ML20236B463
| ML20236B463 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07000734 |
| Issue date: | 07/16/1987 |
| From: | Brock B, Pang J, Thomas R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236B429 | List: |
| References | |
| 70-0734-87-06, 70-734-87-6, NUDOCS 8707290120 | |
| Download: ML20236B463 (14) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V
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Report No. 70-734/87-06 l
Docket No.70-734
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License No. SNM-696 1.. '
Safeguards G.oup: 1 Licensee: GA Technologies, Inc.
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P. O. Box 85608 San Diego, California 92138 i
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Facility Name:
Torrey Pines Mesa and Sorrento Valley Sites Inspection at:
San Diego, California E
- p Inspection Conducted:
May 18-22, and June 24, 1987 2 4/((
O Inspetters:
B. L. Brock, Fuel Facilities Inspector Date igned j
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ff J. F. Pang, Radiation Specialist Oste Signed Approved y:
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g' R.' O. Thomas, Chief
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. i Nuclear Mate)ial:, Safety Section
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Sumary:
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Inspection on May 18-22, and June 24, 1967 (Report tb. 70-734/87-06)
Areas Inspecte5: A routine unannounced safety inspection was conducted of f
management organization and contrals, operator training and retraining, criticality safety, operations review, radiation protection, transportation of 1e a.
radioactive materials, radioactive M ste management /10 U 4 Part 61, emergency preparedness, environmental programs, and deJCtiVPiion/ decontamination activities.
During this inspection, the procedures covered were 88005, 88010, 88015, 88020, 83822, 86740, 88035/84950, 88050, 88045, and 83890.
Results:
No violations were identified in the areas inspected.
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DETAlLS R
1.
Persons Contauted
- R. N. Rademacher, Director, Human Resources
- K. E. Asmussen,. Manager, Licensing and '4uclear Compliance
- R. C. Neren, Director, Nuclear Fuel Fabrication
- R. P. Vanek, Managce, Fuel Production Department l
- V. Malakhof,' Manager, Nuclear Safety K. L. Jchnson Manager, Facilities Engineering C. Wisham, Manager, Nuclear Materials Accountability
- L. R. Quintana, Manager, tiealth PhyLics R. I. DeVelasco, Staff Engineer, Core Engineering
- A. L. Galli, Manager, Security
- R.
J. Bott, Industrial Safety Engineer J. S. Greenwood, Senior Scientist, Hot Cells R. V. Challam, Consultant, Toxicologist R. K. Krueger, Supervisor:, Triga Fuel Production j
P. T. Marshc11, Emerge 9ty Services Technician i
M. B. Zacavich, Supervisor, Pilot Plant Technicians-T. W. Keim, Senior Nuclear Fuel Wasle Processor H. Overton, Senior Nuclear Fuel Waste Processor B. Evans, Nuclear Materials Coordinator E. L. Spencer, Environmental Technician F. Rustsy, Shift Supervisor V. Krceger, Nuclear Material Controller
- Denotes those attending the exit meeting.
2.
Manegement Organization and Control License Condition 9 of SNM-696 incorporates the statcments, representations' and conditions specified in Part II - License Specifications as part of the license.
A.
Organizational Structure Section 3.1 of Part II - License Specifications permits the licensee to change organizational responsibilities, reporting locatinns and names, providing such changes to not adversely affect the implementation of license conditions and they are reported to the NRC within sixty days after the change.
(1) The licensee's organizational responsibilities are unchanged since the January 1987 team assessment.
Some personnel assignments have been mcdified in response to the team recommendations.
These changes and some of the other licensee responses are addressed in appropriate sectionc of the report.
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Procedure Contr61's
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'.Nectioni.7.2o'fPartII-JLicenseSpecificationsrequires M,
sprocedures for al activities in which aderf als subject to' this j
- license are physically handled, stored, and chemically or physically H
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'(1)' Th6 licensee's procecure NWPF-2718, " Disposal of Liquid Waste j
~ f.o' Sanitary: Sewer," Issbe A, October 23, 1985, addresses.
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, neutralization with sodium hydroxide or mariatic acid 'as appropriate.
The licensee's response to the previous citation Tor failure to foll9w this procedure (inspection report j
70-734/86-06) effectively achieved immediate compliance (see i
Section 5.A.(4)).
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(2) The licensce's-response to procedures'for use with hazardous material work authorizations (HWAs) indicated the detail and the reviews (when approved) serve as the operating procedure
-(see Section 3,.C.).
