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{{#Wiki_filter:.. March 16, 1987 NOTE TO: Files FROM: Rajender Auluck, Project Manager BWR Project Directorate #1 Division of BWR Licensing
SUBJECT:
ISI PLAN FOR THE 1986 REFUELING OllTAGE AT PILGRitt NUCLEAR POWER STATION (TAC 63002) By letter dated September 25,1986(Accession No. 86100200E0) Boston Edison Cortpany (BECo) submitted the Inservice Inspection (ISI) Plan for the 1986 refueling cutage. This plan included all items that were postponed from the 1983/1984 outage. i In e.ddition to the items listed in the ISI plan, BEco will conduct the remaining hydrostatic tests to complete the requirements for the first 10-year inspection i intervel. The following augmented inspections will also be conducted: l l Visual examination of the core spray spargers 4 -l Ultrasonic inspection of the shroud head bolts t Visual examiration of the SRM and IPP dry tubes t ). Intergranular stress corrosion cracking examinationt for NRC Generic Letter 84-11. The staff (R. Auluck and B. Turovlin) has reviewed the September 25, 1986 submittal and has concluded the outege inspection procram is in accordance l with the approved ISI Program at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station and thus j a separate review of this portion of the plan is not needed. This cerpletes i the action on TAC 63002. 4 ) Original signed by j Rajender Auluck, Project Manager j BWR Project Directorate il i Division of BWP Licensing DISTRIBUTION Docket File l BWD1 Reading CJamerson 1 I J Mulock l i JZwolinski l RDiggs l ^ DBL:BWD1.' OBL:BWD1 M CJame rson,'. RAuluck:jg 3/~ /87 3/.d87 m u 'r JM
e April 29,1997 MEMORANCUM FOR: Richard W. Krir.* Assistant Associate Direc'.or Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs Federal Emergency Management Agency FROM: Frank J. Cor. gel. Director Division of Radiation Protection i and Emergency Preparedness Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
OFFSITE EMERGENCY PLANNING AT P!LGRIM, The enclosed letter from Congressman Gerry E. Studds of Massachusetts provides a report by the Town of Plymouth Coimittee on Nuclear Matters concern-a ing the emergency response plan for the Pilgrim nuclear power plant. Since FEMA has the lead responsibility for the evaluation of offsite plans and as the report addresses issues of offsite preparedness. I am transmitting Congressman Studds' let'er and the report to you in connection with your orgoing review of offsite emergency preparedness issues at Pilgrim as described in your memo. randum of March 31, 1987 regarding the Pilgrim 2.206 petition. A copy of the report was previously provided to your staff. ) l 3 Oristant signeo ty i Frank J. Corgel. Director Division of P diation Protection 4 and Emergency Preparedness l Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation d
Enclosure:
Ltr. from Congressman Gerry E. Studds dtd. 4/7/87 CONTACT: C. Rictiard Van Niel. NRR 492 4535 Distribution: FJCongel, MRR 'CBAstthews. NRR <CRYan Niel. NRR ' FKantor. NRR GESimonds. NRR RJ8arrett. NRR i 1.JCunnir.gham NRR (RHWessmen. NRR . WJLazarus, RI WDPaton OGC DCS OR R/F 87-04 EPS R/F ,j DyhR C h NRR 0:0 REP:h CE/tr hiel:bt 0 thews FJConcel 04/g1/87 04 /87 04g/87 L. t, 1 w p,, v ( f W' M &) J/#4
e e .01A.RY L.STUDDS wog._,wg- . ~. - =3,r* Congregg of tfje Wnitch Stated py,, Rouge of Representatibed Ts,'g" -~ m....... "'* T T.'n" " NasSngton BC 20515 T,J.'aT.. c 1 April 7, 1987 e
Dear Chairman tech:
I am writing today to bring to your attention a report prepared by the Town of Plymouth Cor.mittee on Nuclear Matters on the emergency response plan for use in the event of a severe accident at the Pilgrim nuclear power station. I hope that this surmary of the plan a deficiencies and practical suggested i improvements will be helpful as the Commission considers the pending petition requesting tl.at the Cor. mission order the Boston toison Company to show cause why the Pilgric facility should not retain closed until the Company demonscrates that certain issues, including emergency response issues, have been resolved. I would also appreciate being inforced of the status of the corrission's consideration of this petition. Thank you for your attention to this matter. With kind regards. q .j i Since elyf,f/ Lando W. Zech,. Jr. Chairman United States Nuclear Re.ulatory Commission 1717 H Gtreet, NW Washington, DC 20555 Enclosure - f'
1 i TOWN OF PLYMOUTH COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR MATTER $ 1 I j i ) REPORT TO THE SELECTMEN J l 0N THE PLYMOUTH RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESP..3E PLAN i i i i, i ' o/ t-j r ... ~y%. s.. e \\. M - a.- g .% ~ t JF ?- u :.u ; 0..w 1 March. 1987
