration seals at the intake structure. A non-cited violation of 10CFR50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI was identified. This finding is more than minor because the lack of penetration seals could have permitted the Plant Service Water (PSW) valve pit to flood and effected the mitigating systems cornerstone. Because flooding of the PSW valve pit had not occurred nor were flooding conditions present, this failure to promptly correct a condition adverse to quality is of very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2002005(pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Calculation Error Results in Incorrect Steam Line High Flow Setpoints An incorrect calculation constant resulted in a non-conservative setpoint for the Unit 1 main steam line flow - high isolation setpoint. A self-revealing non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) table 3.3.6.1-1 was identified.
This finding is greater than minor because the actual setpoint exceeded the TS allowable value and the analytical limit, file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\HAT2\hat2_pim.html 07/22/2003
1Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 2 of 3 as a result of the error. However, the violation is of very low significance because the increased steam released due to the higher setpoint would not significantly impact offsite radiological dose during a main steam line break accident.
Inspection Report# : 2002005(pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Operability Assessment of Main Steam Safety Relief Valve The licensee did not promptly identify the cause of a failed safety relief valve (SRV). An operability evaluation written in response to the failure was not timely and did not adequately support a determination that the remaining SRV's were operable. Consequently, this significant condition adverse to quality was not promptly corrected and adequate measures were not taken to preclude repetition. A non-cited violation of 10CFR50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI was identified.
This finding is greater than minor because the licensee's operability assessment was not timely and relied primarily on unsupported engineering judgement for a determination of operable for the remaining SRV's. It also required multiple revisions when inconsistencies were identified by the inspectors. This finding was of very low significance because no loss of SRV function occurred.
Inspection Report# : 2002005(pdf)
Significance: Oct 24, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Consider Vortexing in the Calculation for CST Level for Automatic Switchover of the HPCI Pump Suction Green. A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified for inadequate design control of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system suction source from the condensate storage tank (CST). Vortexing in the CST was not accounted for when the licensee calculated the CST level setpoint specified in the Technical Specifications (TS) for automatic HPCI system suction switchover from the CST to the suppression pool.
Vortexing could cause air ingestion into the HPCI system suction from the CST and the air could then damage the HPCI pump. This finding was of very low safety significance because licensee use of the non-safety CST as a HPCI pump suction source with the CST at low levels was unlikely since the reactor vessel or suppression pool would generally reach a high level first, where the HPCI pump would be automatically stopped or its suction would be automatically switched to the safety-related suppression pool. In addition, alternate core cooling methods would normally be available, including reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) as well as automatic depressurization system (ADS) and low pressure coolant injection (LPCI).
Inspection Report# : 2002006(pdf)
Significance: Oct 24, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate RCIC System Operating Procedure Green. A non-cited violation of TS 5.4.1, Procedures, was identified for an inadequate RCIC system operating procedure. The section of the procedure for local manual operation of RCIC, if followed exactly as written, would have resulted in overspeeding the RCIC pump with no water flow through the pump and with no cooling water to the pump.
This finding was of very low safety significance because the likelihood of losing Division I direct current (DC) power was low; consequently the potential need for local manual operation of RCIC was low. In addition, other core cooling methods would normally be available, including HPCI as well as ADS and LPCI.
Inspection Report# : 2002006(pdf) file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\HAT2\hat2_pim.html 07/22/2003
1Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 3 of 3 Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Jun 29, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate SCBA Training Procedure Green. A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 20.1703(c)(4)(ii) was identified for the failure of the licensee to implement a self-contained breathing apparatus training program that required all designated SCBA users to demonstrate proficiency in the change out of SCBA air bottles. This finding was of very low safety significance because it involved a failure to meet a regulatory requirement but did not involve the failure to implement or meet an emergency preparedness planning standard and because no actual event required emergency response workers to change self contained breathing apparatus air bottles. This finding been entered into the licensee corrective action program as CR2002006279.
Inspection Report# : 2002003(pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Miscellaneous Last modified : May 30, 2003 file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\HAT2\hat2_pim.html 07/22/2003
2Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 1 of 3 Hatch 2 2Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Sep 28, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Meet Conditions of License for Requalification Examinations Green. A non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 5.2.2.f was identified for allowing the Operations Manager to continue in his normal duties without a current license in that he did not complete a requalification program within the two year training cycle as required by 10 CFR 55.53(h) and 10 CFR 55.59(a). The finding was more than minor because the Operations Manager was permitted to continue his daily duties, including directing day-to-day plant operation by licensed operators. The finding was of very low safety significance because the individual did not actually perform any licensed operator duties. Although not suitable for Significance Determination Process (SDP) analysis in the Operator Requalification or Reactor SDP, the issue was determined by management review to be of Green significance. (Section 1R11.2)
Inspection Report# : 2002004(pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Dec 31, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Corrective Action for Missing Penetration Seals The licensee had not taken prompt corrective action for missing RHR Service Water (RHRSW) piping penetration seals at the intake structure. A non-cited violation of 10CFR50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI was identified. This finding is more than minor because the lack of penetration seals could have permitted the Plant Service Water (PSW) valve pit to flood and effected the mitigating systems cornerstone. Because flooding of the PSW valve pit had not occurred nor were flooding conditions present, this failure to promptly correct a condition adverse to quality is of very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2002005(pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Calculation Error Results in Incorrect Steam Line High Flow Setpoints An incorrect calculation constant resulted in a non-conservative setpoint for the Unit 1 main steam line flow - high isolation setpoint. A self-revealing non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) table 3.3.6.1-1 was identified.
This finding is greater than minor because the actual setpoint exceeded the TS allowable value and the analytical limit, file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\HAT2\hat2_pim.html 10/08/2003
2Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 2 of 3 as a result of the error. However, the violation is of very low significance because the increased steam released due to the higher setpoint would not significantly impact offsite radiological dose during a main steam line break accident.
Inspection Report# : 2002005(pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Operability Assessment of Main Steam Safety Relief Valve The licensee did not promptly identify the cause of a failed safety relief valve (SRV). An operability evaluation written in response to the failure was not timely and did not adequately support a determination that the remaining SRV's were operable. Consequently, this significant condition adverse to quality was not promptly corrected and adequate measures were not taken to preclude repetition. A non-cited violation of 10CFR50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI was identified.
This finding is greater than minor because the licensee's operability assessment was not timely and relied primarily on unsupported engineering judgement for a determination of operable for the remaining SRV's. It also required multiple revisions when inconsistencies were identified by the inspectors. This finding was of very low significance because no loss of SRV function occurred.
Inspection Report# : 2002005(pdf)
Significance: Oct 24, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Consider Vortexing in the Calculation for CST Level for Automatic Switchover of the HPCI Pump Suction Green. A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified for inadequate design control of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system suction source from the condensate storage tank (CST). Vortexing in the CST was not accounted for when the licensee calculated the CST level setpoint specified in the Technical Specifications (TS) for automatic HPCI system suction switchover from the CST to the suppression pool.
Vortexing could cause air ingestion into the HPCI system suction from the CST and the air could then damage the HPCI pump. This finding was of very low safety significance because licensee use of the non-safety CST as a HPCI pump suction source with the CST at low levels was unlikely since the reactor vessel or suppression pool would generally reach a high level first, where the HPCI pump would be automatically stopped or its suction would be automatically switched to the safety-related suppression pool. In addition, alternate core cooling methods would normally be available, including reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) as well as automatic depressurization system (ADS) and low pressure coolant injection (LPCI).
Inspection Report# : 2002006(pdf)
Significance: Oct 24, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate RCIC System Operating Procedure Green. A non-cited violation of TS 5.4.1, Procedures, was identified for an inadequate RCIC system operating procedure. The section of the procedure for local manual operation of RCIC, if followed exactly as written, would have resulted in overspeeding the RCIC pump with no water flow through the pump and with no cooling water to the pump.
This finding was of very low safety significance because the likelihood of losing Division I direct current (DC) power was low; consequently the potential need for local manual operation of RCIC was low. In addition, other core cooling methods would normally be available, including HPCI as well as ADS and LPCI.
Inspection Report# : 2002006(pdf) file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\HAT2\hat2_pim.html 10/08/2003
2Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 3 of 3 Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Miscellaneous Last modified : September 04, 2003 file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\HAT2\hat2_pim.html 10/08/2003
3Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 1 of 4 Hatch 2 3Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Aug 29, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Evaluate Pressure Transients on Safety Related System A Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria XVI, was identified for failure to identify that recurring pressure transients during Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) pump startup required evaluation.
This finding is is more than minor because on multiple occasions the piping design pressure was exceeded yet the licensee failed to evaluate the effect of the pressure transient on the system. This issue is of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not actually result in the safety related system being inoperable for greater than the time allowed by plant TS.
Inspection Report# : 2003007(pdf)
Significance: Aug 29, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Corrective Actions For A Previous Violation A Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria XVI, involving inadequate corrective actions for a previously identified NCV was identified. This resulted in the failure to perform a Technical Specification surveillance requirement within the specified frequency.
This finding is more than minor because if left uncorrected TS required surveillances would not be performed due to procedural inadequacies. Specifically, this finding involved the failure to determine the extent of condition with regard to procedural deficiencies following initial identification of deficiencies in September 2001. In this instance, the individual channel response times could have become greater than the maximum values assumed in the safety analysis associated with the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) Safety Limit. This missed surveillance requirement was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the subsequent successful performance of the response time test demonstrated the relays were operable at all times.
Inspection Report# : 2003007(pdf)
Significance: Jul 25, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\HAT2\hat2_pim.html 01/12/2004
3Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 2 of 4 Unapproved Manual Operator Actions for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 in that the licensee relied on some manual operator actions to operate safe shutdown equipment, instead of providing the required physical protection of cables from fire damage without NRC approval.
The finding is greater than minor because it affected the availability and reliability objectives and the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone. Since the actions could reasonably be accomplished by operators in a timely manner, this finding did not have potential safety significance greater than very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2003006(pdf)
Significance: Jul 25, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Emergency Lighting for Operation of Post-Fire SSD Equipment Green. The team identified a non-cited violation 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.J because emergency lighting was not adequate for some manual operator actions that were needed to support post-fire operation of safe shutdown equipment.
The finding is greater than minor because it affected the reliability objective and the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone. Since operators would be able to accomplish the actions with the use of flashlights, this finding did not have potential safety significance greater than very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2003006(pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Corrective Action for Missing Penetration Seals The licensee had not taken prompt corrective action for missing RHR Service Water (RHRSW) piping penetration seals at the intake structure.
A non-cited violation of 10CFR50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI was identified. This finding is more than minor because the lack of penetration seals could have permitted the Plant Service Water (PSW) valve pit to flood and effected the mitigating systems cornerstone. Because flooding of the PSW valve pit had not occurred nor were flooding conditions present, this failure to promptly correct a condition adverse to quality is of very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2002005(pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Calculation Error Results in Incorrect Steam Line High Flow Setpoints An incorrect calculation constant resulted in a non-conservative setpoint for the Unit 1 main steam line flow - high isolation setpoint.
A self-revealing non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) table 3.3.6.1-1 was identified. This finding is greater than minor because the actual setpoint exceeded the TS allowable value and the analytical limit, as a result of the error. However, the violation is of very low significance because the increased steam released due to the higher file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\HAT2\hat2_pim.html 01/12/2004
3Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 3 of 4 setpoint would not significantly impact offsite radiological dose during a main steam line break accident.
Inspection Report# : 2002005(pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Operability Assessment of Main Steam Safety Relief Valve The licensee did not promptly identify the cause of a failed safety relief valve (SRV). An operability evaluation written in response to the failure was not timely and did not adequately support a determination that the remaining SRV's were operable. Consequently, this significant condition adverse to quality was not promptly corrected and adequate measures were not taken to preclude repetition.
A non-cited violation of 10CFR50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI was identified. This finding is greater than minor because the licensee's operability assessment was not timely and relied primarily on unsupported engineering judgement for a determination of operable for the remaining SRV's. It also required multiple revisions when inconsistencies were identified by the inspectors. This finding was of very low significance because no loss of SRV function occurred.
Inspection Report# : 2002005(pdf)
Significance: Oct 24, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Consider Vortexing in the Calculation for CST Level for Automatic Switchover of the HPCI Pump Suction Green. A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified for inadequate design control of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system suction source from the condensate storage tank (CST). Vortexing in the CST was not accounted for when the licensee calculated the CST level setpoint specified in the Technical Specifications (TS) for automatic HPCI system suction switchover from the CST to the suppression pool.
Vortexing could cause air ingestion into the HPCI system suction from the CST and the air could then damage the HPCI pump.
This finding was of very low safety significance because licensee use of the non-safety CST as a HPCI pump suction source with the CST at low levels was unlikely since the reactor vessel or suppression pool would generally reach a high level first, where the HPCI pump would be automatically stopped or its suction would be automatically switched to the safety-related suppression pool. In addition, alternate core cooling methods would normally be available, including reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) as well as automatic depressurization system (ADS) and low pressure coolant injection (LPCI).
Inspection Report# : 2002006(pdf)
Significance: Oct 24, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate RCIC System Operating Procedure Green. A non-cited violation of TS 5.4.1, Procedures, was identified for an inadequate RCIC system operating procedure. The section of the procedure for local manual operation of RCIC, if followed exactly as written, would have resulted in overspeeding the RCIC pump with no water flow through the pump and with no cooling water to the pump.
file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\HAT2\hat2_pim.html 01/12/2004
3Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 4 of 4 This finding was of very low safety significance because the likelihood of losing Division I direct current (DC) power was low; consequently the potential need for local manual operation of RCIC was low. In addition, other core cooling methods would normally be available, including HPCI as well as ADS and LPCI.
Inspection Report# : 2002006(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Aug 29, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Results The team identified that the licensee was generally effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution. The licensee maintained a low threshold for identifying problems as evidenced by the continued large number of condition reports (CR) entered annually into the CAP. The team also determined that the licensee was generally prioritizing and evaluating issues properly. The team concluded however, that deficiencies exist in the implementation of effective corrective actions to prevent recurrence. Numerous repetitive equipment problems had not been resolved in a timely manner. Two NCVs involving 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, were identified. Audits and self-assessments continued to identify issues related to the corrective action program. On the basis of interviews conducted during the inspection, the team identified that personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and to resolve issues via the CAP.
Inspection Report# : 2003007(pdf)
Last modified : December 01, 2003 file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\HAT2\hat2_pim.html 01/12/2004
4Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 1 of 3 Hatch 2 4Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Aug 29, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Corrective Actions For A Previous Violation A Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria XVI, involving inadequate corrective actions for a previously identified NCV was identified. This resulted in the failure to perform a Technical Specification surveillance requirement within the specified frequency.
This finding is more than minor because if left uncorrected TS required surveillances would not be performed due to procedural inadequacies. Specifically, this finding involved the failure to determine the extent of condition with regard to procedural deficiencies following initial identification of deficiencies in September 2001. In this instance, the individual channel response times could have become greater than the maximum values assumed in the safety analysis associated with the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) Safety Limit. This missed surveillance requirement was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the subsequent successful performance of the response time test demonstrated the relays were operable at all times.
Inspection Report# : 2003007(pdf)
Significance: Aug 29, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Evaluate Pressure Transients on Safety Related System A Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria XVI, was identified for failure to identify that recurring pressure transients during Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) pump startup required evaluation.
This finding is is more than minor because on multiple occasions the piping design pressure was exceeded yet the licensee failed to evaluate the effect of the pressure transient on the system. This issue is of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not actually result in the safety related system being inoperable for greater than the time allowed by plant TS.
Inspection Report# : 2003007(pdf)
Significance: Jul 25, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\HAT2\hat2_pim.html 04/22/2004
4Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 2 of 3 Unapproved Manual Operator Actions for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 in that the licensee relied on some manual operator actions to operate safe shutdown equipment, instead of providing the required physical protection of cables from fire damage without NRC approval.
The finding is greater than minor because it affected the availability and reliability objectives and the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone. Since the actions could reasonably be accomplished by operators in a timely manner, this finding did not have potential safety significance greater than very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2003006(pdf)
Significance: Jul 25, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Emergency Lighting for Operation of Post-Fire SSD Equipment Green. The team identified a non-cited violation 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.J because emergency lighting was not adequate for some manual operator actions that were needed to support post-fire operation of safe shutdown equipment.
The finding is greater than minor because it affected the reliability objective and the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone. Since operators would be able to accomplish the actions with the use of flashlights, this finding did not have potential safety significance greater than very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2003006(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\HAT2\hat2_pim.html 04/22/2004
4Q/2003 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 3 of 3 Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Aug 29, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Results The team identified that the licensee was generally effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution. The licensee maintained a low threshold for identifying problems as evidenced by the continued large number of condition reports (CR) entered annually into the CAP. The team also determined that the licensee was generally prioritizing and evaluating issues properly. The team concluded however, that deficiencies exist in the implementation of effective corrective actions to prevent recurrence. Numerous repetitive equipment problems had not been resolved in a timely manner. Two NCVs involving 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, were identified. Audits and self-assessments continued to identify issues related to the corrective action program. On the basis of interviews conducted during the inspection, the team identified that personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and to resolve issues via the CAP.
Inspection Report# : 2003007(pdf)
Last modified : March 02, 2004 file://C:\RROP\NRR\OVERSIGHT\ASSESS\HAT2\hat2_pim.html 04/22/2004
1Q/2004 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 1 of 3 Hatch 2 1Q/2004 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 27, 2004 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Maintenance Instructions Results in Emergency Diesel Generator Start and Inoperability A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) was identified for inadequate work instructions provided to workers to remove a section of Plant Service Water (PSW) piping. This resulted in spilling water on to the 2C Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) relay panel causing an auto-start of the 2C EDG and subsequent inoperability.
This finding is more than minor because it adversely affected the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone in that the water spillage affected EDG operability. The finding was determined to be of a very low safety significance because the required redundant equipment trains were operable and the 2C EDG was restored to operable status within the Technical Specification (TS) allowed outage time.
Inspection Report# : 2004002(pdf)
Significance: Aug 29, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Corrective Actions For A Previous Violation A Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria XVI, involving inadequate corrective actions for a previously identified NCV was identified. This resulted in the failure to perform a Technical Specification surveillance requirement within the specified frequency.
This finding is more than minor because if left uncorrected TS required surveillances would not be performed due to procedural inadequacies.
Specifically, this finding involved the failure to determine the extent of condition with regard to procedural deficiencies following initial identification of deficiencies in September 2001. In this instance, the individual channel response times could have become greater than the maximum values assumed in the safety analysis associated with the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) Safety Limit. This missed surveillance requirement was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the subsequent successful performance of the response time test demonstrated the relays were operable at all times.
Inspection Report# : 2003007(pdf)
Significance: Aug 29, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Evaluate Pressure Transients on Safety Related System A Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria XVI, was identified for failure to identify that recurring pressure transients during Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) pump startup required evaluation.
This finding is is more than minor because on multiple occasions the piping design pressure was exceeded yet the licensee failed to evaluate the effect of the pressure transient on the system. This issue is of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not actually result in the safety related system being inoperable for greater than the time allowed by plant TS.
Inspection Report# : 2003007(pdf)
Significance: Jul 25, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation 07/14/2004
1Q/2004 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 2 of 3 Unapproved Manual Operator Actions for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 in that the licensee relied on some manual operator actions to operate safe shutdown equipment, instead of providing the required physical protection of cables from fire damage without NRC approval.
The finding is greater than minor because it affected the availability and reliability objectives and the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone. Since the actions could reasonably be accomplished by operators in a timely manner, this finding did not have potential safety significance greater than very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2003006(pdf)
Significance: Jul 25, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Emergency Lighting for Operation of Post-Fire SSD Equipment Green. The team identified a non-cited violation 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.J because emergency lighting was not adequate for some manual operator actions that were needed to support post-fire operation of safe shutdown equipment.
The finding is greater than minor because it affected the reliability objective and the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone. Since operators would be able to accomplish the actions with the use of flashlights, this finding did not have potential safety significance greater than very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2003006(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Aug 29, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Results The team identified that the licensee was generally effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution. The licensee maintained a low threshold for identifying problems as evidenced by the continued large number of condition reports (CR) entered annually into the CAP. The team also determined that the licensee was generally prioritizing and evaluating issues properly. The team concluded however, that deficiencies exist in the implementation of effective corrective actions to prevent recurrence. Numerous repetitive equipment problems had not been resolved in a timely manner. Two NCVs involving 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, were identified. Audits and self-assessments continued to identify issues related to the corrective action program. On the basis of interviews conducted during the inspection, the team identified that personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and to resolve issues via the CAP.
07/14/2004
1Q/2004 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 3 of 3 Inspection Report# : 2003007(pdf)
Last modified : May 05, 2004 07/14/2004
2Q/2004 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 1 of 2 Hatch 2 2Q/2004 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 27, 2004 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Maintenance Instructions Results in Emergency Diesel Generator Start and Inoperability A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) was identified for inadequate work instructions provided to workers to remove a section of Plant Service Water (PSW) piping. This resulted in spilling water on to the 2C Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) relay panel causing an auto-start of the 2C EDG and subsequent inoperability.
This finding is more than minor because it adversely affected the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone in that the water spillage affected EDG operability. The finding was determined to be of a very low safety significance because the required redundant equipment trains were operable and the 2C EDG was restored to operable status within the Technical Specification (TS) allowed outage time.
Inspection Report# : 2004002(pdf)
Significance: Aug 29, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Corrective Actions For A Previous Violation A Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria XVI, involving inadequate corrective actions for a previously identified NCV was identified. This resulted in the failure to perform a Technical Specification surveillance requirement within the specified frequency.
This finding is more than minor because if left uncorrected TS required surveillances would not be performed due to procedural inadequacies.
Specifically, this finding involved the failure to determine the extent of condition with regard to procedural deficiencies following initial identification of deficiencies in September 2001. In this instance, the individual channel response times could have become greater than the maximum values assumed in the safety analysis associated with the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) Safety Limit. This missed surveillance requirement was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the subsequent successful performance of the response time test demonstrated the relays were operable at all times.
Inspection Report# : 2003007(pdf)
Significance: Aug 29, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Evaluate Pressure Transients on Safety Related System A Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria XVI, was identified for failure to identify that recurring pressure transients during Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) pump startup required evaluation.
This finding is is more than minor because on multiple occasions the piping design pressure was exceeded yet the licensee failed to evaluate the effect of the pressure transient on the system. This issue is of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not actually result in the safety related system being inoperable for greater than the time allowed by plant TS.
Inspection Report# : 2003007(pdf)
Significance: Jul 25, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Unapproved Manual Operator Actions for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 in that the licensee relied on some manual operator actions to operate safe shutdown equipment, instead of providing the required physical protection of cables from fire damage without NRC approval.
The finding is greater than minor because it affected the availability and reliability objectives and the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating
2Q/2004 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 2 of 2 systems cornerstone. Since the actions could reasonably be accomplished by operators in a timely manner, this finding did not have potential safety significance greater than very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2003006(pdf)
Significance: Jul 25, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Emergency Lighting for Operation of Post-Fire SSD Equipment Green. The team identified a non-cited violation 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.J because emergency lighting was not adequate for some manual operator actions that were needed to support post-fire operation of safe shutdown equipment.
The finding is greater than minor because it affected the reliability objective and the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone. Since operators would be able to accomplish the actions with the use of flashlights, this finding did not have potential safety significance greater than very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2003006(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Aug 29, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Results The team identified that the licensee was generally effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution. The licensee maintained a low threshold for identifying problems as evidenced by the continued large number of condition reports (CR) entered annually into the CAP. The team also determined that the licensee was generally prioritizing and evaluating issues properly. The team concluded however, that deficiencies exist in the implementation of effective corrective actions to prevent recurrence. Numerous repetitive equipment problems had not been resolved in a timely manner. Two NCVs involving 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, were identified. Audits and self-assessments continued to identify issues related to the corrective action program. On the basis of interviews conducted during the inspection, the team identified that personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and to resolve issues via the CAP.
Inspection Report# : 2003007(pdf)
Last modified : September 08, 2004
3Q/2004 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 1 of 2 Hatch 2 3Q/2004 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: SL-IV Sep 25, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation The inspectors identified a SL-IV non-cited violation (NCV) when the licensee failed to perform a 10 CFR 50.59 screening or evaluation for failing closed the RHRSW minimum flow valves. This evaluation was required to demonstrate that the change did not create the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR).
As described in the NRC Enforcement Policy, violations of 10 CFR 50.59 are considered to potentially impede or impact the regulatory process. Therefore, the significance of this finding was assessed using the Enforcement Policy Supplements. The inspectors determined the finding was more than minor because the inspectors could not reasonably determine that the change would not ultimately require NRC approval, based on the lack of licensee documentation related to compensatory measures, short or long term corrective actions. Based on the inspectors review of the licensee's 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation, this violation was determined to be of very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2004004(pdf)
Significance: Mar 27, 2004 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Maintenance Instructions Results in Emergency Diesel Generator Start and Inoperability A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) was identified for inadequate work instructions provided to workers to remove a section of Plant Service Water (PSW) piping. This resulted in spilling water on to the 2C Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) relay panel causing an auto-start of the 2C EDG and subsequent inoperability.
This finding is more than minor because it adversely affected the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone in that the water spillage affected EDG operability. The finding was determined to be of a very low safety significance because the required redundant equipment trains were operable and the 2C EDG was restored to operable status within the Technical Specification (TS) allowed outage time.
Inspection Report# : 2004002(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety
3Q/2004 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 2 of 2 Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Last modified : December 29, 2004
4Q/2004 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 1 of 2 Hatch 2 4Q/2004 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: SL-IV Sep 25, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation The inspectors identified a SL-IV non-cited violation (NCV) when the licensee failed to perform a 10 CFR 50.59 screening or evaluation for failing closed the RHRSW minimum flow valves. This evaluation was required to demonstrate that the change did not create the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR).
As described in the NRC Enforcement Policy, violations of 10 CFR 50.59 are considered to potentially impede or impact the regulatory process. Therefore, the significance of this finding was assessed using the Enforcement Policy Supplements. The inspectors determined the finding was more than minor because the inspectors could not reasonably determine that the change would not ultimately require NRC approval, based on the lack of licensee documentation related to compensatory measures, short or long term corrective actions. Based on the inspectors review of the licensee's 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation, this violation was determined to be of very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2004004(pdf)
Significance: Mar 27, 2004 Identified By: Self Disclosing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Maintenance Instructions Results in Emergency Diesel Generator Start and Inoperability A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) was identified for inadequate work instructions provided to workers to remove a section of Plant Service Water (PSW) piping. This resulted in spilling water on to the 2C Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) relay panel causing an auto-start of the 2C EDG and subsequent inoperability.
This finding is more than minor because it adversely affected the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone in that the water spillage affected EDG operability. The finding was determined to be of a very low safety significance because the required redundant equipment trains were operable and the 2C EDG was restored to operable status within the Technical Specification (TS) allowed outage time.
Inspection Report# : 2004002(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety
4Q/2004 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 2 of 2 Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Last modified : March 09, 2005
1Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 1 of 2 Hatch 2 1Q/2005 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: SL-IV Sep 25, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation The inspectors identified a SL-IV non-cited violation (NCV) when the licensee failed to perform a 10 CFR 50.59 screening or evaluation for failing closed the RHRSW minimum flow valves. This evaluation was required to demonstrate that the change did not create the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR).
As described in the NRC Enforcement Policy, violations of 10 CFR 50.59 are considered to potentially impede or impact the regulatory process. Therefore, the significance of this finding was assessed using the Enforcement Policy Supplements. The inspectors determined the finding was more than minor because the inspectors could not reasonably determine that the change would not ultimately require NRC approval, based on the lack of licensee documentation related to compensatory measures, short or long term corrective actions. Based on the inspectors review of the licensee's 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation, this violation was determined to be of very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2004004(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Significance: Mar 31, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Implement Appropriate DOT Type A Package Closure Requirements An NRC-identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 71.5 was identified for failure to implement current package design specifications for proper closing of Type A shipping packages (CRDM shipment boxes) as required by DOT regulations. Specifically, for Type A packages containing CRDM equipment shipped between January 2003 and February 2005, the licensee failed to prepare the package closures in accordance with vendor package specifications as required by 49 CFR 173.475(e).
This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the public radiation cornerstone program and process attribute and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety from exposure to radioactive material released into the public domain. The issue was reviewed using the Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process and was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because a radiation limit was not exceeded nor was the packaging breached. In addition, previous shipments made by the licensee had arrived at their destination with no identified degradation of the subject packaging and immediate corrective actions assured
1Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 2 of 2 that on-going CRDM equipment packages were prepared properly prior to shipment.
Inspection Report# : 2005002(pdf)
Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Last modified : June 17, 2005
2Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 1 of 2 Hatch 2 2Q/2005 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Jun 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Untimely and Unapproved Manual Operators Actions for Post-Fire SSD The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a because Abnormal Operating procedure 34AB-X43-001-2, Fire Procedure, was not adequate to preclude spurious opening of all eleven safety relief valves (SRVs) during plant fires. In lieu of protecting the cables, a local manual operator action was directed to preclude spurious opening of the SRVs as a result of fire damage to cables in the SRV control circuitry. The inspectors determined that the local manual operator action would not be performed in sufficient time to be effective.
The finding is greater than minor because it affects the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, spurious operation of all SRVs during certain fire scenarios could complicate post-fire recovery actions. The finding is associated with the protection against external factors attribute.
The finding was evaluated using the Fire Protection SDP and was determined to be a finding of very low safety significance because the likelihood of starting a fire in Fire Area 2104 was very low and equipment needed to mitigate the transient caused by all SRVs opening would be unaffected by the fire. In addition, the inspectors verified the systems and equipment required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions would remain free of fire damage and that safe shutdown capability could be achieved even with all SRVs open.
Inspection Report# : 2005003(pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Sep 25, 2004 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation The inspectors identified a SL-IV non-cited violation (NCV) when the licensee failed to perform a 10 CFR 50.59 screening or evaluation for failing closed the RHRSW minimum flow valves. This evaluation was required to demonstrate that the change did not create the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR).
As described in the NRC Enforcement Policy, violations of 10 CFR 50.59 are considered to potentially impede or impact the regulatory process. Therefore, the significance of this finding was assessed using the Enforcement Policy Supplements. The inspectors determined the finding was more than minor because the inspectors could not reasonably determine that the change would not ultimately require NRC approval, based on the lack of licensee documentation related to compensatory measures, short or long term corrective actions. Based on the inspectors review of the licensee's 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation, this violation was determined to be of very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2004004(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Significance: TBD Jun 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: AV Apparent Violation Failure to Maintain Facilities and Equipment to Support Emergency Response The NRC identified an apparent violation associated with emergency preparedness planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8). [The Technical
2Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 2 of 2 Support Center (TSC) was rendered inoperable for greater than seven days due to planned modification activities.]
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Facilities and Equipment attribute of the Emergency Preparedness (EP)
Cornerstone and impacts the objective of the Hatch TSC to maintain facilities and equipment to support emergency response in that the TSC was inoperable during the modification activities and could not be returned to operable within a short period. Based upon IMC 0609, Appendix B, Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process, Sheet 1, and the examples provided in Section 4.8, this finding was
[preliminarly] determined to be of low to moderate safety significance (White) because the PS function was lost in that the TSC was inoperable for greater than seven days due to a planned outage in which activities were not scheduled to proceed with high priority for completion.
Inspection Report# : 2005003(pdf)
Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Significance: Mar 31, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Implement Appropriate DOT Type A Package Closure Requirements An NRC-identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 71.5 was identified for failure to implement current package design specifications for proper closing of Type A shipping packages (CRDM shipment boxes) as required by DOT regulations. Specifically, for Type A packages containing CRDM equipment shipped between January 2003 and February 2005, the licensee failed to prepare the package closures in accordance with vendor package specifications as required by 49 CFR 173.475(e).
This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the public radiation cornerstone program and process attribute and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety from exposure to radioactive material released into the public domain. The issue was reviewed using the Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process and was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because a radiation limit was not exceeded nor was the packaging breached. In addition, previous shipments made by the licensee had arrived at their destination with no identified degradation of the subject packaging and immediate corrective actions assured that on-going CRDM equipment packages were prepared properly prior to shipment.
Inspection Report# : 2005002(pdf)
Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Last modified : August 24, 2005
3Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 1 of 3 Hatch 2 3Q/2005 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Jul 29, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Take Prompt Corrective Actions for an NCV A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria XVI, involving the failure to take prompt corrective actions for a previously identified NCV was identified. This resulted in the failure to evaluate and restore compliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.
This finding is greater than minor because it affected the reliability objective and the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. Although emergency lighting units with at least an 8-hour battery power supply were not provided as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.J, the inspectors determined that operators would be able to accomplish the actions with the use of flashlights. The inspectors determined that the finding affected the "Post-fire SSD" category in that it affected the ability to complete post-fire actions. Because the operators had a high probability of completing the task using flashlights, a low degradation rating was assigned due to minimal impact on the effectiveness of post-fire actions. Therefore, this finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green). This finding affects the corrective action attribute of the Problem Identification and Resolution crosscutting area.
Inspection Report# : 2005006(pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Untimely and Unapproved Manual Operators Actions for Post-Fire SSD The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a because Abnormal Operating procedure 34AB-X43-001-2, Fire Procedure, was not adequate to preclude spurious opening of all eleven safety relief valves (SRVs) during plant fires. In lieu of protecting the cables, a local manual operator action was directed to preclude spurious opening of the SRVs as a result of fire damage to cables in the SRV control circuitry. The inspectors determined that the local manual operator action would not be performed in sufficient time to be effective.
The finding is greater than minor because it affects the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, spurious operation of all SRVs during certain fire scenarios could complicate post-fire recovery actions. The finding is associated with the protection against external factors attribute.
The finding was evaluated using the Fire Protection SDP and was determined to be a finding of very low safety significance because the likelihood of starting a fire in Fire Area 2104 was very low and equipment needed to mitigate the transient caused by all SRVs opening would be unaffected by the fire. In addition, the inspectors verified the systems and equipment required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions would remain free of fire damage and that safe shutdown capability could be achieved even with all SRVs open.
Inspection Report# : 2005003(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Significance: Jun 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation
3Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 2 of 3 Failure to Maintain Facilities and Equipment to Support Emergency Response The NRC identified an apparent violation associated with emergency preparedness planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8). [The Technical Support Center (TSC) was rendered inoperable for greater than seven days due to planned modification activities.]
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Facilities and Equipment attribute of the Emergency Preparedness (EP)
Cornerstone and impacts the objective of the Hatch TSC to maintain facilities and equipment to support emergency response in that the TSC was inoperable during the modification activities and could not be returned to operable within a short period. Based upon IMC 0609, Appendix B, Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process, Sheet 1, and the examples provided in Section 4.8, this finding was
[preliminarly] determined to be of low to moderate safety significance (White) because the PS function was lost in that the TSC was inoperable for greater than seven days due to a planned outage in which activities were not scheduled to proceed with high priority for completion.
Inspection Report# : 2005009(pdf)
Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Significance: Mar 31, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Implement Appropriate DOT Type A Package Closure Requirements An NRC-identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 71.5 was identified for failure to implement current package design specifications for proper closing of Type A shipping packages (CRDM shipment boxes) as required by DOT regulations. Specifically, for Type A packages containing CRDM equipment shipped between January 2003 and February 2005, the licensee failed to prepare the package closures in accordance with vendor package specifications as required by 49 CFR 173.475(e).
This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the public radiation cornerstone program and process attribute and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety from exposure to radioactive material released into the public domain. The issue was reviewed using the Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process and was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because a radiation limit was not exceeded nor was the packaging breached. In addition, previous shipments made by the licensee had arrived at their destination with no identified degradation of the subject packaging and immediate corrective actions assured that on-going CRDM equipment packages were prepared properly prior to shipment.
Inspection Report# : 2005002(pdf)
Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Jul 29, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Biennial Identification and Resolution of Problems Inspection Assessment The inspectors identified that the licensee was generally effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution. The licensee maintained a low threshold for identifying problems as evidenced by the continued large number of condition reports (CR) entered annually into the CAP. The inspectors also determined that the licensee was generally prioritizing and evaluating issues properly. The inspectors identified minor problems involving corrective actions for operating experience not being documented within the corrective action program, timeliness of evaluations, and corrective actions which were incomplete. Non-cited violations (NCVs) related to the effectiveness of corrective actions and inadequate evaluation of issues were identified. Audits and self-assessments continued to identify issues related to the corrective action program. On the basis of interviews conducted during the inspection, the inspectors identified that personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and to resolve issues via the CAP.
3Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 3 of 3 Inspection Report# : 2005006(pdf)
Last modified : November 30, 2005
4Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 1 of 3 Hatch 2 4Q/2005 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Jul 29, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Take Prompt Corrective Actions for an NCV A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria XVI, involving the failure to take prompt corrective actions for a previously identified NCV was identified. This resulted in the failure to evaluate and restore compliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.
This finding is greater than minor because it affected the reliability objective and the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. Although emergency lighting units with at least an 8-hour battery power supply were not provided as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.J, the inspectors determined that operators would be able to accomplish the actions with the use of flashlights. The inspectors determined that the finding affected the "Post-fire SSD" category in that it affected the ability to complete post-fire actions. Because the operators had a high probability of completing the task using flashlights, a low degradation rating was assigned due to minimal impact on the effectiveness of post-fire actions. Therefore, this finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green). This finding affects the corrective action attribute of the Problem Identification and Resolution crosscutting area.
Inspection Report# : 2005006(pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Untimely and Unapproved Manual Operators Actions for Post-Fire SSD The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a because Abnormal Operating procedure 34AB-X43-001-2, Fire Procedure, was not adequate to preclude spurious opening of all eleven safety relief valves (SRVs) during plant fires. In lieu of protecting the cables, a local manual operator action was directed to preclude spurious opening of the SRVs as a result of fire damage to cables in the SRV control circuitry. The inspectors determined that the local manual operator action would not be performed in sufficient time to be effective.
The finding is greater than minor because it affects the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, spurious operation of all SRVs during certain fire scenarios could complicate post-fire recovery actions. The finding is associated with the protection against external factors attribute.
The finding was evaluated using the Fire Protection SDP and was determined to be a finding of very low safety significance because the likelihood of starting a fire in Fire Area 2104 was very low and equipment needed to mitigate the transient caused by all SRVs opening would be unaffected by the fire. In addition, the inspectors verified the systems and equipment required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions would remain free of fire damage and that safe shutdown capability could be achieved even with all SRVs open.
Inspection Report# : 2005003(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Significance: Jun 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation
4Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 2 of 3 Failure to Maintain Facilities and Equipment to Support Emergency Response The NRC identified an apparent violation associated with emergency preparedness planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8). [The Technical Support Center (TSC) was rendered inoperable for greater than seven days due to planned modification activities.]
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Facilities and Equipment attribute of the Emergency Preparedness (EP)
Cornerstone and impacts the objective of the Hatch TSC to maintain facilities and equipment to support emergency response in that the TSC was inoperable during the modification activities and could not be returned to operable within a short period. Based upon IMC 0609, Appendix B, Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process, Sheet 1, and the examples provided in Section 4.8, this finding was
[preliminarly] determined to be of low to moderate safety significance (White) because the PS function was lost in that the TSC was inoperable for greater than seven days due to a planned outage in which activities were not scheduled to proceed with high priority for completion.
Inspection Report# : 2005009(pdf)
Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Significance: Mar 31, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Implement Appropriate DOT Type A Package Closure Requirements An NRC-identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 71.5 was identified for failure to implement current package design specifications for proper closing of Type A shipping packages (CRDM shipment boxes) as required by DOT regulations. Specifically, for Type A packages containing CRDM equipment shipped between January 2003 and February 2005, the licensee failed to prepare the package closures in accordance with vendor package specifications as required by 49 CFR 173.475(e).
This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the public radiation cornerstone program and process attribute and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety from exposure to radioactive material released into the public domain. The issue was reviewed using the Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process and was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because a radiation limit was not exceeded nor was the packaging breached. In addition, previous shipments made by the licensee had arrived at their destination with no identified degradation of the subject packaging and immediate corrective actions assured that on-going CRDM equipment packages were prepared properly prior to shipment.
Inspection Report# : 2005002(pdf)
Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Jul 29, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Biennial Identification and Resolution of Problems Inspection Assessment The inspectors identified that the licensee was generally effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution. The licensee maintained a low threshold for identifying problems as evidenced by the continued large number of condition reports (CR) entered annually into the CAP. The inspectors also determined that the licensee was generally prioritizing and evaluating issues properly. The inspectors identified minor problems involving corrective actions for operating experience not being documented within the corrective action program, timeliness of evaluations, and corrective actions which were incomplete. Non-cited violations (NCVs) related to the effectiveness of corrective actions and inadequate evaluation of issues were identified. Audits and self-assessments continued to identify issues related to the corrective action program. On the basis of interviews conducted during the inspection, the inspectors identified that personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and to resolve issues via the CAP.
4Q/2005 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 3 of 3 Inspection Report# : 2005006(pdf)
Last modified : March 03, 2006
1Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 1 of 2 Hatch 2 1Q/2006 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Jul 29, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Take Prompt Corrective Actions for an NCV A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria XVI, involving the failure to take prompt corrective actions for a previously identified NCV was identified. This resulted in the failure to evaluate and restore compliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.
This finding is greater than minor because it affected the reliability objective and the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. Although emergency lighting units with at least an 8-hour battery power supply were not provided as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.J, the inspectors determined that operators would be able to accomplish the actions with the use of flashlights. The inspectors determined that the finding affected the "Post-fire SSD" category in that it affected the ability to complete post-fire actions. Because the operators had a high probability of completing the task using flashlights, a low degradation rating was assigned due to minimal impact on the effectiveness of post-fire actions. Therefore, this finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green). This finding affects the corrective action attribute of the Problem Identification and Resolution crosscutting area.
Inspection Report# : 2005006(pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Untimely and Unapproved Manual Operators Actions for Post-Fire SSD The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a because Abnormal Operating procedure 34AB-X43-001-2, Fire Procedure, was not adequate to preclude spurious opening of all eleven safety relief valves (SRVs) during plant fires. In lieu of protecting the cables, a local manual operator action was directed to preclude spurious opening of the SRVs as a result of fire damage to cables in the SRV control circuitry. The inspectors determined that the local manual operator action would not be performed in sufficient time to be effective.
The finding is greater than minor because it affects the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, spurious operation of all SRVs during certain fire scenarios could complicate post-fire recovery actions. The finding is associated with the protection against external factors attribute.
The finding was evaluated using the Fire Protection SDP and was determined to be a finding of very low safety significance because the likelihood of starting a fire in Fire Area 2104 was very low and equipment needed to mitigate the transient caused by all SRVs opening would be unaffected by the fire. In addition, the inspectors verified the systems and equipment required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions would remain free of fire damage and that safe shutdown capability could be achieved even with all SRVs open.
Inspection Report# : 2005003(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Significance: Jun 30, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation
1Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 2 of 2 Failure to Maintain Facilities and Equipment to Support Emergency Response The NRC identified an apparent violation associated with emergency preparedness planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8). [The Technical Support Center (TSC) was rendered inoperable for greater than seven days due to planned modification activities.]
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Facilities and Equipment attribute of the Emergency Preparedness (EP)
Cornerstone and impacts the objective of the Hatch TSC to maintain facilities and equipment to support emergency response in that the TSC was inoperable during the modification activities and could not be returned to operable within a short period. Based upon IMC 0609, Appendix B, Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process, Sheet 1, and the examples provided in Section 4.8, this finding was
[preliminarly] determined to be of low to moderate safety significance (White) because the PS function was lost in that the TSC was inoperable for greater than seven days due to a planned outage in which activities were not scheduled to proceed with high priority for completion.
