ML20058P175

Package Consisting of Attachment to Employee Concerns Programs

ML20058P175
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	09/07/1993
From:	Bristow K NRC
To:
References
NUDOCS 9312230126
Download: ML20058P175 (5)

Text

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6 Attachment A EMPLOYEE CONCERNS PROGRAMS PLANT NAME: Point Beach Nuclear Plant LICENSEE: WEPCo. DOCKET #: 50-266/50-301 A. PROGRAM:

1. Does the licensee have an employee concerns program?

( Ho, employees are expected to comunicate nuclear safety concerns to their respective supervisors. A formal program exists for industrial safety concerns.

2. Has NRC inspected the program? Report # 93013 B. SCOPE: (Circle all that apply) Note: All answers in parts B - I pertain to the industrial safety program only.

1. Is it for:

a. Technical? ( No )

b. Administrative? ( No )

c. Personnel issues? ( No )

2. Does it cover safety as well as non-safety issues?

( No, only covers industrial safety issues. )

3. Is it designed for:

a. Nuclear safety? ( No )

b. Personal safety? ( Yes )

c. Personnel issues - including union grievances?

( No, union grievances are handled using a four step process. In step one, the employee, his/her supervisor, and a union representative discuss the issue and the-corresponding group manager issues a resolution document. If the union is not satisfied with this resolution, they can appeal the resolution to the plant manager for another decision. The union has the option -

of appealing the plant manager's decision to the WEPCo Employee Relations Manager. If the issue remains unresolved, it goes to final and binding arbitration.  :

4. Does the program apply to all licensee employees?

( Yes )

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Employee Concerns Programs

5. Contractors?

( Yes, the' program applies to contractors when they_' are {

working on projects in conjunction ~ with - WEPCo employees. -j Contractors performing independent of WEPCo are not required -: i to follow the program. -)

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6. Does the licensee require lits contractors and their subs to  !

have a similar program?: _

( No, WEPCo expects contractors to.have a program but :.the -

program is not evaluated. ) ',i

7. Does the licensee conduct an exit interview upon terminating-employees asking if they have any safety concerns?

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( No ) .

C. INDEPENDENCE: 'I k

1. What is the title of the person in charge? l Fire Protection and Safety Coordinator '

2. Who do they report to?

Site Services Manager

3. Are they independent of line management? i No '

4. Does the ECP use third party consultants?- '

No ,

5. How is a concern about a manager or vice president' followedi up? k Industrial Safety Program does not address concerns pertaining  ;

to management.

7 D. RESOURCES:

1. What is the size of staff devoted to this program? .[

One Fire Protection and Safety Coordinator, : five Division  :

Safety Consittee members, and the Plant Manager._ All duties are collateral.

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2. What are ECP staff qualifications ' (technical training, j interviewing training, investigator' training, other)?- -*

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E. REFERRALS:  !

1. Who has followup on concerns - (ELP staff, line management' ,

other)?

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The Division Safety Connittee and the Plant' Manager.

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Employee Concerns Programs

F. CONFIDENTIALITY

!1. Are the reports confidential?

E ( No )

2. Who is the identity .of ' the . alleger. made known to -(senior management, ECP staff, line management, other)?

To the Division Safety Committee. who reconsnends actions. to resolve the concern, and the Plant Manager who is responsible for providing feedback to the alleger.

3. Can employees be:

p a. Anonymous? ( Yes )

b. Report by phone? ( Yes )

6. FEEDBACK:

1. Is feedback given to the alleger upon completion of the followup? ( Yes, results are comununicated through the Planc Manager. )

2. Does program reward good ideas?-

No

3. Who, or at what level, makes the' final decision of resolution?

The Plant Manager

4. Are the resolutions.of anonymous concerns disseminated?~

Yes

5. Are resolutions of valid concerns publicized (newslett'er, bulletin board, all hands' meeting, other)?'

Yes, through the Division Safety Committee meeting minutes which are posted on plant bulletin boards.

H. EFFECTIVENESS:

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1. How does the licensee measure the effectiveness of the program?

By the low number of serious injuries that occur at the plant.

2. Are concerns:

.a. Trended? ( No.)

Only the injury and accident rate 'is trended.

b. Used? ( Yes )

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Employee Concerns. Programs

3. In the last three years how many concerns were raised? 151 Closed? 97 What percentage were substantiated? 91%

4. How are followup techniques used to measure . effectiveness (random survey, interviews, other)?

The Industrial Safety Program does not use any types of fo11cwup techniques at this time to measure the effectiveness of the program. As stated earlier, the effectiveness of the program is measured by the low number of injuries.

5. How frequently are internal audits of the ECP conducted and by whom?

The Industrial Safety Program is randomly audited by the onsite quality assurance group ( last audit 4/93 ) and the corporate Industrial Health and Safety Group ( last audit 4/92)

I. ADMINISTRATION / TRAINING:

1. Is ECP prescribed by a procedure? ( Yes )

2. How are employees, as well as contractors, made aware of this program (training, newsletter, bulletin board, other)?

Safety improvement suggestion forms are located in a central area on the plant.