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e % 1 f f M l' TIE CONNITTEE ON NUCLEAR MATTERS MIMBI18 : J j Grace M. Beaty. Chair Charles W. Adey. Yice-Chair l Ana Vaitkus Arnold q Theodore L. Bosen j Marie F. Fehlow 1 Renneth T. Bolmes l Esthleen M. Leslie Anthony V.14aardo l John P. Rooney j Jones W. Ryan loward E. Shetterly 1 i I SUIC00tIITTtt MIMat18: j Aan Waitkus Arnold Renneth T. Belmes i s ) 1 4 \\ I, 4 i l 4 1 l 1 1 .yre g
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TOWN OF PLYNOUTH TEE RADIOLOGICAL ENERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN INTRODUCTION As one of its tasks, the Committee on Nuclear Matters assumed respon-sibility for a review of the Plymouth Radiological Issergency Response Plan (RIRF). The following is t t'e result of research ondertaken by the sub-consittee, and of the deliberations of the entire cognittee. In order to determine Plan adeguacy and f ea sibility, information was sought from many sources. Subcommittee members reviewed writteu wterials other Emergency Response Plans (ERP); Federal Emergency Maassement Agency (TEMA) Regulations; reports on the adequacy of variees RERF's; testimony of public intenst groups, and one available sectio 3 of Sec ret ary Barry's report. Subcommittee members also contacted, la person asd by telephone, representatives f rom: (1) Fecal. Regional and State Civil Defense Of fices. (2) FEMA. (3) various Tows Of fices; (4) State Of fice of Randicapped Af f airs; and (5) Moston Edison.
SUMMARY
CONCLUSIONS AND RECCHMENDATIONS There are deficiencies in the Plymouth RERP.
- Moreover, these deficiencies are serious enough, in the Coenit t ee's judgment, to preclude
"... reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken (by the Town and State) in the event of 6 Radiological Eme rgency.' There is reason to believe that as things stand now, the Selectmen cannot fulfill their legal responsibility, partic,ala rly during a Radiological Emergency. ".... to provide for the health and safety of persons ard their property...." The Plymouth 1E17 is a "paper" plan, essentially untested relative to mobilisation of some of the essential personnel. As long as it is untested, difficult questions can remain unanswered and difficult d ecision s can be ave'ded. This is a situation unacceptable to the members of the committee. Thus, we respectfully urge Selectmen to assign tasks and t imeline s to appropriate personnel and/or offices to ensure accomplishment of the follow.at A. Comprehensive revision of the Plymouth 1187. 1. Correction of outdated information. 2. Elialaaties of specific deficiencies seted below. 3. Complete specification of implenestaties procedures. 4. Specification of procedures for ongoing updating and coordination with local, area, and state pisas. S. Appointment of a full-time Civil Defense Director, with staff as na ed ed, with adeguese lateria headguarters, and with less-tern plans for location in one of the new Town buildings. C. Developsect of funds for energency preparedsens from f ederal, state and utility sources. (Appointment of liaison for same.)
i D. Full Town participation in a comprehensive drill prior to Pilgria's coming back on-line. (While actual citizen evacustica may not be feasible, full participation must at least include A).L responsible personnel being h place.nd carrying out assigned tasks.) Coordination of agencies, their services and lines of responsibility - local, state, federal levels must be tested. The Committee further recommends that all deficiencies be remedied and all recommendations be implemented prior to reactor start-up. There was one dissenting opinica espressed concerning the above. The objection relates to making total task accomplishment a condities for reactor start-up when longer time may be reguired for some tasks. The diesentias opinion does not represent disagreement on deficiencies *er recommendations. but on timelines. la all cases there is agree Jat sa need and urgency for action. SPECIFIC DEFICIDCIES AND REC 040END&T!0Ns Following are specific deficiencies found by the Coenittee on Nuclear Matters and some recommended corrective measures; they have been grouped in eight categories: (A) Advance Information, (3) Notification and Communication Systess. (C) Evacuation Routes (D) tvecuation Time Estimates, (E) Transport of Dependent Populations, (P) Reception Centers and Public Shelters, (C) Medical facilities, and (E) Radioprotective Drugs. A. ADVANCE INFORMATION DT.FICI DCIES: 1. Inadeguate public information la Baergency Preparedness ' tone (172). 1. Lack of mult i-lingual information (Italias, Portusvese,
- Spanish, Japanese).
