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OCT 2 71977 m?5 g> ' "
MDIORANDUM FOR:
T. M. Novak, Chief, Reactor Systems Branch, DSS V. Beneroya, Chief, Auxiliary Systems Branch, DSS T. A. Ippolito, Chief, I & C Systems Branch, DSS l
F. Rosa, Chief, Power Systems Branch, DSS FRON:
R. J. Bosnak, Chief, Mechanical Engineering Besuch, DSS
SUBJECT:
SEISMIC RE-rvALUATION: DIABLO CANYON UNITS 1 & 2 In a aseso from J. P. Knight to R. Tedesco and D. Ross (April 22, 1977),
we requested your guidance and assistance in proving information concerning l
those systems and components necessary to accomplish " safe shutdown and contir M shutdown heat removal".
In seismic re-evaluation for the Hoegri earthquake, the appliaant has presented a scenario to bring the plant to hot standby and finally cold shutdown in Amendment 50 to the subject FSAR, and has concluded that the equipment required for safe shutdown and contineed heat removal are those presented in Tables 7-5, 7-7 and 10-1 in miclosure 1 and 2 (Table 10-1 contadas all the Class 1E equipment including those required for safe shutdown and continud heat removal). Unless we receive other N
comments from you Before November 18, 1977, we intend to establish our scheduled seismic audit program based on"these three tables. For your information, the P. G. & E tables are baeed on a seismic event and do not include a concurrent LOCA event.
Enclosed please find also, for your reference, two anclosures:
. (1) Enclosure 3 provides additional P. G. & E Seismic Design Class I equigeant not required for safe shutdown and continued heat e
- removal, (2)
(2) Enclosure 4 is a list of systems and equipment important to seismic resis,tance recently compiled by the MEB staff from a Japanese program.
We dernet intmed to select items from Enclosures 3 and 4 for the scheduled seismic audit unless we receive other comments from you.
/mo:- o
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R. J. Bosnak, Chief Mechanical Engineering Branch
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Division of Systems Safety cc: See next page.
8608250312 860301 PDR FOIA HOUGH 86-391 PDR
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.e OCT 2 71977 cc:
R. Mattson, SS F. Schroeder, SS J. Knight, SS D. Ross. SS R. Tedesco, SS J. Stokz, PM D. C. Lainas, SS D. Allison, PM H. L. Branneer, SS E. J. Sullivan, SS P. Y. Chan, SS DISTRIBUTION:
Central File NRR Reading File DSS:MEB Reading File M
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ENCLOSURE 1 h
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DIABLO CANYON UNITJ l
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Items of Table 7-5 in Amendment 50
~
(Summary - Seismic Qualification of Class I Equipment Required Following Hosgri Event).
1.
Aux. Feedwater Pump (Turbine-Driven) 2.
Aux. Feeduater Pump Turbine 3.
Diesel-Generators 4.
Diesel-Generator Starting Air Receivers 5.
Diesel-Generator Fuel-Oil Filter 6.
Diesel-Generator Fuel-Oil Priming Tank 7.
Diesel-Generator Fuel-Oil Strainer 8.
Diesel-Generator Fuel-Oil Transfer Pump 9.
Centrifugal Charging Pumps M
10.
Boric Acid Tanks 11.
Boric Acid Transfer Pumps 12.
Regenerative Heat Exchanger 13.
Seal Water Injection Filter 14.
Boric Acid Filter 15.
Residual Heat Removal Pumps 16.
Residual Heat Exchangers 17.
Component Cooling Water Pumps 18.
Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers 19.
Auxiliary Saltwater Pumps i
1 I
1
I f
l TABLE 7-7 I
SupemRY - SEISP!C QUALIFICATION ACTIVE VALVES FOR H05GRI SEISMIC EVENT i
VALVE QUAtlFICA1104 H05CRI EVALUAll0N A Yclerations Accelerations Freq.,
OL. e
- tt e QL/HE tocation Identification Function Mr M
V Method Results H
V H
V 4104 2Tn5dFN Boric Acid to Chg. Pump 0.95 0.47 8701 14GH445E2 RHR SuCtlon 26.3 6
4 (1)
Yoke most highly stressed X
5.24 3.75 1.15 1.07 area: 1405 of allowable 8702 149e485E2 RHR Suction 26.3 6
4 (1)
Yoke nest highly stressed X
18.0 4.85 0.33 0.87 area: 140s of allowable HCV-637 88AS40 RHR to Cold Leg 15 6
4 (1)
Estended structure over-OK 1.19 0.14 5.04 28.6 stressed:.170s of allowable Adequate for 3g h. 2g v HCV-638 88A540 RHR to Cold Leg 15 6
4 (1)
Entended structure over-OK 0.38 0.54 15.8 7.4' stressed: "1705 of allowable Adequate for 3g h, 3g,
HCV-670 88A540 RHR HI Bypass 15 6
4 (1)
Estended structure over.
