ML20235C566
| ML20235C566 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000000, Limerick |
| Issue date: | 04/30/1971 |
| From: | Mckinley J Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Kaufman W Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20234A777 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-87-40 NUDOCS 8707090464 | |
| Download: ML20235C566 (14) | |
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"': " ~ ' i- ~r w > a, h .6, j 'e April 30, 1971 I!; k ih r.? W. J. Kaufman, Chairman Limerick Subcomunittee LIMERICK SUBCOMMITTEE 1EETING ON MARCH 31, 1971 Attached for your review are draf t minutes of the Limerick Subcomunittee meeting held on March 31, 1971. Flesse forward any comments you may have so that. corrections may be made if needed. 1 Ori inal Sicace by B J. C. L'cKinley J. C. McKinley Staff Assistant
Attachment:
Limerick Subeste Mtg Minutes dtd 4/30/71 cc: <CL Members w/attet EKS Staff w/attat Filed: Limerick project ,'$f,~.l : tgg o'r-M,
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J l 1 omcc > ...ACRS...... ...g........,.... SURNAME > .....JCM:.bjw.... j 4/29/71 oArt > ..L 8707090464 B'70610 u========"" .PDR FOIA THOMASB7-40 PDR
b h U h;.w_ h,M M, April 30, 1971 if. 2 LDERICK SUSCODOGTTEE MEETING MARCH 31,.1971 G; vT* Hiahlimhts The Regulatory Staff considers the Limerick site comparable to the Newbold Island site primarily because the slight difference in population is offset by meteorological considerations (the wind generally blows toward Philadelphia). The Subcomunittee requested a summary statement from the Staff supporting this position. The applicant intends to provide sonne design feature to assure no leakage past the main steam isolation valves but what form this feature takes has i not yet been determined, i. The applicant agreed to provide a system for hydrogen control and to protect the, plant against a fuel cask drop. The applicant was advised that DRL may require a Class I on-site source of emergency cooling water. The applicant agreed to provide protection to vital plant camponents against ' pipe whip. The plant will be protected against turbine'aissiles and the j k turbine will be provided with redundant overspeed protection. l The applicant refuses to consider possible reactor vessel, failures. The applicant was requested to discuss at the next Subcommittee meeting the pros and cons of the Limerick secondary containment as compared to Newbold Island and Consolidated Edison Company Units 4 and 5. The applicant was requested to study the valves that need to close on a con-tainment isolation and to consider random and comanon mode failures and to evaluate the reliability achieved against that required. The applic. ant was requested to discuss at a future meeting the possible effects of a fire on the operation or maloperation of components due to damage to control or power circuits. The applicant will provide a position on ATwS before the C.P. review is s completed. p, %;{ The applicant was requested to prop he a list of ganaric items and of the actions being taken'to resolve them. 1,! [ BEL was requested to develop a logical statement of the seismic design require-monts for main steen lines. omcE > -.{ - - -[[- - - - - -- -"'"~~~ ^ j SURNAME >
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DATE> Pbrm AEC-318 (Rev. 9-63) u.t GOVERNMEN1 PRINTING 0FFICE.106t-O- 364-598 k j
j -. s.4 ,i j l: k. ) L l l- )s. ua, i g.3i. ( . g. + g.g Limerick April 30, 1971 Tf? .g - J yk ) Attendees ) E E E W.'J. Kaufman, Chairman D. F. Knuth M. Spector C. P. Siess C. Lear D. Okrent R. Powell 2 J. C. McKinley, Staff R. Baer GQJQ A. P. Kenneke T. F. Westerman l l Bechtel Corporation Philadelphia Electric j H. Friend E. H. Logue j C. K. Soppet S. L. Daltroff l A. Appleford L. J. Bradley j C. J. Cill V. 8. Bo:Fer 1 C. W. Dick R. A.; kPford j M. J. Hauf J. L. Allen 1 C. S. Kraft R. L. Fiske i K. E. Schwartstrauber R. T. Jones j E. C. Covert G. M. Morley er General Electric R. V. Pie { R. L. Lebre R. Cordova P..tanni L. S. Gifford g i Executive Session Dr. Kaufman stated the primary objective of this meeting was to determine why the Regulatory Staff considered the Limerick and Newbold Island sites ) to be essentially the some from the point of view of protecting the public ) health and safety. I Dr. Kaufman also mentioned his visit to Dresden Unit 2 and the fact that Draeden Unit 2 had to reduce power because of inadequate radioactive waste j treatment capability. He acted that the treatment system is shared with Unit 3 and is poorly placed with regard to expansion or improvement. It was meted that the waste handling problems stem from poor defective fuel that has experienced a number of failures. OFFICE > .y..... 7...., so-E, .......r/. DATE> 1%rm AEC.818 (Rev. 9-63) u.s.sor.nNMENT PRINTING 0FFIG illth-O-364498