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.C.
- Internal Review and Audit g
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Section 3.6 or Part II
. License Specificatioils requires that health j
physics.inspectior.s be' conducted quarterly and nuclear safety
,f r.spections be conducted at least annually for all' areas possessing SNM and at least quarterly for' areas possessing more than 500 grams of SNM.
(1F Tne NRC inspectors reviewed th9 licensee's health physics and
, nucle.ar safety inspections.
Eight separate facility.
- inspections are conducted by the Manager of Health Physics each
-quarter.
Additionally nineteen separate criticality safety inspections were conducted by the Manager Nuclear Safety or his deputy.
The licensee's inspections were conducted as required Jand.were appropriately documented.
It was noted that health-physics technicians are now accompanying the Manager of Health Physics during the quarterly inspections as recommended by the March 1987 assessment team.
D.
Safety Committe2s Section 3.2.3 of Part II - License Specifications requires that the 4
Criticality and Radiation Safety Committee (CR$C) report to the Office of the President via a. designated Vice President.
The CRSC shall as a minimum:
(1) act in a radiological safety advisory capacity; (2) review policies and criteria established for safety of SNM operations; (3) provide second level 0* review for nuclear safety analysis; and (4) audit work involving radioactive materials
-for conformance to and effectiveness of applicable procedures and practices including a review to determine how exposures might be reduced to meet ALARA.
(1) The adequacy of the CR50 second level review of nuclear safety analysis will continue to be assessed in subsequent inspections p
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because of the review inadequacies identified during the team assesement. The licensee's assessment response included selection of three' individuals the licensee evaluated as qualified to perform the nuclear safety tasks.
These individuals were selected from a group of individuals at GA-Technologies who'have expertise in some or all aspects of nuclear safety evaluations.
The four individuals meet the license requirements for appropriate fields of study however their experience in nuclear safety activities related to nuclear fuel fabrication operations is limited.
See Section 4.A.(1) for further details.
No violations were identified.
3.
Operator Training Secti?n 3.2.2.1 of Part II - License Specification states that on-site radiological safety training will be conducted.
A.
The licensee's radiological safety training program was reviewed and it appears to be adeguate.
The licensee is in the process of planning and scheduling the annual refresher training for 1987.
B.
Additional training is planned for the three selectees scheduled to perform nuclear safety analysis rrviews (see Section 4.A.(1)).
j C.
The licensee retained a Ph.D. Toxicologist consultant to provide training and assistance in the hazardous materials program.
Early projects undertaken included training the Emergency Services Technicians further so they were able to assist in identifying and correcting incompatible chemical storage.
Some storage lockers are not yet completed; therefore, item (87-01-03) remains open.
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Improvements are being made in storage of hazardous materials and the contr:1 provided for spills.
Storage areas are being controlleo and locked.
The hazardous material invencory has been broadered.
An effort will be made to substitute less hazardous chemicals where pussible.
Labeling of chemicals used by gardeners and janitors was 1
completed.
Appropriate hazardoup material training less been given to the gardeners and janitors.
An inventory is being maae of the Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) to determine if all MSDSs needed are on hand.
Those still needed will be acquired.
According to the Industrial Safety Engineer, persons authorizrd to work with d
hazardous materials must have'and be familiar with the Material.
Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) which specify the physical and chemical properties, health hazards, precautions for safe handling, emergency spill control and cleanup procedures.
Thus, the MSDS for each 4
hazardous material essentially constitutes a " Standard Operating l
Procedure'".
This approach appears to be adequate and reasonable.
The training program includes informing laboratory workers of hazardous byproducts from chemicals subjected to a fire in the -
laboratcry.
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Plens. include acquisition of' supplied air monitors that.will alarm visually and audibly when the oxygen content drops below 19.5 percent.
Other pollutants will also be monitored.
E.
The Emergency Services Technicians (EST) have been part of a sep3 rate hazardous materials training program.
The ESTs are also yelied upon to provide hazardous material inventory information for specific buildings to responding fire department personncl.
No violations were identified.
4.
Criticality Safety Section 3.2.2.2 of Part II - License Specification requires assurance of nuclear criticality safety through review of proposed SNM activitics and review of proposed changes in processing equipment and procedures.
It also requires frequent inspection and monitoring to assure adequate nuclear safety control.
Independent verification of all determinations of criticality limits tre also required.
