ML20203G154
| ML20203G154 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 04/22/1986 |
| From: | Matthews D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | Martin T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20197J117 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8604280337 | |
| Download: ML20203G154 (21) | |
Text
y v
/ A UNITED SSTES-
[ p, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
-j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 5
%,,,,,# April 22,1986 MEMORANDUM FOR: Thomas T. Martin, Director Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards Region I FROM: David B. Matthews, Chief Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement
SUBJECT:
FEMA REPORT OF THE JUNE 5, 1985 0YSTER CREEK EXERCISE The subject report, forwarded by memorandum dated March 25, 1986, is enclosed.
There were no deficiencies observed during the exercise, which involved full participation by the State of New Jersey and Ocean County.
There were inadequacies requiring corrective actions and the state-prepared schedule of these corrective actions is enclosed.
Also enclosed, for your information, are copies of exercise reports for the March 1982, May 1983 and May 1984 exercises of the Radiological Emergency Response Plans of the State of New Jersey, Ocean County and Ocean County municipalities.
N. ,
David B. Matthews, Chief l Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Enclosure:
- 2. Schedule of Corrective Actions l
- 3. Copies of Exercise Reports for 3/82, 5/83 and 5/84 CONTACT: Gerald E. Simonds, IE 492-4870 Off2-80%] Kb y
J
.s ~
fgQ " s. 3y x Federal Emergen~cy Management Agency 3 Washington, D.C. 204/2
,, y e t
MAR 251986 MEMOmNDlN FOR: Edward L. Jordan Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S Nucle R atory Ccrnmission FIOM: a .. 1 Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs
SUBJECT:
Post Exercise Assessment of the June 5,1985, Exercise of the Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Attached are two copies of the Post Exercise Assessment of the June 5,1985, joint exercise of the offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. This was a joint full participation exercise for the State of New Jersey and Ocean County . The assessment dated August 22, 1985, was prepared by Region II of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (fem ).
There were no deficiencies observed at the exercise. 'Ihere were inadequacies identified rquiring corrective actions; however, they did not detract from the overall demonstrated capability to protect the health and safety of the public.
A cspy of the State's schedule of corrective actions is also attached. 'Ihe schedule identifies exercise inadquacies, indicates the State or County response, provides fem 's evaluation of the response, and notes the status of the remedial action. fem Region II is working with the State to assure completion of the necessary corrective actions.
For purposes of ccatpleteness, we have also attached copies of exercise reports for the March 1982, May 1983 and May 1984 exercises of the Radiological Emergency Response Plans of the State of New Jersey, Ocean County and Ocean County nunicipalities.
If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Robert S. Wilkerson, Chief, Technological Hazards Division, at 646-2861.
Attachments as Stated
. f
?*
, TABLE 3.1 OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR CENERATING STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCl!EDitLE June 5, 1985 Deffetencies and Outstanding Deffetencies from Previous Exercises State of New Jersey - EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTERS o
2 0 0 Q'
~ 7 8 ~3
. 3: -: 10 *310 sa j at at a 831 ;;& t
. tj
- ti &2* 2p X::23 N RAC Recommendation for Corrective Action Uw $5 State (S)/ County (C) Respones (ACTION) 20$ SM FEMA Evaluation of State /Cosanty Response M STATIC OF M5f JERSEY EMERCENCY OPERATIONS CENTER M.I 1. The State RERP contains two con- X titcting 1his comment, which originated at th<. Sectinn 11.5.4.3 of the State Plan A I criteria for clearing May 24, 1983 Oyster Creek Exercise, ha., gives a contamination level at which evacuated areas for reentry; this been resolved by the plan revisioni reentry will be allowed and there is a inconsistency delayed reentry for a submitted on April 26, 1985 and May 14 general discurston of various agency short period. The plan sho. eld he 1985.
reviewed and revised to resolve this responsibilities. The final decision on reentry v;11 be based on ALARA conflict. (Tahle 4.11 3) principles and a cost benefit analysis (page 11-7). The State is awaiting EPA guidance on reentry dose commitments before adopting a more definitive position.
L4.c 2. The runor control telephone nunber X The rumor control telephone nunber and 1he State response adequate; A was not included in all of the EMS reference to the public informattoi is remedial action will be verified at I
messages, netermine whether the brochore will be added to all ER', next exercise.
rumor control telephone number is to messages.
he included as part of EBS messages Please provide revised EBS messages and during next plan revision.
follew consistent procedures with regard to this policy for alt
- ERS mess.iges. Also, consider in-ciuding reference to public infor-nation brochures in EMS messages.
(Table 4.I; IO)
TABLE 3.2 OYSTER CREFK NUCl. EAR CENERATING STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCHEDUI.E
- June 5, 1985, Dettelencies and Outstanding Deftetencies from Previous Exercises State of New Jersey - NEAR-SITE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PACILITY R
2 ;'
~: 7 g
=
m : 5 ,
II TO !"11 33 n "O *t 1; *4
~
831 ;;e:t 2 ri g:g3 d3a 3 : a23 MOS FEMA Evaluettom of State /Comty Response Eld $,$
RAC Rec. - dation Corrective Action $5 45 State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION)
WERacceCY orERATIcels FACILITY The response is adequate. A 1 F.I 1. Emergency response f actitty did not X Ceneral Public littltties is in thi- State telephone to process of installing new telephon<- Remedial action to be verified at next have enour.h lines support emergency operattung. lines between Oyster Creek, the Burea<i exercise.
telephone of Radiation Protection, and the Stat <'
Utilize the additional line which was apparently available Police Office of Emergency Mcnagement during drills. Identify and resolve These newlines should be operational b:'
the proble m with the ring dnwn tele- the next exercise.
phone. (Tahle 4.2; l)
The display board on plant status vil The State response is adequate. A I
- 2. One display bua r.1 on plant statug X .
C .3 Remedial action to be verif ted at nest which is .in aid in dectston making be reworded to f actittate interpretattoi i was initialty use.t but was not kept by specif ying the boundaries that may bi- exercise.
up to date. If the plant status breached. Also, a statement as to t hi-display board is to be retained, it time of last update has been added, must he kept current so as not to he misleading. Additionally, this hoard sho.std he rew.srded to simplify interpretation of the status of the plant. (Table 4.2; 2)
A.2.a 3. The destanated official at the OlF X The BRP SRAO at the EOF is in charge o The deftctency was cited because the 1 1 was not clearly in charP,e of cum- communicating PARS to the OEM. However SRP SAO made a decision during the SAE municating PARS to OEM for imple- as per SOP 202, this does not precludi- classtitcation . for a precautionary mentation. The RRP SRA0 at the EuF consultation with individuals at BRP-lii! sheltering PAR. However, he did not should be clearly in charge of com- or the RRP Liaison at OEM. communicate this recomajendation to OEM runnicat ing PARS to ilEM for imple- via the sap representative at the State mentation. (Table 4.2; 1) 01C. The issue is not one of consulta-tion, but of following procedures and communicating recommendations to the proper authorities.
k TARI.F. 3.2 (Cont'd) {
?
i
' ~ i W; O 2 7 5 - ~2 ~3 3" .3 10 , 331 13 30 at :" 83f ;;gS t 1j. :: :: an3 e am EE RAC Recommendation for Corrective Action Ed $5 State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION) UOS FEMA Evaleasttom of State /Coestty Response $p/4 @
l 4 On several occantons there was con- X see comment above. (Table 3.2; F.1 91) . The State's response is adequate. The A I 3
- I remedial action will be verified at the siderable delay in contacting the (
BRP representative at the State DC riest exercise. )
4 by commercial phone. Identify the I
cause of the delay in contactinf the RRP repreentative at the State DiC by comie rci al telephone and impte- [
ment a method to avoid repeat occur- 9 c
rences of delays in ainking these contacts. (Table 4.2; 4) 1
- 2. 5. During the early stages of th.* ewr- X ntscussions with CPU have begun in order FEMA has requested that the NItC contact A 1
- CPU and recommend that a nuclear cise, there were delays in obtaininR to resolve this problem. A suggestion plant statug information due to the to CPU by FEMA or by their NRC represen- engineer augment the early staffing at *r fact that the utility does not futty tative ori the Regional Assistance the EOF. f, activate the OlF with a nuclear Committee would facilitate the State's [
engineer until the Site Area Iberg- efforts.