f, j y'.' W;. LD V m Limerick April 30, 197 D / $ e g f: tr. Okrent noted that the ACR8 has asked for " strong reactor vessel e Et Eton and Indian Point and at Newbold Island it has asked for somethW E greater. He didn't believe the Committee considered the Limerick site equivalent to the Newbold site. He speculated that possibly by 1980 or 2000 the sites would have comparable population distributions. Be suggested that the SPI for each site be calculated for the projected population of the year 2010 (near the end of a 40 year life). Dr. Okrent also thought that questions relating to the ECC8 should be cleaned up on this plant. f Meeting with the Regulatory Staff j Dr. Knuth reiterated DEL's position of considering the Limerick and Newbold Island sites identical with respect to population. Be pointed out that } within about 3 miles of the reactors, Limerick has a greater total population. In addition the meteorology at the sites is such that a release from Limerick would tend to drif t toward Philadelphia while a release from Newbold would i tend to drift away. The Staff has been telling Philadelphia Electric that a standard CE plant is not satisfactory at the Limerick site and the design features should be more like Newbold Island. The Staff is applying the ACES i I istter on the Newbold Island site to Limerick. The applicant has been told to provide a similar degree of protection. Current indications are that DEL is satisfied with the design being proposed for Newbold Island. Dr. Okrant taked if DEL could develop a paper presenting DEL's reasoning for considering the two sites the same. It would also be useful to have the SFI calculated for both sites for 1980 and 2000 as usil as for Indian Point Eton and Millstone. Dr. Knuth indicated that the applicant had just started to consider the effects of a reactor vessel failure. He had been given a chart of considerations developed by DRS. The design pressure of the Limerick containment is being increased from 48 psi to 54 poi. Dr. Okrent found it hard to understand why a 10% margin on containment design pressure was considered adequate for the rate dependent pressure suppression system. Dr. Knuth stated that, although the applicant has proposed 107., the Staff is thinking in terms of 19-20%. ,Dr. Okrant expressed his doubts that the Staf f has looked at the 1ACA blowdown l analysis as intently as it has the ECC8 calculations. [f, (,b [9r.Emuthcontendedthatthepressuresuppressionventflowmodelisan" ,,aceurate model and in three cases it undertredicted the pressure by a ses11 amount. Mr. Specter stated that he had been reviewing the pressure suppreesten calculations intensily over the past six months and had tried to justify each step La the calculation. ne esmed i'n.i "I fi Osc,4h O.e T;;.t: i: re t e&' 0FFICE > fs SURNAME > u,gij g DATE> Fonn AEC-818 (Rev. 943) UAGovtRNMuff PRINTINGDFTK;f.19W0 364490 ) t_
l p,, b [iv. - h i ,,,a l l n.g Limerick April 30,19R{M*'" S g&[ ;, then the drywell pressure increases and can reach rather high value6. 4s",P believes the Moody model used by GE for calculating the flow from a primary system rupture is conservative in that it gives higher flow rates than will be' observed, however, GE compensates for this conservatism by removing steam through the vents into the pool faster than he thinks it will be observed. DEL has aaked GE to substantiate every aspect of the calculational model and to reexamine the pressure traces obtained in earlier experiments to reaffirm the adequacy of the models. GE will file a topical report on the analytical method in a few weeks. DEL has requested INC to develop an independent model to check the GE analysis, a Thus far the GE and INC models are similar except for the vent flow portion. There may be soma ef fect on vent flow as a function of nossla height above the floor. Currently DRL is discussing with the designers what this height should be. Dr. Okrent asked about the seismic design criteria to be applied to the main steam piping beyond the isolation valves. He was told that DEL believes it should be designed closer to Class I standards than to Class II. Dr. Okrent suggested that it would be useful to have a written statement from DEL on the design basis for the main steam piping beyond the isolation valves. Dr. Knuth said that he understood that a Regulatory policy decision is being developed that turbine generated missiles are not to bs a design basis. Dr. Okrent was not aware that this was a Committee position. 