ML20235Z305

Committee to Bridge the Gap Memorandum as to Status of Contention Xx (Security) Re UCLA Application for Renewal of Ol.Allegations of Three NRC Employees Made

ML20235Z305
Person / Time
Site:	05000142
Issue date:	12/23/1983
From:	Hirsch D CALIFORNIA, UNIV. OF, LOS ANGELES, CA, COMMITTEE TO BRIDGE THE GAP
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Shared Package
ML20235Z143	List: IA-84-454, Recommends Commission Affirm SECY-83-500 to Revise 10CFR73.40(a),general Physical Protection Requirement ML20235Z140 ML20235Z266 ML20235Z287 ML20235Z305 ML20235Z328 ML20235Z366 ML20235Z369 ML20244C916
References
FOIA-84-454, FOIA-88-A-50 OL, NUDOCS 8903150311
Download: ML20235Z305 (17)

Text

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l December 13, 1983 l

1 1

C Fy.IT"EE TO BRIDGE TE CAF 137 Butler Avenue, Suite 203 2

los Angeles, California 90025 l

(n3) 478-0829 3

4 WI"I'D STATES & AMERICA NUCIZAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEr0RE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSINC BOARD I

In the htter af Docket No. 50-142 aL I

8 THE REERTS & THE UNIVERSITY

& CALITGtNIA (Proposed Rensusi of 9

Facility License No. R-71)

(UCIA Research Reactor) 10

'l 11 12 C]C MEMORANDUM AS TO STAtt!S OF CONTENTION II (SECURITY) i 13 14 I.

Introduction 15 i

16 In its Memorandum ami order of November 23, 1983, m i

17 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board directed the parties to file briefs t

(

18 as to w status of Contention II.

That contention alleges wt Applicant's 19 security plan, and implementation thereof, are inadequate to meet the i

20 requirements for protection against aabotage and ass. inst thef t of 21 weapons-grade nuclear saterial.

22-Interrogatories filed April 20, 1981, and other discovery j

23 requests as to this contention have been held in abeyance pendin6 resolution :

24 of certain matters perceived by the Board to be threshold issues.

25 Likewise, the bulk of a summary disposition motion filed by staff 26 before completion (or even, for ht satter, commencement) of discovery 27 and which has repeatedly been ruled by W Board untimely until completion I

pg of discovery, rosains deferred.

CBG's action, sade last July, that P f j Q, _

'q 8903150311 890303 i

h 2.

discovery be reopened, hearing dates set, and determination expedited v

3 has not yet been acted upon.

(Becaum of the upcoming olympics to be 4,

held a few hundred feet from the nactor this sunner, CJC has repeatedly 5

indi****d the necessity of determination of sajer issues in the contentioc 6

by late winter at the latest.

Published reports identify the reactor as 7

a prime target f ar sabotage during the Olympics. Because of the time g

that would be necessary to cool the reactor fuel down and aske other g

arrangements for its shipment off-site prior to the Olympics, should 10 CBG'8 Position on the necessity of that precautionary measure be upheld, decision must be reached many months before the Olympics.)

g 12 The Board has unde its rulings on the preliminary threshold g

It has determined that UCLA has finally gotten its inventory matters.

of weapons-grade nuclear asterials a hair below the "formuls? quantity:

4.9

srams, t a50fod ld. W it ks Med ht the 15 Applicant must have a security plan designai te protect against sabotage.

16 despite repeated protestations to the contrary by both Applicant and Staff.

l.e the threshold issues resolved, discovery should be reopened, 18b 4

early hearing date set, and C2C's action for expedited procedures granted 19 20hi because of the rapidly approaching Olympics and the seriousness of the 21ll proliferation and public safety risks associated with potential thef t of

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d 22,'

weapons saterial or radiological sabotage of a reactor in a crowded urkn area.

I As to what remains stil.1 to be resolved regarding Contention II.

24; essentially everythiA6 remains in contest as to the adequacy of UCLA's 25 :

measures to protect against thef t of Strategic Special Nuclear Paterials.

26:

Only two words in that portion of Contention II have been resolved:

27 28 I

1 1 e 3l 2!!

3 73.60 and" in w citation of aplicable wf t-pnteetion naulauns.

4 CBC, three years ago when the contention was written, alleged that UCLA's 5

security failed t e rply with 10 Cra 73.60 and 73 67.

mat was true at e8P te denials W Stan aM Aplicant, m W far non tb hd i

6 a formula quantity at the time, and for a considerable period thereaf ter.

I he Boa.ni has now ruled that UCLA's belated off-shipments of some of its g

excess Highly Enriched Uranium haver finally brou6ht it just below the g

10 As CBC has contended all alon6 that UCLA is in violation af both provisions, 11 and since there is little substantive difference between the the central 12 issue raised 4 the contention rermins to be resolved:

will the weapons-g2sde asterials at UCLA be ensured of adequate protection against thef t or diversion? CBG intends to demonstrate that security is so lax at the facility that thef t er diversion of weapons-grade ura.nium would be very I

easy.

17ll 11

18i, i

19' 20 if As counsel for Staff said at the June 29, 1982, prahes. ring conference:

J 21 "As a matter f act, I w uld like to point out that ji 73 60 is not different froz73.67 except in the matter of searches.

Dere is no significant diff erence between 3'

_the regula tions, but there is that difference.'

24 It should be noted that even in the one area where Staff identifies a difference, the difference is trivial, as both 73.60 and 73 67 have search requirements, ard sabotage protection would necessitate cher kinds of searches as well.

26 27 28 l

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he sabotage protection issue is now resolved.

Ap;11 cant has 2'

repeatedly indicated that its security plan is not designed te protect 3

against sabotage, but asserts instead (as does staff) that no such 4

protection is required.

As Applicant stated in its August 25, 1923, 5

pleading in support of staff's Motion far Reconsideration or m Paard's 6

rulings in this rogazes 7

University wishes to note that its security g

vlan, which is not designed to provide protection against embotase, has been approved by the Commission's 9

safeguaziis branch and that the low-power university 10 research reactor licensees have never been required to 3) adopt security plans designed to protect against j

sabotage.

l 12 The Boczd has ruled squarely that Applicant and staff are both wrong 13 in asserting that UCIA's security plan need not be designed to povide 14 protection against aabotage, that the regulations do indeed so require.

15 hus, the facts s.nd the law re6arding this portion of the contention 16 have now been resolved.

UCLA says its plan is not designai to protect 17 against aabotages the Board says it must.

i 18 CE respectfully suggests that the Bos.rd act on CE's previous 19 'I actions for expedited procedures to resolve the issues roaminin6 in this 20ll q

contention, including setting of a Tehruary hearing date.

21.4 22' 23 24.

I 25,l 26 27 l

28

1G

~V 2:-

il II, hekrround 3

4 A brief' review of how we got to this point regarding this 5

contention and why expedited resolution of the remaining issues is 6

important fonous.

7 8

h Issues 9

mare are two admitted contentions in this proceeding 10 aneging related public halth and an.fety and commo8dstense and security i

11 thruts posed by the virtually unprotected pasence of weapons-srsde I

32 nuclear materials at the UCLA reactor facility.

Rose are contention l

13 xx and Contention IIII.

}4 Contention II alleges that the security required to protect 15 these materials is woefully inadequate, that security at shampoo factories 16 or record stores is many times better than that at UCLA, where what is 37 to be protected is material which, if stolen, could be used to make a 18; nuclear bosh, as well as a device which, if aabotaged, could nisase

" radiation resulting in exposures in excess of legal lir.its out at least 10 20 '! 75 kilometers th a highly populated urtan area.

h 21 Contention XIII al.leges that the threat to public health and cafety and common def ense and security is unnecessary and violates 23 the Policy of 23ducing amounts of weapons grude anterials to the minimum necessary.

Ortly when absolutely neccesary-which CIC contends is 2{ g 2

clearly n t the case at UCLA--are such materials to be chosen over non-weap:n 8** d ' " *

""d P " d'd' 26 27 which brings us back to Contention II.

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I he reason why expedited proceedings on these Contentions 2'

is so necessary--and why the three-year delay has been so potentially l

3' injurious-is precisely the unique nature of the materials possessed 4

by UCIA.

he material requested in the Application peniing before this 5

aoard is 9yt enriched uranium.

Unlike pow,:ir reactor fuel, this is 6

weapons-grade, i.e., it can be used, if stolen or diverted, directly 7

in the making of a nucasar weapon.

In the fors requested (aluminua-8 uranium plates), it is a trivial matter to extract the uranium.

9 And the principal barrier to acquisition of a nuclear weapon is acquisition 10 af the weapons-srade materials the construction at the weapon itself is 11 relatively easy.b And lastly, because of its very high enrichment, 12 very sas11 quantities af the asterial are needed to make a clandestine 13 fission explosive, primarily because the critical mass goes down as the 14 15 16 17

_2/ See, for example, declarations in this proceeding by CBG declarants 18 Dr. Herbert Scoville (former Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, former Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmanant Agency, 19h and former Technical Director of the U.S. Arasi Terces special Weapons i

20ll:

Project): Dr. heodore hylor (former nuclear weapons designer at Los Alam:s, perhaps the leading authority in the country on non-proliferation.

nonbar cf Keneny Commission, co-designer of TRICA reactor, author of 21; Nuclear Beft:

Risks and Saf eruards for the Tori Touniation, sub{ect of i

McPhoe's book he Curve of Birdins Enerrv): and Professor David nafemeister 22!

(former state Department non-proliferation official, now Professor of Physics at Cal Poly, on leave at MIT).

23 J/ Two methods that can be performed by Chen I students are described 24 in Professor James Varf's declaration (Profea;sor Varf was Group Imader of the Analytic and Inorganic Sections of the Manhattan Projects currently 25 i a Professor of Chemistry at USC).

An even simpler method is described by Dr. Taylor in the section of 2e Curve of Binding Enerry attached to his 26 declaration.

27 h/ John Foster, former Director of Iawrence Radiation Iab and a leading weapons authority, is qtoted in the sections of Dr. hylor's book attached 28 to his dociaration as writing, "It must be appreciated that the only difficul part of making a fission bomb of sono sort is the preparation of a supply of fissionable saterial of adequate purity: the design of the bomb itoelf Qn on9nMm90 r~vm a

.s 1 ll square of the increase in density in an implosion device.Y aus, thef t 2? of kilogram quantities of the kind of material at UCIA would be very, 3

very serious in its implications to international order.M j

4 Recognizing these severe dangers, the Commission has taken 5

two steps.

It has required, as a condition af receiving a license to i

6 possess such highly dangerous materials to national security, security 7

sufficient to protect against thaft or diversion. And the Commission, 8

in compliance, with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of the Congress 9

and the policy of DG, State Department, ami other as encies of government, 10 assumed a policy of using its lice-4=< authority to the maximum artent 11 Possible to reduce quantity of highly enriched uranium at research reactors.