3. Inadeguate distributics of Emergency Preparedness !aformation (EPI) brochures. A. No information for people without access to trans'pertaties. 5. No information about stagias areas (pick-up potate). 6. tourist and transient information inadeguate er mes-existent. 7. No educational ef fort outside the Town of Plymouth. 2
MVANCE INT 0tNATIOj! (Continued) RECOMMLNDAT10ll5: 1. Implement a comprehensive, ongoing public educations) pregram through news ads, cable TV programs, radio public senice snoouncesents, and informational packets included in utility bills. teclude an outreach progran for non-English speaking people 4 these activities. 2. Develop emergency inf ormat ion pos t ars (multi-11egual), with maps explaining 3 - Protective Actions - location cd 12blic Transportation - tvecuation Routes - Locs1 Radio 8 talion of E55 - location of Public Shelters - Staging Ares locations 3. Post Energency Information Posters ig public locational Rotels, notels restauraats, gas stations, phone booths, recreation a facilities, tourist sites. Informational centers, theaters, a irpo rt s. a bs
- stations, trolley cars, and all publie. buildings.
4. Develop susvey to identify special populationst s. Non-English speaking people. b. Transport dependent groupet - 15% of Plymouth households hcve no cart - 50% of households have one car, but one half of workers have jobs outside of Plymouth, c. Specist needs people - Federal regulations require notificatica of "all sessents of society." - Deaf and hard-of-hearing people must be identified beforehand so they can be alerted by appropriate means. 5. Distribute updated pamphlets semi-annually tot i - General public and all reccamended locations is #3 above. - hiti-11agual pamphlets should be available la the same places. J ( 3 j
i 1 3. NOTIFICATION AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS DEFICIENCIES: 1. Siren Systes a. The siren systes is not equipped to confirm that gjj, sirens have been sounded during an exercise. There are no provisions for determining which sirens are not working. I b. Present siren systes does not vara hearing-impaired persons. No alternate plan exists to notify this seguest of the population. 2. Radio Coussunications I l a. Department of Public Works radio eguipment used for Civil Defense is unreliable and inadeguate. b. Present *ystem for notifyina local officials is unreliable. l c. Plymouth County radio network (Sheriff's) is inadequate / inef ficient. 1ECOMMENDATIONS: ALL PROCEDURES FOR NOTIFICATION OF AN ACCIDENT AT PI!411M 1 5100LD BE REVIEVED. 1. Investigste the "hard-wire" systes or other alternatives that confiru siren activation. Alert of ficials who will dispatch personnel to arena j l with def ective sirens to activate sirens manually and to warn public free vehicles and loudspeakers. 2. Develop proc edur e t to confirm activation of every siren. Specify numbers of vehicles and personnel required for il above. 3. Test airens weekly on the same day and at the same time. 4 Identify hearing impaired people and install telttoamannication devices. 5. frovide closed captionina for the amergency 3roafcastjeg System. 6. Install tone alert radios ia every school bus, transport vehicle, and other vehicle specially licensed to transport childres, the elderly, and 1 handicapped persons in the knergency Preparedness tone. 7. Usarade Plymouth County Radio network hardware. Test the hardware og a r6dular basis. l l r
I l 1 C. IVACUAf t0N ROUTES - 1,IMITED_ ACCES$ AND ECRESS DEFICIENCIES : l i 1. Proposed routes (Routes 3 and 44) are completely inade quat e for of fective handling of anticipated volume of traffic. Traffic is already janused due to the heavy volume of tourists in the summer months, and i I during heavy winter storms. or when roads are under construction or repair. 2. Voluntary evacuation (Evacuation Shadee Thesoneson) is not tsken into I account. RICOMMENDAT10NS The following are not remediall they simply address worsening of the probles. 1. New development along evacuation routes should require an impact studv by developers with specifications set by appropriate Tows Of fices. The study should be reviewed by the Flanning Consittee. l 2. Prior to approval of road cc,astruction/ repair (along evacuation routes) l the appropriate Town of fice must make an impact assessment and develop i altenative routes. D. EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES i DEFICIENCIES : 1. Present time estimates are based on outdated information and have major flaws. 2. Evacuation Time Istimates (ETE) is ba sed es seversi questionable assumptions: a. It assumes there will be ao mass voluntary evassation set la planned boundaries (shadow *phenomeson) as occurred at Three Mile Isisad, which could cause major route blockage and back-ups. b. It assumes that emergency personnel will tensis is place and not evacuate with their families, c. It assumas that commsualties outside the Tes Elle EFE beve developed adeguate plans to augment evacuation and sheltering efforts, although Massachusetts Civil Defene: Agency (MCDA) states ao such plan exists. d. It assuses the timely presence of State Police and National Cuard. 3. 1.a rge discrepancies exist between Boston Edison and the nuclear Regulatory Ccamission (NRC) ETI's. 5 l l