3 l 4 Mr. Lear said that the turbine was oriented such that the nuclear. portion of the plant is protected from direct impact from turbina generatea missiles and the structures can withstand the impact of a high trajectory missile. Dr. Okrant wondered if the applicant had given much thought to material control in his Industrial Security plan. He also noted that this plant does not seem to fall within the. guidelines established for granting an exemption without ACRS concurrence to proceed with limited construction prior to issuance of a construction permit. He felt the ACKS should be advised if DEL plans to issue ) an exemption. j Dr. Knuth reported that there is a number of technical issues yet to be resolved ) with the applicant including the QA/QC program. The plant will easily meet i the recently published Illinois release limits since the applicant espects j to release only about 0.01 c/yr (excluding tritium) of liquid wastes. iBo 1& quids will be released without prior treatment; most will be recycled where possible. n 9} OmCE > p g4g ..k,. ppUw Le v. SURNAME >- DATE > ' Foran AEC.1118 (Rev. 9-63) U.s GonnNMENTPRINTING0FFICEdtE9-0-364-698
m e I l p,3,., Wi.. L i. m ut g., ?W, Limerisk April 70, Meetina with philadelphia Electric Company The applicant described the popuistion distribution around the Limerick site and said that it was comparable to the Newbold Island sits. Es. claims to have taken additional measures to protect the public such as reducing the containment leak rate, recirculation and filtration of air in the reacter building, improvements in the Standby Gas Treatment System, an off gas treatment system, recycling liquid of fluents, and improved solid waste handling.. The applicant has reviewed past ACES letters and is amare of the recoennendations made in the Newbold Isisad site report. The appliaant plans to develop an acceptable means of assuring reliable, leak tight closure of the main. steam line. This may take the form of a third isolation valve or some other technique. A definitive proposal will be made for ACES consideration-during the construction permit review. This applicant has seme reservations regardingthe Newbold Island proposal of an ametioneering J eircuit to datermine which space between valves should be pressurized to i provant steam leakage. The applicant is looking at other maans to assure no leakage. Dr. Okrent asked if the applicant had considered some other siternatives that he rejected for one reason or another. ' The applicant replied that he was looking at the reactor building leakage, the gaseous waste handling system, consequences of a dropped' fuel cask anyplace in the building, and at hydrogen control. Dr. Okrent asked if the applicant had any reservations concerning the development of a hydrogen control system for the Liesrick plant in time for initial operation. Mr. Boyer thought that there is sufficient potential. in various techniques being investigated to say that the applicant will provide a' system for hydrogen control. There had been some reluctance on the part of philadelphia Electric to make a flat statement for fear the entire cost of development would fall on them; they have joined others in the development of a catalytic recombiner. There was also some reluctance to make a conniement to meet some unknown future AEC criteria. Dr. Knuth stated that the AEC will require a hydrogen control system and noted that the applicant had been informed of this requirement. i Br. Seyer stated that the applicant would comply and will provide infocusties es a proposed system. He also said that the applicant will protect the' plant agatast a fuel cask drop but a design has not yet been developed. (- There is no question of flood protection, plant grade is at elevation Ett it, while the PMF reaches only 158 ft. OFFICE > O*a QY ? 'f f f F
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............L$.'... I SURNANC> DATE > I'brm AEC-818 (Rev. 948) U.S GOVERNMENT PRINTIN6 0FTICE iltEF-O-364-698 l' J
