|
---|
Category:TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
MONTHYEARML20217F9701999-10-14014 October 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Incorporating ARC for Axial Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking at Dented Tube Support Plate Intersections ML20217E4301999-10-12012 October 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Requirements for Containment Penetrations During Refueling Operations ML20211M7341999-08-30030 August 1999 Marked-up & Revised TS Pages,Providing Alternative to Requirement of Actually Measuring Response Times ML20211K1721999-08-30030 August 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Providing Clarification to Current TS Requirements for Containment Isolation Valves ML20209B7731999-06-30030 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Updating Requirmements for RCS Leakage Detection & RCS Operational Leakage Specifications to Be Consistent with NUREG-1431 ML20196F2211999-06-24024 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Pages for Amend to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,allowing Use of Fully Qualified & Tested Spare Inverter in Place of Any of Eight Required Inverters ML20196G4701999-06-24024 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Re Amends to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,revising TS to Be Consistent with Rev to ISTS Presently Submitted to NEI TSTF for Submittal as Rev to NUREG-1431 ML20196G7961999-06-22022 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Bases,Clarifying Proper Application of TS Requirements for Power Distribution Systems & Functions That Inverters Provide to Maintain Operability & Providing Updated Info on Cold Leg Injection Accumulators ML20195E9841999-06-0707 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Increasing Max Allowed Specific Activity of Primary Coolant from 0.35 Microcuries/Gram Dose Equivalent I-131 to 1.0 Microcuries/Gram Dose Equivalent I-131 for Plant Cycle 10 (U2C10) Core ML20206E1391999-04-29029 April 1999 Proposed Tech Spec Change 99-03, Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation Sys Versus Radiation Monitors. Changes Add LCOs 3.3.3.1 & 3.7.7 to Address Inoperability of Radiation Monitoring CREVS & NUREG-1431 Recommendations ML20206E1611999-04-29029 April 1999 Proposed Tech Spec Change 99-04, Auxiliary Suction Pressure Low Surveillance Frequency Rev. Change Deletes Surveillance ML20204H4081999-03-19019 March 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Relocating TS 3.8.3.1,3.8.3.2,3.8.3.3 & Associated Bases Associated with Electrical Equipment Protective Devices to Technical Requirements Manual ML20207D6011999-02-26026 February 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Relocating TS 3.7.6, Flood Protection Plan & Associated Bases from TS to Plant TRM ML20207D6331999-02-26026 February 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Providing for Consistency When Exiting Action Statements Associated with EDG Sets ML20206S0131999-01-15015 January 1999 Proposed Tech Specs 3.3.3.3, Seismic Instrumentation & Associated Bases,Relocated to Plant Technical Requirements Manual ML20199K6001999-01-15015 January 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Adding New Action Statement to 3.1.3.2 That Would Eliminate Need to Enter TS 3.0.3 Whenever Two or More Individual RPIs Per Bank May Be Inoperable,While Maintaining Appropriate Overall Level of Protection ML20195H6111998-11-16016 November 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Revising EDG SRs by Adding Note That Allows SR to Be Performed in Modes 1,2,3 or 4 If Associated Components Are Already OOS for Testing or Maint & Removing SR Verifying Certain Lockout Features Prevent EDG Starting ML20154H7251998-10-0808 October 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Supplementing Proposed TS Change 96-08,rev 1 to Add CRMP to Administrative Controls Section & Bases of TS ML20238F1091998-08-27027 August 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Providing for Insertion of Limited Number of Lead Test Assemblies,Beginning W/Unit 2 Operating Cycle 10 Core ML20238F3001998-08-27027 August 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Replacing 72 H AOT of TS 3.8.1.1,Action b,w/7 Day AOT Requirement for Inoperability of One EDG or One Train of EDGs ML20236G5961998-06-29029 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Typed Pages for TS Change 95-19, Section 6 - Administrative Controls Deletions ML20249C6371998-06-26026 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Lowering Specific Activity of Primary Coolant from 1.0 Uci/G Dose Equivalent I-131 to 0.35 Uci/G Dose Equivalent I-131,as Provided in GL 95-05 ML20248F0051998-05-28028 May 1998 Proposed Tech Specs for Section 6, Administrative