s j JYA,,$UATION TIME ESTIMATES (Continued) 4 Panic and traffic disorder have not been adequately considered a. Blocking of cross streets b. Disregard of traffic sigasta c. Driving in lef t hand laae d. Abandoned vehicles i e. Driver confusion f. Failure of traffic control g. Accidents These considerations plus inef f ective traf fic, cont rol could result la more than a 50% reduction in traffic flow, which would mean the evacuation time could be acre than doubled. 5. No edeguate estimates for time required to evacua t e non-car-ownias people dependent on public transport. 6. Estimates of the aumbar of vehicles at public teaches is inadeguate. 7. Eatinates required by federal regulations are tecking. a. Separate times for adverse weather - fog, raia, flooding, snow,
- storna, i
b. Day versus night, workday versus weekend, peak transiest versus 1 aca-peak transient, and evacu6 tion versus aca-evacuation it l adjacent sectors. i c. Separate estimates for "special population groups" on as "institution by institution" basis (e.g., schools, hospitals, nursing homes, correctional f acilities). t RECOMMENDATIONS: 1. The nov lotton Edison Company (BECo) ITI's must t be based on realistic assumptions. a. b. include all specific time estimates required by FINA, d take into account mass voluntary evacuation conseguences, c. i d. address previously stated shortcomings. 2. T' e sev ETE must be complete'd prior to plant operation. 3. Documentation should be provided by 5tco to assure the BTE*s provide a t workable means to evacaste All residents of the IFE based on a wide range of accident scenarios. ] l 6 k 1 i [
E. PIANS TO TRANSPORT DEPENDENT F0PULATION (People without access to cars, school children and children in day care, ho s pit al and nursing home residents, handicapped persons, campers, persor;s in correctional inststutions.) DEJICIENCIES: 1. Numbers of vehicles needed and sources for then have not been analysed. 2. No contracts or letters of agreement have been signed with MBTA, bus companies, drivers, ambulance companies, and other entities providing public transportation and personnel support for the. plan. 3. There are no particular plans for evacuating handicapped people. This sessent of the population has not even been identified. 4 plans call for individuals to make arrant-ments with local CD for transportation. 14 cal CD will then contact MCDA Area !! for assistance; however, the Ares !! Plan does not contain leformation on how to procure additional transportation. 5. ' Schools - There are no separate pleas or procedores for each school and day care center. Sus companies and drivers have act signed agreesents to perform during an evacuation. The school plan lacks detailed pro-cedures. Estimated time to mobillae National Guard for schools is three hours, and Guardsmen may not be feuiliar with road network. P ECOMKD"DATIONS : 1. Conduct a turvey to determine transportation needs of all people dependent on public transportation in all s er. tar s of ZFZ. Provide specific and separate information for summer /non-summer, weekday / weekend populations. 2. Docuneat available resources and resourte asede, such as tressportation centractors, t roised persossel, drivers t r ained in seergency rosyonse procedules, special care personnel and equipment for disabled perseas. 3. Obtain written agreements with traceportation contractors and drivers. 4 Develop specific, adeguate pleas to evacuate each dependent group, such as the populaties la nursing homes, hospitals,
- schools, c amp s,
residential hoses, correctional institutions, day care centers. 5. Provide for special need s population physically and mentally handicapped peoples a. Provide actification in adysace of special evacustica procedures for disabled people; b. Plan for delivery of necessary services durias se emergency with trained assistance for each handicapped persos desigested beforehand; c. Provide beepers, backup personnel for vacatica t ime s, special equipment and medications. I 7 i i
r h T. IfCEPTION CENTE85 AND SHtt.Ttt$ Bridgewater State College and Taunton State Hospital) DETICIENCIES: 1. There are no clearly defined functions for the reception centers and shelters. 2. There are so letters of agreroent, or contracts with reception centers. (Who provides what and who payst) 3. There are no adeguate plans, equipment, supplies or personnel to implement purposes for reception c.aters. (Such as contamination nositering, decontamination, congregate care,...) 4. Public shelter locations are act identified. 5. Adeguate plass for public shelters are aca-ex is t en t (personnel, supplies,etc.) 6. Resettlement and/or reentry plans have not been formulated. 7. The option of sheltering in private hoses versus ev acuat ion is act addressed. RECOMMENDATIONS: 1. Define specific and separate functions for public sheltern and receptica centers. 1 2. Specify conditions for which sheltering in private homes might be preferable to evacuation. 3. Condact servey of potential shelters adeguate to accommodate pesh, summer populations. 4. Identify and contract for at edeguate number of recepties centers and public shelters to accoesedate EFE population. S. Provide adeguate pleas for equipeest, supplies and personnel for centers and shelters. ) i 8