b. Limerick MQf April 30, 1 pygt. The applicant proposed nothing with regard to vibration testing since Y ' feels this will be a second generation Browns Ferry reactor. The feel will use gadolinia se a burnable poison and an huondment will be submitted containing this proposal. failure of instrument lines that penetrate the containment.The applicant wi The plant design will consider common mode failures. No new or meFel equipment is being considered solely on the basis of greater population. Philadelphia Electric Company claims that it does not believe in a double standard for rural and urban sites. If a second cooling system is required for Limerick then it should also be required at Peach Bottom. ( The applicant know of no new accident situation that would not be adequately protected against by the present safeguards system. Dr. Okrent asked what Philadelphia, Electric Company considered to be an acceptable probability of an accident exceeding the Part 100 guides by a factor of ten or approaching the Brookhaven assumptions. Would it be serof The applicant had not made a study and Dr. Okrent suggested that it might be fair to the stockholders and neighbors to tell them of the probability of such an accident. The applicant guessed that the probability of such an accident would be ten to a very high negative exponent such as 10-20, Mr. Soyer listad a number of areas where the Limerick plaat would be improved over the Peach Bottom units. These included: 1. Cisan steam seals on the turbine 2. Recombiner and cryogenic waste gas treatment 3. Evaporation and recycling of liquids 4. Monitoring of all gas releases a I 5. Shoreham type drywell/ pressure suppression pool containment 6. Standby Cas Treatment System filters 7. Reduced reactor building leak rate j 8. Improved reactor building air mixing and filtration 9. Instrument line protection 10 LOCA hydrogen control 11. Reduced steam line isolation valve leakage 12. Protection against a dropped fuel eask [4 g.n Q W OFFICE > -"; m %;; 7 F" * * - - - ~~ ^' ~~ h ~ k SURNAME > '- **^ ' - ' " " " " ~ ~ i DATE> Form AEC.316 (bv. 9-58) U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFTIG de69.-t. 364-690 (
0 : I g 3p v. s. c .,s ug Limerisk. April 30, 1 %h b[ y~. Sr. Kaufman asked about the adequacy of cooling water during periods of, flow'in the Schuylkill River. On's 100 yr. resurrence basis the lowest"fbur'* is estimated to b 54 cfs (the lowest historic flow was 87 cfs in 19,W). Flood control and recreational projects in the watershed any improve the low flow situation. The applicant takes his normal water requirements via pipe line and creek from the Delaware River. Arrangements have been made with 6e state authorities that in case of an emergency at the plant the consumptive flow may be taken from the Schuylkill River even during periods of low flow. Emergency conditions include loss of pumping power at the Delaware River pumping station or the loss of the pipeline from the Delaware. The plant's consumptive need is 37 cfs. The applicant will assure sufficient NPSH for the Schuylkill pumps by making a trench across the river bottom to the punp. house. sumps. There is some reserve water on site in the cooling i tower basins. The cooling towers will be structurally designed to Class I standards but Class I QA/QC will not be imposed and therefore the applicant is not claiming Class I integrity. f Dr. Knuth pointed out that in the case of a loss of off-site power, the { dissel driven generators require auxiliary cooling water. Without water j there would be no on-site power. DEL may require a Class I source of on-site water. The applicant noted that a dem and reservoir are proposed at Blue Marsh, upstream of the Limerick site, that would aid in maintaining flow in the Schuylkill. This reservoir won't esist until about 1977. Its response to Dr. Kaufman's question the applicant stated that he intends to protect the plant against the effects of pipe whip to the estent of assuring containment liner integrity and safety system operability. The main steam lines will be restrained. -the s.ir tanks protected, etc. The details have not yet been defined. Dr. Kaufman asked the applicant to justify the peak pressures he assumed in the design of the containment system. Mr. Mulford stated that they had calculated a peak pressure of 48 psi and a peak dif ferential pressure across the floor of 27 psi. This is a very recent calculation and is not reflected in the PSAR. To these pressures the applicant added 10% for margin to arrive at design values of 53 psi and 27 pai. All blowdown and pressure suppression calculations are derived from the Bodega test series. It was found that the actual flows were about 70% of those predicted with the Moody model. Mr. Ianni claimed that what has happened is that GE has changed its bookkeeping system and unved the~ margin from one area to another. He also noted that 15-20% of the vents to the pressure suppression pool can be blocked without affecting the peak' ' differential pressure across the floor. Mr. Ianni was asked how well he woula om sole to preaf.to..eama.withlin 201...Es.. mas..than.. asked..why..he.. Af An .. include..a-et ene peat pressure ror containments et a attrere t g-y;..he.. expected ,'***f .Ae g gg SURN AME > ...... J. A.,.,..',.g...g.g...... DATE> Fortn AEC.818 (Rev. 9-63) uJ. soVERNMENT PRINTING OITICE. Hub CF B64-598 f'