OK 0.36 0.03 16.7 133 btressed: 170% of allowable Adequate for 39 h. 39 v
{
f FCV-641 A 2TH58FN RHE Pus @ ReCirC.
1.68 0.38 FCV-641 8 2iH58FN RHR Pump Recirc.
2.22 0.34 PCV-19 8AA36AG SG 101 Atmos. Relief 35.2 6
4 (1)
Yoke most highly stressed OK l.37 0.60 4.38 6.63 area: 861 of allowable PCV-20 8RA36RG SG 101 Atmos. Relief 35.2 6
4 (1)
Yoke most highly stressed OK 1.37 0.60 4.38 6.67 area: 36% of allowable PCV-21 8AA36RG SG 101 Atmos. Rettef 35.2 6
4 (1)
Yoke es,st highly stressed OK ~
2.59 0.70 2.31 5.7!
area: 861 of allowable PCV-22 8AA36AG SG 101 Atmos. Relief 35.2 6
4 (1)
Yoke most highly stressed OK 2.59 0.70 2.31 5.71 area: 865 of allowable I
8010 A 6Rv5tsM58 Press. Safety 216 6
4 (1)
Ham. stress in valve OK 3.43 0.10 1.75 40.0 bonnet: 331 of allowable 8010 8 6Rv5bH58 Press. Safety 216 6
4 (1)
Man. stress in valve OK 3.66 0.11 1.64 36.4 bonnet: 33% of allowable 5
l 6010 C 6Rv58H58 Press. Safety 216 6
4 (1)
Man. stress in valve OK 3.51 0.10 1.71 40.0 j
teor. net: 33% of allowable fr
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TABLE 10-1 4
SupenRY - SEISMIC QUALIFICATION GF CLASS IE INSTRUMENTATION AND ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT Qualification HosJri Evaluation Freq.
Accelerations Accelerations Equipment Hz Elev./81dg.
QL,(g)*
Method Remarks QL/HE H
V H __ V
,H V
1.
Annunciator (Main)
Rigid 128'/ Aux.
1.40 0.26 OK 1.41 0.74 1.00 0.35 2.
Auxiliary Safeguards 128'/ Aux.
1.35 1.00 (1,3)
Tested at resonance OK 1.26-0.69 1.07 1.45 Cabinet 3.
Battery Chargers 115'/ Aux.
1.1 0.30 (1)
Tested at resonance OK 1.12 0.56 1.0 0.54 4.
Station Battery 115'/ Aux.
2.0 1.33 (2)
Tested at resonance OK 1.14 0.56 1.75 2.4 Battery Racks Rigid 115'/ Aux.
3.0 0.65 OK 1.14 0.56 2.65 1.16 5.
DC Motor Control Center 115'/ Aux.
2.3 1.67 (2)
Analysis supple-OK 1.14 0.56 2.0 3.0 DC Switchgear 115'/ Aux.
mented by extrapola-tion from tests of similar equipment 6.
Diesel Generators 85'/Turb.
- later -
0.54 0.50
- later -
7.
Electrical Penetrations Rigid
-130'/ Cont.
10.5 7.0 (4)
OK 2.0 1.5 5.25 4.67 l
8.
Fire Pump Controller Rigid 115'/ Aux.
1.20 0.36 (1)
OK 1.02 0.56 1.18 0.64 9.
Hot Shutdown Panel Rigid 100'/ Aux.
1.90 0.40 (5)
OK 0.97 0.53
- 1. %
0.76 i
- 10. Static Inverter 115'/ Aux.
1.35 0.90 Tested at resonance OK 1.15 0.56 1 17 1
- 11. Instrument AC Panel Rigid 115'/ Aux.
1.41 0.27 (5)
OK 1.13 0.56 1.25 0.48 i
- 12. Instrument Panels 22 128'/ Aux.
2.0 0.72 (5)
OK 1.44 0.69 1.4 1.05 PIA, 8&C
- 13. Local Instrument Panels Various later
- 14. Local Starters Various 2.2 (1)
OK 1.14 0.56 1.93 l
- 15. Main Control Board Rigid 140'/ Aux.
2.0 1.0 (1,5)
OK 1.55 0.81 1.3 1.24 i
- QL denotes maximum acceleration of test table or other input.
+
TABLE 10-1 (continued)
SUMMARY
- SF l5MIC QUALIFICAliO4 0F CLASS IE INSTRUMENTATION AND ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT
_- _ ually.c,at,i.on,,,,,._ _,.
