ML20151H064
| ML20151H064 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07000734 |
| Issue date: | 07/20/1988 |
| From: | Brock B, Prendergast K, Thomas R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151H062 | List: |
| References | |
| 70-0734-88-05, 70-734-88-5, NUDOCS 8808010128 | |
| Download: ML20151H064 (14) | |
Text
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V Report No. 70-734/88-05 Docket No.70-734 License No. SNM-696 Priority 0 Category II Safeguards Group I Licensee: General Atomics P. O. Box 85608 San Diego, California 92138 Facility Name:
Torrey Pines Mesa and Sorrento Valley Sites Inspection 5t:
San Diego, California Inspection Conducted:
June 20-24 and 28, 1988 Inspector:
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- A. L. Brock, Fuel Facilities Inspector p6teSigned
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B S.,_#
7/ivis V Inspector-
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c K. M. Prendergast, Emergency Preparedness Date Signed Analyst Approved by:
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R. D. Thomas, Chief pteAigned Nuclear Materials Safety St.ction Summary:
Inspection on June 20-24 and 28, 1988 (Report No. 70-734/88-05)
Areat Inspected:
A routine unannounced safety inspection was conducted of management organization and controls; operator training and retraining; criticality safety; operations review; radioactive waste management; radiation protection; waste generator requirements /10 CFR 20/10 CFR 61; emergency preparedness: environmental programs; and deactivation / decontamination.
During this inspection, Inspection Procedures 88005, 88010, 88015, 88020, 83822, 84850, 88050, 88045 and 83890 were covered.
Results: No violations were identified in the ten areas inspected.
j G800010120 080722 PDR ADOCK 07000734 1
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1 DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted A.'
Licensee Employees:
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- R. N. Rademacher, Director, Human Resources l
- K. E. Asmussen, Manager, Licensing and Nuclear Compliance
- V. Malakhof, Manrqer, Nuclear Safety
- K. L. Johnson, Manager, Facilities Engineering
- A. L. Galli, Manager, Security
- P. Warner, Manager, Fuel Operations, Production & Material Control i
r
- L. R. Quintana, Manager, Health Physics J. S. Greenwood, Senior Scientist, Hot Cells l
G. Normandie, Staff Engineer R. K. Krueger, Supervisor, Triga Fuel Production T. W. Keim, Ser. lor Nuclear Fuel Waste Processor E. Daro, Equipment Specialist I
- Denotes those attending the exit meeting i
i Functional or Program Areas Inspected j
j-2.
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A.
Manaaement Organization snd Controls (88005) l l
(1) Organizational Structure
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i The licensee's management structure is unchanged since the last inspection.
It continues to provide appropriate checks and balances.
The licensee continues to use personnel with appropriate backgrounds for their assigned responsibilities, functions, and authorities, i
(2) Procedure Cont.rols
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f I
The licensee continues to use reviewed and approved procedures l
j in the conduct of operations.
If the licensee moves toward l
j plant restart, the procecure control system, previously found j
4 effective, would again keep the HTGR production procedures
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current.
l (3)
Internal Review and Audit
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The NRC inspector reviewed the six nuclear safety inspections j
conducted by the Manager, Nuclear Safety since the previous NRC inspection.
The inspections were of sufficient scope and i
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depth.
The Naclear Safety Manager tracks identified items to j
assure appropriate follow-up, j
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i i
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J 3
2
g (4) Safety Committee The licensee's Criticality and Radiation Safety Committee (CRSC) continues to provide guidance in safety matters by offering direction early in the planning stage of specific I
operations.
The CRSC has suggested that plans for restart of the production of HTGR type fuels in SV-A (Building.37) include retrainir,g of the operators and requalification testing of the equipment and the operators to assure the HTGR type fuel can again be produced safely in the plant.
Performance in this program area appears to be adequate.
No violations were identified.
8.
Operator Training and Retraining (88010)
(1) Process Nuclear Safety The NRC inspectors observed the training videotape the licensee i
uses to supplement criticality safety training of operators.
The tape was a forty minute composite of several which the l
licensee had acquired recently.