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Uitk.... b. p-9 2 Limerick -S-April 30, 1971 4 \\. ,, v g g. 10% margin'and he replied there is stready a 30% margin in the bloudei h l% W rate calculation. He was next asked what the 10% margin was intended to ? l cover. 'Ne replied that he didn't know; that it was added on.tep just to be safer. Some concern was expressed for damage to the vent pipes discharging into the pressure suppression pool due to shock and vibration caused by steam bubble collapse. DEL noted that a commitment had been made in the Shoreham review to brace the vent pipes and to analyse the forces. Mr. Ianni said the only time significant forces existed was during the initial phase when there was an air / steam mixture at low flow. Once steam flow was established a stable void formed at the tip of the vent pipe. The applicant agreed to ' brace the vents.- If the' forces to be protected against can't be defined then the bracing will be designed to an envelope of forces. The. applicant stated that the turbine will be provided with redundant' overspeed protection and that the plant will-be protected against turbine missiles. The applicant has looked at-various breaks in pipes and safe ends with regard to the shield's ability to withstand the pressures and jet forces; he has not considered a reactor vessel break of the same area. The applicant is not considering a reactor vessel wetal rupture. Dr. Okrent suggested that he look at what is being considered and done at Indian point and Newbold Island. Mr. Ianni expressed GE's concern that there isn't mech difference between a small crack in a reactor vessel and a major rupture. He does not believe there will be a reactor vessel failure and, if it should happen, it would Isak before it failed. Be is concerned that if he analysed for a small d break'he would then have to consider a major break. He could find no 2 justification to limit the break size to 4 ft, Dr, Okrent acknowledged the applicant's commitment t.o put 1/4" orifices l and position indicators on encess flow check valves with an alarm in the control room on the instrument lines that penetrate the containment. Be = now wanted to know how many instrument lines would have to be ruptured to damage the reactor bo11 ding. Mr. Sill described the reactor building ventilation system peinting east. <, that it will have a espacity of 60.000 sefs with the building'at 1/4"1.. water negativ+ pressure. It will go into operation on the regular seed tatement isolation signals. The Standby Ces treatment system will entrast about 1.000 sefs for discharge. To obtain the best possible mixing is.g the system the designers are including perforated plates in front of the ....iii.iti e. fil ter e. It i:.w td tic thi: 1,: = ' : g r -' l l d a 30 day dose byafactor$f shu% . dose by a factor of 20 to 30 and that 2 to ~ M oe" values"wl55"E"Ess luded"is"EE assE"amsadnesiE"Es"Ehi?SW."' ~ ~ ~~~ sen=r > em.u. g.. b a.h8h, DATE> .s. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICr H89- 0-96.-596 a, Form AEC. Sit) (Rev. 9-53) u a L' I
' l ) t y+q Limerisk April 30. 19 'i )D tr. Okreet asked the' appiteant to. have prepared for the most Subeamudhgt;*4 meeting a discussion of the pros and caos of the Limerick seesadery seui F, tainment system as compared to Newbold Island and Consolidated Edison Company Units 4 and 5. The applicant objeeted-to being placed in the position of criticizing another applicants' design. 