Controls Deletions ML20217N3511998-04-30030 April 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Modifying Surveillance Requirement 4.4.3.2.1.b to Change Mode Requirement to Allow PORV Stroke Testing in Modes 3,4 & 5 W/Steam Bubble in Pressurizer Rather than Only in Mode 4 ML20203J1681998-02-25025 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Revising EDG Surveillance Requirements to Delete Requirement for 18-month Insp IAW Procedures Prepared in Conjunction W/Vendor Recommendations & Modify SRs Associated W/Verifying Capability of DGs ML20202J7601998-02-13013 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Section 3.7.9 Re Relocation of Snubber Requirements ML20202J7141998-02-13013 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Adding New LCO That Addresses Requirements for Main Feedwater Isolation,Regulating & Bypass Valves ML20202J6961998-02-13013 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Incorporating MSIV Requirements to Be Consistent W/Std TS (NUREG-1431) ML20198T4311998-01-21021 January 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Re New Position Title & Update of Description of Nuclear Organization ML20199K4571997-11-21021 November 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Adding one-time Allowance Through Operating Cycle 9 to Surveillance Requirement 4.4.3.2.1.b to Perform Stroke Testing of PORVs in Mode 5 Rather than Mode 4,as Currently Required ML20211A3191997-09-17017 September 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Pressure Differential Surveillance Requirements for Containment Spray Pumps ML20137T0871997-04-0909 April 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Elimination of Cycle 8 Limitation for SG Alternate Plugging Criteria ML20137M8581997-04-0101 April 1997 Proposed Tech Specs 2.1 Re Safety Limits & TS 3/4.2 Re Power Distribution Limits ML20137C8421997-03-19019 March 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Conversion from Westinghouse Electric Corp Fuel to Framatome Cogema Fuel ML20136J0381997-03-13013 March 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Section 5.6.1.2,revising Enrichment of Fuel for New Fuel Pit Storage Racks ML20134P8631997-02-14014 February 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Requesting Discretionary Enforcement for 48 Hours Which Is in Addition to 72 Hours Allowed Outage Time Provided by TS Action 3.8.1.1.b ML20134K9981997-02-0707 February 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Revising TS Change Request 96-01, Conversion from W Electric Corp Fuel to Framatome Cogema Fuel (MARK-BW-17), to Ensure That Core Analysis Computer Code Output Actions Are Consistent W/Hot Channel Factor SRs ML20134L9261996-11-0808 November 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Re Placing of Channel in Trip for Reactor Trip & Engineered Safety Feature Instrumentation Sys Solely to Perform Testing as Not Requiring Channel to Be Declared Inoperable ML20129D2661996-10-18018 October 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Removing Existing Footnotes That Limit Application of Apc for Plant S/G Tubes to Cycle 8 Operation for Both Units ML20129G7301996-09-26026 September 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.3.3 Re Fire Detection instrumentation,3/4.7.11 Re Fire Suppression Systems & 3/4.7.12 Re Fire Protection Penetrations ML20113G2691996-09-20020 September 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Change 96-09, Clarification of Work Shift Durations for Overtime Limits ML20117J3391996-08-28028 August 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Revising Psv & MSSV Setpoint Tolerance from Plus or Minus 1% to Plus or Minus 3% ML20117D1651996-08-22022 August 1996 Proposed Tech Specs of SQN Units 1 & 2,deleting Table 4.8.1, DG Reliability, & Revising Section 3.8.1 to Allow Once Per 18 month,7 Day AOT for EDGs ML20117D3121996-08-22022 August 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Lowering Minimum TS ice-basket Weight of 1,155 Lbs to 1,071 Lbs.Reduced Overall Ice Weight from 2,245,320 Lbs to 2,082,024 Lbs ML20117D3141996-08-21021 August 1996 Proposed TS 3.7.1.3 Re Condensate Storage Tank ML20117D3341996-08-21021 August 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Re Deletion of Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.b ML20112H0431996-06-0707 June 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Section 6, Administrative Controls, to Be More Closely Aligned W/Requirements of STSs ML20101N7071996-04-0404 April 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Allowing Conversion from Westinghouse Fuel to Fuel Provided by Framatome Cogema Fuels ML20096B3761996-01-0404 January 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Extending Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Period Per GL 93-05 ML20096C2481996-01-0303 January 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Bases Section 3/4.7.1.2 to Indicate Current Operational Functions of turbine-driven AFW Level Control Valves Modified During Unit 1 Cycle 7 Refueling Outage 1999-08-30
