ML20135F143

Insp Rept 70-0734/97-01 on 970225-27.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Repts of Safeguards Events,Control of Special Nuclear Matl,Detection Aids & Locks,Response & Communication & Testing & Maint

ML20135F143
Person / Time
Site:	07000734
Issue date:	03/06/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20135F132	List: ML20135F129 ML20135F135 ML20135F143
References
70-0734-97-01, 70-734-97-1, NUDOCS 9703110225
Download: ML20135F143 (9)

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! ENCLOSURE 2 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV l

Docket No.: 70-734 )

License No.: SNM-696 Report No.: 70-734/97-01 Licensee: General Atomics Facility: Torrey Pines Mesa and Sorrento Valley Facilities Location: P.O. Box 85608 l San Diego, California Dates: February 25-27,1997 Inspector: D. W. Schaefer, Security Specialist Plant Support Branch I Approved By: Blaine Murray, Chief, Plant Support Branch ,

Division of Reactor Safety Attachment SupplementalInformation l l

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9703110225 970306 PDR ADOCK 07000734 C PDR

r 2-EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

l General Atomics

, NRC Inspection Report 70-734/97-01

! This routine, announced inspection focused on the licensee's physical security program.

The areas inspected included reports of safeguards events; control of special nuclear material; detection aids and locks; response and communications; testing and maintenance; security program plan and procedures; access control; and review of previous inspection l findings.

Results l The licensee conformed to the regulatory requirements regarding the reporting of security events (Section 1.1). (

The overall level of physical protection provided to special nuclear material was very good (Section 2.1).

An excellent detection system was maintained inside the cont olled access areas,

! and all segments of this system were performance tested at the frequency required {

by the physical protection plan. A violation identified that the licensee had not changed the locks annually on two controlled access areas (Section 2.2). t

• Response to security alarms was excellent. Additionally, an excellent security radio l communication system was maintained (Section 2.3).  !

• The testing program was being conducted in accordance with the physical protection plan and was a major strength in the overall security program )

(Section 2.4). j 1

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• Security implementing procedures were consistent with the requirements of the physical protection plan. Changes to the physical protection plan did not decrease the effectiveness of the plan. A violation was identified that the licensee had not furnished to the NRC in the form of a report, a description of two changes to its j physical protection plan, without prior NRC approval, within two months after the f l change (Section 3.1).  !

• The access control of personnel entering and exiting controlled access areas was excellent (Section 4.1).

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Report Details 1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities 1.1 Reoorts of Safeauards Events (81402)

a. insoection Scoce

! The licensee's records were inspected to insure compliance with reporting of safeguards events contained in 10 CFR 73.71.

b. Observations and Findinas The licensee stated that there were no safeguards events which required notification to the NRC. The inspector reviewed various records, logs, and

,- associated documents and found no reportable events. The inspector determined I

that the licensee conformed to the regulatory requirements regarding the reporting i of security events.

c. Conclusions l

The licensee conformed to the regulatory requirements regarding the reporting of security events. ,

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2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment I l

2.1 Control of Special Nuclear Material (81421) I

a. Insoection Scope  !

The control of special nuclear material was inspected to determine compliance with j the requirements of the security plan, i i

b. Observations and Findinas The inspector performed a walkdown of all controlled access areas maintained for the licensee's (70-docket) material. Except as identified in paragraphs 2.2 and 3.1 below, the inspector determined that special nuclear material was properly stored and secured only within controlled access areas, and that the licensee's overalllevel of physical protection to special nuclear material was very good,

c. Conclusions The overall level of physical protection provided to special nuclear material was very i good. <

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2.2 Detection Aids and Locks (81421) l

a. ln_sgection Scope (

The licensee's detection aids and locking devices were inspected to determine compliance with the requirements of the security plan.

b. Observations and Findinas j The inspector discussed with enembers of the security organization the procedures for conducting monthly tests of the intrusion detection system inside the controlled i access areas. The licensee's tests of the intrusion detection system were l performance oriented to ensure that system failures were identified and corrected. I During a walkdown of all controlled access areas the inspector determined that the intrusion detection system conformed to the requirements of the physical protection l

plan. The inspector determined by testing, that the motion detectors were properly positioned and sensitive to movement inside the controlled access areas. All alarms from the controlled access areas annunciated in the security control station.

