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E N G I N E E R S C O N S T R U C T O R.5 EEE File Ocpy 828 SO UTH P'lO V EROA STRE ET LOS ANGELES 17 nosson usn LOS ANGELES HONOLULU June 17,1963 Mr. Robert H. Bryan, Chief Research and Power Reactor Safety Branch Division of Licensing and Regulation U. S. Atomic Energy Commission Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Sir:
Near the close of the June 12 meeting, I mentioned some revisions which appeared to be desirable in the preliminary draft dated May 29, 1963, relating to certain structural considerations in connection with the proposed Bodega Bay reactor. At that time, you indicated a need for receiving these changes as soon as possible. Accordingly, I am transmitting herewith a revised preliminary draft dated June 14, 1963. Most of the revisions therein stem from a subsequent review of the original draft and from additional investigation of certain features of the reactor. Other changes result from the discussions of the June 12 meeting. A summary of the revisions which have been J
made to the May 29, 1963 draft to produce the June 14, 1963 draft, is also included in this transmittal for ready reference.
It is probable that some additional amendments will result when this material is combined with that of Dr. Newmark. I will be glad to provide any other revisions you may require.
Included in this transmittal are three copies of average acceleration spectra curves which we have used in the past for representing ground motion of El Centro intensity. These curves are probably a reason-ably accurate representation of the spectra proposed for use in the
-Bodega Bay reactor design. Through an oversight, I neglected to j
give you these curves at the June 12 mee' g.
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PRELIMINARY D' RAFT Revised as of 6/14/63 BODEGA BAY ATOMIC PARK UNIT NUMBER 1 3.
Special Considerations in Design of Facility Components 3.1 General This material includes a discussion based on Refererfces 1
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through 5 and supplementary information obtained during a meeting held at the Universitjr of Illinois on May 17, 1963. It utilizes as a guide the suggested outline of work presented at the above meeting.
The comments are intended to serve only as general guide-line s.
Neither the information nor the time are available to provide a detailed item-by-item review of specific components an effort which should be a part of the designer's responsibility.
Integrity of the entire facility is totally dependent upon the absence of gross differential foundation movement. Movements of this nature would be associated with slippage of faults located beneath the site. Such movements could also be identified with structural I
weaknesces in the granite base rock, extreme consolidation of the-evils overlying the base rock, or landslides in these soils. It would be impossible to design an installation to survive such large displace-ments. The entire discussion assumes that such movements do not occur.
The discussion further assumes that the ground motion de-v ".
scribed by the spectr'a' presented in Ref.1 is acceptable as a design basis when utilized with usual working stresses and design methods which consider dynamic response. The une of dynamic methods based HOLMES a NARVER,INC
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on the response spectra of Ref.1 in the design of critical components (Class 1) is, in most cases, equivalent to the use of static lateral forces significantly greater than 0. 33g.
Seismic resistance depends on response of numerous com-ponents whose structural integrity is generally ignored when ground motion is not a factor. Because of this, many features customarily considered non-structural, including components of mechanical and electrical systems, require special structural attention in design to avoid weak links in the system. For this reason, the discussion con-siders these items as well as those usually classified as structural.
- 3. 2 Reactor Substructure and Foundations The main foundation problem associated with the design and construction of the reactor substructure (cylindrical concrete structure housing the reactor) appears to be that of ground water. This will cause sizeable static lateral pressures on the foundation, which will be essen-tially uniformly distributed under normal conditions. Transient unsym-metrical pressures may occur under earthquake conditions, but these should not cause any serious design problem. Minimum steel percent-ages needed for ductility requirements are probably adequate for lateral pressures. It should be feasible to provide the necessary seismic resis--
tance in the substructure with proper attention to the reinforcing steel details.
Special treatment may be required for thermal stresses in the region of the dry well. Internally, the substructure with its compart-mented interior is highly i edundant, and will require the use of overlap-ping assumptions in design; however, in these areas seismic considera-tions should not be 'of major importance.