ADDITIOKAL COMMENTS: (Including characteristics which make the program especially effective or ineffective.)

The expectations of the licensee's safety policy are as follows:

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1. No manager or management employee may impede proper consideration of a safety concern brought to his ar her i attention.

2. No employee of the Nuclear Power Department is permitted to waive an accepted safety requirement in the conduct of his/her job.

3. All employees are encourage to bring safety concerns to the attention of their respective supervisor. However, any employee who believes a safety concern was not properly addressed or understood by his/her supervisor or who is reluctant for any reason to discuss that concern with his/her supervisor is free to convey that concern to any section head or directly to the department head.

4. No supervisor may penalize an employee in any way for expressing a safety concern outside the normal chain of couraand.

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5. Communication of a safety concern may be made by writing, by telephone, or in person.

The person completing this form please provide the following information to the Regional Office Allegations Coordinator and fax it to Richard Rosano at 301-504-3431.

RAME: TITLE: PHONE f: DATE COMPLETED:

Karla Bristow Reactor Eng. Intern 414-755-2309 09-07-93 ,

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SEP 2 41993 Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301 G$ I Wisconsin Electric Power Company ATTN: Mr. R. E. Link Vice President Nuclear Power 231 West Michigan Street - P379 Milwaukee, WI 53201

Dear Mr. Link:

This refers to the routine safety inspection conducted by Messrs. Vs. R. Jury, J. Gadzala and J. H. Neisler of this office, from July 15 through September 6, 1993, of activities at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2. Our findings were discussed with Mr. G. J. Maxfield and members of his staff at the conclusion of the inspection.

Areas examined during the inspection are identified in the report. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observations.

No violations of NRC requirements were identified during the course of this <

inspection. It was noted, however, that the unavailability of safety related- '

equipment was unnecessarily extended on two recent occasions as a result of poor communications between the Operations and Maintenance groups. Although out-of-service times did not exceed technical specification limits, improvements in inter-group communications appear warranteo. We will review this issue further in future inspections.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection.

Your cooperation with us is appreciated.

Sincerely, ChigM ack J. A. Gavula, Acting Chie Reactor Projects Section 3A

Enclosure:

Inspection Repbrts No. 50-266/93013(DRP);

No. 50-301/93013(DRP)

SEE ATTACHED CONCURRENCE I See Attached Distribution i

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'l, Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301' Wisconsin Electric Power Company l

ATTN: Mr. R. E. Link Vice President Nuclear Power 231 West Michigan Street - P379 Milwaukee, WI 53201

Dear Mr. Link:

This refers to the routine safety inspection conducted by Messrs. K. R. Jury, J. Gadzala and J. H. Neisler of this office, from July 15 through September 6, 1993, of activities at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2. - Our findings were discurced with Mr. G. J. Maxfield and members of his staff at the conclusion of the inspection.

Areas-examined during the inspection are identified in the report. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observations.

No violations cf NRC requirements were identified during the course of this inspection. It was noted, however, that the unavailability of safety related equipment was unnecessarily extended as a result of poor commcnications between the Operations and Maintenance groups. Although out of service times did not exceed technical specification limits, improvements in inter-group communications are warranted.

In ac;ordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosures will be placed-in the NRC Public Document Room.

We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection.

Your cooperation with us is appreciated.

Sincerely, J. A. Gavula, Acting Chief-Reactor Projects Section 3A

Enclosure:

Inspection Reports No. 50-266/93013(DRP); ,

No.- 50-301/93013(DRP)

See Attached Distribution RIII 111 RIII RIII RIII Tongue 4'

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Gardner cc<9 Olteanu Greger h'ih3 9 I4f3 M1@ 9Mf i

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. SEP 2 41993 Wisconsin Electric Power 2 Company Distribution cc w/ enclosure:

G. J. Maxfield, Plant Manager OC/LFDCB Resident Inspector, RIII V rgil Kanable, Chief Boiler Section Cneryl L. Parrino, Chairman Wisconsin Public Service Comnission State Liaison Officer bec: PUBLIC i

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U.S.-NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION' [

REGION III.

Reports No. 50-266/93013(DRP); No. 50-301/9 13(DRP) j

'l Jocket Nos. 50-266; 50-301 itenses No. DPR-24; No. DPR-27 I

.icensee: Wisconsin Electric Company 231 West Michigan j "ilwaukee, WI 53201 facility Name: Point Beach Units 1 and 2  ;

Inspection At: Two Rivers, Wisconsin ,

Dates: July 15 thrcugh September 6, 1993 Insoectors: K. R. Jury k 1

J. Gadzala if J. H. Neisler  !

Accompanying Personnel: K. K. Bristow I Approved By: M 9- Zy J p.) A. Osvula, Acting Chief Dat6 '

W actor Projects Section 3A i

i Insoection Summarv

nstection from July 15 throuah September 6.1993 fRecorts No. 50-266/93013(DRPl: No. 50-301/93013(DRP)

Areas inspected:

Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of-plant operations; radiological controls; maintenance and surveillance; emergency preparedness; security; engineering and technical' support; and safety assessment / quality verification.