12 mese are the two issues raised by contentions II ami IIII, and are why 13 it is so important that they be expeditiously resolved, after w years 14 of delay alread,y having occurred.

15 should 4 9 kilograme of weapons-grade uranium be stolen from 16 the Ucu reactor facility because of inadequate security or failure to

]7 g reducs-)EU inventories to the saxinua artent possible--and should that u

18 thef t ar diversion occur while the Board has before it unresolved issues

}g, as to the adequacy of that security or the propriety of possession of that 20 18U--*"

'"t 'f "18 ** 1"ti"*hl' Potential hara to public saf ety 21:

and international order as well as national security could have occurred.

22 he satter densada expeditious resolution.

Bere have been too many delays i

23l J/ see hyler book section, attached to his declaration.

hylor indicates i

fast critical sans for )EU with a 3* beryllium reflector at normal density 24i as 11 kg.

Bus, an implosion device which produces a factor of 2 compressic will reduce critical mass requirements by a factor of 4, to less than 3 kg 25;! a factor of 3 increase in density in an implosion device will reduce critica I

mass by a factor of 9, to about 1 kg.

Dr. Foster, in the hylor attachsent, 261 is quoted as writing that increases in density "several times" normal are readily achievable with conventional high explosives.

27 6] See hylor linfm it er, and Scoville declarations.

L

-t-he Histo 2 'l The problem of thef t of nuclear material was not an issue 3

far the original Argonaut, tocause it ran on low enriched fuel from which 4

weapna could not be directly produced.

Be University of ylorida

)

5 I

Argonaut, built before UCM's, purposely initially utilized low enriched 6

fuel also, indicating in its hazards analysis it did so in order not to have to arrange substantial security precautions.

8 UCIA's initial license application, in 1960, was for 4 kg l

9 of highly enriched uranium 5 kg af which it returned to ABC shortly 10 after going on line. For its first doende, the UCIA reactor facility II possessed only 3 5 ks.

In 1970 Ucu requested a license amendment 12 to increase possession authorization 250%. to 10 kg.

It said it dtd 13 so as a tempansry measure, because it wished to reland the reactor with II fresh fusi and would, far a short tias, have on site both new and the old i

i 15 core, before off-shipping W old.

However, full reloading never occurred, 16 ani w excess remained on site fe h nart decade, almost continually II in violation of Commission security requirements.

18 Ryery couple of years during the 1970's, the Cosmission would 19 find that UCIA had on site more uranium than its security plan was p

20{

qualified to possess.

Ucu would say it would ship off some of W fuel 21!

that was excess, to cose hek into compliance.

It would take s. ocuple of d

22 years to accomplish this, and thereaf ter the Commission would discover 23 that UctA still had too much on site, in violation of the security requirams:

24;! It was with this history as backdrop ht Contention II came before this 25 aoare.

26 7/ This is summarized from C2G's past pleadings on Contention II and its 27 still-peniing action for summary disposition of Contention III (see particu-larly p.14-18 of the latter for citations).

28 1:

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1 2e Procedural Historv Ucu filed its renewal application in February 1980 CBG petitioned for leave to intervene when the notice of such opportunity was finally printed in the Federal Register, and in August 1980 submitted its supplemental contentions, including those that form the basis for Contention II ami IIH. At a prehearing conference in September 1980, Staff requested the Board defer ruling on at Isamt contantion II until the Staff had an opportunity to brief CEG on the nature of the NRC 9

esteguards regulations.

Mose triefings never occurred (e.1though prior 10 to the Septesbar 1980 conference the Staff's James ML11er, then in charge 11 1

of the Staff's security review for UCLA, told CIC that it would have 12 discovery on its security concerns "over my dead body.").

Os11s waran't 13 returned, and so Contention II went to the Board five months later 14 far admiaaion, which was granted.

At that prehearing conference, 15 Staff proposed, and all parties agreed to, a stipulation as to schedule, 16 with suasary disposition not to occur until close of discovary.

S e Board 17 adoptai the stipulation and ordered that schedule in its Farch 20, 1981 18 Ord er.

19!

CIC, pursuant to the schedule stipulated to and czdsrod by 20 q the Board, submitted interro6 stories on April 20.

Mose included 21' I

interrogatories as to Contention II.

However, on April 13, Staff submitted 22 a action for sumanry disposition on Contention II-before discovery had 23 oven commenced, lat. alone been completed.

CEG moved for the action to be struck as untimely, granted by the Board in its Order of April }0.

25 he Board determined that the action is premature and need not be responded 26 to until the close of discovery, as stipulated to, which was than scheduled for July 30, 1981.

Staff moved the Board to reconsider the Board affirmed 28 its previous ruling in an Order of June 9, saying, "It would be patently

v p

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t.

,. to which it agreed."

r 2

In the meantime, UCIA requested a protective order as to 3

the interrogatories sumitted n Contention II, which was granted by 4

W Board tereora.rily until a suitable protective order on non-disclosure was in place, whereupon the interrogatories and other discovery requests a

were to be imediately responded to.

(Certain other interrogatories were subsequently objected to on security gronds, with a temporary I

datarra1Ef response granted until the non-disclosure agreements are in g

place. )

g CEI has proposed non-disclosure agrosasnts and a form of protective order, and moved that the protective order and non-disclosure commitments apply to all parties.

Rose matters have been fully briefed, and remain pending. As long as they remain Mending, discovery cannot commence, and until discovery is complete, summary di,sposition cannot proces Se Board, in a June 1982 prehearing conference, attempted to see if cetain threshold issues could not be resolved first, without access i,t to sensitive security information, issues which, if resolved, might affect the scope of the security information necessary to be disc 3osed.

Rose issues involves (1) the amount of SSh?. (Strategic Special Nuclear hateriul Il on site, (2) its irradiation level (as to whether it could properly be 20ll exempted under the 100 Rea/ hour / bundle exemption), and (3) whether u

21 5 h Staff armi UCIA were correct in their assertions that sabotage protection 22 was not required under the regulations.

23 24 UCIA's application was for 4700 g fresh, and 4700 g irradiated U-2 plus a 2 curie plutonium-239 source.

25, CE contended that UCIA had more than a formula quantity (5000 g), which was denied by UCLA and staff.

26 However, at the very time they were making those initial assertions to the 27 licensi.ng board (early 1981), the NRC Staff had just written UCIA that it 28 had, based on an inspection,found UCIA to possess more than a formula qua.nt

~*

-U-Il i fl Attached to Staff's motion were two affidavits, one by 2'l9 Donald Carlson aM the other by Ja.nes Miner, which raised issues that 3

the Board asked CBC to addreas in trying to resolve these threshold' 4

satters.

Mr. ML11er asserted, under oath, that ha had personally vari.fici 5

that UcIA's fuel met the 100 Rom exemptio(

k. Carlson asserted that{

6 research reactors like UCIA's were only subject to 10 cra 73 67 and.31 I

(specifically omitting 73 40) and there are "no explicit MRC regulation (

0 for the protection of non-power reactors asadast radiological sabotage...N' 9

noth searn statements were satariany false, and cBc obtained documents 10 under the Freedos of Infarsation Act and supplied to the Board in its 11 responses to these affidavits that demonstrated that both men knew their assertions were incorrectk UCIA had suisuitted to the NRC severa 12 13 iniicating they could not reach 100 res/ hour protection leva 14, and Mr.

i 14 Miller himself had tethed a memorandum that said the amas thing (

15 Mr. Carlson had repeatedly stated at a confmnee af non-power rameter 16 operstars; a tuanacript of which was ob+m under FaIA, that such reactars 17 aust comply with 73.40 protection requirements against sabotage."

18 q UCIA's new assertion that it could meet 100 Rea exemption 19F levels was based on an unsupported assertion by Mr. Ostrknder, referring, 20l in a fashion very similar to the current episode over his supposed neutron 21l0 transport calculations, to calculations that were not initiany provided.

22 ~ CBG fought for access to those calculations, which, like the current 23 neutron ones, were parf armed on Mr. Ostrander's programmable hand-calculater, 24' and.demonstra4ed that, like the finaHy-produced neutron ca.iculations, d

25' there were based on fundamental assumption errars.

(Mr. ostreMer had 26 cahulated dose for the full care, rather than each readily separable bundle.

27 When the errors were corrected, the result was that the fuel fell below 28 the 100 Rom exemption after just eight hours of shutdown.

(seedeclaration mm n_

m_ c

~

v 10 UCLA had in excess of 73.60 S5h? limits with admittaily no 73 60 protection 2

In the Board's Order of July 26, 1982, CBC was directed-3 significantly, only after discovery on these pointe-to address the 4

issue of how much SSNM was on site and if the 100 Rom exemption was 5

being complied with, in addition to the sabotage matter.

Eleven days 6

later, UCIA informed the Board that it had shipped off what it asserted was sufficient excess fuel to being the inventory finally below 8

5 0 kg (to 4 9!), so that the issue af whether it had failed to comply 0

with the 100 Rea exemption, it asserted, was now moot. Sare followed 10 a year of trying to figure out.if Uc1A really mas below 5 kg, because II of nuasrous ami frustrating discrepancies in the available records, 12 as wall as the issue of whether to count the Pu-Bo sources, which the 13 maard initially ruled had to be counted.

(It took some more months, i

14 and more prodding by CBG, before UCIA finally maanded its application 15 request from 9.4 kg highly enriched uranium to ness than 5 kg," so we 16ll are no longer even litigating the application initially filed.)

i II l

So what is the message of all this history? me theme is 18 clocrly that of delay, of material falsehoods and omissions, of four 19 years of security violations while the central issues in contest regarding n

20 the security contention have sat idle.

Se Board was told initial'.y there s !

b 21 j less than 5 kg on site, which was falas t,that the fuel in the care never 22b fell below the 100 Rom per bundle exemption, which was falses ami that 23 no sabotage protection was requirai, which was false. A stipulation and 24. Board Onier that suman.ry disposition actions not be filed until completion h

25'i of discovery was violated. And during much of these delays, UCIA was, 26 l as asserted by the ccr.tention, in violation of the security requirem 27 sandated for the excessive amount of bomb-grade uranium they possessed.