1 Dr. Okrent suggested that the applicant look at the list of valves that smist close to inclate the containment and to look at the probability of random and of common mode failures that could prevent closure. Be asked the applicant to give an estimate of the reliability required and of that provided. Be would like a systematic look at the need and an evaluation of what is supplied to meet that need. Dr. Okrent asked if the applicant had looked at all possible sources of fires and considered fires leading to events whose esasequensas the applicant cannot. define. The applicant couldn't say thot he had leaked at every possible source and consequence. Dr. Okrent pointed out that there has been other experience besidetthat at San Onofre; there have been cases where flammable material was used instead d flame res'.stant. He asked if a fire in the cable spreading room could cause the auto depressurisation valves to open or stop the addition of water to the reactor vessel. The applicant had not gone beyond the conventional review. Be had assured himself that a fire in one location could not propogate nor cause failure of redundant equipment. Dr. Okrent suggested that the applicant be prepared to discuss this further at a future meeting.. He expressed his desire for fewer surprises at a site in a more populated area. I In response to Dr. Okrent's query regarding ATWS the applicant stated that GE was completing its study and would submit a topical report for the j Hatch application in late April.. One action to minimise the cassequences j would be to trip the roeirculation pumps but the applicant is not ready to accept that approach yet. The applicant plans to be able to discuss ATWS with the Committee before completion of the C.p. review. The applicant stated that he was aware of the generic problems of the BWRs and that they are listed and a status is provided in Appendia J of the peach .Settem 9mits 2 and 3 pSAR. Dr. Okrant requested that applicant t, mahe.a presentationatafuturemeetingonthelistandofhisproposalsto(geolve i "these items. N Ul In reopease to Dr. Caufman's questions en liquid waste treatment the toast stated thel all equipment drains are collected'in one system, all flot e a--<-- a_ u.- m... >- - - e m..u,..u.. _m ,,u....... g M tions betweenl collection shstems.~~""~~~- applicast fools that this is The . en hapfsisd"CE"5ys't' set. ""~'"'" $URNAME> -- ----{-,y-,,.;-,3 y ;-. -- t----u DATE > ForIn AEC=818 (bv. 9-68) U1 GOVERNMENT PRINTING 0FTICE 4 tese-- 0-364-598
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ph .n L(serisk April 30, 19 y fr '- Responding to Dr. Okrent's questions, the applicant stated he had not' i considered the potential for industrial sabotage in the design of the plant details. He had looked at the conventional means of protecting the plant. by fences and buildings. Bis approach is to deny access rather than to i minimise effects after access has been gained. Philadelphia Electric Company has recently become more concerned with this problem and is looking at the protection afforded all of its generating stations. Although trucka entering the plant are not routinely inspected additional precautions are taken (such as inspection of packages) during periods of civil unrest. The applicant agreed that a study should be made of sabotage potential in order to achieve a balance between security and operability. Meetine with the Esaulatory Staff Dr. Kaufman asked the Staff to prepare a s9== mary on the ; population comparability of Limerick and Newbold Island that would include meteorological considerations. Dr. Okrent noted that the Staff analysis on the Pilgrim Station operating license review contained many items on instrumentation that should have been resolved earlier. He wanted to know what is being done on Newbold Island and Limerick to prevent a similar occurrence. He suggested that it might be necessary to reach agreement on the details of the design before the system is installed in the plant. eeee U l ml6.. 4a 19 - \\ omet > 4 ........................OFRE F:DEY ....r......... DATE > Forzn AEC-81ft (Rev. 9-53) U.S. GOlIRNMENT PRINTING OFFlG 1WO-364-598
"L A. r. t ( L p 1 TENTATIVE AGENDA l Meeting on Limerick Generating Station March 30, 1971 1. Discuss areas at. issue, including areas for which inadequate information has been submitted. TL.sc arcos are'11sted below with an accompanying brief statement of the requirement: a. Low level meteorology data: Provide instrumentation on low 1cyc1 tower to collect meteorological data representative at the site ground levcl. b. Stability factors: Convert the available meteorological data froa i Brookhaven to Pasquill stability factors for use in exposore calcula-tions. c. Schuylkill River hydrology: Provide more data on calculation of PMF, the plot of low flows versus frequency, and effect of upstream water allocations on plant operation. d. Pipe Whip: Provide protect' ion against effects of pipe whip inside primary containments. Application