Results: No violations or deviations were identified. While a number of  !

individual weaknesses were identified during this inspection period, overall  !

licensee performance does not appear.to have declined.

Plant Onerations An:

Engineered Safeguards Feature (ESF) actuation o.ccurred due to a' personnel.

error by a maintenance technician. .

A security system power supply inverter failed, causing extensive ~ smoke and fire brigade activation.

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Radioloaical' Control Housekeeping and equipment stowage weaknesses were noted in-high and locked' high radiation areas.

Maintenance / Surveillance Poor communications between Maintenance and Operations resulted in extended limiting condition for operations (LCO) entries on two occasions.

A weak maintenance work plan resulted in an additional test of the emergency diesel generator.

A personnel error resulted in an ESF actuation.

Emeroency Preparedness An emergency drill was conducted on August 18 with acceptable results.

Weaknesses included failure to promptly recognize and declare a general emergency and inter-facility communications. Drill' planning was considered a strength.

Enaineerina and Technical Succort Strong engineering involvement and coordination was evident during_several-maintenance-activities.

Safety Assessment /0uality Verification A Manager's Supervisory Staff Meeting did not properly focus on the safety / risk perspective while discussing the timing of two work activities.

The Offsite Review Committee meeting was considered-effective.

Plant housekeeping has gradually deteriorated and the spent fuel pool material control procedure does not address material in the pool's vicinity'.

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.l DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted (71707) I(3070211

• G. J. Maxfield, Plant Manager '

T. J. Koehler, Site Engineering Manager  ;

R.,D. Seizert, Training Manager .

• M. F. Baumann, Manager - Licensing and Radiological Engineering

• J. F. Becka, Regulatory Services Manager ,

• J. G. Schweitzer, Maintenance Manager J. C. Reisenbuechler, Manager - Operations N. L. Hoefert, Manager - Production Planning . I J. J. Bevelacqua, Manager - Health Physics F. P. Hennessy, Manager - Chemistry J. A. Palmer, Manager Maintenance G. R. Sherwood, Manager - Instrument & Controls i W. B. Fromm, Sr. Project Engineer - Plant Engineering '

T. G. Staskal, Sr. Project Engineer - Performance Engineerirg i W. J. Herrman, Sr. Project Engineer - Construction Engineering

• F. A. Flentje, Administrative Specialist ,

Other company employees were also contacted including members of the technical and engineering staffs, and reactor and auxiliary operators.

• Denotes .the personnel attending the management exit interview for -

summation of preliminary findings.

2. Plant Operations (71707) I(71710) (9370211' The inspectors evaluated licensee activities to confirm that the- '

facility was being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory l requirements. These activities were confirmed by direct-observation,.  ;

facility tours, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel and ,1 management, verification of safety. system status, and review of. facility records. ,

To verify equipment operability and compliance with technical specifications (TS), the inspectors reviewed shift logs, Operations' j records, data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment  ;

malfunctions. Through work observations and discussions.with Operations {;

staff members, the inspectors verified the staff was~ knowledgeable of plant conditions, responded promptly and properly to alarms, adhered to- i procedures and applicable administrative controls, was: cognizant of in =l progress surveillance and maintenance activities,-and was aware of-  !'

inoperable equipment status. The inspectors performed channel verifications and reviewed. component status and safety related parameters to verify conformance with TS. Shift changes were observed,.

verifying that system status continuity was maintained and that' proper control room staffing existed. Access to the control room was ~

restricted and operations personnel carried out their assigned duties in-3

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an effective manner. The inspectors noted professionalism in most f acets of control room operation.

Plant tours and perimeter walkdowns were conducted to verify equipment .

operability, assess the general condition of plant equipment, and.to verify that radiological controls, fire protection controls, physical Orotection controls, and equipment tag out procedures were properly i implemented.

he inspectors accompanied two auxiliary operators-(A0s) as they.

erformed equipment rounds to ascertain their knowledge and

omprehension of pump lubricating oil bubblers. The A0s were aware of ,

che function of the bubblers and the_ purpose for checking oil levels. .

Any bubbler requiring oil would be noted on the rounds sheet'and formally documented under the maintenance work request process  :

immediately following completion of the rounds. ,

The licensee's use and control of overtime was reviewed. Currently,-  !

overtime is controlled by PBNP 3.4.4, " Work Duration Restrictions,"

Revision 9. This policy applies to all Wisconsin Electric (WE) employees participating in safety related work during normal operation .,

2nd outages. Contractor personnel are exempt from the restrictions.  !