28 8/ Counsel for Applicant at tl

'obruary 23, 1983, prehearing conference n_

~ms _- - ~_-_

-n.

~~~ -

l l

l a

-13 g

q Objecti ons to Procedure as to Final Board Determination of SNr.

2h Inventory at t'cu 3

4 Far the record, CBC wishes to note its objections to the 5

procedure by whid the issue of sNM inventory was finany rulai upon.

6 CBC notes that W procedure must fonow w rules rosarding summary 7

disposition, as this was an consideration of a certain portion of 8

Staff's action for. summary disposition that h Board had ruled was 9

ripe far dotaraination because dimoovery had been completed on Wee 1

10 natters. In response to Staff assertions about the amount of material 12 on site, c3C responded with evidence and argument that iniicated the 13 matter was in dispute, with contradictory records and other evidence. 14 2at should have entailed a dotaraination that summary disposiWn could 15 not be granted and W issue resolved by evidentiary hearing, with sworn 16 witnesses available for cross-examination. Instead, the Board provided }7 adddeional response opportunities to the moving party and its supporter )g. (interestingly, as in so many other aspects of this case, it is the Staff { 39 ' carrying the wei6ht of advocacy for the Applicant). After CBG demonstrated 20 ht there rossined inconsistencies in the records of serious import, 21 l with which the Board agreed, the Board still paraitted additional response r a the other parties. 22 23 I" * * "*8**d' #1"*1 d'**"*i""*i"" "# th' 1"*"* DY

• 8***d 2(

was based upon a response by UCLA to CBC's last pleading in W aatter. gi Re party benefitin6 from the summary disposition action got the last w rd (genersHy prohibited by 10 CTR 2.749), and it was on W basis of 26 27 asserti ns ande by Applicant's counsel in that pleading, to which CBG 28 t permitted response, that the Board made its dotaraination. was

w, -14 Il In particular, the Board's determination rests on unsworn 21 factual assertions made by Applicant's counsel and unsworn " correcte \\ t 3 (by hand) documentary assertions. Broughout the pleading counsel asserts 4 facts, for which there is no evidentiary basis (e.g., that the Ec inspects: 5 tased their su inventory figures on Exhibit G, ht Exhibit G srrs in 6 leaving out 19 g af scrap and two fuel bundles in the core). 7 Suasary disposition aust rest on the same evidentiary standards as hearingst 8 unsworn assertions are insufficient. Cleveland Elee. Illuminata = Co., 9 (perry Nuclear power Plant. Units 1 and 2) AIA3 43, 6 RRC 741 (1977). 10 Ito affidavits were provided, just long assertions attempting to put forward 11 facts not in evidence and for whom no qualified sponsor had sunnitted an 12 affidavit. CPG was thus denied both the opportunity to put forward 13 countering information tai W opportunity to cross----he on h contradie-i 14 inforsatics. 15 cic notes that the 1978 and 1979 inspection reports, and v 16 ' Ucu's own 1989 letter to m ac, all continue to indicate higher 17 510.' levels than UCLA asserts. UCIA's applanation that all three are in 18, error is interesting, but surely not dispositive vihut cross-examination 19 for example, of the authors of the reports. 20 lI cac also notes'that the fact that the most recent ac

• audit" I

5 21 d came up with the name figures as UCIA puts forward with its Exhibit c b 22. is not dispositive. me staff did not, as requested by the Board, do a 23 shysical inventory. It merely checked UCLA's records-i.e., Exhibit G. The fact that when Staff reviews Ethibit G (and the documents from 24 emme) and when VCIA reviews the same satorial the sara. d 254 us nothing as to why when the EC on two previous inspections, and UCIA 26 l 27 in its letter to nc, came up with higher results. 28 1:

1 -1> \\ 1' CIC is also concerned by the Board's reliance on a proposed 9 regulation-not yet in effect and subject to modification prior to 3 f acceptance or rejection-for resolving what h current regulations 4' require as to PuSe sources. (73 60 contains the current formula definitic: 5' of W235 + 2 5 x Pu-239, removed from the proposed re6ulations.) 6 1 7 IU. VMERE DO MAT 1ERS STAND 7 8 The Board has before it proposals for non disclosure agreemants 9 to apply to all parties. CBC has also put farwazd motions to expdite 10 the. proceedings on these contentions (contention n ami IIn are closely-11 linked, including the experts who will be involved). The Board has 12 deferred discovery pemiins resolution at threshold issues now resolved: 13' discovery should commence, summary disposition has been deferred pending 14 coupletion of discovery it should be scheduled for that completion time. 15 A February hearing date should be set. (If profiled testimony is to be .i 16i utilized in the security hearing--and perhaps it would be best for security ll 17 reasons for it to be oral M camera-that written testimony can perhaps 18: constitute response to summary disposition actions. A hearing can always 19 be canceled or reduced in scope, but it takes considerable time to schedule 2honeanew). C3G's sumanry disposition action on Contantion XIII, and its 21 action to expedite partial suanary disposition on the non-criticality aspe::: 22 thereof, which are not disputed, should be expeilted. l' 23J cx;/ at a previous prehearing centerence, sussested that ' 4 24h. the remlution af thed security contentions-which are among the most K 25 1"portant issues in this case--could be readily resolved by a heahng N 263 seWnTat soon in which all parties an! the Bosat tour the facilit:$ l' 2-3e?i_su_.the_ security plan and security inspection reports, and the expert 4 28 in an g g g gg, setting expeditiously present opinions as to whether the i I security is adequate.' It is not a terribly complicated procedure. U

16-1 ami should be capable of being accoe:plished quickly. De issues which 2:i are at stake are, however, extremely important, and the public interest 3 is best served by it being expedited. Very serious risks to national 4 security and public safety would result if CBC is right ab:ut the inadequate 5 security ani somethim6 untoward occurs before the matter is resolved. 6 7 /' Respectfully su7 tied, 8 g-A 9 Daniel Hirsch 10 dated at Ben Icaond, CA 11 this 13th day of December, 1983 12 13 14 15 16 17

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'E "I*. 5"' AII2 CT A F.:.? ! :.A NUCII.A? RE;'."JTC F Y CC.*?'.'55 I *..V BE70RE T)E ATCVJC S AT!*Y AND LICD.* SINC BOA RD i j In the Phtter of Docket No. 50-142 THE EliENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY & CALITORNIA (Proposed Renewal of (UCLA Research Reactor) l DECLARATION OF GEM I hereby declare that copies. of the attached: CMar Mortdv& _ 44 4 S4a 4vc, e6 (o Ah XY ( Mahi M i/ i in the above-captioned proceeding have been served an the following by l deposit in the United States anil. fig />n tu At class, postap prepaid, addres as indicated, an this dates /3 " /M2 I w John H. Prye, III, Chairman Christine Helwick Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Glenn R. Woods U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission office of General Counsel 390 University Hall Dr. Emmeth A. Inehke 2200 University Avenne Adminis trative Judge Berkeley, CA 94720 Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. John Bay We.shington, D.C. 20555 3755 Divinadero #203 Glenn C. Brf4bt San Francisco, CA 94123 Mainistrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board W Nali W f U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Deputy city Attorney Va =M wt cm, D. C. 20555 City Hall 1685 Main street Chief, Docketing and Service Section Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Doro 2y h apson Washington, D.C. 20555 Nuclear 14w Center 6300 vilshire 31vd., #1200 f nc Nf Ios Angeles, Calif rnia 90046 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Ms. Carolo Xagan, Esq. attention: Ms. Colleen Woodhead Atomic safety and Licensing soard Pane ~- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cozzission ym, g, g, vashington.' D.C. 20555 Office of Administaa tive Vice Chancellor / University of California / 405 Milgard Avenue / M[ Los Angeles, California 90024 President COMMITTEE TO BRIDGE THE GAP M-

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NUCLEAF. REGULATOFu COMMISSICN AT0ft1C SAFETY At;D LICENSING BG' E .Before Administrative Judges: John H. Frye,111 Chaiman Glenn 0. Bright-Dr. Emeth A. Luebke - ) In the Matter of ) Docket No. 50-142 OL. ) (Proposed Renewal of THE REGENTS.0F THE UNIVERSITY ) Facility License) -0F CALIFORNIA ~ ) ) (UCLA Research Reactor) December 23, 1983 i MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (RegardingContentionXX) 1 Contention XX advanced by the Comittee to Bridge the Gap (CBG) concerns the provisions governing the physical. security of the Nuclear Energy Laboratory (NEL). It asserts in part that UCLA must comply with both 10 CFR ll 73.60 and 73.67, must take measures against potential i sabotage. UCLA anc Staff agree that UCLA must cor.:1y with.) 73.67; they ~ I disagree with C5G or the applicability of % 73.60 and the need to protect against potential sabotage. Contention XX is attached as an cppendix to this Memorandum ano Order. On April 13, 1951, NRC Staff moved for sumary disposition of this contention. Its motion was ruled to be premature and responses were deferred pending completion of discovery. In turn, discovery was l l contingent upon the agreement of the parties to e suitable protective order and nondisclosure agreement which would protect sensitive ) i 3

l information. No such agreerert was forthcoming and the parties have submitted that matter for a Scaro ruling. Because it appeared that the NRC Staff's motion raised some issues which could be addressed without access to sensitive information, and because ruling on those issues could influence the scope of other issues raised by Contention XX, the Board directed that these issues be taken up initially. These issues concern the applicability'of 10 CFR i 73.60 and the need to protect against potential sabotage. In our Memorandum and Order ruling on Staff's Motion (LBP-83-25A, 17 NRC 927, May 11, 1983), we held that UCLA must comply with 10 CFR 6 73.60 and must take measures to protect against radiological sabotage. Our Memorandum and Order specifically permitted motions for reconsideration of these holdings. Staff so moved on August 15; UCLA supported Staff's Motion on August 25 and CBG opposed it on September 12, 1983. In LBP-83-25A, we also noted that it was impossible to determine from the papers precisely how much special nuclear material is on hand et the NEL. Consequently, we directeo Staff to inventory the material and report its findings. Staff filed reports on this matter on July 12 j and 28. CBG corrt:ented on these reports on August 30, and UCLA respondeo l to CBG's corrnents on September 9,1983. In LBP-83-67 (18 NRC _, October,1983), we addressed the issues raised by Staff's motion for reconsideration ard fuel inventory. We detemined that Staf"s fuel inventory established that there was less than a fomula quantity of U-235 on hand at the NEL, and we g nted

Staff's petition #or recersiceration with restEct to the applicability of 10 CFR l 73.60. The latter result meant that the Pu-Be neutron sources present at the NEL did not have to be incluced with the U-235 in the inventory of special nuclear material (ShP.) for purposes of detemining whether a formula quantity of strategic special nuclear material (SSNft) was on hand. Were these neutron sources included in the inventory, a fonnula' quantity would exist, and i 73.60 would be applicable. l In LBP-83-67, we adhered to our earlier ruling that i 73.40 requires UCLA to take some measures to protect against potential sabotage. Staff has, in SECY-83-500, December 6,1983, requested the Comission to publish a proposed amendment to 9 73.40 which would overturn our ruling. In LBP-83-25A, we denied Staff's motion for sumary disposition cf Contention XX. In its petition for reconsideration, Staff asserted that this was error. We pointed out in LBP-83-67 that we believed this result was reovired by our holding in LBP-83-25A that UCLA must comply with il 73.60 and 73.67, pointing out that no part;. concluded that UCLA was in compliance with both provisions. Additionally, our holding with respect to the necessity to protect against pote"tdal sabetage generated litigable issues. Because in LBP-83-67 we vacated our earlier ruling with respect to 9 73.60 and adopted Staff's position, we indicated that we wished to hear the positions of the parties with respect to what portions of l