i 6 l I C. MEDICAL FACILITIES DEFICIENCIES : 1. There are inadequate plans for treating large numbers of victims of { i radiation orposure. 2. The two hospitals listed in the Plan (Jordan and St. Luke's) can treat only a limited ausber of people with cadioactive contamination. 3. One hospital is withis the UZ and could be simultaneously receiving and evacuating patients. i EZCOMKINDATIONS: 1. Clearly deterwise response capacity of, Jordan and St. Luke's Rospitals. I l 2. Identify all possible referral hospitals outside DZ. 3. Document capacity, types of care and provisions available at referral l l hospitals outside D Z. 4. Obtain signed agreements with referral hospitals. i 5. Develop proceduras for transportation of patients outside the UE. l E. AgipfjoTICTIVE DRUGS PR18ENT POLICT: The Massachusetts Department of Public Bealth does not advise distribu-tion to the general public of Potassium todide (K!) as a radioprotective d rug. U CC
- DDATION:
That the Departseat of Public Bealth provide for the distribution of Fotassius Iodide er a proves alt'ernative to the gaaeral Plymouth population prior to reacter start-up. In conclusies', the Coenittee notes, esce ag e ls, t ha t the deficiencies identified herois and the receemendations made relative to the Plymouth ut? are by se seems exhaustive er all-Lactusive. These !!sted are, howeve r. l serious enough that were they not to be addressed, the selectmen might he l unable to "... Provide for the health and safety of persons sad their property..." during a radiological energency. Reace, tl.e Committee respect-fully urges the Selectmen to give inanediate attenties to the matters con-tained is this report. Ives af ter the current revision of the 11U and the tuplementation of recommendations, regular maaltoring by the Town will be needed so that improvements in the plan say be made as they become necessary. 9
i hPR091gl1 0 Occket No. 50-293 Mr. James M. Lydon Chief Optrating Officer Boston Edison Company 800 Bey 1ston Street Boston, Massachusetts 02199 Dear Mr. Lydon
SUBJECT:
ADDITION OF FUEL TYPE BPSCPP300 (TAC 63043) Re: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station The Ccccission has issued the enclosed Arnendment No.100 to Facility Operating Licente No. OPR-35 for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. Tnis I arendment is in response to your application dated October 2,1986. The acendment revises the Technical Specifications by adding Figure 3.11-7 to provide the maxinum average planar linear hat generation rate (MAPLHGR) versus planar average exposure curves for fuel type BP80RS300. This will allow the licensee to use fuel type BP80RB300 in addition to the fuel types currently reflected in curves in Figure 3.11-6 through 3.11-6. A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be Mcluded in the Comission's btweekly Federal Daaister notices. Sincerely,, 0u./ Pajender Auluck, Project Manager l BWR Project Directorate il 01 vision of BWR Licensing Enclesures: 1. ArendMnt No.100 to License No. OPR 35 l 2. Safety Evaluation I cc */ enclosures: ,s 1 See next page M, q,l; i O!5TRIBUT!_0N i Docket File CJamerson BGrimes OPA Pilgrir, File l ';RC PDR RAuluck TBarnhart (4) R0igos UCheb Local PCR CGC BETH Jores EButchee l SWD1 Peeding LJHarren DVassallo NThompson l RBe rne ro ELJordan ACRS (10) JPartlow 1 3 DSL:BWD1* DE Ad1 OGC-BETF DBL:BWD1'2 4/a/86 (/ pg , hl,f cJa erso iuck:pn 47y/87(g !4/1/87 4/# /87 TN8
Poston Edison Company Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station CC. Pr. Alfred E. Pedersen, Station Manager Mr. lames M. t.ydon Boston Edison Company Chief Operating Officer t RFD #1. Rocky Hill Road Besten Edison Company Pip outh, Massachusetts 02360 800 Boylston Street L Bostnn, Massachusetts 0?l99 Resident inspector's Office U. 5. Nuclear Regulatory Cossnission Post Office Bos P67 i P1 p uth, Massachusetts 0?MO Chairman. Board of Selectmen 11 Lincoln Street i P1,m uth, Massachusetts 02360 l Office of the Comissioner Massachusetts Department of Environmental Ouality Engineering i One Winter Street Boston, Massachusetts 02108 l Office of the Attorney General l Ashburton Place [ 19th F'oor i Boston, Massachusetts 02108 l l Fr. Robert F. Hallisey, Director Padiation Control Program Passachuf etts Departrent of Public Health 150 Treront Street. ?nd Floor Besten Massachusetts 0?111 I Regional Administrater, Region ! U. 5. Nuclear Regulatory Ctesission 6.11 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 Mr. Jar.es D. Keyes Poston Edison Coepany 25 Braintree Hill Office Part Freintree. Massachusett'. 02184 I n, _g- -->n,--. _,y,en-,---,_n--,, , - -_,,_,,m,.-m, -n-,-, , ep -,,, -., -
t ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.100 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-35 DOCKET NO. 50-293 Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages ideatified below and inserting the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change. REMOVE INSERT 205A 205A 205F 205F
yf 'o, UNITED STATES y v.c g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3* ' ' E W ASHING TON, D. C. 20555 a., / %,..... / BOSTON EDISON COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50 293 PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 100 License No. OPR-35 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that: A. The application for amendment by Boston Edison Company (the liceasee) dated October 2, 1986, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will o;, rate in confomity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and,he rules and regulations of the Comission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (11) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Fart 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied. l 2. Accordingly, the license is amuded by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No. DPR-35 is hereby amended to read as follows: e