However, the WE liaison engineer is made aware of contractor work practices and stated that an evaluation would be initiated if excessive contractor overtime was noted. '

a. Unit 1 Operational Status i

The unit continued to operate at full power during this period with only dispatcher requested load reductions. 'A loss of the 1

1A06 electrical safeguards bus occurred during. performance of maintenance but did not result in a plar.t transient. Details appear in paragraph 4.c. below.  ;

. Unit 2 Coerational Status 1 i

The unit continued to operate at full power during this period l with only dispatcher-requested load reductions. -l

c. Security System Power Supply Inverter Failure l On September 1, an electrical fire occurred in a security system j power supply inverter. All affected personnel were immediately.

evacuated and the necessary compensatory measures were ]

implemented. Although flames were not observed, smoke was exhausted from the area promptly and fire brigade activities were- j suspended within ten minutes. No impact on operations resulted i from the event and a root cause for the inverter's failure was 'l determined.

l Onsite NRC representatives responded to the area and evaluated the 1 licensee's response. Following the event, a debrief was~ held with 4

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all personnel that responded in order to obtain important information that may improve emergency response in the future.

3. Radiolooical Controls (71707)  !

The inspectors routinely observed the plant's . radiological controls and practices during normal: plant tours and the inspection of work activities. Inspection in this area included direct observation of the use of Radiation Work Permits (RWPs); normal work practices 'nside contaminatec barriers; maintenance of radiological barriers and signs; and health physics (HP) activities regarding monitoring, sampling, and surveying. The inspectors also observed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste processing.

From a radiological standpoint the plant is in good condition, allowing access to most sections of the facility. During tours of the facility, the inspectors noted that barriers.and signs also were in good condition. During a tour of high and locked high radiation areas, the inspectors noted that housekeeping in infrequently entered areas was poor and that most areas had at least one unsecured ladder in the area.

These concerns were communicated to an HP supervisor who was accompanying the inspector. He subsequently documented the concerns on

• a zone inspection report for correction.

4. Maintenance / Surveillance Observation (62703) (61726)

a. Maintenance The inspectors observed safety related maintenance activities on systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with TS,-approved procedures, and appropriate industry codes and standards. The; inspectors determined that these activities did not violate LCOs and that required redundant components were operable. The inspectors verified that required administrative, material, testing, and -

radiological and fire prevention controls were adhered to.

Specifically, the inspectors observed / reviewed the following maintenance activities:

ICI-6 (Revision 1), Rod Control System Maintenance MWRs 933381, 933488, and 933790, Rod Control System Troubleshooting / Circuit Card Replacement These activities were well coordinated and controlled by the system engineer. The technicians involved in trouble shooting and repair were knowledgeable of the system and conductsd their work in a professiona' manner.

MWR 933530, Replacement of DOS station battery.

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IWP 93-030-02 (Revision 0), Replacement of HX-128 Outlet 4" l( SW Piping i

IWP 93-030-03 (Revision 0), Replacement of HX-12C Outlet 4" i SW Piping a

Replacement of G01 diesel generator high fuel level switch ,

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L This level switch was believed responsible for intermittent 1, L stopping of the day tank to engine sump fuel transfer pumps -j during manual operation. Additional details are ' contained in Inspection Reports 50-266/93011; 50-301/93011'. Following replacement of the switch on August 4, routine surveillance test TS-1 was performed to verify diesel generator .j operability. However, TS-1 does not normally result-in-cycling of the high fuel level switch. As a result, the  :

high level pump cut-off function was not tested. Although -

this is not a safety related function of the switch and-is -

redundant to the normal level control switch, the responsible engineer felt that it was prudent to test this  ;

function. As a result of not testing the switch during the '

first diesel test, the diesel was tested a second time using .

a modified TS-1 to raise fuel sump tank level sufficiently ~ .

to fully test the level switch operation. The modified return to service test was satisfactorily completed without i further incident.

During review of the circumstances-surrounding the failure I to test the switch during the first diesel test,-the maintenance planner stated that it was his intention that both of the switch's functions be-tested during TS-1. This was not clearly stated on the MWR work plan, consequently resulting in the second test of the diesel. .The concern of a lack of specific instructions'in the work plan'resulting.

in an additional diesel test was discussed with the Maintenance Manager.

G05 gas turbine' load fuel scheduler repair This activity was also well coordinated and. controlled by I the system engineer. The technicians-involved in-trouble shooting and repair were knowledgeable of the system and conducted their. work in a professional manner. ,

b. Surveillance  ;

The inspectors observed certain safety related surveillance activities on systems and components to ascertain that these ,

activities were conducted in'accordance with license ~ requirements.

For the' surveillance test procedures listed below,. the : inspectors  !

determined that precautions and LCOs were adhered to, the: required .

administrative approvals and tag-outs were obtained prior to' test '

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' initiation, testing was accomplished by qualified personnel -in accordance with an approved test procedure, test instrumentation was properly calibrated, the tests were completed at the required frequency, and that the. tests conformed to TS requirements. Upon test completion, the inspectors verified the recorded test data '

was complete, accurate, and met TS requirements; test discrepancies were properly documented and rectified; and .that the systems were properly returned to service.