I.- Cententior. XI rer.ain in controversy. These positions have beer furnishea in writing ard are addressed in this Memorandum anc Oroer.- CBG's Position j Because CBG is the proponent of Contention XX, we sumarize its position first. CBG points out that "... essentially everything remains in contest as to the adequacy.of UCLA's measures to protect against I theftof[$5NM]." (CBG Memorandum, p. 2.) CBG emphesizes that nothing j in our prior orders affects the allegations contained in the first paragraph of this contention that UCLA is not in compliance with i 73.67. CBG goes on to point out that our ruling with respect to the l applicability of 6 73.40(a) affims its legal position set out in the l i first paragraph of the contention and that that matter must be resolved. l CBG reiterates its motions made orally at past hearings for expedited proceedings to resolve these matters in light of the fact that the Olympic Games will take place in Los Angeles during the sumer of 1984. 4 CBG maintains that Contention XIII is closely related to Contention XX and that consequently its motion to expedite partial sumr ary disposition proceedings on the non-criticality aspects of this centention should aise be expedited. The relationship betaeen

• CBG Memorandum as to Status of Contention XX (Security), December 13, 1983; University's Position Concerning Contention XX, December 13, 1983; and NRC Staff Response to Board Order Concerning Contentien XX, December 13, 1983.

Center.tions 1111 and D. results, accoroing tc C5s', from the fact that the fomer contention alleges that the presence of highly erriched l uraniur. (HEU) at the NEL poses an unnecessary risk to the public health and safety, while the latter contention alleges that the security precautions necessitated by the presence of HEU re inadequate. CBG recites the procedural history of our consideration of this contention add makes some disturbing allegations regarding Staff's past representations to the Board. We deal with these allegations in more detail below. CBG also raised some procedural objections to our resolution of th? factual issue regarding the inventory of SNM of the NEL. We deal with these in more detail below. Staff's Position Staff takes the position that Contention XX is an attack on 6 73.67 which is prohibited by 6 2.758. Additionally, Staff takes the position 4 that the existing security plan provides adecuate protectier against potential sabotage because Staf#'s accident analysis demonstrates that significant damage to the UCLA Argonaut would not result in releases creatir.g a significant risk to the public. Staff then summarizes its position as follows: In brief summary of the Staff's position, set forth in greater 4 detail in the April,1981 motion for sumary disposition and the August 15, 1983 petition for reconsideration, the Staff believes no I issues exist for litigation for the following reasons: A. There is no f actual or legal basis to require safeguards i for the following areas proposed by Contention XX.1 and 2 1

l r C j l I -(- 'a .l sirce they contain neither vital eqiip,ent'nor SfW. XX.1.c. the third floor equipment ros-e. the area immediately surrounding the reactor stack and exhaust fan 19/ The definition of vital equipment and controlled access creas are' contained in i 73.2 and are not concerned with whether or not 6 73.60 is applicable. Thus the Board's ruling on 6 73.60 is not related to this part of Contention XX. XX.2.a. the access court used for truck loading and unloading b. the Tokamak lab c. the main entrance reception lobby d. the roof of Boelter Hall and Math Sciences building e.' the rooms in the Math Sciences Building i i f. the entrance to the door to the reactor stack area B. The allegation of inadequate security measures in Contention XX.3 for the actual controlled access areas designated in XX.1 as: j X). 1.a. the reactor room b. the control room d. the fresh fuel storage area goes beyond the i 73.67 safeguards requirements and constitutes an attack on those regulations, j l i Therefore, Staff is of the opinion that sumary disposition should be granted, since Contention XX raises no genuine issue of material fact to be litigated, as previously demonstrated in detail in the motion for sumary disposition. i I I l i -______--_m

1 UCLA's Position UCLA is primarily concerned witn our ruling Cn the applicability of 6 73.40(a). UCLA in essence asks us to indicate whether this ruling means that UCLA will be required to institute protective measures in addition to those specified in i 73.67 and, if so. the specific threat which UCLA must protect against. UCLA also requests that we determine whether any other factual matters raiseo by Staff's motion for summary disposition are in controversy. Discussion 1. Portions of Contention XX in Controversy The parties' submissions are not helpful in determining which portions of Contention XX remain to be resolved. CBG is clearly correct when it states that we have done nothing to resolve the issue of whether UCLA is in compliance with 6 73.67. However, that does not tell us which portions, if any, of li 1, 2, and 3 of Contention XX CBG views as bearing on that issue, or the sabotage issue. Additionally, we decline CBG's invitation tc take up part of Contention XIi! with Contention XA, for its part, Staff believes its motion for summary disposition should now be granted. Staff does not tell us how we can properly de so without giving CBG an opportunity, which it has net had, to respond to 1 the motion. Paragraph A of Staff's summary of its position quoted above I l clearTy rests on the proposition that there is no factual or legal basis for certain portions of it 1 and 2 of Contention XX. CBG has not yet 1 _ x _________

}y.. ;. I l ? .. y. l j i had an opportunity to meet this argument. Howese", Staff's' position set l forth.in its T B may raise matters which are cutsice the secpe of 5 73.67. At the moment, UCLA is preoccupied with sabetage. It has not focussed on these questions. 4 By January 6,1984, CBG is to indicate which portions of M 1, 2, and 3 of Contention XX bear on the issues of sabotage and compliance { 1 with 6 73.67. Within five days of the date of service of CBG's filing, any other party may respond. 2. Sabotage With respect to the sabotage issue, UCLA clearly seeks guidance as l l to the practical impact of our ruling that it must comply with i i 73.40(a). The regulations furnish no such guidance. Staff taket the position that compliance with i 73.67 provides adequate protection for purposes of i 73.40(a). We cannot rule out the possibility that, after hearing, we may so conclude. But prior to hearing evidence, we cannet mcke such a judgment Q~%ntly, it is the parties' responsibility tc analyze th. realistic threat of sabotace facec Dy this facility anc the degree of protection necessary to meet that threat. In analyzing the threat facing the facility, the parties shcu'd keep in Find the realities of the environment in which this reacter operates. With these analyses in hand, the parties and the Board may then focus on the specific issues raised by the contention. l l

.C 3. Procedure for Detemining ShM Inventory CBG objects to the procedures we.enployed in resolving the. issue of the inventory of SM' present at the NEL. CBG's objections center en two points. First, CBG points out that the Buard's determination did not ) rest on sworn affidevits as required by 6 2.749(b) and Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, et al. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2) ALAB-443, 6 NRC 741, 752-57 (1977). CBG's point is well taken. UCLA and Staff should furnish appropriate affidavits attesting to the truth of the matters upon which the Board relied in reaching its determination by January 10, 1984, CBG may file objections within five days of service of these affidavits. If these affidavits are not forthcoming or are objectionable, the Board I i will set aside its determination and set this matter down for hearing. CBG's second point is that it was denied the opportunity to put forward countering infomation and to cross examine on contradictory infomation. Therefore, within five days of the service of the affidavits referred to above, CBG is to indicate specifically what countering infomation it desires to put forward and specifically what points it believes it can establish on cross examination. The Board will then determine whether a hearing is necessary to explore these points. CBG also notes that the Staff did not physically inventory the SNM. However, the Staff's report clearly indicates that a physical inventory of the fresh fuel was conducted, while the fuel in the core was established by reference to source documents. The three neutron sources x-

7 l were inventoried by serial number and neutrer f b detettien. The Boaro views the Staff's actions as fully satisfying its Order. While Staff did not physically inventory the irradiated fuel in the reactor core, the difficulties inherent in se doing fully justi#, the decision to establish the core inventory by reference to source documents. 4 Allegations of Staff Misconduct On pages 10 and 11 of its memorandum on the status of Contention XX, CBG makes disturbing allegations regarding representations made to the Board by the Staff. The first of these is that Staff counsel in early 1981 denied that UCLA had more than a formula quantity of SSNM shortly af ter the technical staff had written UCLA indicating that more than a fortnula quantity existed. CBG made a similar allegation in its February 8,1983 supplemental responce to Staff's motion for sumary disposition (see p. 5). We have reviewed the transcript referenced in 'i CBG February 8,1983 filing and are not convinced that CBG has correctly character'ized Staff ecunsel's representation to the Board. Nonetheless, for the reasons discussed below, we wish Staff ccursel to address this allegation. The second and third allegations made by CBG are more serious. In essence, CBG alleges that two staff members who furnished affidavits in support of Staff's motion for sumary disposition rade statements in those affidavits which were known by the affiants to be incorrect. 4 Allegations of culpable conduct by NRC staff members should be made to the Corrnission's Inspector anc Auditor (see NUREG-0325, Rev. 4, February 1982, p. 7). Consequently, by a letter of even date herewith, we have ) 1 u

l ?. A l \\ J L i i l brought these allegations to the attention of the O'fice o' 'nspectcr and Auditor. (Cf. Florida Power & Light Comoany [St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 2] CL1-77-28, 6 NRC 717 [1977]; Carolina Power and 1 Light Company [Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Piar.t, Units 1, 2, 3, and 4] CLI-78-18,8NRC293[1978].) In taking this action, we wish to point out that we have not at this time formed any views as to the merits of-these allegations. i Unfortunately, that does not end our involvement in this matter. The two staff affiants who are the subject of these allegations supply the total factual underpinning for Staff's motion for sumary disposition. Similarly, Staff counsel's representations and arguments put forth in Staff's motion constitute an important part of the matters which we must consider in ruling upon that motion. The Commission's adjudicatory boards must be able to rely on representations of the Comission's staff. When these representations are called into question, as they have been here, the propriety of such reliance is called into question. In these circumstances, we are compelled to defer any further consideration of Staff's motion for sumary disposition pending receipt of a satisfactory response to'these allegations fror. Staff. Any such response is to be fileo no later than January 10, 1984 5. Status of Contention XX Proceedings The Board is inclined to agree with CBG that Contention XX should be resolved expeditiously. Consequently, in a separate memorandum and order to be issued shortly, we will adopt an appropriate protective