A.
Nuclear Criticality Safety Analysis (1) The reviewers of the Nuclear Criticality Safety analyses are required by Section 3.34 of Part II to have similar-qualifications to those specified for the Manager, Nuclear Safety in Section 3.3.2 of Part II.
In Section 2.0..of this report it was noted that the licensee selected three persons with graduate degrees in appropriate fields of st.udy for the nuclear saTety evaluations or independent reviews.
In accordance with the requirements of Section 3.3.4 the qualifications of the selectee's were reviewed and approved by the Manager, Licensing and Compliance and the Manager Nuclear Safety and Chairman of the CRSC.
The new independent reviewer for the CRSC has a Ph.D. degree in Nuclear Engineering.
He also gained a thorough knowledge of the HTGR processing line during the five years when he was responsible for nondestructive assay of all intermediate products, products, and side streams.
The licensee has arranged for the retired Hanager of Nuclear Safety, to present a three day course on the related nuclear criticality safety analyses.
The Manager of Nuclear Safety also plans to include in the quarterly audits those persons selected to perform the nuclear criticality hafety reviews.
Other problems encountered'and resolved during full production could be reviewed to broaden the benefit the selectees derive from the quarterly audits.
The progress in assuring the human error and other aspects of operations receive appropriate attention remains an open item (86-04-03).
j Additionally, the licensee is sending the Deputy Manager of Nuclear Safety to the Nuclear Criticality Safety workshop (scheduled for the first week of June) sponsored by the University of New Mexico, Department of Chemical and Nuclear Engineering.
The licensee is endeavoring to assure adequate depth.in nuclear safety analysis.
The Deputy Manager, Nuclear Safety recently completed over one year of applicable nuclear
5 safety activities related to nuclear fuel fabrication operations.
The North Warning System fuel fabrication process was operating within this period as was the Triga fuel fabrication line.
The licensee can therefore meet the analysis and single independent review requirement with the Manager Nuclear Safety and the Deputy Manager of Nuclear Safety.
For i
new or revised nuclear safety analyses, all of which require I
ceparate verification by two independent parties, the licensee must call on the services of the Manager, Core Nuclear Branch for assistance in the near term, this closes item (87-01-01).
It appears that the licensee is in a position to assure, on plant restart, the eventual qualification of several independent reviewers who could meet the two independent review license requirement fcr new or revised nuclear safety analyses.
(2) The Manager Nuclear Safety is preparing a guide to asrure the adequacy of nuclear safety evaluations.
The guide should prove useful in precluding oversights.
(3) The licensee prepared and appropriately reviewed a second nuclear safety analysis of the Building 37 Dump Sink.
This closes item (87-01-02).
(4) The criticality limit sign review is still in process.
B.
Procedures (1)
The licensee's program for assuring tne early recognition of the need for procedures addressing Nide streams of production operations appears appropriate.
The program will preclude late development of a necessary procedure _.
This closes item (86-04-05).
No violations were identified.
5.
Operations Review Section 3.2.1 of Part II - License Specification requires that the licensee's organization conduct their respective activities within federal, state, and local rules and regulations, license criteria, and company policy, criteria and established practices.
A.
Conduct of Operations (1) North Warning System (NWS)
The NWS productior, process was shut down.
The required rods had been successfully fabricated ano shipped. The dropping columns used'for kernel production have been disassembled and redesigned columns have been assembled.
A new drying oven is also in place in the NWS production area.
Further work is dependent upon the performance of the core assembled and tested by the Los Alamos National Laboratory.
6 (2) Tr' iga Fuel Fabrication Operatic % continue at a low level.
The need for clarification of criticality-safety limit signs h&s been adequately
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addressed.
The row criticality safety limit sign within the i
vault now specifically states the constraint on the type of i
containers stored in that row and includes a mechanism indicating the type currently stored.
Additionally,'the ambiguity that existed on the criticality safety limit sign at the mill has been corrected.
The sign now I
clearly states the chip limit of 350 grams of chips (alloy) and 650 grams as one piece (alloy).
The alloy composition varies up to 30% U at a little under 20 percent enriched.
A significant portion of the work in the near future will be directed towards production of fuel elements for the Mark F Reactor.
A small fire nccurred at the lathe when a hot chip ignited the chips accumulated on the metal oed of the lathe.
A class D fire extinguisher was used to extinguish the fire.
See S'ection 9.B.(2) for further information.