Specifically, the inspectors witnessed / reviewed selected portions of the following test activities:

TS-5 (Revision 14), Biweekly Rod Exercise Test, Unit 1 The plant had increased the performance frequency of'this test from twice monthly to twice weekly following replacement of a faulty circuit card on Unit 1; Details (

appear in Inspection Report 266/93011. On July 22, Unit 1  ;

testing frequency was returned to its normal periodicity '

after no further abnormal operation of the rod control system occurred. Unit 2 testing frequency was then increased to twice weekly to verify normal operation in that unit's rod control circuitry.

IT-06 (Revision 31), Containment Spray Pumps and Valves-(Quarterly), Unit 2 The_ inspector noted that the lighting in #3 pipeway-(upper) ,

was inadequate to allow operators to properly identify containment spray header discharge valves 2SI-868A/B and a header vent valves 2SI-869A/B without using a' flashlight.

The plant was informed of this condition for' correction. Of-positive note, operators consciously _ minimized the time that.

spray pumps were out of service by performing the test in a manner that allowed for uninterrupted; progression from start to finish.

TS-1 (Revision 37), Emergency Diesel Generator G-01 Biweekly 21CP02.003A-1, Reactor Protection System Logic Train.A '

(Monthly)

c. Inadvertent loss of Vital Bus 1A06 and Emeroency Diesel Start During performance of meter calibration on July 27,- a technician caused a short circuit that resulted in -loss of the 1A06 electrical bus. Loss of normal power to this 4160 VAC safeguards bus caused the emergency diesel generator-(EDG) to start as designed and supply emergency power to it. Bus lA06 provides B train _ safeguards power forL Unit 1.

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4 A maintenance technician had been calibrating a control- room voltmeter. The procedure requires that a slider (manual disconnect device) first be opened to remove the meter from the circuit. The' technician operated the slider but not sufficiently to open it. As a result, when he connected his calibration i instrument to the metering circuit, a grounding path developed '

which caused one of two supply fuses for the circuit to blow and deenergize the circuit. The affected circuit also supplies power to the undervoltage protection relays for bus IA06. When the circuit was deenergized, these relays sensed the loss of voltage and caused the supply breaker for bus 1A06 to open as designed.

The emergency diesel started automatically as required and  ;

promptly reenergized the bus. -

Station battery charger D-108, which is powered from bus lA06, was stripped from the bus on the undervoltage signal as designed.

This occurrence placed the plant in a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications. Loss .of this battery charger necessitated station battery D106 to power its associated 125 VDC distribution bus, D04. Since battery chargers do not reset automatically upon restoration of power, DC bus ~ D04 continued to be powered by battery D106 for about 22 minutes until operators manually reset the battery charger. Wisconsin Electric documented this incident in Licensee Event Report (LER) 266/301/93-007. >

Operators responded to the event and-ensured that the plant ,

remained stable. No reactor power transient occurred as a result of this event. The inspectors were onsite at the time of the i event and responded to the control room and the vital switchgear room. Troubleshooting and repair activities were well controlled - ,

and directed by the engineering staff. After initial-determination of the cause, an independent evaluation was made by another engineer to verify the initial conclusion prior to ,

initiating corrective action.

i following repair of the affected circuit,. operators restored -l normal power to bus lA06 and secured the emergency diesel. As j initial corrective action, the plant changed the meter calibrating  ;

procedure to verify a slider is open by use of a portable voltmeter to check for the no voltage condition. ]

On July 30, an analogous event occurred 'on the 2Y103 inverter  !

circuit during meter calibration. The same technician involved in i the above event was using a voltmeter for slider position i verification and a signal generator for the calibration procedure.

After opening the slider to disconnect a meter in the inverter  !

circuit, the technician attempted to verify the open circuit with l the p'ortable voltmeter as required. However, he inadvertently '

reached for and used the wrong set of leads, thereby connecting the signal generator instead of the voltmeter'to the circ 6it. The  ;

resultant short circuit caused a minor electrical perturb 2 tion on'  !

the inverter bus but did not result in a loss of the bus'nor a 8

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plant transient. Testing was suspended at that point until i completion of a human performance evaluation to determine appropriate corrective actions. Corrective action adequacy for both events will be tracked and reviewed during LER closeout.

d. Loss of Boric Acid Heat Trace Circuitry On the evening of July 28, during performance of surveillance test TS-11 on boric acid heat trace circuit HTCP-49 controller, a fault +

was foun: in the test switch which prevented testing the circuit. ,

This tes. is required to be performed monthly but is normally i schedule: and performed at two week intervals. The shift supervisor declared the circuit inoperable based on the inability 1 to test and appropriately commenced a 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> LCO. The Duty and Call Superintendent .was notified, who decided to wait until the following morning to initiate repair activities. The switch was replaced the following day but additional problems were then found ,

in the circuit controller. The ensuing troubleshooting activities were unaole to correct the fault. No spare controller existed in stock, requiring fabrication of a new one. At this point, it was the end of the work day and due to miscommunication.between Operations and Maintenance groups, maintenance personnel believed '

they had ample time to complete the work the next' day. Therefore, no work was scheduled or performed on this system after the normal day shift crew left for the day. The next morning, with about ,

10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> remaining in the 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> LCO, a new controller was fabricated, installed and tested, and the system returned to '

service.