[Table view] Category:TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS & TEST REPORTS
MONTHYEARML20217F9701999-10-14014 October 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Incorporating ARC for Axial Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking at Dented Tube Support Plate Intersections ML20217E4301999-10-12012 October 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Requirements for Containment Penetrations During Refueling Operations ML20211M7341999-08-30030 August 1999 Marked-up & Revised TS Pages,Providing Alternative to Requirement of Actually Measuring Response Times ML20211K1721999-08-30030 August 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Providing Clarification to Current TS Requirements for Containment Isolation Valves ML20209B7731999-06-30030 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Updating Requirmements for RCS Leakage Detection & RCS Operational Leakage Specifications to Be Consistent with NUREG-1431 ML20196F2211999-06-24024 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Pages for Amend to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,allowing Use of Fully Qualified & Tested Spare Inverter in Place of Any of Eight Required Inverters ML20196G4701999-06-24024 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Re Amends to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,revising TS to Be Consistent with Rev to ISTS Presently Submitted to NEI TSTF for Submittal as Rev to NUREG-1431 ML20196G7961999-06-22022 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Bases,Clarifying Proper Application of TS Requirements for Power Distribution Systems & Functions That Inverters Provide to Maintain Operability & Providing Updated Info on Cold Leg Injection Accumulators ML20196G8071999-06-22022 June 1999 Revs to Technical Requirements Manual ML20195E9841999-06-0707 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Increasing Max Allowed Specific Activity of Primary Coolant from 0.35 Microcuries/Gram Dose Equivalent I-131 to 1.0 Microcuries/Gram Dose Equivalent I-131 for Plant Cycle 10 (U2C10) Core ML20206E1611999-04-29029 April 1999 Proposed Tech Spec Change 99-04, Auxiliary Suction Pressure Low Surveillance Frequency Rev. Change Deletes Surveillance ML20206E1391999-04-29029 April 1999 Proposed Tech Spec Change 99-03, Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation Sys Versus Radiation Monitors. Changes Add LCOs 3.3.3.1 & 3.7.7 to Address Inoperability of Radiation Monitoring CREVS & NUREG-1431 Recommendations ML20204E8501999-03-21021 March 1999 Plant,Four Yr Simulator Test Rept for Period Ending 990321 ML20204H4081999-03-19019 March 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Relocating TS 3.8.3.1,3.8.3.2,3.8.3.3 & Associated Bases Associated with Electrical Equipment Protective Devices to Technical Requirements Manual ML20207D6331999-02-26026 February 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Providing for Consistency When Exiting Action Statements Associated with EDG Sets ML20207D6011999-02-26026 February 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Relocating TS 3.7.6, Flood Protection Plan & Associated Bases from TS to Plant TRM ML20206S0131999-01-15015 January 1999 Proposed Tech Specs 3.3.3.3, Seismic Instrumentation & Associated Bases,Relocated to Plant Technical Requirements Manual ML20199K6001999-01-15015 January 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Adding New Action Statement to 3.1.3.2 That Would Eliminate Need to Enter TS 3.0.3 Whenever Two or More Individual RPIs Per Bank May Be Inoperable,While Maintaining Appropriate Overall Level of Protection ML20195H6111998-11-16016 November 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Revising EDG SRs by Adding Note That Allows SR to Be Performed in Modes 1,2,3 or 4 If Associated Components Are Already OOS for Testing or Maint & Removing SR Verifying Certain Lockout Features Prevent EDG Starting ML20154H7251998-10-0808 October 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Supplementing Proposed TS Change 96-08,rev 1 to Add CRMP to Administrative Controls Section & Bases of TS ML20238F1091998-08-27027 August 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Providing for Insertion of Limited Number of Lead Test Assemblies,Beginning W/Unit 2 Operating Cycle 10 Core ML20238F3001998-08-27027 August 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Replacing 72 H AOT of TS 3.8.1.1,Action b,w/7 Day AOT Requirement for Inoperability of One EDG or One Train