ML20215L510

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Proposed Tech Spec Changes,Incorporating Three Addl Special Test Exceptions Necessary to Allow Testing of Fine Motion Control Drive
ML20215L510
Person / Time
Site: LaSalle Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 10/16/1986
From:
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20215L495 List:
References
NUDOCS 8610290071
Download: ML20215L510 (17)
v • d • e


Text

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l 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 SHdTDOWN MARGIN .

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MAkJIN shall be equal to or greater than:

a. 0.38% delta k/k with the highest worth rod analytically determined, or _
b. 0.28% delta k/k with the highest worth rod determined by test.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONALCONDITIONSlf2 3f4Yand5 ACTION:

With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than specified:

a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 or 2, reestablish the required SHUTDOWN l MARGIN within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 1 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3 or 4, immediately verify all inse.rtable control rods to be inserted and suspend all activities that could reduce the SHUTDOWN MARGIN. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4, establish SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
c. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5, suspend CORE' ALTERATIONS
  • and other activities that could reduce the SHUTDOWH MARGIN, and insert all insertable control rods within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. Establish SECONDARY '

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be equal to or greater g than specified at any time during the fuel cycle:

ano ..

g@n. a. By measurement, prior to or during the first startup after each go refueling.

Go

,, g b. By measurement, within 500 MWD /T prior to the core average exposure No at which the predicted SHUTDOWN MARGIN, including uncertainties and 88 calculation biases, is equal to the specified limit.

E o c. Within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after detection of a withdrawn control rod that is 58 immovable, as a result of excessive friction or mechanical inter-mal ference, or is untrippable, except that the above required SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable control rod.

/

  • Except movement of IRMs, SRMs or special movable detectors.

+ See spedal ht &ce soa 3.40.9 i LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-1

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM 3/4.1.3 CONTROL R005 CONTROL ROD OPERA 8ILITY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.1 All control rods shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICA8ILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2f l ACTION:

a. With one control rod inoperable due to being immovable, as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference, or known to be untrippable:
1. Within 1 hour:

a) Verify that the inoperable control rod, if withdrawn, is separated from all other inoperable control rods by at least two control cells in all directions.

b) Disarm the associated directional control valves

  • either:
1) Electrically, or
2) Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves.

c) Comply with Surveillance Requirement 4.1.1.c.

2. Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
3. Restore the inoperable control rod to OPERA 8LE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTOOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
b. With one or more control rods trippable but inoperable for causes other than addressed in ACTION a, above:
1. If the inoperable control rod (s) is withdrawn:

a) Immediately verify:

1) That the inoperable withdrawn control rod (s) is separated from all other inoperable withdrawn control rod (s) by at least two control cells in all directions, and
2) The insertion capability of the inoperable withdrawn control rod (s) by inserting the control rod (s) at least one notch by drive water pressure within the normal i operating range **.

b) Otherwise, insert the inoperable withdrawn control rod (s) and disarm the associated directional control valves

  • either:
1) Electrically, or j
2) Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust j water isolation valves j
  • May be rearmed intermittently, under administrative control, to permit testing associated with restoring the control rod to OPERABLE status.

LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-3

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM CONTROL R00 MAXIMUM SCRAM INSERTION TIMES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.2 The maximum scram insertion time of each control rod from the fully

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withdrawn position to notch position 05, based on de-energization of the scram 4 pilot valve solenoids as time zero, shall not exceed 7 seconds.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2.#

ACTION:

a. With the maximum scram insertion time of one or more control rods exceeding 7 seconds:
1. Declare the control rod (s) with the slow insertion time inoperable, and
2. Perform the Surveillance Requirements of Specification 4.1.3.2c.

at least once per 60 days when operation is continued with three or more control rods with maximum scram insertion times in excess of 7 seconds.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.3.2 The maximum scram insertion time of the control rods shall be demonstrated through measurement with reactor coolant pressure greater than or equal to 950 psig and, during single control rod scram time tests, the control rod drive pumps isolated from the accumulators:

a. For all control rods prior to THERMAL POWER exceeding 40% of RATED THERMAL POWER following CORE ALTERATIONS
  • or after a reactor shutdown that is greater than 120 days, i
b. For specifically affected individual control rods following maintenance on or modification to the control rod or control rod drive system which could affect the scram insertion time of those specific control rods, and
c. For at least 10% of the control rods, on a rotating basis, at least once per 120 days of operation. l "Except movement of SRM, IRM or special movable detectors or normal control l

rod movement.