ency clanslftcation. The State . j should arrange with the utility to have the ut tlity augment the initial EOF stafflug by adding one nuclear 9{
engineer so that the RRP staff will !
he able to obtain plant status !
information as goon as BRP arrives , {
at the EOF. (Tahle 4.2; 5) l-5 I
-r n, - r r< ' t p9 g i t*: ' e
TABLE 3.2 (Cont'd) 0 O S , Q'
~
7 0 5 3
=
3: 3 10 231 43*
"O *O 3* 83i;;g3 t 3 ::" : &it3 CD 3::g:
N RAC Recommenifation for Corrective Action Ei a $5 State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION) 20$ FEMA Evaluation of State /Coimty Response Eld M The State response le adequate. The A 1 1.8 6. Field teams were not used effec- X Addttional training has been given and tively to obtain information needed new SOPS have been written for ef fective effective use of field teams will be to verify dose projections for an uttitration of field teams. vertfled at the next exercise.
estended period of time. The field teams must be effectively used to define the plume with respect to both site and strength. Several measurements of the plume strength should he made at or near plurw centertine, as determined by measurements, so that the projec-tions can be vertfled or modtf ted as necessary. By this vertitcation process, PARg can he adjusted accordingly. (Table 4.2; 6)
G
TABLE 3.1 OYSTER CREEK NUC1. EAR CENERATING STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCHEDULE
- June 5, 1985, Deftetencies and outstanding Deficiencies from Previous Exeretsee State of New Jersey - BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION - FORWARD COMMAND POST
=
$ ' W: T E *: ~3 3" . 10 333 0 34 30 at 24 83i ;E:t k!
NU RAC Recosusendation for Corrective Action US
$5 State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTICII)
RE3 EOS FEMA Evalisation of Stata/Consity Response 2p 333 E4/ M 3RP-FOWARD CDBeuf1D POST
- 1. Some emergency workers did not have X Recause these emergency workers are new The State's response is adequate. 1he A I-1.e issuance of Tt.D cards and dosteeters TLD hadges. Regular briefings employees, they had not yet received TLD should he given to emergency field cards. A duty roster of Nuclear will be vertfled at the next exercise.
workers to assure that proper use of Fmergency Response Personnel has Seen dostmeters and record keeping nf prepared and included in SOP 204. A doses are applied. (Table 4.1; l) schedule to maintain and update this roster has been established, including issuance of TLD cards and training in use of personnel dostmetry.
x Additional training has been given. The State response is adequate. A 1 it.2 2. Some caergency workers were unfast-Faerr,ency workers knowledge of exposure liar with the ma n tem = cuposure allowed without proper authoriza- levels will be evaluated at the nest tion. Fmergency workers should he exercise.
trained to know the maximun exposure levels at which they will be re- .
quired to nottfy their supervisor 8 and he authurtzed to receive addIttonal exposure if necessary.
(Tahle 4.1; 2)
By letter dated 9/I4/83 to FEMA tt was The conflict with the radio frequency A C 1.4 1. A radio frequency should he set X N/
aside for the exclustve use of fleid ohj Indicated that the frequency confitet has been corrected and has not been a monitoring teams. (Tahte 4.1; 4) with the Middlesex County Park Police problem at subsequent excretses.
has been resolved.
2 .
5 TARI.E 3.4 OYSTER CREFK NUCl. EAR CENERATING STATION - REMEDIAI, ACTION SCHEDUI.E June 5. 1985. Deficiencies and Outstanding Deficiencies from Previous Exercises State of New Jersey - RADIOLOGICAI FIE1.D MONITORING TEAMS' E #
Q
- 2 *: 2
= 3" 10 j "O at 34 23! q3 83; ;;Og E
&&3 tg1 3::t3 RAC Recommendation for Corrective Action Ue5 45 State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION) US$ FEMA Evalenstion of State /Ceesity Response 244 g RADIOtACICAL FIELD MDN11DRING TEAftS Mone i
i .
O
TABLE 3.5 OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR CENERATING STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCitEDUt.E June 5, 1985, Deftetencies and outstanding Deftetencies from Previous E-- -es State of New Jersey - FIELD IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTtoalS TO PROTECT Tite P. O ;C C O C - V 7 0 i *: 3
. 3* 3 10 -
233 0 3A j M at 2" 83 ;;e t E
RAC Recommendation for Corrective Action t
E* 5 4.5 State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION)
Rit*
$* O $
2p #::23 FEMA Evalisattee of State / County Response 2 < 4 74 3,$
i actions to pecTECT THg Putt.lC .
I C.t 1. Despite the puhite education efforts X X ;ee response provided on 7/19/85 letter the State's response to correct the A s1 C.2 undertaken by the state and utility, o Kowieski. feltetency of public education informa- !
the puhite awareness concerning tion is adequate. The pubite education radiological emergency procedures efforts of the State and utility appears to he low. The State working July 19, 1985 include the matting of Emergency Infor- i jointly with the ut i t t t'y should u- nation brochures to all addresses plore additional avenues to edi . ate althin the EPZ, providing 5,000 the pubtle about the meaning o. the ir. Roger Kowleski placards for distribution to s-"nici-stren signal, Faergency Planning r ederal Fmergency Management Agency Paltties within the EPZ and advertising Areas, and protective action op- f6 Federal Plaza in local weekly newspapers from tions. This could he accompitshed dew York, NY 10278
- mortal Day through 1. abor Day (or by placing an ad-crtisement in tele- longer). In addition, the advertise-phone directurteg, including the lear Ptr. Kowleskt: nent in the 224,000 telephone direc-infrumation 19 calendars, posting tories should prove to be an ef fective road signs, and making radio and W The State Office of Emergency method of upgrading public ausreness.
announcements. A public Informatlan 4anagement (nEM) has 'reviawed the draf t The ef fectiveness of these ef forts will program should be initiated in the Post Esercise Assessment for the June 5, he evaluated at the next esercise.
IO-mile EPZ. Posted nottees should 1985 oyster Creek Enercise. The State be placed in hotels, motels, and 1DI strongly takes exception to the other places f requented by transtent Category "A" deftetency designation to persons. puhtte Information pam- Field Inplementations of Actions to
- phlets giving information and in- Protect the Public. The State is very struction for use during an emer- dismayed that no indication was given at gency should he printed and dis- .iny meetings or crittques that a trthuted to all members of the category "A" deftetency was being public. (Tahl. 4.5; t) considered.
s TABLE 3.5 (Cont'd)
OYSTER CREFK NUCLEAR CENERATING STATION - REMEDI At, ACTION SCllEDULE 6 June 4, 1985. Deficiencies and Outstanding Deftetencies from Previous Exercises State of New Jersey - FIELD IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTIONS 10 PROTECT 11tE Pt!BLIC l O
- O - WO 7 0 E *: ~3
- 3 . TO 131 0 33 "O *t 817 ;;"a t 3:" t : &&3 t
$gi 3::23 NO$ FEMA Evaluation of State /Ceestty Response d@
- 4. 0 RAC Recommendation for Corrective Action 55 45 State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION)
The (IEM further believes that a ategory 'A" cannot be. substantiated in
'act. The State, county and municipal IEM's and the uttitty have jointly taken
'fforts to insure that emergency Information is provided to the transtent wpulat ion, dpecifteally, the following actions have been taken:
e 85,000 Emergency Information
- Brochures which identify evacua-
- tion routes and congregate care shelters where mailed to all addresses within the EPZ. This included privately owned rental
' f units.
3
\
e 100 Emergen'cy . Information Brochures where matted to each hotel and/or motel within the EPZ. .
e 5000 Placards identifying the purpose of the Alert .Nottf tcation * '
strens, Emerdency Broadcast System radio stations and the toll free rumor control phone number were provided to the municipal OEH's for general distethution.
3
+
i
i i
TABLE 3.5 (Cont'd)
OYSTER CREEK NUCLF.AR CENERATING STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCHEnt!LE June 5, 1985 Deficiencies and outstanding Deficiencies fross Previous Exercises j State of New Jersey - FIELD IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTIONS 10 PROTECT 1ME PUSLIC t
! QE [j
. # , *: ~3 i a 3: .
- 10 23143 30 *t 3M EliteJ t i
- =
2 3 : *: &R3 20 3::rg .