The Triga Fuel Fabrication exhaust air sampler with PVC and 90 bends is included in the licensee's overall neview of the adequacy of nozzles in place for isokinetic sampling of exhaust stacks. Action will be taken on a project basis at the completion of the review rather than on a piecemeal basis.
This item (.87-01-06) remains open.
i (3) Hot Cells The hot cell cleanup operation involved cell entry only as far as the airlock for the high level cell.
Decontamination of materials being remcved from the high level cell is done remotely before entries are made.
The tygon tubing used in the low level hot cell has been removed and new inlet metal piping has been fabricated on the inlet side of the filter.
However, the new fabrication has several pipe joints and 90* bends.
For this reason it was
. recommended that the inlet tubing be prefabricated to reduce the number of joints and to eliminate 90" bends.
This item (87-01-05) remains open.
(t 8_ow Level Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment System (Building 25)
The licensee was previously cited in inspection report l
70-734/86-06 for failure to follow procedure NWPF-2718
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" Disposal of Liquid Waste to Sanitary Sewer".
The licensee's corrective action of restricting further processing to strict adherence to the approved procedure achieved full compliance.
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7 The licensee subsequently proposed to review the chemical thermodynamics oi the neutralization process, and if appropriate, revise the procedure to include use of the 500 I
gallon transfer tank.
The revised procedure wculd be subject j
to the normal reviewers; however, the Industrial Safety J
Engineer would also be included.
The insoector observed that the procedure had been revised and reviewed as plannud.
THe licensee's review of the chemical thermodynamics will be checked during the next inspection (87-06-01).
1 (5) Nuclear Waste Processing Facility (NWPF)
Some of the liquid scrap packaged for shipment to the Los Alamos National Laboratory is still on site (see Section 7. A.).
(6) Facility Exhaust Stacks The licensee has not completed the review of the adequacy of nozzles in place for isokinetic sampling of exhaust stacks.
Only some facilities have been reviewed by the licensee for this item. The licer.see's plan is to complete the review of all facilities and then take appropriate corrective action.
This item (86-04-07) remains open.
(7) Experimental Building The licensee has recently completed decontamination and made contamination surveys of the Experimental (E) Building in anticipation of releasing E Building for unrestricted use.
The E Building had previously been used for activities under the NRC license and had subsequently been releaspd by the licensee for unrestricted use.
Documentation of the radiological surveys of the C Building, for activities conducted under this license, were not available at the time of the inspection.
The documentation will be reviewed during the next inspection (87-06-03).
A cursory radiation survey of the decontaminated areas conducted by the inspector indicated the presence of several isolated areas or spots of contamination still present.
The highest radiation level noted was 2 mr/hr.
The findings were provided to the licensee representative accompanying the inspector during the survey.
An Eberline Model PRM-7 Micro R survey meter, S.N. a53, calibrated on 1-28-87 was used to conduct the survey.
No violations were identified.
6.
Radiation Protection Protection against radiation hazards associated with licensed activities is required by 10 CFP. Part 20.
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A.
External Exposure-l
.The inspector reviewed the licensee's records of radiation exposure for the period of June, 1986 to April, 1987.
No Part 20 exposure limits were emeeded.
The highest annual doses received by GA-T, Inc. radiation monitors in 1986 were 1.76 and 1.08 rems accrued by two hot cell workers respe.ctively.
According to the Manager, Health Physics the licensee's program averages about 20 missing or lost hadges per quarter.
The licensee's investigations and estimates of exposures for the missing badges for the 1st quarter of 1987 were reviewed and were found to have been made in an appropriate manner.
B.
Lung Coung During January 27-28, 1987, 31 lung counts were conducted by the contractor for the licensee.
One high count was determined to have j
been external contamination rather than a lung burden.
No significant tung burden was detected.
C.
Bioassau Results The inspector reviewed urinalyses results for July, 1986 through March, 1987.
No significant results were noted.
D.
Surveys The' licensee's documentation of radiation and contamination surveys conducted since July, 1986 were reviewed on a randomly selected basis.
Surveys had been conducted at the stated frequencies and appropriately documented as required.
E.
Portable Monitoring Instruments Survey instruments and area alarms were checked by the inspectors during the tour of the licensee's facilities.
All instruments were in calibration.
F.
Leak Tests i
Compliance with leak test requirements was reviewed by the
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inspector. All of the sealed sources (Pu) under this license are in i
l storage thereby obviating the need for leak testing at this time, Tho licensee's leak tests procedures are in compliance with the license requirements.