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The turbine foundation is situated on soil, whereas the reactor substructure is founded on bedrock. The soil report (Reference 5) con-templates the possibility of about one inch differential settlement between the two foundations, most of which would occur during construction. How-ever, in the design of the connecting steam lines and any other non-expend-i able components crossing this joint, it is felt that allowances should be l
i made for at least several inches of differential settlement to arrive at I
maximum assurance against rupture of these critical elements. There should be no insurmountable problem in designing the supports of the I
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turbine and generator to resist high seismic forces. Seismic effects I
on the supports will be minimized by maximizing the lateral rigidity of I
the piers and shear walls..
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- 3. 3 Piping and Equipment
- 3. 3.1 General Accommodating the seismic stresses in the piping systems of this installation should be simpler than the similar problem of shock loading encountered in the design of the piping systems used in nuclear submarines, which involve transient inputs many times greater. However, more than usual care is mandatory in the design of those systems of the facility which are critical from a safety view-point because: (1) minimization of thermal stresses calls for a min-imum amount of restraint, whereas minimizing of seismic stresses requires the opposite - leading to a conflict which must be resolved in design; (2) the usual static analysis using factors of 0. 20g or less may result in significant overstress in an earthquake of the anticipated in-tensity.
,e, Brittle materials should be avoided in all elements of the piping system stressed by earthquake motion. This limitation should apply not only to the piping and pressure vessels, but also to supporting elements, all appurtenances, including valves, and to pumps and their C onn eClion s.
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Response
The equipment elements, including such components as pumps, motors, valves, and pressure vessels and their supports, along with the connecting piping constitute a highly elastic structure with low damping. It is not unusual to find that the fundamental period of the system lies in a range which maximizes the response to close-in earth-quakes. This combination of factors can amplify significantly the effect of ground motion. For example, the ground motion criterion proposed in the PHSR (Reference 1) with its peak acceleration of 0. 33g, could in some instances, induce stresses which would approximate those caused by a static lateral force of Ig acting on the system.
3.3.3 Differential Motion in addition to the differential motion which often must be expected due to seismically induced oscillations in piping systems connecting pieces of equipment mounted on a rigid common support, piping connecting equipment mounted on separate fomlations may be e
subjected to the effects of tilt and relative displacement of the founda-tions. The main steam loop leading from the reactor to the turbine is an example of such a case.
Each main steam line running from the reactor to the turbine should be specially investigated for this case. The design should insure that the effects of seismically induced oscillation of the loop, plus those due to the estimated differential displacement between the reactor structure and the turbine foundation will not cause over-stress when combined with operating stresses. A rough calculation indicates that these l' ops should be capable of tolerating several inches o
of differential displacement without incurring large stresses. The same type of criterion should be applied to any other line of critical importance which crosses such an interface.
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3.3.4 Stress Analysis Manual stress analysis of a complex piping system requires the use of simplifying assumptions, but may be entirely ade-quate if it can be determined that the results are conservative. How-ever, computer programs originally used for anal'ysis of dynamically loaded piping systems in nuclear submarines have been applied to evaluate earthquake effects in piping systems of nuclear reactor facili-tie s.
This approach should be considered.
- 3. 4 Containment 3.4.1 General To avoid deficiencies it is important that a complete systems approach be used in the anti-seismic design of the suppression containment, in which all components, including those of the shutdown and spray systems, regardless of whether they may be classified as structural, mechanical or electrical, receive the same degree of attention.
3.4.2 Pressure Vessel There should be no particular problem in bracing the pressure vessel laterally to resist earthquake-iniluced forces in such a way that the thermal expansion movements can be accommodated.
While it is probable that the internal parts contained in the pressure vessel are not particularly sensitive to the induced forces from the grcund motion, including that associated with " sloshing" of the coolant, nev'ertheless, these parts should be looked at from this standpoint in p
sufficient detail to verify that this supposition is correct.