The composite videotape addressed criticality scftty, the prevention of criticality, and the causes and the results (exposures, deaths, and property damage) of the criticality accidents of record.
No violations were identified.
C.
Criticality Safety (88015)
(1) Nuclear Criticality Safety Analysis (a) The licensee updated the Triga Fuel Fabrication Facility floor plan reflecting relative positions of processing equipment and special nuclear material (SNM) storage locations.
The acquisition of a new lathe and the designation of a new D-2 station, graphite crucible disassembly, necessitated the floor plan update.
The licensee also updated the Summary Table s7 criticality limit signs that identifies the specific criticality limit sign required at each work station.
l (b) The licensee is preparing a new nuclear safety anclysl*
l (NSA) of the SV-A coater because of interest in changing one of the coater operation parameters.
The change, a significant one, involves increasing the quantity of SNM per batch processed through the coater.
The initial NSA indicates that a neutron absorber (poison) will be required in the coater.
The location, form, method of installation, and subsequent verification of the continued presence of the neutron absorber are still being reviewed.
The licensee's controls for the verification of the init !al and continued presence of the neutron absorber
3 will be reviewed during subsequent inspections as open item (88-05-01).
The changed throughput will also necessitate updating one or more coater related procedures.
The licensee's review and approval of the revisions to the procedures will be followed-up in a subsequent inspection as open item (88-05-02).
(2) Audits (a) The licensee sent an additional nuclear engineer to the University of New Mexico Nuclear Criticality Safety Workshop and the optional Criticality Physics Tutorial during June, 1988.
This preparation facilitates i
increasing the breadth of the licensee's pool of persons with exposure to the kinds of criticality safety related problems encountered in fuel processing plants.
Those selected by the licensee to attend the course have had l
some fuel processing peripheral responsibilities and
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therefore have some basis to which they can relate the i
course material.
It appears that under the circumstances of a shutdown main plant, the licensee is making a reasonable effort to assure, that if production of more HTGR t)pe fuel is commissioned, the licensee's staff will be prepared to fabricate it safely.
(b) It was noted by the r4RO inspector during the previous inspection that the Triga Fuel SNH Storage Vault contained non SNM items.
The items were immediately removed from the vault.
The Nuclear Safety Manager subsequently issued a memo designed to facilitate a case by case evaluation of non SNM items being considered for storage in SNM storage vaults.
The memo was issued March 22, 1988 and requested written justification be provided to Nuclear Safety where it appeared r.uch vault storage of non SNM items was justified.
During the current inspection, the NRC inspector noted that although a method had been provided to evaluate such cases individually, two non SNM items (Air Follower Control Rods) were found stored in the Triga vault without the written justification for their presence.
Additionally, the licensee's internal inspections found ten plastic containers of thorium rods stored in the SV-A West vault. It appears that the individual case by case evaluation ?rovided for in the March 22, 1988 memo is not being followed.
The licensee's performance with regard to providing the documentation justifying the storage of non SNM items in the SNM storage vaults will be reviewed during the next inspection as open item (88-05-03).
(c) The inspectors review of the licensee's internal critical by safety inspections found them to be of suf ficit.mt depth and scope.
The licensee's findings were well documented and were tracked in subsequent inspections to assure they were adequately corrected.
The corrective
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4 actions were identified in subsequent reports.
The inspections were conducted by persons not responsible for the activities inspected.
Performance in this program area appears adequate.
No violations were identified.
D.
Operations Review (88020)
(1) Conduct of Operations (a) Hot Cells It was previously reported that operations in this facility wera on a standby status.
It appears now that there is little expectation of securing the contract that would have required increasing the plutonium license limit to accommvate the post irradiation examination (PIE) work that would have involved other fuel types.
Current plans include consideration of decommissioning the Hot Cell Facility.
This includes returning the facility to 'open field' status.
Considerable planning needs to be done before such an undertaking would be started; therefore, the NRC would have ample time for scheduling the independent overcheck by the Oak Ridge Associated Universities survey team.
Activities presently included upgrading visibility through I
one of the oil filled windows.