of EDGs ML20209J1631998-08-0707 August 1998 Rev 41 to Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Odcm ML20236G5961998-06-29029 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Typed Pages for TS Change 95-19, Section 6 - Administrative Controls Deletions ML20249C6371998-06-26026 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Lowering Specific Activity of Primary Coolant from 1.0 Uci/G Dose Equivalent I-131 to 0.35 Uci/G Dose Equivalent I-131,as Provided in GL 95-05 ML20248F0051998-05-28028 May 1998 Proposed Tech Specs for Section 6, Administrative Controls Deletions ML20217N3511998-04-30030 April 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Modifying Surveillance Requirement 4.4.3.2.1.b to Change Mode Requirement to Allow PORV Stroke Testing in Modes 3,4 & 5 W/Steam Bubble in Pressurizer Rather than Only in Mode 4 ML20203J1681998-02-25025 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Revising EDG Surveillance Requirements to Delete Requirement for 18-month Insp IAW Procedures Prepared in Conjunction W/Vendor Recommendations & Modify SRs Associated W/Verifying Capability of DGs ML20202J7651998-02-13013 February 1998 Technical Requirements Manual ML20202J7141998-02-13013 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Adding New LCO That Addresses Requirements for Main Feedwater Isolation,Regulating & Bypass Valves ML20202J6961998-02-13013 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Incorporating MSIV Requirements to Be Consistent W/Std TS (NUREG-1431) ML20202J7601998-02-13013 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Section 3.7.9 Re Relocation of Snubber Requirements ML20198T4311998-01-21021 January 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Re New Position Title & Update of Description of Nuclear Organization ML20199F8231997-11-30030 November 1997 Cycle 9 Restart Physics Test Summary, for 971011-971130 ML20199K4571997-11-21021 November 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Adding one-time Allowance Through Operating Cycle 9 to Surveillance Requirement 4.4.3.2.1.b to Perform Stroke Testing of PORVs in Mode 5 Rather than Mode 4,as Currently Required ML20211A3191997-09-17017 September 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Pressure Differential Surveillance Requirements for Containment Spray Pumps ML20203B9731997-08-0505 August 1997 Rev 1 to RD-466, Test & Calculated Results Pressure Locking ML20217J5581997-07-31031 July 1997 Cycle Restart Physics Test Summary, for Jul 1997 ML20210J1671997-04-30030 April 1997 Snp Unit 1 Cycle 8 Refueling Outage Mar-Apr 1997,Results of SG Tube ISI as Required by TS Section 4.4.5.5.b & Results of Alternate Plugging Criteria Implementation as Required by Commitment from TS License Condition 2C(9)(d) ML20137T0871997-04-0909 April 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Elimination of Cycle 8 Limitation for SG Alternate Plugging Criteria ML20137M8581997-04-0101 April 1997 Proposed Tech Specs 2.1 Re Safety Limits & TS 3/4.2 Re Power Distribution Limits ML20137C8421997-03-19019 March 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Conversion from Westinghouse Electric Corp Fuel to Framatome Cogema Fuel ML20136J0381997-03-13013 March 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Section 5.6.1.2,revising Enrichment of Fuel for New Fuel Pit Storage Racks ML20134P8631997-02-14014 February 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Requesting Discretionary Enforcement for 48 Hours Which Is in Addition to 72 Hours Allowed Outage Time Provided by TS Action 3.8.1.1.b ML20134K9981997-02-0707 February 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Revising TS Change Request 96-01, Conversion from W Electric Corp Fuel to Framatome Cogema Fuel (MARK-BW-17), to Ensure That Core Analysis Computer Code Output Actions Are Consistent W/Hot Channel Factor SRs ML20138F2581997-01-17017 January 1997 Rev 39 to Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Odcm ML20134L9261996-11-0808 November 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Re Placing of Channel in Trip for Reactor Trip & Engineered Safety Feature Instrumentation Sys Solely to Perform Testing as Not Requiring Channel to Be Declared Inoperable ML20129D2661996-10-18018 October 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Removing Existing Footnotes That Limit Application of Apc for Plant S/G Tubes to Cycle 8 Operation for Both Units ML20129G7301996-09-26026 September 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.3.3 Re Fire Detection instrumentation,3/4.7.11 Re Fire Suppression Systems & 3/4.7.12 Re Fire Protection Penetrations ML20134J9991996-09-23023 September 1996 Fuel Assembly Insp Program 1999-08-30
[Table view] |
Text
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ -
. s . .