Inspection Report# : 2005009(pdf)
Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Jul 29, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Biennial Identification and Resolution of Problems Inspection Assessment The inspectors identified that the licensee was generally effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution. The licensee maintained a low threshold for identifying problems as evidenced by the continued large number of condition reports (CR) entered annually into the CAP. The inspectors also determined that the licensee was generally prioritizing and evaluating issues properly. The inspectors identified minor problems involving corrective actions for operating experience not being documented within the corrective action program, timeliness of evaluations, and corrective actions which were incomplete. Non-cited violations (NCVs) related to the effectiveness of corrective actions and inadequate evaluation of issues were identified. Audits and self-assessments continued to identify issues related to the corrective action program. On the basis of interviews conducted during the inspection, the inspectors identified that personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and to resolve issues via the CAP.
Inspection Report# : 2005006(pdf)
Last modified : May 25, 2006
2Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 1 of 2 Hatch 2 2Q/2006 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Jul 29, 2005 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Take Prompt Corrective Actions for an NCV A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria XVI, involving the failure to take prompt corrective actions for a previously identified NCV was identified. This resulted in the failure to evaluate and restore compliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.
This finding is greater than minor because it affected the reliability objective and the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. Although emergency lighting units with at least an 8-hour battery power supply were not provided as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.J, the inspectors determined that operators would be able to accomplish the actions with the use of flashlights. The inspectors determined that the finding affected the "Post-fire SSD" category in that it affected the ability to complete post-fire actions. Because the operators had a high probability of completing the task using flashlights, a low degradation rating was assigned due to minimal impact on the effectiveness of post-fire actions. Therefore, this finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green). This finding affects the corrective action attribute of the Problem Identification and Resolution crosscutting area.
Inspection Report# : 2005006(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Jul 29, 2005 Identified By: NRC
2Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 2 of 2 Item Type: FIN Finding Biennial Identification and Resolution of Problems Inspection Assessment The inspectors identified that the licensee was generally effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution. The licensee maintained a low threshold for identifying problems as evidenced by the continued large number of condition reports (CR) entered annually into the CAP. The inspectors also determined that the licensee was generally prioritizing and evaluating issues properly. The inspectors identified minor problems involving corrective actions for operating experience not being documented within the corrective action program, timeliness of evaluations, and corrective actions which were incomplete. Non-cited violations (NCVs) related to the effectiveness of corrective actions and inadequate evaluation of issues were identified. Audits and self-assessments continued to identify issues related to the corrective action program. On the basis of interviews conducted during the inspection, the inspectors identified that personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and to resolve issues via the CAP.
Inspection Report# : 2005006(pdf)
Last modified : August 25, 2006
3Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 1 of 3 Hatch 2 3Q/2006 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Report Safety Relief Valve Test Results Outside Technical Specification Limits.
An NRC-identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) was identified for failure to report past conditions prohibited by plant Technical Specifications (TSs). The inspectors determined that, during the most recent operating cycle for both Units 1 and 2, several main steam safety/relief valves exceeded the TS lift setting tolerance.
This finding was evaluated using the traditional enforcement process because the failure to accurately report events has the potential to impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This finding was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation based on Supplement I of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Inspection Report# : 2006004(pdf)
Significance: Jul 14, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Use Adequate Test Instrumentation During Room Cooler Performance Tests.
The team identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, for not assuring adequate test equipment or suitable environmental conditions were used for testing safety related room coolers.
Specifically, the licensee used instrumentation with excessive instrument inaccuracies and did not establish the proper test conditions with an adequate room heat load as described in GL 89-13. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action program as CR-2006107057 and planned to reestablish a baseline for room cooler performance.
This finding is greater than minor because it is related to the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affects the objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding is of very low safety significance because the operability evaluation performed by the licensee determined that the margin afforded by the excess design capacity of these room coolers and the actual assumed accident heat loads were such that the room coolers could perform their safety function. The cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting element of human performance in the aspect of resources.
Inspection Report# : 2006007(pdf)
Significance: Jul 14, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Analyze Circuit Components with Motor Thermal Overload Devices Bypassed.
The team identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50,
3Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 2 of 3 Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, relating to a design deficiency which has existed since initial plant operation. Specifically, the team identified that the licensee bypassed the thermal overload protection of several 600 Volt motors and failed to evaluate and fully understand the effect on each motors circuit components to ensure that they would be able to withstand motor overload currents without catastrophic failure. The licensee initiated a corrective action to evaluate the effect of overcurrent on 600 Volt motor circuit components and entered the finding into their corrective action program as CR-2006107110.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring reliable, available, and capable systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding is of very low safety significance because no loss of safety function occurred and only limited equipment on one motor control center would be lost in an overcurrent condition due to selective tripping. The cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting element of problem identification and resolution in the aspect of operating experience.
Inspection Report# : 2006007(pdf)
Significance: Jul 14, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Alternate Boron Injection Supply Hose not suitable for pump suction application.
The team identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for improperly analyzing and allowing the use of a collapsible fire hose in the transfer of borated water from the standby liquid control (SLC) pump moat to the high pressure safety injection (HPCI) pump suction during alternate SLC injection in accordance with emergency operating procedures. This finding has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 2006106806.
This finding is greater than minor because it is related to the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). This finding is of very low safety significance because although the alternate boron injection flowpath would not function reliably, the actual safety system function was not lost due to the availability of the two trains of the normal SLC system.
Inspection Report# : 2006007(pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Significance: SL-IV Jun 23, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Implementation of a Change which Decreased the Effectiveness of the Emergency Plan, Version 24 A Severity Level IV non-cited violation was identified for failure to comply with the emergency plan change requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q). A change involving removal from the Emergency Plan of the licensees methodology for determining offsite Protective Action Recommendations (PAR) decreased the effectiveness of the
3Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 3 of 3 Emergency Plan, Version 24, without prior NRC approval.
The finding was evaluated using the NRCs Enforcement Policy because licensee reductions in the effectiveness of its emergency plan impact the regulatory process. This finding is more than minor because it involved deletion from the licensees Emergency Plan of most of the substantive information addressing emergency planning standard 10 CFR 50.47 (b)(10). The finding was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation because it involved licensee failure to meet an emergency planning requirement not directly related to assessment and notification.
Inspection Report# : 2006013(pdf)
Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Last modified : December 21, 2006
4Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 1 of 3 Hatch 2 4Q/2006 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Report Safety Relief Valve Test Results Outside Technical Specification Limits.
An NRC-identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) was identified for failure to report past conditions prohibited by plant Technical Specifications (TSs). The inspectors determined that, during the most recent operating cycle for both Units 1 and 2, several main steam safety/relief valves exceeded the TS lift setting tolerance.
This finding was evaluated using the traditional enforcement process because the failure to accurately report events has the potential to impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This finding was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation based on Supplement I of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Inspection Report# : 2006004 (pdf)
Significance: Jul 14, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Use Adequate Test Instrumentation During Room Cooler Performance Tests.
The team identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, for not assuring adequate test equipment or suitable environmental conditions were used for testing safety related room coolers.
Specifically, the licensee used instrumentation with excessive instrument inaccuracies and did not establish the proper test conditions with an adequate room heat load as described in GL 89-13. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action program as CR-2006107057 and planned to reestablish a baseline for room cooler performance.
This finding is greater than minor because it is related to the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affects the objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding is of very low safety significance because the operability evaluation performed by the licensee determined that the margin afforded by the excess design capacity of these room coolers and the actual assumed accident heat loads were such that the room coolers could perform their safety function. The cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting element of human performance in the aspect of resources.
Inspection Report# : 2006007 (pdf)
Significance: Jul 14, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Analyze Circuit Components with Motor Thermal Overload Devices Bypassed.
The team identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50,
4Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 2 of 3 Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, relating to a design deficiency which has existed since initial plant operation. Specifically, the team identified that the licensee bypassed the thermal overload protection of several 600 Volt motors and failed to evaluate and fully understand the effect on each motors circuit components to ensure that they would be able to withstand motor overload currents without catastrophic failure. The licensee initiated a corrective action to evaluate the effect of overcurrent on 600 Volt motor circuit components and entered the finding into their corrective action program as CR-2006107110.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring reliable, available, and capable systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding is of very low safety significance because no loss of safety function occurred and only limited equipment on one motor control center would be lost in an overcurrent condition due to selective tripping. The cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting element of problem identification and resolution in the aspect of operating experience.
Inspection Report# : 2006007 (pdf)
Significance: Jul 14, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Alternate Boron Injection Supply Hose not suitable for pump suction application.
The team identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for improperly analyzing and allowing the use of a collapsible fire hose in the transfer of borated water from the standby liquid control (SLC) pump moat to the high pressure safety injection (HPCI) pump suction during alternate SLC injection in accordance with emergency operating procedures. This finding has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 2006106806.
This finding is greater than minor because it is related to the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). This finding is of very low safety significance because although the alternate boron injection flowpath would not function reliably, the actual safety system function was not lost due to the availability of the two trains of the normal SLC system.
Inspection Report# : 2006007 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Significance: SL-IV Jun 23, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Implementation of a Change which Decreased the Effectiveness of the Emergency Plan, Version 24 A Severity Level IV non-cited violation was identified for failure to comply with the emergency plan change requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q). A change involving removal from the Emergency Plan of the licensees methodology for determining offsite Protective Action Recommendations (PAR) decreased the effectiveness of the
4Q/2006 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Page 3 of 3 Emergency Plan, Version 24, without prior NRC approval.
The finding was evaluated using the NRCs Enforcement Policy because licensee reductions in the effectiveness of its emergency plan impact the regulatory process. This finding is more than minor because it involved deletion from the licensees Emergency Plan of most of the substantive information addressing emergency planning standard 10 CFR 50.47 (b)(10). The finding was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation because it involved licensee failure to meet an emergency planning requirement not directly related to assessment and notification.
Inspection Report# : 2006013 (pdf)
Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Last modified : March 01, 2007
Hatch 2 1Q/2007 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: SL-IV Mar 31, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Manual Operator Actions Allowed Due To An Inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation.
An NRC-identified Severity Level IV non-cited violation (NCV) was identified for an inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation. The licensee proceduralized manual actions in place of automatic actions to close the door to an adjacent office to maintain the main control room (MCR) pressure boundary operable without prior NRC review and approval.
Violations of 10 CFR 50.59 potentially impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. Therefore, this finding was subject to traditional enforcement. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the door only impacted the radiological response of the MCR, the door was capable of being closed, and procedural guidance was in place to close the door. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, Supplement I.D.5, this finding was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation. This violation has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report (CR) 2006112331.
Inspection Report# : 2007002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Pre-conditioning of RHR/CS Room Cooler Valves An NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, APP B, Criterion XI, Test Control, was identified for pre-conditioning of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)/Core Spray (CS) pump room cooler water supply valves. The surveillance test procedure sequence caused these valves to be opened and closed prior to performing the documented stroke time testing.
The inspectors determined this finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute and affected Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective in that potential valve and other component performance deficiencies could have been masked. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance because the finding did not result in a loss of safety function. This finding is directly related to the operating experience (OE) implementation aspect of the problem identification and resolution cross-cutting area because the licensee had reviewed prior OE on unacceptable preconditioning, but failed to prevent pre-conditioning during the testing sequence. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 2007102031.
Inspection Report# : 2007002 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Report Safety Relief Valve Test Results Outside Technical Specification Limits.
An NRC-identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) was identified for failure to report past conditions prohibited by plant Technical Specifications (TSs). The inspectors determined that, during the most recent operating cycle for both Units 1 and 2, several main steam safety/relief valves exceeded the TS lift setting tolerance.
This finding was evaluated using the traditional enforcement process because the failure to accurately report events has the potential to impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This finding was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation based on Supplement I of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Inspection Report# : 2006004 (pdf)
Significance: Jul 14, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Use Adequate Test Instrumentation During Room Cooler Performance Tests.
The team identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, for not assuring adequate test equipment or suitable environmental conditions were used for testing safety related room coolers.
Specifically, the licensee used instrumentation with excessive instrument inaccuracies and did not establish the proper test conditions with an adequate room heat load as described in GL 89-13. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action program as CR-2006107057 and planned to reestablish a baseline for room cooler performance.
This finding is greater than minor because it is related to the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affects the objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding is of very low safety significance because the operability evaluation performed by the licensee determined that the margin afforded by the excess design capacity of these room coolers and the actual assumed accident heat loads were such that the room coolers could perform their safety function. The cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting element of human performance in the aspect of resources.
Inspection Report# : 2006007 (pdf)
Significance: Jul 14, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Analyze Circuit Components with Motor Thermal Overload Devices Bypassed.
The team identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, relating to a design deficiency which has existed since initial plant operation. Specifically, the team identified that the licensee bypassed the thermal overload protection of several 600 Volt motors and failed to evaluate and fully understand the effect on each motors circuit components to ensure that they would be able to withstand motor overload currents without catastrophic failure. The licensee initiated a corrective action to evaluate the effect of overcurrent on 600 Volt motor circuit components and entered the finding into their corrective action program as CR-2006107110.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring reliable, available, and capable systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding is of very low safety significance because no loss of safety function occurred and only limited equipment on one motor control center would be lost in an overcurrent condition due to selective tripping. The cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting element of problem identification and resolution in the aspect of operating experience.
Inspection Report# : 2006007 (pdf)
Significance: Jul 14, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Alternate Boron Injection Supply Hose not suitable for pump suction application.
The team identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50
Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for improperly analyzing and allowing the use of a collapsible fire hose in the transfer of borated water from the standby liquid control (SLC) pump moat to the high pressure safety injection (HPCI) pump suction during alternate SLC injection in accordance with emergency operating procedures. This finding has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 2006106806.
This finding is greater than minor because it is related to the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). This finding is of very low safety significance because although the alternate boron injection flowpath would not function reliably, the actual safety system function was not lost due to the availability of the two trains of the normal SLC system.
Inspection Report# : 2006007 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Significance: SL-IV Jun 23, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Implementation of a Change which Decreased the Effectiveness of the Emergency Plan, Version 24 A Severity Level IV non-cited violation was identified for failure to comply with the emergency plan change requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q). A change involving removal from the Emergency Plan of the licensees methodology for determining offsite Protective Action Recommendations (PAR) decreased the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan, Version 24, without prior NRC approval.
The finding was evaluated using the NRCs Enforcement Policy because licensee reductions in the effectiveness of its emergency plan impact the regulatory process. This finding is more than minor because it involved deletion from the licensees Emergency Plan of most of the substantive information addressing emergency planning standard 10 CFR 50.47 (b)(10). The finding was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation because it involved licensee failure to meet an emergency planning requirement not directly related to assessment and notification.
Inspection Report# : 2006013 (pdf)
Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Physical Protection information not publicly available.
Miscellaneous Last modified : June 01, 2007
Hatch 2 2Q/2007 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: SL-IV Mar 31, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Manual Operator Actions Allowed Due To An Inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation.
An NRC-identified Severity Level IV non-cited violation (NCV) was identified for an inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation. The licensee proceduralized manual actions in place of automatic actions to close the door to an adjacent office to maintain the main control room (MCR) pressure boundary operable without prior NRC review and approval.
Violations of 10 CFR 50.59 potentially impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. Therefore, this finding was subject to traditional enforcement. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the door only impacted the radiological response of the MCR, the door was capable of being closed, and procedural guidance was in place to close the door. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, Supplement I.D.5, this finding was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation. This violation has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report (CR) 2006112331.
Inspection Report# : 2007002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Pre-conditioning of RHR/CS Room Cooler Valves An NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, APP B, Criterion XI, Test Control, was identified for pre-conditioning of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)/Core Spray (CS) pump room cooler water supply valves. The surveillance test procedure sequence caused these valves to be opened and closed prior to performing the documented stroke time testing.
The inspectors determined this finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute and affected Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective in that potential valve and other component performance deficiencies could have been masked. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance because the finding did not result in a loss of safety function. This finding is directly related to the operating experience (OE) implementation aspect of the problem identification and resolution cross-cutting area because the licensee had reviewed prior OE on unacceptable preconditioning, but failed to prevent pre-conditioning during the testing sequence. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 2007102031.
Inspection Report# : 2007002 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Report Safety Relief Valve Test Results Outside Technical Specification Limits.
An NRC-identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) was identified for failure to report past conditions prohibited by plant Technical Specifications (TSs). The inspectors determined that, during the most recent operating cycle for both Units 1 and 2, several main steam safety/relief valves exceeded the TS lift setting tolerance.
This finding was evaluated using the traditional enforcement process because the failure to accurately report events
has the potential to impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This finding was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation based on Supplement I of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Inspection Report# : 2006004 (pdf)
Significance: Jul 14, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Use Adequate Test Instrumentation During Room Cooler Performance Tests.
The team identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, for not assuring adequate test equipment or suitable environmental conditions were used for testing safety related room coolers.
Specifically, the licensee used instrumentation with excessive instrument inaccuracies and did not establish the proper test conditions with an adequate room heat load as described in GL 89-13. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action program as CR-2006107057 and planned to reestablish a baseline for room cooler performance.
This finding is greater than minor because it is related to the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affects the objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding is of very low safety significance because the operability evaluation performed by the licensee determined that the margin afforded by the excess design capacity of these room coolers and the actual assumed accident heat loads were such that the room coolers could perform their safety function. The cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting element of human performance in the aspect of resources.
Inspection Report# : 2006007 (pdf)
Significance: Jul 14, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Analyze Circuit Components with Motor Thermal Overload Devices Bypassed.
The team identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, relating to a design deficiency which has existed since initial plant operation. Specifically, the team identified that the licensee bypassed the thermal overload protection of several 600 Volt motors and failed to evaluate and fully understand the effect on each motors circuit components to ensure that they would be able to withstand motor overload currents without catastrophic failure. The licensee initiated a corrective action to evaluate the effect of overcurrent on 600 Volt motor circuit components and entered the finding into their corrective action program as CR-2006107110.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring reliable, available, and capable systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding is of very low safety significance because no loss of safety function occurred and only limited equipment on one motor control center would be lost in an overcurrent condition due to selective tripping. The cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting element of problem identification and resolution in the aspect of operating experience.
Inspection Report# : 2006007 (pdf)
Significance: Jul 14, 2006 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Alternate Boron Injection Supply Hose not suitable for pump suction application.
The team identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for improperly analyzing and allowing the use of a collapsible fire hose in the transfer of borated water from the standby liquid control (SLC) pump moat to the high pressure safety injection (HPCI) pump suction during alternate SLC injection in accordance with emergency operating procedures. This finding has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 2006106806.
This finding is greater than minor because it is related to the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). This finding is of very low safety significance because although the alternate boron injection flowpath would not function reliably, the actual safety system function was not lost due to the availability of the two trains of the normal SLC system.
Inspection Report# : 2006007 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : August 24, 2007
Hatch 2 3Q/2007 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Sep 30, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Maintenance Instructions Results in Reactor Scram during Generator Recorder Calibration A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of 10CFR50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified for inadequate work instructions provided to workers for the calibration of a main generator output recorder. The calibration was performed with the main generator on-line which caused a sensed power load unbalance (PLU) resulting in a reactor scram.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with Equipment Performance attribute and adversely affected the Initiating Events cornerstone objective in that it resulted in a challenge to safety functions at power. The finding was determined to be of a very low safety significance because no other mitigating equipment or functions were adversely affected. The inspectors determined this finding was related to the complete and accurate procedures aspect of the human performance cross-cutting area (H.2c). The licensee has entered this issue their corrective action program (CAP) as Condition Report (CR) 2006104201. (Section 4OA3.3 )
Inspection Report# : 2007004 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Aug 17, 2007 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Update Parts Specifications Following a Design Modification A self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III was identified for failure to control the design aspects of a plant modification. The licensee failed to incorporate vendor parts and specifications for a modification to the Unit 1 residual heat removal (RHR) pump discharge check valves.
The team determined this finding is more than minor because it was related to the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affects the cornerstone objective in that the repeat failures resulted in unplanned unavailability of one train of RHR. This finding is of very low safety significance because it did not result in loss of safety function for a single train greater than allowed Technical Specification outage time. The team determined this finding was of very low safety significance because it did not result in loss of safety function for a single train greater than allowed Technical Specification outage time. The team determined this finding involved a Human Performance cross-cutting aspect of complete, accurate and up-todate design documentation, procedures, and work packages in that the vendor part number for the non-counterweighted valve disk hanger was not reflected in current station documents. The licensee has entered this violation into their corrective action program as CR 2007107101.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance: Aug 17, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Required ASME Code,Section XI Testing An NRC-identified Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4) for the failure to perform periodic leakage
testing of buried piping sections of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Standby Diesel Service Water (SBDSW) systems as required by Section XI of the ASME Code for the third 10-year In-service Inspection (ISI) interval.
This finding is more than minor because it affects the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affects the cornerstone objective in that if a significant leak or rupture should occur as a result of undetected piping degradation, water could not be delivered to mitigating system components preventing these systems from fulfilling their intended safety functions. This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because it does not represent an actual loss of a systems safety function. Further, the licensee performed the required testing on the SBDSW piping on May 22, 2007, and performed HPCI piping inspections in 2005 and found no significant degradation. This finding was reviewed for any cross-cutting aspects and none were identified. The licensee has entered the violation into their corrective action program as CRs 2007102265 and 2007104138.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Mar 31, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Manual Operator Actions Allowed Due To An Inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation.
An NRC-identified Severity Level IV non-cited violation (NCV) was identified for an inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation. The licensee proceduralized manual actions in place of automatic actions to close the door to an adjacent office to maintain the main control room (MCR) pressure boundary operable without prior NRC review and approval.
Violations of 10 CFR 50.59 potentially impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. Therefore, this finding was subject to traditional enforcement. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the door only impacted the radiological response of the MCR, the door was capable of being closed, and procedural guidance was in place to close the door. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, Supplement I.D.5, this finding was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation. This violation has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report (CR) 2006112331.
Inspection Report# : 2007002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Pre-conditioning of RHR/CS Room Cooler Valves An NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, APP B, Criterion XI, Test Control, was identified for pre-conditioning of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)/Core Spray (CS) pump room cooler water supply valves. The surveillance test procedure sequence caused these valves to be opened and closed prior to performing the documented stroke time testing.
The inspectors determined this finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute and affected Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective in that potential valve and other component performance deficiencies could have been masked. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance because the finding did not result in a loss of safety function. This finding is directly related to the operating experience (OE) implementation aspect of the problem identification and resolution cross-cutting area because the licensee had reviewed prior OE on unacceptable preconditioning, but failed to prevent pre-conditioning during the testing sequence. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 2007102031.
Inspection Report# : 2007002 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Aug 17, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Biennial Identification and Resolution of Problems Inspection Summary Two Green non-cited violations (NCVs) were identified. The team identified that the licensee was generally effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution. The licensee maintained a low threshold for identifying problems as evidenced by the continued large number of condition reports (CRs) entered annually into the CAP. The team also determined the licensee was generally prioritizing and evaluating issues properly. The team identified minor problems involving corrective actions for operating experience not being documented within the corrective action program, timeliness of evaluations, and corrective actions which were incomplete. NCVs related to the effectiveness of corrective actions and inadequate evaluation of issues were identified. Audits and selfassessments continued to identify issues related to the corrective action program. On the basis of interviews conducted during the inspection, the team identified that personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and to resolve issues via the CAP.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Last modified : December 07, 2007
Hatch 2 4Q/2007 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Dec 31, 2007 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding Improper Test Lead Construction Results in Plant Transient A self-revealing finding was identified for the licensees failure to follow proper work practices during construction of two test leads in accordance with skill of the craft training. The failure of the test leads resulted in an abrupt speed decrease in the Unit 2 B Recirculation Pump and a reactor power reduction.
The inspectors determined that a performance deficiency existed because work practices were not followed in accordance with skill-of-the-craft training. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the Initiating Event Cornerstone and affected the objective in that it resulted in a rapid 2B recirculation pump speed reduction and reactor power transient. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because there were no complications associated with this transient and all mitigation systems remained available. The inspectors did not identify a specific cross-cutting aspect associated with this issue.
Inspection Report# : 2007005 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Maintenance Instructions Results in Reactor Scram during Generator Recorder Calibration A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of 10CFR50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified for inadequate work instructions provided to workers for the calibration of a main generator output recorder. The calibration was performed with the main generator on-line which caused a sensed power load unbalance (PLU) resulting in a reactor scram.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with Equipment Performance attribute and adversely affected the Initiating Events cornerstone objective in that it resulted in a challenge to safety functions at power. The finding was determined to be of a very low safety significance because no other mitigating equipment or functions were adversely affected. The inspectors determined this finding was related to the complete and accurate procedures aspect of the human performance cross-cutting area (H.2c). The licensee has entered this issue their corrective action program (CAP) as Condition Report (CR) 2006104201. (Section 4OA3.3 )
Inspection Report# : 2007004 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Aug 17, 2007 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Update Parts Specifications Following a Design Modification A self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III was identified for failure to control the design aspects of a plant modification. The licensee failed to incorporate vendor parts and specifications for a modification to the Unit 1 residual heat removal (RHR) pump discharge check valves.
The team determined this finding is more than minor because it was related to the Equipment Performance attribute of
the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affects the cornerstone objective in that the repeat failures resulted in unplanned unavailability of one train of RHR. This finding is of very low safety significance because it did not result in loss of safety function for a single train greater than allowed Technical Specification outage time. The team determined this finding was of very low safety significance because it did not result in loss of safety function for a single train greater than allowed Technical Specification outage time. The team determined this finding involved a Human Performance cross-cutting aspect of complete, accurate and up-todate design documentation, procedures, and work packages in that the vendor part number for the non-counterweighted valve disk hanger was not reflected in current station documents. The licensee has entered this violation into their corrective action program as CR 2007107101.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance: Aug 17, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Required ASME Code,Section XI Testing An NRC-identified Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4) for the failure to perform periodic leakage testing of buried piping sections of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Standby Diesel Service Water (SBDSW) systems as required by Section XI of the ASME Code for the third 10-year In-service Inspection (ISI) interval.
This finding is more than minor because it affects the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affects the cornerstone objective in that if a significant leak or rupture should occur as a result of undetected piping degradation, water could not be delivered to mitigating system components preventing these systems from fulfilling their intended safety functions. This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because it does not represent an actual loss of a systems safety function. Further, the licensee performed the required testing on the SBDSW piping on May 22, 2007, and performed HPCI piping inspections in 2005 and found no significant degradation. This finding was reviewed for any cross-cutting aspects and none were identified. The licensee has entered the violation into their corrective action program as CRs 2007102265 and 2007104138.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Mar 31, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Manual Operator Actions Allowed Due To An Inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation.
An NRC-identified Severity Level IV non-cited violation (NCV) was identified for an inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation. The licensee proceduralized manual actions in place of automatic actions to close the door to an adjacent office to maintain the main control room (MCR) pressure boundary operable without prior NRC review and approval.
Violations of 10 CFR 50.59 potentially impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. Therefore, this finding was subject to traditional enforcement. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the door only impacted the radiological response of the MCR, the door was capable of being closed, and procedural guidance was in place to close the door. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, Supplement I.D.5, this finding was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation. This violation has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report (CR) 2006112331.
Inspection Report# : 2007002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Pre-conditioning of RHR/CS Room Cooler Valves An NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, APP B, Criterion XI, Test Control, was identified for pre-conditioning of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)/Core Spray (CS) pump room cooler water supply valves. The surveillance test procedure sequence caused these valves to be opened and closed prior to performing the documented stroke time testing.
The inspectors determined this finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute and affected Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective in that potential valve and other component performance deficiencies could have been masked. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance because the finding did not result in a loss of safety function. This finding is directly related to the operating experience (OE) implementation aspect of the problem identification and resolution cross-cutting area because the licensee had reviewed prior OE on unacceptable preconditioning, but failed to prevent pre-conditioning during the testing sequence. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 2007102031.
Inspection Report# : 2007002 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Aug 17, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Biennial Identification and Resolution of Problems Inspection Summary Two Green non-cited violations (NCVs) were identified. The team identified that the licensee was generally effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution. The licensee maintained a low threshold for identifying problems as evidenced by the continued large number of condition reports (CRs) entered annually into the CAP. The team also determined the licensee was generally prioritizing and evaluating issues properly. The team identified minor problems involving corrective actions for operating experience not being documented within the corrective action program, timeliness of evaluations, and corrective actions which were incomplete. NCVs related to the effectiveness of corrective actions and inadequate evaluation of issues were identified. Audits and selfassessments continued to identify issues related to the corrective action program. On the basis of interviews conducted during the inspection, the team identified that personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and to resolve issues via the CAP.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Last modified : February 04, 2008
Hatch 2 1Q/2008 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Dec 31, 2007 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding Improper Test Lead Construction Results in Plant Transient A self-revealing finding was identified for the licensees failure to follow proper work practices during construction of two test leads in accordance with skill of the craft training. The failure of the test leads resulted in an abrupt speed decrease in the Unit 2 B Recirculation Pump and a reactor power reduction.
The inspectors determined that a performance deficiency existed because work practices were not followed in accordance with skill-of-the-craft training. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the Initiating Event Cornerstone and affected the objective in that it resulted in a rapid 2B recirculation pump speed reduction and reactor power transient. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because there were no complications associated with this transient and all mitigation systems remained available. The inspectors did not identify a specific cross-cutting aspect associated with this issue.
Inspection Report# : 2007005 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Maintenance Instructions Results in Reactor Scram during Generator Recorder Calibration A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of 10CFR50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified for inadequate work instructions provided to workers for the calibration of a main generator output recorder. The calibration was performed with the main generator on-line which caused a sensed power load unbalance (PLU) resulting in a reactor scram.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with Equipment Performance attribute and adversely affected the Initiating Events cornerstone objective in that it resulted in a challenge to safety functions at power. The finding was determined to be of a very low safety significance because no other mitigating equipment or functions were adversely affected. The inspectors determined this finding was related to the complete and accurate procedures aspect of the human performance cross-cutting area (H.2c). The licensee has entered this issue their corrective action program (CAP) as Condition Report (CR) 2006104201. (Section 4OA3.3 )
Inspection Report# : 2007004 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Aug 17, 2007 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Update Parts Specifications Following a Design Modification A self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III was identified for failure to control the design aspects of a plant modification. The licensee failed to incorporate vendor parts and specifications for a modification to the Unit 1 residual heat removal (RHR) pump discharge check valves.
The team determined this finding is more than minor because it was related to the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affects the cornerstone objective in that the repeat failures resulted
in unplanned unavailability of one train of RHR. This finding is of very low safety significance because it did not result in loss of safety function for a single train greater than allowed Technical Specification outage time. The team determined this finding was of very low safety significance because it did not result in loss of safety function for a single train greater than allowed Technical Specification outage time. The team determined this finding involved a Human Performance cross-cutting aspect of complete, accurate and up-todate design documentation, procedures, and work packages in that the vendor part number for the non-counterweighted valve disk hanger was not reflected in current station documents. The licensee has entered this violation into their corrective action program as CR 2007107101.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance: Aug 17, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Required ASME Code,Section XI Testing An NRC-identified Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4) for the failure to perform periodic leakage testing of buried piping sections of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Standby Diesel Service Water (SBDSW) systems as required by Section XI of the ASME Code for the third 10-year In-service Inspection (ISI) interval.
This finding is more than minor because it affects the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affects the cornerstone objective in that if a significant leak or rupture should occur as a result of undetected piping degradation, water could not be delivered to mitigating system components preventing these systems from fulfilling their intended safety functions. This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because it does not represent an actual loss of a systems safety function. Further, the licensee performed the required testing on the SBDSW piping on May 22, 2007, and performed HPCI piping inspections in 2005 and found no significant degradation. This finding was reviewed for any cross-cutting aspects and none were identified. The licensee has entered the violation into their corrective action program as CRs 2007102265 and 2007104138.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Mar 30, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Equipment Clearance Procedures Results in Control Room Ventilation Inoperability A self revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V was identified for the failure to recognize the impact of a clearance activity on the Main Control Room Environmental Control (MCREC) system. The licensee entered this violation into their Corrective Action Program (CAP) as Condition Report (CR) 2008102274.
Failure to recognize the impact of a clearance activity on the MCREC system is a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the structure, system, component and barrier performance attribute as it relates to the radiological barrier functionality of the control room of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone.
The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance because the loss of the air handling units represents a degradation of the radiological barrier function (control room pressurization) only. This finding is related to the work practices aspect of the human performance cross-cutting area in that the full impact of the clearance was not properly identified and assessed in accordance with the equipment clearance procedure. (H.4(a))
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Aug 17, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Biennial Identification and Resolution of Problems Inspection Summary Two Green non-cited violations (NCVs) were identified. The team identified that the licensee was generally effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution. The licensee maintained a low threshold for identifying problems as evidenced by the continued large number of condition reports (CRs) entered annually into the CAP. The team also determined the licensee was generally prioritizing and evaluating issues properly. The team identified minor problems involving corrective actions for operating experience not being documented within the corrective action program, timeliness of evaluations, and corrective actions which were incomplete. NCVs related to the effectiveness of corrective actions and inadequate evaluation of issues were identified. Audits and selfassessments continued to identify issues related to the corrective action program. On the basis of interviews conducted during the inspection, the team identified that personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and to resolve issues via the CAP.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Last modified : June 05, 2008
Hatch 2 2Q/2008 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Dec 31, 2007 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding Improper Test Lead Construction Results in Plant Transient A self-revealing finding was identified for the licensees failure to follow proper work practices during construction of two test leads in accordance with skill of the craft training. The failure of the test leads resulted in an abrupt speed decrease in the Unit 2 B Recirculation Pump and a reactor power reduction.
The inspectors determined that a performance deficiency existed because work practices were not followed in accordance with skill-of-the-craft training. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the Initiating Event Cornerstone and affected the objective in that it resulted in a rapid 2B recirculation pump speed reduction and reactor power transient. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because there were no complications associated with this transient and all mitigation systems remained available. The inspectors did not identify a specific cross-cutting aspect associated with this issue.
Inspection Report# : 2007005 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Maintenance Instructions Results in Reactor Scram during Generator Recorder Calibration A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of 10CFR50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified for inadequate work instructions provided to workers for the calibration of a main generator output recorder. The calibration was performed with the main generator on-line which caused a sensed power load unbalance (PLU) resulting in a reactor scram.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with Equipment Performance attribute and adversely affected the Initiating Events cornerstone objective in that it resulted in a challenge to safety functions at power. The finding was determined to be of a very low safety significance because no other mitigating equipment or functions were adversely affected. The inspectors determined this finding was related to the complete and accurate procedures aspect of the human performance cross-cutting area (H.2c). The licensee has entered this issue their corrective action program (CAP) as Condition Report (CR) 2006104201. (Section 4OA3.3 )
Inspection Report# : 2007004 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 07, 2008 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Response to Water Contaminated Oil Results in HPCI Unavailability A Green NRC identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified when the licensee failed to thoroughly identify and correct water intrusion into the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) lubricating oil system (LOS) on two separate occasions. Residual water from these events was not fully removed which resulted in corrosion of the HPCI turbine controls. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program (CAP) as CR 2008100154.
The inspector determined the performance deficiency was the failure to remove all residual water from the HPCI LOS following water intrusion on two separate occasions. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute and adversely affected the objective of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone in that unplanned corrective maintenance of the HPCI pump rendered the system unavailable to respond to initiating events. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the failure did not represent a loss of safety function of a single train. The inspector determined this finding was related to the thoroughness of evaluations aspect of the Problem Identification and Resolution cross cutting area.
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Significance: Aug 17, 2007 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Update Parts Specifications Following a Design Modification A self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III was identified for failure to control the design aspects of a plant modification. The licensee failed to incorporate vendor parts and specifications for a modification to the Unit 1 residual heat removal (RHR) pump discharge check valves.
The team determined this finding is more than minor because it was related to the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affects the cornerstone objective in that the repeat failures resulted in unplanned unavailability of one train of RHR. This finding is of very low safety significance because it did not result in loss of safety function for a single train greater than allowed Technical Specification outage time. The team determined this finding was of very low safety significance because it did not result in loss of safety function for a single train greater than allowed Technical Specification outage time. The team determined this finding involved a Human Performance cross-cutting aspect of complete, accurate and up-todate design documentation, procedures, and work packages in that the vendor part number for the non-counterweighted valve disk hanger was not reflected in current station documents. The licensee has entered this violation into their corrective action program as CR 2007107101.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Significance: Aug 17, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Required ASME Code,Section XI Testing An NRC-identified Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4) for the failure to perform periodic leakage testing of buried piping sections of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Standby Diesel Service Water (SBDSW) systems as required by Section XI of the ASME Code for the third 10-year In-service Inspection (ISI) interval.
This finding is more than minor because it affects the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affects the cornerstone objective in that if a significant leak or rupture should occur as a result of undetected piping degradation, water could not be delivered to mitigating system components preventing these systems from fulfilling their intended safety functions. This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because it does not represent an actual loss of a systems safety function. Further, the licensee performed the required testing on the SBDSW piping on May 22, 2007, and performed HPCI piping inspections in 2005 and found no significant degradation. This finding was reviewed for any cross-cutting aspects and none were identified. The licensee has entered the violation into their corrective action program as CRs 2007102265 and 2007104138.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Mar 30, 2008
Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Equipment Clearance Procedures Results in Control Room Ventilation Inoperability A self revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V was identified for the failure to recognize the impact of a clearance activity on the Main Control Room Environmental Control (MCREC) system. The licensee entered this violation into their Corrective Action Program (CAP) as Condition Report (CR) 2008102274.
Failure to recognize the impact of a clearance activity on the MCREC system is a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the structure, system, component and barrier performance attribute as it relates to the radiological barrier functionality of the control room of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone.
The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance because the loss of the air handling units represents a degradation of the radiological barrier function (control room pressurization) only. This finding is related to the work practices aspect of the human performance cross-cutting area in that the full impact of the clearance was not properly identified and assessed in accordance with the equipment clearance procedure. (H.4(a))
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Aug 17, 2007 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Biennial Identification and Resolution of Problems Inspection Summary Two Green non-cited violations (NCVs) were identified. The team identified that the licensee was generally effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution. The licensee maintained a low threshold for identifying problems as evidenced by the continued large number of condition reports (CRs) entered annually into the CAP. The team also determined the licensee was generally prioritizing and evaluating issues properly. The team identified minor problems involving corrective actions for operating experience not being documented within the corrective action program, timeliness of evaluations, and corrective actions which were incomplete. NCVs related to the effectiveness of corrective actions and inadequate evaluation of issues were identified. Audits and selfassessments continued to identify issues related to the corrective action program. On the basis of interviews conducted during the inspection, the team identified that personnel at the site felt
free to raise safety concerns to management and to resolve issues via the CAP.
Inspection Report# : 2007006 (pdf)
Last modified : August 29, 2008
Hatch 2 3Q/2008 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Dec 31, 2007 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding Improper Test Lead Construction Results in Plant Transient A self-revealing finding was identified for the licensees failure to follow proper work practices during construction of two test leads in accordance with skill of the craft training. The failure of the test leads resulted in an abrupt speed decrease in the Unit 2 B Recirculation Pump and a reactor power reduction.
The inspectors determined that a performance deficiency existed because work practices were not followed in accordance with skill-of-the-craft training. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the Initiating Event Cornerstone and affected the objective in that it resulted in a rapid 2B recirculation pump speed reduction and reactor power transient. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because there were no complications associated with this transient and all mitigation systems remained available. The inspectors did not identify a specific cross-cutting aspect associated with this issue.
Inspection Report# : 2007005 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 07, 2008 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Response to Water Contaminated Oil Results in HPCI Unavailability A Green NRC identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified when the licensee failed to thoroughly identify and correct water intrusion into the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) lubricating oil system (LOS) on two separate occasions. Residual water from these events was not fully removed which resulted in corrosion of the HPCI turbine controls. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program (CAP) as CR 2008100154.
The inspector determined the performance deficiency was the failure to remove all residual water from the HPCI LOS following water intrusion on two separate occasions. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute and adversely affected the objective of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone in that unplanned corrective maintenance of the HPCI pump rendered the system unavailable to respond to initiating events. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the failure did not represent a loss of safety function of a single train. The inspector determined this finding was related to the thoroughness of evaluations aspect of the Problem Identification and Resolution cross cutting area.
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Sep 19, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Incomplete Mitigating Strategy Required by Facility Operating License (Section 4AO5.2 c)
This B.5.b Pase 2 and 3 Mitigating Strategy Finding has been classified as OUO containing sensitive information classified under 2.390 - see inspection report for details.
Inspection Report# : 2008007 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 30, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Equipment Clearance Procedures Results in Control Room Ventilation Inoperability A self revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V was identified for the failure to recognize the impact of a clearance activity on the Main Control Room Environmental Control (MCREC) system. The licensee entered this violation into their Corrective Action Program (CAP) as Condition Report (CR) 2008102274.
Failure to recognize the impact of a clearance activity on the MCREC system is a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the structure, system, component and barrier performance attribute as it relates to the radiological barrier functionality of the control room of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance because the loss of the air handling units represents a degradation of the radiological barrier function (control room pressurization) only. This finding is related to the work practices aspect of the human performance cross-cutting area in that the full impact of the clearance was not properly identified and assessed in accordance with the equipment clearance procedure. (H.4(a))
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : November 26, 2008
Hatch 2 4Q/2008 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: SL-IV Dec 31, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Report A Reportable Condition A NRC-identified violation of 10 CFR 50.72, Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors, and 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, was identified when the licensee did not recognize the loss of all three main control room (MCR) air handling units (AHUs) was a reportable condition. Consequently, the licensee failed to make an eight hour report as required by 10 CFR 50.72 and submit a licensee event report (LER) within 60 days as required by 10 CFR 50.73. This violation does not apply to Unit 1 because it was in a refueling outage and the AHUs were not required to be operating. This violation has been entered into the licensees CAP as CR 2008111957.
Failure to recognize the loss of the MCREC system safety function was reportable is a performance deficiency. This finding was evaluated using traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function of event assessment. The inspectors determined this finding was a SL IV violation because the failure to report this condition did not substantively impact the Agency's regulatory responsibilities and the Agency would not have responded in a significantly different manner had the information been properly reported.
This finding had the cross-cutting aspect of evaluating for reportability in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution (P.1(c)) because the licensee evaluated reportability only for the entry into TS LCO 3.0.3.
Inspection Report# : 2008005 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 07, 2008 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Response to Water Contaminated Oil Results in HPCI Unavailability A Green NRC identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified when the licensee failed to thoroughly identify and correct water intrusion into the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) lubricating oil system (LOS) on two separate occasions. Residual water from these events was not fully removed which resulted in corrosion of the HPCI turbine controls. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program (CAP) as CR 2008100154.
The inspector determined the performance deficiency was the failure to remove all residual water from the HPCI LOS following water intrusion on two separate occasions. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute and adversely affected the objective of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone in that unplanned corrective maintenance of the HPCI pump rendered the system unavailable to respond to initiating events. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the failure did not represent a loss of safety function of a single train. The inspector determined this finding was related to the thoroughness of evaluations aspect of the Problem Identification and Resolution cross cutting area.
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Sep 19, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Incomplete Mitigating Strategy Required by Facility Operating License (Section 4AO5.2 c)
This B.5.b Pase 2 and 3 Mitigating Strategy Finding has been classified as OUO containing sensitive information classified under 2.390 - see inspection report for details.