The window would be needed j
for the decommissioning work, or for preparation of stored I
materials for shipping or, for other additional in-cell I
work that may develop.
(b) Triga Fuel Fabrication (TFF)
This operation continues at a relatively low but fairly steady level.
Current attention is directed toward l
providing three different customers with the fuel alloys needed for their specific applications.
One of the customers is the onsite Triga Mark F reactor.
This small staff operation continues to be a clean one.
Criticality limit signs were recently upgraded along with the Summary Table of Criticality Limits.
In several instances the upgrading involved administrative reductions of the NSA criticality limits to values consistent with those encountered during production.
Additionally, the floor plan was upgraded to reflect the installation of the new equipment and work station changes.
The hydriding furnace hydrogen leak te m ng system was described.
It appeared during the inspection that the
5 system was not being adequately tested.
- However, subsequent telephonic contact with the cognizant staff engineer, on June 28, 1988, resulted in a satisfactory explanation of the logic behind the system's test procedure.
The question of t.he need for a filter in the line to the sump of the cutoff saw was raised by the supervisor of the TFF.
Discussions with the Nuclear Safety Manager pointed out that the cutoff saw was used infrequently and generated coarse particles relative to the fines generated i
by the centerless grinder which required such a filter.
A review of the license confirmed in Part 2, Section 3.7.5.5, that the sump of the cutoff saw is '.imited to 350 t
grams of U-235.
The licenree's evaluation of the sump l
contents was specified as being determined by difference of input minus output.
The licensee's record of this difference, necessary to assure the limit would not be i
exceeded, will be reviewed during the next inspection as open ites (88-05-04).
The NSA originally permitted 1600 j
grams of U-235 at this station with a 350 grams U-235 sump limit.
However, the recent revision reduced the station to an administrative limit of 350 grams of U-235 including the sump.
f (c) Sorrento Valley B Buildino (SV-8)
The licensed is doing develupment work on the Modular High l
Temperature Gas Reactor (MHTGR) with source material.
No i
SNH is in current operations at SV-B.
Current operations j
are directed towards assuring the MHTGR rods meet product specifications.
A NSA is contemplated for the coater in SV-B because of the interest in processing more than a j
safe mass.
The coating gas abort and reset control system for the coater were discussed and demonstrated by the cognizant i
engineer.
Additionally, the system that detected hydrogen leaks was described and demonstrated.
All hydrogen t
detectors were tested and they responded appropriately.
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The startup procedure for the coater includes routine j
testing of the sensors.
(d)
Low Level Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment System j
(Buildino 25) j i
While passing this area the NRC inspectors noted a 55
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gallon barrel in a horizontal position near a manhole cover to a sewer.
Followup with the Manager, Health Physics disclosed that the horizontal drum was used for
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authorized controlled dumpirig of specified volumes of i
liquid radioactive wastes.
The specified volumes were the result of calculations froa the measurements of the i
contained radionuclides.
The two 3000 gallon tanks in l
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6 Building 25 are used infrequently because the backlog has been worked off and the quantities generated currently are small.
The dump records were reviewed and were found complete and satisfactory.
(e) Facility Exhaust Stacks The licensee completed a review of the environmental monitoring program conducted in April and May, 1908.
The results indicated that the stacks at General Atomics are being sampled isokinetically.
The licensee indicated a review will be conducted annually.
Additionally, the licensee will recheck for isokinetic sampling if new enclosures are Installed or if plenums have been shut down.
This action closes item (86-04-07),
t The licensee is continuing efforts to obtain additional information on plating out of particulates in plastic l
sampling tubes.
Item (87-01-06) therefore remains open.
(f) Experimental Building (E-Building) 1 The licensee did some additional surveying of E-Building, which formerly housed the TFF, and found some activity l
under the carpet.
The licensee plans to do a more thorough check in the near future.
This subject will be followed as open item (88-05-05).
(g) Sorrento Valley A Building (SV-A) i During the tour of SV-A, the NRC inspectors noted one of the magnehelic gauges had apparently reached 0.92 inches of water which requires a prefilter change.