ENCLOSURE 1 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-327 -
(TVA-SQN-TS-88-09)
L2ST OF AFFECTED PAGES Unit 1 3/4 6-6 i
l' l
8808020283 GG0725 PDR ADOCK 0S000327 P PDC
. -_..-. ......t
.+
' TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)
M BYPASS LEAKAGE PATHS TO THE AUX 1LIARY BUILDING E -
SECO*;DARY CONTAlhMENT BYPASS LEAKAGE PATHS '
O 5
. PfMETRATION DESCRIPTION RELEASE LOCATION c
3 X-64 A/C Chilled Water (ERCW) A ufliary Area X-65 A/C Chilled Water (ERCW) Auxiliary Area X-66 A/C Chilled Water (ERCW) Auxiliary Area X-67 A/C Chilled Water (ERCW) Auxiliary Area X-68 ERCW Auxiliary Area X-69 ERCW Auxiliary Area X-70 ERCW Auxiliary Area X-71 ERCW Auxiliary Area X-72 ERCW Auxiliary Area X'73 ERCW Auxiliary Area X-74 ERCW Auxiliary Area w X-75 ERCW Auxiliary Area ,i 75]
, 1 X-76 Service Air Auxiliary Area l m X-77 Demineralized Water Auxiliary Area 1- J, X-78 Fire Protection Auxiliary Area li X-81 RC Orain Tank Auxiliary Area ,
Fuel Pool '
X-82 Auxiliary Area X-83 Fuel Fool Auxiliary Area
.' X-84A Pressurizer Relief Tank Gas Sample Auxiliary Area X-8SA Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger Auxiliary Area
^
c X-90 Control Air Auxiliary Area mX-91 Postaccident Sampling, Hot Leg 1 Auxiliary Area M 'X-93 Accumulator Sample Ai.xiliary Area
.l ; , X-94ABC Radiation Sample Auxiliary Area X-95ABC Radiation Sample Auxiliary Area
)4 1F X-%C Hnt Leg Sample Auxiliary Area g-98 ILRT Auxiliary Area j . X-101 Postaccident Sampling, Containment Auxiliary Area i Uy ! X-103 Postaccident Sampling, Liquid Discharge Auxiliary Area
.y A to Containment 1 ?..! X-106 Postaccident Sampling, Air Discharge Auxiliary Area A to Containment L
X-108 UHI Auxiliary Area 0
Q lX-% H y jpu,;Iar. Ara
.( T
_x- oo og/c3a,A,,ayzer a,, Aal r er- p:1.k Rre- ,
j~x -92. A,8 H_, dim ,,s%=lyzer Aa,x.%q , Area.