Inspection Report# : 2008007 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 30, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Follow Equipment Clearance Procedures Results in Control Room Ventilation Inoperability A self revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V was identified for the failure to recognize the impact of a clearance activity on the Main Control Room Environmental Control (MCREC) system. The licensee entered this violation into their Corrective Action Program (CAP) as Condition Report (CR) 2008102274.
Failure to recognize the impact of a clearance activity on the MCREC system is a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the structure, system, component and barrier performance attribute as it relates to the radiological barrier functionality of the control room of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone.
The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance because the loss of the air handling units represents a degradation of the radiological barrier function (control room pressurization) only. This finding is related to the work practices aspect of the human performance cross-cutting area in that the full impact of the clearance was not properly identified and assessed in accordance with the equipment clearance procedure. (H.4(a))
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous
Last modified : April 07, 2009 Hatch 2 1Q/2009 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Preconditioning of the turbine building plant service water isolation valves An NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control was identified for preconditioning of the Turbine Building Plant Service Water (PSW) Isolation Valves. A maintenance work order stoked the valves several times prior to performing the documented stroke time testing.
This finding is more than minor because if left uncorrected the finding had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern in that other safety-related valve performance deficiencies could have been masked. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significant Determination Process, the inspectors performed a Phase 1 analysis and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not result in a loss of safety function. The finding has an associated cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification &
Resolution. Specifically as it relates to implementation of Operating Experience (OE) because the licensee has reviewed prior OE describing unacceptable preconditioning, but failed to recognize preconditioning and prevent it prior to performing work associated with the maintenance work order P.2.b]. (Section 1R22)
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Dec 31, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Report A Reportable Condition A NRC-identified violation of 10 CFR 50.72, Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors, and 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, was identified when the licensee did not recognize the loss of all three main control room (MCR) air handling units (AHUs) was a reportable condition. Consequently, the licensee failed to make an eight hour report as required by 10 CFR 50.72 and submit a licensee event report (LER) within 60 days as required by 10 CFR 50.73. This violation does not apply to Unit 1 because it was in a refueling outage and the AHUs were not required to be operating. This violation has been entered into the licensees CAP as CR 2008111957.
Failure to recognize the loss of the MCREC system safety function was reportable is a performance deficiency. This finding was evaluated using traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function of event assessment. The inspectors determined this finding was a SL IV violation because the failure to report this condition did not substantively impact the Agency's regulatory responsibilities and the Agency would not have responded in a significantly different manner had the information been properly reported.
This finding had the cross-cutting aspect of evaluating for reportability in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution (P.1(c)) because the licensee evaluated reportability only for the entry into TS LCO 3.0.3.
Inspection Report# : 2008005 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Improper core drill location results in secondry containment inoperability A self-revealing NCV of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified because workers did not properly follow the work instructions during a core drilling activity which resulted in a breach of secondary containment. A maintenance worker missed the containment box designed to maintain secondary containment integrity during core drilling to support a plant modification.
The finding is more than minor because it adversely impacted the Configuration Control Attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone. The improper core drill caused secondary containment to become inoperable. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significant Determination Process, the inspectors performed a Phase 1 analysis and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding only affected secondary containment. The finding has an associated cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance.
Specifically, work practices as it relates to use of human error prevention techniques commensurate with the risk of the assigned task. The workers mistakenly measured the drill location from two different reference points above and below the floor H.4.a]. (Section 1R18)
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 19, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Incomplete Mitigating Strategy Required by Facility Operating License (Section 4AO5.2 c)
This B.5.b Pase 2 and 3 Mitigating Strategy Finding has been classified as OUO containing sensitive information classified under 2.390 - see inspection report for details.
Inspection Report# : 2008007 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to provide training to users of powered air-purifiying respirators The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of TS 5.4, Procedures, for failure to provide training to users of Powered Air-purifying Respirator (PAPR) type respiratory protection devices as required by procedure 10AC-MGR-026-0, Respiratory Protection Program, revision 1.0. The licensee has entered this issue into the Corrective Action Program as Condition Report 2009102825.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of Human Performance (Training) and adversely affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. The finding was evaluated using the Occupational Radiation Safety SDP and determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). The finding was not related to ALARA planning, nor did it involve an overexposure or substantial potential for overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised. This
finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance, Resources H.2.b] because there was no formal training program provided to users of PAPR type respiratory protection devices. (Section 2OS3)
Violations of very low safety significance, which were identified by the licensee, have been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. These violations and corrective actions are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : May 28, 2009
Hatch 2 2Q/2009 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Maintain Fire Brigade Minimum Staffing Green. A Green NRC identified NCV of License Conditions 2.C.(3) for Unit-1 and 2.C.(3).(a) for Unit-2 was identified for failure to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program.
Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain adequate fire brigade staffing by assigning the Unit-1 Operator at the Controls (OATC) the additional responsibility of Fire Brigade Leader. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution.
This finding is more than minor because it affected the protection from external factors (fire) attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the shift staffing compliment was adequate to support the safe shutdown operating functions and independent fire brigade. In addition, the condition existed for only one 12-hour shift. The cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting element of Human Performance. (Section 4OA2)
Inspection Report# : 2009003 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Preconditioning of the turbine building plant service water isolation valves An NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control was identified for preconditioning of the Turbine Building Plant Service Water (PSW) Isolation Valves. A maintenance work order stoked the valves several times prior to performing the documented stroke time testing.
This finding is more than minor because if left uncorrected the finding had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern in that other safety-related valve performance deficiencies could have been masked. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significant Determination Process, the inspectors performed a Phase 1 analysis and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not result in a loss of safety function. The finding has an associated cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification &
Resolution. Specifically as it relates to implementation of Operating Experience (OE) because the licensee has reviewed prior OE describing unacceptable preconditioning, but failed to recognize preconditioning and prevent it prior to performing work associated with the maintenance work order P.2.b]. (Section 1R22)
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 10, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation
1B EDG Coupling Failure TBD. A self-revealing apparent violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for failure to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality. Since 1988, the licensee had observed cracks in the glands of the EDG couplings, but did not identify the cracking was an indication of coupling degradation. Therefore, no condition report was written to identify and correct the condition adverse to quality.
Consequently, the 1B coupling developed higher than normal vibration on July 12, 2008, during a routine surveillance which prompted the licensee to declare the 1B EDG inoperable.
The failure to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality for the observed degraded condition of the 1B EDG coupling is a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the objective in that there was no reasonable assurance the 1B EDG could meet its mission time. This finding was assessed using the applicable SDP and preliminarily determined to White because there was a calculated risk increase over the base case between 1E-5 and 1E-6. The dominant sequences included (1) LOOP with loss of emergency power (SBO), success of RCIC, successful depressurization, failure to recover offsite power and the EDGs within 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, and failure of firewater injection due to repressurization caused by inability to operate SRVs without DC power (2) a Transient induced LOOP with failures of PCS and HPCI, successful depressurization and failure of all injection due to inability to recover EDGs or offsite power and (3) LOOP with loss of emergency power, RCIC, and HPCI with failure to recover offsite power and the EDGs. The HPCI system is failed in the model with loss of room cooling due to SBO.
The exposure period was a total of 182 days including the 4 day repair interval and the 178 day interval consisting of the individual success periods.
Inspection Report# : 2008009 (pdf)
Inspection Report# : 2009008 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Dec 31, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Report A Reportable Condition A NRC-identified violation of 10 CFR 50.72, Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors, and 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, was identified when the licensee did not recognize the loss of all three main control room (MCR) air handling units (AHUs) was a reportable condition. Consequently, the licensee failed to make an eight hour report as required by 10 CFR 50.72 and submit a licensee event report (LER) within 60 days as required by 10 CFR 50.73. This violation does not apply to Unit 1 because it was in a refueling outage and the AHUs were not required to be operating. This violation has been entered into the licensees CAP as CR 2008111957.
Failure to recognize the loss of the MCREC system safety function was reportable is a performance deficiency. This finding was evaluated using traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function of event assessment. The inspectors determined this finding was a SL IV violation because the failure to report this condition did not substantively impact the Agency's regulatory responsibilities and the Agency would not have responded in a significantly different manner had the information been properly reported.
This finding had the cross-cutting aspect of evaluating for reportability in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution (P.1(c)) because the licensee evaluated reportability only for the entry into TS LCO 3.0.3.
Inspection Report# : 2008005 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Improper core drill location results in secondry containment inoperability A self-revealing NCV of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified because workers did not properly follow the work instructions during a core drilling activity which resulted
in a breach of secondary containment. A maintenance worker missed the containment box designed to maintain secondary containment integrity during core drilling to support a plant modification.
The finding is more than minor because it adversely impacted the Configuration Control Attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone. The improper core drill caused secondary containment to become inoperable. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significant Determination Process, the inspectors performed a Phase 1 analysis and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding only affected secondary containment. The finding has an associated cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance.
Specifically, work practices as it relates to use of human error prevention techniques commensurate with the risk of the assigned task. The workers mistakenly measured the drill location from two different reference points above and below the floor H.4.a]. (Section 1R18)
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to provide training to users of powered air-purifiying respirators The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of TS 5.4, Procedures, for failure to provide training to users of Powered Air-purifying Respirator (PAPR) type respiratory protection devices as required by procedure 10AC-MGR-026-0, Respiratory Protection Program, revision 1.0. The licensee has entered this issue into the Corrective Action Program as Condition Report 2009102825.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of Human Performance (Training) and adversely affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. The finding was evaluated using the Occupational Radiation Safety SDP and determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). The finding was not related to ALARA planning, nor did it involve an overexposure or substantial potential for overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised. This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance, Resources H.2.b] because there was no formal training program provided to users of PAPR type respiratory protection devices. (Section 2OS3)
Violations of very low safety significance, which were identified by the licensee, have been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. These violations and corrective actions are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection
Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: Sep 19, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Incomplete Mitigating Strategy Required by Facility Operating License (Section 4AO5.2 c)
This B.5.b Pase 2 and 3 Mitigating Strategy Finding has been classified as OUO containing sensitive information classified under 2.390 - see inspection report for details.
Inspection Report# : 2008007 (pdf)
Last modified : August 31, 2009
Hatch 2 3Q/2009 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Maintain Fire Brigade Minimum Staffing Green. A Green NRC identified NCV of License Conditions 2.C.(3) for Unit-1 and 2.C.(3).(a) for Unit-2 was identified for failure to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program.
Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain adequate fire brigade staffing by assigning the Unit-1 Operator at the Controls (OATC) the additional responsibility of Fire Brigade Leader. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution.
This finding is more than minor because it affected the protection from external factors (fire) attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the shift staffing compliment was adequate to support the safe shutdown operating functions and independent fire brigade. In addition, the condition existed for only one 12-hour shift. The cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting element of Human Performance. (Section 4OA2)
Inspection Report# : 2009003 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Preconditioning of the turbine building plant service water isolation valves An NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control was identified for preconditioning of the Turbine Building Plant Service Water (PSW) Isolation Valves. A maintenance work order stoked the valves several times prior to performing the documented stroke time testing.
This finding is more than minor because if left uncorrected the finding had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern in that other safety-related valve performance deficiencies could have been masked. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significant Determination Process, the inspectors performed a Phase 1 analysis and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not result in a loss of safety function. The finding has an associated cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification &
Resolution. Specifically as it relates to implementation of Operating Experience (OE) because the licensee has reviewed prior OE describing unacceptable preconditioning, but failed to recognize preconditioning and prevent it prior to performing work associated with the maintenance work order P.2.b]. (Section 1R22)
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 10, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation 1B EDG Coupling Failure
TBD. A self-revealing apparent violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for failure to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality. Since 1988, the licensee had observed cracks in the glands of the EDG couplings, but did not identify the cracking was an indication of coupling degradation. Therefore, no condition report was written to identify and correct the condition adverse to quality.
Consequently, the 1B coupling developed higher than normal vibration on July 12, 2008, during a routine surveillance which prompted the licensee to declare the 1B EDG inoperable.
The failure to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality for the observed degraded condition of the 1B EDG coupling is a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the objective in that there was no reasonable assurance the 1B EDG could meet its mission time. This finding was assessed using the applicable SDP and preliminarily determined to White because there was a calculated risk increase over the base case between 1E-5 and 1E-6. The dominant sequences included (1) LOOP with loss of emergency power (SBO), success of RCIC, successful depressurization, failure to recover offsite power and the EDGs within 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, and failure of firewater injection due to repressurization caused by inability to operate SRVs without DC power (2) a Transient induced LOOP with failures of PCS and HPCI, successful depressurization and failure of all injection due to inability to recover EDGs or offsite power and (3) LOOP with loss of emergency power, RCIC, and HPCI with failure to recover offsite power and the EDGs. The HPCI system is failed in the model with loss of room cooling due to SBO.
The exposure period was a total of 182 days including the 4 day repair interval and the 178 day interval consisting of the individual success periods.
Inspection Report# : 2008009 (pdf)
Inspection Report# : 2009008 (pdf)
Significance: SL-IV Dec 31, 2008 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Report A Reportable Condition A NRC-identified violation of 10 CFR 50.72, Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors, and 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, was identified when the licensee did not recognize the loss of all three main control room (MCR) air handling units (AHUs) was a reportable condition. Consequently, the licensee failed to make an eight hour report as required by 10 CFR 50.72 and submit a licensee event report (LER) within 60 days as required by 10 CFR 50.73. This violation does not apply to Unit 1 because it was in a refueling outage and the AHUs were not required to be operating. This violation has been entered into the licensees CAP as CR 2008111957.
Failure to recognize the loss of the MCREC system safety function was reportable is a performance deficiency. This finding was evaluated using traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function of event assessment. The inspectors determined this finding was a SL IV violation because the failure to report this condition did not substantively impact the Agency's regulatory responsibilities and the Agency would not have responded in a significantly different manner had the information been properly reported.
This finding had the cross-cutting aspect of evaluating for reportability in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution (P.1(c)) because the licensee evaluated reportability only for the entry into TS LCO 3.0.3.
Inspection Report# : 2008005 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Improper core drill location results in secondry containment inoperability A self-revealing NCV of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified because workers did not properly follow the work instructions during a core drilling activity which resulted in a breach of secondary containment. A maintenance worker missed the containment box designed to maintain secondary containment integrity during core drilling to support a plant modification.
The finding is more than minor because it adversely impacted the Configuration Control Attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone. The improper core drill caused secondary containment to become inoperable. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significant Determination Process, the inspectors performed a Phase 1 analysis and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding only affected secondary containment. The finding has an associated cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance.
Specifically, work practices as it relates to use of human error prevention techniques commensurate with the risk of the assigned task. The workers mistakenly measured the drill location from two different reference points above and below the floor H.4.a]. (Section 1R18)
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to provide training to users of powered air-purifiying respirators The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of TS 5.4, Procedures, for failure to provide training to users of Powered Air-purifying Respirator (PAPR) type respiratory protection devices as required by procedure 10AC-MGR-026-0, Respiratory Protection Program, revision 1.0. The licensee has entered this issue into the Corrective Action Program as Condition Report 2009102825.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of Human Performance (Training) and adversely affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. The finding was evaluated using the Occupational Radiation Safety SDP and determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). The finding was not related to ALARA planning, nor did it involve an overexposure or substantial potential for overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised. This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance, Resources H.2.b] because there was no formal training program provided to users of PAPR type respiratory protection devices. (Section 2OS3)
Violations of very low safety significance, which were identified by the licensee, have been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. These violations and corrective actions are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : December 10, 2009
Hatch 2 4Q/2009 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Jul 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Correctly Establish Acceptance Criteria for the Standby Diesel Service Water Pump Section The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, for failure to correctly establish acceptance criteria for the Standby Diesel Service Water (SDSW) System. The licensee performed a past operability determination and initiated Condition Report (CR) 2009105651 to revise the acceptance criteria.
The licensees failure to correctly establish acceptance criterion for the SDSW pump under the most limiting conditions was a performance deficiency. The finding is greater than minor because it adversely affected the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding is of very low safety significance (Green) using the SDP because it did not represent a loss of system or safety function. A cross-cutting aspect was not identified because the finding does not represent current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2009006 (pdf)
Significance: Jul 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Monitor the Main Steam and Feedwater Line Pipe Whip Restraints The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) for the licensees failure to monitor the main steam line and feedwater line pipe whip restraints for Units 1 and 2. The licensee initiated CRs 2009105147 and 200910622 and plans to complete inspections of the whip restraints during the upcoming Units 1 and 2 outages.
The licensees failure to periodically inspect the condition of the safety-related pipe whip restraints was a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The team determined that the finding is of very low safety significance (Green) using the SDP because the finding did not represent an actual loss of safety function. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting aspect of implementing a corrective action program with a low threshold for identifying issues under the Corrective Action Program component of the Problem Identification and Resolution area P.1(a).
Inspection Report# : 2009006 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Maintain Fire Brigade Minimum Staffing Green. A Green NRC identified NCV of License Conditions 2.C.(3) for Unit-1 and 2.C.(3).(a) for Unit-2 was
identified for failure to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program.
Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain adequate fire brigade staffing by assigning the Unit-1 Operator at the Controls (OATC) the additional responsibility of Fire Brigade Leader. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution.
This finding is more than minor because it affected the protection from external factors (fire) attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the shift staffing compliment was adequate to support the safe shutdown operating functions and independent fire brigade. In addition, the condition existed for only one 12-hour shift. The cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting element of Human Performance. (Section 4OA2)
Inspection Report# : 2009003 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Preconditioning of the turbine building plant service water isolation valves An NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control was identified for preconditioning of the Turbine Building Plant Service Water (PSW) Isolation Valves. A maintenance work order stoked the valves several times prior to performing the documented stroke time testing.
This finding is more than minor because if left uncorrected the finding had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern in that other safety-related valve performance deficiencies could have been masked. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significant Determination Process, the inspectors performed a Phase 1 analysis and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not result in a loss of safety function. The finding has an associated cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification &
Resolution. Specifically as it relates to implementation of Operating Experience (OE) because the licensee has reviewed prior OE describing unacceptable preconditioning, but failed to recognize preconditioning and prevent it prior to performing work associated with the maintenance work order P.2.b]. (Section 1R22)
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 10, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation 1B EDG Coupling Failure TBD. A self-revealing apparent violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for failure to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality. Since 1988, the licensee had observed cracks in the glands of the EDG couplings, but did not identify the cracking was an indication of coupling degradation. Therefore, no condition report was written to identify and correct the condition adverse to quality.
Consequently, the 1B coupling developed higher than normal vibration on July 12, 2008, during a routine surveillance which prompted the licensee to declare the 1B EDG inoperable.
The failure to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality for the observed degraded condition of the 1B EDG coupling is a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the objective in that there was no reasonable assurance the 1B EDG could meet its mission time. This finding was assessed using the applicable SDP and preliminarily determined to White because there was a calculated risk increase over the base case between 1E-5 and 1E-6. The dominant sequences included (1) LOOP with loss of emergency power (SBO), success of RCIC, successful depressurization, failure to recover offsite power and the EDGs within 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, and failure of firewater injection due to repressurization caused by inability to operate SRVs without DC power (2) a Transient induced LOOP with failures of PCS and HPCI, successful depressurization and failure of all injection due to inability to recover EDGs or offsite power and (3) LOOP with loss of emergency power, RCIC, and HPCI with failure to recover offsite power and the EDGs. The HPCI system is failed in the model with loss of room cooling due to SBO.
The exposure period was a total of 182 days including the 4 day repair interval and the 178 day interval consisting of
the individual success periods.
2009009 95001 Inspection The NRC staff performed this supplemental inspection in accordance with IP 95001 to assess the licensees evaluation of a White finding, which affected the mitigating systems cornerstone in the reactor safety strategic performance area. The inspection objectives were to:
? Verify that the licensee understands the root causes and contributing causes of the 1B EDG failure.
? Verify that the licensee has determined the extent of condition and extent of cause of the identified root and contributing causes.
? Verify that the corrective actions for these issues are sufficient to address the root and contributing causes and to prevent recurrence.
? Verify that the procedures have been revised to perform visual inspections of both sides of the coupling (generator/motor).
The licensee entered the Regulatory Response Column of the NRCs Action Matrix in the first quarter of 2008 as a result of one inspection finding of low to moderate safety (White) significance. The finding was associated with the inoperability of the 1B EDG in July 2008. On July 12, 2008, the 1B EDG was manually shutdown due to excessive vibration and declared inoperable. The finding was characterized as having White safety significance based on the results of a Phase 3 risk analysis performed by a region-based senior reactor analyst (SRA), as discussed in NRC IR 05000321/2008009, 05000366/2008009. The excessive vibration was attributed to age-related cracks in the rubber gland on both the diesel engine side and generator side of the generator/motor coupling. On July 16, 2008, the generator/motor coupling was replaced and the 1B EDG was returned to service.
The licensee had performed its initial root cause determination (CR 2008107432 RCCA version 1.0, dated 09/04/08) to identify weaknesses that existed in various organizations, which allowed for a risk-significant finding and to determine the organizational attributes that resulted in the White finding. As part of the root cause determination, the licensee also completed a safety culture assessment. The licensee staff informed the NRC staff on September 23, 2009, that they were ready for the supplemental inspection. In October 2009, in preparation for the 95001 inspection, the licensee conducted an indepth readiness assessment of the original root cause determination report. As a result of that self-critical readiness assessment, the licensee made numerous significant improvements to the original report. As a result, the revised root cause determination report (CR 2008107432 RCCA version 2.0, dated 11/12/09) was issued just prior to the inspection.
The inspector reviewed the licensees root cause determination report, along with several evaluations that were conducted in support of the root cause determination. The inspector reviewed the licensees extent of condition and extent of cause evaluations to ensure they were sufficient in breadth. The inspector reviewed the corrective actions that were taken or planned to address the identified causes. The inspector also held discussions with licensee personnel to ensure that the root and contributing causes, as well as the contribution of safety culture components, were understood and that corrective actions taken or planned were appropriate to address the causes and preclude repetition.
Findings No findings of significance were identified. Inspectors did note weaknesses in the revised maintenance procedure used to inspect the engine/generator coupling. For example, no specific criteria was provided on how to determine when inspection of the engine side of the coupling would be needed. Based on observations provided by the inspector the licensee initiated actions to add criteria to address this issue.
4OA6 Exit Meeting On November 18, 2009, the inspector presented the results of the supplemental inspection to Mr. Dennis R. Madison and other members of licensee management and
staff, who acknowledged the findings. The inspector confirmed that no proprietary information was provided or examined during the inspection.
Inspection Report# : 2008009 (pdf)
Inspection Report# : 2009008 (pdf)
Inspection Report# : 2009009 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Jul 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Cause Determinations and Corrective Actions for Deficiencies in Containment Penetration Seals The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to promptly correct deficiencies in containment penetration seals. The licensee initiated CR 2009105747 to evaluate corrective actions for the seals.
The team determined that the failure to take corrective actions for deficiencies in containment penetration seals was a performance deficiency. The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Structures, Systems and Components (SSC) and Barrier Performance attribute of maintaining functionality of containment and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that containment protects the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting aspect of thoroughness of evaluation within the Corrective Action Program component of the Problem Identification and Resolution area P.1(c).
Inspection Report# : 2009006 (pdf)
Significance: Jul 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Correctly Establish Containment Isolation Valve Leakage Criteria for the Unit 2 Feedwater Check Valves The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for failure to correctly establish containment isolation valve leakage criteria for Unit 2 feedwater check valves. The licensee initiated CR 2009104567 and revised the associated calculation during the inspection.
The team determined that the failure to correctly establish leakage acceptance criteria for the feedwater check valves was a performance deficiency. The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the SSC and Barrier performance attribute of maintaining functionality of containment and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that containment protects the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events.
The finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting aspect of complete, accurate and up-to-date design documentation within the Resources component of the Human Performance area[H.2 (c)].
Inspection Report# : 2009006 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Improper core drill location results in secondry containment inoperability A self-revealing NCV of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was
identified because workers did not properly follow the work instructions during a core drilling activity which resulted in a breach of secondary containment. A maintenance worker missed the containment box designed to maintain secondary containment integrity during core drilling to support a plant modification.
The finding is more than minor because it adversely impacted the Configuration Control Attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone. The improper core drill caused secondary containment to become inoperable. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significant Determination Process, the inspectors performed a Phase 1 analysis and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding only affected secondary containment. The finding has an associated cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance.
Specifically, work practices as it relates to use of human error prevention techniques commensurate with the risk of the assigned task. The workers mistakenly measured the drill location from two different reference points above and below the floor H.4.a]. (Section 1R18)
Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Mar 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to provide training to users of powered air-purifiying respirators The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of TS 5.4, Procedures, for failure to provide training to users of Powered Air-purifying Respirator (PAPR) type respiratory protection devices as required by procedure 10AC-MGR-026-0, Respiratory Protection Program, revision 1.0. The licensee has entered this issue into the Corrective Action Program as Condition Report 2009102825.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of Human Performance (Training) and adversely affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. The finding was evaluated using the Occupational Radiation Safety SDP and determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). The finding was not related to ALARA planning, nor did it involve an overexposure or substantial potential for overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised. This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance, Resources H.2.b] because there was no formal training program provided to users of PAPR type respiratory protection devices. (Section 2OS3)
Violations of very low safety significance, which were identified by the licensee, have been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. These violations and corrective actions are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report Inspection Report# : 2009002 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection
Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : March 01, 2010
Hatch 2 1Q/2010 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Mar 31, 2010 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to implement adequate configuration control on Unit 2 main generator stator water cooling temperature control instrument loop, 2N43-F100 A self-revealing finding was identified for the licensees failure to create, implement, and make available to maintenance personnel, quality processes or documents for configuration control. Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain the correct configuration of the stator water cooling (SWC) temperature control instrument loop air-operated valve, 2N43-F100, as required by licensee procedure NMP-ES-014, Air Operated Valve Program. The failure to implement adequate configuration control on the SWC temperature control instrument loop directly resulted in a Unit 2 reactor scram on June 20, 2009. The licensee has addressed this issue in their Corrective Action Program (CAP) and developed corrective actions in CR 2009106326. As part of the licensee's immediate corrective actions the Unit 2 SWC instrument loop was reconfigured to the correct alignment, and changes were made to procedure NMP-ES-014.
This performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Configuration Control attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability. Specifically, inadequate configuration control resulted in a Unit 2 reactor scram on June 20, 2009. The significance of this finding was screened using the Phase 1 of the Significance Determination Process (SDP) in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Attachment 4. Because the finding contributed to a reactor scram, but did not affect mitigation equipment availability, the finding screened as Green.
This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Resources component of the Human Performance area, because the licensee did not provide complete, accurate and up-to-date design documentation, procedures, and work packages, and correct labeling of components. Specifically, the licensee did not implement a means of configuration control of the SWC temperature control instrument loop. (H.2(c)). (Section 4OA3.1)
Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Jul 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Correctly Establish Acceptance Criteria for the Standby Diesel Service Water Pump Section The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, for failure to correctly establish acceptance criteria for the Standby Diesel Service Water (SDSW) System. The licensee performed a past operability determination and initiated Condition Report (CR) 2009105651 to revise the acceptance criteria.
The licensees failure to correctly establish acceptance criterion for the SDSW pump under the most limiting conditions was a performance deficiency. The finding is greater than minor because it adversely affected the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding is of very low safety significance (Green) using the SDP because it did not represent a loss of system or safety function. A cross-cutting aspect was not identified because the finding does not represent current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2009006 (pdf)
Significance: Jul 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Monitor the Main Steam and Feedwater Line Pipe Whip Restraints The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) for the licensees failure to monitor the main steam line and feedwater line pipe whip restraints for Units 1 and 2. The licensee initiated CRs 2009105147 and 200910622 and plans to complete inspections of the whip restraints during the upcoming Units 1 and 2 outages.
The licensees failure to periodically inspect the condition of the safety-related pipe whip restraints was a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The team determined that the finding is of very low safety significance (Green) using the SDP because the finding did not represent an actual loss of safety function. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting aspect of implementing a corrective action program with a low threshold for identifying issues under the Corrective Action Program component of the Problem Identification and Resolution area P.1(a).
Inspection Report# : 2009006 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Maintain Fire Brigade Minimum Staffing Green. A Green NRC identified NCV of License Conditions 2.C.(3) for Unit-1 and 2.C.(3).(a) for Unit-2 was identified for failure to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program.
Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain adequate fire brigade staffing by assigning the Unit-1 Operator at the Controls (OATC) the additional responsibility of Fire Brigade Leader. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution.
This finding is more than minor because it affected the protection from external factors (fire) attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the shift staffing compliment was adequate to support the safe shutdown operating functions and independent fire brigade. In addition, the condition existed for only one 12-hour shift. The cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting element of Human Performance. (Section 4OA2)
Inspection Report# : 2009003 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Jul 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Cause Determinations and Corrective Actions for Deficiencies in Containment Penetration Seals The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to promptly correct deficiencies in containment penetration seals. The licensee initiated CR 2009105747 to evaluate corrective actions for the seals.
The team determined that the failure to take corrective actions for deficiencies in containment penetration seals was a performance deficiency. The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Structures, Systems and
Components (SSC) and Barrier Performance attribute of maintaining functionality of containment and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that containment protects the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting aspect of thoroughness of evaluation within the Corrective Action Program component of the Problem Identification and Resolution area P.1(c).
Inspection Report# : 2009006 (pdf)
Significance: Jul 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Correctly Establish Containment Isolation Valve Leakage Criteria for the Unit 2 Feedwater Check Valves The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for failure to correctly establish containment isolation valve leakage criteria for Unit 2 feedwater check valves. The licensee initiated CR 2009104567 and revised the associated calculation during the inspection.
The team determined that the failure to correctly establish leakage acceptance criteria for the feedwater check valves was a performance deficiency. The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the SSC and Barrier performance attribute of maintaining functionality of containment and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that containment protects the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events.
The finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting aspect of complete, accurate and up-to-date design documentation within the Resources component of the Human Performance area[H.2 (c)].
Inspection Report# : 2009006 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : May 26, 2010
Hatch 2 2Q/2010 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Mar 31, 2010 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to implement adequate configuration control on Unit 2 main generator stator water cooling temperature control instrument loop, 2N43-F100 A self-revealing finding was identified for the licensees failure to create, implement, and make available to maintenance personnel, quality processes or documents for configuration control. Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain the correct configuration of the stator water cooling (SWC) temperature control instrument loop air-operated valve, 2N43-F100, as required by licensee procedure NMP-ES-014, Air Operated Valve Program. The failure to implement adequate configuration control on the SWC temperature control instrument loop directly resulted in a Unit 2 reactor scram on June 20, 2009. The licensee has addressed this issue in their Corrective Action Program (CAP) and developed corrective actions in CR 2009106326. As part of the licensee's immediate corrective actions the Unit 2 SWC instrument loop was reconfigured to the correct alignment, and changes were made to procedure NMP-ES-014.
This performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Configuration Control attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability. Specifically, inadequate configuration control resulted in a Unit 2 reactor scram on June 20, 2009. The significance of this finding was screened using the Phase 1 of the Significance Determination Process (SDP) in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Attachment 4. Because the finding contributed to a reactor scram, but did not affect mitigation equipment availability, the finding screened as Green.
This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Resources component of the Human Performance area, because the licensee did not provide complete, accurate and up-to-date design documentation, procedures, and work packages, and correct labeling of components. Specifically, the licensee did not implement a means of configuration control of the SWC temperature control instrument loop. (H.2(c)). (Section 4OA3.1)
Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Jun 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to maintain safety related cables in a non-submerged environment
- Green. The NRC identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure implement measures to assure that safety-related cables remained in an environment for which they were designed. Safety-related cables purchased and installed in underground electrical pull boxes at Hatch Nuclear Plant have been subjected to submergence, a condition for which they are not designed. To address this issue the licensee has performed the immediate corrective action of increasing the frequency of measuring water level and pump down of the pull boxes. The licensee initiated CR 2010104298 to address this issue.
This performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, it is reasonable to conclude the cables may be in a degraded condition where the continued reliability of the cable cannot be ensured because: 1) the
licensee does not have a cable testing/monitoring program to detect degradation of inaccessible or underground power cables; 2) the cables have been subject to a submerged physical environment which is outside the cables design parameters; and 3) there have been documented failures of cables throughout the nuclear industry due to degradation caused by submergence in water. Because the finding affects the safety of an operating reactor, the significance of this finding was screened using the Phase 1 of the SDP in accordance with NRC IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Table 4a. The finding screened as Green, because the finding is a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Work Control component of the Human Performance area, because the licensee did not appropriately coordinate activities by incorporating actions where maintenance scheduling is more preventive than reactive. Specifically, the licensee did not schedule performance of procedure 52PM-Y46-001-0, Inground Pull Box and Cable Duct Inspection for Water, at a frequency that prevented safety related cable submersion (H.3(b)). (Section 1R06)
Inspection Report# : 2010003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to follow procedure while in shutdown cooling to record corrected reactor water level
- Green. The NRC identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to prescribe in procedure 34GO-OPS-015-2, Maintaining Cold Shutdown or Refueling Condition, appropriate documented instructions for recording and verifying reactor water level when reactor vessel level is greater than 60 inches and instrument 2B21-R605 is unavailable. To address this issue the licensee performed the immediate corrective action of initiating CR 2010104615 and has generated an action item to upgrade procedure 34GO-OPS-015-2.
This performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability of systems (ability of operators to monitor, trend, and maintain reactor water level) to prevent undesirable consequences. Because this finding is associated with the safety of a reactor while the unit was in cold shutdown and on residual heat removal shutdown cooling, NRC IMC 0609, Attachment 4, directs using IMC 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, to determine the significance of this finding. In Appendix G, Attachment 1, Checklist 6 was used because during the time period of this finding the unit was in cold shutdown, with a time to boil
< 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, and reactor coolant system level < 23 feet above the top of the reactor vessel flange. Each item in Appendix G, Attachment 1, Checklist 6 was determined to have been met, therefore per Figure 1 of Appendix G this finding screened as GREEN significance because a Qualitative Assessment was not required by Checklist 6. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Work Control component of the Human Performance area, because the licensee did not plan and coordinate work activities consistent with nuclear safety including planned contingencies, compensatory actions, or abort criteria. Specifically, the licensee did not plan and coordinate the activity of transitioning the reference leg for reactor water level instrument 2B21-R605 with contingencies, compensatory actions, or abort criteria addressed to ensure measurable reactor water level was available to control room operators (H.3(a)). (Section 1R20)
Inspection Report# : 2010003 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to establish appropriate preventative maintenance for electrolytic capacitors
- TBD A self-revealing apparent violation (AV) of TS 5.4, Procedures, was identified for failure to establish and perform preventive maintenance activities to replace electrolytic capacitors prior to their failure, specifically the electrolytic capacitors for the Unit 2 EDG LOCA/LOSP timer cards and their associated power supplies. As a result, between 2005 and 2009, the 2A, 2C and the 1B swing EDG experienced failures of the LOSP/LOCA circuitry, which were attributed to electrolytic capacitor age-related failures. On February 12, 2009 the Unit 2A EDG LOSP timer card was found in a failed state. These issues were documented in the licensees corrective action program as condition reports (CRs) 2005103415, 2008107899, 2008107935, 2009101237 and 2009102221. All Unit 2 EDG LOCA/LOSP time cards were replaced and their power supplies refurbished with new capacitors.
A second example of this performance deficiency was also identified. The performance deficiency directly contributed to the feedwater level controller 2C32-K648 power supply failing resulting in a Unit 2 automatic scram on June 23, 2009 (LER 05000366/2009-004). The licensee replaced the failed power supply. This issue is documented in the licensees corrective action program as CR 2009106352.
This finding with two examples is more than minor because if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency has the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, equipment containing electrolytic capacitors could fail and result in a plant transient or render systems/components used to respond to a plant transient unreliable or unavailable. The inspectors evaluated the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, , Phase 1 - Initial Screening. It was determined that a SDP Phase 2 analysis was required since the first example of the finding represents an actual loss of a safety function of a single train (EDG) for greater than its TS allowed outage time. The SDP Phase 2 analysis evaluated the finding for a Loss of Offsite Power (LOSP) event and required a Phase 3 review. The risk associated with the example for the failed main feedwater median level 2C32-K648 controller power supply was aggregated into the result of the phase 3 for the Unit 2 EDG timer cards. This finding has potential safety significance greater than very low safety significance (Green) and is classified as an apparent violation. The finding was also determined to have a cross-cutting aspect in the Operating Experience component of the Problem Identification and Resolution area (P.2(b), because the licensee did not effectively incorporate pertinent industry operating experience into the preventative maintenance program for the Unit 2 EDG LOCA/LOSP and the feedwater level controller components.
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Inspection Report# : 2010006 (pdf)
Significance: Jul 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Correctly Establish Acceptance Criteria for the Standby Diesel Service Water Pump Section The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, for failure to correctly establish acceptance criteria for the Standby Diesel Service Water (SDSW) System. The licensee performed a past operability determination and initiated Condition Report (CR) 2009105651 to revise the acceptance criteria.
The licensees failure to correctly establish acceptance criterion for the SDSW pump under the most limiting conditions was a performance deficiency. The finding is greater than minor because it adversely affected the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding is of very low safety significance (Green) using the SDP because it did not represent a loss of system or safety function. A cross-cutting aspect was not identified because the finding does not represent current performance.
Inspection Report# : 2009006 (pdf)
Significance: Jul 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Monitor the Main Steam and Feedwater Line Pipe Whip Restraints The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) for the licensees failure to monitor the main steam line and feedwater line pipe whip restraints for Units 1 and 2. The licensee initiated CRs 2009105147 and 200910622 and plans to complete inspections of the whip restraints during the upcoming Units 1 and 2 outages.
The licensees failure to periodically inspect the condition of the safety-related pipe whip restraints was a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The team determined that the finding is of very low safety significance (Green) using the SDP because the finding did not represent an
actual loss of safety function. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting aspect of implementing a corrective action program with a low threshold for identifying issues under the Corrective Action Program component of the Problem Identification and Resolution area P.1(a).
Inspection Report# : 2009006 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Jul 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Perform Cause Determinations and Corrective Actions for Deficiencies in Containment Penetration Seals The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to promptly correct deficiencies in containment penetration seals. The licensee initiated CR 2009105747 to evaluate corrective actions for the seals.
The team determined that the failure to take corrective actions for deficiencies in containment penetration seals was a performance deficiency. The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Structures, Systems and Components (SSC) and Barrier Performance attribute of maintaining functionality of containment and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that containment protects the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting aspect of thoroughness of evaluation within the Corrective Action Program component of the Problem Identification and Resolution area P.1(c).
Inspection Report# : 2009006 (pdf)
Significance: Jul 31, 2009 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Correctly Establish Containment Isolation Valve Leakage Criteria for the Unit 2 Feedwater Check Valves The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for failure to correctly establish containment isolation valve leakage criteria for Unit 2 feedwater check valves. The licensee initiated CR 2009104567 and revised the associated calculation during the inspection.
The team determined that the failure to correctly establish leakage acceptance criteria for the feedwater check valves was a performance deficiency. The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the SSC and Barrier performance attribute of maintaining functionality of containment and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that containment protects the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events.
The finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting aspect of complete, accurate and up-to-date design documentation within the Resources component of the Human Performance area[H.2 (c)].
Inspection Report# : 2009006 (pdf)
Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : September 02, 2010
Hatch 2 3Q/2010 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Mar 31, 2010 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to implement adequate configuration control on Unit 2 main generator stator water cooling temperature control instrument loop, 2N43-F100 A self-revealing finding was identified for the licensees failure to create, implement, and make available to maintenance personnel, quality processes or documents for configuration control. Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain the correct configuration of the stator water cooling (SWC) temperature control instrument loop air-operated valve, 2N43-F100, as required by licensee procedure NMP-ES-014, Air Operated Valve Program. The failure to implement adequate configuration control on the SWC temperature control instrument loop directly resulted in a Unit 2 reactor scram on June 20, 2009. The licensee has addressed this issue in their Corrective Action Program (CAP) and developed corrective actions in CR 2009106326. As part of the licensee's immediate corrective actions the Unit 2 SWC instrument loop was reconfigured to the correct alignment, and changes were made to procedure NMP-ES-014.
This performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Configuration Control attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability. Specifically, inadequate configuration control resulted in a Unit 2 reactor scram on June 20, 2009. The significance of this finding was screened using the Phase 1 of the Significance Determination Process (SDP) in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Attachment 4. Because the finding contributed to a reactor scram, but did not affect mitigation equipment availability, the finding screened as Green.
This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Resources component of the Human Performance area, because the licensee did not provide complete, accurate and up-to-date design documentation, procedures, and work packages, and correct labeling of components. Specifically, the licensee did not implement a means of configuration control of the SWC temperature control instrument loop. (H.2(c)). (Section 4OA3.1)
Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Jun 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to maintain safety related cables in a non-submerged environment
- Green. The NRC identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure implement measures to assure that safety-related cables remained in an environment for which they were designed. Safety-related cables purchased and installed in underground electrical pull boxes at Hatch Nuclear Plant have been subjected to submergence, a condition for which they are not designed. To address this issue the licensee has performed the immediate corrective action of increasing the frequency of measuring water level and pump down of the pull boxes. The licensee initiated CR 2010104298 to address this issue.
This performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, it is reasonable to conclude the cables may be in a degraded condition where the continued reliability of the cable cannot be ensured because: 1) the
licensee does not have a cable testing/monitoring program to detect degradation of inaccessible or underground power cables; 2) the cables have been subject to a submerged physical environment which is outside the cables design parameters; and 3) there have been documented failures of cables throughout the nuclear industry due to degradation caused by submergence in water. Because the finding affects the safety of an operating reactor, the significance of this finding was screened using the Phase 1 of the SDP in accordance with NRC IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Table 4a. The finding screened as Green, because the finding is a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Work Control component of the Human Performance area, because the licensee did not appropriately coordinate activities by incorporating actions where maintenance scheduling is more preventive than reactive. Specifically, the licensee did not schedule performance of procedure 52PM-Y46-001-0, Inground Pull Box and Cable Duct Inspection for Water, at a frequency that prevented safety related cable submersion (H.3(b)). (Section 1R06)
Inspection Report# : 2010003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to follow procedure while in shutdown cooling to record corrected reactor water level
- Green. The NRC identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to prescribe in procedure 34GO-OPS-015-2, Maintaining Cold Shutdown or Refueling Condition, appropriate documented instructions for recording and verifying reactor water level when reactor vessel level is greater than 60 inches and instrument 2B21-R605 is unavailable. To address this issue the licensee performed the immediate corrective action of initiating CR 2010104615 and has generated an action item to upgrade procedure 34GO-OPS-015-2.
This performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability of systems (ability of operators to monitor, trend, and maintain reactor water level) to prevent undesirable consequences. Because this finding is associated with the safety of a reactor while the unit was in cold shutdown and on residual heat removal shutdown cooling, NRC IMC 0609, Attachment 4, directs using IMC 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, to determine the significance of this finding. In Appendix G, Attachment 1, Checklist 6 was used because during the time period of this finding the unit was in cold shutdown, with a time to boil
< 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, and reactor coolant system level < 23 feet above the top of the reactor vessel flange. Each item in Appendix G, Attachment 1, Checklist 6 was determined to have been met, therefore per Figure 1 of Appendix G this finding screened as GREEN significance because a Qualitative Assessment was not required by Checklist 6. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Work Control component of the Human Performance area, because the licensee did not plan and coordinate work activities consistent with nuclear safety including planned contingencies, compensatory actions, or abort criteria. Specifically, the licensee did not plan and coordinate the activity of transitioning the reference leg for reactor water level instrument 2B21-R605 with contingencies, compensatory actions, or abort criteria addressed to ensure measurable reactor water level was available to control room operators (H.3(a)). (Section 1R20)
Inspection Report# : 2010003 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2009 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: VIO Violation Failure to establish appropriate preventative maintenance for electrolytic capacitors
- TBD A self-revealing apparent violation (AV) of TS 5.4, Procedures, was identified for failure to establish and perform preventive maintenance activities to replace electrolytic capacitors prior to their failure, specifically the electrolytic capacitors for the Unit 2 EDG LOCA/LOSP timer cards and their associated power supplies. As a result, between 2005 and 2009, the 2A, 2C and the 1B swing EDG experienced failures of the LOSP/LOCA circuitry, which were attributed to electrolytic capacitor age-related failures. On February 12, 2009 the Unit 2A EDG LOSP timer card was found in a failed state. These issues were documented in the licensees corrective action program as condition reports (CRs) 2005103415, 2008107899, 2008107935, 2009101237 and 2009102221. All Unit 2 EDG LOCA/LOSP time cards were replaced and their power supplies refurbished with new capacitors.
A second example of this performance deficiency was also identified. The performance deficiency directly contributed to the feedwater level controller 2C32-K648 power supply failing resulting in a Unit 2 automatic scram on June 23, 2009 (LER 05000366/2009-004). The licensee replaced the failed power supply. This issue is documented in the licensees corrective action program as CR 2009106352.
This finding with two examples is more than minor because if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency has the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, equipment containing electrolytic capacitors could fail and result in a plant transient or render systems/components used to respond to a plant transient unreliable or unavailable. The inspectors evaluated the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, , Phase 1 - Initial Screening. It was determined that a SDP Phase 2 analysis was required since the first example of the finding represents an actual loss of a safety function of a single train (EDG) for greater than its TS allowed outage time. The SDP Phase 2 analysis evaluated the finding for a Loss of Offsite Power (LOSP) event and required a Phase 3 review. The risk associated with the example for the failed main feedwater median level 2C32-K648 controller power supply was aggregated into the result of the phase 3 for the Unit 2 EDG timer cards. This finding has potential safety significance greater than very low safety significance (Green) and is classified as an apparent violation. The finding was also determined to have a cross-cutting aspect in the Operating Experience component of the Problem Identification and Resolution area (P.2(b), because the licensee did not effectively incorporate pertinent industry operating experience into the preventative maintenance program for the Unit 2 EDG LOCA/LOSP and the feedwater level controller components.
This was determined to be a White finding for Unit 2 and was documented as Violation 2010006-01.
As required by the NRC Reactor Oversight Process Action Matrix, a supplemental inspection was performed because two findings of White safety significance were identified which placed Unit 2 in the Degraded Cornerstone Column in the fourth quarter of 2009. The issues, which degraded the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, included a fourth quarter 2009 Unit 2 White finding for failure to establish appropriate preventative maintenance for electrolytic capacitors and a first quarter 2009 White finding for the 1B emergency diesel generator (EDG) coupling failure which affected both units. These issues were documented in inspection reports 05000366/2010006 and 05000321,366/2009008, respectively. The NRC determined that the proposed corrective actions are appropriate to resolve the deficiencies related to the Degraded Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified. As such, the inspection objectives of IP 95002 have been satisfied. Therefore, the White finding for the failure to establish appropriate preventative maintenance for electrolytic capacitors was considered closed.
On August 26, 2010, the IP 95002 inspection team presented the inspection results in an exit meeting to the licensee.
Inspection Report# : 2009005 (pdf)
Inspection Report# : 2010006 (pdf)
Inspection Report# : 2010007 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety
Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : November 29, 2010
Hatch 2 4Q/2010 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Mar 31, 2010 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to implement adequate configuration control on Unit 2 main generator stator water cooling temperature control instrument loop, 2N43-F100 A self-revealing finding was identified for the licensees failure to create, implement, and make available to maintenance personnel, quality processes or documents for configuration control. Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain the correct configuration of the stator water cooling (SWC) temperature control instrument loop air-operated valve, 2N43-F100, as required by licensee procedure NMP-ES-014, Air Operated Valve Program. The failure to implement adequate configuration control on the SWC temperature control instrument loop directly resulted in a Unit 2 reactor scram on June 20, 2009. The licensee has addressed this issue in their Corrective Action Program (CAP) and developed corrective actions in CR 2009106326. As part of the licensee's immediate corrective actions the Unit 2 SWC instrument loop was reconfigured to the correct alignment, and changes were made to procedure NMP-ES-014.
This performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Configuration Control attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability. Specifically, inadequate configuration control resulted in a Unit 2 reactor scram on June 20, 2009. The significance of this finding was screened using the Phase 1 of the Significance Determination Process (SDP) in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Attachment 4. Because the finding contributed to a reactor scram, but did not affect mitigation equipment availability, the finding screened as Green.
This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Resources component of the Human Performance area, because the licensee did not provide complete, accurate and up-to-date design documentation, procedures, and work packages, and correct labeling of components. Specifically, the licensee did not implement a means of configuration control of the SWC temperature control instrument loop. (H.2(c)). (Section 4OA3.1)
Inspection Report# : 2010002 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Jun 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to maintain safety related cables in a non-submerged environment
- Green. The NRC identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure implement measures to assure that safety-related cables remained in an environment for which they were designed. Safety-related cables purchased and installed in underground electrical pull boxes at Hatch Nuclear Plant have been subjected to submergence, a condition for which they are not designed. To address this issue the licensee has performed the immediate corrective action of increasing the frequency of measuring water level and pump down of the pull boxes. The licensee initiated CR 2010104298 to address this issue.
This performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, it is reasonable to conclude the cables may be in a degraded condition where the continued reliability of the cable cannot be ensured because: 1) the
licensee does not have a cable testing/monitoring program to detect degradation of inaccessible or underground power cables; 2) the cables have been subject to a submerged physical environment which is outside the cables design parameters; and 3) there have been documented failures of cables throughout the nuclear industry due to degradation caused by submergence in water. Because the finding affects the safety of an operating reactor, the significance of this finding was screened using the Phase 1 of the SDP in accordance with NRC IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Table 4a. The finding screened as Green, because the finding is a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Work Control component of the Human Performance area, because the licensee did not appropriately coordinate activities by incorporating actions where maintenance scheduling is more preventive than reactive. Specifically, the licensee did not schedule performance of procedure 52PM-Y46-001-0, Inground Pull Box and Cable Duct Inspection for Water, at a frequency that prevented safety related cable submersion (H.3(b)). (Section 1R06)
Inspection Report# : 2010003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to follow procedure while in shutdown cooling to record corrected reactor water level
- Green. The NRC identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to prescribe in procedure 34GO-OPS-015-2, Maintaining Cold Shutdown or Refueling Condition, appropriate documented instructions for recording and verifying reactor water level when reactor vessel level is greater than 60 inches and instrument 2B21-R605 is unavailable. To address this issue the licensee performed the immediate corrective action of initiating CR 2010104615 and has generated an action item to upgrade procedure 34GO-OPS-015-2.
This performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability of systems (ability of operators to monitor, trend, and maintain reactor water level) to prevent undesirable consequences. Because this finding is associated with the safety of a reactor while the unit was in cold shutdown and on residual heat removal shutdown cooling, NRC IMC 0609, Attachment 4, directs using IMC 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, to determine the significance of this finding. In Appendix G, Attachment 1, Checklist 6 was used because during the time period of this finding the unit was in cold shutdown, with a time to boil
< 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, and reactor coolant system level < 23 feet above the top of the reactor vessel flange. Each item in Appendix G, Attachment 1, Checklist 6 was determined to have been met, therefore per Figure 1 of Appendix G this finding screened as GREEN significance because a Qualitative Assessment was not required by Checklist 6. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Work Control component of the Human Performance area, because the licensee did not plan and coordinate work activities consistent with nuclear safety including planned contingencies, compensatory actions, or abort criteria. Specifically, the licensee did not plan and coordinate the activity of transitioning the reference leg for reactor water level instrument 2B21-R605 with contingencies, compensatory actions, or abort criteria addressed to ensure measurable reactor water level was available to control room operators (H.3(a)). (Section 1R20)
Inspection Report# : 2010003 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety
Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : March 03, 2011
Hatch 2 1Q/2011 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inaccessbile fire hose station in the cable spreading room An NRC-identified NCV of Hatch Unit 1 operating license condition 2.C.(3) and Hatch Unit 2 operating license condition 2.C.(3)(a), Fire Protection, was identified for failure to maintain fire hose station HS-C20 operable while equipment in the area was required to be operable. Hose station HS-C20 was determined to be inaccessible to the fire brigade. Immediate corrective actions taken by the licensee included performing a fire protection alternate compensatory measures evaluation, (as required by Fire Hazards Analysis section 9.2,specification 1.6.1 action a),
which resulted in staging an additional 100 feet of hose at hose station, HS-C21, located just outside of the cable spread room. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 2011100783.
Failure to ensure the accessibility and thus operability of HS-C20 or take required compensatory action in accordance with Fire Hazards Analysis Section 9.2 Appendix B Specification 1.6.1 is a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it adversely affected the protection against external events (fire) attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability and reliability of systems (safety related cable spreading room cabling) that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This violation was assessed using the Phase 1 screening worksheets of Attachment 4 and Appendix F of IMC 0609. The inspectors performed an initial qualitative screening and determined the inoperability of HS-C20 was a low degradation violation against the fire protection program. The cable spreading room fire area contains full pre-action sprinkler coverage and a manual carbon dioxide flooding system. Additionally, a manual hose station and fire extinguishers are located outside the primary access doors to the cable spreading room. Based on the low degradation of the fire protection program, this violation was screened as Green. The inspectors determined this performance deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution under the Corrective Action Program component because the licensee did not appropriately identify the long standing issue of the inaccessibility of HS-C20 during monthly surveillance testing. (P.1(a)) (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Interaction of non-safety related power system with safety systems during bus transfers An NRC indentified NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified for the failure to properly analyze electrical bus transfers that could adversely affect redundant safety buses. Specifically, the licensee failed to analyze the effects of severe voltage dips on the 4.160 kV safety buses that could occur if a loss of coolant accident occurred coincident with bus transfers that occur during a unit trip. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 2009105775.
The licensees failure to properly analyze the effects of severe voltage dips during bus transfers was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating System Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee
failed to properly analyze the effects of voltage dips that could occur following the transfer of the non-safety bus to the transformer supplying power to redundant safety-related buses during LOCA block loading. The finding was assessed for significance in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter 0609, a Phase III analysis was required since this finding represented a potential loss of safety system function for multiple trains which was not addressed by the Phase II pre-solved tables/worksheets. The regional SRA performed a Phase III analysis for the deficiency. Because the failure of the onsite power system (such as including the turbine/generator tripping scheme) would have to occur concurrent with the loading of large ECCS motors onto safety-related buses in response to an accident the event, the period of vulnerability for the trip is was assumed to be a few seconds. Therefore the likelihood of the event results in a risk very much below the threshold for a colored finding. Because this finding is not related to current licensee performance, no cross cutting aspect was identified. (Section 4OA5.2)
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to maintain safety related cables in a non-submerged environment
- Green. The NRC identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure implement measures to assure that safety-related cables remained in an environment for which they were designed. Safety-related cables purchased and installed in underground electrical pull boxes at Hatch Nuclear Plant have been subjected to submergence, a condition for which they are not designed. To address this issue the licensee has performed the immediate corrective action of increasing the frequency of measuring water level and pump down of the pull boxes. The licensee initiated CR 2010104298 to address this issue.
This performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, it is reasonable to conclude the cables may be in a degraded condition where the continued reliability of the cable cannot be ensured because: 1) the licensee does not have a cable testing/monitoring program to detect degradation of inaccessible or underground power cables; 2) the cables have been subject to a submerged physical environment which is outside the cables design parameters; and 3) there have been documented failures of cables throughout the nuclear industry due to degradation caused by submergence in water. Because the finding affects the safety of an operating reactor, the significance of this finding was screened using the Phase 1 of the SDP in accordance with NRC IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Table 4a. The finding screened as Green, because the finding is a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Work Control component of the Human Performance area, because the licensee did not appropriately coordinate activities by incorporating actions where maintenance scheduling is more preventive than reactive. Specifically, the licensee did not schedule performance of procedure 52PM-Y46-001-0, Inground Pull Box and Cable Duct Inspection for Water, at a frequency that prevented safety related cable submersion (H.3(b)). (Section 1R06)
Inspection Report# : 2010003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2010 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to follow procedure while in shutdown cooling to record corrected reactor water level
- Green. The NRC identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to prescribe in procedure 34GO-OPS-015-2, Maintaining Cold Shutdown or Refueling Condition, appropriate documented instructions for recording and verifying reactor water level when reactor vessel level is greater than 60 inches and instrument 2B21-R605 is unavailable. To address this issue the licensee performed the immediate corrective action of initiating CR 2010104615 and has generated an action item to upgrade procedure 34GO-OPS-015-2.
This performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability of systems
(ability of operators to monitor, trend, and maintain reactor water level) to prevent undesirable consequences. Because this finding is associated with the safety of a reactor while the unit was in cold shutdown and on residual heat removal shutdown cooling, NRC IMC 0609, Attachment 4, directs using IMC 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, to determine the significance of this finding. In Appendix G, Attachment 1, Checklist 6 was used because during the time period of this finding the unit was in cold shutdown, with a time to boil
< 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, and reactor coolant system level < 23 feet above the top of the reactor vessel flange. Each item in Appendix G, Attachment 1, Checklist 6 was determined to have been met, therefore per Figure 1 of Appendix G this finding screened as GREEN significance because a Qualitative Assessment was not required by Checklist 6. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Work Control component of the Human Performance area, because the licensee did not plan and coordinate work activities consistent with nuclear safety including planned contingencies, compensatory actions, or abort criteria. Specifically, the licensee did not plan and coordinate the activity of transitioning the reference leg for reactor water level instrument 2B21-R605 with contingencies, compensatory actions, or abort criteria addressed to ensure measurable reactor water level was available to control room operators (H.3(a)). (Section 1R20)
Inspection Report# : 2010003 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : June 07, 2011
Hatch 2 2Q/2011 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Jun 30, 2011 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to promptly identify and take corrective actions to ensure Bussmann fuses identified by the Part 21 notification 2005-37 were removed from use in safety related applications.
A self-revealing NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, was identified for failure to promptly identify and take corrective actions to ensure Bussmann fuses identified by the Part 21 notification 2005-37, were removed from use in safety related applications. Corrective actions taken include replacing the KTN-R 10 amp fuses on the 1B emergency diesel generator with fuses manufactured after 1991, placing a hold on all KWN-R and KTN-R fuses size 30 amps below manufactured between 1987 and 1991, and replacement of these fuses with new KWN-R and KTN-R fuses with a date code 2009 or newer. This violation has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition report (CR) 2010116039.
Failure to promptly identify and take corrective actions to ensure Bussmann fuses identified by the Part 21 notification 2005-37 were removed from use in safety related applications is a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the Equipment Performance attribute and adversely affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, on December 23, 2010, the Hatch 1B emergency diesel generator #3 stop circuitry operability light was discovered not illuminated on panel 1R43-P003B. Without power to this circuitry the 1B emergency diesel generator is inoperable and unavailable to provide its required safety function. The significance of this finding was screened using IMC 0609 Attachment 4, table 4a. The risk significance screening required a Phase 3 analysis, because the finding screened as potentially risk significant due to a seismic initiating event. The regional senior reactor analyst (SRA) performed a Phase 3 analysis for the finding.
The analysis included two parts, the first covering the time period of total inoperability of the fuse; and the second covering the exposure time from when the non qualified fuses were installed until they were replaced, when they were subject to potential seismic failure. Calculations were performed using the NRCs plant specific risk models. The short exposure time for the first analysis, and the low likelihood of a seismic event at the plant for the second analysis, caused the combined result to be a very low risk condition. The finding was determined to be Green in the SDP.
Because the performance deficiency occurred in 2006 and is outside the past three years, no cross-cutting aspect is assigned. (Section 4OA2.2)
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to consider potential adverse system interactions when developing procedure to open SRVs without power An NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified for failure to establish adequate procedures that address potential adverse system interactions when opening safety relief valves (SRV) without power. Immediate corrective actions taken by the licensee include changing procedure 31EO-TSG-001-0, Attachment 6, SRV Actuation Without Power to Allow Injection with Portable Pump, to ensure the SRV control circuits are isolated electrically from the direct current (DC) busses prior to installing the
portable DC power supply. This violation has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 2011106008.
Failure to address potential adverse system interactions when developing procedures affecting quality is a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the Procedural Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affects the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of the safety relief valves to reduce reactor pressure in response to a loss of alternating current (AC) and DC power event. Because this finding is associated with B.5.b mitigation strategies, the finding was assessed using MC 0609 Appendix L, B.5.b Significance Determination Process, Table 2. The inspectors performed an initial screening and determined the finding did not meet the criteria listed within Table 2 for greater than Green significance therefore this finding was screened as Green. Because the mitigating strategy was developed and implemented in site procedures in 2007, the performance deficiency occurred outside the past three years and no cross-cutting aspect is assigned. (Section 4OA5.3)
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to address the anticipated environmental conditions when developing procedures to manually operate containment vent valves An NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V. Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified for failure to establish adequate procedures that address the anticipated environmental conditions when operating containment vents without power. Immediate corrective actions taken by the licensee include changing procedure 34AB-R22-003-1/2, Station Blackout, to perform preliminary actions in the torus area before high containment pressure and temperature conditions require venting. This change is intended to allow required torus area entries to be performed prior to reaching high temperature conditions in the area. This violation has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 2011105966 and CR 2011106007.
Failure to address the anticipated environmental conditions when developing procedures affecting quality is a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the Procedural Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affects the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of the containment vent valves to allow reliable pressure control of primary containment in response to a loss of AC and DC power event. This finding was assessed using MC 0609 Appendix L, B.5.b Significance Determination Process, Table 2. The inspectors performed an initial screening and determined the finding did not meet the criteria listed within Table 2 for greater than Green significance therefore this finding was screened as Green. Because the procedure was developed and implemented in 2005, the performance deficiency occurred outside the past three years and no cross-cutting aspect is assigned. (Section 4OA5.3)
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inaccessbile fire hose station in the cable spreading room An NRC-identified NCV of Hatch Unit 1 operating license condition 2.C.(3) and Hatch Unit 2 operating license condition 2.C.(3)(a), Fire Protection, was identified for failure to maintain fire hose station HS-C20 operable while equipment in the area was required to be operable. Hose station HS-C20 was determined to be inaccessible to the fire brigade. Immediate corrective actions taken by the licensee included performing a fire protection alternate compensatory measures evaluation, (as required by Fire Hazards Analysis section 9.2,specification 1.6.1 action a),
which resulted in staging an additional 100 feet of hose at hose station, HS-C21, located just outside of the cable spread room. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 2011100783.
Failure to ensure the accessibility and thus operability of HS-C20 or take required compensatory action in accordance with Fire Hazards Analysis Section 9.2 Appendix B Specification 1.6.1 is a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it adversely affected the protection against external events (fire) attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability and reliability of systems (safety related cable
spreading room cabling) that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This violation was assessed using the Phase 1 screening worksheets of Attachment 4 and Appendix F of IMC 0609. The inspectors performed an initial qualitative screening and determined the inoperability of HS-C20 was a low degradation violation against the fire protection program. The cable spreading room fire area contains full pre-action sprinkler coverage and a manual carbon dioxide flooding system. Additionally, a manual hose station and fire extinguishers are located outside the primary access doors to the cable spreading room. Based on the low degradation of the fire protection program, this violation was screened as Green. The inspectors determined this performance deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution under the Corrective Action Program component because the licensee did not appropriately identify the long standing issue of the inaccessibility of HS-C20 during monthly surveillance testing. (P.1(a)) (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Interaction of non-safety related power system with safety systems during bus transfers An NRC indentified NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified for the failure to properly analyze electrical bus transfers that could adversely affect redundant safety buses. Specifically, the licensee failed to analyze the effects of severe voltage dips on the 4.160 kV safety buses that could occur if a loss of coolant accident occurred coincident with bus transfers that occur during a unit trip. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 2009105775.
The licensees failure to properly analyze the effects of severe voltage dips during bus transfers was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating System Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee failed to properly analyze the effects of voltage dips that could occur following the transfer of the non-safety bus to the transformer supplying power to redundant safety-related buses during LOCA block loading. The finding was assessed for significance in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter 0609, a Phase III analysis was required since this finding represented a potential loss of safety system function for multiple trains which was not addressed by the Phase II pre-solved tables/worksheets. The regional SRA performed a Phase III analysis for the deficiency. Because the failure of the onsite power system (such as including the turbine/generator tripping scheme) would have to occur concurrent with the loading of large ECCS motors onto safety-related buses in response to an accident the event, the period of vulnerability for the trip is was assumed to be a few seconds. Therefore the likelihood of the event results in a risk very much below the threshold for a colored finding. Because this finding is not related to current licensee performance, no cross cutting aspect was identified. (Section 4OA5.2)
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance: Feb 24, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Untimely Corrective Action for Installing Appendix R Emergency Lights Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of Hatch Unit 1 License Condition 2.C.3 and Unit 2 License Condition 2.C.3 (a) for the failure to take timely corrective actions to restore emergency lighting to be in compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.J. Specifically, during a 2006 triennial fire protection inspection, a total of ten Unit 1 and Unit 2 indicating instruments, credited for alternative post-fire safe shutdown, were identified in condition reports written in 2006, as not having dedicated emergency lighting units installed to illuminate the instruments. The licensee subsequently closed the 2006 condition reports to design change packages and, at the time of this inspection, had not implemented the modifications to restore compliance. The licensee entered the current non-compliance into their corrective action program as condition report CR 2010115127.
The licensees failure to take timely corrective actions to address non-compliances with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.J, as required by the licensees fire protection program, is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it affects the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and the objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to
initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage). Specifically, the finding affected the ability of operators to shutdown the reactor from outside the control room in the event of a fire. The team evaluated this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Qualitative Screening Approach. The finding affects post-fire safe shutdown and was assigned a low degradation rating because operators had a high likelihood of completing tasks requiring use of the affected indicators using hand-held portable lights. The finding is characterized as Green, a finding of very low safety significance. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Human Performance Area, Resources component, because the licensee failed to ensure that equipment was available and adequate to assure nuclear safety. Specifically, the licensee did not ensure that emergency lighting units were adequate to support post-fire safe shutdown actions (H.2 (d)).
Inspection Report# : 2010009 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : October 14, 2011
Hatch 2 3Q/2011 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Jun 30, 2011 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to promptly identify and take corrective actions to ensure Bussmann fuses identified by the Part 21 notification 2005-37 were removed from use in safety related applications.
A self-revealing NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, was identified for failure to promptly identify and take corrective actions to ensure Bussmann fuses identified by the Part 21 notification 2005-37, were removed from use in safety related applications. Corrective actions taken include replacing the KTN-R 10 amp fuses on the 1B emergency diesel generator with fuses manufactured after 1991, placing a hold on all KWN-R and KTN-R fuses size 30 amps below manufactured between 1987 and 1991, and replacement of these fuses with new KWN-R and KTN-R fuses with a date code 2009 or newer. This violation has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition report (CR) 2010116039.
Failure to promptly identify and take corrective actions to ensure Bussmann fuses identified by the Part 21 notification 2005-37 were removed from use in safety related applications is a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the Equipment Performance attribute and adversely affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, on December 23, 2010, the Hatch 1B emergency diesel generator #3 stop circuitry operability light was discovered not illuminated on panel 1R43-P003B. Without power to this circuitry the 1B emergency diesel generator is inoperable and unavailable to provide its required safety function. The significance of this finding was screened using IMC 0609 Attachment 4, table 4a. The risk significance screening required a Phase 3 analysis, because the finding screened as potentially risk significant due to a seismic initiating event. The regional senior reactor analyst (SRA) performed a Phase 3 analysis for the finding.
The analysis included two parts, the first covering the time period of total inoperability of the fuse; and the second covering the exposure time from when the non qualified fuses were installed until they were replaced, when they were subject to potential seismic failure. Calculations were performed using the NRCs plant specific risk models. The short exposure time for the first analysis, and the low likelihood of a seismic event at the plant for the second analysis, caused the combined result to be a very low risk condition. The finding was determined to be Green in the SDP.
Because the performance deficiency occurred in 2006 and is outside the past three years, no cross-cutting aspect is assigned. (Section 4OA2.2)
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to consider potential adverse system interactions when developing procedure to open SRVs without power An NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified for failure to establish adequate procedures that address potential adverse system interactions when opening safety relief valves (SRV) without power. Immediate corrective actions taken by the licensee include changing procedure 31EO-TSG-001-0, Attachment 6, SRV Actuation Without Power to Allow Injection with Portable Pump, to ensure the SRV control circuits are isolated electrically from the direct current (DC) busses prior to installing the
portable DC power supply. This violation has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 2011106008.
Failure to address potential adverse system interactions when developing procedures affecting quality is a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the Procedural Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affects the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of the safety relief valves to reduce reactor pressure in response to a loss of alternating current (AC) and DC power event. Because this finding is associated with B.5.b mitigation strategies, the finding was assessed using MC 0609 Appendix L, B.5.b Significance Determination Process, Table 2. The inspectors performed an initial screening and determined the finding did not meet the criteria listed within Table 2 for greater than Green significance therefore this finding was screened as Green. Because the mitigating strategy was developed and implemented in site procedures in 2007, the performance deficiency occurred outside the past three years and no cross-cutting aspect is assigned. (Section 4OA5.3)
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to address the anticipated environmental conditions when developing procedures to manually operate containment vent valves An NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V. Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified for failure to establish adequate procedures that address the anticipated environmental conditions when operating containment vents without power. Immediate corrective actions taken by the licensee include changing procedure 34AB-R22-003-1/2, Station Blackout, to perform preliminary actions in the torus area before high containment pressure and temperature conditions require venting. This change is intended to allow required torus area entries to be performed prior to reaching high temperature conditions in the area. This violation has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 2011105966 and CR 2011106007.
Failure to address the anticipated environmental conditions when developing procedures affecting quality is a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the Procedural Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affects the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of the containment vent valves to allow reliable pressure control of primary containment in response to a loss of AC and DC power event. This finding was assessed using MC 0609 Appendix L, B.5.b Significance Determination Process, Table 2. The inspectors performed an initial screening and determined the finding did not meet the criteria listed within Table 2 for greater than Green significance therefore this finding was screened as Green. Because the procedure was developed and implemented in 2005, the performance deficiency occurred outside the past three years and no cross-cutting aspect is assigned. (Section 4OA5.3)
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inaccessbile fire hose station in the cable spreading room An NRC-identified NCV of Hatch Unit 1 operating license condition 2.C.(3) and Hatch Unit 2 operating license condition 2.C.(3)(a), Fire Protection, was identified for failure to maintain fire hose station HS-C20 operable while equipment in the area was required to be operable. Hose station HS-C20 was determined to be inaccessible to the fire brigade. Immediate corrective actions taken by the licensee included performing a fire protection alternate compensatory measures evaluation, (as required by Fire Hazards Analysis section 9.2,specification 1.6.1 action a),
which resulted in staging an additional 100 feet of hose at hose station, HS-C21, located just outside of the cable spread room. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 2011100783.
Failure to ensure the accessibility and thus operability of HS-C20 or take required compensatory action in accordance with Fire Hazards Analysis Section 9.2 Appendix B Specification 1.6.1 is a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it adversely affected the protection against external events (fire) attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability and reliability of systems (safety related cable
spreading room cabling) that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This violation was assessed using the Phase 1 screening worksheets of Attachment 4 and Appendix F of IMC 0609. The inspectors performed an initial qualitative screening and determined the inoperability of HS-C20 was a low degradation violation against the fire protection program. The cable spreading room fire area contains full pre-action sprinkler coverage and a manual carbon dioxide flooding system. Additionally, a manual hose station and fire extinguishers are located outside the primary access doors to the cable spreading room. Based on the low degradation of the fire protection program, this violation was screened as Green. The inspectors determined this performance deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution under the Corrective Action Program component because the licensee did not appropriately identify the long standing issue of the inaccessibility of HS-C20 during monthly surveillance testing. (P.1(a)) (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Interaction of non-safety related power system with safety systems during bus transfers An NRC indentified NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified for the failure to properly analyze electrical bus transfers that could adversely affect redundant safety buses. Specifically, the licensee failed to analyze the effects of severe voltage dips on the 4.160 kV safety buses that could occur if a loss of coolant accident occurred coincident with bus transfers that occur during a unit trip. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 2009105775.
The licensees failure to properly analyze the effects of severe voltage dips during bus transfers was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating System Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee failed to properly analyze the effects of voltage dips that could occur following the transfer of the non-safety bus to the transformer supplying power to redundant safety-related buses during LOCA block loading. The finding was assessed for significance in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter 0609, a Phase III analysis was required since this finding represented a potential loss of safety system function for multiple trains which was not addressed by the Phase II pre-solved tables/worksheets. The regional SRA performed a Phase III analysis for the deficiency. Because the failure of the onsite power system (such as including the turbine/generator tripping scheme) would have to occur concurrent with the loading of large ECCS motors onto safety-related buses in response to an accident the event, the period of vulnerability for the trip is was assumed to be a few seconds. Therefore the likelihood of the event results in a risk very much below the threshold for a colored finding. Because this finding is not related to current licensee performance, no cross cutting aspect was identified. (Section 4OA5.2)
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance: Feb 24, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Untimely Corrective Action for Installing Appendix R Emergency Lights Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of Hatch Unit 1 License Condition 2.C.3 and Unit 2 License Condition 2.C.3 (a) for the failure to take timely corrective actions to restore emergency lighting to be in compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.J. Specifically, during a 2006 triennial fire protection inspection, a total of ten Unit 1 and Unit 2 indicating instruments, credited for alternative post-fire safe shutdown, were identified in condition reports written in 2006, as not having dedicated emergency lighting units installed to illuminate the instruments. The licensee subsequently closed the 2006 condition reports to design change packages and, at the time of this inspection, had not implemented the modifications to restore compliance. The licensee entered the current non-compliance into their corrective action program as condition report CR 2010115127.
The licensees failure to take timely corrective actions to address non-compliances with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.J, as required by the licensees fire protection program, is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it affects the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and the objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to
initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage). Specifically, the finding affected the ability of operators to shutdown the reactor from outside the control room in the event of a fire. The team evaluated this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Qualitative Screening Approach. The finding affects post-fire safe shutdown and was assigned a low degradation rating because operators had a high likelihood of completing tasks requiring use of the affected indicators using hand-held portable lights. The finding is characterized as Green, a finding of very low safety significance. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Human Performance Area, Resources component, because the licensee failed to ensure that equipment was available and adequate to assure nuclear safety. Specifically, the licensee did not ensure that emergency lighting units were adequate to support post-fire safe shutdown actions (H.2 (d)).
Inspection Report# : 2010009 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : January 04, 2012
Hatch 2 4Q/2011 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Jun 30, 2011 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to promptly identify and take corrective actions to ensure Bussmann fuses identified by the Part 21 notification 2005-37 were removed from use in safety related applications.
A self-revealing NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, was identified for failure to promptly identify and take corrective actions to ensure Bussmann fuses identified by the Part 21 notification 2005-37, were removed from use in safety related applications. Corrective actions taken include replacing the KTN-R 10 amp fuses on the 1B emergency diesel generator with fuses manufactured after 1991, placing a hold on all KWN-R and KTN-R fuses size 30 amps below manufactured between 1987 and 1991, and replacement of these fuses with new KWN-R and KTN-R fuses with a date code 2009 or newer. This violation has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition report (CR) 2010116039.
Failure to promptly identify and take corrective actions to ensure Bussmann fuses identified by the Part 21 notification 2005-37 were removed from use in safety related applications is a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the Equipment Performance attribute and adversely affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, on December 23, 2010, the Hatch 1B emergency diesel generator #3 stop circuitry operability light was discovered not illuminated on panel 1R43-P003B. Without power to this circuitry the 1B emergency diesel generator is inoperable and unavailable to provide its required safety function. The significance of this finding was screened using IMC 0609 Attachment 4, table 4a. The risk significance screening required a Phase 3 analysis, because the finding screened as potentially risk significant due to a seismic initiating event. The regional senior reactor analyst (SRA) performed a Phase 3 analysis for the finding.
The analysis included two parts, the first covering the time period of total inoperability of the fuse; and the second covering the exposure time from when the non qualified fuses were installed until they were replaced, when they were subject to potential seismic failure. Calculations were performed using the NRCs plant specific risk models. The short exposure time for the first analysis, and the low likelihood of a seismic event at the plant for the second analysis, caused the combined result to be a very low risk condition. The finding was determined to be Green in the SDP.
Because the performance deficiency occurred in 2006 and is outside the past three years, no cross-cutting aspect is assigned. (Section 4OA2.2)
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to consider potential adverse system interactions when developing procedure to open SRVs without power An NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified for failure to establish adequate procedures that address potential adverse system interactions when opening safety relief valves (SRV) without power. Immediate corrective actions taken by the licensee include changing procedure 31EO-TSG-001-0, Attachment 6, SRV Actuation Without Power to Allow Injection with Portable Pump, to ensure the SRV control circuits are isolated electrically from the direct current (DC) busses prior to installing the
portable DC power supply. This violation has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 2011106008.
Failure to address potential adverse system interactions when developing procedures affecting quality is a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the Procedural Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affects the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of the safety relief valves to reduce reactor pressure in response to a loss of alternating current (AC) and DC power event. Because this finding is associated with B.5.b mitigation strategies, the finding was assessed using MC 0609 Appendix L, B.5.b Significance Determination Process, Table 2. The inspectors performed an initial screening and determined the finding did not meet the criteria listed within Table 2 for greater than Green significance therefore this finding was screened as Green. Because the mitigating strategy was developed and implemented in site procedures in 2007, the performance deficiency occurred outside the past three years and no cross-cutting aspect is assigned. (Section 4OA5.3)
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to address the anticipated environmental conditions when developing procedures to manually operate containment vent valves An NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V. Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified for failure to establish adequate procedures that address the anticipated environmental conditions when operating containment vents without power. Immediate corrective actions taken by the licensee include changing procedure 34AB-R22-003-1/2, Station Blackout, to perform preliminary actions in the torus area before high containment pressure and temperature conditions require venting. This change is intended to allow required torus area entries to be performed prior to reaching high temperature conditions in the area. This violation has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 2011105966 and CR 2011106007.
Failure to address the anticipated environmental conditions when developing procedures affecting quality is a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the Procedural Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affects the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of the containment vent valves to allow reliable pressure control of primary containment in response to a loss of AC and DC power event. This finding was assessed using MC 0609 Appendix L, B.5.b Significance Determination Process, Table 2. The inspectors performed an initial screening and determined the finding did not meet the criteria listed within Table 2 for greater than Green significance therefore this finding was screened as Green. Because the procedure was developed and implemented in 2005, the performance deficiency occurred outside the past three years and no cross-cutting aspect is assigned. (Section 4OA5.3)
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inaccessbile fire hose station in the cable spreading room An NRC-identified NCV of Hatch Unit 1 operating license condition 2.C.(3) and Hatch Unit 2 operating license condition 2.C.(3)(a), Fire Protection, was identified for failure to maintain fire hose station HS-C20 operable while equipment in the area was required to be operable. Hose station HS-C20 was determined to be inaccessible to the fire brigade. Immediate corrective actions taken by the licensee included performing a fire protection alternate compensatory measures evaluation, (as required by Fire Hazards Analysis section 9.2,specification 1.6.1 action a),
which resulted in staging an additional 100 feet of hose at hose station, HS-C21, located just outside of the cable spread room. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 2011100783.
Failure to ensure the accessibility and thus operability of HS-C20 or take required compensatory action in accordance with Fire Hazards Analysis Section 9.2 Appendix B Specification 1.6.1 is a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it adversely affected the protection against external events (fire) attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability and reliability of systems (safety related cable
spreading room cabling) that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This violation was assessed using the Phase 1 screening worksheets of Attachment 4 and Appendix F of IMC 0609. The inspectors performed an initial qualitative screening and determined the inoperability of HS-C20 was a low degradation violation against the fire protection program. The cable spreading room fire area contains full pre-action sprinkler coverage and a manual carbon dioxide flooding system. Additionally, a manual hose station and fire extinguishers are located outside the primary access doors to the cable spreading room. Based on the low degradation of the fire protection program, this violation was screened as Green. The inspectors determined this performance deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution under the Corrective Action Program component because the licensee did not appropriately identify the long standing issue of the inaccessibility of HS-C20 during monthly surveillance testing. (P.1(a)) (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Interaction of non-safety related power system with safety systems during bus transfers An NRC indentified NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified for the failure to properly analyze electrical bus transfers that could adversely affect redundant safety buses. Specifically, the licensee failed to analyze the effects of severe voltage dips on the 4.160 kV safety buses that could occur if a loss of coolant accident occurred coincident with bus transfers that occur during a unit trip. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 2009105775.
The licensees failure to properly analyze the effects of severe voltage dips during bus transfers was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating System Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee failed to properly analyze the effects of voltage dips that could occur following the transfer of the non-safety bus to the transformer supplying power to redundant safety-related buses during LOCA block loading. The finding was assessed for significance in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter 0609, a Phase III analysis was required since this finding represented a potential loss of safety system function for multiple trains which was not addressed by the Phase II pre-solved tables/worksheets. The regional SRA performed a Phase III analysis for the deficiency. Because the failure of the onsite power system (such as including the turbine/generator tripping scheme) would have to occur concurrent with the loading of large ECCS motors onto safety-related buses in response to an accident the event, the period of vulnerability for the trip is was assumed to be a few seconds. Therefore the likelihood of the event results in a risk very much below the threshold for a colored finding. Because this finding is not related to current licensee performance, no cross cutting aspect was identified. (Section 4OA5.2)
Inspection Report# : 2011002 (pdf)
Significance: Feb 24, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Untimely Corrective Action for Installing Appendix R Emergency Lights Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of Hatch Unit 1 License Condition 2.C.3 and Unit 2 License Condition 2.C.3 (a) for the failure to take timely corrective actions to restore emergency lighting to be in compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.J. Specifically, during a 2006 triennial fire protection inspection, a total of ten Unit 1 and Unit 2 indicating instruments, credited for alternative post-fire safe shutdown, were identified in condition reports written in 2006, as not having dedicated emergency lighting units installed to illuminate the instruments. The licensee subsequently closed the 2006 condition reports to design change packages and, at the time of this inspection, had not implemented the modifications to restore compliance. The licensee entered the current non-compliance into their corrective action program as condition report CR 2010115127.
The licensees failure to take timely corrective actions to address non-compliances with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.J, as required by the licensees fire protection program, is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it affects the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and the objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to
initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage). Specifically, the finding affected the ability of operators to shutdown the reactor from outside the control room in the event of a fire. The team evaluated this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Qualitative Screening Approach. The finding affects post-fire safe shutdown and was assigned a low degradation rating because operators had a high likelihood of completing tasks requiring use of the affected indicators using hand-held portable lights. The finding is characterized as Green, a finding of very low safety significance. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Human Performance Area, Resources component, because the licensee failed to ensure that equipment was available and adequate to assure nuclear safety. Specifically, the licensee did not ensure that emergency lighting units were adequate to support post-fire safe shutdown actions (H.2 (d)).
Inspection Report# : 2010009 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : March 02, 2012
Hatch 2 1Q/2012 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Jun 30, 2011 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to promptly identify and take corrective actions to ensure Bussmann fuses identified by the Part 21 notification 2005-37 were removed from use in safety related applications.
A self-revealing NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, was identified for failure to promptly identify and take corrective actions to ensure Bussmann fuses identified by the Part 21 notification 2005-37, were removed from use in safety related applications. Corrective actions taken include replacing the KTN-R 10 amp fuses on the 1B emergency diesel generator with fuses manufactured after 1991, placing a hold on all KWN-R and KTN-R fuses size 30 amps below manufactured between 1987 and 1991, and replacement of these fuses with new KWN-R and KTN-R fuses with a date code 2009 or newer. This violation has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition report (CR) 2010116039.
Failure to promptly identify and take corrective actions to ensure Bussmann fuses identified by the Part 21 notification 2005-37 were removed from use in safety related applications is a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the Equipment Performance attribute and adversely affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, on December 23, 2010, the Hatch 1B emergency diesel generator #3 stop circuitry operability light was discovered not illuminated on panel 1R43-P003B. Without power to this circuitry the 1B emergency diesel generator is inoperable and unavailable to provide its required safety function. The significance of this finding was screened using IMC 0609 Attachment 4, table 4a. The risk significance screening required a Phase 3 analysis, because the finding screened as potentially risk significant due to a seismic initiating event. The regional senior reactor analyst (SRA) performed a Phase 3 analysis for the finding.
The analysis included two parts, the first covering the time period of total inoperability of the fuse; and the second covering the exposure time from when the non qualified fuses were installed until they were replaced, when they were subject to potential seismic failure. Calculations were performed using the NRCs plant specific risk models. The short exposure time for the first analysis, and the low likelihood of a seismic event at the plant for the second analysis, caused the combined result to be a very low risk condition. The finding was determined to be Green in the SDP.
Because the performance deficiency occurred in 2006 and is outside the past three years, no cross-cutting aspect is assigned. (Section 4OA2.2)
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to consider potential adverse system interactions when developing procedure to open SRVs without power An NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified for failure to establish adequate procedures that address potential adverse system interactions when opening safety relief valves (SRV) without power. Immediate corrective actions taken by the licensee include changing procedure 31EO-TSG-001-0, Attachment 6, SRV Actuation Without Power to Allow Injection with Portable Pump, to ensure the SRV control circuits are isolated electrically from the direct current (DC) busses prior to installing the
portable DC power supply. This violation has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 2011106008.
Failure to address potential adverse system interactions when developing procedures affecting quality is a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the Procedural Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affects the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of the safety relief valves to reduce reactor pressure in response to a loss of alternating current (AC) and DC power event. Because this finding is associated with B.5.b mitigation strategies, the finding was assessed using MC 0609 Appendix L, B.5.b Significance Determination Process, Table 2. The inspectors performed an initial screening and determined the finding did not meet the criteria listed within Table 2 for greater than Green significance therefore this finding was screened as Green. Because the mitigating strategy was developed and implemented in site procedures in 2007, the performance deficiency occurred outside the past three years and no cross-cutting aspect is assigned. (Section 4OA5.3)
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2011 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to address the anticipated environmental conditions when developing procedures to manually operate containment vent valves An NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V. Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified for failure to establish adequate procedures that address the anticipated environmental conditions when operating containment vents without power. Immediate corrective actions taken by the licensee include changing procedure 34AB-R22-003-1/2, Station Blackout, to perform preliminary actions in the torus area before high containment pressure and temperature conditions require venting. This change is intended to allow required torus area entries to be performed prior to reaching high temperature conditions in the area. This violation has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 2011105966 and CR 2011106007.