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.7 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM CONTROL R00 AVERAGE SCRAM INSERTION TIMES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1. 3. 3 The average scram insertion time of all OPERABLE control rods from the fully withdrawn position, based on de energization of the scram pilot valve solenoids as time zero, shall not exceed any of the following:

1 Position Inserted From Average Scram Inser-Fully Withdrawn tion Time (Seconds) 45 0.43 0.86 39 25 1.93 05 3.49

(

t tf APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS l~ rand 2.

ACTION:

With the average scram insertion time exceeding any of the above limits, be in at least HOT SHUTOOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.3.3 All control rods shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by scram time testing from the fully withdrawn position ar required by Surveillance Requirement 4.1.3.2.

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM FOUR CONTROL R00 GROUP SCRAM INSERTION TIMES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.4 The average scram insertion time, from the fully withdrawn position, for the three fastest control rods in each group of four control rods arranged in a two-by-two array, based on deenergization of the scras pilot valve solenoids as time zero, shall not exceed any of the following: ,

Position Inserted From Average Scram Inser-Fully Withdrawn tion Time (Seconds) ,

45 0.45 39 0.92 25 2.05 05 3.70 APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONALCONDITIONS1and2f ACTION:

a. With the average scram insertion times of control rods exceeding the above limits:
1. Declare the control rods with the slower than average scram insertion times inoperable until an analysis is performed to determine that required scram reactivity remains for the slow four control rod group, and
2. Perform the Surveillance Requirements of Specification 4.1.3.2c.

at least once per 60 days when operation is continued with an average scram insertion time (s) in excess of the average scram insertion time limit.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />,

b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.3.4 All control rods shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by scram time testing from the fully withdrawn position as required by Surveillance Requirement 4.1.3.2.

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I LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-8

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM CONTROL R00 SCRAM ACCUMULATORS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.5 All control rod scram accumulators shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONALCONDITIONSl','2fand5[

  • ACTION:
a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 or 2:
1. With one control- rod scram accumulator inoperable:

a) Within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, either:

1) Restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status, or
2) Declare the control rod associated with the inoperable accumulator inoperable.

b) Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTOOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

2. With more than one control rod scram accumulator inoperable, declare the associated control rod inoperable and:

a) If the control rod associated with any inoperable scram accumulator is withdrawn, immediately verify that at least one CR0 pump is operating by inserting at least one with-drawn control rod at least one notch by drive water pressure within the normal operating range or place the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position.

b) Insert the inoperable control rods and disarm the associated directional control valves either:

1) Electrically, or
2) Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTOOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5 with:
1. One withdrawn control rod with its associated scram accumulator inoperable, insert the affected control rod and disarm the associated directional control valves within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, either:

a) Electrically, or b) Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves.

2. More than one withdrawn control rod with the associated scram accumulator inoperable or with no control rod drive pump operating, immediately place the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position.
c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

"At least the accumulator associated with each withdrawn control rod. Not ayplicable o control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM CONTROL ROC ORIVE COUPLING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.6 All control rods shall be coupled to their drive mechanisms.

l APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS , 2, and 5*.