I Section 3.3 of the licensee's physical protection plan requires, in part, that key locks (cores) controlling access to Controlled Access Areas be changed at least annually.

The inspector determined that the licensee had not changed lock cores to two controlled access areas at least annually. The lock core for the licensee's controlled access area at the Sorrento Valley facility had not been changed since May 1995, 21 months earlier. Additionally, the lock core for the licensee's controlled access area at Station 1 had not been changed since September 1995, approximately 17 months earlier.

During the exit meeting on February 27,1997, the licensee stated that the Station 1 locks had been changed the previous evening, and that the locks for the Sorrento Valley Facility had been scheduled to be changed in the near future.

The licensee's f ailure to change locks to its controlled access areas at least annually, is a violation of Section 3.3 the physical protection plan (VIO 70-734/9701-01).

c. Conclusions An excellent detection system was maintained inside the controlled access areas.

A violation identified that the licensee had not changed the locks annually on two controlled access areas.

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2.3 Resoonse and Communications (81421) i

a. Insoection Scone

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The response to security alarms and radio communication capabilities were inspected to determine compliance with the requirements of the security plan.

b. Observations and Findinas The inspector determined through observations and interviews that, in accordance with the physical protection plan requirements, the minimum number of qualified individuals were on duty at all times to assess and respond to alarms caused by unauthorized penetrations or activities in the controlled access areas. Each alarm response was by a watchman dispatched from the security control station.

The inspector also determined that the licensee had an excellent radio system. The licensee was capable of meeting all communication requirements of the physical protection plan. The licensee maintained an adequate number of portable radios for use by members of the security organization.

c. Conclusions Response to security alarms was excellent. Additionally, an excellent security radio communication system was maintained. I I

2.4 Testina and Maintenance (81421) )

a. insoection Scoce The testing program was inspected to determine compliance with the requirements c,f the Security Plan.

b. Observations and Findinas The inspector reviewed testing records and confirmed that the records committed to in the security plan were on file and well documented. The inspector determined through interviews and a review of records, that repairs to security equipment were completed in a timely manner. The licensee's documented testing program for  ;

security equipment was determined to be a major strength of the overall security program.

c. Conclusions The testing program was being conducted in accordance with the physical protection plan and was a major strength in the overall security program.

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• 3 Security and Safeguards Procedures and Documentation ,

1 3.1 Security Proaram Plan and Procedures (81401) l J

a. Inspection Scoce l

The Security Plan and the implementing procedures were inspected to determine compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 70.32(e) and the security plan.

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b. Observations and Findinas The inspector reviewed security implementing procedures and verified that the licensee had an effective management system for the development and administration of procedures, and that changes to the procedures did not reduce the effectiveness of the licensee's security program.

Page xi (Plan Change Procedure) of the licensee's physical protection plan dated April 1995, states, in part, that " Changes made (to the physical protection plan) without prior NRC approval will be furnished to the NRC in the form of a report containing a description of each change within two months after the change."

Additionally,10 CFR 70.32(e) requires, in part, that changes to the security plan made without prior NRC approval will be furnished to the NRC in the form of a report containing a description of each change within two months after the change is made. ,

On February 26,1997, the inspector determined that the licensee had made the following changes to its physical protection plan without prior NRC approval and did not furnish a report to the NRC containing a description of each change within two months of the change:

• In January 1996, the licensee initiated permanent storage of fuel samples  ;

inside of a separate building. Storage of materialin this building was not I addressed in the physical protection plan. This new storage area, i established as a controlled access area, met all of the security requirements for other controlled access areas.

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• In September 1995, the licensee discontinued a manuf acturing operation l inside a portion of one of its buildings described in the physical protection l plan.  !

In both instances, the licansee had made interim pen and ink changes to its copy of the physical protection plan and had intended to previously notify the NRC of these i plan changes.

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l The licensee's failure to report to the NRC a description of each change made to its ,

physical protection plan, without prior NRC approval, within two months after the-change, is a violation of page xi of its physical protection plan and 10 CFR 70.32(e)  !