Failure to address the anticipated environmental conditions when developing procedures affecting quality is a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the Procedural Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affects the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of the containment vent valves to allow reliable pressure control of primary containment in response to a loss of AC and DC power event. This finding was assessed using MC 0609 Appendix L, B.5.b Significance Determination Process, Table 2. The inspectors performed an initial screening and determined the finding did not meet the criteria listed within Table 2 for greater than Green significance therefore this finding was screened as Green. Because the procedure was developed and implemented in 2005, the performance deficiency occurred outside the past three years and no cross-cutting aspect is assigned. (Section 4OA5.3)
Inspection Report# : 2011003 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety
Physical Protection Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : May 29, 2012
Hatch 2 2Q/2012 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Jun 30, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate surveillance procedures for evaluating accumulated gas in the HPCI and RCIC systems The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Hatch Nuclear Plant Technical Specification 5.4, Procedures, with five examples for the licensees failure to establish, implement and maintain surveillance procedures for the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) systems. The deficiencies associated with the surveillance procedures precluded adequate evaluation of the as-found condition of those systems against acceptance criteria which serve as a basis for system operability. The licensee entered these five issues into their corrective action program under CRs 440646, 441302, 441333 and 441863. The immediate corrective actions included performing ultrasonic inspection of the surveillance test points which verified the absence of gas pockets.
Interim corrective actions included implementing the performance of ultrasonic inspection of the surveillance test points immediately prior to venting the system in accordance with the surveillance procedure as a means to accurately quantify and evaluate the effects of any gas discovered.
For the five examples identified, the failure to establish, implement and maintain adequate surveillance procedures to identify and evaluate accumulated gas in the HPCI and RCIC systems were performance deficiencies. The performance deficiencies were determined to be more than minor because they affected the procedure quality attribute of mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the performance deficiencies challenged the assurance that procedures used to perform surveillance testing of the HPCI and RCIC systems had adequately identified and evaluated the as-found condition of those systems as a basis for continued system operability. Additionally, if the performance deficiencies were left uncorrected, assurance was challenged that any future voids in the HPCI and RCIC system would be adequately identified and evaluated. The team screened the finding in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 4, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). These performance deficiencies were assigned a cross-cutting aspect in the corrective action component of the problem identification and resolution area because the licensee did not take adequate corrective actions in 2009 when weaknesses were identified with the surveillance procedures (P.1 (d)). (Section 4OA5.3)
Inspection Report# : 2012003 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness
Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : September 12, 2012
3Q/2012 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Hatch 2 3Q/2012 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Sep 30, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to follow transient combustible control requriements within the site's intake structure An NRC identified Green non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 5.4, Procedures, was identified on August 14, 2012, for failure of the licensee to follow transient combustible control requirements within the sites intake structure. Specifically, inspectors discovered unattended transient combustibles within the intake, which is designated by site procedures as a transient combustible free zone. The licensee immediately removed the transient combustible from the intake structure, and entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 500623.
Failure to follow transient combustible control requirements within the sites intake structure on August 14, 2012, was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the Protection Against External Factors (Fire) attribute and adversely affected the Initiating Events cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operations. The performance deficiency is also similar to example 4.k. of IMC 0612 Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues.
Specifically, this issue meets the Not minor if criteria because identified transient combustibles were in a combustible free zone required for separation of redundant trains. Because this finding involved the administrative controls of transient combustibles, the inspectors utilized IMC 0609 Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, to assess the risk. This issue was assigned a low degradation rating in IMC 0609 Appendix F, step 1.2, because the degradation reflected a fire protection element whose performance and reliability was minimally impacted. Specifically the combustible liquids were not open and were contained within their approved containers.
Because the finding was assigned a low degradation rating, this finding screened as Green per step 1.3. This performance deficiency has a cross-cutting aspect in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance area because personnel did not follow procedures for control of transients combustibles at the intake. H.4(b) (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2012004 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 30, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Licensed operator requalification annual operating test administration issues An NRC-identified finding (FIN) was identified for the licensees failure to adhere to licensed operator requalification examination standards during the administration of an annual operating test. Specifically, the licensee failed to adhere to the examination guide to allow adequate time for operating crews to respond to planned events, and the licensee failed to correct the error before finalizing operator evaluation and critique documentation. This affected the licensees Page 1 of 4
3Q/2012 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 ability to effectively test and evaluate operator performance in response to a simulated malfunction in the automatic scram circuitry. As part of their immediate corrective action, the licensee re-evaluated the affected operators and entered the issue into their corrective action program.
This performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
Specifically, the failure to adhere to scenario examination administration standards adversely affected the quality of the operating exams, which test licensed operator performance in order to ensure timely and accurate mitigating actions after an event. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, Licensed Operator Requalification Significance Determination Process, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it occurred in the simulator and was not an actual plant event, and the crew whose scenario was administered with the error was re-evaluated with an alternate scenario prior to resuming on-shift duties. The cause of the finding was related to the cross-cutting aspect of training of personnel and sufficient qualified personnel under the Resources component of the Human Performance cross-cutting aspect, because the scenario guides narrative description of the required malfunction sequencing did not match the listed simulator operator actions in the body of the scenario guide.
H.2(b) (Section 1R11)
Inspection Report# : 2012004 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate surveillance procedures for evaluating accumulated gas in the HPCI and RCIC systems The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Hatch Nuclear Plant Technical Specification 5.4, Procedures, with five examples for the licensees failure to establish, implement and maintain surveillance procedures for the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) systems. The deficiencies associated with the surveillance procedures precluded adequate evaluation of the as-found condition of those systems against acceptance criteria which serve as a basis for system operability. The licensee entered these five issues into their corrective action program under CRs 440646, 441302, 441333 and 441863. The immediate corrective actions included performing ultrasonic inspection of the surveillance test points which verified the absence of gas pockets.
Interim corrective actions included implementing the performance of ultrasonic inspection of the surveillance test points immediately prior to venting the system in accordance with the surveillance procedure as a means to accurately quantify and evaluate the effects of any gas discovered.
For the five examples identified, the failure to establish, implement and maintain adequate surveillance procedures to identify and evaluate accumulated gas in the HPCI and RCIC systems were performance deficiencies. The performance deficiencies were determined to be more than minor because they affected the procedure quality attribute of mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the performance deficiencies challenged the assurance that procedures used to perform surveillance testing of the HPCI and RCIC systems had adequately identified and evaluated the as-found condition of those systems as a basis for continued system operability. Additionally, if the performance deficiencies were left uncorrected, assurance was challenged that any future voids in the HPCI and RCIC system would be adequately identified and evaluated. The team screened the finding in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 4, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). These performance deficiencies were assigned a cross-cutting aspect in the corrective action component of the problem identification and resolution area because the licensee did not take adequate corrective actions in 2009 when weaknesses were identified with the surveillance procedures (P.1 (d)). (Section 4OA5.3)
Page 2 of 4
3Q/2012 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Inspection Report# : 2012003 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Sep 30, 2012 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to establish adequate preventative maintenance for the safety related main control room air conditioning units A self revealing Green NCV (with two examples) of Hatch Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS 5.4, Procedures, was identified for failure to establish and perform preventive maintenance activities to replace the B main control room condensing unit overload in the MS2 motor starter components prior to age related failure of the component. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 195542.
Failure to establish and perform preventive maintenance activities to replace aged B main control room condensing unit overload in the MS2 starter components prior to their failure is a performance deficiency. Specifically, section 5.4 of NMP-ES-006, Predictive Maintenance Implementation and Continuing Equipment Reliability Improvement, requires, in part, that the licensee develop and maintain a documented maintenance strategy with recommended time-based preventive maintenance taking into account OEM/Vendor recommendations and other data affecting component reliability. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it adversely affected the SSC and Barrier Performance attribute of the barrier integrity cornerstone objective to ensure physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors evaluated the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, using table 2 Cornerstones Affected by Degraded Condition or Programmatic Weakness. The finding affected the barriers cornerstone. Further evaluation was required using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Based on Appendix A, Exhibit 3 Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, the finding represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the control room, spent fuel pool, or SBGT system and therefore screened as Green. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Operating Experience component of the Problem Identification and Resolution area because the licensee did not implement operating experience through changes to station procedures when prior age related failures were identified at the site. P.2(b) (Section 1R12)
Inspection Report# : 2012004 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2012 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to follow clearance procedures for returning the A main control room air conditioning unit to service following maintenance A self-revealing Green NCV of Hatch Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specification 5.4. Procedures, was identified on June 21, 2012, when the C main control room air conditioning unit tripped due to loss of power when the licensee operated an electrical breaker outside of procedural guidance. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 473701.
Failure to restore the A main control room air conditioner tagout clearance in accordance with the tag removal list on June 21, 2012, was a performance deficiency. Specifically, tagout 1-DT-1Z41-00168(004) required the normal supply breaker for 1R24S029 to be maintained open but the breaker was improperly positioned closed instead. This Page 3 of 4
3Q/2012 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it adversely affected the Human Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclides caused by accidents or events. The inspectors evaluated the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, , Initial Characterization of Findings, using Table 2 Cornerstones Affected by Degradation Condition or Programmatic Weakness. The inspectors determined that the finding affected the barriers cornerstone. Further evaluation was required using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Based on Appendix A, Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, the finding represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the control room and therefore screened as Green. The inspectors determined this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance Area because the licensee did not communicate the human error prevention technique of holding an adequate pre-job brief for the restoration of the electrical portion of the tagout. H.4(a) (4OA2.2)
Inspection Report# : 2012004 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : November 30, 2012 Page 4 of 4
4Q/2012 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Hatch 2 4Q/2012 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Sep 30, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to follow transient combustible control requriements within the site's intake structure An NRC identified Green non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 5.4, Procedures, was identified on August 14, 2012, for failure of the licensee to follow transient combustible control requirements within the sites intake structure. Specifically, inspectors discovered unattended transient combustibles within the intake, which is designated by site procedures as a transient combustible free zone. The licensee immediately removed the transient combustible from the intake structure, and entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 500623.
Failure to follow transient combustible control requirements within the sites intake structure on August 14, 2012, was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the Protection Against External Factors (Fire) attribute and adversely affected the Initiating Events cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operations. The performance deficiency is also similar to example 4.k. of IMC 0612 Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues.
Specifically, this issue meets the Not minor if criteria because identified transient combustibles were in a combustible free zone required for separation of redundant trains. Because this finding involved the administrative controls of transient combustibles, the inspectors utilized IMC 0609 Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, to assess the risk. This issue was assigned a low degradation rating in IMC 0609 Appendix F, step 1.2, because the degradation reflected a fire protection element whose performance and reliability was minimally impacted. Specifically the combustible liquids were not open and were contained within their approved containers.
Because the finding was assigned a low degradation rating, this finding screened as Green per step 1.3. This performance deficiency has a cross-cutting aspect in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance area because personnel did not follow procedures for control of transients combustibles at the intake. H.4(b) (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2012004 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Dec 31, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Low voltage safety-related cables subjected to water submersion The NRC identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, on October 16, 2012, when the licensee failed to maintain safety-related cables in an environment for which they were designed. Specifically, safety-related cables are not designed for continuous submersion in water. The inspectors determined that a diesel fuel oil storage tank level transmitter cable and the emergency diesel generator 2A fuel oil pump 2A2 power cable were exposed to continuous submersion in water. The licensee removed the accumulated water from the pull box and initiated condition report (CR) 534897 to enter this condition into the corrective action program for resolution.
Failure to maintain safety-related cables in an environment for which they were designed does not meet the 10 CFR Page 1 of 8
4Q/2012 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control requirement. The licensee should have identified this violation when addressing Generic Letter 2007-01 and therefore, this failure is a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated September 7, 2012, because it is associated with the Equipment Performance attribute and adversely affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
Specifically, subjecting a diesel fuel oil storage tank level transmitter cable and the 2A emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump cable to continuous submersion could degrade the cable and result in failure. In accordance with IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because questions 1 through 4 of Section A, Mitigating SSCs and Functionality, were answered no. The inspectors determined that the finding does not have a cross-cutting aspect because the cause of the finding was directly related to the licensees Generic Letter 2007-01 review.
This review occurred more than 3 years ago; therefore, the performance deficiency is not indicative of present licensee performance. (Section 1R06)
Inspection Report# : 2012005 (pdf)
Significance: Nov 30, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Low voltage safety-related cables subjected to water submersion The NRC identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, on October 16, 2012, when the licensee failed to maintain safety-related cables in an environment for which they were designed. Specifically, safety-related cables are not designed for continuous submersion in water. The inspectors determined that a diesel fuel oil storage tank level transmitter cable and the emergency diesel generator 2A fuel oil pump 2A2 power cable were exposed to continuous submersion in water. The licensee removed the accumulated water from the pull box and initiated condition report (CR) 534897 to enter this condition into the corrective action program for resolution.
Failure to maintain safety-related cables in an environment for which they were designed does not meet the 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control requirement. The licensee should have identified this violation when addressing Generic Letter 2007-01 and therefore, this failure is a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated September 7, 2012, because it is associated with the Equipment Performance attribute and adversely affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
Specifically, subjecting a diesel fuel oil storage tank level transmitter cable and the 2A emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump cable to continuous submersion could degrade the cable and result in failure. In accordance with IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because questions 1 through 4 of Section A, Mitigating SSCs and Functionality, were answered no. The inspectors determined that the finding does not have a cross-cutting aspect because the cause of the finding was directly related to the licensees Generic Letter 2007-01 review.
This review occurred more than 3 years ago; therefore, the performance deficiency is not indicative of present licensee performance. (Section 1R06)
Inspection Report# : 2012502 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Licensed operator requalification annual operating test administration issues An NRC-identified finding (FIN) was identified for the licensees failure to adhere to licensed operator requalification examination standards during the administration of an annual operating test. Specifically, the licensee failed to adhere to the examination guide to allow adequate time for operating crews to respond to planned events, and the licensee failed to correct the error before finalizing operator evaluation and critique documentation. This affected the licensees ability to effectively test and evaluate operator performance in response to a simulated malfunction in the automatic scram circuitry. As part of their immediate corrective action, the licensee re-evaluated the affected operators and Page 2 of 8
4Q/2012 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 entered the issue into their corrective action program.
This performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
Specifically, the failure to adhere to scenario examination administration standards adversely affected the quality of the operating exams, which test licensed operator performance in order to ensure timely and accurate mitigating actions after an event. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, Licensed Operator Requalification Significance Determination Process, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it occurred in the simulator and was not an actual plant event, and the crew whose scenario was administered with the error was re-evaluated with an alternate scenario prior to resuming on-shift duties. The cause of the finding was related to the cross-cutting aspect of training of personnel and sufficient qualified personnel under the Resources component of the Human Performance cross-cutting aspect, because the scenario guides narrative description of the required malfunction sequencing did not match the listed simulator operator actions in the body of the scenario guide.
H.2(b) (Section 1R11)
Inspection Report# : 2012004 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 06, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Account for Potential Pump Discharge Check Valve Back-leakage Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to verify or check the adequacy of design of the plant service water system including the pump discharge check valves allowable backleakage. As a result, the licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program as condition report 481741, performed an immediate determination of operability, and placed administrative control over the river level at which the pumps are declared inoperable to a level higher than the one specified in the plants technical specifications until more detailed analyses could be performed. The limit was reduced back to the original technical specification level following the results of the analysis.
The failure to verify the adequacy of the plant service water system design through calculational methods or through a suitable test program as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of design control and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the reliability, availability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee did not implement a suitable test program to verify design inputs and ensure the capability of the system. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Att. 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, for mitigating systems and Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a design control deficiency issue that did not result in a loss of operability or functionality of the PSW system. The performance deficiency was indicative of current licensee performance since the system hydraulic model was verified in 2011, and was directly related to the complete documentation and labeling cross-cutting aspect of the resources component in the area of human performance because the licensee did not have accurate design documentation for the potential pump discharge check valve leakage that could cause reverse rotation of the pumps H.2(c).
Inspection Report# : 2012008 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 06, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Ensure Adequacy of Intake Structure Ventilation Design Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, in that the licensee failed to verify or check the adequacy of the design of the intake structure ventilation support function for the plant service water and residual heat removal service water systems. Following the teams discovery, the licensee Page 3 of 8
4Q/2012 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 performed a bounding analysis and verified that the safety related components in the intake structure would not fail under the worst case high temperature conditions. The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program as condition report 477809 to address the issue.
The failure to verify the adequacy of intake structure ventilation design through calculational methods or through a suitable test program as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of design control and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the reliability, availability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
Specifically, the licensee did not have adequate measures in place to ensure negative effects due to heat loading did not affect the reliability, availability, and capability of intake structure equipment. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Att. 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, for mitigating systems and Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a design control deficiency issue that did not result in a loss of operability or functionality of the plant service water and residual heat removal service water systems. During the inspection, it was determined that there was adequate margin to preclude component failures when conservative heat loading and single failure criteria were assumed. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the failure to provide an adequate calculation or test is not indicative of current licensee performance due to the age of the heat load analysis.
Inspection Report# : 2012008 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 06, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Incorporate Appropriate Test Acceptance Criteria to Assure Satisfactory Steady State EDG Performance Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, for the licensees failure to incorporate adequate acceptance limits in surveillance test procedures used to verify acceptable steady state output voltage of the emergency diesel generators. The licensee performed an immediate determination of operability to verify that the emergency diesel generators would reach and maintain a steady state voltage greater than the minimum 3,860 volts determined by the calculation and issued interim administrative limits for acceptable output voltage until technical specifications can be revised. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as condition report 482310 to address the issue.
The licensees failure to include the correct minimum steady state output voltage as surveillance test acceptance criteria for the emergency diesel generators was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the finding challenged the assurance that the acceptance criteria used during surveillance testing would ensure the emergency diesel generators could perform their intended safety function and remain operable. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, the team used the mitigating systems column, which resulted in screening the finding through Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design deficiency resulting in the loss of functionality or operability, did not represent an actual loss of system safety function, did not result in exceeding a technical specification allowed outage time, and did not affect external event mitigation. A cross-cutting aspect was not identified because this issue has existed since the implementation of Improved Technical Specifications on March 3, 1995, and is not indicative of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2012008 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 06, 2012 Identified By: NRC Page 4 of 8
4Q/2012 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Provide Appropriate Acceptance Criteria for EDG Air-Start System Check Valves Green. The team identified a finding for the licensees failure to follow Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.155, Station Blackout, guidance for testing and test control for the emergency diesel generator (EDG) air start system check valves. The testing deficiency was entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition reports 490288 and 490210.
The failure to implement the guidance in RG 1.155, to which the licensee was committed in the stations Final Safety Analysis Report, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of ensuring the capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the capability of the EDGs to start following a station blackout coping period was not ensured by the licensees test acceptance criteria for the air start check valves. The team used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Att. 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, for mitigating systems and Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, and determined a detailed risk evaluation was required, because the finding represented an actual loss of function of a non-Technical Specification train of equipment designated as high safety significant in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program for greater than twenty-four hours. A regional senior reactor analyst performed an analysis to determine the risk associated with the finding. An actual loss of EDG function following a station blackout would require all of the Unit 1 EDGs to fail to start, because if any Unit 1 EDG ran and was connected to either emergency bus, even for a relatively short time, an air compressor would partially or fully recharge the 1A EDGs air start tank. The calculation showed that the portion of plant risk that came from common cause fail to start of the Unit 1 EDGs, and of the sites EDGs was less than the threshold for greater than green for conditional core damage frequency or large early release frequency in the SDP. Therefore, the finding is Green. There was no cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because the performance deficiency is not indicative of current licensee performance due to the age of the established test acceptance criteria for the check valve leakage.
Inspection Report# : 2012008 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate surveillance procedures for evaluating accumulated gas in the HPCI and RCIC systems The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Hatch Nuclear Plant Technical Specification 5.4, Procedures, with five examples for the licensees failure to establish, implement and maintain surveillance procedures for the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) systems. The deficiencies associated with the surveillance procedures precluded adequate evaluation of the as-found condition of those systems against acceptance criteria which serve as a basis for system operability. The licensee entered these five issues into their corrective action program under CRs 440646, 441302, 441333 and 441863. The immediate corrective actions included performing ultrasonic inspection of the surveillance test points which verified the absence of gas pockets.
Interim corrective actions included implementing the performance of ultrasonic inspection of the surveillance test points immediately prior to venting the system in accordance with the surveillance procedure as a means to accurately quantify and evaluate the effects of any gas discovered.
For the five examples identified, the failure to establish, implement and maintain adequate surveillance procedures to identify and evaluate accumulated gas in the HPCI and RCIC systems were performance deficiencies. The performance deficiencies were determined to be more than minor because they affected the procedure quality attribute of mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the performance deficiencies challenged the assurance that procedures used to perform surveillance testing of the HPCI and RCIC systems had adequately identified and evaluated the as-found condition of those systems as a basis for continued system operability. Additionally, if the performance deficiencies were left uncorrected, assurance was challenged that any future voids in the HPCI and RCIC system would be adequately identified and evaluated. The team screened the finding in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 4, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). These performance deficiencies were assigned a cross-cutting aspect in the corrective action Page 5 of 8
4Q/2012 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 component of the problem identification and resolution area because the licensee did not take adequate corrective actions in 2009 when weaknesses were identified with the surveillance procedures (P.1 (d)). (Section 4OA5.3)
Inspection Report# : 2012003 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Sep 30, 2012 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to establish adequate preventative maintenance for the safety related main control room air conditioning units A self revealing Green NCV (with two examples) of Hatch Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS 5.4, Procedures, was identified for failure to establish and perform preventive maintenance activities to replace the B main control room condensing unit overload in the MS2 motor starter components prior to age related failure of the component. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 195542.
Failure to establish and perform preventive maintenance activities to replace aged B main control room condensing unit overload in the MS2 starter components prior to their failure is a performance deficiency. Specifically, section 5.4 of NMP-ES-006, Predictive Maintenance Implementation and Continuing Equipment Reliability Improvement, requires, in part, that the licensee develop and maintain a documented maintenance strategy with recommended time-based preventive maintenance taking into account OEM/Vendor recommendations and other data affecting component reliability. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it adversely affected the SSC and Barrier Performance attribute of the barrier integrity cornerstone objective to ensure physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors evaluated the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, using table 2 Cornerstones Affected by Degraded Condition or Programmatic Weakness. The finding affected the barriers cornerstone. Further evaluation was required using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Based on Appendix A, Exhibit 3 Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, the finding represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the control room, spent fuel pool, or SBGT system and therefore screened as Green. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Operating Experience component of the Problem Identification and Resolution area because the licensee did not implement operating experience through changes to station procedures when prior age related failures were identified at the site. P.2(b) (Section 1R12)
Inspection Report# : 2012004 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2012 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to follow clearance procedures for returning the A main control room air conditioning unit to service following maintenance A self-revealing Green NCV of Hatch Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specification 5.4. Procedures, was identified on June 21, 2012, when the C main control room air conditioning unit tripped due to loss of power when the licensee operated an electrical breaker outside of procedural guidance. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 473701.
Failure to restore the A main control room air conditioner tagout clearance in accordance with the tag removal list on June 21, 2012, was a performance deficiency. Specifically, tagout 1-DT-1Z41-00168(004) required the normal supply breaker for 1R24S029 to be maintained open but the breaker was improperly positioned closed instead. This performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it adversely affected the Human Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclides caused by accidents or events. The inspectors evaluated the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Page 6 of 8
4Q/2012 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 , Initial Characterization of Findings, using Table 2 Cornerstones Affected by Degradation Condition or Programmatic Weakness. The inspectors determined that the finding affected the barriers cornerstone. Further evaluation was required using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Based on Appendix A, Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, the finding represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the control room and therefore screened as Green. The inspectors determined this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance Area because the licensee did not communicate the human error prevention technique of holding an adequate pre-job brief for the restoration of the electrical portion of the tagout. H.4(a) (4OA2.2)
Inspection Report# : 2012004 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Significance: Nov 30, 2012 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Installation of a transformer for the TSC cooling coil and condensing unit control circuit not adequately designed to provide full system load A self-revealing NCV of 10 CFR Part 50.54(q)(2), was identified when the licensee failed to maintain an adequate on-site Technical Support Center (TSC) to support emergency response. The violation existed from November 10 to December 22, 2011, when the TSC ventilation system was returned to service following a modification which replaced the TSC air conditioning cooling coils and condensing unit. During the modification, the control circuit transformer for the new cooling coil and condensing unit was not adequately sized to provide full system load. This resulted in a loss of the TSC air conditioning climate control system on December 21, 2011, when the undersized transformer tripped on thermal overload. The licensee replaced the undersized transformer with a properly sized transformer and entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 386124.
The licensees installation of a transformer for the TSC cooling coil and condensing unit control circuit that was not adequately designed to provide full system load was a performance deficiency. On December 21, 2011, this failure directly led to the licensee failing to meet 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8) which requires, in part, that adequate emergency facilities to support the emergency response are provided and maintained. The licensee failed to identify the undersized transformer design deficiency during both their modification documentation reviews and post modification testing. The performance deficiency was more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated September 7, 2012, because it is associated with the Facilities and Equipment attribute and adversely affected the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone objective of ensuring the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Specifically, with the cooling coil and condensing unit control circuit transformer in a tripped condition the TSC is non-functional per the sites Technical Requirements Manual. This finding was evaluated in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix B, Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process, dated February 24, 2012. Utilizing Attachment 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix B, the inspectors determined the finding is associated with planning standard function 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8) Emergency Facilities and Equipment, which is not a risk-significant planning standard. Therefore the first two blocks (Loss of Risk Significant Planning Standard and Risk Significant Planning Standard Degraded Function) were answered, no. The inspectors determined there was not a loss of the (b)
(8) planning standard function, because the transformer was able to be reset, restoring air conditioning to the TSC, and key emergency response members would have been able to perform their assigned emergency plan function.
Therefore per the flowchart this violation screened as Green. The finding has a cross cutting aspect in the resource component of the human performance area because DCP SNC330548, Remove/Replace Cooling Coil and Condensing Unit serving TSC (1X75-B001 and 1X75-B002), did not ensure the transformer for the cooling coil and condensing unit control circuit was designed to supply full control circuit load under high load demand. [H.2.(c)]
(Section 4OA5.4)
Inspection Report# : 2012502 (pdf)
Page 7 of 8
4Q/2012 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : February 28, 2013 Page 8 of 8
1Q/2013 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Hatch 2 1Q/2013 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Sep 30, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to follow transient combustible control requriements within the site's intake structure An NRC identified Green non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 5.4, Procedures, was identified on August 14, 2012, for failure of the licensee to follow transient combustible control requirements within the sites intake structure. Specifically, inspectors discovered unattended transient combustibles within the intake, which is designated by site procedures as a transient combustible free zone. The licensee immediately removed the transient combustible from the intake structure, and entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 500623.
Failure to follow transient combustible control requirements within the sites intake structure on August 14, 2012, was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the Protection Against External Factors (Fire) attribute and adversely affected the Initiating Events cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operations. The performance deficiency is also similar to example 4.k. of IMC 0612 Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues.
Specifically, this issue meets the Not minor if criteria because identified transient combustibles were in a combustible free zone required for separation of redundant trains. Because this finding involved the administrative controls of transient combustibles, the inspectors utilized IMC 0609 Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, to assess the risk. This issue was assigned a low degradation rating in IMC 0609 Appendix F, step 1.2, because the degradation reflected a fire protection element whose performance and reliability was minimally impacted. Specifically the combustible liquids were not open and were contained within their approved containers.
Because the finding was assigned a low degradation rating, this finding screened as Green per step 1.3. This performance deficiency has a cross-cutting aspect in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance area because personnel did not follow procedures for control of transients combustibles at the intake. H.4(b) (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2012004 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 31, 2013 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to perform appropriate post maintenance test on 2A EDG Green. A self-revealing Green NCV of Hatch Unit 2 Technical Specification 5.4. Procedures, was identified on March 9, 2013, when the licensee failed to perform post maintenance activities appropriate to the circumstances to verify 2A emergency diesel generator (EDG) lube oil heat exchanger integrity at normal plant service water operating pressure prior to declaring the 2A EDG operable. This violation has been entered into the licensees Page 1 of 9
1Q/2013 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 corrective action program as condition report (CR) 603356. The licensee replaced the gasket on the lube oil heat exchanger waterbox flange and on March 10, 2013, 2A EDG was returned to operable status.
Failure to perform post maintenance activities appropriate to the circumstances to verify 2A EDG lube oil heat exchanger integrity at normal service water operating pressure prior to declaring the 2A EDG operable was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it adversely affected the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the 2A EDG was rendered unavailable after leakage developed at plant service water pressure. The inspectors evaluated the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, June 19, 2012, using Table 2, Cornerstones Affected by Degradation Condition or Programmatic Weakness. The finding affected the mitigating systems cornerstone and required further evaluation using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, June 19, 2012. Based on Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, Section A, Mitigating SSCs and Functionality, all four questions were answered no and thus this finding screened as Green. The inspectors determined this finding had a cross cutting aspect in the human performance area associated with resources - training and sufficiently qualified personnel because senior reactor operators did not ensure that the post maintenance test conditions were at maximum system operating pressure as required by procedure. H.2(b)
Inspection Report# : 2013002 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Low voltage safety-related cables subjected to water submersion The NRC identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, on October 16, 2012, when the licensee failed to maintain safety-related cables in an environment for which they were designed. Specifically, safety-related cables are not designed for continuous submersion in water. The inspectors determined that a diesel fuel oil storage tank level transmitter cable and the emergency diesel generator 2A fuel oil pump 2A2 power cable were exposed to continuous submersion in water. The licensee removed the accumulated water from the pull box and initiated condition report (CR) 534897 to enter this condition into the corrective action program for resolution.
Failure to maintain safety-related cables in an environment for which they were designed does not meet the 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control requirement. The licensee should have identified this violation when addressing Generic Letter 2007-01 and therefore, this failure is a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated September 7, 2012, because it is associated with the Equipment Performance attribute and adversely affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
Specifically, subjecting a diesel fuel oil storage tank level transmitter cable and the 2A emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump cable to continuous submersion could degrade the cable and result in failure. In accordance with IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because questions 1 through 4 of Section A, Mitigating SSCs and Functionality, were answered no. The inspectors determined that the finding does not have a cross-cutting aspect because the cause of the finding was directly related to the licensees Generic Letter 2007-01 review.
This review occurred more than 3 years ago; therefore, the performance deficiency is not indicative of present licensee performance. (Section 1R06)
Inspection Report# : 2012005 (pdf)
Significance: Nov 30, 2012 Page 2 of 9
1Q/2013 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Low voltage safety-related cables subjected to water submersion The NRC identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, on October 16, 2012, when the licensee failed to maintain safety-related cables in an environment for which they were designed. Specifically, safety-related cables are not designed for continuous submersion in water. The inspectors determined that a diesel fuel oil storage tank level transmitter cable and the emergency diesel generator 2A fuel oil pump 2A2 power cable were exposed to continuous submersion in water. The licensee removed the accumulated water from the pull box and initiated condition report (CR) 534897 to enter this condition into the corrective action program for resolution.
Failure to maintain safety-related cables in an environment for which they were designed does not meet the 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control requirement. The licensee should have identified this violation when addressing Generic Letter 2007-01 and therefore, this failure is a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated September 7, 2012, because it is associated with the Equipment Performance attribute and adversely affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
Specifically, subjecting a diesel fuel oil storage tank level transmitter cable and the 2A emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump cable to continuous submersion could degrade the cable and result in failure. In accordance with IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because questions 1 through 4 of Section A, Mitigating SSCs and Functionality, were answered no. The inspectors determined that the finding does not have a cross-cutting aspect because the cause of the finding was directly related to the licensees Generic Letter 2007-01 review.
This review occurred more than 3 years ago; therefore, the performance deficiency is not indicative of present licensee performance. (Section 1R06)
Inspection Report# : 2012502 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Licensed operator requalification annual operating test administration issues An NRC-identified finding (FIN) was identified for the licensees failure to adhere to licensed operator requalification examination standards during the administration of an annual operating test. Specifically, the licensee failed to adhere to the examination guide to allow adequate time for operating crews to respond to planned events, and the licensee failed to correct the error before finalizing operator evaluation and critique documentation. This affected the licensees ability to effectively test and evaluate operator performance in response to a simulated malfunction in the automatic scram circuitry. As part of their immediate corrective action, the licensee re-evaluated the affected operators and entered the issue into their corrective action program.
This performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
Specifically, the failure to adhere to scenario examination administration standards adversely affected the quality of the operating exams, which test licensed operator performance in order to ensure timely and accurate mitigating actions after an event. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, Licensed Operator Requalification Significance Determination Process, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it occurred in the simulator and was not an actual plant event, and the crew whose scenario was administered with the error was re-evaluated with an alternate scenario prior to resuming on-shift duties. The cause of the finding was related to the cross-cutting aspect of training of personnel and sufficient qualified personnel under the Resources Page 3 of 9
1Q/2013 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 component of the Human Performance cross-cutting aspect, because the scenario guides narrative description of the required malfunction sequencing did not match the listed simulator operator actions in the body of the scenario guide.
H.2(b) (Section 1R11)
Inspection Report# : 2012004 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 06, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Account for Potential Pump Discharge Check Valve Back-leakage Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to verify or check the adequacy of design of the plant service water system including the pump discharge check valves allowable backleakage. As a result, the licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program as condition report 481741, performed an immediate determination of operability, and placed administrative control over the river level at which the pumps are declared inoperable to a level higher than the one specified in the plants technical specifications until more detailed analyses could be performed. The limit was reduced back to the original technical specification level following the results of the analysis.
The failure to verify the adequacy of the plant service water system design through calculational methods or through a suitable test program as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of design control and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the reliability, availability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee did not implement a suitable test program to verify design inputs and ensure the capability of the system. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Att. 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, for mitigating systems and Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a design control deficiency issue that did not result in a loss of operability or functionality of the PSW system. The performance deficiency was indicative of current licensee performance since the system hydraulic model was verified in 2011, and was directly related to the complete documentation and labeling cross-cutting aspect of the resources component in the area of human performance because the licensee did not have accurate design documentation for the potential pump discharge check valve leakage that could cause reverse rotation of the pumps H.2(c).
Inspection Report# : 2012008 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 06, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Ensure Adequacy of Intake Structure Ventilation Design Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, in that the licensee failed to verify or check the adequacy of the design of the intake structure ventilation support function for the plant service water and residual heat removal service water systems. Following the teams discovery, the licensee performed a bounding analysis and verified that the safety related components in the intake structure would not fail under the worst case high temperature conditions. The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program as condition report 477809 to address the issue.
The failure to verify the adequacy of intake structure ventilation design through calculational methods or through a suitable test program as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of Page 4 of 9
1Q/2013 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 design control and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the reliability, availability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
Specifically, the licensee did not have adequate measures in place to ensure negative effects due to heat loading did not affect the reliability, availability, and capability of intake structure equipment. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Att. 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, for mitigating systems and Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a design control deficiency issue that did not result in a loss of operability or functionality of the plant service water and residual heat removal service water systems. During the inspection, it was determined that there was adequate margin to preclude component failures when conservative heat loading and single failure criteria were assumed. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the failure to provide an adequate calculation or test is not indicative of current licensee performance due to the age of the heat load analysis.
Inspection Report# : 2012008 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 06, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Incorporate Appropriate Test Acceptance Criteria to Assure Satisfactory Steady State EDG Performance Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, for the licensees failure to incorporate adequate acceptance limits in surveillance test procedures used to verify acceptable steady state output voltage of the emergency diesel generators. The licensee performed an immediate determination of operability to verify that the emergency diesel generators would reach and maintain a steady state voltage greater than the minimum 3,860 volts determined by the calculation and issued interim administrative limits for acceptable output voltage until technical specifications can be revised. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as condition report 482310 to address the issue.
The licensees failure to include the correct minimum steady state output voltage as surveillance test acceptance criteria for the emergency diesel generators was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the finding challenged the assurance that the acceptance criteria used during surveillance testing would ensure the emergency diesel generators could perform their intended safety function and remain operable. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, the team used the mitigating systems column, which resulted in screening the finding through Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design deficiency resulting in the loss of functionality or operability, did not represent an actual loss of system safety function, did not result in exceeding a technical specification allowed outage time, and did not affect external event mitigation. A cross-cutting aspect was not identified because this issue has existed since the implementation of Improved Technical Specifications on March 3, 1995, and is not indicative of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2012008 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 06, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Provide Appropriate Acceptance Criteria for EDG Air-Start System Check Valves Page 5 of 9
1Q/2013 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Green. The team identified a finding for the licensees failure to follow Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.155, Station Blackout, guidance for testing and test control for the emergency diesel generator (EDG) air start system check valves. The testing deficiency was entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition reports 490288 and 490210.
The failure to implement the guidance in RG 1.155, to which the licensee was committed in the stations Final Safety Analysis Report, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of ensuring the capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the capability of the EDGs to start following a station blackout coping period was not ensured by the licensees test acceptance criteria for the air start check valves. The team used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Att. 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, for mitigating systems and Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, and determined a detailed risk evaluation was required, because the finding represented an actual loss of function of a non-Technical Specification train of equipment designated as high safety significant in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program for greater than twenty-four hours. A regional senior reactor analyst performed an analysis to determine the risk associated with the finding. An actual loss of EDG function following a station blackout would require all of the Unit 1 EDGs to fail to start, because if any Unit 1 EDG ran and was connected to either emergency bus, even for a relatively short time, an air compressor would partially or fully recharge the 1A EDGs air start tank. The calculation showed that the portion of plant risk that came from common cause fail to start of the Unit 1 EDGs, and of the sites EDGs was less than the threshold for greater than green for conditional core damage frequency or large early release frequency in the SDP. Therefore, the finding is Green. There was no cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because the performance deficiency is not indicative of current licensee performance due to the age of the established test acceptance criteria for the check valve leakage.
Inspection Report# : 2012008 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate surveillance procedures for evaluating accumulated gas in the HPCI and RCIC systems The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Hatch Nuclear Plant Technical Specification 5.4, Procedures, with five examples for the licensees failure to establish, implement and maintain surveillance procedures for the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) systems. The deficiencies associated with the surveillance procedures precluded adequate evaluation of the as-found condition of those systems against acceptance criteria which serve as a basis for system operability. The licensee entered these five issues into their corrective action program under CRs 440646, 441302, 441333 and 441863. The immediate corrective actions included performing ultrasonic inspection of the surveillance test points which verified the absence of gas pockets.
Interim corrective actions included implementing the performance of ultrasonic inspection of the surveillance test points immediately prior to venting the system in accordance with the surveillance procedure as a means to accurately quantify and evaluate the effects of any gas discovered.
For the five examples identified, the failure to establish, implement and maintain adequate surveillance procedures to identify and evaluate accumulated gas in the HPCI and RCIC systems were performance deficiencies. The performance deficiencies were determined to be more than minor because they affected the procedure quality attribute of mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the performance deficiencies challenged the assurance that procedures used to perform surveillance testing of the HPCI and RCIC systems had adequately identified and evaluated the as-found condition of those systems as a basis for continued system operability. Additionally, if the performance deficiencies were left uncorrected, assurance was challenged that any future voids in the HPCI and RCIC system would be adequately identified and evaluated. The team screened the Page 6 of 9
1Q/2013 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 finding in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 4, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). These performance deficiencies were assigned a cross-cutting aspect in the corrective action component of the problem identification and resolution area because the licensee did not take adequate corrective actions in 2009 when weaknesses were identified with the surveillance procedures (P.1 (d)). (Section 4OA5.3)
Inspection Report# : 2012003 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Sep 30, 2012 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to establish adequate preventative maintenance for the safety related main control room air conditioning units A self revealing Green NCV (with two examples) of Hatch Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS 5.4, Procedures, was identified for failure to establish and perform preventive maintenance activities to replace the B main control room condensing unit overload in the MS2 motor starter components prior to age related failure of the component. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 195542.
Failure to establish and perform preventive maintenance activities to replace aged B main control room condensing unit overload in the MS2 starter components prior to their failure is a performance deficiency. Specifically, section 5.4 of NMP-ES-006, Predictive Maintenance Implementation and Continuing Equipment Reliability Improvement, requires, in part, that the licensee develop and maintain a documented maintenance strategy with recommended time-based preventive maintenance taking into account OEM/Vendor recommendations and other data affecting component reliability. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it adversely affected the SSC and Barrier Performance attribute of the barrier integrity cornerstone objective to ensure physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors evaluated the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, using table 2 Cornerstones Affected by Degraded Condition or Programmatic Weakness. The finding affected the barriers cornerstone. Further evaluation was required using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Based on Appendix A, Exhibit 3 Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, the finding represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the control room, spent fuel pool, or SBGT system and therefore screened as Green. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Operating Experience component of the Problem Identification and Resolution area because the licensee did not implement operating experience through changes to station procedures when prior age related failures were identified at the site. P.2(b) (Section 1R12)
Inspection Report# : 2012004 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2012 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to follow clearance procedures for returning the A main control room air conditioning unit to service following maintenance A self-revealing Green NCV of Hatch Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specification 5.4. Procedures, was identified on June 21, 2012, when the C main control room air conditioning unit tripped due to loss of power when the licensee Page 7 of 9
1Q/2013 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 operated an electrical breaker outside of procedural guidance. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 473701.
Failure to restore the A main control room air conditioner tagout clearance in accordance with the tag removal list on June 21, 2012, was a performance deficiency. Specifically, tagout 1-DT-1Z41-00168(004) required the normal supply breaker for 1R24S029 to be maintained open but the breaker was improperly positioned closed instead. This performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it adversely affected the Human Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclides caused by accidents or events. The inspectors evaluated the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, , Initial Characterization of Findings, using Table 2 Cornerstones Affected by Degradation Condition or Programmatic Weakness. The inspectors determined that the finding affected the barriers cornerstone. Further evaluation was required using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Based on Appendix A, Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, the finding represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the control room and therefore screened as Green. The inspectors determined this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance Area because the licensee did not communicate the human error prevention technique of holding an adequate pre-job brief for the restoration of the electrical portion of the tagout. H.4(a) (4OA2.2)
Inspection Report# : 2012004 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Significance: Nov 30, 2012 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Installation of a transformer for the TSC cooling coil and condensing unit control circuit not adequately designed to provide full system load A self-revealing NCV of 10 CFR Part 50.54(q)(2), was identified when the licensee failed to maintain an adequate on-site Technical Support Center (TSC) to support emergency response. The violation existed from November 10 to December 22, 2011, when the TSC ventilation system was returned to service following a modification which replaced the TSC air conditioning cooling coils and condensing unit. During the modification, the control circuit transformer for the new cooling coil and condensing unit was not adequately sized to provide full system load. This resulted in a loss of the TSC air conditioning climate control system on December 21, 2011, when the undersized transformer tripped on thermal overload. The licensee replaced the undersized transformer with a properly sized transformer and entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 386124.
The licensees installation of a transformer for the TSC cooling coil and condensing unit control circuit that was not adequately designed to provide full system load was a performance deficiency. On December 21, 2011, this failure directly led to the licensee failing to meet 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8) which requires, in part, that adequate emergency facilities to support the emergency response are provided and maintained. The licensee failed to identify the undersized transformer design deficiency during both their modification documentation reviews and post modification testing. The performance deficiency was more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated September 7, 2012, because it is associated with the Facilities and Equipment attribute and adversely affected the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone objective of ensuring the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Specifically, with the cooling coil and condensing unit control circuit transformer in a tripped condition the TSC is non-functional per the sites Technical Requirements Manual. This finding was evaluated in accordance Page 8 of 9
1Q/2013 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 with IMC 0609, Appendix B, Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process, dated February 24, 2012. Utilizing Attachment 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix B, the inspectors determined the finding is associated with planning standard function 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8) Emergency Facilities and Equipment, which is not a risk-significant planning standard. Therefore the first two blocks (Loss of Risk Significant Planning Standard and Risk Significant Planning Standard Degraded Function) were answered, no. The inspectors determined there was not a loss of the (b)
(8) planning standard function, because the transformer was able to be reset, restoring air conditioning to the TSC, and key emergency response members would have been able to perform their assigned emergency plan function.