$5 $5 State (S)/ Cot.ny (C) Response (ACTION) UO$ FEMA Evaluation of State /Cointy Response Elf @l bN RAC Recommendation Corrective Action e e An advertisement informing botti l residents and transients of the EBS stations and the State rumor control phone number. The advertisement will appear t ri 224,000 directories in both the f, 201 and 609 area codes. e e An advertiscuent informing tron- f sleets of emergency information. l This appears is weekly newspapers directed towards the treasient population. 3 Documentation for these actions are I provided with the esception of the weekly newspaper advertisements (This will be provided later). The Oct has no other comments at
- this time ce the contents of this document. If you have l any questtoes please feel free to r contact the Radiological neergency l Response Planning Unit at (609) 292-7710. .
Sincerely, t b
Harold E. Spedding, Major Deputy State Director l-Office of Emergency Management f,
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TABLE 3.7 OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR CENERATING STATION - RENEDIAL ACTION SCHEDULE June 5, 1985 Deftetencies and Outstanding Deftetencies from Previous Exercises State of New Jersey - OCEAN COUNTY .
J C C?
E ' 2' 7
. 0 8 ~2 ~3 3" .: TO 2310 33
- t
. at :: 23? ;;gss-l}I : ::: O tt 3 y1 333 IE RAC Recommendation for Corrective Action US S iU State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION) UU$ FDIA Evalenetton of State /Coesity Response E44 @
nream CotHETY EOC has responded in the A C 3.2 1. The capahttity for fixed and moht te X N/ this ttee, deftetent in the 3/16/82 The State mercise, has been renedtated at the referenced spread sheets for revision medical support factittles to com- lbj ounty level. See the response on page to the Oyster Creek Plan that all municate vitti cach other should he Jersey and all 15 of 96 of the spread sheets submitted hospitals in New reviewed and upgraded. This was deficient during th exercise and to FEMA in Nay, 1985 for revisions to Honnouth/ Ocean County ambulances are such comminicat ion should he avait- the Oyster Creek Plan. rquipped in accordance with the JENS able. (Tahle 4.7; 7) plan. The JEMS Plan has been reviewed and provides an excellent discussion of
.i coordinated communication system.
9 9
- =4
)
TABLE 3.8 OYSTER CREEK NUCLF.AR CENERATING STATION - REMEDI AI, ACTION SCHEDULE June 4, 1985. Deftetencies and Outstanding Deftetencies from Previous Exercises State of New Jersey- OCEAN COUNTY FIELD Q W; tt'C o
C 5 *2 ~3 a 3: .: it -
23! O SA at at :a d! : : 0R*
837 ;E:t T M3::lt3
$E RAC Reco m ndation for Corrective Action US $5 State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION) U55 FDIA Evaluetten of State /Ceesity Response E<d OCEAll CDEMETY FIRLD
- 5
. 1. It should he vertfled that all X X All schools in the Ocean County EPZ have The list of factittles which have A I 6 schools under the Jurtsdiction of been offered Tone Alert radios. received tone alert radios was not the superintendent at the Stafford Attached you will find the existing attached. However, a copy of the F.lementary School have recetved tone distributton of the radios as well as a 1.e t t e r to the county DOC transettting alert radios. (Table 4.8; l) copy of a letter to the County EMC the list of factittles that arenot requesting further action on this issue. participating in the tone alert radio However, the Tone-Alert system is a program has been attached. The State redundant systen since the school plan OEM, through the county, is trying to gives the option to the County Superin- rectify this situstion. Yhts remedial tendant to order evacuation prior to an action will be vertfled in the next ERS nottftention. exeretse. .
. 0.c 2. A comprehensive puhite education 1 N/ See response to items C.1/C.2 above in See response to C.I and C.2 above. A I
' program should be conducted, es- Obj Table 3.5.
pecially in t ir,ht of the large transient population. Energency -
procedures should be posted in motel
, rooms and in puhlte factittleg. A program shout.1 he instituted to insure that hnth full-ttee and transient residents receive ,
emergency information. (Tahle 4.8; 1)
4 s
TABLE 3.8 (Cont'd)
O O O 2 -
G*
- 8 3: .: 10
- 5 lj. "O *t ::a 23 30 sa
$$U : : &an 81 i;"a t RAC Recommendation for Corrective Action US 45 State (S)/Conalty (C) Itesponse (ACTION) UOE F1 3::20 FDth Evaluation of Stata/Coissty Respostae E / @
I.9 3. Although Ocean County is not re-quired to have a capability to monitor radiotodine, if it elects to do so the follow!ng should be addressed:
- a. The county followed the state X N/ 3 air sampling procedure for Obj 1he State SOPS have been revised The air purge of the saepig cartridge A with guidance from Mr. Joseph C radiotodine. However, the state outside the plume has been added to SOP procedure needs to he corrected Keller, FEMA consultant, and were 102. The proceture for calculation of with respect to air flow rate and submitted for RAC review on 9/4/85. thyroid committed dose has been the calculation of activity. New incorporated. SOP 302 has been pumps to correct the air flow revleved and found acceptable, problem have been ordered; their receipt whoes td be vertfled.
(Table 4.3; 7a)
- b. Sampling kits should contain N/ h. Silver Zeolite cartridges will be silver acolite cartridges. (Table Obj The State response is adequate to be A 4.R; 7b) provided to the County teams. I vertited at the nest exercise.
e
TA8t.E 3.8 (Cont'd) 3 G .
- O O >
W 7 N' .: 2: *
- ~3 m j U *t 10
- .. 33 M 33 n*N RAC Recommendetton for Corrective Actton Ua 4 a: State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTloN) n3 {r3 ;r.M e
Ff jq4 **'m* 8! -.
d' O E FDIA Evalesetles of State /Coestty Reepianse A.4 4 There was no indication that a X The Ocean County Chapter of the American The State response is adequate.
written roster was available at the 1he A I.
Red Cross and the County Radiological remedial action will be verified at the Pinelands and ,Retek Mir,h Schools Of ficer have been advised to provide 24 Congregate Care . Shelters or at the next exercise.
hour staf fing rosters for their shelter Manahawkin decontamination center to and decontamination operations. See .
assure that staffing could he accom-pitsbed on a 24-hour hasts.
attached letters.
A roster should he available at these facilities to ensure. 24-hour staffing capahtlity. (Table 4.8;13)
J.9 5. A message to notify all Emergenry
.'. l .d 1 Ocean . County's records of the 6/5/85 A review of the ocean County messages Workers within the 10-stle EPZ to exercise indicate that the KI message shows message #18 (Log #88) for all A I simulate taking KI was not relayed was property routed to all EOC's,
] by the county to all Fmergency. Police, Fire, first Aid, Radiological emergency workers in the 10 mile EFZ to Workers an.1 was transmitted only on . take KI was sent to EOC, Police, Fire, Teams, and the Health Department over First Aid , RAD teams, and Health Dept.
the Fire Rand and the Emergency EMRAD and EMS radte ftequencies. The g Medical Service -radio f regisenc ies. via Fire Board at 1958 and EMS at 1953.
The message slvmeld go to att Fner-Ocean County Comrumications Officer Please provide FEMA with Ocean County's l' gency Workers and shout.f be trang- Indicates that all EMRAD transmisstons documentation that this message was are routinely rebroadcast over RACES. transmitted via EMRAD.
l
' m1tted no EMRAD and the RACES.
(Tahle 4.91 14) t t
t
,J .
y.
1
TABLE 3.8 (Cont'd)
C C
3 , & T C E ~2 ~3
. 3* .