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3.4.3 Dry Well and Suppression Chamber Stresses from seismic effects on the dry well and sup-pression chamber should not create any serious problems as compared i
to those from thermal effects. If the concrete is poured directly against the steel shell throughout, the shell becomes essentially a liner and a
special bracing for earthquake effects may not be needed. At the other
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extreme, isolation from the concrete would require the use of seismic bracing. Stress conditions at penetrations customarily require special attention, even in the absence of a seismic threat. These stresses may i
be amplified by seismically induced inertia forces; in addition, " sloshing
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action" may require consideration, as, for example, in the case of com-ponents projecting into the suppression chamber area.
i 3,4.4 Control Rod System l
If the control rod drive mechanism is not external to i
the reactor vessel, the possibility of jamming during a severe earthquake is probably low. However, this system is of such importance that its seismic integrity should be demonstrated by analysis or other means.
3.4.5 Liquid Poison System All components needed for injection of the poison solution must be designed to remain functional in a severe earthquake. It is noted that this system is manually controlled. Automatic control should also be considered in view of the possibility of operator error.
3.4.6 Controls In g,oneral, the electronic gear used for reactor controls is insensitive to accelerations of intensities found in severe earthquakes.
In addition, much of this equipment may be available under military speci-6 l
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fications calling for shock and vibration tests. Earthquake damage to such components would probably be caused primarily by. falling objects 7
or deficiencies in mounting, etc.
Adequate anchorage of such components as instrument i
i panels and relay racks, and " shipboard" stowage practices should be ef-fective in minimizing damage to the control system and possible injury
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to the operator during a severe earthquake.
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- Some of the emergency actions are manually performed.
1 Since the typical human reaction to a strong earthquake is one of fright, j
operator error could be the result. Hence, serious consideration should be given to earthquake drills and to the advisability of automatic controls..
particularly controls involving emergency shutdown.
3.4.7 Power Sources
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Remote power sources should not be considered reliable' n
in a severe earthquake. This is particularly true of any circuits crossing the San Andreas fault. Malfunctions of transmission and distribution sys-t tems in California have occurred in strong shocks.
8 The emergency sources for use under seismic conditions should be located at the facility. The emergency engine-driven generator, l
station battery and associated circuitry should incorporate adequate anti-seismic features.
3.4.8 Water Sources
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degree of reliability as a fluid container under seismic conditions than any other fluid container at the site. Consequently, seismic problems 4
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are minimized if the volume of water in the suppression pool is adequate as the sole source of emergency coolant in a strong earthquake. How-ever, if auxiliary emergency sources are needed, the auxiliary containers and supports and associated piping require special attention and should be designed for maximum seismic resistance.
- 3. 5 Other Features
- 3. 5.1 Spent Fuel Storage Pool Seismically induced increments of water pressure acting i
on the side walls of the spent fuel storage pool cause no structural difficul-ty. However, percentages of reinforcing in the walls should be sufficient to prevent seepage through cracks. Use of a metal liner (which may be desirable for other reasons) would avoid any question regarding cracking of the concrete. If flooding of the interior of the refueling building is to be avoided, ' sufficient freeboard should be provided above the normal water surface to avoid over-topping from the wave action generated by the ground motiori.
3.5.2 Refueling Building The junction between the circular reactor substructure and the square refueling building requires special measures for support of the projecting corners of the refueling building. However, seismic considerations should not materially add to the problem in this area.
It appears feasible to use the roof of the building as an earthquake diaphragm, with the walls functioning as shear walls. In this event, there should be no difficulty in attaining the required resistance against seismic forc'es acting in the plane of the wall. Reinforcing steel in amounts considerably greater than usually provided will be needed to l
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resist the forces caused by ground motion normal to the plane of the wall.
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lateral support for the seismically loaded wall above and below.
- 3. 6 Inspection After a Severe Earthquake A decision regarding the need to shut down for inspection in-volves complex considerations which preclude pre-establishing firm courses 'of action. In addition, it is obviously impossible to specifical-ly identify the most seismically vulnerable components. Cons equently, in discussing the subject of inspection only general comments can be 4
offe red.