No changes are required; however, the licensee is consolidating the existing leak test procedures into one.
The licensee had previously misinterpreted the requirements.
I This' item (87-01-04) is closed.
'No violations were identified.
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Trmsportation Licensee's transportation activities are regulated by 43 CFR 100-177,10 CFR 71, and 20.311.
In addition, an NRC issued Certificate of Compliance regulates the use of shipping casks used to transport fuel and corr.ponents to and from Fort Saint Vrain (FSVR).
A.
To date the licensee has made several shipments of the aoxed drums of NWS liquid scrap.
Two or three shipments still must be made to remove the remaining waste.
According to the licensee the first priority at present is to ship the contaminated soil on site to a l
burial site.
This item (86-06-03) rs ains open.
B.
The licensee's compliance with DOT requirements were reviewed.
The licensee has the appropriate certificate-of compliance for the Type l
B containers used and was alto registers t with the NRC as a user as required.
However, at the time of the inspection, the reference documents for the certificates of cumpliance relating to the use and mainter.ance of the packaging and to the actions to be taken prior to shipment were not available.
This open item (87 06-02) will be reviewed in a subsequent inspection.
No vic,lations were identified.
8 Waste Disposal /Part 61 Annex "C" of the current license incorporates guidelines for release of equipment and facilities to unrestricted use.
10 CFR Part 20.301 to Part 20.401 regulates the disposal of waste.
10 CFR Part 61 requires that all radioactive waste prepared for disposal is classified in accordance with Section 61.55 and meet the waste requirements in Section 61.66.
A.
The two drums reading in excess of 1R/hr and 2R/hr on the surface were opened, according to licensee representatives, and the contents redistributed and repacked into three drums.
The radiation 1svels subsequently measured on contact were below 200 mr/hr.
These drums were shipped to the U.S. Ecology burial site.
This closes item (85-09-01).
B.
The hig~ nest annual exposure doses received by GA-T, Inc. radiation workers in 19C5 were raceived by hot cell' workers.
However, the maximum quarterly radiation exposure received by any hot cell worker, since the last inspection of June 2-3, 1986, was 650 mrem during the 2nd quarter of 1986.
Subsequently, the maximum exposure received by any hc t cell worker was 370 mrem during the 1st quarter of 1987.
It appears that the radiation exposures doses of the hot cell workers were within the limits of 10 CFR 20.101.
For this reason, this item (86-06-04) is closec.
No violations were identified.
10 9.
Emergency Preparedness License Condition 23, of SNM-696, requires the licensee to implement, maintain and execute the response measures of the Radiological Contingency Plan subhiitted ta the Commission on May 25, 1984 and supplemented on August 22, 1984.
The licensee shall also maintain imp *ismenting procedures for the Radiological Contingency Plan.
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Emergency Plan (1) A discussion to preclude any misunderstandings was held with licensee representatives or, NRC philosophy regarding the advantages of having independent Emergency Plan assessment and audits.
Since there 1> no current activity in this area by the licensee, this item (87-01-07) will remain open.
(2) With regard to givir.g early emergency notification to the local hospital, the Director of Security (Emergency Coordinator) stated that it was standerd practice to give Scripps Memorial Hospital an early notification whenever a decision had been made to transport a patient.
B.
fire Protection (1) Fifty-seven fire extinguishers were checked during the course of the in@oction and all were found current with regard to their monthly inspections.
(2) During the inspection the inspector learned that a small fire involving UZr alloy chips had occurred on the metal bed of a lathe in the Triga Fuel Fabrication Building.
The fire required the use of a Class D dry chemical extinguisher after liquid nitrogen failed to extinguish it.
The fire was considered minor because of the controlled absence of large quantities of chips and other combustible materials.
The lathe's hood precluded spread of contamination and controlled airborne particulate.
Air samplers in the area were changed and measurement of the filters indicated no elevated airborne radioactivity above NRC limits was found.
Etforts to notify the Supervisor of Emergency Services (SES) of the use of the fire extinguisher were not adequate'y followed up.
The SES suggested that the dispatcher (on duty 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) alsc be notified since the dispatcher can reach the SES by radio when he is out of the office.
No violations were identified.
10.