ACTION: .

a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2 with one control rod not coupled to its associated drive mechanism:
1. Within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, either:

a) If permitted by the RWM and RSCS, insert the' control rod drive mechanism to accomplish recoupling and verify recoupling by withdrawing the control rod, and:

1) Observing any indicated response of the nuclear instrumentation, and
2) Demonstrating that the control rod will not go to the overtravel position.

b) If recoupling is not accomplished on the first attempt or, if not permitted by the RWM or RSCS then until permitted by the RWM and RSCS, declare the control rod inoperable and insert the control rod and disarm the associated directional control valves ** either:

1) Electrically, or
2) Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves.
2. Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTOOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5* with a withdrawn control rod not coupled to its associated drive mechanism, within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, either:
1. Insert the control rod to accomplish recoupling and verify recoupling by withdrawing the control rod and demonstrating

^

that the control rod will not go to the overtravel position, or

2. If recoupling is not accomplished, insert.the control rod and disarm the associated directional control valves ** either:

a) Electrically, or b) Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves.

c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

"At least each withdrawn control rod. Not applicable to control rods removed l per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

    • May be rearmed intermittently, under administrative control, to permit testing  ;

ssociated with restoring the control rod to OPERABLE status.  !

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM CONTROL ROD POSITION INDICATION

! LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.1.3.7 The control rod position indication system shall be OPERABLE.

11 2 l i APPLICA8ILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 2'and 5*.

ACTION: .

a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 or 2 with one or more control rod position ge indicators inoperable within one hour:
1. Determine the position of the control rod by:

1 4

(a) Moving the control rod, by single notch movement, to a

.- position with an OPERA 8LE position indicator.

(b) Returning the control rod, by single notch movement, to its original position, and (c) Verifying no control rod drift alarm at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, or

2. Move the control rod to a position with an OPERA 8LE position indicator, or

! 3. When THERMAL POWER is:

1 Within the low power setpoint of the RSCS:

(a)

1) Declare the control rod inoperable,

' 2) Verify the position and bypassing of control rod with inoperable " Full in" and/or " Full out" position indi- 4

, II

  • cators by a second licensed operator or other techni-cally qualified member of.the unit technical staff. I (b) Greater than the low power setpoint of the RSCS, declare the control rod inoperable, insert the control rod and disarm the associated directional control valves ** either:

1

.1) Electrically, or

-2) Hydraulically by closing the drive water and

! exhaust water isolation valves.

4. Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

"At least each withdrawn control rod. Not applicable to control rods removed j per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

    • May be rearmed intermittently, under administrative control, to permit testing ,tt l

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L associated YAth % I M 7OthNrestoring W #*T/fi-13 the control rodAmendment to OPERA No.14 8LE st g

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM 3/4.1.4 CONTROL R00 PROGRAM CONTROLS R00 WORTH MINIMIZER LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.4.1 The rod worth minimizer (RWM) shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICA8ILITY: OPERATIONALCONDITIONS1and2*fwhenTHERMALPOWERisless than or equal to 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER, the minimum allowable low power setpoint.

ACTION:

a. With the RWM inoperable, verify control rod movement and compliance with the prescribed control rod pattern by a second lice ~nsed operator or other technically qualified member of the unit technical staff who is present at the reactor control console. Otherwise, control rod movement may be only by actuating the manual scram or placing the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position.
b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS  !

l 4.1.4.1 The RWM shall be demonstrated OPERA 8LE: l

a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 prior to withdrawal of control rods for the purpose of making the reactor critical, and in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 prior to RWM automatic initiation when reducing THERMAL i POWER, by verifying proper annunciation of the selection error of at j least one out-of-sequence control rod.  :

i

b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 prior to withdrawal of control rods for the purpose of making the reactor critical, by verifying the rod block function by demonstrating inability to withdraw an out-of-sequence control rod.
c. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after RWM automatic initiation when reducing THERMAL POWER, by verifying the rod block function by demonstrating inability to withdraw an out-of-sequence control rod.
d. By verifying the control rod patterns and sequence input to the RWM computer is correctly loaded following any loading of the program into the computer.

" Entry into OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 and withdrawal of selected control rods is permitted for the purpose of determining the OPERABILITY of the RWM prior to withdrawal of control rods for the purpose of bringing the reactor to criticality.