ENCLOSURE 2 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET No. 50-327 _
(TVA-SQN-TS-88-09)
DESCRIPTION AND JUSTIFICATION FOR TdE REVISION OF TABLE 3.6-1, "3YPASS LEAKAGE PATHS 10 THE AUXILIARY BUILDING"
)
e
ENCLOSURE 2
.:_ l Description of Change Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) proposes to modify the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) unit 1 technical specifications to revise Table 3.6-1, "Bypass Lentage Paths to the Auxiliary Building," to add four potential bypass imkege paths associated with the hydrogen analyser system. --
Reason for Change During the review of a design change notion (DCN) issued to enhance the ,
hydrogen analyzer calibration process, it was discovered that the current system design contained a potential pathway for the relear.e of radionuclides to the environment following ; postulated loss of coolant .
accident (LOCA). Previously, the hydrogen aftalyser system was considered a closed system with respect to containment icolation. ,
This proposed technical specification chsnge is needed for unit 1 to identify the bypass leakage paths to the Auxiliary Building. Inclusion of :
these potential leakage paths in table 3.6-1 of the unit 1 technical specifications ensures that these bypass leakage paths are tested in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J and specification 5.6.1.2. This change is similar to a previously approved technical specification change (87-46) for unit 2 that was suamitted to NRC on March 1, 1988.
Modifications to the unit I hydrogen analyzer system are being performed i I to eliminate the potential bypass leakage to the environment. In ordec to i comply with specification 3.6.4.1 for operable hydrogen analyzers, the unit 1 modifications will be completed before entering mode 2. These modifications are Ming performed under DCNs M00229, M00230, M00231, and M00232 as part of ;,e corrective action to Conditiont Adverse to Quality Report (CAQR) SQP871652 R1. This CAqR encompasses the design inadequacies that were documented for unit 2 under SQP871611 and SQP871650. These deficiencies were also reported to NRC in Licensee Event Report (LER) '
327/87077, t Justificatinn for ",*4ng
! FIAures 1 and 2 show the unit 1, train A and B, hydrogen analyzer system configurations that contained the potential bypass 1takage path to the environment. After the postulated LOCA, the in5oard containment isolation ,
valves (CIVs) would have been open because they vere fail-open, I air-operated valvesI and the control air would have been isolated during ,
the accident. If the hydrogen analyzer was in the "analyse" moda, the electrically operated solenoid valve on the reagent-gas line would have been open as designed. If the failure of one train of essential control air was also postulated, the pressure in the control air line (reagent gas) supp ving tne hydrogen analyzer would have fallen below containment pressure allowing the potential bypass leakage to the environment through the essential control air system.
se %e'm M 6 4 a b. _-M, y
Figure 3 shows the modified hydrogen analyzer system configuration for trains A and B. DCN M00229A (phase 1) will be completed before mode 4 to establish containment integrity while in modes 4 and 3. This DCN replaces the unit 1, train A and B, inboard CIVs with electrically operated fail-closed solenoid valves and adds new electrically operated fail-closed outboard CIVs inside the annulus. The new outboard valves will be electrically connected during implementation of DCN M00230A (phase 2).
These valves are TVA class B qualified to be operated in a harsh environment for 30 days and leak tested in accordance with existing procedures. DCN M00231A (phase 3) modifies the portion of the hydrogen analyzer system located in the Auxiliary Building to eliminate potential bypass leakage paths to the environment. The analyzer will be disconnected from the essential control e.ir system for bnth trains.
Bottled air will be used as the reagent-gas supply. DCN M00232A (phase 4) electrically connects the calibration panel snd associated instrwoentation.
The configuration proposed for the unit 1 hydrogen analyzer system will eliminate the need for the administrative concrois that are currently used for unit 2. Unlike the unit 2 design, the unit I hydrogen analyzer system will not be required to maintain a pressurized calibration / reagent-gas system. This is due to the fact that the unit 1 calibration panel and associated gas supply bottles are located entirely within the Auxiliary Building Secondary Containment Enclosure (ABSCE). In addition, the unit 1 outboard containment isolation valves are located on the hydroget. sample line inside the annulus rather than on the reagent / calibration lines inside the ABSCE. The administrative controls for maintaining a pressurized calibration / reagent-gas system are thereby eliminated.