(70 734/9701-02).

c. Conclusions Security implementing procedures were consistent with the requirements of the physical protection plan. Changes to the physical protection plan did not decrease  :

the effectiveness of the plan. A violation was identified that the licensee had not furnished to the NRC in the form of a report, a description of each change to the ,

physical protection plan, within two months of the change.

4 Security and Safeguards Staff Knowledge and Performance 4.1 Access Control

a. insoection Scope j l

The access control of personnel entering and exiting controlled access areas war  !

inspected to determine compliance with the requirements of the physical protection '

plan.

b. Observations and Findinas The inspector determined through observations and interviews that the control of personnel access to all controlled access areas met the requirements of the physical protection plan. Personnel entering all controlled access areas wore distinctive l licensee badges. All visitors were escorted. The inspector determined through  !

observations that the licensee was capable of preventing unauthorized entry of j individuals or material. i

c. Conclusions I l

The access control of personnel entering md exiting controlled access areas was  ;

excellent.

5 Miscellaneous Security and Safeguer.. sues (92701) 5.1 (Closed) Inspection Followuo item 70-734/9304-01: Emeraency Power.

During a previous security inspection, it was determined during a test of the security emergency power system, that following the loss of primary electrical power, the security computer could not communicate with several area intrusion detectors, and generated a series of alert messages to that effect. This condition existed for approximately 10-20 seconds while the bulk of the system was

,o 8-operating on batteries. Once the security system switched to generator power, all required systems operated normally with no apparent loss or spurious introduction of intrusion alarms.

During this inspection, the licensee performed a test of its security emergency power system. No problems were identified during this test.

5.2 (Closed) Inspection Followuo item 70-734/9103 03: Safenuards Information Procedure During a previous security inspection, it was determined that the licensee's procedure for the protection of unclassified safeguards information incorrectly identified standard single-wall steel file cabinets with a built-in lock, as an acceptable storage container, without an NRC statement of approval for the container. Additionally, the procedure incorrectly noted the acceptability of storage of safeguards information in the password protected, but non-volatile memory of "self-contained (within licensee facilities) ADP" systems. Further, the procedure improperly identified tearing as an acceptable means of destruction (in addition to burning or shredding) of safeguards information.

During this inspection, the licensee stated that in October '1993, the above procedure had been retracted and that the licensee no longer generated, received, or stored safeguards information.

6. Exit Meeting Summary The inspector presented the inspection results to members of the licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on February 27,1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. As indicated in paragraph 2.2 above, the licensee stated that on February 26,1997, the lock on Station 1, a controlled access area, had been changed.

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SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee K. Asmussen, Director, Licensing, Safety and Nuclear Compliance  :

R. Cook, Security Supervisor l M. Crouch, Security Locksmith S. Felix, Manager, Human Resources 1 D. Hamblin, Electrician, Facility Engineer I H. Kleinsorge, Security Administrator  :

B. Laney, Licensing Engineer  ;

R. Noren, Director, Nuclear Fuel Fabrication j

J. Razvi, Director, TRIGA Products and Services l J. Saurwein, Health Physics C. Wisham, Manager, Nuclear Material Accountability I

LNSPECTION PROCEDURES USED I IP 81401 Physical Security and Safeguards Contingency Plans IP 81402 Reports of Safeguards Events IP 81421 Fixed Site Physical Protection of MSNM r

IP 92701 Followup on inspector identified Problems and Unresolved items LIST OF ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED ltems Ooened 70 734/9701-01 VIO Rotation of Security Locks 70-734/97-01 02 VIO Changes to Physical Protection Plan items C!osed 70-734/9103-03 IFl Safeguards Information Procedure 70-734/9304-01 IFl Emergency Power LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Security Maintenance Procedure (Series of 5 procedures)

Special Security Order, Station 1, dated 10/05/95 Special Security Orders, TRIGA Fuel Fabrication Facility, dated 09/06/95 Special Security Orders, TRIGA Reactors Facility, dated 09/30/96 Supplemental Security Procedures, Intrusion Alarm Testing, dated 04/25/96