ML20247A967

Insp Rept 70-0734/89-04 on 890626-30.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings,Criticality Safety,Operations Review & Maint & Surveillance Testing.Weaknesses Noted

ML20247A967
Person / Time
Site:	07000734
Issue date:	07/17/1989
From:	Fish R, Hooker C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20247A964	List: ML20247A960 ML20247A967
References
70-0734-89-04, 70-734-89-4, NUDOCS 8907210378
Download: ML20247A967 (7)

Text

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l U." S.. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION' ,

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'. $l , Report No. 70-734/89-04 ,

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o E.,. ' Docket No.- 70-734' m x ,

i.icense No.-SNM-696 ,

' Priority Of Category'11 ' Safeguards Group 11

'Lbensee: General Atomics 1 e

P : D. Box 85608 ,

San.Diego California 92138

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Facili.ty(Nameb[TorreyPinesMesaandSorrento.ValleySites 3 Inspection at: San Diego, California ,

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, Inspection Conducted:y June 26-30, 1989 f). ht y[I nspector:[ I '

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l C. A. Hooker,. Fuel Facilities Inspector Date Signed Q.tv

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'R.sFish, Chief' Date' Signed '

-; 4 ..d Emergency. Preparedness Section

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y Summ,ary:,:, .. ,, +

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C i]h. Areas I'nspected: i '

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g a This ps 'a routine unannounced inspection.'of licensee action on previous  %

i J inspection findings, criticality safet9, operations review,~ and . i-d maintenance and surveillance testing. The inspection also included tours of the'licer.see's facilities. Inspection procedures ' 30703, 92701, 88015, -

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, 88020 and 88025 were addressed.

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b. Results: '

'In the areas inspected, the licensee's performance appeared adequate to accomplish their safety objectives. However, weakness was exhibited in the areas of criticality safety regarding posting and use of ,

geometrically unsafe containers (paragraph 3); and the licensee's air.

sampling program (paragraph 4).

No violations or deviations were identified.

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4 DETAILS '

1. Persons Contacted Licensee

• R. N. Rademacher, Vice Presideret, Human Resources

-* V. Malakhof, Manager, Nuclear Safety (NSM)

• A..L. Galli, Manager, Security

• S. Perlman, Health Physics Technician (HPT)

• R. K. Krueger, Manager, TRIGA Fuel Fabrication R. Vanek, Manager, Nuclear Waste Processing Facility

• C. L.'Wisham, Manager, Nuclear Materials Accountability P. J. Niccoli, Superintendent, Facilities Maintenance E. Dora, Lead Electrical / Electronics Specialist (LEES)

• Denotes those attending the exit interview on June 30, 1989.

In addition to the individuals noted.above, the inspector met and held

-discussions with other members of the licensee's staff.

2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings ( 92701)

JClosed) Inspection Follow-up (70-734/88-05-01 and 02): Inspection Report No. 70-734/88-05 described the licensee's preparation for a proposed change in the operation of the coater in the SVB pilot plant.

This change involved a new nuclear safety analysis (NSA) for increasing the quantity and enrichment of special nuclear material (SNM) processed for Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (MHTGR) fuel development.

The inspection identified two items for further review: (1) the need to review the licensee's controls for verification of the initial and continued presence of the neutron absorber to be used in the coater '

(70-734/88-05-01; and (2) a review of the licensee's revisions to procedures for this operation (70-734/88-05-02). ,

Based on a review of current operations and discussions with NSM, it appears that the use of the coater at the SVB pilot plant for MHTGR fuel

.. development will not likely occur in 1989. This project and development '

i of procedures are currently in a standby mode, with no near future j operations planned. Inspection Report No. 70-734/88-09 documented the i review of the NSA for this project. Procedures for operating and ,

i determining the presence of the neutron absorber in the coater are p matters'that would be covered in a routine inspection of this operation. 3 Therefore, these items are considered closed.

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3. Criticality Safety (88015) '

l L The inspector reviewed the licensee's program for compliance with 10 CFR Part 70, License Conditions, licensee proceduras, and recommendations outlined in various industry standards. The inspection included a review of selected procedures and records, interviews with personnel and facility tours.

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- 2 There had been no operations that required a NSA since the last inspection in'this area (Report No. 70-734/89-01). The U. S. Department of Energy had arranged for the shipment of all of the Pubiic Service Company's SNM from the licensee's site. This shipment reduced the licensee's inventory of SNM from a Category I status to a Category II status. The licensee'had also reduced their physical protection plan accordingly.