Therefore per the flowchart this violation screened as Green. The finding has a cross cutting aspect in the resource component of the human performance area because DCP SNC330548, Remove/Replace Cooling Coil and Condensing Unit serving TSC (1X75-B001 and 1X75-B002), did not ensure the transformer for the cooling coil and condensing unit control circuit was designed to supply full control circuit load under high load demand. [H.2.(c)]
(Section 4OA5.4)
Inspection Report# : 2012502 (pdf)
Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : June 04, 2013 Page 9 of 9
2Q/2013 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Hatch 2 2Q/2013 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Sep 30, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to follow transient combustible control requriements within the site's intake structure An NRC identified Green non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 5.4, Procedures, was identified on August 14, 2012, for failure of the licensee to follow transient combustible control requirements within the sites intake structure. Specifically, inspectors discovered unattended transient combustibles within the intake, which is designated by site procedures as a transient combustible free zone. The licensee immediately removed the transient combustible from the intake structure, and entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 500623.
Failure to follow transient combustible control requirements within the sites intake structure on August 14, 2012, was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the Protection Against External Factors (Fire) attribute and adversely affected the Initiating Events cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operations. The performance deficiency is also similar to example 4.k. of IMC 0612 Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues.
Specifically, this issue meets the Not minor if criteria because identified transient combustibles were in a combustible free zone required for separation of redundant trains. Because this finding involved the administrative controls of transient combustibles, the inspectors utilized IMC 0609 Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, to assess the risk. This issue was assigned a low degradation rating in IMC 0609 Appendix F, step 1.2, because the degradation reflected a fire protection element whose performance and reliability was minimally impacted. Specifically the combustible liquids were not open and were contained within their approved containers.
Because the finding was assigned a low degradation rating, this finding screened as Green per step 1.3. This performance deficiency has a cross-cutting aspect in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance area because personnel did not follow procedures for control of transients combustibles at the intake. H.4(b) (Section 1R05)
Inspection Report# : 2012004 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 31, 2013 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to perform appropriate post maintenance test on 2A EDG Green. A self-revealing Green NCV of Hatch Unit 2 Technical Specification 5.4. Procedures, was identified on March 9, 2013, when the licensee failed to perform post maintenance activities appropriate to the circumstances to verify 2A emergency diesel generator (EDG) lube oil heat exchanger integrity at normal plant service water operating pressure prior to declaring the 2A EDG operable. This violation has been entered into the licensees Page 1 of 7
2Q/2013 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 corrective action program as condition report (CR) 603356. The licensee replaced the gasket on the lube oil heat exchanger waterbox flange and on March 10, 2013, 2A EDG was returned to operable status.
Failure to perform post maintenance activities appropriate to the circumstances to verify 2A EDG lube oil heat exchanger integrity at normal service water operating pressure prior to declaring the 2A EDG operable was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it adversely affected the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the 2A EDG was rendered unavailable after leakage developed at plant service water pressure. The inspectors evaluated the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, June 19, 2012, using Table 2, Cornerstones Affected by Degradation Condition or Programmatic Weakness. The finding affected the mitigating systems cornerstone and required further evaluation using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, June 19, 2012. Based on Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, Section A, Mitigating SSCs and Functionality, all four questions were answered no and thus this finding screened as Green. The inspectors determined this finding had a cross cutting aspect in the human performance area associated with resources - training and sufficiently qualified personnel because senior reactor operators did not ensure that the post maintenance test conditions were at maximum system operating pressure as required by procedure. H.2(b)
Inspection Report# : 2013002 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Low voltage safety-related cables subjected to water submersion The NRC identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, on October 16, 2012, when the licensee failed to maintain safety-related cables in an environment for which they were designed. Specifically, safety-related cables are not designed for continuous submersion in water. The inspectors determined that a diesel fuel oil storage tank level transmitter cable and the emergency diesel generator 2A fuel oil pump 2A2 power cable were exposed to continuous submersion in water. The licensee removed the accumulated water from the pull box and initiated condition report (CR) 534897 to enter this condition into the corrective action program for resolution.
Failure to maintain safety-related cables in an environment for which they were designed does not meet the 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control requirement. The licensee should have identified this violation when addressing Generic Letter 2007-01 and therefore, this failure is a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated September 7, 2012, because it is associated with the Equipment Performance attribute and adversely affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
Specifically, subjecting a diesel fuel oil storage tank level transmitter cable and the 2A emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump cable to continuous submersion could degrade the cable and result in failure. In accordance with IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because questions 1 through 4 of Section A, Mitigating SSCs and Functionality, were answered no. The inspectors determined that the finding does not have a cross-cutting aspect because the cause of the finding was directly related to the licensees Generic Letter 2007-01 review.
This review occurred more than 3 years ago; therefore, the performance deficiency is not indicative of present licensee performance. (Section 1R06)
Inspection Report# : 2012005 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2012 Page 2 of 7
2Q/2013 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Licensed operator requalification annual operating test administration issues An NRC-identified finding (FIN) was identified for the licensees failure to adhere to licensed operator requalification examination standards during the administration of an annual operating test. Specifically, the licensee failed to adhere to the examination guide to allow adequate time for operating crews to respond to planned events, and the licensee failed to correct the error before finalizing operator evaluation and critique documentation. This affected the licensees ability to effectively test and evaluate operator performance in response to a simulated malfunction in the automatic scram circuitry. As part of their immediate corrective action, the licensee re-evaluated the affected operators and entered the issue into their corrective action program.
This performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
Specifically, the failure to adhere to scenario examination administration standards adversely affected the quality of the operating exams, which test licensed operator performance in order to ensure timely and accurate mitigating actions after an event. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, Licensed Operator Requalification Significance Determination Process, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it occurred in the simulator and was not an actual plant event, and the crew whose scenario was administered with the error was re-evaluated with an alternate scenario prior to resuming on-shift duties. The cause of the finding was related to the cross-cutting aspect of training of personnel and sufficient qualified personnel under the Resources component of the Human Performance cross-cutting aspect, because the scenario guides narrative description of the required malfunction sequencing did not match the listed simulator operator actions in the body of the scenario guide.
H.2(b) (Section 1R11)
Inspection Report# : 2012004 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 06, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Adequately Account for Potential Pump Discharge Check Valve Back-leakage Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to verify or check the adequacy of design of the plant service water system including the pump discharge check valves allowable backleakage. As a result, the licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program as condition report 481741, performed an immediate determination of operability, and placed administrative control over the river level at which the pumps are declared inoperable to a level higher than the one specified in the plants technical specifications until more detailed analyses could be performed. The limit was reduced back to the original technical specification level following the results of the analysis.
The failure to verify the adequacy of the plant service water system design through calculational methods or through a suitable test program as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of design control and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the reliability, availability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee did not implement a suitable test program to verify design inputs and ensure the capability of the system. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Att. 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, for mitigating systems and Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a design control deficiency issue that did not result in a loss of operability or functionality of the PSW system. The performance deficiency was indicative of current licensee Page 3 of 7
2Q/2013 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 performance since the system hydraulic model was verified in 2011, and was directly related to the complete documentation and labeling cross-cutting aspect of the resources component in the area of human performance because the licensee did not have accurate design documentation for the potential pump discharge check valve leakage that could cause reverse rotation of the pumps H.2(c).
Inspection Report# : 2012008 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 06, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Ensure Adequacy of Intake Structure Ventilation Design Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, in that the licensee failed to verify or check the adequacy of the design of the intake structure ventilation support function for the plant service water and residual heat removal service water systems. Following the teams discovery, the licensee performed a bounding analysis and verified that the safety related components in the intake structure would not fail under the worst case high temperature conditions. The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program as condition report 477809 to address the issue.
The failure to verify the adequacy of intake structure ventilation design through calculational methods or through a suitable test program as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of design control and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the reliability, availability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
Specifically, the licensee did not have adequate measures in place to ensure negative effects due to heat loading did not affect the reliability, availability, and capability of intake structure equipment. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Att. 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, for mitigating systems and Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a design control deficiency issue that did not result in a loss of operability or functionality of the plant service water and residual heat removal service water systems. During the inspection, it was determined that there was adequate margin to preclude component failures when conservative heat loading and single failure criteria were assumed. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the failure to provide an adequate calculation or test is not indicative of current licensee performance due to the age of the heat load analysis.
Inspection Report# : 2012008 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 06, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Incorporate Appropriate Test Acceptance Criteria to Assure Satisfactory Steady State EDG Performance Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, for the licensees failure to incorporate adequate acceptance limits in surveillance test procedures used to verify acceptable steady state output voltage of the emergency diesel generators. The licensee performed an immediate determination of operability to verify that the emergency diesel generators would reach and maintain a steady state voltage greater than the minimum 3,860 volts determined by the calculation and issued interim administrative limits for acceptable output voltage until technical specifications can be revised. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as condition report 482310 to address the issue.
The licensees failure to include the correct minimum steady state output voltage as surveillance test acceptance Page 4 of 7
2Q/2013 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 criteria for the emergency diesel generators was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the finding challenged the assurance that the acceptance criteria used during surveillance testing would ensure the emergency diesel generators could perform their intended safety function and remain operable. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, the team used the mitigating systems column, which resulted in screening the finding through Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design deficiency resulting in the loss of functionality or operability, did not represent an actual loss of system safety function, did not result in exceeding a technical specification allowed outage time, and did not affect external event mitigation. A cross-cutting aspect was not identified because this issue has existed since the implementation of Improved Technical Specifications on March 3, 1995, and is not indicative of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2012008 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 06, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding Failure to Provide Appropriate Acceptance Criteria for EDG Air-Start System Check Valves Green. The team identified a finding for the licensees failure to follow Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.155, Station Blackout, guidance for testing and test control for the emergency diesel generator (EDG) air start system check valves. The testing deficiency was entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition reports 490288 and 490210.
The failure to implement the guidance in RG 1.155, to which the licensee was committed in the stations Final Safety Analysis Report, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of ensuring the capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the capability of the EDGs to start following a station blackout coping period was not ensured by the licensees test acceptance criteria for the air start check valves. The team used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Att. 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, for mitigating systems and Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, and determined a detailed risk evaluation was required, because the finding represented an actual loss of function of a non-Technical Specification train of equipment designated as high safety significant in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program for greater than twenty-four hours. A regional senior reactor analyst performed an analysis to determine the risk associated with the finding. An actual loss of EDG function following a station blackout would require all of the Unit 1 EDGs to fail to start, because if any Unit 1 EDG ran and was connected to either emergency bus, even for a relatively short time, an air compressor would partially or fully recharge the 1A EDGs air start tank. The calculation showed that the portion of plant risk that came from common cause fail to start of the Unit 1 EDGs, and of the sites EDGs was less than the threshold for greater than green for conditional core damage frequency or large early release frequency in the SDP. Therefore, the finding is Green. There was no cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because the performance deficiency is not indicative of current licensee performance due to the age of the established test acceptance criteria for the check valve leakage.
Inspection Report# : 2012008 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Page 5 of 7
2Q/2013 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Significance: Sep 30, 2012 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to establish adequate preventative maintenance for the safety related main control room air conditioning units A self revealing Green NCV (with two examples) of Hatch Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS 5.4, Procedures, was identified for failure to establish and perform preventive maintenance activities to replace the B main control room condensing unit overload in the MS2 motor starter components prior to age related failure of the component. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 195542.
Failure to establish and perform preventive maintenance activities to replace aged B main control room condensing unit overload in the MS2 starter components prior to their failure is a performance deficiency. Specifically, section 5.4 of NMP-ES-006, Predictive Maintenance Implementation and Continuing Equipment Reliability Improvement, requires, in part, that the licensee develop and maintain a documented maintenance strategy with recommended time-based preventive maintenance taking into account OEM/Vendor recommendations and other data affecting component reliability. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it adversely affected the SSC and Barrier Performance attribute of the barrier integrity cornerstone objective to ensure physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors evaluated the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, using table 2 Cornerstones Affected by Degraded Condition or Programmatic Weakness. The finding affected the barriers cornerstone. Further evaluation was required using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Based on Appendix A, Exhibit 3 Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, the finding represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the control room, spent fuel pool, or SBGT system and therefore screened as Green. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Operating Experience component of the Problem Identification and Resolution area because the licensee did not implement operating experience through changes to station procedures when prior age related failures were identified at the site. P.2(b) (Section 1R12)
Inspection Report# : 2012004 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2012 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to follow clearance procedures for returning the A main control room air conditioning unit to service following maintenance A self-revealing Green NCV of Hatch Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specification 5.4. Procedures, was identified on June 21, 2012, when the C main control room air conditioning unit tripped due to loss of power when the licensee operated an electrical breaker outside of procedural guidance. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 473701.
Failure to restore the A main control room air conditioner tagout clearance in accordance with the tag removal list on June 21, 2012, was a performance deficiency. Specifically, tagout 1-DT-1Z41-00168(004) required the normal supply breaker for 1R24S029 to be maintained open but the breaker was improperly positioned closed instead. This performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it adversely affected the Human Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclides caused by accidents or events. The inspectors evaluated the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, , Initial Characterization of Findings, using Table 2 Cornerstones Affected by Degradation Condition or Programmatic Weakness. The inspectors determined that the finding affected the barriers cornerstone. Further evaluation was required using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Based on Appendix A, Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, the finding represented a Page 6 of 7
2Q/2013 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the control room and therefore screened as Green. The inspectors determined this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance Area because the licensee did not communicate the human error prevention technique of holding an adequate pre-job brief for the restoration of the electrical portion of the tagout. H.4(a) (4OA2.2)
Inspection Report# : 2012004 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : September 03, 2013 Page 7 of 7
3Q/2013 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Hatch 2 3Q/2013 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 30, 2013 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to take required actions for inoperable equipment in accordance with Hatch's fire hazards analysis, Appendix B The NRC identified a non-cited violation of Unit 1 License Condition 2.C.(3), Fire Protection, and Unit 2 License Condition 2.C.(3)(a), Fire Protection, which occurred on September 3, 2013, when the licensee failed to establish fire watches and compensatory measures required by Hatchs Fire Hazards Analysis, Appendix B, after a fire header pipe rupture rendered sprinklers and hose stations inoperable. The licensee returned the fire header to operable status September 4, 2013, to restore compliance. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition report (CR) 700402.
Failure to establish fire watches and compensatory actions as required by Hatchs Fire Hazards Analysis, Appendix B, when sprinkler systems and hose stations became inoperable on September 3, 2013, was a performance deficiency.
This performance deficiency was more-than-minor because the performance deficiency is associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone protection against external factors (fire) attribute and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to establish fire watches and alternate compensatory measures resulted in the loss of fixed fire suppression capabilities within each fire area on the plant site for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The inspectors screened this finding using IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 1, dated February 28, 2005.
Using Part 1, Fire Protection SDP Phase 1 Worksheet, this finding screened as requiring a Phase 2 analysis, because the duration factor was determined to be 0.01 (< 3 Days), the summation of estimated fire frequency for the fire areas was calculated to be 3.78E-01, and the delta core damage frequency (CDF) calculation of 3.78E-03 was greater than a high degradation value of 1E-6 in Table A1.1. The inspectors submitted this finding to the Region II senior reactor analyst for further processing. A detailed SDP risk evaluation was performed by a regional senior reactor analyst. A bounding SDP risk evaluation was completed using a hand calculation and guidance from NRC IMC 0609 Appendix F. The significant analysis assumptions included a five hour exposure time, plant wide ignition frequency of approximately 3E-1/year, severity factor of 1E-1 (only large fires likely to require use of fixed suppression),
probability of non-suppression (PNS) of 5E-1 (10 minute fire growth scenario for base case and PNS of 1.0 no suppression due to the PD for the non-conforming case), and a conditional core damage probability of 1E-1 (assumed that large unsuppressed fire would lead to alternate shutdown scenario). The low exposure period mitigated the risk of the performance deficiency. The result of the bounding SDP evaluation was a core damage frequency increase (?CDF) of < 1E-6/year, a GREEN finding of very low safety significance. The inspectors determined this performance deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect in the human performance area decision-making attribute because the licensee did not use conservative assumptions in decision making when applying actions for inoperable fire hose stations, yard fire hydrants, and sprinklers. H.1(b) (Section 4OA3.1)
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3Q/2013 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Inspection Report# : 2013004 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2013 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to perform appropriate post maintenance test on 2A EDG Green. A self-revealing Green NCV of Hatch Unit 2 Technical Specification 5.4. Procedures, was identified on March 9, 2013, when the licensee failed to perform post maintenance activities appropriate to the circumstances to verify 2A emergency diesel generator (EDG) lube oil heat exchanger integrity at normal plant service water operating pressure prior to declaring the 2A EDG operable. This violation has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition report (CR) 603356. The licensee replaced the gasket on the lube oil heat exchanger waterbox flange and on March 10, 2013, 2A EDG was returned to operable status.
Failure to perform post maintenance activities appropriate to the circumstances to verify 2A EDG lube oil heat exchanger integrity at normal service water operating pressure prior to declaring the 2A EDG operable was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it adversely affected the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the 2A EDG was rendered unavailable after leakage developed at plant service water pressure. The inspectors evaluated the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, June 19, 2012, using Table 2, Cornerstones Affected by Degradation Condition or Programmatic Weakness. The finding affected the mitigating systems cornerstone and required further evaluation using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, June 19, 2012. Based on Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, Section A, Mitigating SSCs and Functionality, all four questions were answered no and thus this finding screened as Green. The inspectors determined this finding had a cross cutting aspect in the human performance area associated with resources - training and sufficiently qualified personnel because senior reactor operators did not ensure that the post maintenance test conditions were at maximum system operating pressure as required by procedure. H.2(b)
Inspection Report# : 2013002 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2012 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Low voltage safety-related cables subjected to water submersion The NRC identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, on October 16, 2012, when the licensee failed to maintain safety-related cables in an environment for which they were designed. Specifically, safety-related cables are not designed for continuous submersion in water. The inspectors determined that a diesel fuel oil storage tank level transmitter cable and the emergency diesel generator 2A fuel oil pump 2A2 power cable were exposed to continuous submersion in water. The licensee removed the accumulated water from the pull box and initiated condition report (CR) 534897 to enter this condition into the corrective action program for resolution.
Failure to maintain safety-related cables in an environment for which they were designed does not meet the 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control requirement. The licensee should have identified this violation when addressing Generic Letter 2007-01 and therefore, this failure is a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated September 7, 2012, because it is associated with the Equipment Performance attribute and adversely affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
Specifically, subjecting a diesel fuel oil storage tank level transmitter cable and the 2A emergency diesel generator Page 2 of 3
3Q/2013 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 fuel oil transfer pump cable to continuous submersion could degrade the cable and result in failure. In accordance with IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because questions 1 through 4 of Section A, Mitigating SSCs and Functionality, were answered no. The inspectors determined that the finding does not have a cross-cutting aspect because the cause of the finding was directly related to the licensees Generic Letter 2007-01 review.
This review occurred more than 3 years ago; therefore, the performance deficiency is not indicative of present licensee performance. (Section 1R06)
Inspection Report# : 2012005 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : December 03, 2013 Page 3 of 3
4Q/2013 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Hatch 2 4Q/2013 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Dec 31, 2013 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Scaffolding installed in safety related areas failed to meet procedureal requirements The NRC inspectors identified an NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to implement existing procedural guidance for the control of clearances between installed scaffolding and safety-related plant equipment. The licensee corrected each scaffold identified to restore compliance. This violation has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 721564.
Failure to maintain the required clearance of two inches between scaffolding and safety related equipment in accordance with 50AC-MNT-003-0, Scaffold Control, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more-than minor because it adversely affected the protection against external factors attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Specifically, this issue is similar to IMC 0612 Appendix E, Section 4 Example (a) of a more-than-minor issue because the licensee routinely failed to perform engineering evaluations on scaffolding erected with clearances less than procedural requirements. The inspectors screened this finding utilizing IMC 0609 Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, dated June 19, 2012, and IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power dated June 19, 2012. The finding screened as Green using Exhibit 2, Section A.
Mitigating Structures, Systems, Components and Functionality screening question 1, because the finding was a qualification (seismic) deficiency of a mitigating structure, system, or component which maintained its operability or functionality. The inspectors determined this performance deficiency had a cross cutting aspect in the work practices component of the human performance area because the licensee did not ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities, including contractors, such that nuclear safety is supported. H.4(c) (Section 1R12)
Inspection Report# : 2013005 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2013 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to implement an administrative procedure for equipment control when using personal danger tags A self-revealing NCV of Hatch Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specification 5.4., Procedures, was identified on October 5, 2013, when the licensee failed to implement an administrative procedure for equipment control which caused the A main control room air conditioning unit to trip. The licensee properly realigned the system and restarted the A main control room air conditioning unit to restore compliance. This violation has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 713629.
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4Q/2013 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Failure to ensure the use of the personal danger tags (PDTs) will have no adverse effects on the continued operation of the plant as required by procedure NMP-AD-003-005, PDT Tags/Maintenance Locks Use With Operating Permit Tags or PDT Documentation Sheets, was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it adversely affected the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, a PDT clearance sheet was performed on in-service equipment and resulted in the tripping of the A main control room air conditioner. The inspectors evaluated the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, dated June 19, 2012. Using Table 2, Cornerstones Affected by Degradation Condition or Programmatic Weakness, the finding affected the mitigating systems cornerstone and required further evaluation using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012. Based on Appendix A, Exhibit 2 - Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the finding screened as Green because all the questions were answered no. The inspectors determined this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the work control aspect of the human performance area, because the licensee did not coordinate work activities by incorporating actions to address the need to keep personnel apprised of work status, the operational impact of work activities, or plant conditions that may affect work activities. H.3(b) (Section 4OA2.3)
Inspection Report# : 2013005 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2013 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to take required actions for inoperable equipment in accordance with Hatch's fire hazards analysis, Appendix B The NRC identified a non-cited violation of Unit 1 License Condition 2.C.(3), Fire Protection, and Unit 2 License Condition 2.C.(3)(a), Fire Protection, which occurred on September 3, 2013, when the licensee failed to establish fire watches and compensatory measures required by Hatchs Fire Hazards Analysis, Appendix B, after a fire header pipe rupture rendered sprinklers and hose stations inoperable. The licensee returned the fire header to operable status September 4, 2013, to restore compliance. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition report (CR) 700402.
Failure to establish fire watches and compensatory actions as required by Hatchs Fire Hazards Analysis, Appendix B, when sprinkler systems and hose stations became inoperable on September 3, 2013, was a performance deficiency.
This performance deficiency was more-than-minor because the performance deficiency is associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone protection against external factors (fire) attribute and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to establish fire watches and alternate compensatory measures resulted in the loss of fixed fire suppression capabilities within each fire area on the plant site for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The inspectors screened this finding using IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 1, dated February 28, 2005.
Using Part 1, Fire Protection SDP Phase 1 Worksheet, this finding screened as requiring a Phase 2 analysis, because the duration factor was determined to be 0.01 (< 3 Days), the summation of estimated fire frequency for the fire areas was calculated to be 3.78E-01, and the delta core damage frequency (CDF) calculation of 3.78E-03 was greater than a high degradation value of 1E-6 in Table A1.1. The inspectors submitted this finding to the Region II senior reactor analyst for further processing. A detailed SDP risk evaluation was performed by a regional senior reactor analyst. A bounding SDP risk evaluation was completed using a hand calculation and guidance from NRC IMC 0609 Appendix F. The significant analysis assumptions included a five hour exposure time, plant wide ignition frequency of approximately 3E-1/year, severity factor of 1E-1 (only large fires likely to require use of fixed suppression),
probability of non-suppression (PNS) of 5E-1 (10 minute fire growth scenario for base case and PNS of 1.0 no suppression due to the PD for the non-conforming case), and a conditional core damage probability of 1E-1 (assumed that large unsuppressed fire would lead to alternate shutdown scenario). The low exposure period mitigated the risk of Page 2 of 4
4Q/2013 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 the performance deficiency. The result of the bounding SDP evaluation was a core damage frequency increase (?CDF) of < 1E-6/year, a GREEN finding of very low safety significance. The inspectors determined this performance deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect in the human performance area decision-making attribute because the licensee did not use conservative assumptions in decision making when applying actions for inoperable fire hose stations, yard fire hydrants, and sprinklers. H.1(b) (Section 4OA3.1)
Inspection Report# : 2013004 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2013 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to perform appropriate post maintenance test on 2A EDG Green. A self-revealing Green NCV of Hatch Unit 2 Technical Specification 5.4. Procedures, was identified on March 9, 2013, when the licensee failed to perform post maintenance activities appropriate to the circumstances to verify 2A emergency diesel generator (EDG) lube oil heat exchanger integrity at normal plant service water operating pressure prior to declaring the 2A EDG operable. This violation has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition report (CR) 603356. The licensee replaced the gasket on the lube oil heat exchanger waterbox flange and on March 10, 2013, 2A EDG was returned to operable status.
Failure to perform post maintenance activities appropriate to the circumstances to verify 2A EDG lube oil heat exchanger integrity at normal service water operating pressure prior to declaring the 2A EDG operable was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it adversely affected the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the 2A EDG was rendered unavailable after leakage developed at plant service water pressure. The inspectors evaluated the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, June 19, 2012, using Table 2, Cornerstones Affected by Degradation Condition or Programmatic Weakness. The finding affected the mitigating systems cornerstone and required further evaluation using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, June 19, 2012. Based on Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, Section A, Mitigating SSCs and Functionality, all four questions were answered no and thus this finding screened as Green. The inspectors determined this finding had a cross cutting aspect in the human performance area associated with resources - training and sufficiently qualified personnel because senior reactor operators did not ensure that the post maintenance test conditions were at maximum system operating pressure as required by procedure. H.2(b)
Inspection Report# : 2013002 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Dec 13, 2013 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Update the UFSAR Following a Change in Neutron Fluence Calculation Methodology SL IV. The inspectors identified an NRC-identified Severity Level IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.71(e) for the licensees failure to update the UFSAR following the change in methodology used to calculate reactor vessel neutron fluence. Specifically, the licensee did not completely update the UFSAR to reflect the change in fluence calculation methodology from the General Electric methodology to the Radiation Analysis Modeling Application Page 3 of 4
4Q/2013 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 (RAMA) methodology described in BWRVIP-114-A, BWR Vessel and Internals Project, RAMA Fluence Methodology Theory Manual. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as condition report (CR) 744853.
The inspectors determined that the failure to update the UFSAR as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was greater than minor because the failure to provide complete licensing and design basis information in the UFSAR could result in either the licensee making an inappropriate licensing interpretation or the NRC making an inappropriate regulatory decision based on incomplete information in the UFSAR. This performance deficiency was dispositioned using the traditional enforcement process because failing to update a UFSAR had the potential to adversely impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. The performance deficiency was characterized as a Severity Level IV violation in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy (dated July 9, 2013), Section 6.1.d.3. Since this issue was dispositioned using traditional enforcement, there was no cross-cutting aspect associated with this violation (Section 4OA5.3).
Inspection Report# : 2013007 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : February 24, 2014 Page 4 of 4
1Q/2014 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Hatch 2 1Q/2014 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Mar 31, 2014 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Operate the Unit 2 Master Feedwater Controller In Accordance With Procedures Green. A self-revealing Green non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 5.4, Procedures, was identified when an automatic recirculation pump runback occurred after improper operations of the Unit 2 master feedwater controller PF push button. The licensee restored compliance when the crew responded to the runback using approved procedures, and restored reactor water level to the correct setpoint. The violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition report (CR) 759497.
Failure to operate the Unit 2 master feedwater controller, 2C32-R600, in accordance with plant procedures on January 17, 2014, was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability during power operations. Specifically, the performance deficiency directly resulted in an unplanned transient when plant systems automatically reduced reactor power. The inspectors screened this finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significant Determination Process (SDP) For Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012. The finding screened as Green per Section B. of Exhibit 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions, because the finding did not cause a reactor trip and the loss of mitigation equipment, a high energy line-break, internal flooding, or a fire. Inspectors determined the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of avoid complacency of the human performance area because the operator did not implement the error reduction tool (reading the placard below the controller) prior to performing an action. [H.12] (Section 4OA3.1)
Inspection Report# : 2014002 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 31, 2014 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Install Seismic Restraints of the Unit 2 LOCA LOSP Timer Cabinet Doors Following Inspection Green. The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, when the licensee failed to prescribe in documented instructions, procedures, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances the inspection of the Unit 2 loss of coolant accident (LOCA)/loss of offsite power (LOSP) emergency diesel generator loading timers. The licensee restored compliance by adding a step within the operator rounds to confirm the LOCA/LOSP emergency diesel generator loading timer cabinet door fasteners are reengaged and tightened. This violation has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 793669.
Failure to engage and tighten the Unit 2 LOCA/LOSP emergency diesel generator loading timer cabinet doors following inspection on January 2, 2014, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than Page 1 of 5
1Q/2014 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 minor, because it is associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone protection against external factors attribute and adversely affected the corner objective to ensure the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, with none of the latches engaged the reliability of circuitry within the cabinet following a seismic event was adversely affected. The inspectors screened this finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significant Determination Process (SDP) For Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012. The finding screened as Green per Section A. of Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, because each of the four screening questions were answered no. The inspectors determined the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of resources in the human performance area because the licensee did not ensure that procedures were available and adequate for performing the nightly inspection of the Unit 2 LOCA/LOSP emergency diesel generator loading timers. [H.1]
(Section 1R15)
Inspection Report# : 2014002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2014 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Scope Safety System MOVs in the GL 96-05 Periodic Verification Program Green. The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50.55a, Codes and Standards, for the licensees failure to establish a periodic verification program for the core spray, high pressure core injection, and reactor core injection cooling systems pump outboard discharge motor-operated valves (MOVs) to ensure their long-term capability to perform their design bases safety functions. The licensee provided operators with interim instructions to declare the affected systems inoperable until permanent corrective actions are implemented. This violation has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 799261.
Failure to establish a periodic verification program for the core spray, high pressure core injection, and reactor core injection cooling systems pump outboard discharge MOVs to ensure their long-term capability to perform their design basis safety functions was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, failure to ensure the long-term capability of the valves to perform their design basis safety functions overestimated the availability and reliability of the core spray, high pressure core injection, and reactor core injection cooling systems during testing or other activities that would place the valves in their non-safety position. The inspectors screened this finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significant Determination Process (SDP) For Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012. The finding screened as Green per Section A of Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, because each of the four screening questions were answered no. The inspectors determined the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of evaluation in the problem identification and resolution area because in 2013 the licensee had corrective actions in the corrective action program to evaluate the adequacy of the MOV periodic verification program scope and failed to identify that reliance on the valves to reposition when in the closed position required the valves to be in the program. [P.2] (Section 4OA2.2)
Inspection Report# : 2014002 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2013 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Scaffolding installed in safety related areas failed to meet procedureal requirements The NRC inspectors identified an NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to implement existing procedural guidance for the control of clearances between installed scaffolding and safety-related plant equipment. The licensee corrected each scaffold identified to restore compliance. This violation has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 721564.
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1Q/2014 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Failure to maintain the required clearance of two inches between scaffolding and safety related equipment in accordance with 50AC-MNT-003-0, Scaffold Control, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more-than minor because it adversely affected the protection against external factors attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Specifically, this issue is similar to IMC 0612 Appendix E, Section 4 Example (a) of a more-than-minor issue because the licensee routinely failed to perform engineering evaluations on scaffolding erected with clearances less than procedural requirements. The inspectors screened this finding utilizing IMC 0609 Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, dated June 19, 2012, and IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power dated June 19, 2012. The finding screened as Green using Exhibit 2, Section A.
Mitigating Structures, Systems, Components and Functionality screening question 1, because the finding was a qualification (seismic) deficiency of a mitigating structure, system, or component which maintained its operability or functionality. The inspectors determined this performance deficiency had a cross cutting aspect in the work practices component of the human performance area because the licensee did not ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities, including contractors, such that nuclear safety is supported. H.4(c) (Section 1R12)
Inspection Report# : 2013005 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2013 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to implement an administrative procedure for equipment control when using personal danger tags A self-revealing NCV of Hatch Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specification 5.4., Procedures, was identified on October 5, 2013, when the licensee failed to implement an administrative procedure for equipment control which caused the A main control room air conditioning unit to trip. The licensee properly realigned the system and restarted the A main control room air conditioning unit to restore compliance. This violation has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 713629.
Failure to ensure the use of the personal danger tags (PDTs) will have no adverse effects on the continued operation of the plant as required by procedure NMP-AD-003-005, PDT Tags/Maintenance Locks Use With Operating Permit Tags or PDT Documentation Sheets, was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it adversely affected the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, a PDT clearance sheet was performed on in-service equipment and resulted in the tripping of the A main control room air conditioner. The inspectors evaluated the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, dated June 19, 2012. Using Table 2, Cornerstones Affected by Degradation Condition or Programmatic Weakness, the finding affected the mitigating systems cornerstone and required further evaluation using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012. Based on Appendix A, Exhibit 2 - Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the finding screened as Green because all the questions were answered no. The inspectors determined this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the work control aspect of the human performance area, because the licensee did not coordinate work activities by incorporating actions to address the need to keep personnel apprised of work status, the operational impact of work activities, or plant conditions that may affect work activities. H.3(b) (Section 4OA2.3)
Inspection Report# : 2013005 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2013 Identified By: NRC Page 3 of 5
1Q/2014 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to take required actions for inoperable equipment in accordance with Hatch's fire hazards analysis, Appendix B The NRC identified a non-cited violation of Unit 1 License Condition 2.C.(3), Fire Protection, and Unit 2 License Condition 2.C.(3)(a), Fire Protection, which occurred on September 3, 2013, when the licensee failed to establish fire watches and compensatory measures required by Hatchs Fire Hazards Analysis, Appendix B, after a fire header pipe rupture rendered sprinklers and hose stations inoperable. The licensee returned the fire header to operable status September 4, 2013, to restore compliance. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition report (CR) 700402.
Failure to establish fire watches and compensatory actions as required by Hatchs Fire Hazards Analysis, Appendix B, when sprinkler systems and hose stations became inoperable on September 3, 2013, was a performance deficiency.
This performance deficiency was more-than-minor because the performance deficiency is associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone protection against external factors (fire) attribute and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to establish fire watches and alternate compensatory measures resulted in the loss of fixed fire suppression capabilities within each fire area on the plant site for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The inspectors screened this finding using IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 1, dated February 28, 2005.
Using Part 1, Fire Protection SDP Phase 1 Worksheet, this finding screened as requiring a Phase 2 analysis, because the duration factor was determined to be 0.01 (< 3 Days), the summation of estimated fire frequency for the fire areas was calculated to be 3.78E-01, and the delta core damage frequency (CDF) calculation of 3.78E-03 was greater than a high degradation value of 1E-6 in Table A1.1. The inspectors submitted this finding to the Region II senior reactor analyst for further processing. A detailed SDP risk evaluation was performed by a regional senior reactor analyst. A bounding SDP risk evaluation was completed using a hand calculation and guidance from NRC IMC 0609 Appendix F. The significant analysis assumptions included a five hour exposure time, plant wide ignition frequency of approximately 3E-1/year, severity factor of 1E-1 (only large fires likely to require use of fixed suppression),
probability of non-suppression (PNS) of 5E-1 (10 minute fire growth scenario for base case and PNS of 1.0 no suppression due to the PD for the non-conforming case), and a conditional core damage probability of 1E-1 (assumed that large unsuppressed fire would lead to alternate shutdown scenario). The low exposure period mitigated the risk of the performance deficiency. The result of the bounding SDP evaluation was a core damage frequency increase (?CDF) of < 1E-6/year, a GREEN finding of very low safety significance. The inspectors determined this performance deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect in the human performance area decision-making attribute because the licensee did not use conservative assumptions in decision making when applying actions for inoperable fire hose stations, yard fire hydrants, and sprinklers. H.1(b) (Section 4OA3.1)
Inspection Report# : 2013004 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Dec 13, 2013 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Update the UFSAR Following a Change in Neutron Fluence Calculation Methodology SL IV. The inspectors identified an NRC-identified Severity Level IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.71(e) for the licensees failure to update the UFSAR following the change in methodology used to calculate reactor vessel neutron fluence. Specifically, the licensee did not completely update the UFSAR to reflect the change in fluence calculation methodology from the General Electric methodology to the Radiation Analysis Modeling Application Page 4 of 5
1Q/2014 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 (RAMA) methodology described in BWRVIP-114-A, BWR Vessel and Internals Project, RAMA Fluence Methodology Theory Manual. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as condition report (CR) 744853.
The inspectors determined that the failure to update the UFSAR as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was greater than minor because the failure to provide complete licensing and design basis information in the UFSAR could result in either the licensee making an inappropriate licensing interpretation or the NRC making an inappropriate regulatory decision based on incomplete information in the UFSAR. This performance deficiency was dispositioned using the traditional enforcement process because failing to update a UFSAR had the potential to adversely impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. The performance deficiency was characterized as a Severity Level IV violation in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy (dated July 9, 2013), Section 6.1.d.3. Since this issue was dispositioned using traditional enforcement, there was no cross-cutting aspect associated with this violation (Section 4OA5.3).
Inspection Report# : 2013007 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : May 30, 2014 Page 5 of 5
2Q/2014 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Hatch 2 2Q/2014 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Mar 31, 2014 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Operate the Unit 2 Master Feedwater Controller In Accordance With Procedures Green. A self-revealing Green non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 5.4, Procedures, was identified when an automatic recirculation pump runback occurred after improper operations of the Unit 2 master feedwater controller PF push button. The licensee restored compliance when the crew responded to the runback using approved procedures, and restored reactor water level to the correct setpoint. The violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition report (CR) 759497.
Failure to operate the Unit 2 master feedwater controller, 2C32-R600, in accordance with plant procedures on January 17, 2014, was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability during power operations. Specifically, the performance deficiency directly resulted in an unplanned transient when plant systems automatically reduced reactor power. The inspectors screened this finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significant Determination Process (SDP) For Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012. The finding screened as Green per Section B. of Exhibit 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions, because the finding did not cause a reactor trip and the loss of mitigation equipment, a high energy line-break, internal flooding, or a fire. Inspectors determined the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of avoid complacency of the human performance area because the operator did not implement the error reduction tool (reading the placard below the controller) prior to performing an action. [H.12] (Section 4OA3.1)
Inspection Report# : 2014002 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 31, 2014 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Install Seismic Restraints of the Unit 2 LOCA LOSP Timer Cabinet Doors Following Inspection Green. The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, when the licensee failed to prescribe in documented instructions, procedures, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances the inspection of the Unit 2 loss of coolant accident (LOCA)/loss of offsite power (LOSP) emergency diesel generator loading timers. The licensee restored compliance by adding a step within the operator rounds to confirm the LOCA/LOSP emergency diesel generator loading timer cabinet door fasteners are reengaged and tightened. This violation has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 793669.
Failure to engage and tighten the Unit 2 LOCA/LOSP emergency diesel generator loading timer cabinet doors following inspection on January 2, 2014, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than Page 1 of 6
2Q/2014 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 minor, because it is associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone protection against external factors attribute and adversely affected the corner objective to ensure the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, with none of the latches engaged the reliability of circuitry within the cabinet following a seismic event was adversely affected. The inspectors screened this finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significant Determination Process (SDP) For Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012. The finding screened as Green per Section A. of Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, because each of the four screening questions were answered no. The inspectors determined the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of resources in the human performance area because the licensee did not ensure that procedures were available and adequate for performing the nightly inspection of the Unit 2 LOCA/LOSP emergency diesel generator loading timers. [H.1]
(Section 1R15)
Inspection Report# : 2014002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2014 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Scope Safety System MOVs in the GL 96-05 Periodic Verification Program Green. The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50.55a, Codes and Standards, for the licensees failure to establish a periodic verification program for the core spray, high pressure core injection, and reactor core injection cooling systems pump outboard discharge motor-operated valves (MOVs) to ensure their long-term capability to perform their design bases safety functions. The licensee provided operators with interim instructions to declare the affected systems inoperable until permanent corrective actions are implemented. This violation has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 799261.
Failure to establish a periodic verification program for the core spray, high pressure core injection, and reactor core injection cooling systems pump outboard discharge MOVs to ensure their long-term capability to perform their design basis safety functions was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, failure to ensure the long-term capability of the valves to perform their design basis safety functions overestimated the availability and reliability of the core spray, high pressure core injection, and reactor core injection cooling systems during testing or other activities that would place the valves in their non-safety position. The inspectors screened this finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significant Determination Process (SDP) For Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012. The finding screened as Green per Section A of Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, because each of the four screening questions were answered no. The inspectors determined the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of evaluation in the problem identification and resolution area because in 2013 the licensee had corrective actions in the corrective action program to evaluate the adequacy of the MOV periodic verification program scope and failed to identify that reliance on the valves to reposition when in the closed position required the valves to be in the program. [P.2] (Section 4OA2.2)
Inspection Report# : 2014002 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2013 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Scaffolding installed in safety related areas failed to meet procedureal requirements The NRC inspectors identified an NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to implement existing procedural guidance for the control of clearances between installed scaffolding and safety-related plant equipment. The licensee corrected each scaffold identified to restore compliance. This violation has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 721564.
Page 2 of 6
2Q/2014 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Failure to maintain the required clearance of two inches between scaffolding and safety related equipment in accordance with 50AC-MNT-003-0, Scaffold Control, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more-than minor because it adversely affected the protection against external factors attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Specifically, this issue is similar to IMC 0612 Appendix E, Section 4 Example (a) of a more-than-minor issue because the licensee routinely failed to perform engineering evaluations on scaffolding erected with clearances less than procedural requirements. The inspectors screened this finding utilizing IMC 0609 Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, dated June 19, 2012, and IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power dated June 19, 2012. The finding screened as Green using Exhibit 2, Section A.
Mitigating Structures, Systems, Components and Functionality screening question 1, because the finding was a qualification (seismic) deficiency of a mitigating structure, system, or component which maintained its operability or functionality. The inspectors determined this performance deficiency had a cross cutting aspect in the work practices component of the human performance area because the licensee did not ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities, including contractors, such that nuclear safety is supported. H.4(c) (Section 1R12)
Inspection Report# : 2013005 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2013 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to implement an administrative procedure for equipment control when using personal danger tags A self-revealing NCV of Hatch Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specification 5.4., Procedures, was identified on October 5, 2013, when the licensee failed to implement an administrative procedure for equipment control which caused the A main control room air conditioning unit to trip. The licensee properly realigned the system and restarted the A main control room air conditioning unit to restore compliance. This violation has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 713629.
Failure to ensure the use of the personal danger tags (PDTs) will have no adverse effects on the continued operation of the plant as required by procedure NMP-AD-003-005, PDT Tags/Maintenance Locks Use With Operating Permit Tags or PDT Documentation Sheets, was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it adversely affected the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, a PDT clearance sheet was performed on in-service equipment and resulted in the tripping of the A main control room air conditioner. The inspectors evaluated the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, dated June 19, 2012. Using Table 2, Cornerstones Affected by Degradation Condition or Programmatic Weakness, the finding affected the mitigating systems cornerstone and required further evaluation using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012. Based on Appendix A, Exhibit 2 - Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the finding screened as Green because all the questions were answered no. The inspectors determined this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the work control aspect of the human performance area, because the licensee did not coordinate work activities by incorporating actions to address the need to keep personnel apprised of work status, the operational impact of work activities, or plant conditions that may affect work activities. H.3(b) (Section 4OA2.3)
Inspection Report# : 2013005 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2013 Identified By: NRC Page 3 of 6
2Q/2014 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to take required actions for inoperable equipment in accordance with Hatch's fire hazards analysis, Appendix B The NRC identified a non-cited violation of Unit 1 License Condition 2.C.(3), Fire Protection, and Unit 2 License Condition 2.C.(3)(a), Fire Protection, which occurred on September 3, 2013, when the licensee failed to establish fire watches and compensatory measures required by Hatchs Fire Hazards Analysis, Appendix B, after a fire header pipe rupture rendered sprinklers and hose stations inoperable. The licensee returned the fire header to operable status September 4, 2013, to restore compliance. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition report (CR) 700402.