U See ~9'eeal Tert fx<ynen 3. /o. 8 LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-16

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM R00 SEQUENCE CONTROL SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.4.2 The rod sequence control system (RSCS) shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2* hen THERMAL POWER is less

! than or equal to 207, RATED THERMAL POWER, the minimum allowable low power setpoint.

ACTION:

a. With the RSCS inoperable: .
1. Control rod withdrawal for reactor startup shall not begin.
2. Control rod movement shall not be permitted, except by a scram.
b. With an inoperable control rod (s), OPERABLE control rod movement may continue by bypassing the inoperable control rod (s) in the RSCS i provided that:

1

1. The position and bypassing of inoperable control rods is verified by a second licensed operator or other technically qualified member of the unit technical. staff, and
2. There are not more than 3 inoperable control rods in any RSCS l

group.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.4.2 The RSCS shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a. Performance of a self-test prior to:

Each reactor startup, and 1

1.
2. Rod inhibit mode automatic initiation when reducing THERMAL POWER.

1

b. Attempting to select and move an inhibited control rod:
1. After withdrawal of the first' insequence control rod for each

! reactor startup, and i

2. Within one hour after rod inhibit mode automatic initiation when reducing THERMAL POWER.

i "See Special Test Exception 3.10.2. l i

  1. Entry into OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 and withdrawal of selected control rods is permitted for the purpose of determining the OPERA 8ILITY of the RSCS prior to l j

withdrawal of control rods for the purpose of bringing the reactor to criticality.  !

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! LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-17 1

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3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 1

3/4.9.1 REACTOR N00E SWITCH ,

1 LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION  ;

[ 3.9.1 The reactor mode switch shall be OPERA 8LE and locke'd in the Shutdown or

. Refuel position. When the reactor mode switch is locked in the Refuel position:

s o1/er/M d2-Ei I 3

a. A control rod 3shall not be withdrawn unless the Refuel position 4

one-rod-out interlock is OPERA 8LEqfhad A<ias A sewd 44 c.yck, coa bt red oz- 43 5 d.rar - J $ 4 & N m re d eJ. -

b. CORE ALTERATIONS shall not be performed using equipment associated with a Refuel position interlock unless at least the following Refuel position interlocks are OPERA 8LE for Such equipment.
1. All rods in.

J 2. Refuel platform position.

3. Refuel platform hoists fuel-loaded.
4. , Service platform hoist fuel-loaded.

.; APPLICA8ILI'i_ :', OPERATIONAL CONDITION 50 s

ACTIO_N:

a. With the reactor mode switch not locked in the Shutdown or Refuel position as specified, suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and lock the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown or Refuel position.

With the one-rod-out interlock inoperable, lock the reactor mode i b.

. switch in the Shutdown position.

c. - With any of the above required Refuel position equipment interlocks
,* inoperable, suspend CORE ALTERATIONS with equipment associated with the_ inoperable Refuel position equipment interlock.

" See Special . Test Exceptions 3.10.1 and 3.10.3.#

  1. The resctor shall be maintained in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5 whenever fuel is in the reactor vessel with the vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned or with the head removed.

NThe reactor mode switch may be placed in the Run or Startup/ Hot Standby position to test the switch interlock functions provided that all control rods are verified to remain fully inserted by a second licensed operator or other technically qualified member of the unit technical staff.

J LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 9-1

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SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.8 CONTROL ROD PROGRAM CONTROLS M MITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.10.8 The provisions of Specifications 3.1.4.1 and 3.1.4.2 may be suspended for control rod 02-43 during the second fuel cycle to allow the demonstration of a fine motion control rod drive installed at this control rod location.

The PMCRD 02-43 will be bypassed in the Rod Sequence Control System (RSCS) and programmed out of the Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM).

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITONS 1 and 2.

ACTION:

Movement of control rod 02-43 during the second fuel cycle is permitted provided that:

a. Thermal power is greater than 25% Rated Thermal Power, and
b. A rod pattern has been establishea.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.10.8 Prior to movement of control rod 02-43 during the second fuel cycle, a second licensed operator or other technically qualified member of the unit technical staff who is present at the reactor control console will verify that:

a. Thermal power is greater than 25% Rated Thermal Power, and
b. A rod pattern has been established.

LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 10-9 2269K

SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.9 SHUTDOWN MARGIN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.10.9 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN is equal to or greater than:

a. 0.38% delta k/k with the highest worth rod analytically determined, or
b. (0.28% delta k/k with the highest worth rod determined by test.

(With an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of FMCRD 02-43.)

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.

ACTION:

With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than specified:

a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 or 2, reestablish the required SHUTDOWN MAFGIN within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3 or 4, immediately verify all insertable control rods to be inserted and suspend all activities that could reduce the SHUTDOWN MARGIN. In OPERATIONF.L CONDITION 4, establish SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY WITHIN 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
c. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5, suspend CORE ALTERATIONS # and other activities that could reduce the SHUTDOWN MARGIN, and insert all insertable control rods within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. Establish SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.10.9 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the fine motion control rod 02-43 to be equal to or greater than specified at any time during the second fuel cycle:

a. By measurement, prior to or during the first startup after each refueling.
b. By measurement, within 500 MWD /T prior to the core average exposure at which the predicted SHUTDOWN MARGIN, including uncertainties and calculation biases, is equal to the specified limit.
c. Within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after detection of a withdrawn control rod that is immovable, as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference, or is untrippable, except that the aboie required SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable control rod.
  1. Except movement of IRMs, SRMs or special moveable detectors.

LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 10-10 2269K

SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.10 CONTROL RODS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.10.10 The provisions of Specifications 3.1.3.1 through 3.1.3.7 may be suspended for control rod 02-43 during the second fuel cycle to allow the demonstration of a fine motion control rod drive installed at this control rod location, provided conditions of 3.10.9 are satisfied.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 5.

ACTION:

With the requirements of 3.10.9 not satisfied, immediately insert control rod 02-43 and disarm the drive motor electrically.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.10.10 The provisions of Specifications 4.1.3.1 through 4.1.3.7 may be suspended for control rod 02-43 during the second fuel cycle to allow the demonstration of a fine motion control rod drive installed at this location.

LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 10-11 2269K

SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3

BASES 3/4.10.8 CONTROL ROD With the in-plant demonstration of a fine motion control rod drive (FMCRD) installed at the peripheral location 02-43 during the second fuel cycle, position 02-43 will be bypassed in the Rod Sequence Control System (RSCS) and programmed out of the Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM). This will free the FMCRD rod from the Banked Position Withdrawl sequence (BPWS) and notch movement restrictions. By requiring that thermal power be greater than 2% rated thermal power and a rod pattern be established (after the withdrawal / insert sequences of its Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence Group are complete) before movement of control rod 02-43, one ensures that this rod will be moved only under conditions when the RSCS and RWM are not required to be operable.

After one cycle of demonstration with this control rod, position 02-43 will be returned to the RSCS and RWM in conjunction with the reinstallation of the original locking piston control rod.

3/4.10.9 SHUTDOWN MARGIN With the in-plant demonstration of a fine motion control rod drive installed at 02-43 during the second fuel cycle, the shutdown margin shall be demonstrated assuming this control rod is at the fully withdrawn position. In other words, during the second fuel cycle, the shutdown margin shall be equal to or greater than the values specified in Specification 3.1.1 with the most reactive control rod and the fine motion control rod fully withdrawn.

3/4.10.10 CONTROL ROD A fine motion control rod drive will be installed at LaSalle County Station Unit-2 during the second fuel cycle. To minimize the safety impact, a peripheral location 02-43 is selected. Due to the temporary test nature of this control rod drive, safety evaluation has been performed to justify continued safe operation of the reactor assuming this control rod drive is  ;

inoperable. However, this rod is not considered inoperable in the context of specifications 3.1.3.1 through 3.1.3.*1 and any scram time will not be included in ave in specification 3/4.2.3. Thus during the second fuel cycle operation the LCO and surveillance requirements applicable to regular control rods are exempted for this control rod. After one cycle of demonstration, this control rod drive will be removed and the original locking piston control rod drive wil be reinstalled at this location.