The inspectors discussed the importance of minimizing time spent.

in a LC0 with plant management. The plant manager stated that entry into the LC0 was believed to have been a conservative decision based on the. assumption that this condition was only due to a tes; switch that prevented testing the circuit.and did not  ;

actually affect operation of the system. Consequently, he decided to postpone initiation of maintenance activities that evening until the next morning. The maintenance and operations managers acknowlecged that miscommunication regarding the time of entry.

into the LC0 was a principle factor-.in not addressing this issue with the priority it warranted.

e. Emeroencv Diesel Generator Redundant Start Testina' '

An additional example of misonmunications between Maintenance and  !

Operations occurred during redandant start testing of the  :

emergency diesel generators. This miscommunication resulted in  !

Operations taking the diesel out of service for approximately.four

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hours be# ore maintenance began the actual testing. Due to problems encounterec during the test, additional daily surveillance tests of the other diesel were required. If^the 1 miscommunication between the two groups had not occurred -

initially, one of the required diesel test runs could have -

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possibly 'been avoided. The inspectors discussed these two I o

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examples of poor communication with management. A policy memo was -  ;

subsequently promulgated by the maintenance manager discussing '

performance of maintenance on systems that are responsible for the plant being in a LCO.

5. Emeroency prenaredness (71707)

An inspection of emergency preparedness activities was performed to assess the plant's implementation-of the site emergency plan and  ;

implementing procedures. The inspection included monthly review and tour of emergency facilities and equipment, discussions with company staff, and a review of selected procedures. ,

Point Beach performed an emergency plan drill on August 18 involving declaration of several emergency classification levels; activation of the technical support center, operations support center and emergency.

operations facility; plant accountability exercising; and offsite ,

response team exercising. The drill scenario consisted of a fire in the i, cable spreading room causing loss of one train of safeguards equipment,  ;

and a Unit I loss of coolant accident in containment followed by a seal leak in a residual heat removal pump leading to an offsite release. The '

control room simulator was used to provide realism and enhance effectiveness of the drill.

Excellent preparations for the conduct of the drill were evident. The  :

scenario and its timing were well planned and carried out. Effective drill control was evident throughout the scenario, thereby maximizing its training effectiveness.

Overall drill performance was acceptable. Emergency classification ,

levels, with the exception of a general emergency, were appropriately declared and notifications were made within specified time requirements.

A significant weakness was the length of time required to identify the containment breach and offsite release. About 35 minutes elapsed from the start of the release until this fact was recognized. Although simulation weaknesses were partly to blame, significant items of information such as alarming area radiation monitors, a distinct upward-trend in exhaust stack activity levels, and an identified loss of primary inventory were known to drill participants but not adequately relayed to the Technical Support Center (TSC) director for evaluation.

This resulted in the failure to recognize and declare a general emergency.

Control room personnel responded well .to the scenario and a second control operator was assigned to assist the Unit 1 operator. ,

Communications were occasionally weak among the control room, technical .!

support center, and operations support center. This resulted in degraded coordination of activities and some confusion regarding status of these response facilities' responsibility for specific corrective actions.

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Operations teams were well briefed on the specific job they were to perform. However, they received minimal briefing on current plant status. This factor, coupled with the plant's practice of providing minimal status announcements over the plant wide announcing system, resulted in some confusion among operatcr> as to the reason for some of' the actions they were directed to perform. This caused some delays in implementation of actions as operators attempted to obtain information amongst themselves before performing certain evolutions.

A critique was held shortly after the drill to provide feedback to the-participants. Many of the weaknesses noted.by the controllers were~also-identified by the inspectors. The licensee recognized that lack of.

communication continues to be a concern as evidenced by the poor turnover between the TSC and the emergency operations fccility, the excessive time required to assess the damage in the cable spreading room, and the amount of time that was allowed to elapse before the offsite release was recognized. The licensee plans to correct the identified weaknesses by performing extensive trai. sing in the areas of concern.

6. Enoineerina and Technical Support (71707) (45053) f(37828)1 The inspectors evaluated engineering and technical support activities to determine their involvement and support of facility operations. This was accomplished during the course of routine evaluttion of facility events and concerns, through direct observation of ectivities, and discussions with engineering personnel.

a. Replacement of Station Battery DOS On July 19, replacement of station battery D0b commenced.