- 10 231 13A
- *t at :A 837 22
! :: :: n: ep ma.
lN RAC Recosusendation for Corrective Action Es $5 State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION) Ud$ FEMA Evelisation of State / Comity Response 2<l fiM The State's response is adequate. The A I
".5.b, 6. Radiation semitoring personnel at X 1he State OEM offers annual initial and use of radiation monitoring instruments the Pinelands High Schoni Congregate refresher training radiation monitoring C.5 care Shelter did not have adequate throughout Ocean County as specified in by radiation monitoring personnel will training schedules previously provided be evaluated at the next esercise.
expertence in the une of radiation
- monitoring instrunent operation and to FDtA.1he 1986 training schedule will proper- procedures for determining he provided to FEMA when it is radtation contamination levels of finalized. i Individuals. Radiation monitor personnel thoest.t receive additional
- training on the operat tem of radiation monitoring instrur* nts and proper procedures for s ...t l .e t t on contaminattan surveys. (Tahle 4.8t;
- 15) i i
1 e
e t
TABLE 3.9 OYSTER CREEK NUCl. EAR CENERATINC STATION - REMEDI AI, ACTION SCllEDULE June 4. 1985 Deftetencies and Outstanding Deftetencies from Previous Exercises Ocean County Hunicipalttles - EMERCENCY OPERATIONS CENTER $
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- a. n.. .c.:: = :t Oct"E E RAC Reconsendation for Correc9ive Action Us5 E sU State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION)
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FDIA Evalenstion of State /Consity Respuose 2g/
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% I .o 1. Full participation in the eteretse X X IM 10/14/85, the State OEM sent a letter The State's response is adequate. Full A I is necessary to develope and demon- to the Mayor of Island Heights Borough participation of all municipalttles strate emergency operations manage- notifying him of the deftetencies utit he vertfled at the next exercise.
ment skitts. Full parttelpatton tg observed in the EOC (i.e., the Island suggested for Island fleights. The lleights EOC was not fully staffed, did State should contact the Island not perform radiological monitoring as Heights Mayor an.1 recommenal full, part of access control, and did not have participation. (Table 4.9; 10) the lists of mobility impatred residents needing transportation). The State also advised the Mayor of the need for additional training for the EOC staff and that additional municipal training should be arranged independent of the annual training provided by the State and County to assure municipal capahtlity.
I.3 2. The Enc at neactwood lack potable X lt The State will attempt to arrange the Recause this deftetency has not been A I water. (Table 4.9; II) installation of portable water service corrected stoce the 1983 exercise, at the Beachwood EOC dependent upor please provide. documentation of the mantcipal plans for EOC development. State's attempt and an estimated completion date for the installation of potable water at the Beachwood EOC.
TAsti 3.9 (Cont'd)
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. l:: : OR: 21n 3::R3 E RAC Recoussendation for Corrective Action Ed 45 State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTtose) 50$ FEMA Evalisation of Stata/Coesity Respuese Eld M4 C.5.0 3. Municipal DCs within protective X X The State and County provided annual The State's response is adequate. The A I action areas should implement pro- training on EOC operations will remedial action w111 be vertited at the cedures to ensure that contaminated emphastre appropriate access next exercise.
Individuals are not allowed access control / radiological monitoring.
Into the DCs. (Table 4.9; 12) 9.4 4 Municipal procedures should be X X A generic emergency response procedure it is recognized that municipal A I developed, including a checklist fur has been provided for all affected procedures have been developed and each emergency classtitcation. municipalttles in Ocean County which provided to municipalttles prior to the (Table 4.9; 11) includes the suggested checklist. 6/5/85 exercise. The def tetency cited copies of the procedure were provided to in the 1985 exercise was because three FEMA and the RAC prior to the 6/5/85 municipalttles (i.e., teachwood, Pine exercise. Reach and Ocean Cate) did not use the procedures. This deftetency was included with the previous deficiency because it was related.
12.d 5. Lists of nontnstitutionalized X X I.t s t s of non-institutionaltzed mobility The State's response is adequate. The A I mobility-tapatred persons shestd he impaired residents are updated annually availability of tlx! lists of non-institu-avattable at each nunicipal DC. at the ncean County Of fIce of Emergency tionalized pobility inpaired residets (Table 4.9; 14) Management and provided to the resp,re- will be verified at each IDC at the tive saunicipal EMCs. This recommenda- next exercise, tion will also be emphasized at the .
annual Eoc Operations Training.
TABt,E 3.9 (Cont'd) e
- O C C 3" .: E W T j
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a t *t 34 13 303a 4
RAC Recommendation for Corrective Action 45 R&* 83 f ;&* t Ue5 State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTitul)
UO4 M ;3::g3 FEMA Evaluation of $ tate /Coesity *- . x E 5 *1t*
4.3.b 6. Training of emergency workers in the X X proper use. distrthution, checking rraining in all aspects of personal ne State's response is adequate. A and recording of information from iostmetry is provided annually by the Osergency workers' use of dostmetry I
State. The County has been encouraged will be vertited at the next exercise, dostmeters is needed. (Tahle 4.9; to provide additional
- 15) dostmetry training.
.2.o. 7 henty-four hour staffing by roster A.4 was not available at Barnegat am!
X The importance of 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> rosters will The State's response is adequate. A Stafford. 4 twenty-fost hour he emphastred at the EOC Operations Twenty four hour staffing by roster I
staffing ragter should he prepared Tralning provided by the State. will he vertited at the next esercise, and he nade avattable for review.
(Table 4.9; 16) 9.3 8. The working area at Barnegat Town '
ship EOC should he better organized:
X Specifte assistance to Barnegat Township The State's response is adequate. The A to factittate emergency opera t ions'. has been of fered by both the State and working area at Barnegat Township EOC I
The state in its training should the County Coordinator's Association. will be evaluated at the next exeretse.
recommend efftetent use of space. The Township will be given the assist-ance necessary to imprpve its EOC (Table 4.9; 17) operation, t.2.a 9 Pine Beach And Islind Ileights missed some of the early messages when the X The importance of full exercise parti- De State's response is adequate. A communications operator was away etpation and adequate EOC staffing has Cossounication . procedures I
been brought to the attention of local at the from the radio. The EP.1 TAD radio (see municipal EOCs will be evaluated at the should he manned at all times when governments attached letter). next exercise.
the EOC is activated. (Tahle 4.1; Continuous ronttoring of the communt-
- 18) catte- links will be emphastzed at t he FAC Op._ rations Training.
TABLE 3.9 (Cont'd) e E C
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!! 43 is i n U RAC Recosamendation for Correcti e Action
.e State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTIUff) 12.
k FEMA Evatustice of State /Comty " g - :
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@.4.a 10. Training to needed for newly X Mditional training will be offered to The State's response is adequate. The assigned 19ecs or the Deputy in those municipalttles as A I charge of Island Incights. Fine deftetent.
identified training of newly assigned ENCs and Beach and Barnegat Township DICs to Deputies of these municipalities will faelltartse them with their be verified at tie next esercise.
responsthititles. The State should provide .iddit ional training for EMCs and deputieg in charge of emergency response at the fWs indicate.t a Nve. (Table 4.9; 19)
J.13.f II. Six nunicipal OM:s were familiar with the procedure for not I The State will provide additional train- The State's response is adequate. A I administering KI. ing on the distribution and use of KI. Procedures for administering KI will be The state should However, since this information already incorp.erate the procedures for evaluated at the I.acey Ocean. Barnegat, taking KI into the enentclpilf t tem' appears in SOP 406 and the KI plan, it Stafford. Pine Beach and South Toms procedures anal provide training in is inappropriate to , duplica te it in the River EOC at the next exercise.
nunicipal procedures manual.
Its distrthutton and use. (Tahle 4.9; 20) .
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'g666666666666666666666t3666666666g i POST EXERCISE l 6 e iEssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss ASSESSMENT l Exercise of the New Jersey State, Ocean County and Twenty Municipalities
. Radiological Emergency Plans for 0YSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION J U N E 1,19 8 2 Federal Emergency Management Agency l
Region 2 FRANK P. PETRONE ~gW
,3a 26 FEDERAL PLAZA New York, N.Y.10278 Regional Director [Uff *
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, CONTENTS i l
l 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... 1 1.1 FEMA Responsibilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... I 1.2 Exercise Event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... 2 1.3 Exercise Scenario Objectives . . . . . . . . . ......... 2
- 1.4 Exercise Scenario. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... 6 1.5 Participating State and Local Organizations . ......... 6 1.6 RAC Evaluation Objectives. . . . . .. . . . . . ......... .7 1.7 Evaluation Procedures and Criteria . . . . . . ......... 7 1.8 Exercise Critique. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... 8 1.9 Federal Observer Team. . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... 9 1.10 Remedial' Action Procedures . . . . . . . . . . ......... 10 1.11 Review and Approval Procedures . . . . . . . . ......... 10 2 EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... 12 2.1 Overview. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... 12 2.2 Summary of Activities - State of New Jersey . . ......... 12 2.3 Summary of Activities - Ocean County. . . . . . ......... 16 2.4 Summary of Activities - Municipalities. . . . . ......... 18 3 EVALUATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... 22 3.1 State of New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... 22 3.2 Ocean County, New Jersey. . . . . . . . . . . . ......... 28 3.3 Ocean County Municipalities . . . . . . . . . . ......... 33 4
SUMMARY
OF SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCIES. . . . . . . . . ......... 51
, 4.1 State Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... 51 4.2 Ocean County, New Jersey. . . . . . . . . . . . ......... 52 4.3 Ocean County Municipalities . . . . . . . . . . ......... 53 5
SUMMARY
OF MINOR DEFICIENCIES. . . . . . . . . . . . ......... 54 5.1 State Functions . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . ......... 54 5.2 Ocean County, New Jersey. . . . . . . . . . . . ......... 56 5.3 Ocean County Municipalities . . . . . . . . . . ......... 57 6 CORRECTIVE ACTION FOR DEFICIENCIES . . . . . . . . . ......... 59 6.1 Schedule for Correcting Significant Deficiengies. ........ 59 e .