The reagent-gas pressure switch will be configured for both trains to provide an automatic trip of the hydrogen analyzer sample pump and automatic closure of the inboard / outboard CIVs on a low-pressure signal.
The new inboard / outboard containment isolation valves will provide a double containment isolation barrier for protection against potential leakage out of containment. Any leakage from containment would be required to follow a tortuous path through two containment isolation solenoid valves and into the hydrogen analyzer reagent-gas or calibration-gas lines before reaching the ABSCE. Because the entire calibration panel is located inside the ABSCE, any leakage would be processed by the Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS).
The orfsite dose analysis of record (Final Safety Analysis Report, st.ction 15.5.3) is not affected by moving the potential release point of the hydrogen analyzer system from the annulus to the ABSCE. This is because the total primary containment leakage remains unchanged, as do the assumptions that 75 percent of the leakage is to the annulus and 25 percent of the leakage is to the Auxiliary Building within the ABSCE.
The change in potential release points only changes the allowable leakage for each individual penetration.
l l
i L -
l l
i
- r In sununation, the modifications described above will ensure that the system meets containment isolation requirements. These modifications will also eliminate potential bypass leakage paths to the environment, ensuring compliance with containment bypass leakage requirements. Potential leakage paths to the ABSCE will still exist and are included in the technical specifications. Inclusion of these potential leakage paths in --
the table ensures that they are adequately tested in accordance with i
10 CFR 50, Appendix J, and specification 3.6.1.2.
1 i
l l
l
-w,>,w_,- we,--- me w-w yy- --ywyeyy--wyy wwp,a
7-5 W-o9 ,
. FMcAE .L
~
l!YDROGEli ANALYZER 'SYSTEf/ SClEFINCC (EXISTillG CONFlGURATION FOR TRAlls A) t rei [.ow l11 essure siipinl CJY y '
lo rinntrnciqlui in flCft O g L FCV- 43-2 2 T *: h F V 'l
- 00ACl~rh) PS 'I - 00A (Tr A)
'S (15 vsis selvolust)
Ec4 gens g1s
[
- ~'
M l- /
J' 4-E5 5thfiell ~ '
l pg.g3-llh I.; eontrolesi-t r
l* ~ ~
Calil; ofien ,ggs / I.'eplafor (Id IcutI Eilft CI)f v Sf' "
l 4 g/ filter s'irnpl e insiile ry;cql of 4 J,og. I,ox )
A _,\llYllROGEll e
-wy f ! -
"~'
- y. AllAl.YZT.It FCV-<!3-201 (Tr A) h'[*;'[S",',Ijog j
1 ABSCE+
INBOARD e < 4NNUIUS 4 +-AUX HLI)G. 5 3--'a,.,,, not ,
co L gas I.or sles -
l -,
typical of.4 t
f p .
L.. -
~
/ 5 SF-09 .
neons 2 -
- HYDROGDI ANALYZER S'(STEM SCllEl4K~lC (EXISTillG C0i'IFlGURATION FOR TRAIN B)
~
e., '
~
[.tu il es5ure sigrial '
ClY y , Io 48 "f'88ciqlot . : ilCit O A .
i
- M "8 TSV- 13-2104 (.lt U) I'5- 13-2l0A (li- 13)
I CY--!3-2Uli(l*r U) is5 (IS lssl3 s e tgoo itst )
- 1. J rc 2 Rea3ent sas [/ g, ,,,;,, g ,
r ceierf rol eter-rc i 14--
Cnlararron ses 7'" >-l4 R
g/yvisor r.frer (fi ence 3.isli sningle nisi<le ClV y --- spical of 4 Iiot bor-)
A Ill'l>ROGEll
_q q -_ __
x-gu y
p)ilAI.v7.r.it o" s s'eix 0'",sj* "0 s
1 FCV 13-201Cli- U]
ABSCII- ~
i lilBOAP.D : < AilllVLUS ? t- AllX, llLilG $' i ~
Calil.intions I, l eJ ts IrelIIG5 -
tyical of 4 3
(r .