Monthly and annual Nuclear Safety inspection reports for inspections conducted during the period of February 14 to June 22, 1989, were examined. The areas inspected by the licensee included the new shipping vault in building 4;, the Hot Cell Facility, the laboratories, the SVA Fuel Fabrication Facility (FFF), and the TRIGA Fuel Fabrication Facility (TFFF). The inspector.noted that the inspections were sufficient in depth and scope. Inspection findings appeared to be administrative in

, nature and did not represent any significant afety problems with the '

licensee's' criticality' safety program. Immediate action to correct inspection findings was evident.

The inspector conducted extensive tours of tne licensee's facilities to observe current operations and criticality controls. The following observations were made during the tours and discussed with licensee personnel:

a. The licensee was utilizing their new vault in building 41 to storr SMN removed from the Tunnel Vault and and West Vault. Packaged SNM was being temporarily stored in 55 gallon. drums until new permanent storage racks could be installed. 'The licensee had-limited each drum-to 350 grams of U-235. Although the drums were properly posted with the SNM eimit, 18 of 20 drums being used to store SNM were not , i lidded. The inspector discussed the nuclear safety advantages for 4

-having the drums lidded, such as to reduce the potential for double t ~ batching. These drums are not typically considered to be geometrically desired containers for SNM storage. The inspector's observations were acknowledged by the licensee. At the exit -

interview on June 30, 1989, the inspector was informed by the licensee that lids had been placed on the drums. s

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b .' In the TFFF the inspector noted that the storage carts used to store

'and transport SNM within the facility were labeled "Do Not Mix Geometry Gal Cans Only or Compartments Only". The Process Station s L'imit Summary Table (PSLST), attached to the Work Authorization for operations conducted in this area, specified six criticality control operating limitations for use of the carts. Part II, Section 5.8.5 of'the license requires, in part, that each defined area where more than 350 grams of U-235 is stored or used.shall be posted with the with the applicable operating limits. Although the posting on the carts provided criticality control limits, the inspector considered l 'them too general in nature and encouraged the licensee to evaluate the current cart posting with those delineated in the PSLST. This matter was also discussed at the exit interview on June 30, 1989.

The licensee's action regarding this matter will be examined ir, a subsequent inspection (70-734/89-04-01).

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c. Lathe' turnings from each batch of fuel castings in the TFFF were collect 2d and stored in 5 gallon cans. The turnings from each l processed batch of TRIGA fuel typically occupied the volume of the

5 gallon cans, which were limited to 350 grams of U-235 per .

container. The turnings were subsequently chopped to small chips and placed back into their original 5 gallon container, and placed in the storage rack for future processing. After the chipping process, only a small volume of the 5 gallon container was being occupied and they were not lidded when in storage. Although the storage rack was protected from overhead flooding and each container was limited 350 grams of U-235, the inspector. encouraged the

. licensee to consider the use of 1 gallon containers with lids.for storing the chipped fuel. The use of 1 gallon containers would

. provide an additional safety margin for potential overmatching and the' lids would inhibit inadvertent water intrusion. This matter was" -

also discussed at the exit it.terview on June 30, 1989. ,

d. . Criticality monitoring systems were noted to be functional in the"

. areas where they were required. The TFFF had not completed installation of their upgraded system at the time of the inspection.

The control panel for the TFFF's criticality alarm system was noted to be located in a locked storage room at the entry to the facility.

s Since this area was not frequently visited by the TTFF's staff, the1, inspector encouraged the licensee to consider moving this unit to an '

area where it would be r.. ore visible. Placing the control panel in a more visible area would allow earlier detection of system 4 i

malfunctions by personnel working in the area. j Records of annual calibrations and monthly field tests of the criticality alarn systems were reviewed. Calibrations were being performed semiannually and field tests were being performed every two weeks for the more active areas. However, based on an interview with the LEES and review of the licensee's test procedure FMP-2-A, Criticality Alarm System Testing, the inspector noted that the method used for testing the main site system was not adequately described in the procedure. Specifically, the field tests to check the master unit consisted of a three point meter check (5, 10, and 20 mR/hr) using a 4.5 mci Cs-137 source. Thit method was not specifically delineated in the procedure. The procedure only noted the performing of a check for normal operation. In additiun, the procedure called for checking the alarm set point for each channel, however, no numerical value was specified for the alarm set point.

The inspector's observations were discussed with the licensee during

-the inspection and at the exit interview on June 30, 1989. The licensee's actions regarding this matter will be reviewed in a subsequent inspection (70-734/89-04-02).

During the inspectfon, criticality controls for the liquid dump room in l the HTGR FFF (Building No. 37) were discussed with the licensee. This j facility is in a shut down mode and there are no immediate plans for restart. However, the liquid dump room was an area of interest since it l l

l was considered to be a location where a criticality accident was remotely credible. Previous operations in this location involvcd dumping of i quids contaminated with U-235 from safe geometry vessels into non-safe t

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geometry, vessels. The dump room was designed to mitigate the results of f,'- '

a criticality accident with 24-inch thick concrete wells and a 16-inch g

concrete' ceil.ing. . Strict administrative controls were administered in the waste handling operations to maintain criticality controls.