1 oroer to govern discovery ano any hearir.g which r.ay be necessary. That memorandum and order will also identify those portions of Contention XA which are in controversy. As the filing schecule set forth in our Order indicates, we will be in a position to identify those portions of Contention XX which are in controversy after January 17. At that time, we may also be able to indicate whether we will give any further consideration to Staff's motion for summary disposition. In the event we do consider that motion, we will set a date for responses in opposition to it. Regardless whether we give further consideration to Staff's motion for summary disposition, at that time we will need to lay down the ground rules for discovery on these portions of Contention XX which are in controversy. In this connection, we are mindful of CBG's representation that its need for discovery can be satisfied by an appropriate tour of the NEL, and a review of the security plan and security inspection reports. These matters can best be dealt with in a telephone conference. { Therefore, a telepnene conference is scheduled for Wednesday, l January 23, 1984, at 1:30 p.m. Eastern Standard Time. In that conference, in additior. to considering discovery ground rules, we will inform the parties of our rulings on the various pending matters of which they may be unaware. If need be, we will also hear the views of the parties on pending matters. We will also set a schedule for the completion of proceedings on Contention XX.

.] a - :~ - 1 In consideration of the foregoing, it is th's 22nd day of December, 1983, ORDERED: 1 1. By January 6,1984, CBG is to indicate which portions of tt 1, 2, and 3 of Contention XX bear on the issues of UCLA's compliance with i 10 CFR ll 73.40(a) and 73.67. Within five days following serv. ice of CBG's filing, any other party may respond. 2. By January 10, 1984: a) UCLA and Staff should furnish appropriate affidavits attesting to the truth of the matters relied upon by the Board with regard to the inventory of SNM at the NEL. Within five days of service i of these affidavits, CBG may file any objections it may have to them, together with a specific enumeration of the infonnation CBG believes counters the infonnation relied on by the Board and the points it believes it can establish on cross examination; and b) Staff is to furnish its response to the allegations of Staff misconduct made by CBG. 3. All Service is'to be made by Express Mail or its equivalent. THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD l 6_ A c.Lu A Dr. Emeth A. Luebke ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE f h. < 1 P Glenn 0. Bright ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE - ~.. John Hi Frye, Ill, Chainnan ADMINISTRAQVEJUDGE Bethesda, Maryland 1 December 23, 1983

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physical security plan is inaceouate and its implementation of said plan is t".acecuate. Acclicant has f ailec te cemenstrate in its recent performance any evidence that its physical security measures can reasonably be expected to improve in the future, in the absence of which demonstration grant of an operating license and a SNM license cannot be made without undue threat to public health and safety. 1. Applicant has at its f acilities areas containing vital equipment and special nuclear materials, areas which should be i adequately protected against possible acts of radiological sabotage or attempts at theft or diversion of SNM, and to which access should be adeouately controlleo. Specifically: a. the reactor room. b. the control room, the tr.irc floor ecuipment room, c. o. the 'resn ' vel stcrage area, ano the " estricted area" immediately sur cuncing the reactor e. st acx arc Exnaust f an on the eignth floor of Boeiter Hall. ) 2. There exist arets aojecent to the above-mentionec vital and material access areas wnich should be sufficiently isolatec ano secureo to prevent them from being usec as ;enetration points or staging areas for penetration of the vital and material access arees. Specifically: 1

u-q; k ........,:...,.:... 1 :...;. 4 ( 3. 3..a.. located between the reacter Ogi'cing and the Engineer ng 1 SuOing t its west, b. the Tokamak lab adjacent to the reactor room, c. tne main entrance (rece:t :n * ::: y'.

NEL, the presently unrestricted roof areas of Boelter anc Math d.

Sciences adjacent to the "restrictec area" around the reactor stack, the rooms within Math Sciences whose windows open to the e. " restricted area" around the reactor stack, and f. the entryway for the single locked door to the " restricted area" around the reactor stack. 3. Applicant's physical " security measures for its vital ano 6 material access areas and the areas adjacent to tnem have been in the past and are at present inadequate to procerly protect, isolate, and control access to those areas in that presence by guarcs and wet.chmen is toe infrecuent; a. methods 'or cetecting :en:ea'ec ;uns, exo'es ves, or b. intenciary devices that cou e te :ar dec Oy ;e pie t enter'ng these areas. an: SW that ::uld te :ar 4eo by

ecole 'enving these areas, are 'nacecuate; i.

Aoplicant lacks mecnanical devices to detect firearms, explosives, incendiary devices; or SNM anc

1;Fi (fI' r..- 3::' :n-: <e *s :: -:.: e,. :ea : . s ::-: a: u I L staff for firearms, explestves, 'ncenciary cevices, i' l' or-SNM pnysical barriers to penetration are inaceguate; C. i. fences and walls are too sncrt, 'ack tarted wire at the top, and otherwise fail in 'ul'.y enclose the area to be protected i 11 windows and doors in waTis that are to act as , physical barriers are made of construction and fastening of insufficient' strength such that the integrity of the wall is lessened by the opening, j provided by the windows and doors iii. dual or reduhdant barriers are lacking; penetration s of these areas can be made by breaching a single barrier d. security measures w th regard to keys anc locks are i inadecuate; and i. doors that should be kept lockee 9 ave been 'ef t open ii. locxs are of insufficient ::nst-.:: ion anc strength to prevent tampering and penetrat'en 'd4

e many keys to areas that are sJCCosec to De 'OcKeo nave teen given out iv.

control of those keys is inacecuate in that :: Dies can be made, keys can be lent to.nautneritec i l I s l e ____-___----_--_.

yi--f;f* g / j p*!g h p' ..: ::.: ct3a: :..v ::: ? , 3,? { BEFORE THE ATO'ilt Strg7y A;iD LICEti5liiG BOARD lr

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) (Pro (posed Renewal 'of Fa'iilit Dod.et fio. 50-14 ). )

HE REGENTS OF THE Ur*VERSITY OF

)' i CALIFORHIA ) License) ) 'J:.' Research Reacto-) ) s AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES R. MILLER e STATE OF MARYLAHD ) 33 C00ATY OF HONTGOMERY ) 1, Janes R. Miller, being duly sworn do depose and state as follo,is: 1. I an employed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission in the Office of.Huclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Licensing Standardization and Special Projects Branch (SSPB). My professional qualifications are attached. 2.

an Chief of ne SSPE and have responsibility for review and licensing non-powerreactors.]

of al Prior to my present assignnent, I was]r 3. Chief of-the Safeguards Branch in 'the Division of Operatine Reactors,*Jffice of. fiuclear Reactor Recu- '.!; ion and took part in writin; the present 10 CFR Part 72 sa#e; carts reguistions. I have personally toured the area containing and surrounding the UCL( rescarch react ** and can State fro, my own observation inac the 4.

ro rg a QCLhcomplies with the applicable requirements c' 10 CFR V n..i.

site the quantity of special nuclear material descr(JCLA coes not have on Additionally 1 can of ny own knowledge, state that 5. ibefin 10 CFR i 73.60 anc ina, tnere'ere, tr.is section of 10 CFR Part 73 coes nct appiy to UCLA, anc that only 6 73.67(d) of Part 73 applies to the[UCLA security

1an requirements.

L 6. I have read contention XX admitted by the Atonic Safety and Licensing Board and do hereby state that nothing in the contention cenonstrates non-conpliance with 10 CFR 6 73.67 which I attest to as follows: The only controlled access areas in Boelter Hall, acccrdin; to 10 CFR Part 73 definitions and regulations, are the reatic-roo, and 74N OY

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.: : :.....i.;;.. t ;- s saf e;. arcs regulations in 10 CFR Part 73.acewate to meet the Co. to the controlled access areas are lo*ked and/or alAll doors leet ; 5 aut.: rue: ~he syste of access 1: reactor personnoi may enter without tri syste. a '. a -- ' of keys to cor,trolles areas by unauthorized pe[rsonnelLeys used b physical barriers such as fences, barbed wire 10 CFR i 73.67 - tion or recuncant barriers. , or Visitors r.ay be taken on reactor-personnel. ,. cors.r t-accompanied tours of the facility according to the safegu lations. I have personally observed the security arrangement o necting doors between the controlled access areas of the reac u-and adjacent roons located in Doeiter Hall and can state from on. or facility knowledge that the NEL personnel working in areas adj trolled eccess areas do not have ready eccess to roons y own acent to the con-equipnent or special nuclear materials. containing vital 7 I have verified that the irradiated fuel in the UCLA reacto fuel very difficult.per hour and that the des r core emits rens operations to naintain the self pro ection of the fu y to that core. c or I attest tnat the fore knowiecge and belief. going affidavit is true and correct to the best o .f

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p _c i h 3 1 i Uf.li E Ie stall! Oi AMEhiCA q NUCLEAP REGULATORY COMt'!SS10t; 4 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING E0A:D in the Matter of ) 1 t l THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF Docket No; 50-142 i CALIFORNIA ) ) .(Proposed Renewal of Facility (UCLA Research Reactor) ) License) AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES R. MILLER STATE OF MARYLAND COUNTY OF MONTGOMERY ss: I, James R. Miller, being duly sworn do depose and state as follows: 1. I am employed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com-ission in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Licensing, Operating Reactors Branch No. 3 (ORBt3). 2. I am presently Chief of ORBf3. 3. In April 1981 I was Chief of the Standardization and Special Projects Branch of the Division of Licensing. This Branch is responsible for licensing actions for all nonpower reactors. 4. On April 8,1981 I prepared an affidavit to support the NRC Staff's Motion for Summary Disposition of Contention XX. My professional qualifications are attached to my April 1981 affidavit. 5. The purpose of this affidavit is to respond to the allegation against me made by Comittee to Bridge the Gap (CBG). CBG alleges my1981affidavitstatingIhadverifiedthe'UCLA] reactor i radiation level was 100 rem per hour at three feet, unshielded, was untrue. w n -. n-