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' l A. 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 FEMA RESPONSIBILITIES On December 7, 1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assume lead responsibility for all off-site
= nuclear planning and response.
FEMA's immediate b.a s ic responsibilities in Fixed Nuclear Facility Radiological Emergency Planning include:
Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning and review e
and evaluation of State and local government emergency plans for adequacy.
e Determining whether the plans can be implemented, based upon observation and evaluation of exercises conducted in these jurisdictions. ,
e Coordinating the activities of other invokved Federal and volunteer agencies:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Department of Energy (DOE)
Department of Commerce /NOAA Department of Transportation (DOT)
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
Representatives of these agencies serve as members of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.
Formal submiss ion of emergency plans to the RAC by the states and involved local jurisdictions is, in each case, followed closely by evaluation of those plans, their exercising and critiquing. A public meeting is held to acquaint the citizenry with the concents of the plans, answer questions about them, and receive suggestions on the plans.
This report evaluates the first joint exercise at the Oyster Creek site which involved the participation of state, local, and Oyst'er Creek personnel to determine whether the draf t radiological emergency plans can be implemented.
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l 1.2 EXERCISE EVE.VT i
A radiological emergency exercise was conducted on March 16, 1982, between the hours of 6:00 a.m. (EST) and approximately 4:00 p.m. h is exer-cise tested the ability of the State of New Jersey, Ocean County, and twenty municipalities within Ocean Coun ty to protect the public in the event of a radiological emergency involving the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS). his station is operated by General Public Utilities (GPU) - Nuclear Corp. and is near Forked River, New Jersey.
1.3 EXERCISE SCENARIO OBJECTIVES he exercise scenario objectives were developed to test the ability of the state, county and local governments to res pond in accord with existing plans in the event that a radiological emergency at the OCNGS affected of f-site areas.
De exercise provided the basis for an evaluation by the participating organizations of the' adequacy .of their emergency plans and of their competency in implementing the plans. he benefits of the critique are the id entifica-
- tion of problems and the development of the corrective measures required to improve performance.
he on-site and of f-site objectives of the exercise scenario were as follows:
Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources e Demonstrate that each EOC and emergency response facility has adequate space, equipment, and supplies.
e Demonstrate that each EOC and emergency response facility has adequate access control and that adequate security can be maintained.
e Demonstrate that messages are transmitted in an accurate and timely manner; that messages are properly logged; that status boards are accurately maintained and updated; that appro- !
priate briefings are held and incoming EOC personnel are l brie fed and updated. .
Alerting and Mobilization of Of ficials and Staf f e Demonstrate the ability of the licensee to activate and man the emergency response facilities as appropriate for the existing emergency class and 'to transfer functional responsi-bilities to the appropriate operations center when escalating or de-escalating to a dif ferent emergency class.
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- Demonstrate the ability of the State of New Jersey, Ocean County and the participating municipalities to activate and man the emergency operations centers as appropriate for the existing emergency class.
e Demonstrate that licensee and of f-site notification and alerting of officials and staff can be accomplished in a timely manner and that all initial notification and updating o is verified and logged.
e Demonstrate that the state and county can establish notifi-cation and communication links with all municipalities.
e Demonstrate the ability of the licensee to communicate with their monitoring teams, rescue parties, and other personnel as needed.
- Demonstrate that the communications systems between the licensee, the EOCs, the Federal agencies, and the contiguous states are operable.
Emergency Operations Management e Demonstrate that state, county, and municipal elected and appointed officials and local off-site agencies such as first aid squads, police, and fire companies will provide thsely s up po rt .
e Demonstrate that the designated state, county, and municipal officials in each EOC are in command; that officials desig-
, . nated in the plan are actually in charge of the overall coordination of the response; and that designated off-site officials are represented in the EOF in accordance with the
, existing emergency plans.
o Demonstrate that licensee management is in control in accordance with the existing emergency plan.
e Demonstrate coordination between state, county, municipal, and Federal agencies and between those agencies and the licensee.
e Demonstrate that all agencies have 24-hour capability and
- that all agency representatives who are assigned emergency j
responsibilities can effectively operate from their planned location inside or outside the EOC. ~n, Public Alerting and Notification e Demonstrate that the state's decision to notify the public can be accomplished in an effective and timely manner.
+ e Demonstrate the Emergency Broadcast System procedure by ,
having an exercise EBS test message transmitted.
e Demonstrate that prompt notification is tLeely and is consonant with EBS activation.
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Public and Media Relations e Demonstrate the ability to establish a public information center; that there are accurate and timely press releases and briefings and that designed public information personnel are bnplementing their procedures.
e Demonstrate that emergency response infonmation material
- will be available to the public.
e Demonstrate coordination and arrangements for dealing with runors.
Accident Assessment e Demonstrate the ability of licensee personnel to recognize an l emergency initiating event and properly characterize and classify the emergency according to the pre established l Emergency Action levels and make proper notifications to of f-site agencies.
e Demonstrate that the State of New Jersey and GPU Nuclear personnel can perform off site dose projections and accident assessment for both radioactive noble gases and radioiodine quickly and accurately, e Demonstrate the field monitoring capability of the licensee, state, and county, for (1) predetermined area radiation levels; and (2) air sampling and analysis for radioiodine and particulates in the plume exposure EPZ for plume exposure
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rate verification; demonstrate that results can be effectively used by the licensee and the state in determining protective action recommendations.
e Demonstrate that appropriate sampling can be done in the ingestion EPZ. Samples will be forwarded to a laboratory although no radioactivity analyses will be performed. 1-131 concentration in milk will be predetermined to demonstrate that the results of such analyses could be effectively used to determine ingestion protective action recommendation.
e Demonstrate that independent accident assessment can be accomplished by the Department of Environmental Protection of the State of New Jersey; that they are capable of recommend-ing appropriate protective actions and that information is communicated between the licensee and the state accident as se s sment personnel .
e De=enstrate that the field monitoring teaas of the licensee, state and county can be dispatched and deployed in a tbsely
" manner; that communications are adequate; that radiological monitoring equipment is functional; that abaulated data are accurately obtained and transmitted through their respective channels.
- Demonstrate the ability of the licensee to obtain and analyze a post-accident s ampl e. ,
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e Demonstrate the ability of the licensee to assess the accident and provide appropriate protective action recommendations.
e Demonstrate the ability of the state to evaluate and make decisions to take protective actions based on recommenda-tions from the licensee and their independent as ses sment s .
e Demonstrate the ability of the state to receive meteoro-logical data and apply the data to the making of recom-mandations.
Actions to Protect the Public e Demonstrate protective actions (including mock evacuation and sheltering) by preparing an exercise scenario which provides for a hypothetical total integrated whole body or thyroid dose exceeding the evacuation PAGs for at least the nearest residents.
e Demonstrate the ability to perform personnel monitoring and decontamination.
e Demonstrate the following for at least one congregate care / decontamination center: that it can be opened and staffed on a timely basis; that records can be maintained; that adequate provisions for the care of the evacuees can be located; and that health and sanitation requirements can be met, e Demonstrate that access control points are established promptly and according to the plan, and that access and traffic control can be effectively implemented with 24-hour capabilities.
