ML20205H507

Package Consisting of LAS 74-81 Re Safeguards Briefing

ML20205H507
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Issue date:	05/24/1974
From:	NRC
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NUDOCS 9904080247
Download: ML20205H507 (4)

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141 3 D / -$ - /2 2 I '2-IV. Safeguards Briefing ,

The Chairman emphasized that this briefing was of an informational nature only, that no actions would be taken by the Commission and

- that none should be assumed to have been taken. -The briefing would consist of discussion with questions and comments entertained.

A. The Commission noted that:

1. up to now, the Commission's safeguards efforts have j been largely pragmatic, sharing no general, underlying j assumptions;

2. since the public would hold the AEC responsible for any. incidents involving radioactive release, the safe-guards effort cannot be considered independent of general health and safety questions;

3. furthermore, safeguards evaluations ought to include a probabalistic risk assessment as is done with reactor safet

4. Commissioner. Kriegsman questioned the efficacy of the probabalistic approach to safeguards; staff responded that such an approach would not only help balance any system, bu would provide an outside rationale for safeguards decisions

5. the use 'of the probabalistic approach would not preclude the~use of any of the present means of risk assessment, but would be instituted in conjunction with these programs;

6. the Director of Regulation felt that safeguards objectives must be defined and rationalized qualitatively as well, adding that any quantification of the process will involve considerable time; OFFECHAL USE ONLY i i .- ,t 9904090247 740524- * -

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7. the Regulatory staff added that it plans to use quantification to systematize its approach to safe-

. guards and then test the probabalistic assumptions by constructing scenarios and performing safeguards

, exercises;

8. for the short term Regulatory staff will be concentrating on strengthening cargo security and communications during transportation of radioactive materials;

9. many of the present safeguards actions regarding the transportation of weapons can be applied to shipments of other radioactive materials, attractive to unauthorized persons;

10. in particular, the press has singled out for publicity the shipments of naval fuels, making them attractive targets; hence, these shipments ought to be treated in the same manner as weapons shipments; *

11. in addition, a paper is being prepared which discusses the possibility of classifying certain information disseminated by the application process, and using clearances for certaii individuals in industry;

12. there might be a risk of compromising weapons security systems if they are linked too closely with commercial shipment protections;

13. there was a further risk of committing the Government to too many sa'feguards functions that could be handled by the private sector;

14. Commissioner Doub felt that any further licensee safeguards discussions ought to be closely coordinated with thcse personnel on the General Manager's staff most able to give guidance on weapons protection programs; in additica these discussions should be held in the context of firmly de"eli s objectives;

15. at present the safeguards program has well developed

. requirements for fixed site protection and for transportatic

16. every fixed site is required to have adequate fencing of th(

perimeter, access controls, clearance programs, alarm systems, sophisticated communication systems, and a respons<

capability;

17. for weapons shipments by land, specially designed safe /secui trailers for trucks (SST) are used; truck drivers are clear (

and the trucks are convoyed with armed guards, escort vehic:

a preplanned route, and constant communication;

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18. rail shipments travel in specially designed AEC or contractor equipment with AEC couriers, sophisticated communications,.and clearances for those involved;

19. air shipments travel under'similar criteria to truck travel, with pilots cleared by the AEC;

20. there exist uniform regulations for transportation, but certain exceptions reflect an inability to meet these regulations because of lack of money and personnel;

21. although the first line of defense is the couriers and guards , many are over-age and their numbers , relative to their responsibilities, have decreased since 1948;

22. new safeguards standards were approved in November, 1973 and are now being implemented; for the 29 fuel cycle facilities affected by the changes, 1 terminated the license, 5 reduced the possession amounts below that affected by the new regulations, and 23 submitted plans for implementing these new standards; 23, 24 of the 44 reactors affected by the new standards are expected to have their plans approved by May 31, 1974; 18 are upgrading their protection with approval expected by June 30, 1974; 11 units were licensed this year with acceptable plans; these plans must be operative by the time the fuel is loaded in the reactor;

24. a representative from Sandia Laboratory felt that weapons safeguards were most significant, but agreed that transportation and storage of other materials presented an important safeguards problem;

25. the Sandia representative felt that many systems were not designed for an organized, external attack, that these systems rely heavily upon personnel, they were not balancer with a response force capability, no provisions were r.c.ac to deny use of any materials successfully diverted, and that many weapons systems protections were adaptable to the fuel cycle;

26. for the future, the Sandia representative suggested balancing the effectiveness of the safeguards systems, relying upon improved hardware, enhancing the response force capability, and considering use-denial methods;

27. the magnitude of the problem is such that it might be necessary in the future for the Commission to recognize the entire safeguards question as a national security matter; j

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28. the General Counsel emphatically pointed out that even if this question became a national security matter, it does not mean ipso facto that the Federal Government should absorb and control all safeguards operations;

29. the questions of operational responsibility for any l incident is as yet undecided, being shared in a confusing way by many agencies; and

30. Commissioners Kriegsman and Doub felt that an overall definition and statement of objectives was missing from the staff report.

B. The Commission noted that this is an ongoing problem and that discussion of these matters will continue.

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