a. 6. I have read the.Memorancur and Order (recardino Contentior. xy) dated December 23,19F2, the Dete-ber 13, 1983 CE'i Merrar.cu at ic Status of Contention XX and other informatio.n in the record of the. UCLA] proceeding. ~ 7. My 1981 affidavit was true and correct to the best of my knowledge as I will demonstrate. As I stated in my April 8, 1981 affidavit, I did verify by independent calculations, performed by myself and a memberofmystaff,thattheirradiatedfuelinthe}CLA}corewould be in excess of 100 rems per hour (unshielded) and that the design of the reactor makes accessibility to that fuel very difficult. 9 Although UCLA,,did not previously operate to meet the "100 rem" exemption, UCLA committed by letter of January 29, 1981 from Dr. Walter Wegst to change reactor operations, as a result of a January 12, 1981 notification from me that the core and the SNM storage areas were recently determined by NRC to be contiguous. Dr.Wegstinformedme[UCLA]ntendedtoschedulereactoroperations such that UCLA would conform with the self-protection criteria for the in-core fuel. This comitment by CLA[wasmademorethan 2 months before my April 8,1981 affidavit. 1 1 8. Section 7 of my April 81981 affidavit states: I have verified that the irradiated fuel in the UCLA) reactor core emits radiation such that the dose at three feet will be in excess of 100 rems per hour and that the design of the reactor m es Accessibility to that fuel very difficult. In

addition, CLAjhas committed to schedule reactor operations to maintain e self protection of the fuel in the reactor core.

9. This verification was done utilizing a calculational technique to determine dose rate at given distances for a reactor core with fuel similarindesignto'UCLA}andassuminggivenoperatingtimesata L._

4. s-given power with given decay times. A copy of the typed version of the calculation is attached. The absolute r.,ter is not important. What is important is that the dose rate will remain above the regulatory self-protecting criteria for a giver. decay period. In any event, the attached calculations which Mr. Carter and I performed prior to April 8,1981 show that my affidavit of 1981 was true and accurate in my knowledge and belief. SinceitwasnotuntilJanuary1981thathCLAhevisedoperationsto 10. meet the 100 rem exemption, oth'er documents referenced by CBG which I and other members of NRC Staff authored prior to January 1981, whichstatethat{CLE_andothernonpowerreactorlicenseesdidnot or could not meet the 100 rem exemption, were true when written but are not relevant to kCLA)after January 1981. In advising the Comission that many reactors could not meet the 100 rem level the Staff meant that, the reae. tors did not reach or maintain 100 rem, as operated at that time. 11. The January 29, 1981 letter from UCLA was considered by NRC to be a licensee comitment until the reduction in SW' inventory in 1982. I attest that the foregoing affidavit is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. ] / .n / 1 l ' mes R. Millq/r Subscribed and s orn to before me this W day of sie 1984 %xth$t N% Notary Public NN g\\dIU My commission expires: 3 b I b)

9. t*. l T E D ST AT E S OF AE P ! C A NUCL E G REGUL ATORY C0"15510L REFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD in the Matter of ) ) THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ) Docket No. 50-142 CALIFORNIA ) ) (Proposed Renewal of facility-(UCLA Research Reactor) ) License) AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT E. CARTER 1 I, Robert E. Carter, being duly sworn, stats. as follows: 1. I am employed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, NRR/ DOL, SSPB. 2. The purpose of this affidavit is to verify that James R. Miller and I performed calculations in early April 1981 to assess the radiationlevelofth[UCLAreactorcore. 3. Mr. Miller and I worked on these calculations informally in m order to verify the adequacy of the UCLA modified operating schedule as u 3 sufficient to maintain the 100 rem exemption. 4 I later produced a document, dated April 14, 1981 setting out e n the specific calculation used to reach our conclusion that UCLA would .) meet the 100 rem exemption. I attest that the foregoing affidavit is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. M Robert E. Carter I Subscribed and sworn to before me this 44 day of hest 4, 1984 i \\ WEbbkb / 4 T g. u u,. Notary P0blic ' ,or~~-~ m X a ma A ca a,

y-v l 005E DATE D'.ti TO IRR*r.;ATED FUf! ) 1 l F. E. Car:er 4.i'/f' 1. T. G. Williamson of the University of Virginia has aeveloped a method for estimating the dose rate at three feet from an irraciated MTP-type fuel element. In order to simplify the calculation., he has made the I fellowing assur.ptions: a) The element can be represented as a line source b) The line is assumed to be at the center of the fuel element c) The radioactivity is uniform along the length of the line source Figure I shows the geometry assumed TI I I I l l L l r------------ t I I r_ -t 91 k'- 'Fit 1 For the MTR element, L= 61 cm = active length W = 7.6 cm - width T Including attenuation through the near half of the fuel element, the - dose rate at the point P 3 feet from the surface of the fuel element is given by: D = 1.8 x 10 -11 x T rems /hr - watt where Iis the fission produce source strength at the time of interest, following a finite irradiation time generating 1 watt of power in the l-entire fuel element. ': ?)- ' faf-J&

o I'is civen in Mev/ watt - sec, and has been tabulated by several ~autnors ic vi-c.: remetatica t et ene ver cut ee:ry - e: 11. In the following, some additoinal assumptions are made, and the expected dose rate at 3 feet (in air) from the surface of a compact core of MTR-type fuel is estimated. ~/ -#l 3" b' d d l 4 . fI'6.e[i. t i Figure 2 illustrates a typical compact MTR-type core. In order to estimate-the dose rate from the entire core at the point P, 3 feet (in air) from the l surface, the following assumptions are made: a) The dose rate from each element in the front row is computed as l above, for a single element (D) b) The dose rate from the second row is computed in the same way, but displaced an additional 3" from the first row, hence an inverse square reduction in dose rate. c) The front row, including the water, attenuates the average photon from the second row by 10%. d) The power level of each element is just 1/20 of the total core power level e) Successive rows are treated as described for row 2. The computed does rate from the core then becomes:

v l .{ Ro.: 1. D 5 x D c 5: 3 3 = a Ro,e 2; D S D { )

• '9 t

S ' '7? 2 5 x D x ( )2 x,9 2 Row 3; D = 5D..6 3 = (h) 2 3 ( Row 4; D 5 x D x = x,9 4 5 0- .c7 a = R Total 5D x 2.84 = D = 1.8 x 10 "II x I rems / watt-hr Assume a) Irradiation core power 100 kW = b) Irradiation time 2 hrs = c) Decay time 5 55.6 hrs = 2 x 10 see = These numbers are appropriate for the UCLA operations For these parameters , for a single. fuel element i P = 6.60 x 10 13 11 MeV -W~I-S x 2 x.1 = 6.60 x 10 ~I TO so D = 1.8 x 10'II x 6.60 x 1013 = 11.9 rem /hr and for the 20 element core, the total dose rate,' from above, becomes R total = 5 x 11.9 x 2.84 = 169 rem /hr

• (1) "A Handbood of Radiation Shielding", edited by J. C. Courtney ANS/SD 76/14 (July 1976)

(2) Figure 8.11, Reactor Handbood, Volume III Part B. Shielding, edited b'y E. P. Blizzard, 2nd Edition; Interscience Publishers (1962) III. A simplified approach to the u.ae problem would be to assume that the total core radioactivity is concentrated at a point at its center, and to assume simple inverse square fall-off of flux density out to the measuring point, three feet from the core surface. w.

=_w_. i. rey << utt 2. the distance (d) tatween the core certer and point r it t. S.:ref:rc, tr.c ;r.:en ter ener;y; <!.. :en:n; :t P is: 5 5 5 2 And 4r(42x2.54)2 1.43x10 f 5 cm =- = i For ttie same operating parameters as used above for UCLA, 13 13 g,y,3.1 S = 6.6 x 10 x 2 x.1 = 1.32 x 10 from which ? = 1.32x10 = 9,23 x 10 MeV -cm -s 'I 7 2 1.43x10 5 -l -2 In Williamson's derivation; it was assumed that a flux of 5 x 10 g,y,3 cm is equivalent to one rem-br-I so R total = 9.23x107 = 185 rem /hr 5 5 x 10 IV. A " rule of thumb" for estimating exposure rates from a point source is, for 137Cs (.66 MeV) R tota'i =.33 x Ci = r-hr"I @ 1 ' meter For the same parameters as used above for UCLA, but using the total dis-integration rate fror. Courtney, rather than energy emission rates, 4 2 R total = 1.38 x 10 x.1 x 2 x.33 = 7.46 x 10 x.33 10 3.7 x 10 R total = 246 R-hr "I if we make the small adjustment from 1 meter to 42", to be consistent with all of the foregoing, this becomes R total = 246 x ( )2 = 246 x.89 = 216 r/hr V. On Friday,10 April Neil Ostrander gave James R. Miller the following infonnation on the telephone:

i

t. sume that the UCLA react:r is rur. fer 2.0 heurt at 100 U.'.

t

rt:n: :t.1000 en : fr:ca/.

..t Ci". t r.: next ' ten::/, the exposure rate at 3 meter fro-the s s' ' ace c', the ccre, wit h no intervening shielding, would be 113 R "r-2 If there ..ere no significant operation of the reacter all that week, on Friday, one we would be 40 R-br gk from the initial run, the exposure rate 0 1 me.ter 3 Still assuming no additional operation on this second Fr: day, the exposure rate on the second Monday would be 26 R-hr <. The following table displays the way in which exposure rate at 1 meter accumulates, assuming that on each Friday, an identical 200 kW-br operation is performed, with no additional significant operation any other day of the week. Each column i gives the total exposure rate on Monday at 0800. Each row gives the residual exposure rate on any Monday from each of i the previous Friday operations. The bottom row gives the sum of all previous contributions on any Monday. For simplifica-tion, it is carried forward for only 5 weeks, but the exten-sion is clear. Ist 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Mon. Mon. Mon. Mon. Mon. etc--- 200 kW-hr 113 26 14 9 8 on Eriday.AM 113 26 14 9 113 26 14 113 26 113 -1 Total R-hr 113 139 153 162 170 VI. Conclusion l All methods agree that the exposure rate at three feet from the

• surface of the core with no intervenin maintained well above 100 rem - hr ~1.g shielding, can readily be 1

e l. l' twC.E Ak F.E WL A10F.1 CDP.: 55 ; L'. 1 EErn:t yr tc '1C SArETs A ;;c ;;;te;3 ta E::.:- ]n the Matter of )' ~~ ~ ) THE REGENTS Ci THE UNIVERS]TY-0F ) Docket No. 50-142 CALIFORNIA ) ) (Proposed Renewal of Facility UCLA Research Reactor)- ) _ License) AFFIDAVIT. OFIDONALD M. CARLSON 1, Donald M. Carlson] being duly sworn do depose and state: 1. "CBG MEMORANDUM AS TO STATUS OF CONTENTION XX (SECURITY)" dated December 13, 1983 stated on page 11 that Mr. Carlsor asserted that I research reactors like UCLA'shere only subject to 10 CFR 73.67 and .37 (specifically omitting 73.40) and there are "no explicit NRC regulations for the protection of non-power reactors against radiological sabotage...." The CBG memorandum further alleges that try swtrn statement was materially f alse. The above statement in quotation marks appears to have been taken from my affidavit dated the 7th day of April,1981 before the Atomic Safety anc Licensing Scarc (attache:) wherein ] stated, in part, "Easec or the type r and quantity of special nuclear material in use or storage at the j r 1 I I CLA,hvciear Energy Laboratory, the prescriptive portions of 10 CFF. U Part 73 that apply to this facility consist of ? 73.37 (protection of spent fuel in transit), and 5 73.67 (specific reovirements for j the physical protectior, of special nuclear meterial of moc'erate and low strateoic sigr.ificance at fixed sites)." l further stated "There l g Mf f nw n, l