As stated in Reference 1, it is the intent to provide for con-tinuous operation through a major earthquake. Hence, should the facility continue to function during and after a severe earthquake, there might be a reluctance to shut down for inspection. In that case, a deci-I sion to shut down could be based on information such as that obtained from:
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Inspection of those features which are accessible during operation.
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Assessment of the earthquake intensity (preferably from an instrument located at the site),
Examination of operating records for any evidences c.
of unsafe conditions.
A manual # cram resulting from the earthquake would argue very strongly for a shutdown inspection, unless it could be demonstrated that the scram was unjustified. An automatic scram would appear to justify inspection and repair or replacement of the malfunctioning com-ponents which were involved, and it might be prudent to make a complete inspection of all other critical components during the shutdown period.
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Conditions such as those at bends, penetrations of vessels, and at connections to equipment, including pumps and valves, should be inspected. Such insp'ection could be visual, radiographic, ultrasonic, I
dye-penetrant, or other type as appears to be dictated by the particular circums tanc es.
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Inspection of the reactor substructure, refueling building, and turbine pedestal for evidences of overstress should be made. This would include such items as determining the, location and extent of crack-ing and spalling of concrete and searching for evidences of slippage or yielding at connections, and tilt, settlement, or differential movement of foundations and soil.
A requirement that the designer of the facility supply a manual dealing with post-earthquake inspection of the facility should be considered.
- 3. 7 Seismic Instrumentation Serious consideration should be given to the installation of a strong motion seismograph or other instrument at the site in view of the possibility of an extremely intense earthquake. Instrumental recordings i
of strong ground motion would seem to be of the same order of importance as the recordings of wind ' direction, velocity and temperature which are to be made as a part of the meteorological program to be carried out at the site. Instrumental data could be useful in determining whether a post-earthquake inspection shutdown should be made, i
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seismological standpoint and from the standpoint of earthquake engineer-ing, particularly in the case of strong shocks.
The presence of bedrock close to the surface would afford this opportunity at reduced cost.Other locations worth considering would be inside the reactor substructure
, at the lowest level and at ground floor level.
The counsel of authorities on earthquake engineering and seismology should be sought in deciding on the number and type of instruments and their location.
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- 3. 8 Design Coordination The earthquake problem affects all the ' engineering disciplines involved in the design of a reactor facility, including not only stru t c ural and architectural engineering, but mechanical and electrical as wellThe structural engineer is familiar with earthquake problems as they relate to building structures.
However, with the possible exception of some i
P Ping systems, mechanical and electrical components are almost never considered from a seismic viewpoint by the structural engineet or the mechanical or electrical engineer. On the other hand, it should be noted that structural, mechanical and electrical systems have been succ es sfully designed to resist very severe shock inputs in nuclear submarines and also in missile facilities " hardened" against nuclear attack.
Reasonable assurance that the gaps between the various engineer-ing disciplines do not lead to deficiencies in seismic resistance mi ht b g
e provided by a special monitoring effort on the part of the designer of the fa cility. This might invol$d including in the design staff one or more engi knowledgeable in the field'of earthquake effects with the sole duties of revi ing all critical elements to insure that seismic resistance has been pro ew-perly considered.
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Preliminary Hazards Summary Report, Bodega Bay Atomic Park Unit Number 1, submitted by Pacific Gas and Electric Company, December 28,1962, (Docket No. 50-205).
2.
Amendments 1 and 2 to Docket No. 50-205.
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3.
Preliminary Soils Investigation and Seismic Survey, Proposed Nuclear Pow'er Plant, Bodega Bay, California, for the Pacific 5
Gas and Electric Company, by Robert D. Darragh and John F.
Stickel, Jr. of Dames and Moore, Consultants in Applied Earth Sciences, December 2,1960 4.