The licensee called on Juna 28, 1988 to report the prefilter in this inactive area had been changed.
Additionally, during the tour, an empty bottle storage area on the south mezzanine was in need of housekeeping.
The Manager. Health Physics, who was serving as escort promptly initiated cleanup and I
subsequently arranged for final clearup.
The completion of the cleanup effort was discussed in the telephone conversation mentioned above.
The inspectors were concerned about the use of the Westinghouse furnace on the north mezzanine.
A discussion t
with the shif t supervisor clarified the project underway and this was readily verified by the container identification numbers.
The area under consideration as the new break / lunch room was visited.
It appeared that a door which previously may have led to the production area had been closed.
No access penetration into the production area currently exists.
A ventilation shaft is present, and the route it t
follows should be checked by the licensee.
7 (h) Laboratory Building (L-Building)
This laboratory was currently being used for work l
involving only sealed sources or encapsulated materials.
l However,it could not be assured that it would not at some l
future time be used for unencapsulated materials; therefore, the fence separating the adjacent laboratory l
was replaced with a wall to prevent contamination of that laboratory.
l (1) Nuclear Waste Processing Facility (NWPF)
The NRC inspectors visited the location in Building 41 l
where the SNM previously stored in the South Tunnel Annex l
had been moved.
The change was undertaken to permit ready access to this relatively active inventory of less than I
370 grams of uranium (less than 5% of this inventory is enriched to greater than 20% U-235).
The materials were relocated to permit routine access te them without the i
l physical security constraints inherent in entering the Tunnel Vault or the West Vault.
The licensee was asked to verify that an expended Ir-192 source was no longer in its container that was being held for disposal.
The licensee followed up and reported, during the inspection, that the Ir-192 source capsule was not a part of the container.
Performance in this program area appears adequate.
No violations were identified.
E.
Radioactive Waste Management (88035)
(1) The licensee's effluent reports were issued as required by 10 CFR Part 70.59.
The reports indicated the licensee's effluents, liquid, gas and particulate, were less than regulatory limits.
The reports were issued within the regulatory time requirement.
(2) Because of a decrease in activities, there have been no shipments of licensed materials transported to the low level waste facilities for disposal since the last inspection.
(3) Records of releases to the sanitary sewer along with procedure NWPF-2718, Disposal of Liquid Waste To The Sanitary Sewer, were reviewed.
Based on this review all releases were analysed and processed prior to disposal.
Records observed documented four releases thus far in 1988.
All releases were well documented along with appropriate analyses and dilution factors supporting the releases were within the limits specified in 10 CFR Part 20.
Performance in this program area appears adequate.
i
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8 No violations were identified.
F.
Radiation Protection (83822)
(1) Posting of Notices The walkthroughs performed at the licensee's facilities verified the licensee continues to comply with the posting requirements specified in 10 CFR 19.11.
Surveys were also performed by the inspector at the waste storage facility using an Eberline survey meter, Model R0-2, calibrated 6-21-88. The surveys verified that radiation warning signs were appropriately posted.
All containers were also noted to be appropriately labeled to identify their contents. No problems were identified in this area.
(2) Audits The licensee conducts quarterly audits of the radiation safety i
I program implemented at the numerous facilities.
The facilities audited included; Sorrento Valley A Building, Sorrento Valley B Building, Triga Fuel Fabrication Building, Hot Cell Building, the waste yard, numerous science laboratories, and EA-1/ Bunker.
The audits were noted to examine the following areas: radiation work authorizations, posting and labeling, instrument calibration and location, ventilation checks, operations, and
)
airborn contamination levels and wipe surveys, 1
The inspector reviewed the audit reports for the fourth quarter of 1987 and the first quarter of 1988. The review indicated the licensee is actively following the radiation safety practices at their facilities and taking corrective action when deficiencies are identified or improvements are warranted.
The i
licensee appears to have an effective audit program for radiation safety.
)
(3) External Exposures l
Records of annual whole body exposures for 1987, and for the j
first quarter of 1988 were examined. The examination determined that all exposures were within the guidelines contained in 10 j
CFR Part 20.