Health, Medical and Exposure Control Measures e Demonstrate the ability of the designated hospital to treat an off-site hypothetically contaminated injured patient and that the ambulance service can ef fectively transport off-site hypothetically contaminated injured personnel to the hospital. Demonstrate that the ambulance and associated equipment can be decontaminated and that contaminated clothing and materials are properly disposed of.
e Demonstrate that off-site agencies with on-site support responsibilities such as fire and first aid squad personnel can gain access to the site and proceed to the correct location.
e Demonstrate that appropriate state, county, and municipal
- emergency workers are briefed, receive dosimeters and KI supplies before assignments; that permanent records are -
maintained; and that the opened decontamination centers are properly manned and supplied.
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- Demonstrate the ability of the licensee to account for personnel on-site and to provide adequate radiation protec-tion services such as dosimetry, personnel monitoring and the ability to perform area surveys under emergency conditions.
e Demonstrate the ability of the licensee to enter a highly contaminated area for the purpose of rescuing casualties.
e Demonstrate the ability of the license to provide first aid and transport to a suitably prepared medical facility for an injured individual who has been contaminated or has received a high radiation dose.
Recovery and Reentry Operations e Demonstrate that licensee, state and local reentry procedures such as health and sanitation, safety criteria for acceptable radioactive contamination levels, reentry access control, and public information are implemented.
1.4 EXERCISE SCENARIO The scenario provid ed a simulated series of events on-site that resulted in all four classes of emergency conditions being declared.
The scenario began at approximately 6:00 a.m. with the notice of unusual ev ent . Within an hour the notification of alert was issued and the staffing of EOCs and other operations centers began.
At about 10: 00 a.m. , a site area emergency was declared and the airen warning and EBS systems' uere activated. Emergency workers were activated at this t ime. The general energency was declared at approximately 11:15 a.m.
Evacuation of specific areas was ordered by the Governor during the time of general emergency.
The general asergency condition remained in effect throughout the '
afternoon until about 2:00 p.m. when it downgraded to a site area emergency.
Further downgrading -of conditions continued until the exercise was terminated at about 4:00 p.m.
1.5 PARTICIPATING STATE AND LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS '
Participating of f-site state organizations includ ed the New Jersey State Department of Health, the New Jersey National Guard, New Jersey State Police, Bureau of Radiological Protection, and other state agencies. Partic i- l pacing ?.ocal organizations include Ocean County, municipalities within Ocean 1 v.4 , , , _ . - . , ._,m-,, ,y.___ -_.__.---,.m..-m- .r.-,_,.,,,,,-,,,.,_,.c,w,- ,,.m__.m,..-.,-,,,--.--,..--...r,,,,-. -, ,--,--,,,,,,,-.--c.vm m.-4
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. County, (at their EOCs), and other local support groups, e.g. , fire and police departments and volunteer organizations such as the American Red Cross and the Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES).
1.6 RAC EVALUATION OBJECTIVES General objectives of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) for the operational phase of the plans were to observe and evaluate the exercise, focusing on the ten functional areas listed and briefly described below. These ten functional areas include approximately 75 specific criteria taken directly from Section II of NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, Rev. 1. This NUREG document is the basic planning document on which the state and local plans, and also the criteria for observing and evaluating the exercise, are based.
Functional Areas:
e Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources (Space, Internal Communications , Displays , Security) e Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff (Staf fing, 24-hour Capability, Alerting Timeliness)
- e Emergency Operations Management (Organization, Control, Leadership, Supporting Officials, Decision Making) e Public Alerting and Notification (Means of Notification, Effectiveness) e Public and Media Relations (Publications, Press Facilities, Media Briefings, Release Coordination) e Accident Assessment (Staff and Field Operations, Monitoring, Equipment, Calculations, Use of PAGs) e Actions to Protect the Public '
(Sheltering, Evacuation, Reception and Care, Trans-portat ion) e Health, Medical and Exposure Control Meausres (Access Control, Adequacy of Equipment, Use of KI) e Recovery and' Reentry Operations e Relevance of the Exercise Experience 1.7 EVALUATION PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA The EXERCRIT form provides the means for each observer to record and evaluate his observations of the exercise in a consistent fo rm a t . This l
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% EXERCRIT contains about 74 elements, most of which were developed directly from criteria taken from Section II - Planning Standings and Evaluation Criteria of NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, Rev 1.
Many of the 74 elements are specific to only certain locations or emergency response functions so that no individual observer can evaluate all 74 elements. In order to ensure complete coverage, each observer was given an assignment sheet listing those elements that he must evaluate.
Each observer then evaluated each element observed according to the following scheme:
o Capability Outstanding - During the exercise no deficiencies were noted and no improvement is needed.
e Capability Good - Capabilities displayed as implied in the plan, though minor deficiences may have been noted.
e Capability Acceptable - The function was understood and accomplished. However, deficiencies were noted which could limit effective performance.
e Capability Weak - The function had significant deficiencies or the intent of the plan was not followed.
e Capability Lacking - The scenario exercised called for a specific response which was not demonstrated.
e Capability Not Observed - For one reason or another, the observer was not able to establish a rating. Either the
, observer was not present to witness the function, the activity was not called for in the scenario, or not applicable to the site or function. Th*is rating does not imply that a deficiency exists.
After the exercise was terminated, the individual observers met with their team leader to consolidate all of the data for each element. Next, the team leaders ensured that the data entered into the consolidated EXERCRIT was completed and represented a consensus of the observer teams. The RAC Chairman then prepared summary statements based on the data in the consolidated EXER-CRITS for each of the team functional areas listed in Sec.1.6 above. These summary statements formed the basis of the Interim Critique which was presen-ted to the state and local governments in public within two days of the
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exercise. *
, 1.8 EXERCISE CRITIQUE An interim critique of the March 16,1982 exercise was conducted at 11:00 a.m., March 18, 1982, at the La'cey Township Municipal Hall, in Lacey Township, New Jersey. Mr. Frank P. Petrone, Regional Director of FEMA -
Region II presented the Interim Critique of the off-site exercise evaluations.
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s 1.9 FEDERAL OBSERVER TEAM A 29-member federal observer team was established by the FEMA-Region II RAC chairman for observing the response at Oyster Creek. Obs ervers included:
Observer Agency Locale / Functions F. Petrone FEMA (Regional Oversight Responsibility Director)
R. Kowieski FEMA (RAC Chairman) Oversight Responsibility H. Fish DOE (Team Leader) Ocean County EOC R. Reynolds FEMA (Team Leader) State EOC G. Smith FEMA (Team Leader) On-Site EOF S. Glass FEMA (Team Leader) Lacey Township EOC A. Davis FEMA NJSP Command Post /Comm.
M. Goodkind ANL* State EOC E. Levine ANL* Bureau of Rad. Prot. FCP I. Husar FEMA Ocean County EOC/Comm.
N. Stauber NWS On-Site EOF L. Lewis ANL* Radiological Monitoring H. Mittelhauser ANL* Radiological Monitoring L. Phillips DOE Radiological Monitoring N. Chipman INEL** Radiological Monitoring / Sampling J. Tanner INEL** Radiological Monitoring / Sampling J. Keller INEL** Radiological Monitoring / Medical D. Knecht INEL** Radiological Monitoring /Decon Center T. Barts ANL* Access Control / Island Hts EOC/Public Alert F. Fishman. FEMA Access Control /Public Alert R. Rodriquez FEMA Congregate Care / Mass Care / Evacuation M. Jackson FEMA Media K. Lawrence FEMA Media J. O'Sullivan FEMA Barnegat Light Borough EOC J. Bravo FEMA Harvey Cedars Borough EOC T. Holliday FEMA Long Beach Township EOC J. Johnson FEMA Ocean Township EOC/Barnegat Township EOC g Beach Haven Borough Beachwood Bo ough l
Berkeley Township Dover Township Island Heights Borough
' Manchester Township P. McIntire FEMA R. Carelik fOceanGateBorough Pine Beach Borough FEMA '
Seaside Heights Borough ,
Seaside Park Borough Ship Bottom Borough l i
South Tous River Borough (Stafford Township Surf City Borough
- Argonne National Laboratory (under contract to FEMA)
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In addition to the FEMA-Region II RAC observer team, contractor personnel and visitors observed the exercise.