of AUC Code C1' ossification: Upgrade th'e classification c. of the main steamline beyond the second isolation valve to ANSI B31.7 Class'II-(AEC Classification Group B). Similarly, upgrade the turbine bypass, MSL drains, and feedwater lines, outside primary containment, to Group B, AEC Classification requirements. q f. Contalument peak pressure: Explain and justify conservativeness of the calculated post-LOCA peak primary containment pressure of ] 48 psig and the dryvell deck differential pressure of 23 psig. l l g. Mart n,: Justify the conservativeness of selecting a 10% margin which ) i is applied to calculated peak pressure to obtain containment des,ign j pressure of 53 psig. I l h.' Dryvell dech leahaze: Determine allouable Icakage rates through drywell floor during LOCA. Capability of drywell floor to contain-ment wall joint as a leakage barrier. g, ,,, a..,., .,4 'r c,- be rnirt:Ined in a - disc b !v s ';'J /s. i 'j. }'vd r a m.:n Ce r a.,1. c ~.p ' bili * ' f or pos t-LOC _A bydrq ~ a a nd oxycen reco:0ination in prr m. centainr,'rt. l l l
i 4 1 n. p l' 2 k. Containment Inerting: Provide for inerting of primary containment 1 during operation. 1. Biological (sacrificial) shield design: Design the shield to with-stand fluid jet forces from a safe-end rupture inside the annular space betwecn reactor vessel and shield. m. Instrumentation line breaks: Provide an improved capability for isolation of instrumentation lines which penetrate primary con-tainment. n. -Reactor Building Recirculation System: Provide information on design and expected performance of charcoal filters. o. Peak fuel cladding temperature: Conservatively calculate peak clad temperature with singic mode core spray cooling of the core during a LOCA. p. Operational limits' of RRR System: Define limits of heat removal capability for RHR system so that pool temperature remains below 1700F during a LOCA. q. Caseous radwaste system: Provide as lou as practicabic releases e by installing equipment with gr. cater cican-up capability. r. Fuct Cask Accident: Describe additional design provisions or handling procedures which protect spent fuel pool and stored fuel from effects of a dropped fuel cash. s. Flooding of ESUS pumps: Describe design feature which prevents flooding of both ESUS pumps in event of a passive failure of the' pump discharge line, t. Smoke and Airborne radiation: What procedure or design concept will be used when both smoke and airborne radiation contaminate atmosphere of the control room? u. Extosure calculation.: Determine exposure doses to receptor for all the postulated accidents using the TID source terms, conservative assumptions, and account for all mixing and filtration systems. The postulated accidents are: loss-of-coolant, fuel handling, control rod drop, main steamline break, and instrumentation line or process line break. Exposures in the control room and from USL isole tien valve l es'o3e are to be calculated. (Neither applicant t.. r S c '.iG m : Tc -. c ': csiculatn calum.) ___m._
'L> ( S, 3 v.. Emergency Planning: Provide the preliminary plans for coping with emergencies per Appendix E, 10 CFR Part 50. v. Plant Securftv: Provide more information on the physical security available at the site for coping with saboteurs or', civil disturbance. t x. Quality Assurance Program: Prepare and implement a satisfactory QA/QC program implementing the criteria of Appendix B, 10 CFR 50. y.' Site Environmental Monitoring Program: Include this program in i the Technical Specifications. Pre-operation monitoring program. z. Anticipated transients with failure to scram (ATWS):. Submit topical report (GE) for staff review. _ommon mode failure: Review Topical Report NED0-10819,and apply C aa. results to BWR-design (DRS/DRL). 2. Discuss areas of continuing revic$: Resolution of problem areas associated with Nuclear Fuel Integrity: a. Performance of fuel at high burnup and power; evaluation.of "no scram" condition on fuel rod failure propagation; temperature predictions using top core' spray cooling; effectiveness of top core spraying for limiting peak temperature of 3r clad. b. Inservi.cc vibration monitoring and surveillance of reactor vessel for loose parts. i Seismic-induced loads and stresses on reactor vcssel and its c. internals, other pressure retaining components and piping. d. Corrosion cracking of pipe in which gases are allowed to collect must be prevented. e. Turbine Overspeed protection: Provide redundant systems. I _ -. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -}}