Replacement of battery D06 is scheduled fc: November 1993. These batteries, which were last replaced in 1989, are expected to have a life of about 20 years. However,-they have shown visible signs indicating excessive sulfation, and the manufacturer is replacing them under warranty. Other than the precipitate which has built up on the cell bottoms, there has been no measurable deterioration in battery performance such as capacity or individual cell voltages. The inspector monitored replacement of the battery, the ensuing battery tests, and had no concerns.

b. Construction of New Emeroency Diesel Generator Buildina Construction of the building to house two new emergency diesel generators and the new diesel fuel oil system began the week of June 7. Initial observations of this activity are discussed in Inspection Report.266/93011;'301/93011. During this inspection period, concrete pours. continued for the fuel oil tank walls and the main building support walls. The two fuel oil storage tanks were set in place and back-filled. Electrical conduit was placed in the below ground section of the building between the fuel oil storage tanks and back-filled with fill concrete. Trenches'were 11

excavated for the power cables from the new diesel generator  ;

building to the existing safeguards busses. ~ Electrical conduit i was laid in these trenches and back-filled with concrete. Because J both the new diesels will be designated as B train, their output )

power supply conduits were run in the same concrete filled trench. .!

The inspectors monitored e'xcavation and grading act'ivities, concrete placement activities including installation of i reinforcement-(rebar), laying of conduit, batch plant operation, i concrete transport and pumping, testing,' form removal and post J pour inspection. Discussions were held with craft workers and ,

supervisors to evaluate their knowledge of the job requirements. j The inspectors will continue to monitor progress of this ,

construction.

I The inspectors noted that during early pours, the workability of. I the fresh concrete was causing some placement problems. The. '

licensee corrected the problems by reducing the fly ash content -

and adjusting the amount of plasticizer in the mix. These 4 modifications to the mix design produced a more easily worked concrete that should reduce the amount of voids or honeycombs in  ;

the finished structure.

The inspectors observed onsite testing of fresh concrete by the licensee's test contractor. Tests required.by job specifications j were slump tests, air entrainment tests, and concrete strength  !

tests, all were to be from samples.taken.at the pour site. Slump l tests'and air content test results were inconsistent during the early pours but were returned to specified. limits by the above i modifications to the mix design.

The-inspectors noted that the concrete testing contractor's procedures were dated February 1990 and ~ referenced the appropriate codes and standards. However, project specifications referenced  !

codes and standards issued in 1990,1991 and 1992.. . The licensee's quality assurance department initiated immediate corrective action to update the procedures to reflect. project requirements for -;

concrete testing. l Quality control inspectors were present during rebar placement,  ;

form erection and at each concrete pour. Past pour inspections-were performed immediately after form removal. Voids or honeycomb 'l areas were being identified and categorized as minor or major '!

deficiencies. Major honeycombs are' defined as any void or l honeycomb that exposes the rebar when the unsatisfactory concrete i is removed. A nonconformance report (NCR) is issued for each 1 major deficiency. Each NCR is reviewed by the licensee's engineering staff and quality assurance. A copy of the NCR,- i including repair instructions, is.- provided to the craft supervisor- ,

i before repairs commence. Six major honeycombs have been ~ l it identified in the building walls that warranted NCRs and specific  !

repair instructions. '

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l The inspectors reviewed licensee quality assurance audit reports d of the concrete testing contractor's facilities.. Three audit'

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findings relative to the' contractor's quality assurance program were identified in the! report. The contractor responded to each j

of the findings with-their proposed corrective action. Followup ~  ;

of-the. audit findings had not been performed at the time of the .!

inspection. Licensee quality assurance: personnel routinely. '

performed surveillances of construction'and-inspection. activities j at the~ construction site. These surveillances are documented'in-  ;

an activity monitoring report used to effect'immediate corrective: 1

, action. i 1

7. Safety Assessment /Ouality Verification (40500) (90712) (92700). >

7 a.

a Licensee Event Reoort Review- d The inspectors reviewed LERs submitted to the NRC to verify.that the details were'_ clearly reported, ' including accuracy; of the description and corrective action taken. The inspector determined d whether further information was required,- whether generic. 'i implications were indicated, and whether the event warr' anted: .  !

onsite follow up. The inspector also verified that appropriate. '

. corrective action was taken or responsibility was assigned and 1 that continued operation of the facility was conducted'in- 1 accordance with Technical Specifications and did not constitute'an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59. 'The' j

following LER was reviewed and closed: l j.

(Closed) LER 256/301/91-001 Flow During Automatic Actuation Minimum Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW)~ j

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This report documents -discovery of a potential design inadequacy . j involving the- actuation' of simultaneous: AFW- flow to both units I coincident with a failure of ~one of the turbine driven AFW pumps. . i Under tne circumstances of a loss of off site power to'both units,. 'l resulting in a loss of normal feedwater, coincident'.with the ;j failure of the turbine driven AFW pump in one unit, the: AFW system.

may be incapable of providing automatic feedwater) flow to- one of . l the units without. operator intervention. This case would-require that the steam pressure in the unit with the failed: turbine driven j ;

AFW pump also be at a higher pressure than in the other unit.

Under such conditions, the feedwater would be preferentially j

t diverted to the unit with the lower steam generator pressure. j Several discussions were held between the licensee and the:NRC l regarding the acceptability of the response actions'to be taken. 'j during the. scenario. Additional information to evaluat'e the' acceptability of this condition was provided by Wisconsin Electric in their letter. dated August 24, 1993. The information delineated in the discussions and' the >1etter were evaluated and determined to- 1 be acceptable._ The licensee has procedures in place to assure l that appropriate. actions are taken in the event of this' condition.