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...,.s e yee q,* e. reactors against radiological sabotage;- 5 73.55 applies or.ly-to poner reactors. Prel;~;na ry results of stud.e cerforred for tne NkC staff indicate that the sabotage potential cf non-power reactors is very limited and except for certain high poaer, tank type reactors, sabotage protection is probably not necessary." As proof .I of the accuracy of my statement 1 point to the following facts. 2. On January 16, 1979, the Office of Standards Development Nuclear Regulatory Commission, submitted a Staff Paper (SECY-79-38) to the Comission. The subject of this Paper was " Physical Protection of Category 11 and 111 Material." On page 5 of the' Paper there is a i statement made in regard to " Sabotage at Non-Power Reactors." A statement contained therein is, "The proposed amendments, that are I the subject of this paper, are limited to consideration of theft of i SNM and do not include sabotage protection. The NRR staff is currently examining the necessity to require additional physical protection measures at non-power reactors that have the potential for exceeding Part 100 release limits as a res.;'t of sabotage. If this proves to be necessary, NRR piens to propose a new separate section of Fart 73 tc deal with this issue. Preliminary investigation indicates that these added req'uirements, if necessary, would be applicable to a very small number of non-power reactors. l For that reason, the staff recommends that the Commission approval of the propcsed new Section 73.47 not be de",aye: pending resolution 1 1 l

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,t, n,.: ..,,i..1...... a Section 73.67. 3. In June 1979, l25 Alamos Scientific Laboratory ;;blished a document entitled, " Consequences of Sabotage'of Nonpower Reactors" (NUREG/ CR-0843,LA-7845-MS). This document, which is classified at the Confidential level, was prepared for the Division of Operating Reactors (Offite of Nuclear Reactor Regulation), Nuclear Regulatory Commission and supports the statement made above. The Unclassified Abstract for this document states the following, "A study of the possible consequences of the sabotage of nonpower reactors is presented. The study is based on a review of the available literature and documentation for SE nonpower reactor installations. Isotopic fission product release fractions for each fuel form were obtaired ty literature search and represent th best experimental data available. Calculations of fission prodc:t inventories and releases were made with specific models devele:ed for the study. Tne att:s;*.eric dis;ersions and pc;A atier c:se calculations repcrted were made with the standard models. Tne sabotage scenarios developed for the various classes cf nonpowei reactors are based on the general design characteristics of the class er on those of a real or hypothetical installation, which represer.ts a class maximum. 11 is concluded that, within the constraints of this study, only one nonpower reactor installation has any potential for the release of significant amounts of fission product materials in the event of

.c. i' - Abstract. 4. On July 24, 1979, the Nuclear Regulatory Comission published a' rule, in the Federal Reg ster (Vc'ume 42, No. 343, pages'4222*.43284), e r.titie: " Safeguard Requirements for Special Nuclear Material of Moderate and Low Strategic Significance," having an Effective Date of November.21, 1979. On. page 43280 of the Federal Register the Supplementary Information for the rule states that, "The effective physical protection amendments are designed to have overall equivalency to the recommendations of INFCIRC/225 Rev. 1, but there are differences in the detailed requirements. INFC1RC/225 Rev. I recommendations are designed to minimize the possibilities of thef t or sabotage of SNM of moderate or low strategic significance. The effective i amendments have been primarily designed to require early detection 1 of thef t of SNM cf r'oderate or low strategic sige.if'ca :e.

However, in reoviring early detection capabilities, these amendments deter the possibilities cf theft or diversion.

In the jude e".t of the Com-ission, the ce; ee n' orotecUor. af forded t.i the ::- ainment, l monitoring and dete: tion procedures required by these a endments l provide ecuivaler.cy it the 1NFCIRC/225 Rev. 3 re: ore.:stiens for protection of theft or diversion of SNM." On ptge 422E' of this Notice, the Comission also stated, "Since protectior. against sabotage is not within the scope of these amendments, an entry search requirement is not necessary."

g. l. l ~ a: **.: - ;~* 't: c' ,:... '. s : the staf f was not propoting tc adort reasures to protect.against sabotage until furtter res,e. erc ar.aiysis incicated the netc fcr such measures, and since.the Federal Register Notice promulgating the new regulation contained n: shbotage requirements, there appears to be a clear and unmistakable approval by the Commission that sabotage protection was not needed at nonpower reactors at the time of my affidavit. 6. Based on the foregoing, I believe I have shown my affidavit dated j i the 7th day of April,1981, before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board is true. 7. "CBG MEMORANDUM AS TO STATUS OF CONTENTION XX (SECURITY)" dated December 13, 1983, stated on page 11 that, "Mr. Carlson had repeatedly stated, at a conferer.:e of nor.-power reactor operaters, a transcript of which was obtained under FO] A, that such reactors must comply with 73.40 protection reovirements against sabotage." The cc 'e e.:e alluded it above was held or. Augast 27, 1979, at Gier. Ellyn, 311incis. At that conference the NRC Staff conducted discussions with certain nonpoaer reactor licensees concerning the " Impact of the Safeguards Upgrade Rule or, Non;ower Reactor Licensees." The transcrint of that meeting contains the following i statements: l l l

l ,f.. '.g. I l e: .. n : r c+. m,.: .:..... :..... m.,:. sabc.tage uncer the provisions of 73.40." (p. SE:?O-?l). -l MR. BURh: "I was going to ask you, is-sabotage. coming?" and MR. CARL 50h*: '" Sabotage has always-been here. In 1974, your initial plans were submitted to protect against sabotage. You have to-follow the provisions of 50.35C which tells you that you have to follow 73,.'Part 73, and in 'there, in 73.40, it says you have to protect against sabotage..." (p. 143:10-17). I 8. At the time of the Glen Ellyn meeting, various positions were held by the staff regarcing what physical protection shocid be afforded nonpower reactors. Since the Los Alamos " Consequences of Sabotage of Nonpower Reactors" study mentioned previously, had not been reviewed and analyzec by the staff nor had a staff technical position been developed, my statement, "What I might add, you have to protect against sabotage under the previsions of 73.40" was not an inat: ceriate response. Mcwever, a m:re accurate statement might have been, "What I might add, you may have to protect against sabotage cr.:er the provisions of 73.40 ' As show'n by the contents of the cot;iete transcript of the 1979 meeting, the status of the safeguards regulations covering i sabotage protection for nonpower reactors was still uncertain. In addition, the practical impact of the new reguia: ions 673.60 and

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.:.t-1979 meeting reflect individual viewpoints on the ultimate dispesitice o' the eseitior, of the need for set:tage protection of nonpower reactors.

9. With regard to the cther statements above, Mr. Burn asked "]s sabotage coming"? This question appeared to indicate that Mr. Burn did not know that all plans in effect at the time of this meeting were submitted to protect against sabotage. My statement merely 1 identified what rules were in effect at the time of the meeting. To i the best of my knowledge, initial security plans were submitted to l the Atomic Energy Comission in early 1974. These plans were ) l submitted to the Comission in order to identify how a licensee intended to protect against acts of industrial sabotage and to i demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 50.34(c) and 10 CFR 73.40. This j is evidenced by the general guidance in Enclosure 2 to a July 15, i 1974 letter to the Regents of the Unive-sity c' California which is j i attached as an enclosure to this affidavit. It must be recognized that 10 CFR 73.40 prior te March 23, 1978 cor.sisted of one paragraph which recuired unspecified prctectior actinst "'ndustrial sabetage," I (not " radiological sabetage") and thef t. Subsequently,10 CFR 73.40 was changed to reovire unspecified protectior, a;ainst " radiological sabotage," and thef t ir. !73.40(a). However, because of the amendments to 573.40, the Staff believed the nem 673.40(a) did not constitute a specific regulation regarding protection against sabotage and thef t since new prescriptive regulations for various i

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• a period (e.g., 6673.20, 73.37, 73.45, 73.46, and 73.55).

1 30. In sum ary, as shown by.the transcript of the 1979 meeting, the 1 safeguards regulations necessary for sabetage protection for l nonpower reactors was still uncertain. In addition, the practical ) impacts of the new regulations, 5673.60 and.73.67 were still being discussed and evaluated. Therefore, the statements transcribed at the 1979 meeting reflect a situation of changing regulatory position ' and viewpoints. { 11. Based on the foregoing, I have shown that my statements at the 1979 meeting quoted above were true at the time they were given and do not contradict the truth of my statements in my 1981 affidavit. In addition. I have shown by reference to Staff and Comission documents that the Comission knew and ap;*oved Staff's view of the l unlikely necessity of sabotage protection at nonpower reactors, f 13. I attest that the foregeing Af fidavit and q.19El Affidavit are true and correct to the best of my knowledge anc belief. l 1 l /*Y c Donaic M. Carlson Subscribed and sworn to before me this 30th day cf January 1984 ) . k.% M o.shMN Notary Publie s., \\. / g'2 ' g. ,,J-- My commission expires: /s ,y 7 /4 /% U .w. i lE f~ '\\ g e. ..,s a

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E! FORL T Hi A10*t) C SM[1 Y AND L 1 C[ f.S! N3 RGtJD in the Mutter of ) ) Doc k e t lio. ED-14 2 THE REGENTS OF 1HE. UNIVERSITY OF ) (Proposed Renewal of Facility L CAL 1FORNIA ). License) ) (UCLA Research Reactor) ) AFF1 DAY 1T OF D0t!ALD M. C ARL SON I, Donald M. Carlson, being duly sworn do depose and state as f o11cws: 1. 1 am employed as a Plant Protection Analyst by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Division of Safeguards, Physical Security Licens-ing Branch. My professional qualifications are attached to this a f fida vi t. 2. I am responsible for the review of all non-power reactor security plans, including that of the U.C.L.A. researc h reactor. 3. As part of my review responsibilities,1 visited the U.C.L. A. research reactor at Nuclear Energy Laboratory (NEL) in Boelter Hall on the University of California Campus at Los Angeles in Fe brua ry, 1980. 4 D;rinc my visit to the NEL and Boelter Hall,1 toured the reattor room, the Tokamak Fission Laboratory, the fresh fuel storage vault, the rooms adjacent to the reactor room, the second floor high bay area containine the reactor control panel, and areas adjacent to the second story of the reattor room. 5. D.: ring r.y tour of the areas described, I resiewee the physical pro-tettion system used by the University to prctect spe:ial nuclear material, notine the intrusion detection devices and procedures used to detect unauthorized access; the key and 1cck syste s usec to con-trol access to areas where special nuclear rt.aterial was used and/or stcred; and the persor.nel access authorization procrar., 6. 1 have personally reviewed the UCLA security plan subTitted with the applice. tion for renewal of the license for the research reactor at the HEL. 7 fly affidavit explains the Com.ission's regulations in 10 CFR Fart 73 which are applicable to research reactors and else addresses the Aff$Qii$S$*E Nff