Failure to establish fire watches and compensatory actions as required by Hatchs Fire Hazards Analysis, Appendix B, when sprinkler systems and hose stations became inoperable on September 3, 2013, was a performance deficiency.
This performance deficiency was more-than-minor because the performance deficiency is associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone protection against external factors (fire) attribute and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to establish fire watches and alternate compensatory measures resulted in the loss of fixed fire suppression capabilities within each fire area on the plant site for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The inspectors screened this finding using IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 1, dated February 28, 2005.
Using Part 1, Fire Protection SDP Phase 1 Worksheet, this finding screened as requiring a Phase 2 analysis, because the duration factor was determined to be 0.01 (< 3 Days), the summation of estimated fire frequency for the fire areas was calculated to be 3.78E-01, and the delta core damage frequency (CDF) calculation of 3.78E-03 was greater than a high degradation value of 1E-6 in Table A1.1. The inspectors submitted this finding to the Region II senior reactor analyst for further processing. A detailed SDP risk evaluation was performed by a regional senior reactor analyst. A bounding SDP risk evaluation was completed using a hand calculation and guidance from NRC IMC 0609 Appendix F. The significant analysis assumptions included a five hour exposure time, plant wide ignition frequency of approximately 3E-1/year, severity factor of 1E-1 (only large fires likely to require use of fixed suppression),
probability of non-suppression (PNS) of 5E-1 (10 minute fire growth scenario for base case and PNS of 1.0 no suppression due to the PD for the non-conforming case), and a conditional core damage probability of 1E-1 (assumed that large unsuppressed fire would lead to alternate shutdown scenario). The low exposure period mitigated the risk of the performance deficiency. The result of the bounding SDP evaluation was a core damage frequency increase (?CDF) of < 1E-6/year, a GREEN finding of very low safety significance. The inspectors determined this performance deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect in the human performance area decision-making attribute because the licensee did not use conservative assumptions in decision making when applying actions for inoperable fire hose stations, yard fire hydrants, and sprinklers. H.1(b) (Section 4OA3.1)
Inspection Report# : 2013004 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Jun 30, 2014 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Prove Operability Following the Failure of the Secondary Containment Surveillance Test Green. The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Procedures, Instructions, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to prove operability following a failure of a surveillance test as required by Hatch procedure 90AC-OAM-001-0, Test and Surveillance Control, Ver. 1.0, on May 12, 2014. To restore compliance, the licensee isolated the refueling floor dampers and re-performed Surveillance Requirement Page 4 of 6
2Q/2014 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 3.6.4.1.3 with satisfactory results later that day on May 12, 2014. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition report (CR) 819563.
Failure to prove operability following failure of a surveillance test as required by Hatch procedure 90AC-OAM-001-0, Test and Surveillance Control, Ver. 1.0, on May 12, 2014, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency affected the barrier integrity cornerstone and was more-than-minor because, if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, declaring equipment operable following a failed surveillance test would have the potential for the facility to operate outside of technical specification requirements. The inspectors screened this finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significant Determination Process (SDP) For Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012. The finding screened as Green per Section C of Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, because the finding only represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided by the standby gas treatment system. The inspectors determined the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of training in the human performance area, because the licensee did not ensure knowledge transfer of Surveillance Requirement 3.0.1 requirements to maintain a knowledgeable, technically competent workface and instill nuclear safety values. [H.9]
Inspection Report# : 2014003 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Dec 13, 2013 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Page 5 of 6
2Q/2014 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Failure to Update the UFSAR Following a Change in Neutron Fluence Calculation Methodology SL IV. The inspectors identified an NRC-identified Severity Level IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.71(e) for the licensees failure to update the UFSAR following the change in methodology used to calculate reactor vessel neutron fluence. Specifically, the licensee did not completely update the UFSAR to reflect the change in fluence calculation methodology from the General Electric methodology to the Radiation Analysis Modeling Application (RAMA) methodology described in BWRVIP-114-A, BWR Vessel and Internals Project, RAMA Fluence Methodology Theory Manual. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as condition report (CR) 744853.
The inspectors determined that the failure to update the UFSAR as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was greater than minor because the failure to provide complete licensing and design basis information in the UFSAR could result in either the licensee making an inappropriate licensing interpretation or the NRC making an inappropriate regulatory decision based on incomplete information in the UFSAR. This performance deficiency was dispositioned using the traditional enforcement process because failing to update a UFSAR had the potential to adversely impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. The performance deficiency was characterized as a Severity Level IV violation in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy (dated July 9, 2013), Section 6.1.d.3. Since this issue was dispositioned using traditional enforcement, there was no cross-cutting aspect associated with this violation (Section 4OA5.3).
Inspection Report# : 2013007 (pdf)
Last modified : August 29, 2014 Page 6 of 6
3Q/2014 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Hatch 2 3Q/2014 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Mar 31, 2014 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Operate the Unit 2 Master Feedwater Controller In Accordance With Procedures Green. A self-revealing Green non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 5.4, Procedures, was identified when an automatic recirculation pump runback occurred after improper operations of the Unit 2 master feedwater controller PF push button. The licensee restored compliance when the crew responded to the runback using approved procedures, and restored reactor water level to the correct setpoint. The violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition report (CR) 759497.
Failure to operate the Unit 2 master feedwater controller, 2C32-R600, in accordance with plant procedures on January 17, 2014, was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability during power operations. Specifically, the performance deficiency directly resulted in an unplanned transient when plant systems automatically reduced reactor power. The inspectors screened this finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significant Determination Process (SDP) For Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012. The finding screened as Green per Section B. of Exhibit 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions, because the finding did not cause a reactor trip and the loss of mitigation equipment, a high energy line-break, internal flooding, or a fire. Inspectors determined the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of avoid complacency of the human performance area because the operator did not implement the error reduction tool (reading the placard below the controller) prior to performing an action. [H.12] (Section 4OA3.1)
Inspection Report# : 2014002 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 30, 2014 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Implement Fire Surveillance Procedure Resulted in Isolation of All Fire Water to the Station The NRC identified a NCV of Technical Specification 5.4, Procedures, for the licensees failure to properly implement a valve lineup in a surveillance procedure for the fire protection system. The licensee inadvertently isolated all fire suppression water during the performance of a valve lineup. Although this condition was identified by the licensee, the inspectors identified weaknesses in the licensees apparent cause determination. Therefore, this finding is being treated as an NRC-Identified finding. The violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition report 841493.
The licensees failure to implement the correct valve lineup in accordance with procedure 42SV-FPX-015-0, System Flush Fire Protection Water, was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor Page 1 of 6
3Q/2014 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 because the performance deficiency was associated with the Protection Against External Factors (Fire) attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the failure to implement the correct valve lineup of 42SV-FPX-015-0 resulted in total fire suppression water isolation. The inspectors screened this finding as requiring a Phase 3 analysis, because 1) the duration factor was determined to be 0.01 (< 3 Days), 2) the summation of estimated fire frequency for the fire areas was calculated to 1.24E-01, and 3) the delta CDF calculation was greater than 1E-6 in Table 1.5.4. A Senior Reactor Analyst performed a Phase 3 analysis for the finding using licensee input from their fire PRA. Because of the short exposure time of approximately one hour, the change in risk was below 1E-6. Therefore, this finding is Green. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect of resources in the human performance area, because the licensee did not ensure that procedure 42SV-FPX-015-0 was adequate to support nuclear safety. [H.1]
Inspection Report# : 2014004 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2014 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Install Seismic Restraints of the Unit 2 LOCA LOSP Timer Cabinet Doors Following Inspection Green. The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, when the licensee failed to prescribe in documented instructions, procedures, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances the inspection of the Unit 2 loss of coolant accident (LOCA)/loss of offsite power (LOSP) emergency diesel generator loading timers. The licensee restored compliance by adding a step within the operator rounds to confirm the LOCA/LOSP emergency diesel generator loading timer cabinet door fasteners are reengaged and tightened. This violation has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 793669.
Failure to engage and tighten the Unit 2 LOCA/LOSP emergency diesel generator loading timer cabinet doors following inspection on January 2, 2014, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor, because it is associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone protection against external factors attribute and adversely affected the corner objective to ensure the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, with none of the latches engaged the reliability of circuitry within the cabinet following a seismic event was adversely affected. The inspectors screened this finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significant Determination Process (SDP) For Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012. The finding screened as Green per Section A. of Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, because each of the four screening questions were answered no. The inspectors determined the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of resources in the human performance area because the licensee did not ensure that procedures were available and adequate for performing the nightly inspection of the Unit 2 LOCA/LOSP emergency diesel generator loading timers. [H.1]
(Section 1R15)
Inspection Report# : 2014002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2014 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Scope Safety System MOVs in the GL 96-05 Periodic Verification Program Green. The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50.55a, Codes and Standards, for the licensees failure to establish a periodic verification program for the core spray, high pressure core injection, and reactor core injection cooling systems pump outboard discharge motor-operated valves (MOVs) to ensure their long-term capability to perform their design bases safety functions. The licensee provided operators with interim instructions to declare the affected systems inoperable until permanent corrective actions are implemented. This violation has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 799261.
Page 2 of 6
3Q/2014 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Failure to establish a periodic verification program for the core spray, high pressure core injection, and reactor core injection cooling systems pump outboard discharge MOVs to ensure their long-term capability to perform their design basis safety functions was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, failure to ensure the long-term capability of the valves to perform their design basis safety functions overestimated the availability and reliability of the core spray, high pressure core injection, and reactor core injection cooling systems during testing or other activities that would place the valves in their non-safety position. The inspectors screened this finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significant Determination Process (SDP) For Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012. The finding screened as Green per Section A of Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, because each of the four screening questions were answered no. The inspectors determined the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of evaluation in the problem identification and resolution area because in 2013 the licensee had corrective actions in the corrective action program to evaluate the adequacy of the MOV periodic verification program scope and failed to identify that reliance on the valves to reposition when in the closed position required the valves to be in the program. [P.2] (Section 4OA2.2)
Inspection Report# : 2014002 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2013 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Scaffolding installed in safety related areas failed to meet procedureal requirements The NRC inspectors identified an NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to implement existing procedural guidance for the control of clearances between installed scaffolding and safety-related plant equipment. The licensee corrected each scaffold identified to restore compliance. This violation has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 721564.
Failure to maintain the required clearance of two inches between scaffolding and safety related equipment in accordance with 50AC-MNT-003-0, Scaffold Control, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more-than minor because it adversely affected the protection against external factors attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Specifically, this issue is similar to IMC 0612 Appendix E, Section 4 Example (a) of a more-than-minor issue because the licensee routinely failed to perform engineering evaluations on scaffolding erected with clearances less than procedural requirements. The inspectors screened this finding utilizing IMC 0609 Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, dated June 19, 2012, and IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power dated June 19, 2012. The finding screened as Green using Exhibit 2, Section A.
Mitigating Structures, Systems, Components and Functionality screening question 1, because the finding was a qualification (seismic) deficiency of a mitigating structure, system, or component which maintained its operability or functionality. The inspectors determined this performance deficiency had a cross cutting aspect in the work practices component of the human performance area because the licensee did not ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities, including contractors, such that nuclear safety is supported. H.4(c) (Section 1R12)
Inspection Report# : 2013005 (pdf)
Significance: Dec 31, 2013 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to implement an administrative procedure for equipment control when using personal danger tags A self-revealing NCV of Hatch Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specification 5.4., Procedures, was identified on October 5, 2013, when the licensee failed to implement an administrative procedure for equipment control which Page 3 of 6
3Q/2014 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 caused the A main control room air conditioning unit to trip. The licensee properly realigned the system and restarted the A main control room air conditioning unit to restore compliance. This violation has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 713629.
Failure to ensure the use of the personal danger tags (PDTs) will have no adverse effects on the continued operation of the plant as required by procedure NMP-AD-003-005, PDT Tags/Maintenance Locks Use With Operating Permit Tags or PDT Documentation Sheets, was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it adversely affected the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, a PDT clearance sheet was performed on in-service equipment and resulted in the tripping of the A main control room air conditioner. The inspectors evaluated the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, dated June 19, 2012. Using Table 2, Cornerstones Affected by Degradation Condition or Programmatic Weakness, the finding affected the mitigating systems cornerstone and required further evaluation using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012. Based on Appendix A, Exhibit 2 - Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the finding screened as Green because all the questions were answered no. The inspectors determined this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the work control aspect of the human performance area, because the licensee did not coordinate work activities by incorporating actions to address the need to keep personnel apprised of work status, the operational impact of work activities, or plant conditions that may affect work activities. H.3(b) (Section 4OA2.3)
Inspection Report# : 2013005 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Jun 30, 2014 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Prove Operability Following the Failure of the Secondary Containment Surveillance Test Green. The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Procedures, Instructions, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to prove operability following a failure of a surveillance test as required by Hatch procedure 90AC-OAM-001-0, Test and Surveillance Control, Ver. 1.0, on May 12, 2014. To restore compliance, the licensee isolated the refueling floor dampers and re-performed Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.3 with satisfactory results later that day on May 12, 2014. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition report (CR) 819563.
Failure to prove operability following failure of a surveillance test as required by Hatch procedure 90AC-OAM-001-0, Test and Surveillance Control, Ver. 1.0, on May 12, 2014, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency affected the barrier integrity cornerstone and was more-than-minor because, if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, declaring equipment operable following a failed surveillance test would have the potential for the facility to operate outside of technical specification requirements. The inspectors screened this finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significant Determination Process (SDP) For Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012. The finding screened as Green per Section C of Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, because the finding only represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided by the standby gas treatment system. The inspectors determined the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of training in the human performance area, because the licensee did not ensure knowledge transfer of Surveillance Requirement 3.0.1 requirements to maintain a knowledgeable, technically competent workface and instill Page 4 of 6
3Q/2014 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 nuclear safety values. [H.9]
Inspection Report# : 2014003 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Significance: N/A Dec 13, 2013 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Update the UFSAR Following a Change in Neutron Fluence Calculation Methodology SL IV. The inspectors identified an NRC-identified Severity Level IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.71(e) for the licensees failure to update the UFSAR following the change in methodology used to calculate reactor vessel neutron fluence. Specifically, the licensee did not completely update the UFSAR to reflect the change in fluence calculation methodology from the General Electric methodology to the Radiation Analysis Modeling Application (RAMA) methodology described in BWRVIP-114-A, BWR Vessel and Internals Project, RAMA Fluence Methodology Theory Manual. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as condition report (CR) 744853.
The inspectors determined that the failure to update the UFSAR as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was greater than minor because the failure to provide complete licensing and design basis information in the UFSAR could result in either the licensee making an inappropriate licensing interpretation or the NRC making an inappropriate regulatory decision based on incomplete information in the UFSAR. This performance deficiency was dispositioned using the traditional enforcement process because failing to Page 5 of 6
3Q/2014 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 update a UFSAR had the potential to adversely impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. The performance deficiency was characterized as a Severity Level IV violation in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy (dated July 9, 2013), Section 6.1.d.3. Since this issue was dispositioned using traditional enforcement, there was no cross-cutting aspect associated with this violation (Section 4OA5.3).
Inspection Report# : 2013007 (pdf)
Last modified : November 26, 2014 Page 6 of 6
4Q/2014 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Hatch 2 4Q/2014 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Significance: Mar 31, 2014 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Operate the Unit 2 Master Feedwater Controller In Accordance With Procedures Green. A self-revealing Green non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 5.4, Procedures, was identified when an automatic recirculation pump runback occurred after improper operations of the Unit 2 master feedwater controller PF push button. The licensee restored compliance when the crew responded to the runback using approved procedures, and restored reactor water level to the correct setpoint. The violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition report (CR) 759497.
Failure to operate the Unit 2 master feedwater controller, 2C32-R600, in accordance with plant procedures on January 17, 2014, was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability during power operations. Specifically, the performance deficiency directly resulted in an unplanned transient when plant systems automatically reduced reactor power. The inspectors screened this finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significant Determination Process (SDP) For Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012. The finding screened as Green per Section B. of Exhibit 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions, because the finding did not cause a reactor trip and the loss of mitigation equipment, a high energy line-break, internal flooding, or a fire. Inspectors determined the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of avoid complacency of the human performance area because the operator did not implement the error reduction tool (reading the placard below the controller) prior to performing an action. [H.12] (Section 4OA3.1)
Inspection Report# : 2014002 (pdf)
Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 30, 2014 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Implement Fire Surveillance Procedure Resulted in Isolation of All Fire Water to the Station The NRC identified a NCV of Technical Specification 5.4, Procedures, for the licensees failure to properly implement a valve lineup in a surveillance procedure for the fire protection system. The licensee inadvertently isolated all fire suppression water during the performance of a valve lineup. Although this condition was identified by the licensee, the inspectors identified weaknesses in the licensees apparent cause determination. Therefore, this finding is being treated as an NRC-Identified finding. The violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition report 841493.
The licensees failure to implement the correct valve lineup in accordance with procedure 42SV-FPX-015-0, System Flush Fire Protection Water, was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor Page 1 of 4
4Q/2014 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 because the performance deficiency was associated with the Protection Against External Factors (Fire) attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the failure to implement the correct valve lineup of 42SV-FPX-015-0 resulted in total fire suppression water isolation. The inspectors screened this finding as requiring a Phase 3 analysis, because 1) the duration factor was determined to be 0.01 (< 3 Days), 2) the summation of estimated fire frequency for the fire areas was calculated to 1.24E-01, and 3) the delta CDF calculation was greater than 1E-6 in Table 1.5.4. A Senior Reactor Analyst performed a Phase 3 analysis for the finding using licensee input from their fire PRA. Because of the short exposure time of approximately one hour, the change in risk was below 1E-6. Therefore, this finding is Green. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect of resources in the human performance area, because the licensee did not ensure that procedure 42SV-FPX-015-0 was adequate to support nuclear safety. [H.1]
Inspection Report# : 2014004 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2014 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Install Seismic Restraints of the Unit 2 LOCA LOSP Timer Cabinet Doors Following Inspection Green. The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, when the licensee failed to prescribe in documented instructions, procedures, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances the inspection of the Unit 2 loss of coolant accident (LOCA)/loss of offsite power (LOSP) emergency diesel generator loading timers. The licensee restored compliance by adding a step within the operator rounds to confirm the LOCA/LOSP emergency diesel generator loading timer cabinet door fasteners are reengaged and tightened. This violation has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 793669.
Failure to engage and tighten the Unit 2 LOCA/LOSP emergency diesel generator loading timer cabinet doors following inspection on January 2, 2014, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor, because it is associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone protection against external factors attribute and adversely affected the corner objective to ensure the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, with none of the latches engaged the reliability of circuitry within the cabinet following a seismic event was adversely affected. The inspectors screened this finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significant Determination Process (SDP) For Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012. The finding screened as Green per Section A. of Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, because each of the four screening questions were answered no. The inspectors determined the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of resources in the human performance area because the licensee did not ensure that procedures were available and adequate for performing the nightly inspection of the Unit 2 LOCA/LOSP emergency diesel generator loading timers. [H.1]
(Section 1R15)
Inspection Report# : 2014002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2014 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Scope Safety System MOVs in the GL 96-05 Periodic Verification Program Green. The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50.55a, Codes and Standards, for the licensees failure to establish a periodic verification program for the core spray, high pressure core injection, and reactor core injection cooling systems pump outboard discharge motor-operated valves (MOVs) to ensure their long-term capability to perform their design bases safety functions. The licensee provided operators with interim instructions to declare the affected systems inoperable until permanent corrective actions are implemented. This violation has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 799261.
Page 2 of 4
4Q/2014 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Failure to establish a periodic verification program for the core spray, high pressure core injection, and reactor core injection cooling systems pump outboard discharge MOVs to ensure their long-term capability to perform their design basis safety functions was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, failure to ensure the long-term capability of the valves to perform their design basis safety functions overestimated the availability and reliability of the core spray, high pressure core injection, and reactor core injection cooling systems during testing or other activities that would place the valves in their non-safety position. The inspectors screened this finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significant Determination Process (SDP) For Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012. The finding screened as Green per Section A of Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, because each of the four screening questions were answered no. The inspectors determined the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of evaluation in the problem identification and resolution area because in 2013 the licensee had corrective actions in the corrective action program to evaluate the adequacy of the MOV periodic verification program scope and failed to identify that reliance on the valves to reposition when in the closed position required the valves to be in the program. [P.2] (Section 4OA2.2)
Inspection Report# : 2014002 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Jun 30, 2014 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Failure to Prove Operability Following the Failure of the Secondary Containment Surveillance Test Green. The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Procedures, Instructions, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to prove operability following a failure of a surveillance test as required by Hatch procedure 90AC-OAM-001-0, Test and Surveillance Control, Ver. 1.0, on May 12, 2014. To restore compliance, the licensee isolated the refueling floor dampers and re-performed Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.3 with satisfactory results later that day on May 12, 2014. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition report (CR) 819563.
Failure to prove operability following failure of a surveillance test as required by Hatch procedure 90AC-OAM-001-0, Test and Surveillance Control, Ver. 1.0, on May 12, 2014, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency affected the barrier integrity cornerstone and was more-than-minor because, if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, declaring equipment operable following a failed surveillance test would have the potential for the facility to operate outside of technical specification requirements. The inspectors screened this finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significant Determination Process (SDP) For Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012. The finding screened as Green per Section C of Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, because the finding only represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided by the standby gas treatment system. The inspectors determined the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of training in the human performance area, because the licensee did not ensure knowledge transfer of Surveillance Requirement 3.0.1 requirements to maintain a knowledgeable, technically competent workface and instill nuclear safety values. [H.9]
Inspection Report# : 2014003 (pdf)
Page 3 of 4
4Q/2014 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : February 26, 2015 Page 4 of 4
1Q/2015 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Hatch 2 1Q/2015 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 31, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Identify Embedded Conduit prior to Core Drill Operations A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Procedures, Instructions, and Drawings, was identified for failure to identify existing embedded conduit in the vicinity of prescribed core drills location. The violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR) 902506.
Failure to provide adequate instructions in Design Change Package (DCP) SNC467474 to perform core drills in the Unit 2 control building to support conduit installations was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it affected the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that 2P41F316A was rendered incapable of performing its safety related function of closing in the event of an accident condition. The finding was screened as Green because the inoperability did not last longer than the technical specification (TS) allowed outage time. The inspectors determined the performance deficiency has a cross-cutting aspect of work management in the human performance area, because the licensees work process did not identify and manage the risk commensurate to the core drill work.
Inspection Report# : 2015001 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2014 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Implement Fire Surveillance Procedure Resulted in Isolation of All Fire Water to the Station The NRC identified a NCV of Technical Specification 5.4, Procedures, for the licensees failure to properly implement a valve lineup in a surveillance procedure for the fire protection system. The licensee inadvertently isolated all fire suppression water during the performance of a valve lineup. Although this condition was identified by the licensee, the inspectors identified weaknesses in the licensees apparent cause determination. Therefore, this finding is being treated as an NRC-Identified finding. The violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition report 841493.
The licensees failure to implement the correct valve lineup in accordance with procedure 42SV-FPX-015-0, System Flush Fire Protection Water, was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor because the performance deficiency was associated with the Protection Against External Factors (Fire) attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the failure to implement the correct valve lineup of 42SV-FPX-015-0 resulted in total fire suppression water isolation. The inspectors screened this Page 1 of 4
1Q/2015 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 finding as requiring a Phase 3 analysis, because 1) the duration factor was determined to be 0.01 (< 3 Days), 2) the summation of estimated fire frequency for the fire areas was calculated to 1.24E-01, and 3) the delta CDF calculation was greater than 1E-6 in Table 1.5.4. A Senior Reactor Analyst performed a Phase 3 analysis for the finding using licensee input from their fire PRA. Because of the short exposure time of approximately one hour, the change in risk was below 1E-6. Therefore, this finding is Green. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect of resources in the human performance area, because the licensee did not ensure that procedure 42SV-FPX-015-0 was adequate to support nuclear safety. [H.1]
Inspection Report# : 2014004 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Significance: Jun 30, 2014 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Prove Operability Following the Failure of the Secondary Containment Surveillance Test Green. The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Procedures, Instructions, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to prove operability following a failure of a surveillance test as required by Hatch procedure 90AC-OAM-001-0, Test and Surveillance Control, Ver. 1.0, on May 12, 2014. To restore compliance, the licensee isolated the refueling floor dampers and re-performed Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.3 with satisfactory results later that day on May 12, 2014. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition report (CR) 819563.
Failure to prove operability following failure of a surveillance test as required by Hatch procedure 90AC-OAM-001-0, Test and Surveillance Control, Ver. 1.0, on May 12, 2014, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency affected the barrier integrity cornerstone and was more-than-minor because, if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, declaring equipment operable following a failed surveillance test would have the potential for the facility to operate outside of technical specification requirements. The inspectors screened this finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significant Determination Process (SDP) For Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012. The finding screened as Green per Section C of Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, because the finding only represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided by the standby gas treatment system. The inspectors determined the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of training in the human performance area, because the licensee did not ensure knowledge transfer of Surveillance Requirement 3.0.1 requirements to maintain a knowledgeable, technically competent workface and instill nuclear safety values. [H.9]
Inspection Report# : 2014003 (pdf)
Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Page 2 of 4
1Q/2015 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Significance: Mar 31, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to perform adequate surveys of air samples for alpha activity An NRC-Identified non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 20.1501(a) was identified for failure to perform an adequate survey. Air samples obtained in the reactor cavity and on the refuel floor during a contamination event indicating greater than 0.3 beta-gamma Derived Air Concentration (DAC) fraction level were not analyzed for alpha activity as required by the licensees procedures. Previous characterization of the area had determined the area to be an Alpha Level II area requiring additional assessment and evaluation of air samples. This violation was entered into the licensees CAP as CR 10033022.
This finding is greater than minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of Program and Process (Monitoring and RP Controls) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that failure to identify potentially significant contributors to internal dose could lead to unmonitored occupational exposures. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not related to As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and the ability to assess dose was not compromised during these instances. The cause of this finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of leaders ensuing equipment, procedures, and other resources are available and adequate in the Resources component of the Human Performance area. [H.1]
Inspection Report# : 2015001 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to perform complete analysis of air samples An NRC-Identified non-cited violation (NCV) of TS 5.4.1 was identified for the failure of the licensee to perform complete quantitative analysis of air samples using approved counting equipment as required by the licensees procedures. NMP-HP-301, Step 5.6, provides guidance for quantitative evaluation of air samples. On February 16, and 25, 2015, air samples for work activities in the Reactor Pressure Vessel head (RPV) and the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System heat exchanger were not quantitatively analyzed or evaluated for alpha activity even though the areas had been identified as having elevated alpha contamination levels. The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as CR 10034556.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Program attribute of exposure control and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from airborne radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. Failure to identify potentially significant contributors to internal dose could lead to unmonitored occupational exposures. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not involve: (1) an as low as is reasonably achievable finding, (2) an overexposure, (3) a substantial potential for overexposure, or (4) an impaired ability to assess dose related to As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and the ability to assess dose was not compromised during this instance. The cause of this finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of following processes, procedures, and work instructions in the Procedure Adherence component of the Human Performance area.
Inspection Report# : 2015001 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Page 3 of 4
1Q/2015 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : June 16, 2015 Page 4 of 4
2Q/2015 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Hatch 2 2Q/2015 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Jun 30, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Maintain HELB Penetrations A Green NRC identified non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified for failure to maintain reactor building residual heat removal (RHR) diagonal room penetrations in the designed configuration. The violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 10055943. The licensee issued work orders to seal the affected penetrations in accordance with design documents.
The licensees failure to maintain the penetration seals in accordance with design drawings was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the failure to maintain the design basis configuration compromised the capability of the RHR diagonal room wall to restrict a high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) high energy line break to the torus area. The finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the loss of component function did not significantly affect the function of the train or system. The inspectors determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of work management in the human performance area (H.5), because the licensees work process did not control work activities such that nuclear safety was the overriding priority. (Section 1R15)
Inspection Report# : 2015002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Identify Embedded Conduit prior to Core Drill Operations A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Procedures, Instructions, and Drawings, was identified for failure to identify existing embedded conduit in the vicinity of prescribed core drills location. The violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR) 902506.
Failure to provide adequate instructions in Design Change Package (DCP) SNC467474 to perform core drills in the Unit 2 control building to support conduit installations was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it affected the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that 2P41F316A was rendered incapable of performing its safety related function of closing in the event of an accident condition. The finding was screened as Green because the inoperability did not last longer than the technical specification (TS) allowed outage time. The inspectors determined the performance deficiency has a cross-cutting aspect of work management in the human performance area, because Page 1 of 4
2Q/2015 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 the licensees work process did not identify and manage the risk commensurate to the core drill work.
Inspection Report# : 2015001 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2014 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Implement Fire Surveillance Procedure Resulted in Isolation of All Fire Water to the Station The NRC identified a NCV of Technical Specification 5.4, Procedures, for the licensees failure to properly implement a valve lineup in a surveillance procedure for the fire protection system. The licensee inadvertently isolated all fire suppression water during the performance of a valve lineup. Although this condition was identified by the licensee, the inspectors identified weaknesses in the licensees apparent cause determination. Therefore, this finding is being treated as an NRC-Identified finding. The violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition report 841493.
The licensees failure to implement the correct valve lineup in accordance with procedure 42SV-FPX-015-0, System Flush Fire Protection Water, was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor because the performance deficiency was associated with the Protection Against External Factors (Fire) attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the failure to implement the correct valve lineup of 42SV-FPX-015-0 resulted in total fire suppression water isolation. The inspectors screened this finding as requiring a Phase 3 analysis, because 1) the duration factor was determined to be 0.01 (< 3 Days), 2) the summation of estimated fire frequency for the fire areas was calculated to 1.24E-01, and 3) the delta CDF calculation was greater than 1E-6 in Table 1.5.4. A Senior Reactor Analyst performed a Phase 3 analysis for the finding using licensee input from their fire PRA. Because of the short exposure time of approximately one hour, the change in risk was below 1E-6. Therefore, this finding is Green. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect of resources in the human performance area, because the licensee did not ensure that procedure 42SV-FPX-015-0 was adequate to support nuclear safety. [H.1]
Inspection Report# : 2014004 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Mar 31, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to perform adequate surveys of air samples for alpha activity An NRC-Identified non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 20.1501(a) was identified for failure to perform an adequate survey. Air samples obtained in the reactor cavity and on the refuel floor during a contamination event indicating Page 2 of 4
2Q/2015 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 greater than 0.3 beta-gamma Derived Air Concentration (DAC) fraction level were not analyzed for alpha activity as required by the licensees procedures. Previous characterization of the area had determined the area to be an Alpha Level II area requiring additional assessment and evaluation of air samples. This violation was entered into the licensees CAP as CR 10033022.
This finding is greater than minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of Program and Process (Monitoring and RP Controls) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that failure to identify potentially significant contributors to internal dose could lead to unmonitored occupational exposures. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not related to As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and the ability to assess dose was not compromised during these instances. The cause of this finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of leaders ensuing equipment, procedures, and other resources are available and adequate in the Resources component of the Human Performance area. [H.1]
Inspection Report# : 2015001 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to perform complete analysis of air samples An NRC-Identified non-cited violation (NCV) of TS 5.4.1 was identified for the failure of the licensee to perform complete quantitative analysis of air samples using approved counting equipment as required by the licensees procedures. NMP-HP-301, Step 5.6, provides guidance for quantitative evaluation of air samples. On February 16, and 25, 2015, air samples for work activities in the Reactor Pressure Vessel head (RPV) and the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System heat exchanger were not quantitatively analyzed or evaluated for alpha activity even though the areas had been identified as having elevated alpha contamination levels. The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as CR 10034556.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Program attribute of exposure control and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from airborne radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. Failure to identify potentially significant contributors to internal dose could lead to unmonitored occupational exposures. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not involve: (1) an as low as is reasonably achievable finding, (2) an overexposure, (3) a substantial potential for overexposure, or (4) an impaired ability to assess dose related to As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and the ability to assess dose was not compromised during this instance. The cause of this finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of following processes, procedures, and work instructions in the Procedure Adherence component of the Human Performance area.
Inspection Report# : 2015001 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission Page 3 of 4
2Q/2015 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : August 07, 2015 Page 4 of 4
3Q/2015 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Hatch 2 3Q/2015 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 30, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate Surveillance on Fire Barriers and Penetration Seals The NRC identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of Hatch Operating License Conditions (OLCs) 2.C.(3) and 2.C.(3)(a), for Units 1 and 2 respectively, for the licensees failure to perform fire barrier penetration seal inspections in accordance with the requirements of Surveillance Requirement 2.1.1.c of Appendix B of the Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA). Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that fire-rated penetrations and fire-rated barriers separating redundant safe-shutdown trains were adequate to keep a fire from spreading from one fire area to another. To restore compliance the licensee performed a 100 percent inspection of fire-rated penetrations to verify the material condition of the sites rated fire barrier penetrations.
The licensees failure to perform fire barrier penetration seal inspections was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the reactor safety Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (i.e. fire), and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Based on the finding being of very low probability, the finding was determined to be of very-low safety significance (Green). The cause of the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, field presence, because plant leadership did not reinforce standards and expectations, and did not ensure that deviations from standards and expectations were corrected promptly (H.2). Specifically, licensee oversight was not properly engaged to ensure that surveillances were performed adequately, and that deviations were addressed appropriately.
Inspection Report# : 2015003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Maintain HELB Penetrations A Green NRC identified non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified for failure to maintain reactor building residual heat removal (RHR) diagonal room penetrations in the designed configuration. The violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 10055943. The licensee issued work orders to seal the affected penetrations in accordance with design documents.
Page 1 of 4
3Q/2015 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 The licensees failure to maintain the penetration seals in accordance with design drawings was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the failure to maintain the design basis configuration compromised the capability of the RHR diagonal room wall to restrict a high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) high energy line break to the torus area. The finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the loss of component function did not significantly affect the function of the train or system. The inspectors determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of work management in the human performance area (H.5), because the licensees work process did not control work activities such that nuclear safety was the overriding priority. (Section 1R15)
Inspection Report# : 2015002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2015 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Identify Embedded Conduit prior to Core Drill Operations A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Procedures, Instructions, and Drawings, was identified for failure to identify existing embedded conduit in the vicinity of prescribed core drills location. The violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR) 902506.
Failure to provide adequate instructions in Design Change Package (DCP) SNC467474 to perform core drills in the Unit 2 control building to support conduit installations was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it affected the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that 2P41F316A was rendered incapable of performing its safety related function of closing in the event of an accident condition. The finding was screened as Green because the inoperability did not last longer than the technical specification (TS) allowed outage time. The inspectors determined the performance deficiency has a cross-cutting aspect of work management in the human performance area, because the licensees work process did not identify and manage the risk commensurate to the core drill work.
Inspection Report# : 2015001 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Mar 31, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Page 2 of 4
3Q/2015 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Failure to perform adequate surveys of air samples for alpha activity An NRC-Identified non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 20.1501(a) was identified for failure to perform an adequate survey. Air samples obtained in the reactor cavity and on the refuel floor during a contamination event indicating greater than 0.3 beta-gamma Derived Air Concentration (DAC) fraction level were not analyzed for alpha activity as required by the licensees procedures. Previous characterization of the area had determined the area to be an Alpha Level II area requiring additional assessment and evaluation of air samples. This violation was entered into the licensees CAP as CR 10033022.
This finding is greater than minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of Program and Process (Monitoring and RP Controls) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that failure to identify potentially significant contributors to internal dose could lead to unmonitored occupational exposures. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not related to As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and the ability to assess dose was not compromised during these instances. The cause of this finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of leaders ensuing equipment, procedures, and other resources are available and adequate in the Resources component of the Human Performance area. [H.1]
Inspection Report# : 2015001 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to perform complete analysis of air samples An NRC-Identified non-cited violation (NCV) of TS 5.4.1 was identified for the failure of the licensee to perform complete quantitative analysis of air samples using approved counting equipment as required by the licensees procedures. NMP-HP-301, Step 5.6, provides guidance for quantitative evaluation of air samples. On February 16, and 25, 2015, air samples for work activities in the Reactor Pressure Vessel head (RPV) and the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System heat exchanger were not quantitatively analyzed or evaluated for alpha activity even though the areas had been identified as having elevated alpha contamination levels. The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as CR 10034556.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Program attribute of exposure control and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from airborne radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. Failure to identify potentially significant contributors to internal dose could lead to unmonitored occupational exposures. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not involve: (1) an as low as is reasonably achievable finding, (2) an overexposure, (3) a substantial potential for overexposure, or (4) an impaired ability to assess dose related to As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and the ability to assess dose was not compromised during this instance. The cause of this finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of following processes, procedures, and work instructions in the Procedure Adherence component of the Human Performance area.
Inspection Report# : 2015001 (pdf)
Public Radiation Safety Page 3 of 4
3Q/2015 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : December 15, 2015 Page 4 of 4
4Q/2015 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Hatch 2 4Q/2015 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Oct 23, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate Circuit Breaker As-Found Testing The NRC identified a Non-cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI Test Control, for the failure to perform circuit breaker as-found electromechanical testing prior to inspecting, cleaning, and lubricating the mechanical components. The licensee planned to revise the test procedures to correct the deficiencies, and entered this violation into their Corrective Action Program as Condition Reports 10137545 and 10126677.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective, in that inadequate periodic testing to detect deterioration toward an unacceptable condition, the likelihood that these breakers could unpredictably fail when called upon increases with time in service. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component (SSC), and the SSC maintained its operability or functionality. This finding was not assigned a cross-cutting aspect because the issue did not reflect current licensee performance (Section 1R21.2.b.1).
Inspection Report# : 2015007 (pdf)
Significance: Oct 23, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Correct Nonconformances with Regulatory Guide 1.9-1971 The NRC identified a Non-cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to correct non-conformances with the acceptance limits established for the emergency diesel generator (EDG) test requirements. The licensee performed an operability evaluation, and determined the EDGs were operable based on successful completion of the required Technical Specification surveillance testing. In addition, the licensee planned to revise the EDG test procedures suitable for RG 1.9-1971 testing requirements, and entered this violation into their Corrective Action Program as Condition Report 10133018.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective, in that the failure to ensure that non-conformances with the acceptance limits were adequately incorporated into the EDG test procedures, which affected the reliability of the EDGs. The finding was determined to be of very low safety Page 1 of 6
4Q/2015 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 significance (Green) because the finding was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component (SSC), and the SSC maintained its operability or functionality. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution (P.2) because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate issues to ensure that resolutions address causes, and extent of conditions, commensurate with their safety significance (PI.2)
Inspection Report# : 2015007 (pdf)
Significance: Oct 23, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Assure that Class 1E Components were Qualified for Design Temperatures The NRC identified a Non-cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion VII, Control of Purchased Material, Equipment, and Services, for the licensees failure to ensure that adequate environmental test requirements were satisfied before relying on safety-related components to perform their intended safety functions. As an immediate corrective action, the licensee performed an operability evaluation and determined the components were operable. In addition, the licensee indicated that they planned to determine adequate corrective actions to restore full qualification of these commercial grade components, and entered this issue into their Corrective Action Program as Condition Report 10138133.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective, in that the licensee failed to verify the environmental qualification of safety-related components to ensure their performance up to the expected temperature of 150 degrees F. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC, and the SSC maintained its operability or functionality. This finding was not assigned a cross-cutting aspect because the issue did not reflect current licensee performance Inspection Report# : 2015007 (pdf)
Significance: Oct 23, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Verify Design Basis Timing Margins for Safety Related Motor Operated Valves Green: The NRC identified a Non-cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to evaluate if transients in control power voltage could affect the design basis margins for the timing of safety-related motor operated valves (MOVs).
The licensee planned to perform corrective actions to ensure that the safety analysis remains bounded, and entered this violation into their Corrective Action Program as Condition Report 10138053.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective, in that the failure to evaluate transients that effect the timing margins for NOVs affected the established reliability and capability of the valves. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the deficiency did not result in actual loss of safety function. This finding was no assigned a cross-cutting aspect because the issue did not reflect current licensee performance Inspection Report# : 2015007 (pdf)
Page 2 of 6
4Q/2015 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Significance: Oct 23, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Classify RCIC Sub-components as Safety-Related The NRC identified a Non-cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to classify components in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.26 as specified by the Unit 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 3.2.2. As an immediate corrective action, the licensee performed an operability evaluation, and determined that the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) was operable. In addition, the licensee planned to reclassify the relief valve as safety-related, and entered this issue into their Corrective Action Program as Condition Reports 10132353, 10136685, and 10141965.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and affected the cornerstone objective, in that inadequate classification of the relief valves affected the reliabi ity of safety-related function of the RCIC system. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC, and the SSC maintained its operability or functionality. This finding was not assigned a cross-cutting aspect because the issue did not reflect current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2015007 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate Surveillance on Fire Barriers and Penetration Seals The NRC identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of Hatch Operating License Conditions (OLCs) 2.C.(3) and 2.C.(3)(a), for Units 1 and 2 respectively, for the licensees failure to perform fire barrier penetration seal inspections in accordance with the requirements of Surveillance Requirement 2.1.1.c of Appendix B of the Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA). Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that fire-rated penetrations and fire-rated barriers separating redundant safe-shutdown trains were adequate to keep a fire from spreading from one fire area to another. To restore compliance the licensee performed a 100 percent inspection of fire-rated penetrations to verify the material condition of the sites rated fire barrier penetrations.
The licensees failure to perform fire barrier penetration seal inspections was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the reactor safety Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (i.e. fire), and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Based on the finding being of very low probability, the finding was determined to be of very-low safety significance (Green). The cause of the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, field presence, because plant leadership did not reinforce standards and expectations, and did not ensure that deviations from standards and expectations were corrected promptly (H.2). Specifically, licensee oversight was not properly engaged to ensure that surveillances were performed adequately, and that deviations were addressed appropriately.
Inspection Report# : 2015003 (pdf)
Page 3 of 6
4Q/2015 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Significance: Jun 30, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Maintain HELB Penetrations A Green NRC identified non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified for failure to maintain reactor building residual heat removal (RHR) diagonal room penetrations in the designed configuration. The violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 10055943. The licensee issued work orders to seal the affected penetrations in accordance with design documents.
The licensees failure to maintain the penetration seals in accordance with design drawings was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the failure to maintain the design basis configuration compromised the capability of the RHR diagonal room wall to restrict a high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) high energy line break to the torus area. The finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the loss of component function did not significantly affect the function of the train or system. The inspectors determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of work management in the human performance area (H.5), because the licensees work process did not control work activities such that nuclear safety was the overriding priority. (Section 1R15)
Inspection Report# : 2015002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2015 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Identify Embedded Conduit prior to Core Drill Operations A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Procedures, Instructions, and Drawings, was identified for failure to identify existing embedded conduit in the vicinity of prescribed core drills location. The violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR) 902506.
Failure to provide adequate instructions in Design Change Package (DCP) SNC467474 to perform core drills in the Unit 2 control building to support conduit installations was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it affected the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that 2P41F316A was rendered incapable of performing its safety related function of closing in the event of an accident condition. The finding was screened as Green because the inoperability did not last longer than the technical specification (TS) allowed outage time. The inspectors determined the performance deficiency has a cross-cutting aspect of work management in the human performance area, because the licensees work process did not identify and manage the risk commensurate to the core drill work.