2-B. Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.100, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordhnce with the Technical Specifications. 3. This license amendment is effective 30 days after the date of issuance. FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 0-{G d e Mb t Rajender Auluck, Project Manager BWR Project Directorate #1 Division of BWR Licensing
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: APR 9 1337 4 ll
LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.11 REACTOR FUEL ASSEMBLY 4.11 REACTOR FUEL ASSEMBLY Applicability: Applicability The Limiting Conditions for Operation associated with fuel The surveillance requirements rods apply to those parameters apply to the parameters which which monitor the fuel rod the fuel rod operating operating conditions. conditions. 0,bj ec tive : Objective: The Objective of the Limiting Conditions for Operation is to The Objective of the assure the performance of the Surveillance Requirements is to fuel rods, specify the type and frequency of surveillance to be applied to the fuel rods. Specifications: ~ Specifications A. Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate 'APLHGR) A. Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate (APLHGR) During power operation with both recirculation pumps operating, The APLHGR for each type of the APLHGR for each type of fuel fuel as a function of average as a function of average planar planar exposure shall be exposure shall not exceed the determined daily during reactor applicable limiting value shown caeration at 125% rated thermal in Figures 3.11-1 through power. 3.14-7. The top curves are applicable for core flow greater than or equal to 90% of rated core flow. When core flow is less than 90% of rated core flow, the lower curves shall be Ilmiting. If at any time curing 4 operation it is determined by normal surveillance that the limiting value for APLHGR is being exceeded, action shall be initiated within 15 minutes to restore or.e ntion te within the prescribed limits. If the APLHGR is not returned to within the prescribed limits within two (2) hours, the reactor shall be brSught to the Cold Shutdown condition within 36 hours. Surveillance and corresponding action shall continue until reactor operation is within the prescribed limits. Amendment No. 53,100 205A
?? i ~ MAPLHGR Versus O L Planar A verage Exposure .~ Fuel Type BP8DRB300 '. a o 13 g Maxirnum 12.3 -*- Core Flow >.- 90% rated i Average e 12,3 Planar 12.0 j' Linear Heat 12
- Core Flow < 90% rated Rate lit) 11.0 11 7 i 1,
,3 11 : 7
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3 o 10.9 10.5 l >J 10.8 10.9 10 3 1 10.4 ~ x 1 9.8 ]f g,y 1000 N 4 \\ o, I f 8.6 200 8 I . I O 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 40000 45000 Planar Average Exposure (MW d/l) Figure 3.11-7
,:.f"# UNITED STATES 2
- i Qe[y NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
1 j WASHING TON. D. C. 20555 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO.100 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. OPR-35 BOSTON EDISON COMPANY PILGRIM etVCLEAR POWEP STATION DOCKET NO. 50-293
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Cy letter dated October 2,1986 (Ref.1) from J. M. Lydon, Boston Edison company (BECo), to J. A. Zwolinski, NRC, BECo proposed to change the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) Unit 1 Technical Specifications to provide for the addition of a new fuel type (BP80RB300) for the Reload Cycle #7 operation. 2.0 EVALUATION The General Electric Company (GE) pressurized 8x8 retrofit barrier fuel (BP80RB300) has been previously staff-reviewed and approved based on the use of design methodologies described in the approved GE topical report NEDE-24011-P-A, "General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel (GESTAR II)" (Ref. 2). Therefore, we conclude that the design analysis of the fuel assembly is acceptable. The licensee has proposed that the MAPLHGR curve, based on plant specific LOCA and LHGP analyses using standard, approved methodologies for the fresh fuel bundles of BP80R9300, be added to the PNPS technical specifications (LCO 3.11 A and Figure 3.11-7) for the Reload Cycle #7, The staff finds that this change is acceptable and appropriate. The licensee submittal did not address the Cycle 7 reload design or the transient and accident analyses for Cycle 7 operation. Therefore, our evaluation is restricted to tne proposed technical specification change and does not imply staff review and approval of the Cycle 7 operation. 3.0 ENVIRONMENTAt CONSIDERATION l This amendment involves a change to a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the a'nounts, and no significant change in the types, of any ef fluents that may be released offsite and that there is ] i no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public connent on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the ()-,, . i m m cy n lV 'f I Wl v / 1
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- 2 eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement nor environmental asse nment need be prepared in connectinn with the issuance of this amendment.