The highest whole body radiation exposure for the calendar year of 1987 was 750 millirems. The highest whole body exposure for the period of 1/1/88 to 3/31/88 was 250 millirems.
The records also documented that the licensee analyzes their
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exposure reports to determine that all exposures are within j
normal expected ranges. Should a higher than normal exposure occur, the Itcensee would perfona an evaluation to determine i
the reason for the exposure and take corrective action, if necessary.
Termination Reports pursuant to 10 CFR 19.13 were also examined and noted to be satisfactorily completed and furnished within I
the 30 day time frame specified in the above stated regulation.
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'A.
9 (3)
Instruments and Equipment The inspection included walkthroughs of the following facilities:
the Hot Cells, Triga Fuel Fabrication, Sorrento
+
Valley B Building, Sorrento Valley A Building, and Waste Storage.
During the walkthroughs radiological instrumentation was examined for operability and calibration.
Ali instruments observed were noted to be operabic and in calibration.
The licensee's calibration facility was also visited and the J
calibration of one instrument was observed. During the calibration it was noted that all radiation warning lights and alarms functioned properly and the individual wore appropriate personnel monitoring equipment which included; finger rings on both hands, a pocket dosimeter, a radiation chirper, and a j
whole body thermolecent dosimeter.
The competence of the individual performing the calibration and sesociated records appeared satisfactory.
No problems were identified in this area.
Performance in this program area appears adequate.
I l
No violations were identified.
G.
Waste Generator Requirements /10 CFR 20/10 CFR 61 (84850)
The licensee continues to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 20 and 10 CFR 61 through application of appropriate approved procedures.
The principal waste form shipped in the past couple of years was soil with low level contamination.
This soil was subsequently buried at the Department of Energy's Nevada Test Site.
Performance in this program area appears adequate.
No violations were identified.
H.
Emergency Preparedness (88050)
(1) The fire extinguishers inspected during the tour had all received their monthly inspections.
(2) Training Interviews were conducted at all facilities visited to determine that licensee personnel were familiar with their facilities emergency procedures and emergency equipment and that responsibilities have been preassigned to mitigate the consequences of an event.
The interview results indicated some personnel were fully aware of their emergency procedures and had preassigned certain responsibilities to cope with an event.
However, other individuals were noted to be unfamiliar with the facilities emergency procedures and equipment.
This area will be reexamined when the licensee has completed the revision to
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10 the Radiological Contingency Plan which will incorporate the individual facilities emergency procedures and training.
No violations were identified.
I.
Deactivation / Decontamination (0/0) Activities (83890)
(1) The NRC inspectors interfaced with the ORAU personnel who where conducting the independent overcheck of Phase IV of the D/0 project.
The current effort was directed towards the abandoned Callon Ponds sewage treatment plant,13 of the laboratories in the L Building, and the canyon area to the west of and below the TRIGA reactor and hot cells.
Some additional cleanup was needed in one of the laboratories.
The licensee expeditiously and adequately cleaned the hot spots.
The subsequent ORAU overcheck found the contamination had been reduced to less than NRC release limits.
Soil samples were taken within and above the canyon area being overchecked.
The licensee requested a sampling map from ORAU which would reflect the two soil samples taken outside of the area to be released to avoid later
}
confusion.
No information was obtained regarding the progress on the Callon Ponds overcheck.
It appeared that the licensee's efforts in this program area were adequate.
No violations were identified.
J.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (1) (Closed), Open Item 88-02-03, Examine corrective action 1
regarding a violation for the failure to inventory the health physics van as required by Radiological Contingency Plan (RCP).
The licensee's response dated April 14, 1988 to our Notice Of Violation was examined and noted to contain the following corrective actions to avoid a further violation: 1) All emergency kits will be sealed to prevent pilferage and; 2) the monthly van inventory has been added to the required activities list to insure the monthly inventories are accomplished.
Discussions with licensee personnel and a review of inventory records indicate satisfactory corrective action in this area.
This item is closed.
i (2) (0 pen), Open Item 88-02-05, Examine corrective action regarding J
a violation for the failure to provide required Emergency Team training.