1.10 REMEDIAL ACTION PROCEDURES Provided under Parts 4 and. 5 of this report are evaluations and recommendations for remedial actions. These evaluations and recommendations are based on the applicable Planning Standards (from which the state and local plans were developed) and Evaluation Criteria set forth in Section 11 of NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, Rev. 1. Other minor recommendations are suggested that are not keyed to NUREG-0654, but which could improve operations.
In Part 4 of this report, recommendations are provided and are keyed to each of the state and local jurisdictions that are required to take re-medial actions. State and local jurisdictions should submit to the RAC the corrective measures they have taken or intend to take. If remedial actions cannot be instituted immediately, then a detailed plan for scheduling and implementing remedial actions must be provided which include a time frame (dates) for completion.
The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director, State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C.,
that any deficiencies noted in the exercise have been reported and that such corrections have been incorporated into the plan.
1.11 REVIEW AND APPROVAL PROCEDURES A state that seeks review and approval by FEMA of its plan and annexes submits an application for review and approval to the FEMA Regional Director of the region in which the state is located. The application, in the form of a letter from the Governor, or other state of ficial as the Governor may desig-nate, is to contain one copy of the completed state plan with an indication that deficiencies have been corrected.
Upon receipt of a state plan, the Regional Director initiates the review process as described in 44 CFR Part 350, Federal Register, Volume 45, Ntraber 123, Tuesday, June 24,1980 (Review and Approval of State and Local Radiological Emergency Plans and Preparedness). After the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) and the FEMA Regional staff have completed their review, including the evaluation of the supporting exercise and the public meeting I
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1 required in proposed 44 CFR Part 350, the FEMA Regional Director will issue a report to FEMA Headquarters regarding the state and local goverrunent plans, procedures , and preparedne s s capabilities. his report will consist of a stammary of the overall findings and - determinations in respec t to the pr o-cedures, training, resources, staffing level qualifications, and equipment av ailability. He FEMA Associate Director is to conduct such review of this I report as deemed necessary prior to its being forwarded to the appropriate NRC licensing bodies.
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2 EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
A joint exercise of emergency preparedness plans for the of f-site area surrounding the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station on March 16, 1982, was evaluated by a team of 29 federal observers. Participating in the exercise were the power plant owners, General Public Utilities (GPU) - Nuclear Corp.,
and appropriate officials and agencies for the State of New Jersey, Ocean County, New Jersey, and municipalities within Ocean County. he State Emer-gency Operations Center (EOC) was located at West Trenton, the main Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) was at the plant site, with a backup EOF located at Lakewood. ne Bureau of Radiological Protection forward command post (BRPFCP) was located in Berkeley Township, Ocean County.
2.1 OVERVIEW In general, the participants performed in a professional and competent manner. Decision making at the state, county, and local levels, along with resources and staf f to implement decisions was very good. Dere was excellent participation by officials at all levels and there were ntaserous demonstra-tions of good response capabilities. ,
nose deficiencies that were noted are given in greater detail in the summaries provided in this section, in the Exercise Observations-Section 3, in the Summary of Significant Deficiencies-Section 4 and in the Summary of Minor Deficiencies-Section 5.
2.2
SUMMARY
OF ACTIVITIES - STATE OF NEW JERSEY Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources Emergency operations facilities and resources were good, with only minor deficiencies noted. he primary state facilities, which were the EOC and the BRPFCP were good and were well organized and operated during the ;
exercise. Internal communications were excellent, however, some initial incoming sessages were intercepted by the situation room staff. This minor flaw was promptly identified and resolved. He BRPFCP at Berkeley Township had occasional difficulties with security during the exercise. For example, a member of the press entered the BRPFCP unchallenged. he state police forward l l
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command post and farsite EOF at Lakewood were well managed. It was noted that interplay between the state police and EOF personnel was slightly hindered by the arrangement of the operations which was divided between two floors.
Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff Alerting and mobilization of officials and staff were good with only miaor deficiencies noted. Alerting of all personnel was prompt and effective.
The capability of alternate means for notifying key individuals was observed.
Twenty-four hour alerting capability was effectively simulated in the EOC, the forward command posts and the EOF. However, there is some question as to whether sufficient personnel are available to maintain a 24-hour continuous response.
As in the alerting, mobilization was also prompt and effective. The facilities were staffed in a timely manner and communications were promptly activated. All laboratory facilities were staf fed within 45 minutes of the alert. The only deficiency noted was one assessment team was slightly delayed due to vehicle unavailability.
Emergency Operations Management
, Emergency operations manaptnent was good with only minor deficiencies noted. Organization and control 6 activities were good and the appropriate organizations were ir.v ved in the response. Written procedures were ef-factively utilized and were consistent with the operations requirements.
Participation of elected of ficials was outstanding. The Governor, his staff and the Commissioner of Environmental Protection were present in the EOC and demonstrated first-hand knowledge of operations. At the BRPFCP, strong leadership was provided by the Radiological (RAD) officer. l i
Public Alerting and Notification Public alerting was weak with significant deficiencies noted. Public alerting and notification were accomplished through sirens and Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) messages. In general, issuance of the EBS messages and the sounding of sirens were coordinated. In addition, no comprehensive feedback system for verification of the sounding of sirens or of the broad-casting of EBS messages were observed at the state. EBS procedures are not l
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permanent and were used for the day of the exercise only. There is no evi-dence that this temporary EBS system has been approved by the FCC to meet minimal requirements. EBS messages which were issued were timely but lacked suf ficient details and more frequent EBS messages should have been issued. In addition, written copies of EBS messages were not distributed at the state EOC
. or transmitted to county and media center.
Public and Media Relations Public and media relations were lacking with significant deficiencies noted. The state public information of ficer (PIO) was not close enough to the decision making process to have sufficient access to all the necessary i
information. The joint media center was used as the point of contact for media by the state, but was lacking in both facilities and staff.
Significant deficiencies were observed both in the flow of information between the state and county and in, passing information to the public and news media. No news releases were issued, and the center was lacking in maps, radios, and adequate telephone communications.
. The present state of public education is deficient. Public education brochures for the 10-mile EPZ residents have not been mailed. Posters for transient areas are planned. The utility sent out a one page letter to some residents explaining the exercises and local newspapers carried public notices explaining the exercises.
Rumor control phones were staf fed during the exercise. The toll-free number (800 number) had five lines but the capability of five lines to handle rumors is questionable. The two individuals staffing the phones understood basic procedures but need more training regarding overall rumor control.
Accident Assessment Accident assessment was excellent with only minor deficiencies noted.
Accident assessment operations in the EOC were good and included the utiliza-tion of computer capabilities for radiological calculations. The depability to identify and resolve conflicts in data was demonstrated. Equipment and display for dose assessments and for monitoring were good. The capabilities o f the state monitoring teams varied, ,but overall were adequate. There were some discrepancies between monitoring teams in terms of the level of training
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l and equipment available. Supplemental radiological monitoring was simulated j by helicopter. A backup team was also employed to investigate questionable readings thereby demonstrating a capability for verification. The state also
! demonstrated good laboratory capabilities and facilities.
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i Actions to Protect the Public
, Actions to protect the public were good with only minor deficiencies
. noted. At the state EOC, . of ficials demonstrated first-hand knowledge and awareness for all aspects of protective action. The appropriate state agencies were consulted for technical advice prior to formulation of recom-mendations. The decision to evacuate was personally reviewed by the Governor f
! and implemented at his direction. I l
t j Health, Medical and Exposure Control Measures j Health, medical and exposure control measures were good with only minor deficiencies noted. Distribution of potassium iodide (KI) for emergency workers was simulated and the possibility of use by r.he populace was reviewed )
j by the state. All emergency workers reported for decontamination. E f fective j
utilization of pocket dosimeters varied greatly among individual emergency i
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workers. Radiation exposure levels of field monitoring teams were received at j .
the forward command and reviewed by the State Health Department.
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! Recovery and Reentry Recovery and reentry operations were lacking with significant .defi-
- ciencies noted. A thorough and complete discussion of consitierations and i
- requirements for reentry was conducted at the state EOC. This discussion i t
j included the state police, state environmental protection agency and the '
i l i agricultural and health departments. It ef fectively demonstrated the know- 1 j ledge at the state EOC of how to recover from an incident. However, actual i
j recovery and reentry operations for this scenario were not demonstrated, nor 1
3 were municipalities provided guidance on recovery and reentry *.pperations.
i; This was due partly to the short duration of the esercise. The state forward
- command post at Lakewood did not participate due to a reported actual chemical
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j spill which required a response. Recovery operations were , not demonstrated l either at the gerkeley forward command post.