Hosgri Evaluation Q
Freq.
Accelerations Accelerations
~'
Equipment Hz Elev./ Bldg.
QL,(g)
Method Remarks HE,(G)
QL/HE H
V H
V H
V
- 16. Nuclear Instrumentation 140'/ Aux.
1.70 1.13 (1,2)
Tested at resonance OK 1.44 0.81 1.18 1.4 System
- 17. P & AP Transmitters 122'/ Cont.
2.0 1.33 OK 1.92 1.10 1.04 1.21
- 18. Pressure Transmitters Various 18 18 OK
>1.0
>1.0 (Barton)
- 19. Process Control 8 128'/ Aux.
1.90 1.13 (1,2)
Tested at resonance OK 1.35 0.69 1.45 1.64 Protection Equipment
- 20. Reactor Trip Switchgear 115'/ Aux.
1.28 0.86 (1)
Tested at resonance OK 1.04 0.56 1.23 1.54
- 21. Safeguards Relay Bd.
119'/Turb.
1.55 0.45 (1,2)
- later
- 22. Solid State 140*/ Aux.
1.35 G.90 (1,2)
Tested at resonance X
1.60 0.81 0.84 1.11 Protection System
- 23. Ventilation Control.
Rigid 140'/ Aux.
1.70 0.35 (1) r 1.42 0.81 1.20 0.43 Logic
- 24. Ventilation Control.
Rigid 128'/ Aux.
1.44 0.36 (1)
X 1.30 0.69 1.11 0.52 Relay
- 25. Vital Load Centers 100'/ Aux.
0.95 0.64 (1,2)
Tested at resonance OK 0.95 0.53 1.0 1.23
- 26. Vital Switchgear 119'/Turb.
- :ater ---
(3)
la ter
- 27. Resistance Temp.
Rigid 107'/ Cont.
200 (1)
OK
-- l a ter -
>1.0
>I O Detectors
- 28. Safeguards Test 140'/ Aux.
2.0 1.33 (4)
OK 1.60 0.62 1.25 7.'S Cabinet
- 29. Cable Trays
- later -
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Tcblo 7-6
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Pcgs 1 cf 3 DIABLO CA,,NYON UNITS,_l, p,2 Items of Tabl e 7-6 in Amendment 50 (Summary - Seismic Qualification of Additional Class I Equipment Not Required Following Hosgri Event).
1.
Positive Displacement Charging Pump 2.
Safety Injection Pump 3.
Containment Spray Pump 4.
Gas Stripper Pump 5.
Holdup Tank Recirculation Pump 6.
Excess Letdown Heat-Exchanger 7.
Seal Water Heat-Exchanger 8.
SIS Accumulator Tank 9.
Boron Injection Tank 10.
Spray Additive Tank
'"""""U 11.
Cation Bed Deminarilizer 12.
Deborat'ing Demineralizer 13.
Concentrates Filter 14.
Ion Exchange Filter 15.
Seal Water Return 16.
Letdown Heat-Exchanger 17.
Volume Control Tank 18.
Mixed Bed Demineralizer 19.
Reactor Coolant Filter 20.
RCS Inst.. Conduit and Couplings 21.
RCS Seal Table and Parts 22.
RCS Flux Thimble and Tubing
- ~_,__
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r P:gs 2 cf 3 DIABLO CANYON UNITS 1 & 2_
Table 7-6 (Continued) 23.
Full Length Rod Control Cluster Assembly 24.
Part Length Rod Control Cluster Assembly 25.
Fuel Transfer Tube 26.
Evaporator Feed Ion Exchanger Demineralizer 28.
RCP Seal Bypass Orifice 29.
RCP Seal Standpipe Orifice 30.
Boric Acid Blender 31.
Boric Acid Evaporator and Gas Stripper Package 32.
Safety Injection Pump Bypass Orifice 33.
Sample Heat Exchanger 34.
Spray Eductor 35.
Containment Spray Nozzle 36..
Reactor Vessel Head Lifting Device
- 37. Waste Concentrate Hold-Up Tank 38.
Spent Resin Storage Tank 39.
Waste Concentrator 40.
Waste Gas Compressors 41.
Waste Gas Decay Tank 42.
Rodwaste Filters 43.
Containment Hydrogen Purge Filters 44.
Containw.ent Hydrogen Purge Blowers 45.
Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (Motor-Driven) 46.
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Motors 47.
Liquid Hold Up Tanks (To be tested in Place) c.
48.
Component Cooling Water Surge Tank
(
T:blo 7-6 Pcg2 3 cf 3 DIABLO CANYON UNITS 1 & 2 Taole 7-5. (Coa *inuad) 49.
