ML20248G856

Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-317/98-01 & 50-318/98-01.Corrective Actions:Implemented Revised Design Process & Published Training Guidance Using Violation as Example

ML20248G856
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	06/02/1998
From:	Cruse C BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
50-317-98-01, 50-317-98-1, NUDOCS 9806050366
Download: ML20248G856 (9)

Text

l CHARLES II. CRUSE Baltimore Gas and Electric Company l

Vice President Calven Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Nuclear Energy 1650 Calven Cliffs Parkway Lusby. Maryland 20657 410 495-4455 June 2,1998 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION: Document Control Desk

SUBJECT:

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant; Unit Nos.1 & 2; Docket Nos. 50-317 & 50-318 independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Docket No. 72-8 Reply to Notice of Violation -- NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-317/98-01 and 50-318/98-01

REFERENCES:

(a) Letter from Mr. L. T. Doerflein (NRC) to Mr. C. H. Cruse (BGE), dated April 15,1998, NRC Region I Integrated Inspection Report Nos. 50-317/98-01 and 50-318/98-01 and Notice of Violation 0 Letter from Mr. C. H. Cruse (BGE) to NRC Document Control Desk, dated May 1,1998, Clarification of Notice of Violation and Request for Extension of Response Time Regarding Inspection Report Nos. 50-317/98-01 and 50-318/98-01 (c) April 27,1998 Teleconference Between BGE and NRC Staff This letter provides Baltimore Ga.: .md Electric Company's (BGE's) responses to the Notice of Violation issued by Reference (a) containing two violations of NRC requirements. The first cited violation (Violation A) concerns NRC regulation 10 CFR 72.11 due to failure to provide the NRC complete and accurate information in the 1989 site-specific license application for an independent spent fuel storage installation. The second cited violation (Violation B) concerns NRC regulation 10 CFR 72.48 for making a change to the evaluation for the dry shielded canister top end drop accident, which the NRC deems involves an unreviewed safety question, without prior NRC approval.

The details of Violations A and B, followed by BGE's responses, are provided in Attachments (1) and (2), respectively. Please note that, by Reference (b), BGE had requested an extension et the response time to June 3,1998. This extension request was discussed with the NRC Resident Inspectors and in Reference (c).

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recovery of the fuel to the point that different equipment would have been required, or if the impingement had resulted in contact with the fuel rods instead of the fuel assembly grid spacer. The difference, then, reverted to, "What level of physical interaction or phenomenon described in the SAR can be changed by the licensee without prior NRC review." As we understand the NRC's position in this l violation, that answer appears to be, "None. A change in expected performance-unless clearly j beneficial--it a new malfunction. Subsequent analysis may determine whether it is acceptable, but it l

will not substitute for NRC review." Baltimore Gas and Electric Company has hesitated to accept this interpretation because it seems likely to capture many beneficial changes as USQs and thereby invoke delays and expense for NRC review where the change in behavior is inconsequential.

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company has been a close observer during the ongoing discussions between NRC and the industry regarding 10 CFR 50.59 (and by implication,10 CFR 72.48) policy issues and potential rulemaking. This instance appears to fall directly into the area of issues where the current threshold for declaring a USQ is under review. Our engineering processes and training are structured to minimize disputes arising out of the current interpretation discussions by directing our engineers to treat potential increases in consequences or probability of accidents or malfunctions conservatively. This policy has been manifested in submittal of USQs on technical concerns, such as our resolution of Generic Letter 96-06 Service Water System modifications and in the revised design of our Saltwater System.

These have served as conspicuous examples to reiterate our intention that engineers should escalate borderline issues for supervisory attention and that we will exercise the appropriate regulatory processes to attain the right safety results.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE We do not consider the technical or programmatic aspects of this occurrence to have significantly affected safety. i While the 72.48 evaluation resulting in this violation was reviewed by supervision without its being '

declared a USQ, the technical aspects of the issue were closely monitored and extensively reviewed. As noted in the Inspection Report, BGE had a comprehensive program to review ISFSI issues, and we had employed outside technical organizations, both for analysis and for quality reviews, to ensure that the  !

safety concerns were appropriately dispositioned. Likewise, although the 72.48 conclusions reached were different than those reached by NRC staff, the underlying technical issues were self-identified and l

pursued to resolution under BGE's corrective action program. Conservative decisions were made with l respect to conducting spent fuel movements, and we initiated frequent communications with NRC staff to assure a clear understanding of our status.

Subsequent treatment of this interaction between the DSC and fuel assembly as a degraded condition under the guidance of Generic Letter 91-18, Revision 1, was a beneficial instance in demonstrating to our 2

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ATTACIIMENT (2)

NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-317/98-01 & 318/98-01 VIOLATION B staff how the regulatory process could be followed while still allowing the appropriate end result of enhancing safety through spent fuel offload.

IIL CORRECTIVE STEPS THAT HAVE BEEN TAKEN AND RESULTS ACHIEVED We have published training guidance using this instance as an example of a new malfunction to our 50.59/72.48 screeners and evaluators and to our Plant Operating Safety Review Committee.

IV. CORRECTIVE STEPS THAT WILL BE TAKEN TO AVOID FURTHER VIOLATIONS We will include training guidance incorporating the lessons of this instance as an example of a new malfunction in our lesson plan for initial and periodic requalification for personnel preparing 50.59/72.48 safety evaluations and screens.

We will review all 72.48 safety evaluations and a sampling of 50.59 safety evaluations conducted this year to identify any other similar cases that should be reconsidered. Upon completion, we will submit this and any other related USQs, which will not be returned to full compliance, as license amendment requests.

We will review the impact of this interpretation of the regulation after approximately one year. If there are meaningful lessons learned or implications warranting NRC attention, we will communicate them to your staff.

V. DATE WHEN FULL COMPLIANCE WII L BE ACHIEVED Full compliance will be achieved by December 31,1998.

REFERENCE (1) Letter from Mr. C. H. Cruse (BGE) to NRC Document Control Desk, dated May 1,1998, Clarification of Notice of Violation and Request for Extension of Response Time Regarding Inspection Report Nos. 50-317/98-01 and 50-318/98-01 f

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