The licensee's response dated April 14, 1988 to our Notice of Violation contained the following corrective actions to avoid a further violation:
- 1) the RCP will be revised in Section 4.1.7.1 to precisely describe the training objectives;
- 2) the Emergency Team members will be trained in those subjects that are applicable to their respective activities and additionally, the training records for the RCP response teams are being reviewed and any needed training will be accomplished by June 1, 1988 and; 3) selected Health Physics Technicians will also receive self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) i
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training by June 1, 1988; and 4) establish an additional l
position to interface with the Emergency Response and Recovery Director (ERRD). Discussions with licensee personnel and a review of records indicate that the corrective action on this item is incomplete at this time.
The revision to the RCP, the completion SCBA training and the implementation of the additional individual to interface with the ERRD still need to i
be accomplished. Corrective action on this item will be examined in a future inspection.
This item remains open.
(3) (Closed), Open Item 88-02-04, Consider developing a oose assessment and classification procedure. This item was examined and the licensee has issued Health Physics Procedure No. 164 to i
perform dose assessment and classification.
This procedure I
satisfactorily implements the dose assessment and l
classification portion of the RCP.
This item is considered
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closed.
I K.
ExitMeeting(30703J The results of the inspection were discussed with the licensee's staff identified in Section.L The topics discussed included:
l The status of the previous opu items:
l l
Closed (86-04-07)
Isokinetic sampling of exhaust stacks (86-06-03)
Shipment of the liquid scrap from the North l
Warning System production operation p
(88-02-03)
Examine corrective action for failing to conduct inventories of emergene.y equipment.
7 (88-07-04)
Review dose assessment and accident l
classification methodolegy.
l Open i
(84-04-08)
Review grinder holdup study conclusion l
(requires plant restart)
(87-01-06)
Review licensee action on use of PVC tubing for sampling where some information indicates i
potential loth of particulates through a plating out mechanism.
I (87-01-07)
Review the licensee's plans for an independent review of the Emergency and Radiological Contingency Plans.
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(87-01-08)
Review the licensee's plans for increased interfacing and more frequent exercises with Scripps Memorial Hospital.
(87-05-03)
Review the documentation of radiological surveys of the E Building made after cleanup following fuel fabrication activities conducted under federal license.
(88-02-01)
Review new vault storage list of non SNM items allowed in the vaults.
(88-02-02)
Review formal agreements with the City of San Diego and the County Department of Disaster Preparedness.
l (88-02-05)
Examine corrective action for failing to 1
conduct required training, i
i New i
(88-05-01)
Review the licensee's controls for the verification of the initial and continued presence of the neutron absorber.
(88-05-02)
Review the licensee's approval of the revised procedures addressing the increased batch size.
(88-05-03)
Review the licensee's performance with regard to the case by case evaluation of the storage of non SNH in the SNM storage vaults, i
1 (88-05-04)
Review the licensee's record of the determination by difference of the coatents in the sump of the cutoff saw (per Part 2 of the license, Section 3.7.5.5.).
(88-05-05)
Review the results of the licensee's resurvey 6
of the E Building area that once housed the TFF.
Other Topics included:
A.
A review of the observations made during the tour of each of I
the operation areas.
B.
All 82 of the fire extinguishers checked were current with l
regard to the required monthly inspections.
All of the survey instruments checked were also current with regard to instrument r
calibrations.
Only one magnehelic gauge reflected the need for a prefilter change.
This was accomplished within the week L
following the inspection.
C.
Special mention was made of the pride the instrument L
calibration technician displayed in his work, l
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13 0.
Tht NRC interest in the potential Decontamination and Decommissioning (0/0) of the Hot Cell was addressed.
The NRC needs to be aware of potential 0/0 projects to plan for including the projects when scheduling independent overchecks by ORAU.
On June 28, 1988 the NRC inspector discussed the testing of the hydrogen detectors with the licensee's cognizant staff engineer.
The inspector was also informed on that same date that the prefilter change had been completed.
Also, the south mezzanine empty container housekeeping need had been provided.
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