4.0 CONCLUSION
The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance. that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the propused manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security nor to the health and safety of the public. 5.0 PfFERENCE3 1. Letter from J. M. Lydon, Boston Edison Company, to J. A. Zwolinski, NRC, dated October 2, 1985. 2. GESTAR II, General Electric Standard hpplication for Reactor Fuel. NEDE-24011-P-A-8-US Class III, April,1983, and its Proposed Amendment 13 (to Revision 6 to NEDE-24011-P-A) submitted September 24, 1985 and approved March 26, 1986. Principal Contributor: U. Cheh Dated: APR 9 1937 - - - - I
Y COUNCIL OF PARENT-TEACHER ASSOCIATIONS May 1, 1987 Mr. Samuel Chilk Secretary, NRC 1717 H Street NW Washington, D.C.
Dear Sir:
- s Legislative Aide for the Duxbury PTA Council, I have been instructed by our president, Becky Chin, to share our concerns with you regarding the safety of the 3,017 children attending the Duxbury Public Schools, in the esent of a serious nuclear accident at the Pilgrim I Nuclear Power Plant in Plymouth, MA.
As you are aware, Duxbury is within the 10 mile radius of the Plymouth Nuclear Power Plant. Before the Piirim Plant can be re-opened, we as parents and concerned citizens want to be assured of a concise and workable evacuation plan for our children, while they are under the supervision of the Duxbury Public School System. We feel that in the best interest of our children, we should be kept abreast of t.a future of the Plymouth Pilorim I Nucl.;- Dnwer Plant and the pans for the evacuation of our children, in the event of any unforeseen disaster at this plant. We want also tu voice our concerns in regards to the proposed legislation to reduce the 10 mile radius around Nuclear Power Plants to just 1 mile. We feel that is would be a mistake and an injustice to the citizens within the 10 mile radius of a Nuclear Power Plant to throw caution to the wind and ignore their safety. It is ludic"ous to deal with a difficult problem, such as the evacuation of people in the event of a nuclear accident, by simply changing the rules so as to skirt the problem. We hope that our legislators are more responsible than that. We further hope that the disaster at Chenobyl will serve as a learning experience, not as a sign of things to come. We wish to further state our hope that all levels of government and local citizen groups will work together to deve'op a real workable evacuation plan, no~ matter what the radius of the e' euation area. The evacuation plan written by the etate in 1982, while addressing some issues left others unanswered and still others not even considered. The Nuclear Energy Questions & Answers pamphlet put out by the Massachusetts Department of Public Health, states that "The Nuclear Regulatory Commission further requires that the plant's emergency plan be reviewed each year" and also states that "No operating license for anuclear power reactor will be issued unless a finding $s made by the NRC that the state of on site and off site emergency preparedness provides reasonable assurances that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological eme r gency'.' I am here to advise yot that in the 5 years since the evacuation plan was first submitted there has been no review of the plan, especially at 4/^ T/M
_/XBURY COUNCIL OF PARENT-TEACHER ASSOCIATIONS i the local level. The official state evacuatien plan has been filed each year untouched, despite the many changes which have taken place in the towr, which this evacuation plan effects. Changes which make the plan inoperable. The Duxbury School Depatment and the Duxbury ITA Council have both rejected there plans due to the inadequateness of the plan._ }'ith_a history like this you j can undersand our concern for the 'uture Q1 fair)f our children in the event of a Nuclear disaster at the Pilgrim I in nymouth, Maspachusetts. especially during the times our children are under the schools guidance. We sincerely hope that the re-opening of Pilgrim I in Plymouth, MA will be carefully reviewed and the the safety of the people and their children in the surrounding towns will be of the utmost concern. We also hope you will find adequate means to carry out the rules and regulations you so laboriously legislated. Should tne safety of the citizens within the 10 mile radius of Pilgrim I be in any way uncertain, we trust that nothing nor no one ould allow the re-opening of the Pilgrim I Nuclear Power Plant. Please keep us advised of the further developments concerning the evacuation plans for the towns surrounding Pilgrim I, the decision regarding the radius l for evacuation around Nuclear Power Plants and the re-opening of said Nuclear Power Plant. Very truly yours, Tca, CMa Beck) Chin Duxbury FTA Council President ,m Md h AtI G. R tt o Mary St. A. Kaufman Duxbury FTA Council Legislative Aidea 14 Cedar Street Duxbury, MA 02332 cc Sam Chilk, NRC Edward Thomas, FDiA Sen. Edward Kennedy Sen. John Kerry Sen William Golden Congressman Gerald Studds Governor Dukakis Robert Boulay, Dir. MA Civil Defense Charles Barry, Secretara; of Public Safety Carl O'Neill, Duxbury Civil Defense Selectmen's Office, Duxbury National FTA, President ad