Report of Seismic Survey, Proposed Nuclear Power Plant, Bodega Bay, California, for the Pacific Gas and Electric Company, by John F. Stickel, Jr. and Robert T. Lawson of Dames and Moore, Consultants in Applied Earth Sciences, January 25, 1960.
5.
Foundation Investigation, Bodega Bay Atomic Park Unit Number 1, Bodega Bay, California, for the Pacific Gas and Electric Company, by Robert D. Darragh of Dames and Moore, Consultants in Applied Earth Sciences, April 30, 1962 i
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' i, MODIFICATIONS TO PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF 5/29/63 BODEGA BAY ATOMIC PARK UNIT NUMBER 1 Sub-section 3.1 General After the last sentence in the third paragraph which says: "The entire discussion assumes that such movements do not occur", the following paragraph is inserted.
C "The discussion further assumes that the ground motion described by the spectra presented in Ref.1 is acceptable as a design basis when utilized with usual working stresses and design methods which con-sider dynamic response. The use of dynamic methods based on the response spectra of Ref.1 in the design of critical components (Class 1) is, in most cases, equivalent to the use of static lateral forces significantly greater than 0. 33g. "
I Sub-section 3. 2 Reactor Substructure and Foundation - The last sentence in this sub-section is modified to read as follows:
I "There should be no insurmountable problem in designing the supports of the turbine and generator to resist high seismic forces. "
The following sentence is added after the modified sentence:
" Seismic effects on the supports will be minimized by maximizing the lateral rigidity of the piers and shear walls. "
P Sub-section 3. 3. 3 Differential Motion - Second paragraph, second sentence is modified to read [s' follows:
l "The design should insure that the effects of seismically induced oscil-lation of the loop plus those due to the estimated differential displace-l h
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ment between the reactor substructure and the turbine foundation will not cause overstress when combined with operating stresses. "
Sub-section 3. 4.1 General - The first two paragraphs are deleted.
Sub-section 3. 4. 3 Dry Well and Suppression Chamber
- The last sent-ence is modified as follows:
" Stress conditions at penetrations customarily require special attention even in the absence of a seismic threat. "
Add the following after the modified sentence:
"These stresses may be amplified by seismically induced inertia forces; in addition, " sloshing action" may require consideration, as, for example in the case of components projecting into the suppreselon chamber area "
Sub-s ection. 3. 4. 6 Controls The last sentence in the first. paragraph is deleted.
The second paragraph is modified to read a3 follows:
" Adequate anchorage of such components as instrument panels and relay racks and " shipboard" stowage practices should be effective in minimiz-ing damage to the control system and possible injury to the operator during a severe earthquake. "
Sub-section 3. 5. 2 Refueling Building - Second paragraph, second sentence is revised as follows:
"In this event, there should be no difficulty in attaining the required re-sistance against seisrpic forces acting in the plane of the wall. "
The following is added after the modified sentence:
" Reinforcing steel in amounts considerably greater than usually provided will be needed to resist the forces caused by ground motion normal to the i
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may be required at large perimeter openings in the operating floor, such as those occurring at the spent fuel storage pool and the cask removal area, to provide lateral support for the seismically loaded wall areas above and below. "
1 Sub-section 3. 6 Inspection After a Severe Earthquake - Third paragraph, second sentence is modified to read as follows:
"An automatic scram would appear to justify...................... "
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Fifth paragraph, first sentence is modified to read as follows:
" Conditions such as those at bends, penetrations of vessels and at con-nections to equipment, including pumps and valves should be inspected. "
Sub-s ection 3. 8 Design Coordination Third sentence - the order of the two adjacent words "almost" and "are" is interchanged. After this modified sentence, the following is added:
"On the other hand, it should be noted that structural, mechanical and electrical systems have been successfully designed to resist very severe shock inputs in nuclear submarines and also in missile facilities
" hardened" against nuclear attack. "
Second paragraph, second sentence:
The words " adding to" are replaced by the words " including in".
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