Environmental Programs Section 6 of Part II - License Specifications requires that an environmental surveillance program shall b2 maintained to evaluate the effectiveness of the radiological safety program and to provide
'nformation to assist in timely corrective action in the event of accidental relonse u
11 In response to Temporary Instruction 2800/9 " Reconcentration of Radionuclides In Sanitary Sewerage Systems," sludge samples were taken from the Fiesta Island piles of drying sludge.
The sludge is piped there from the Point Loma Sewage Trcatment Plant.
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licensee's releases of low level liquid waste (controlled to less than NRC release limits) joins the waste stream to this plant.
The i
samples were selected from piles representing high and low periods of the licensee's fuel fabrication periods.
Additionally, soil samples'were collected at the abandoned ' Calla 3 Ponds', sewage settling ponds,' adjacent to the licenree's site.
Individual sample collecting sites were selected, in part, at locations having the highest readings on the Eberline PRM-7 Micro-R survey meter.
Radiation levels ranged from approximately 15 uR/hr to 25 uR/hr.
The analytical results will be reported under separate cover when received.
No violations were identified.
11.
Deactivation / Decontamination Activities License Condition 24. requires that at the end of plant life, the licensee shall decontaminate the site and facilities authorized as a place of use for special nuclear materials.
A.
The licensee makes about six low specific activity (LSA) soil shipments per week to the DOE Nevada Test site burial ground.
Each shipment includes a little over 400 cubic feet of soil.
The strong tight containers used are consigned as exclusive use shipments.
At the time of the inspection, almost 56,000 cubic feet of the 75,000 cubic feet of contaminated soil had been shipped.
The licensee expects the 46-50 trip's needed to complete the shipment of the remaining 19,000 cubic feet will be completed by mid-July, 1987.
Completion of the shipments will facilitate final surveys of the old waste yard followed by an independent overcheck by Oakridge Associated Universities (0RAU) survey team, The waste' yard will then be considered for release to unrestricted use along with the previously surveyed and independently overchecked (by ORAU for NRC) surrounding 78 acres.
Subsequently, an additional 215 acres will be considered for similar evaluation for release.
No violations were identified.
12.
Exit My ting The results of the inspection were discussed with the licensee's staff identified in Section 1.
The topics included:
The areas inspected.
Sampling of the sludge output from two sewage treatment plants (including an abandoned plant adjacent to the licensee's site).
Status of open items.
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i Closed items:
85-09-01 Hot cell waste drum classification.
86-04-05 Controls to assure timely preparation of r
proce&.tres.
86-06-02. Changes that assure the industrial hygienist reviews procedures with safety significance.
86-06-04 Review personnel exposures and waste packaging from the hot cell cleanup.
87-01-01 Review qualifications of nuclear safety analysts and independent reviewers.
87-01-02 Review status of Building 37 Dump Sink Analysis documentation file.
87-01-04 Check licensee's leak test procedure for compatibility with the license requirement.
Continuinc Itens-84-04-08 Review grinder holdup study conclusion (requires HTGR plant restart).
86-04-03 Adequacy of nuclear safety inspections.
86-04-07 Isokinetic sampling of exhaust stacks.
86-06-01 Measurement of effluents from the SV-B horizontal storage tanks.
86-06-03 Review licensee's actions in shipment of boxed drums of NWS liquid scrap.
87-01-03 Review the licensee's check for incompatible storage of chemicals.
87-01-05 Review corrective action on the hot cell air sampler using tygon tubing.
87-01-06 Review corrective action on PVC tubing with 90 bends in the exhaust air sampling systems at the 1RIGA Fuel Fabrication and the Waste Handling Facility.
87-01-07 Review the licensee's clans for an independent review of the Emergency and Radiological Contingency Plans.
87-01-08 Review the licensee's plans for increased l.
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l interfacing and more frequent exercises with Scripps Memorial Hospital.
L_N_ew Items:
i 87-06-01 Review the licensee's chemical thermodynamics review of.the neutralization process'for procedure NWPF-2718.
i 87-06-02 Review the results of the licensee's effort to locate the reference documents to the Certificates of Compliance for containers he uses.
87-06-03 Review the documentation of radiological surveys of the E Building made after cleanup following activities conducted under federal license.
Other Topics:
A.
Clarification of the size and frequency of drills.
B.
Air sampling lines in the hot cells reflected s need for improvement.
C.
The'results of a cursory survey of the E Building indicated that the building must be_further decontaminated and resurveyed.
D.
The licensee's container Quality Assurance Program should be internally audited.
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