Inspection Report# : 2015001 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Page 4 of 6
4Q/2015 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Occupational Radiation Safety Significance: Mar 31, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to perform adequate surveys of air samples for alpha activity An NRC-Identified non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 20.1501(a) was identified for failure to perform an adequate survey. Air samples obtained in the reactor cavity and on the refuel floor during a contamination event indicating greater than 0.3 beta-gamma Derived Air Concentration (DAC) fraction level were not analyzed for alpha activity as required by the licensees procedures. Previous characterization of the area had determined the area to be an Alpha Level II area requiring additional assessment and evaluation of air samples. This violation was entered into the licensees CAP as CR 10033022.
This finding is greater than minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of Program and Process (Monitoring and RP Controls) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that failure to identify potentially significant contributors to internal dose could lead to unmonitored occupational exposures. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not related to As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and the ability to assess dose was not compromised during these instances. The cause of this finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of leaders ensuing equipment, procedures, and other resources are available and adequate in the Resources component of the Human Performance area. [H.1]
Inspection Report# : 2015001 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to perform complete analysis of air samples An NRC-Identified non-cited violation (NCV) of TS 5.4.1 was identified for the failure of the licensee to perform complete quantitative analysis of air samples using approved counting equipment as required by the licensees procedures. NMP-HP-301, Step 5.6, provides guidance for quantitative evaluation of air samples. On February 16, and 25, 2015, air samples for work activities in the Reactor Pressure Vessel head (RPV) and the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System heat exchanger were not quantitatively analyzed or evaluated for alpha activity even though the areas had been identified as having elevated alpha contamination levels. The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as CR 10034556.
The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Program attribute of exposure control and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from airborne radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. Failure to identify potentially significant contributors to internal dose could lead to unmonitored occupational exposures. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not involve: (1) an as low as is reasonably achievable finding, (2) an overexposure, (3) a substantial potential for overexposure, or (4) an impaired ability to assess dose related to As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and the ability to assess dose was not compromised during this instance. The cause of this finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of following processes, procedures, and work instructions in the Procedure Adherence component of the Human Performance area.
Inspection Report# : 2015001 (pdf)
Page 5 of 6
4Q/2015 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : March 01, 2016 Page 6 of 6
1Q/2016 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Hatch 2 1Q/2016 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Oct 23, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate Circuit Breaker As-Found Testing The NRC identified a Non-cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI Test Control, for the failure to perform circuit breaker as-found electromechanical testing prior to inspecting, cleaning, and lubricating the mechanical components. The licensee planned to revise the test procedures to correct the deficiencies, and entered this violation into their Corrective Action Program as Condition Reports 10137545 and 10126677.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective, in that inadequate periodic testing to detect deterioration toward an unacceptable condition, the likelihood that these breakers could unpredictably fail when called upon increases with time in service. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component (SSC), and the SSC maintained its operability or functionality. This finding was not assigned a cross-cutting aspect because the issue did not reflect current licensee performance (Section 1R21.2.b.1).
Inspection Report# : 2015007 (pdf)
Significance: Oct 23, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Correct Nonconformances with Regulatory Guide 1.9-1971 The NRC identified a Non-cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to correct non-conformances with the acceptance limits established for the emergency diesel generator (EDG) test requirements. The licensee performed an operability evaluation, and determined the EDGs were operable based on successful completion of the required Technical Specification surveillance testing. In addition, the licensee planned to revise the EDG test procedures suitable for RG 1.9-1971 testing requirements, and entered this violation into their Corrective Action Program as Condition Report 10133018.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective, in that the failure to ensure that non-conformances with the acceptance limits were adequately incorporated into the EDG test procedures, which affected the reliability of the EDGs. The finding was determined to be of very low safety Page 1 of 5
1Q/2016 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 significance (Green) because the finding was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component (SSC), and the SSC maintained its operability or functionality. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution (P.2) because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate issues to ensure that resolutions address causes, and extent of conditions, commensurate with their safety significance (PI.2)
Inspection Report# : 2015007 (pdf)
Significance: Oct 23, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Assure that Class 1E Components were Qualified for Design Temperatures The NRC identified a Non-cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion VII, Control of Purchased Material, Equipment, and Services, for the licensees failure to ensure that adequate environmental test requirements were satisfied before relying on safety-related components to perform their intended safety functions. As an immediate corrective action, the licensee performed an operability evaluation and determined the components were operable. In addition, the licensee indicated that they planned to determine adequate corrective actions to restore full qualification of these commercial grade components, and entered this issue into their Corrective Action Program as Condition Report 10138133.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective, in that the licensee failed to verify the environmental qualification of safety-related components to ensure their performance up to the expected temperature of 150 degrees F. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC, and the SSC maintained its operability or functionality. This finding was not assigned a cross-cutting aspect because the issue did not reflect current licensee performance Inspection Report# : 2015007 (pdf)
Significance: Oct 23, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Verify Design Basis Timing Margins for Safety Related Motor Operated Valves Green: The NRC identified a Non-cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to evaluate if transients in control power voltage could affect the design basis margins for the timing of safety-related motor operated valves (MOVs).
The licensee planned to perform corrective actions to ensure that the safety analysis remains bounded, and entered this violation into their Corrective Action Program as Condition Report 10138053.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective, in that the failure to evaluate transients that effect the timing margins for NOVs affected the established reliability and capability of the valves. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the deficiency did not result in actual loss of safety function. This finding was no assigned a cross-cutting aspect because the issue did not reflect current licensee performance Inspection Report# : 2015007 (pdf)
Page 2 of 5
1Q/2016 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Significance: Oct 23, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Classify RCIC Sub-components as Safety-Related The NRC identified a Non-cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to classify components in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.26 as specified by the Unit 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 3.2.2. As an immediate corrective action, the licensee performed an operability evaluation, and determined that the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) was operable. In addition, the licensee planned to reclassify the relief valve as safety-related, and entered this issue into their Corrective Action Program as Condition Reports 10132353, 10136685, and 10141965.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and affected the cornerstone objective, in that inadequate classification of the relief valves affected the reliabi ity of safety-related function of the RCIC system. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC, and the SSC maintained its operability or functionality. This finding was not assigned a cross-cutting aspect because the issue did not reflect current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2015007 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate Surveillance on Fire Barriers and Penetration Seals The NRC identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of Hatch Operating License Conditions (OLCs) 2.C.(3) and 2.C.(3)(a), for Units 1 and 2 respectively, for the licensees failure to perform fire barrier penetration seal inspections in accordance with the requirements of Surveillance Requirement 2.1.1.c of Appendix B of the Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA). Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that fire-rated penetrations and fire-rated barriers separating redundant safe-shutdown trains were adequate to keep a fire from spreading from one fire area to another. To restore compliance the licensee performed a 100 percent inspection of fire-rated penetrations to verify the material condition of the sites rated fire barrier penetrations.
The licensees failure to perform fire barrier penetration seal inspections was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the reactor safety Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (i.e. fire), and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Based on the finding being of very low probability, the finding was determined to be of very-low safety significance (Green). The cause of the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, field presence, because plant leadership did not reinforce standards and expectations, and did not ensure that deviations from standards and expectations were corrected promptly (H.2). Specifically, licensee oversight was not properly engaged to ensure that surveillances were performed adequately, and that deviations were addressed appropriately.
Inspection Report# : 2015003 (pdf)
Page 3 of 5
1Q/2016 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Significance: Jun 30, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Maintain HELB Penetrations A Green NRC identified non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified for failure to maintain reactor building residual heat removal (RHR) diagonal room penetrations in the designed configuration. The violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 10055943. The licensee issued work orders to seal the affected penetrations in accordance with design documents.
The licensees failure to maintain the penetration seals in accordance with design drawings was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the failure to maintain the design basis configuration compromised the capability of the RHR diagonal room wall to restrict a high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) high energy line break to the torus area. The finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the loss of component function did not significantly affect the function of the train or system. The inspectors determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of work management in the human performance area (H.5), because the licensees work process did not control work activities such that nuclear safety was the overriding priority. (Section 1R15)
Inspection Report# : 2015002 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Page 4 of 5
1Q/2016 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Miscellaneous Last modified : July 11, 2016 Page 5 of 5
2Q/2016 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Hatch 2 2Q/2016 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Jun 30, 2016 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation
, Failure to Implement Maintenance Procedure for Control Room Air Conditioning System A self-revealing Green NCV of Hatch Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specification 5.4, Procedures, was identified when the B main control room air conditioning condenser tripped on high discharge pressure due to an improperly adjusted water regulating valve. The licensee entered the condition into their corrective action program as CR 10217777, adjusted the water regulating valve to the appropriate set-point.
Failure to adjust the water regulating valve in accordance with preventive maintenance procedure 52PM-Z41-002-1, Control Room Air Conditioning Maintenance, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the failure resulted in the inoperability of the B main control room air conditioner. The finding screened as Green because the loss of component function did not significantly affect the function of the train or system. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Resources aspect of the Human Performance area, because licensee leadership did not ensure that procedures were available and adequate to support nuclear safety [H.1].
Inspection Report# : 2016002 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2016 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Adequately Qualify Modifications to Class 1E 4160V Buses The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to verify adequate design and qualification of Class 1E buses in accordance with Institute for Electronics and Electrical Engineering (IEEE) 279-1971, Standard Criteria for rotection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. The licensee entered this issue into the licensees corrective action program as CR10240030. The licensee planned to correct the issue prior to installing new transformers.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. The finding determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the system, structure, or component maintained its operability or functionality. The finding was assigned a cross-cutting aspect of Training [H.9], in the Human Performance area because the organization did not provide training and ensure knowledge transfer to maintain a knowledgeable, technically competent workforce to adequately complete a modification of the Class 1E buses.
Page 1 of 6
2Q/2016 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Inspection Report# : 2016008 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2016 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to identify a condition adverse to quality for Masterpact 600V breakers The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for failing to identify the applicability of US NRC Part 21 Report 2016-20-01 to the 1B emergency diesel generators (EDGs) motor control center (MCC 1B). The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program for resolution as CR 10240007. For corrective actions, the licensee performed an immediate operability determination and established compensatory measures to reset the breaker linkage in the event that it malfunctions.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Equipment Performance and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of the systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the structure, system, or component maintained its operability or functionality. The finding was assigned a cross-cutting aspect of Evaluation [P.2], in the Problem Identification and Resolution area because the organization did not thoroughly evaluate the Masterpact breaker Part 21 to ensure that resolutions addressed the causes.
Inspection Report# : 2016008 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2016 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Control Qualification of Purchased 1E Components in Accordance to IEEE 323-1974 The inspectors identified two examples of a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion VII, Control of Purchased Material, Equipment, and Services, for failing to assure that vendors met the quality standards specified in procurement documents (IEEE 323-1974, IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations). The licensee entered this issue into the licensees corrective action program as CR10240023 and CR102399929. The licensee planned to ensure the adequate qualification of Class 1E components.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Design Control and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of the systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the structure, system, or component maintained its operability or functionality. The finding was assigned a cross-cutting aspect of Field Presence [H.2], in the Human Performance area because senior managers did not ensure supervisory and management oversight of contractors.
Inspection Report# : 2016008 (pdf)
Significance: Apr 22, 2016 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to provide reasonable assurance that Appendix R time critical operator actions (TCOAs) can be completed in a timely manner The NRC identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) violation of Hatch Technical Specifications 5.4.1.d, "Procedures, for Units 1 and 2, for not ensuring manual action feasibility for actions in fire area (FA) 0024.
Page 2 of 6
2Q/2016 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Specifically, the licensee failed to provide reasonable assurance that a credited manual action to ensure emergency power was both feasible and reliable in response to a fire event. The licensee plans to assess the issue and entered this violation into their Corrective Action Program (CAP) based upon CR10209664, CR10213119, &
CR10212821.
The licensees failure to provide reasonable assurance that Appendix R time critical operator actions (TCOAs) associated with fire events can be completed in a timely manner was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it could to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the exclusion of TCOAs from a validation process could lead to plant or program changes that prohibit the completion of actions required to meet the licensing basis. Using the guidance of IMC 0609, App. F, the finding was screened as Green because the finding did not affect the ability to reach and maintain a stable plant condition within the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of a fire event. The deficiency was screened with IMC 0310, Aspects Within Cross Cutting Areas, to determine if any cross-cutting areas were applicable. The team concluded cross-cutting was applicable to the problem identification and resolution (PI&R) area, evaluation attribute due the licensees failure to thoroughly evaluate issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance (P.2).
Inspection Report# : 2016007 (pdf)
Significance: Oct 23, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate Circuit Breaker As-Found Testing The NRC identified a Non-cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI Test Control, for the failure to perform circuit breaker as-found electromechanical testing prior to inspecting, cleaning, and lubricating the mechanical components. The licensee planned to revise the test procedures to correct the deficiencies, and entered this violation into their Corrective Action Program as Condition Reports 10137545 and 10126677.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective, in that inadequate periodic testing to detect deterioration toward an unacceptable condition, the likelihood that these breakers could unpredictably fail when called upon increases with time in service. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component (SSC), and the SSC maintained its operability or functionality. This finding was not assigned a cross-cutting aspect because the issue did not reflect current licensee performance (Section 1R21.2.b.1).
Inspection Report# : 2015007 (pdf)
Significance: Oct 23, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Correct Nonconformances with Regulatory Guide 1.9-1971 The NRC identified a Non-cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to correct non-conformances with the acceptance limits established for the emergency diesel generator (EDG) test requirements. The licensee performed an operability evaluation, and determined the EDGs were operable based on successful completion of the required Technical Specification surveillance testing. In addition, the licensee planned to revise the EDG test procedures suitable for RG 1.9-1971 testing requirements, and entered this violation into their Corrective Action Program as Condition Report 10133018.
Page 3 of 6
2Q/2016 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective, in that the failure to ensure that non-conformances with the acceptance limits were adequately incorporated into the EDG test procedures, which affected the reliability of the EDGs. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component (SSC), and the SSC maintained its operability or functionality. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution (P.2) because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate issues to ensure that resolutions address causes, and extent of conditions, commensurate with their safety significance (PI.2)
Inspection Report# : 2015007 (pdf)
Significance: Oct 23, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Assure that Class 1E Components were Qualified for Design Temperatures The NRC identified a Non-cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion VII, Control of Purchased Material, Equipment, and Services, for the licensees failure to ensure that adequate environmental test requirements were satisfied before relying on safety-related components to perform their intended safety functions. As an immediate corrective action, the licensee performed an operability evaluation and determined the components were operable. In addition, the licensee indicated that they planned to determine adequate corrective actions to restore full qualification of these commercial grade components, and entered this issue into their Corrective Action Program as Condition Report 10138133.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective, in that the licensee failed to verify the environmental qualification of safety-related components to ensure their performance up to the expected temperature of 150 degrees F. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC, and the SSC maintained its operability or functionality. This finding was not assigned a cross-cutting aspect because the issue did not reflect current licensee performance Inspection Report# : 2015007 (pdf)
Significance: Oct 23, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Verify Design Basis Timing Margins for Safety Related Motor Operated Valves Green: The NRC identified a Non-cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to evaluate if transients in control power voltage could affect the design basis margins for the timing of safety-related motor operated valves (MOVs).
The licensee planned to perform corrective actions to ensure that the safety analysis remains bounded, and entered this violation into their Corrective Action Program as Condition Report 10138053.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective, in that the failure to evaluate transients that effect the timing margins for NOVs affected the established reliability and capability of the valves. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the deficiency did not result in Page 4 of 6
2Q/2016 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 actual loss of safety function. This finding was no assigned a cross-cutting aspect because the issue did not reflect current licensee performance Inspection Report# : 2015007 (pdf)
Significance: Oct 23, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Classify RCIC Sub-components as Safety-Related The NRC identified a Non-cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to classify components in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.26 as specified by the Unit 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 3.2.2. As an immediate corrective action, the licensee performed an operability evaluation, and determined that the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) was operable. In addition, the licensee planned to reclassify the relief valve as safety-related, and entered this issue into their Corrective Action Program as Condition Reports 10132353, 10136685, and 10141965.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and affected the cornerstone objective, in that inadequate classification of the relief valves affected the reliabi ity of safety-related function of the RCIC system. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC, and the SSC maintained its operability or functionality. This finding was not assigned a cross-cutting aspect because the issue did not reflect current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2015007 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate Surveillance on Fire Barriers and Penetration Seals The NRC identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of Hatch Operating License Conditions (OLCs) 2.C.(3) and 2.C.(3)(a), for Units 1 and 2 respectively, for the licensees failure to perform fire barrier penetration seal inspections in accordance with the requirements of Surveillance Requirement 2.1.1.c of Appendix B of the Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA). Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that fire-rated penetrations and fire-rated barriers separating redundant safe-shutdown trains were adequate to keep a fire from spreading from one fire area to another. To restore compliance the licensee performed a 100 percent inspection of fire-rated penetrations to verify the material condition of the sites rated fire barrier penetrations.
The licensees failure to perform fire barrier penetration seal inspections was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the reactor safety Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (i.e. fire), and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Based on the finding being of very low probability, the finding was determined to be of very-low safety significance (Green). The cause of the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, field presence, because plant leadership did not reinforce standards and expectations, and did not ensure that deviations from standards and expectations were corrected promptly (H.2). Specifically, licensee oversight was not properly Page 5 of 6
2Q/2016 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 engaged to ensure that surveillances were performed adequately, and that deviations were addressed appropriately.
Inspection Report# : 2015003 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : August 29, 2016 Page 6 of 6
3Q/2016 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Hatch 2 3Q/2016 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 30, 2016 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Ensure Work Hours are Within Work Hour Limits An NRC-identified non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 26, Fitness for Duty Programs, was identified when the licensee failed to ensure that personnel subject to work hour controls did not exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in a work week. The licensee entered this condition into their corrective action program as Condition Report 10214872 and restored compliance when the affected individuals received an adequate rest period.
The failure to ensure that work hours for personnel subject to work hour controls were tracked in accordance with licensee procedures was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the failure to appropriately implement work hour limitations for covered workers could adversely impact the conduct and oversight of work on safety significant components. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not cause any known effects to plant safety due to worker fatigue.
The inspectors determined this performance deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect of Consistent Process in the Human Performance area because the licensee failed to assess which workers were subject to work hour limits. [H.13]
Inspection Report# : 2016003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2016 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation
, Failure to Implement Maintenance Procedure for Control Room Air Conditioning System A self-revealing Green NCV of Hatch Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specification 5.4, Procedures, was identified when the B main control room air conditioning condenser tripped on high discharge pressure due to an improperly adjusted water regulating valve. The licensee entered the condition into their corrective action program as CR 10217777, adjusted the water regulating valve to the appropriate set-point.
Failure to adjust the water regulating valve in accordance with preventive maintenance procedure 52PM-Z41-002-1, Control Room Air Conditioning Maintenance, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the failure resulted in the inoperability of the B main control room air conditioner. The finding screened as Green because the loss of component function did not significantly affect the function of the train or system. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Resources aspect of the Human Performance area, because licensee leadership did not ensure that procedures were available and adequate to support nuclear safety [H.1].
Page 1 of 6
3Q/2016 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Inspection Report# : 2016002 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2016 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Adequately Qualify Modifications to Class 1E 4160V Buses The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to verify adequate design and qualification of Class 1E buses in accordance with Institute for Electronics and Electrical Engineering (IEEE) 279-1971, Standard Criteria for rotection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. The licensee entered this issue into the licensees corrective action program as CR10240030. The licensee planned to correct the issue prior to installing new transformers.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. The finding determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the system, structure, or component maintained its operability or functionality. The finding was assigned a cross-cutting aspect of Training [H.9], in the Human Performance area because the organization did not provide training and ensure knowledge transfer to maintain a knowledgeable, technically competent workforce to adequately complete a modification of the Class 1E buses.
Inspection Report# : 2016008 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2016 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to identify a condition adverse to quality for Masterpact 600V breakers The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for failing to identify the applicability of US NRC Part 21 Report 2016-20-01 to the 1B emergency diesel generators (EDGs) motor control center (MCC 1B). The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program for resolution as CR 10240007. For corrective actions, the licensee performed an immediate operability determination and established compensatory measures to reset the breaker linkage in the event that it malfunctions.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Equipment Performance and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of the systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the structure, system, or component maintained its operability or functionality. The finding was assigned a cross-cutting aspect of Evaluation [P.2], in the Problem Identification and Resolution area because the organization did not thoroughly evaluate the Masterpact breaker Part 21 to ensure that resolutions addressed the causes.
Inspection Report# : 2016008 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2016 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Control Qualification of Purchased 1E Components in Accordance to IEEE 323-1974 The inspectors identified two examples of a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion VII, Control of Purchased Material, Equipment, and Services, for failing to assure that vendors met the quality standards specified in procurement documents (IEEE 323-1974, IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations). The licensee entered this issue into the licensees corrective action program as CR10240023 Page 2 of 6
3Q/2016 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 and CR102399929. The licensee planned to ensure the adequate qualification of Class 1E components.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Design Control and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of the systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the structure, system, or component maintained its operability or functionality. The finding was assigned a cross-cutting aspect of Field Presence [H.2], in the Human Performance area because senior managers did not ensure supervisory and management oversight of contractors.
Inspection Report# : 2016008 (pdf)
Significance: Apr 22, 2016 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to provide reasonable assurance that Appendix R time critical operator actions (TCOAs) can be completed in a timely manner The NRC identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) violation of Hatch Technical Specifications 5.4.1.d, "Procedures, for Units 1 and 2, for not ensuring manual action feasibility for actions in fire area (FA) 0024.
Specifically, the licensee failed to provide reasonable assurance that a credited manual action to ensure emergency power was both feasible and reliable in response to a fire event. The licensee plans to assess the issue and entered this violation into their Corrective Action Program (CAP) based upon CR10209664, CR10213119, &
CR10212821.
The licensees failure to provide reasonable assurance that Appendix R time critical operator actions (TCOAs) associated with fire events can be completed in a timely manner was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it could to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the exclusion of TCOAs from a validation process could lead to plant or program changes that prohibit the completion of actions required to meet the licensing basis. Using the guidance of IMC 0609, App. F, the finding was screened as Green because the finding did not affect the ability to reach and maintain a stable plant condition within the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of a fire event. The deficiency was screened with IMC 0310, Aspects Within Cross Cutting Areas, to determine if any cross-cutting areas were applicable. The team concluded cross-cutting was applicable to the problem identification and resolution (PI&R) area, evaluation attribute due the licensees failure to thoroughly evaluate issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance (P.2).
Inspection Report# : 2016007 (pdf)
Significance: Oct 23, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Perform Adequate Circuit Breaker As-Found Testing The NRC identified a Non-cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI Test Control, for the failure to perform circuit breaker as-found electromechanical testing prior to inspecting, cleaning, and lubricating the mechanical components. The licensee planned to revise the test procedures to correct the deficiencies, and entered this violation into their Corrective Action Program as Condition Reports 10137545 and 10126677.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective, in that inadequate periodic testing to detect deterioration toward an unacceptable condition, the likelihood that these breakers could unpredictably fail Page 3 of 6
3Q/2016 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 when called upon increases with time in service. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component (SSC), and the SSC maintained its operability or functionality. This finding was not assigned a cross-cutting aspect because the issue did not reflect current licensee performance (Section 1R21.2.b.1).
Inspection Report# : 2015007 (pdf)
Significance: Oct 23, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Correct Nonconformances with Regulatory Guide 1.9-1971 The NRC identified a Non-cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to correct non-conformances with the acceptance limits established for the emergency diesel generator (EDG) test requirements. The licensee performed an operability evaluation, and determined the EDGs were operable based on successful completion of the required Technical Specification surveillance testing. In addition, the licensee planned to revise the EDG test procedures suitable for RG 1.9-1971 testing requirements, and entered this violation into their Corrective Action Program as Condition Report 10133018.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective, in that the failure to ensure that non-conformances with the acceptance limits were adequately incorporated into the EDG test procedures, which affected the reliability of the EDGs. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component (SSC), and the SSC maintained its operability or functionality. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution (P.2) because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate issues to ensure that resolutions address causes, and extent of conditions, commensurate with their safety significance (PI.2)
Inspection Report# : 2015007 (pdf)
Significance: Oct 23, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Assure that Class 1E Components were Qualified for Design Temperatures The NRC identified a Non-cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion VII, Control of Purchased Material, Equipment, and Services, for the licensees failure to ensure that adequate environmental test requirements were satisfied before relying on safety-related components to perform their intended safety functions. As an immediate corrective action, the licensee performed an operability evaluation and determined the components were operable. In addition, the licensee indicated that they planned to determine adequate corrective actions to restore full qualification of these commercial grade components, and entered this issue into their Corrective Action Program as Condition Report 10138133.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective, in that the licensee failed to verify the environmental qualification of safety-related components to ensure their performance up to the expected temperature of 150 degrees F. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC, and the SSC maintained its operability or functionality. This finding was not assigned a cross-cutting aspect because the issue did not reflect current licensee performance Inspection Report# : 2015007 (pdf)
Page 4 of 6
3Q/2016 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Significance: Oct 23, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Verify Design Basis Timing Margins for Safety Related Motor Operated Valves Green: The NRC identified a Non-cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to evaluate if transients in control power voltage could affect the design basis margins for the timing of safety-related motor operated valves (MOVs).
The licensee planned to perform corrective actions to ensure that the safety analysis remains bounded, and entered this violation into their Corrective Action Program as Condition Report 10138053.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective, in that the failure to evaluate transients that effect the timing margins for NOVs affected the established reliability and capability of the valves. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the deficiency did not result in actual loss of safety function. This finding was no assigned a cross-cutting aspect because the issue did not reflect current licensee performance Inspection Report# : 2015007 (pdf)
Significance: Oct 23, 2015 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Classify RCIC Sub-components as Safety-Related The NRC identified a Non-cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to classify components in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.26 as specified by the Unit 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 3.2.2. As an immediate corrective action, the licensee performed an operability evaluation, and determined that the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) was operable. In addition, the licensee planned to reclassify the relief valve as safety-related, and entered this issue into their Corrective Action Program as Condition Reports 10132353, 10136685, and 10141965.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and affected the cornerstone objective, in that inadequate classification of the relief valves affected the reliabi ity of safety-related function of the RCIC system. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC, and the SSC maintained its operability or functionality. This finding was not assigned a cross-cutting aspect because the issue did not reflect current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2015007 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Page 5 of 6
3Q/2016 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : December 08, 2016 Page 6 of 6
4Q/2016 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Hatch 2 4Q/2016 Plant Inspection Findings Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Sep 30, 2016 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Ensure Work Hours are Within Work Hour Limits An NRC-identified non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 26, Fitness for Duty Programs, was identified when the licensee failed to ensure that personnel subject to work hour controls did not exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in a work week. The licensee entered this condition into their corrective action program as Condition Report 10214872 and restored compliance when the affected individuals received an adequate rest period.
The failure to ensure that work hours for personnel subject to work hour controls were tracked in accordance with licensee procedures was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the failure to appropriately implement work hour limitations for covered workers could adversely impact the conduct and oversight of work on safety significant components. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not cause any known effects to plant safety due to worker fatigue.
The inspectors determined this performance deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect of Consistent Process in the Human Performance area because the licensee failed to assess which workers were subject to work hour limits. [H.13]
Inspection Report# : 2016003 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 30, 2016 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation
, Failure to Implement Maintenance Procedure for Control Room Air Conditioning System A self-revealing Green NCV of Hatch Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specification 5.4, Procedures, was identified when the B main control room air conditioning condenser tripped on high discharge pressure due to an improperly adjusted water regulating valve. The licensee entered the condition into their corrective action program as CR 10217777, adjusted the water regulating valve to the appropriate set-point.
Failure to adjust the water regulating valve in accordance with preventive maintenance procedure 52PM-Z41-002-1, Control Room Air Conditioning Maintenance, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the failure resulted in the inoperability of the B main control room air conditioner. The finding screened as Green because the loss of component function did not significantly affect the function of the train or system. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Resources aspect of the Human Performance area, because licensee leadership did not ensure that procedures were available and adequate to support nuclear safety [H.1].
Page 1 of 4
4Q/2016 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Inspection Report# : 2016002 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2016 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Adequately Qualify Modifications to Class 1E 4160V Buses The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to verify adequate design and qualification of Class 1E buses in accordance with Institute for Electronics and Electrical Engineering (IEEE) 279-1971, Standard Criteria for rotection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. The licensee entered this issue into the licensees corrective action program as CR10240030. The licensee planned to correct the issue prior to installing new transformers.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. The finding determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the system, structure, or component maintained its operability or functionality. The finding was assigned a cross-cutting aspect of Training [H.9], in the Human Performance area because the organization did not provide training and ensure knowledge transfer to maintain a knowledgeable, technically competent workforce to adequately complete a modification of the Class 1E buses.
Inspection Report# : 2016008 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2016 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to identify a condition adverse to quality for Masterpact 600V breakers The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for failing to identify the applicability of US NRC Part 21 Report 2016-20-01 to the 1B emergency diesel generators (EDGs) motor control center (MCC 1B). The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program for resolution as CR 10240007. For corrective actions, the licensee performed an immediate operability determination and established compensatory measures to reset the breaker linkage in the event that it malfunctions.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Equipment Performance and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of the systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the structure, system, or component maintained its operability or functionality. The finding was assigned a cross-cutting aspect of Evaluation [P.2], in the Problem Identification and Resolution area because the organization did not thoroughly evaluate the Masterpact breaker Part 21 to ensure that resolutions addressed the causes.
Inspection Report# : 2016008 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 24, 2016 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Control Qualification of Purchased 1E Components in Accordance to IEEE 323-1974 The inspectors identified two examples of a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion VII, Control of Purchased Material, Equipment, and Services, for failing to assure that vendors met the quality standards specified in procurement documents (IEEE 323-1974, IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations). The licensee entered this issue into the licensees corrective action program as CR10240023 Page 2 of 4
4Q/2016 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 and CR102399929. The licensee planned to ensure the adequate qualification of Class 1E components.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Design Control and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of the systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the structure, system, or component maintained its operability or functionality. The finding was assigned a cross-cutting aspect of Field Presence [H.2], in the Human Performance area because senior managers did not ensure supervisory and management oversight of contractors.
Inspection Report# : 2016008 (pdf)
Significance: Apr 22, 2016 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to provide reasonable assurance that Appendix R time critical operator actions (TCOAs) can be completed in a timely manner The NRC identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) violation of Hatch Technical Specifications 5.4.1.d, "Procedures, for Units 1 and 2, for not ensuring manual action feasibility for actions in fire area (FA) 0024.
Specifically, the licensee failed to provide reasonable assurance that a credited manual action to ensure emergency power was both feasible and reliable in response to a fire event. The licensee plans to assess the issue and entered this violation into their Corrective Action Program (CAP) based upon CR10209664, CR10213119, &
CR10212821.
The licensees failure to provide reasonable assurance that Appendix R time critical operator actions (TCOAs) associated with fire events can be completed in a timely manner was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it could to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the exclusion of TCOAs from a validation process could lead to plant or program changes that prohibit the completion of actions required to meet the licensing basis. Using the guidance of IMC 0609, App. F, the finding was screened as Green because the finding did not affect the ability to reach and maintain a stable plant condition within the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of a fire event. The deficiency was screened with IMC 0310, Aspects Within Cross Cutting Areas, to determine if any cross-cutting areas were applicable. The team concluded cross-cutting was applicable to the problem identification and resolution (PI&R) area, evaluation attribute due the licensees failure to thoroughly evaluate issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance (P.2).
Inspection Report# : 2016007 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Page 3 of 4
4Q/2016 Inspection Findings - Hatch 2 Public Radiation Safety Security Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary.
Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Miscellaneous Last modified : February 01, 2017 Page 4 of 4
NRC: Hatch 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings Home > Nuclear Reactors > Operating Reactors > Reactor Oversight Process > Plant Summaries > Hatch 2 > Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings Hatch 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings 2Q/2017 - Plant Inspection Findings On this page:
- Security Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 31, 2017 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Identify Abnormal Condition on 2C EDG Cross Drive Assembly Green. A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of Hatch Unit 2 Technical Specification 5.4.1 was identified when technicians performing maintenance on the 2C emergency diesel generator observed pitting on the lower crank component gears and did not initiate a condition report as required by procedure 52SV-R43-001-0, "Diesel, Alternator, and Accessories Inspection." The licensee's failure to initiate a condition report, as required by 52SV-R43-001-0
'Diesel, Alternator, and Accessories Inspection', for the pitting observed on the lower crank component gears was a performance deficiency. The violation of regulatory requirement occurred on or about November 2015 until the licensee replaced the 2C EDG cross drive assembly and restored compliance on August 25, 2016. The violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR 10263236.
The performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, the failure to evaluate gear pitting would allow progression of a degradation mechanism to the point of EDG inoperability. The inspectors screened this finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, "The Significant Determination Process (SDP) For Findings At-Power," dated June 19, 2012. Because all four questions in Section A of Exhibit 2, "Mitigating Systems Screening Questions," were answered "no," the finding screened as Green. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the
'Resources' aspect of the human performance area, because the licensee did not ensure adequate procedural guidance to recognize the difference between normal and destructive pitting. [H.1] (Section 4OA3)
Inspection Report# : 2017001 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2016 Identified By: NRC Page 1 of 2
NRC: Hatch 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Ensure Work Hours are Within Work Hour Limits An NRC-identified non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 26, "Fitness for Duty Programs," was identified when the licensee failed to ensure that personnel subject to work hour controls did not exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in a work week. The licensee entered this condition into their corrective action program as Condition Report 10214872 and restored compliance when the affected individuals received an adequate rest period.
The failure to ensure that work hours for personnel subject to work hour controls were tracked in accordance with licensee procedures was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the failure to appropriately implement work hour limitations for "covered" workers could adversely impact the conduct and oversight of work on safety significant components. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not cause any known effects to plant safety due to worker fatigue. The inspectors determined this performance deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect of Consistent Process in the Human Performance area because the licensee failed to assess which workers were subject to work hour limits. [H.13]
Inspection Report# : 2016003 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security The security cornerstone is an important component of the ROP, which includes various security inspection activities the NRC uses to verify licensee compliance with Commission regulations and thus ensure public health and safety. The Commission determined in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) for SECY-04-0191, "Withholding Sensitive Unclassified Information Concerning Nuclear Power Reactors from Public Disclosure," dated November 9, 2004, that specific information related to findings and performance indicators associated with the security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security-related information is not provided to a possible adversary. Security inspection report cover letters will be available on the NRC Web site; however, security-related information on the details of inspection finding(s) will not be displayed.
Miscellaneous Current data as of : August 03, 2017 Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, August 10, 2016 Page 2 of 2
NRC: Hatch 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings Page 1 of 2 Home > Nuclear Reactors > Operating Reactors > Reactor Oversight Process > Plant Summaries> Hatch 2 > Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings Hatch 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings 2Q/2017 - Plant Inspection Findings On this page:
- Security Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 31, 2017 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Identify Abnormal Condition on 2C EDG Cross Drive Assembly Green. A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of Hatch Unit 2 Technical Specification 5.4.1 was identified when technicians performing maintenance on the 2C emergency diesel generator observed pitting on the lower crank component gears and did not initiate a condition report as required by procedure 52SV-R43-001-0, "Diesel, Alternator, and Accessories Inspection." The licensee's failure to initiate a condition report, as required by 52SV-R43-001-0
'Diesel, Alternator, and Accessories Inspection', for the pitting observed on the lower crank component gears was a performance deficiency. The violation of regulatory requirement occurred on or about November 2015 until the licensee replaced the 2C EDG cross drive assembly and restored compliance on August 25, 2016. The violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR 10263236.
The performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, the failure to evaluate gear pitting would allow progression of a degradation mechanism to the point of EDG inoperability. The inspectors screened this finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, "The Significant Determination Process (SDP) For Findings At-Power," dated June 19, 2012. Because all four questions in Section A of Exhibit 2, "Mitigating Systems Screening Questions," were answered "no," the finding screened as Green. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the
'Resources' aspect of the human performance area, because the licensee did not ensure adequate procedural guidance to recognize the difference between normal and destructive pitting. [H.1] (Section 4OA3)
Inspection Report# : 2017001 (pdf)
Significance: Sep 30, 2016 Identified By: NRC https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight/hat2/hat2-pim.html 10/19/2017
NRC: Hatch 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings Page 2 of 2 Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Ensure Work Hours are Within Work Hour Limits An NRC-identified non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 26, "Fitness for Duty Programs," was identified when the licensee failed to ensure that personnel subject to work hour controls did not exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in a work week. The licensee entered this condition into their corrective action program as Condition Report 10214872 and restored compliance when the affected individuals received an adequate rest period.
The failure to ensure that work hours for personnel subject to work hour controls were tracked in accordance with licensee procedures was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the failure to appropriately implement work hour limitations for "covered" workers could adversely impact the conduct and oversight of work on safety significant components. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not cause any known effects to plant safety due to worker fatigue. The inspectors determined this performance deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect of Consistent Process in the Human Performance area because the licensee failed to assess which workers were subject to work hour limits. [H.13]
Inspection Report# : 2016003 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security The security cornerstone is an important component of the ROP, which includes various security inspection activities the NRC uses to verify licensee compliance with Commission regulations and thus ensure public health and safety. The Commission determined in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) for SECY-04-0191, "Withholding Sensitive Unclassified Information Concerning Nuclear Power Reactors from Public Disclosure," dated November 9, 2004, that specific information related to findings and performance indicators associated with the security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security-related information is not provided to a possible adversary. Security inspection report cover letters will be available on the NRC Web site; however, security-related information on the details of inspection finding(s) will not be displayed.
Miscellaneous Current data as of : September 05, 2017 Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, June 07, 2017 https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight/hat2/hat2-pim.html 10/19/2017
NRC: Hatch 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings Home > Nuclear Reactors > Operating Reactors > Reactor Oversight Process > Plant Summaries> Hatch 2 > Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings Hatch 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings 3Q/2017 - Plant Inspection Findings On this page:
- Security Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Mar 31, 2017 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Identify Abnormal Condition on 2C EDG Cross Drive Assembly Green. A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of Hatch Unit 2 Technical Specification 5.4.1 was identified when technicians performing maintenance on the 2C emergency diesel generator observed pitting on the lower crank component gears and did not initiate a condition report as required by procedure 52SV-R43-001-0, "Diesel, Alternator, and Accessories Inspection." The licensee's failure to initiate a condition report, as required by 52SV-R43-001-0
'Diesel, Alternator, and Accessories Inspection', for the pitting observed on the lower crank component gears was a performance deficiency. The violation of regulatory requirement occurred on or about November 2015 until the licensee replaced the 2C EDG cross drive assembly and restored compliance on August 25, 2016. The violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR 10263236.
The performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, the failure to evaluate gear pitting would allow progression of a degradation mechanism to the point of EDG inoperability. The inspectors screened this finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, "The Significant Determination Process (SDP) For Findings At-Power," dated June 19, 2012. Because all four questions in Section A of Exhibit 2, "Mitigating Systems Screening Questions," were answered "no," the finding screened as Green. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the
'Resources' aspect of the human performance area, because the licensee did not ensure adequate procedural guidance to recognize the difference between normal and destructive pitting. [H.1] (Section 4OA3)
Inspection Report# : 2017001 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Page 1 of 2
NRC: Hatch 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings Public Radiation Safety Security The security cornerstone is an important component of the ROP, which includes various security inspection activities the NRC uses to verify licensee compliance with Commission regulations and thus ensure public health and safety. The Commission determined in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) for SECY-04-0191, "Withholding Sensitive Unclassified Information Concerning Nuclear Power Reactors from Public Disclosure," dated November 9, 2004, that specific information related to findings and performance indicators associated with the security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security-related information is not provided to a possible adversary. Security inspection report cover letters will be available on the NRC Web site; however, security-related information on the details of inspection finding(s) will not be displayed.
Miscellaneous Current data as of : November 29, 2017 Page Last Reviewed/Updated Monday, November 06, 2017 Page 2 of 2
NRC: Hatch 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings Page 1 of 2 Home > Nuclear Reactors > Operating Reactors > Reactor Oversight Process > Plant Summaries> Hatch 2 > Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings Hatch 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings 4Q/2017 - Plant Inspection Findings On this page:
- Security Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Significance: Nov 14, 2017 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Installation of Non-Conforming RPS Equipment
- Green. An NRC-identified non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, ?Design Control?
was identified for failure to translate regulatory requirements and the design basis of the scram discharge volume (SDV) thermal probes into the System Evaluation Document, which resulted in the installation of a nonsafety-related terminal board in the reactor protection system (RPS). As an immediate corrective action the licensee installed fully qualified equipment. The failure to classify reactor protection system components as safety-related in accordance with design documents was a performance deficiency. The violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR 10344772.
- The performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the ensured reliability of the RPS system was adversely affected because the installed components were not qualified for the application. The team used IMC 0609, Attachment 4, ?Initial Characterization of Findings,? issued June 19, 2012, for Mitigating Systems, and IMC 0612, Appendix A, ?The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power,? issued June 19, 2012, and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green), because the finding was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC, and the SSC maintained its operability. The inspectors determined that this finding did not have an associated cross-cutting aspect because this finding did not occur within the previous three years and is not reflective of current licensee performance. (Section 1R18) https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight/hat2/hat2-pim.html 04/19/2018
NRC: Hatch 2 - Quarterly Plant Inspection Findings Page 2 of 2 Inspection Report# : 2017003 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 31, 2017 Identified By: Self-Revealing Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation Failure to Identify Abnormal Condition on 2C EDG Cross Drive Assembly Green. A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of Hatch Unit 2 Technical Specification 5.4.1 was identified when technicians performing maintenance on the 2C emergency diesel generator observed pitting on the lower crank component gears and did not initiate a condition report as required by procedure 52SV-R43-001-0, "Diesel, Alternator, and Accessories Inspection." The licensee's failure to initiate a condition report, as required by 52SV-R43-001-0
'Diesel, Alternator, and Accessories Inspection', for the pitting observed on the lower crank component gears was a performance deficiency. The violation of regulatory requirement occurred on or about November 2015 until the licensee replaced the 2C EDG cross drive assembly and restored compliance on August 25, 2016. The violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR 10263236.
The performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, the failure to evaluate gear pitting would allow progression of a degradation mechanism to the point of EDG inoperability. The inspectors screened this finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, "The Significant Determination Process (SDP) For Findings At-Power," dated June 19, 2012. Because all four questions in Section A of Exhibit 2, "Mitigating Systems Screening Questions," were answered "no," the finding screened as Green. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the
'Resources' aspect of the human performance area, because the licensee did not ensure adequate procedural guidance to recognize the difference between normal and destructive pitting. [H.1] (Section 4OA3)
Inspection Report# : 2017001 (pdf)
Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Security The security cornerstone is an important component of the ROP, which includes various security inspection activities the NRC uses to verify licensee compliance with Commission regulations and thus ensure public health and safety. The Commission determined in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) for SECY-04-0191, "Withholding Sensitive Unclassified Information Concerning Nuclear Power Reactors from Public Disclosure," dated November 9, 2004, that specific information related to findings and performance indicators associated with the security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security-related information is not provided to a possible adversary. Security inspection report cover letters will be available on the NRC Web site; however, security-related information on the details of inspection finding(s) will not be displayed.
Miscellaneous Current data as of : February 01, 2018 Page Last Reviewed/Updated Monday, November 06, 2017 https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight/hat2/hat2-pim.html 04/19/2018