l ', 3,, . [. ' f [,,,f,,', j'*, )) e t, e XX.', Applicant has in the past arid it. at Vesent taking inact-Quate fised site physical security precautions to prcie:t ageinst ra'iolo;ical sabc.tage as well as protection against thef t and diversion of the special nuclear 1 naterials it possesses, thus-indicating that the Appli-cant's physical secur,ity plan is inadequate and its imple-mentation of said plan is inececuate. Applicant has failed to demonstrate in its recent performance any evidence that its physical security measures can reason-ably be expected to improve in the future, in the absence of which demonstration grant of an operating license and a SNM license cannot be made without ' undue threat to public health and safety. 1. Applicant has at its facilities areas containing vital equipment and special nuclear materials, areas which should be adequately protected against possible i acts of radiological sabotage or attempts at theft or l diversion of SNM, and to which access should be adequately controlled. Specifically: ] a. the reactor room, b. the control room, i the third floor equipment room, c. d. the fresh fuel storace area, and the " restricted area" immediately surrounding e. the reactor stack and exhaust fan. on the eighth floor of Boelter Hall. 2. There exist areas adjacer.: :: the above-menticned vital anc material access areas which should be sufficiently isolated and secured to prevent them from being used as penetration p;ints or staging areas for penetration of the vital and material access areas. Specifically: The " access court" used for truck loeding and a. j unloading, located between the reactor building and the Engineering Evilding to its west, b. the Tcka:iak lab adjateni to the reactor room, the main entrance (reception lobby) to ND., c. l i _L__

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area' around the reac tor stect, e. the rooms within liath Sciences whose windo.s oper. to the restric ted' area" a roun:' the reactor j stack, and f. the entryway for the sincie locked door to the: 1 " restricted area" around the reactor stack. 3. Applicant's physical security measures for its vital and :naterial access areas and the areas adjacent to. them have been in the past and. are at present inade.- 4 quate to properly ' protect,. isolate, and control access to those areas in that .l a, presence of guards and watchmen is too infre-l quent; J b. nethods for detecting concealed guns, explo-sives, or incen' diary-devices 'that could be carried by people entering these areas,. and SH!) that could be carried by people leaving these areas, are inadequate; i. Applicant lacks rnechanicel devices to detect firearms, explosives, incendiary devices, or SNM, and ii. Applicant fails to routinely search visitors and staff for fireants, explo-sives, incendiary devices, or SN!? c. physical barriers to penetration are inadeounte; i. fences and walls are tec short, lack terberi wire at the top, anc c.her ise fail to fully enclose the area to be. protected ii. windows and doors in walls that are te att as physical barriers are made of construc-tion and f astening of insufficient strencth such that the integrity of the wall is lessened by the opening provided by the windows and doors 1 iii. dual or redundant barriers are lackinct penetration of these areas can be made by breaching a single barrier 1 I

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l'.: i. doors that.should be kept locked have beer. l 1eit oper. ii. locks are of insufficient construction anc strength to prevent tampering and penetra-tion i iii. too many keys to areas that are supposed to be locked have been given out iv. control of those keys is inadequate in that copies can be nade, keys can be lent to' unauthorized personnel, and keys that are signed out are not required to be returned when not in use procedures to control access are inadequate. e. i. groups that are too large for adequate

• ~

supervision are given tours of the facility by one or two staff people alone ii. these tours include visits to vital and naterial access areas iii. NEL personnel unass'ociated with the reactor have ready access to vital and naterial access areas through egresses connecting their parts of the NEL complex with the parts of the complex utilized by the reactor. A::licable Regulations Easef cr. the type ar.d cuar.tity of special nuclear naterial in use or of 10 CFR Part 79p huclear Energy Laboratory, the prescriptive pertions st: rage at the UCL that apply to this facility consist of 6 73.37 (pro-te: tion of spent fuel in transit), and ! 73.67 (specific requirements for tne physical protection of special nu: lear caterial of moderate and l o<: strategic significance at fixed sites). In this regard, 3 have revieaed the physical protection plan submitted by UCLA against i 73.67 te determine (i) if all requirements have been addressed in the plan and (ii) if the security neasures described in the plan are adequate implemen-tation of the requirements. l 1/ There are no explicit HRC regulations for the protection of ~ non-pover reactors against radiological sabotage; 6 73.55 applies only to power reactors. Preliminary results of studies performed for the NRC staff indicate that the sabotage potential of non-power reactors is very limited and except for certain high power, itnk type reactors, sabotage protection is probably not necessary. z.

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• U The IntervE nor incorrectly describes certain areas cf Boelter Hall sur-rc.f.cinc thf restarch reactor es breas of contrcilet access in subpart i a r.d su bpa r t 2.

While the Intervenor is correct in considering the reactor room and the fresh fuel storage area as areas of controlled access according to the l reo.irer.en'.s of Pa rt 73, the Intervenor is incorre: ir. defining the control roc, the third floor equipment room and the stack area as areas containing vital equipment and special nuclear materials, because there is no equipment in these areas which could endanger the public health end safety by its destruction or failure to function as defined by 10 CFR . 673.2(1) and thus are not vital areas as defined by 10 CFR 73.2(h) nor do they contain special nuclear material. The areas adjacent to the reactor room listed in subpart 2a.-f. do not contain vital equipnent or SNM and are not required to be controlled access areas. Subpart 3 of Contention XX incorrectly alleges defects in the Applicant's security measures for controlled access areas. In allegation 3a, the ]ntervenor asserts that " presence by guards and watchnen is too infrequent." 10 CFR 73.67(d)(3) states that licensees shall menitor controlled access areas with either intrusion alarms or other de-vices or procedures, so that guards are not a requirement if IIcensees choose alternate methods of monitoring (i.e. alarm systems or other devices). 1 Subpart 3b. states that UCLA must provide explcsive and metal detectors and routine searches of personnel, but Section 73.E7(d)(10) requires only randor searches of vehicles and packages leaving the controlled access areas. No require ent for the detection devices or searches described in XX.3.b. exists in 10 CFR 73.67 (The 573.55 requirement for detection devices does nct apply te non-power reactors). Subcar: St. asserts that " physical barriers it per.etra tion are in-adequate" and alleges deficiencies in fentes, wells, windows and doors but no reovirements for fences exist in Section 73.67 nor for " dual or re-dunde r.1 ba rriers" stated in 3.c.iii. Subpart 3d. states that inadequate doors and lecks are installed. 3 erserved the doors and locks and found them adecuate to comply with 10 CFRi! 73.2(m) and 73.67. I have also noted the procedures used in con-trolling the keys and have found them to be adequate. 1 6

. (.. Subpert 3.e. ref f e-.' tc procedures to control access; tour groups which are taken by reactor Pt :.cnnel inte vital and material access erees er.e t;EL personnel. attess to. iti' and meterial access areas. Tours of contre.11ed a c c e s:, e r e e s a r e f.e r-15:':le under cor.diticns of 10 CFF 73.67(d)(7) 5:, that no safecuards regula.1cn is raised by the allegation here. HEL personnel cannot enter the rearcto room through connecting doors since they are se. cured by lock and al..r w v: when unoccupied. The doors described in XX.3.e.ii, are emergen:y exits fc reactor persennel, but are secured entrances. In summary, 1 hereby at;est that the only areas in or around Boelter Hall whic require controlled acAess to comply with 10 CFR 573 are the reactor room and .the fresh fuel storagt e'ea, since only these areas contain vital equipment and special nuclear -rye-ial. The security system in use by UCLA, namely, the lock and alarm system 1s sufficient to comply with 10 CFR 573.67; and no re-quirement exists for Tuards, metal or-explosive detectors or routine searches or ' redundant physicar be riers. ] also attest that the physical protection plan sutrnitted by UC;>. it. total satisfies the requirements of 10 CFR 73. ] swear the foregoinej-is true and correct to the best of my knowled e and D belief. ( a.a.:. f,' " ,,{.( g_ Doneic ti. Carlson Subscribed and sworn to before me this # day of Apr.1,1981 \\l..,'%..._ M D s. c-fJctaty Nblic l'y Co ri s sion Ex pirer, - 4)v - !, : *, 1.:.. [ i e l

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o. b.....:- v. c Ir.ci:!.ure Ec. 1 The folle.tino parapreph nc:L'ers refer to those sectier.s of the interira guidance document (Enclosure 2) which are not addressed inl sufficient detail to permit a thorough evalcation of your security plan.

~ Partorech flo.' Subject 1.A. Essential. Equipment 1.B. Security Aree 1.C. Security Systems '11.A. Organization 11.B. Access Control ~ 11.C. Surveillance 11.D. Pro:edures 11.E. Security Pro;ra Review You ere reminded that since y ur license authorizes possessior, of Slet ir, exces s of E Lilt; dams l'-225, that compliance v.i-t.10*TP.73.it: and 73.60 w::.:id be required 'if your inventory of nor.-exemp 5:r'. equals or ' exceeds the forn ia qun$ity specified in, %0CFF.73.1. L'1THHELD FTG'. PUBLIC D15CLOSL*F.E 1 s *. l e h

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security plans for low power research and training reactors. For purp;st this guice, these reactors are defined as TR]GA rea: tors with authori2Et ;; ~ levels less than or equel to 250 r.h'. and eli other researcn and training re! with power levels less than or equal to 100 101, including AG!l's 2ero power l , and critical, facilities. I l Purpose - The purpose of the security plan developed according to this guidance is to protect the reactor against ects of sabotage. It is intended for use by the licensee to demor. strate compliance with 100FR50.34(c) anc 10CFFJ3.40. Conformance with tr.is guide uiil not

• assure compliance with 10CFR73.50 and 100FR73.60, if these parts are ap;1icatie.o tne license'e.

i 1. Design Features { A. Essertial Ecuio ent - Essential equip cr. should be designated in the security plan. TMs-should -inc4ude,--but-notaeces sa ri1-y-_be-limited to, the following: the reactor, the reactor coolant system, reacter controls, and any F.ssociated ecuipment the 9

Y:. .a 9 failure cf which cedidL eridar.ger thE health ar.d. safety of the public. B. Security Area - security areas should be.ioentified ar.c described, including plan drawings or s' ketches showing these. in ' context of the site location and showing access points. At least t,he fuel storage area, the reactor control room, and the reactor room or building sho.uld be described as ' security. areas. C. Security Systems l '. Lochs and Keys-- a description of the lock and key system should be provided; describe how heys a' re controlled; ioentity ine specific inuividuci (u'y pu>ilivo LiGe) responsible for the security of the keys. 2. Cc=r.u.ications - the comm;nicatier. system to be used in the event of a security violation shocic be described. 11. Adair,istrative Controls A. Organization 1. Security orcenization - the persor. responsible for the 17.cility security program should be identified (by position title); the person (s) or group (s) having security functions and responsibilities on a day 50 c'ay basis should be identified. l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _. _ ____ __}}