- n. . , . O e * ,
g h 0
a I ,e
, .g."
-. ~ ~.
6
, e g 3 eV '
I ,
. .@ g g n -
.ll . . . . . . .
t i 1" g ; y r r n7 k a s% i . .
< a O O b >
kdj) _ i{a:ekf I- !
p 0-E 01 EH:D$h[l y e,-
g s.
b: 3 c 3.,, ,.
ce .,i -
-l .
A[
i>
w = E. ,
@ )
3 i
% 4 2 W Q E S X J
R '
+ *
)
.I 2 -fy-,
Mr 04 ttr Q ?e o++-- 4 f'
EME E$,
I _
El-XI$ >
H '35 a-H ! '
EH,Q ef EH: Iy a[3'I
. t s ?E g' n
S
ENCLOSURE 3 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE SEQUOYAH NUCIEAR PIANT JNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-327 -
(TVA-SQN-TS-88-09)
DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIF1 CANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS 1
- .. d
~
ENCLOSURE 3 Significant Ha:ards Evaluation TVA has evaluated the proposed technical specification change and has determined that it does not represent a signifier.nt hazards consideration .-
based on criteria established in 10 CFR 50.92(c). Operation of SQN in accordance with the proposed amendment will nots (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or concequences of an accident previously evaluated. The addition of the hydrogen analyzer system bypass penetrations to table 3.6-1 ensures that the penetrations are properly tested in accordance with surveillance requirement 4.6.1.2.e. This testing does not affect the probability or consequences of previously evaluated accidents. The hydrogen analyzer system is not required to mitigate design basis events but is used to provide post-LOCA information to the operator in compliance with NUREG-0737. The hydrogen analyzer system does not contribute to the probability of leakage paths from containment to the environment. The remaining potential bypass leakage paths are into the ABSCE and are included in table 3.6-1 as such. Eliminating the leakage paths to the environment will decrease the consequences of an accident. The offsite dose analysis of record (Final Safety Analysis Report, section 15.5.3) is not affected by moving the potential release point of the hydrogen analyzer system from the annulus to the ABSCE. This is because the total primary containment leakage remains unchanged, as de the assumptions that 75 percent of the leakage is to the annulus and 25 percent of the leakage is to the Auxiliary Building. The change in potential release points only changes the allowable leakage for each individual penetration. The change coes not impact systems or components used to mitigate postulated accidents. The probability or consequences of previously evaluated accidents has not been altered.
(2) Create the possibility ot . new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed. *he inclusion of the hydrogen analyzer system bypass penetrations in table 3.6-1 identifies the penetrations as being within the scope of surveillance requirement 4.6.1.2.e. The leak rate testing required by this surveillance does not create the possibility of a new type of accident. The changes made to the hydrogen analyzer system do not affect the function or operation of the system. The changes are made to eliminate potential leakage paths from containment to the environment. The change does not adversely affect other systems; therefore, no new accident scenarios are created.
(3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed change ensures that the hydrogen analyzer system bypass penetrations are routinely tested under the requirements of surveillance requirement 4.6.1.2.e. This testing ensures that the plant is
_g, l l
4 bounded by the offsite dose analysis of record. As described above. '
the offsite dose analysis of record is,not affected by the proposed i changet and the margin of safety as defined by the technical '
specification bases is not changed. The modifications to the
,. hydrogen analyser system eliminate a potential bypass leakage path to the environment and bring the system into compliance with containment '
.; isolation requirements. Any leakage will be into the ABSCE where it !
is processed by ABGTS. The technical specification change is made to
~
reflect the potential bypass leakage paths to the Auxiliary Building. Because the poter.tial for unprocessed bypass leakage is ,
eliminated, the actual margin of safety is increased. j i
r
- i l h
! i l :
L i
i
$ I t
)
t i
I f
l I
t I
,_ - = = . - _ . =r n= ~ 2E =--L'\