Make Up Water Transfer Pump 50.
Fire Pump 51.
CO St rage Tank 2
- 52. Miscellaneous Equipment Drain Pump 53.
Reactor Coolant Drain Pump bulhha t
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l TABLE 7-8
[
SUMMARY
- SEISMIC QUALIFICATION ADDITIONAL VALVES ANALYZED FOR HOSGRI SEISMIC EVENT I
I VALVE QUALIFICATI0h HOSGRI EVALUATIL Accelerations Accelerations Freq..
OL. g HE. o QL/HE Location toentification Function Hz H
V Method Results H
V H
V LCV-459 3!A58RGP Letdown Line Isolation 37.s 6
4 (1)
Yoke most highly stressed OK 0.56 0.aa 10.7 9.09 area: 86% of allowable LCV-460 3IA58RGP Letdown Line Isolation 1.51 0.46 8149 A 21A58RG Letdown Line Orfflee 39.8 6
4 (1)
Yoke most highly stressed OK 3.13 0.01 1.92 57.1 area: A61 of allowable 8149 8 2iA58RG Letdown Line Orifice 39.8 6
4 (1)
Yoke most highly stressed OK 3.13 0.67 1.92 57.1 area: 86% of allowable 8149 C 21A58RG Letdown Line Orifice 39.8 6
4 (1)
Yoke most highly stressed OK 2.97 0.07 2.02 57.1 i
area: 86% of allowable 8152 2IA56RG Letdown Line 1.26 0.f i PCV-455C 3IA58RGP Press. Power Relief 39.8 6
4 (1)
Yoke most highly stressed
^'
j area: 86% of allowable PCV-456 31A58RGP Press. Power Relief 39.8 6
4 (1)
Yoke most hl h1 stressed 86%ofaflowable area:
PCV-474 31A58RGP Press. Power Relief 39.8 6
4 (1)
Yoke most highly stressed area: 861 of allowable l
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NOTES FOR TABLES 7-5, 7-6, 7-7 & 7-8 n
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(1) Equivalent static load method.
(2) Response spectra modal superposition.
(3) Test.
l (4) Detailed comparison to comparable component qualified by analysis.
(5) Detailed comparison to comparable component qualified by test.
(6) Analysis.
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ENCLOSURE 4 fbrA-% -39/
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PWR Systems and Components Important to Seismic Resi.tu..e Compiled by Pei-Ying Chen, U.S. NRC From a Japanese Program Functional Classification I.
Reactor and Reactor Internals A
1.
Control Rod Drive Mechanism N
2.
Fuel Assemblies N
3.
Reactor Internals II.
Primary Coolant System N
1.
2.
3.
Primary Coolant Pump N
4.
Pressurizer N
b 5.
Primary Pipings III. Chemical and Volume Control System A
1 Charging Pump A
2.
Charging /High Pressure Injection Pump N
3 Regenerative Heat Exchanger N
4.
Boric Acid Tank A
5.
Boric Acid Transfer Pump N
6.
Boric Acid Filter IV.
Residual Heat Removal System A
1.
RHR Pump N
2.
RHR Heat Exchanger I
o
- V.
Safety Injedtion System 1.
Safety Injection Accumulator Tank N
2.
High Pressure Safety Injection Pump A
3.
Boron Injection Tank N
4.
Refueling Water Storage Tank N
VI.
Containment Spray System 1.
Containment Spray Pump A
2.
Containment Spray Heat Exchanger N
3.
Spray Additive Tank N
VII. Component Cooiing Water System 1.
CCW Heat Exchanger N
A 2.
CCW Pump 3.
CCW Surge Tank N
N VIII. Saltwater System 1.
Saltwater Pump A
IX.
Compressed Air System A
1.
Air Compressor 2.
Air Reservoir N
N 3.
Air Dryer X.
Spent Fuel Storage System N
1.
Spent Fuel Pool Duct 2.
Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger N
A 3.
Spent Fuel Pool Pump XI.
Auxiliary Feedwater System
+
t 1.
Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump A
2.
Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump A
3.
Condensate Storage Tank N
XII. Ventilation System Annulus Circulation Air Conditioning Equipment 1.
Filter Unit N
2.
Circulation Fan A
Central Control Room Air Conditioning Equipment 1.
Air Conditioning Unit N
2.
Air Conditioning Fan A
3.
Circulation Fan A
4.
Emergency Filter Unit N
5 Emergency Circulation Fan A
N XIII.
Electricai Instrumentation and Control System 1.
2.
Batteries N
3.
Switchgears A
4.
Control Centers A
5.
Various Panels and Instruments A
39/
Y-93