The licensee was encouraged to consider the use of an in-line monitoring 4

system, in addition to their administrative controls, if this operation was ever; restarted. An in-line monitoring system would provide an -

additional safety element in this operation. This matter was also discussed at the exit interview on June 30, 1989.

The licensee's performance in this area appeared adequate to meet the w safety objectives. However, the licensee should concentrate on limitin,1 the use of containers that are considered to be' geometrically unsafe, and ensure that all facility procedures reflect current practices. No violations or_ deviations were identified.

4. Operations Review This area was reviewed to determine that operations were being conducted in accordance with the requirements of the license, licensee procedures, and recommendations outlined in various industry standards. The inspection of this area was primarily based on observations made during

-facility tours. Independent radiation measurements were also made using an Eberline R0-2 portable ion chamber, S/N 837, due for calibration on July 18, 1989.

The inspector noted that there were no process operations being conducted with SNM in the Sorrento Valley A and B Buildings. Operations planned for development and use of the pilot plant coater for MHTGR fuel was on hold. The Hot Cell Decontamination / Decommissioning activities were also at a standstill.

The TFFF continues to manufacture replacement fuel elements, using enrichments equal to or less than 20 % U-235, on a reduced scale. The TFFF was staffed with two operators, two quality control personnel and l

~the facility manager. The lnspector checked the operation of the 1 ventilation system. The system appeared to be fully functional and the-pressure drop across the main filters were within the limits specified in the license. During a discussion with the TFFF's manager, the inspector was informed that the ventilation system was not backed up with an automatic emergency power source and there was no alarm to indicate system failure. The inspector encouraged the licensee to consider installation of an alarm on the ventilation system that would provide a warning to the facility's staff in the event of system failure. This l

matter was also discussed at the exit interview on June 30, 1989. The inspector's observation was acknowledged by the licensee representatives.

During discussions with the HPT regarding the air sampling program in the TFFF and other SNM areas, the inspector was informed that routine air samples were normally analyzed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after they were collected. The inspector noted that Part II, Section 4.1.4.2 of the license states, in part:

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'. . I g yq "The samples will.be analyzed typically within 24 hcurs with the f 5. .

f 4 9,M: 23-  ; exception _of samples collected on Fridays'and holidays which are

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[f 'f @Theair1samplesintheTFFFwerebeingcollected'o'neachMondaymorning,, s a

and were not being analyzed until Thursday morning, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.after-

, 9z coll,ection. The inspector discussed the'importance.of early evaluation

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fof air sample data in areas where sampling was required. This matter was

• discussed.in detail at the exit interview on June 30; 1989. The

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inspector's concern was acknowledged by the licensee. The inspector will evaluate'. the-licensee.'s : actions regarding this matter in a subsequent ' '

-inspection _(70-734/89-04-03%

The inspector observed'that housekeeping practices were good in most' areau toured. House keeping.in the Hot Cell _and service area for this facility could besimproved. The inspector also noted that in the. areas-

. toured,. radiation areas and radioactive' materials areas'were posted as required by '10 CFR Part 20; The licensee's performance in this area appeared adequate to meet'their s safety objectives.:However,,it appeared.that the licensee's air sampling program appeared to warrant-further attention. No violations or deviatioas were identified.

5. Maintenance and Surveillance Testina (88025) 4L This a ea was' reviewed to determine that the general maintenance of equipment was evident, and surveillance tests were being performed in accordance with the. license. The inspection of this area was primarily focused on observations made'during~ facility tours.

The inspector noted that tags indicating recent quarterly air flow tests of operating hoods and/or equipment enclosure openings-indicated that. air flows were within the limits specified in the' license. Equipment was '

appropriately tagged out where. air flows did not meet the license requirement. No. excessive oil'or other.. liquids were observed to be

' leaking from equipment or systems. . Exhaust ventilation systems appeared to opera. ting as expected in all of the areas toured. Racks for storing w SNM appeared to be in. tact and did not appear-to need any maintenance.

In the areas toured, where operations were shut u n, the licensee was  !

noted to be maintaining systems that were vital tv the control and .i

' i-t containment of.SNM.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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'6. Exit Interview

< The inspector met with the licensee representatives, denoted in paragraph '

'i 1 ,at the conclusion of the inspection on June 30, 1989. The NRC was  !.

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also represented by Mr. G. H. Bidinger, Section Leader, Fuel Cycle Safety

1. 0 Branch, Office'of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. The scope'and~

findings of the inspection were summarized.

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'The license'e was informed that no' violations or' deviations were' I identified. ~ The observations described in the report were. acknowledged by,,the licensee.

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