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LA SALLE - UNIT 2 B3/4 10-2 2269K

ATTACISENT C SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION The following evaluation is based on the Safety Evaluation by the NRC Staff (enclosed with the NRC letter dated August 15, 1986) of the General Electric Company (GE) Topical Report NEDO-31130 as supplemented by three transmittals of May 12, June 11, and July 18, 1986.

The proposed change to the Technical Specifications does not involve a significant hazards consideration because operation of LaSalle County Unit 2 in accordance with this change would not:

) (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accidlent previously evaluated because (a) interconnections between the new FMCRD and existing plant systems and equipment have been minimized and configured to include sufficient protection to assure that any potential electrical fault within the FMCRD and its supporting equipment will not propagate back into the rest of the plant equipment to which it  !

is directly or indirectly connected; (b) replacement of the LPCRD at a i peripheral core location with an FMCRD does not affect the fail-safe j feature of the reactor protection system; (c) even when postulating independent or concomitant misoperation of the FMCRD, results of the usually analyzed transient or accident events (and control rod related parameters such as shutdown margin and scram reactivity worth) would bound the reactivity effects fror; the postulated misoperation; and (d) the inserted FMCRD (by administrative control) will not be moved until reactor power is greater than 25 percent and a rod pattern has been established in order to free the FMCRD rod from the Rod Sequence Control Sequence (RSCS) logic and the Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) program as proposed by the new Technical Specification Exception 3/4.10.9 (RSCS and RWM restrictions apply only during 0 to 20 percent reactor power level for establishing a rod pattern).

(2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because (a) the worst case (i.e., bounding) accidents and the assumptions used in the analysis of these accidents remain unchanged; (b) the replaced FMCRD, which utilizes hydraulic equipment similar to the replaced LPCRDs and a small electric motor, does not introduce any significantly new design and does not pose a concern of a new accident; and (c) inadvertent withdrawal of the FMCRD during refueling will be prevented by disconnecting the power supply to the electric motor and a special administratiave controls will be in place for refueling bridge movement or control rod withdrawal.

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(3) Involve a reduction in a margin of safety because low reactivity worth location of the FMCRD assures that (a) the FMCRD rod would not likely reach prompt critical due to a rod withdrawal error and the produced peak fuel enthalpy would be well within those of the generic analyses and the licensing criterion of 170 cal /gm; (b) in case of an FMCRD rod drop accident postulated conservatively in the lower power region, a low peak fuel enthalpy (less than 100 cal /gm) would result, well under the licensing criterion of 280 cal /gm; (c) the associated minimum critical power ratio (MCPR) limit would not be approached because of a rod withdrawal error; and (d) the requirement of current Technical Specification for calculated shutdown margin (equal to or greater than 0.38% delta k/k) will be met throughout the cycle based on the design shutdown margin of 1.0% delta k/k assuming the FMCRD rod and the strongest worth rod are fully withdrawn at the limiting point in the cycle.

The commission has provided guidance and examples (51 FR 7744) of the types of amendments that are considered not likely to involve significant hazards consideration. Example (vi) relates to a change which may result in some increase in the probability or consequences of a previously-analysed accident or may reduce in some way a safety margin, but where the results of the change are clearly within all acceptable criteria with respect to the system or component specified in the Standard Review Plan.

In this case, the proposed change described herein is similar to example (iv) in that while this FMCRD is installed in the Unit 2 reactor it has been analysed as if it is inoperable and the installation has been reviewed by the commision and found to be acceptable.

Based on the preceding discussion, it is concluded that the proposed system change clearly falls within all acceptable criteria with respect to the system or component, the consequences of previously evaluated accidents will not be increased and the margin of safety will not be decreased. Therefore, based on the guidance provided in the Federal Register and the criteria established in 10 CFR 50.92(c), the proposed change does not constitute a significant hazards consideration.

2259K

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