/pa erog*o, UNITED STATES -"i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ), W A SHINGTON, D. C. 20555 s \\...../ Ms. Becky Chin, President Ms. Mary St. A, Kaufman, Legislative Aide Duxbury PTA Council 14 Cedar Street Ouxbury, Massachusetts 02332
Dear Ms. Chin and Ms. Kaufman:
This is in response to your letter to Samuel Chilk, Secretary of the Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC), expressing your concerns regarding emergency preparedness for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. Specifically, ycit referred to the adequacy of evacuation plans for Nhool children, the inadvisability of reducing the emergency planning zone (EPZ) from a 10-mile radius to 1 mile, outdated and unreviewed emergency plans for the Comonwealth of Massachusetts and local comunities, and your concern that the safety of the citizens be considered before the Pilgrim plant is permitted to restart. The date on your letter is May 1,1987, but was not received by the NRC until after the postmark date of September 10, 1987. As you may know, the NRC and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) are the two Federal agencies assigned to evaluate emergency preparedness at and around nuclear power plants. The NRC is responsible for assessing the adequacy of onsite emergency plans developed by the utility; FEMA is responsible for assessing the adequacy of ' Tfsite emergency planning and assisting State and local governments in the preparation of emergency response plans. In September 1986, FEMA began a self-initiated review of its previous finding of adequacy regarding offsite emergency planning for the Pilgrim )lant because of infor-mation received from local officials, the Commonwealti, and other interested parties. FEMA identified six treas of major concern during the course of its review, including the lack of evacuation plans for public and private schools and daycare centers. FEMA concluded that the plai.s and preparedness for the Comonwealth and local governments for Pilgrim were not adequate to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a serious nuclear accident at Pilgrim. Extensive efforts are now underway by the Comonwealth and the local govern-ments within the 10-mile EPZ, with the assistance of the Boston Edison Company, to improve the offsite emergency response programs. Thest efforts include revision of the emergency plans of the local governments, revision of the Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency Area II plan as well at the Comonwea',th's State-wide plan, the development of revised procedures, the developme','c and implementation of training programs for officials and emergeny personnel, and the upgrading of Emergency Operation Centers. In addition, Boston Edison is providing professional p1&nners to assist the local governments and the Ce monwealth in their efforts to improve the emergency preparedness program. Sou training has been conducted to date and training will be continued after the new training program has been developed.
Ms. Chin /Ms. Kauf.ian, With regard to reducing the size of the EPZ, the NRC staff is reassessing the emergency planning regulations; however, there is no proposal currently before the Commission to revise the Connission's rules on the size of the emergency planning zones for nuclear power plants. There was a request in an individual licensing proceeding involving the Seabrook nuclear power plant to reduce the size of the 10-mile emergency planning zone for Seabrook to approx-imately 1 mile. The request lacked technical merit and will not be consid-ered further by the Connission. After the plans are revised, the hRC and FEMA will assess the continued ade-quacy of emergency prepareanu s for Pilgrim through a system of onsite inspec-tions and the observation of exercises involving the participation of the local sovernments and the Comonwealth. These exercises are conducteo annually on site (usually witn the involvement of local governrents) and biennially off site with Connonwealth and local participation. The increased level of cooperation between the utility and the Connonwealth and local emergency response officials should provide for the emergency plans 6t Pilgrim being maintained in an acceptable manner. Additionally, the decision to restart the Pilgrim plant will involve consideration of the resolution of the FEMA-identified emergency planning issues. I assure you that the NRC will not pemit the restart of Pilgrim until all the issues raised during the facility's prolonged shutdown, particularly the safety of your children, have been resolved to the satisfaction La the NRC. Sincerely, Thomas E. Hurley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation .}}