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l' The flow split condition is expected to be corrected by. operators L within five minutes of the loss of feedwater. This situation is analogous to the operator action required to line up the qualified >

AFW suction source (service water) in the event of loss of the non-qualified condensate storage tanks. This latter situation is  ;

addressed in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and is '

considered acceptable. Both conditions are correctable by operators from the control room within the five minutes determined  ;

in section 14.1.10 of the FSAR, wherein the inventory in the steam generators does not go below the minimum inventory determined for the loss of feedwater accident. Additionally. . the May 3,1982, Technical Evaluation Report (TER) for NUREG-0737 item II.E.1.2 discusses the acceptability of manual operator actions under- j certain accident conditions. Based upon the apparently more limiting scenario described in the FSAR and the acknowledgement of required operator action in the TER, this item is closed.

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b. Manaaer's Supervisory Staff Meetina The inspector observed sessions 93-14 and 93-15 of the Manager's Supervisory Staff. Issues discussed included proposed containment system technical specification changes, license renewal '

activities, status of rod control system troubleshooting, design basis documentation activities, diesel generator turbo exhaust-modification, and service water valve maintenance. The inspectors raised a concern with management regarding the. diesel exhaust ,

modification and service water maintenance discussions, in that, '

these discussions did not -address optimal timing based upon a safety / risk perspective. Apparently, the service water system i maintenance's timing was considered prior to the staff meeting-however, this safety consideration was performed at the working i level and was not well understood during the staff meeting. After i the inspectors discussed the diesel modification work's timing I with management, the acting Chairman postponed the decision until a future meeting. This was done to allow further analysis of j

l optimal timing from a safety perspective.  ;

c. Off Site Review Committee Meetina ,

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The inspector observed meeting 50 of the Off Site Review Committee  !

(OSRC). The required quorum was maintained throughout the meeting and was periodically supplemented by additional persons. j Committee members were experienced in various aspects of the .

nuclear industry and possessed diverse backgrounds extending i outside of NRC Region III. Much of the meeting was held onsite  ;

and included tours of the plant and one on one interviews with I selected individuals by committee members. 1 The committee reviewed items required by their charter which included pertinent safety issues such as 10 CFR 50.59 saf6ty l evaluation reports and technical specification change requests. l 14 l l

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5 The committee's discussions were candid and constructive and not 4 dominated by the plant staff. The meeting was well documented and action items clearly identified and tracked. Overall, the inspector considered OSRC's reviews to be effective.

d. Facility Housekeepino During routine tours of the facility, the inspectors noted a ,

gradual deterioration in the general cleanliness / housekeeping of Dortions of the plant. The eight foot elevation of the primary ,

auxiliary building and the area around the spent fuel pool were -

the principle areas of concern. The inspector discussed this with plant management.  !

Reactor Engineering Instruction (REI) 24.0, " Spent fuel Pit", .

provides a checklist to verify that items stored in the vicinity ,

of the spent fuel pool are prevented from inadvertent entry into the pool. The inspector discussed the REI with the spent fuel pool administrator and found that although the instruction is deir.g adequately followed, it fails to address the control of material in close proximity to the pool such as in the contaminated storage area. The inspectors will continue to monitor this area in future inspections.  ;

i. Temporarv Irstructions (TI)

a. (Clcsed) TI 2500/028 Employee Concerns Programs -

Jsir; the TI for guidance, the inspectors- evaluated the characteristics of the company's employee concerns program. The ins;ectors also reviewed General Policy 013, " Safety Policy," and  :

FBfG 3.5.2,

• Injuries, Accident Reporting, OSHA Form 200 '

Reqvirements, and Industrial Safety," to verify the company's conformance with the TI (See Attachment "A").

The inspection determined that no formal employee concern program certaining to nuclear safety issues exists at this time. All employees are expected to bring safety concerns to'the attention of ineir respective supervisor. In cases where the employee relieves that the safety concern was not properly addressed by  ;

nis/ner supervisor, the employee should convey the concern to any manager or department head until the issue is resolved.

A program is in place for employees to express concerns that-pertain to industrial safety. Concerns are communicated through-he use of safety improvement suggestion forms which are located in a central area of the plant. The forms are reviewed by the Division Safety Committee and general recommendations to resolve the concern are made to the Plant Manager. The final corrective actions are approved by the Plant Manager and communicated to the employee. This TI is closed.

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9. ' Exit'Ihterview (71707)  :

A verbal summary of preliminary findings was provided to the licensee +

representatives denoted in paragraph I above on September 14, at the conclusion of the inspect-ion. 'Information highlighted during the a meeting is. contained in the Executive Summary. The licensee agreed with  ;

the. assessment of the inspection findings and dissenting comments were not received. No written inspection material was provided to the licensee during the inspection.

The li(ely informational content of the inspection report with regar'd to-documents or processes reviewed during the inspection was also  :

discussed. Licensee management did not identify any documents or processes that were reported on as proprietary.

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