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l Relevance of the Exercise Experience The exercise was a positive experience for all state participants. The participants believed the exercise ef fectively tested the emergency response system capabilities as well as serving as a useful training tool. However, the pertinence of assignments for the field teams was varied, with some i
only performing mobilization and deployment while others actually performed '
! monitoring.
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- 2.3 SIMMARY OF ACTIVITIES - OCEAN COUNTY Emergency Operatione Facilities and Resources Emergency operations facilities and resources were good with only minor j deficiencies noted. The Ocean County EOC was able to be fully operational in 2
spite of being recently relocated. An integrated communications system was l demonstrated. Appropriate maps, charts and update boards were displayed and 4
l security and control measures were good. A noted deficiency was related to i the dedicated " hot line" which was not installed. Two commercial dial phones were used as " hot lines." The dedicated system was to be installed within two
, weeks after the exercise.
Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff Alerting and mobilization of officials and staf f were good with only minor deficiencies noted. Ocean County demonstrated prompt mobilization of i emergency personnel. Ca pability for 24-hour mobilization was demonstrated 1
j throughout the organization, including field units. The county also, overall, l demonstrated good capabilities for 24-hour continuous . emergency response.
l However, there is some question as to whether the county has 24-hour radio- 1
! logical monitoring capabilities. 1
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l Emergency Operations Management
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- Emergeacy operations management was good with only minor deficiencias t
j noted. The energency management responsibilities were clearly defined and
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l well executed. Staff briefings were effective and timely. Ef fective parti-cipation by elected of ficials was demonptrated.
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Public Alerting and Notification s
Alerting and notification of the public we re acceptable with defi-ciencies noted that limited effective per formanc e. The deficiencies are the siren system and public education. Due to an equipnent inadequach during the exercise, there was a delay in activation of the siren system. In Mdition, a capability to verify siren system activation was not demonstr.sted.-
A limited survey during the exercise indicated that only about 50% of the population surveyed heard the sirens and that most people did not know how to respond.
Public and Media Relations Public and media relations were weak with significant deficiencies noted. A joint state-county media was established at Toms River durin;; the exercise. Significent deficiencies were observed both in the flow of informa-tion between the county and state and in passing information to the'public and news media. No news releases were issued, and the center was lacking in maps, radios,-and adequate telephone comunications. The county spokesperson(st the Joint Media Center in Toms Riv ar was not furnished with information about state emergency information procedures and as a_ result could not respond to
, media inquiries. There i's no evidence of an adequate education program for the f.ransient and permanent population.
Accident Assessment Accident assessment was acceptable with deficiencies noted that limit effective performance. Although ths county radioleg;ical monitoring capability r e' presents an interim and supportive . role to the State Bureau of Radiation Protection, the county's monitoring equipment, resources and training were observed to be deficient. Equipment was limited to whole body exposure monitoring and temas were not trained in methods of monitoring liquids streams or earth samples, for radiological contamination. No capabilities to monitor radioactive iodine were desmonstrated.
Actions to Protect the Public Actions to protect the public were good with only minor deficiencies noted. Th e county EOC demo *2strated timely initiation fo r evacuation,
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18 reception care and transportation of individuals. Medical, first aid, Red Cross and social services were integrated and coordinated from the EOC.
Instructions were quickly formulated and communicated to operational units.
The congregate care facility that was demonstrated and the planned relocation facilities do not cppear to have the capacity to handle the potential evacuees for which they were intended. Decontamination expertise and security was also lacking at the congregate care facility.
Health, Medical and Exposure Control Health, medical and exposure control were good with only minor de-ficiencies noted. Field monitoring teams had adequate dosimeters and read them at proper intervals. The operations at the decontamination center, overall, were good. However, it was noted that the decontamination center was located within the 10 mile EPZ. This center did not exhibit adequate controls for the liquid wastes froc decontamination and was lacking certain amenities such as sufficient number of showers. The medical drill activity was success-fully demonstrated by a staf f of well-trained personnel.
Recovery and Reentry Operations Recovery and reentry operations were lacking as the response was
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called for but not demonstrated. This was due partly to the short duration of the exercise. The exercise was terminated prior to demonstration of recovery and reentry.
Relevance of the Exercise Experience The time constraints inhibited demonstration of full capabilities. It was felt that optional events could be pre planned to more fully test the response systems. While a number of deficient areas were noted, the partici-pants felt their overall response capabilities are good.
2.4
SUMMARY
OF ACTIVITIES - MUNICIPALITIES .
This section summarizes the activities of all municipalities that took part in the exercise. The activities of specific municipalities are given in Section 3.3.
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4 19 f Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources Emergency operations facilities and resources were good with only minor deficiencies noted. Most municipal EOCs had facilities with adequate space and security systems. Communic ation systems were in place and operational with backup systems demonstrated. The Emergency Management Radio System was operational and ef fec tiv e. A few EOCs had the State Police Emergency band and others are expec ted to install it. The ability to dispatch their own
. resources including fire, first aid , Department of Public Works,' and police, was demonstrated. The majority of the EOCs also had asateur radio civil emergency operators available. Internal commun ic ations , includ ing message handling, we r e good . Displays of maps and other information were generally weak and require additional cons id era tion. This is especially true of maps showing the distribution of transient population and evacuation routes.
Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff Alerting and mobilization of officials and staff were good with only minor deficiencies noted. Municipalities, in general, demonstrated efficient staf f with backup capability to handle 24-hour operations. Some preposition-ing in anticipation of the drill was obvious but the ability to mobilize personnel was desonstrated . Municipal EOC staff and their fire, police, first aid, and public works personnel responded promptly and efficiently.
Emergency Management Operations Emergency managesent operations were good with only minor deficiencies noted. In most cases, the individual in charge in each EOC was familiar with the community's responsibilities in case of an incident. Written procedures were lacking in a number of the municipal EOCs and actual plans and procedures were utilized to varying degrees. In most situations, EOC staff were kept appraised of activities at the municipal level, though formal briefings I were relatively rare. Elected officials desonstrated varying degrees of participation.
Public Alerting and Notification Public alerting and notification were acceptable with deficiencies noted that limited effective performance. Most municipalities utilized route
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alerting in which public service vehicles with loud speakers were used to broadcast the information to residents. In most cases, however, it is unknown if this system has adequate alerting capability when a large transient population is present. While most municipal EOCs acknowledged hearing the
, sirens, there is no plan in place to verify siren activation back to the county EOC. In one instance, the municipality said they received no alerting,
Public and Media Relations Public and media relations were not observed and no deficiencies are implied. This response was generally not applicable to the municipalities.
Accident Assessment Accident assessment was not observed and no deficiencies are implied.
Accident assessment is not considered applicable to municipalities.
Actions to Protect the Public
. Actions to protect the public were noc observed and no deficiencies are implied. However, a number of municipalities reviewed activities and plans in their respective communities to assure no impediment existed to hinder evacua-tion control. Long Beach Township police identified potential bridge impedi-ment and initiated early evacuation to compensate. Similarly, Seaside Heights and Seaside Park noted that the narrowing of the main evacuation route from 5 lanes to 2 can also be a potential problem. The overall plan does not address the issue of coordination with adjacent communities and the county in the area of independent evacuation prior to the state government declaration.
Health, Medical and Exposure Control Measures Health, medical and exposure control measures were weak with signifi- !
cant deficiencies noted. These control measures were variable among the
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various municipalities. A number of municipalities were unaware of the availability of potassium iodide for eziergency workers. -Esergency workers in most municipalities were not trained in the proper use of pocket dosimeters and were unaware of appropriate dose , limitations. Many workers were not l
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supplied with the dosimeter equipment even though it was available in some cases.
Recovery and Reentry Operations Recovery and reentry operations were not observed and no deficiencies are implied. This was due partly to the short duration of the exercise. The exercise was terminated prior to demonstration of recovery and reentry.
Relevance of the Exercise Experience Generally, the local participants felt the exercise was beneficial and their res ponse and resources were adequately tested. However, the munici-palities that were not in the plume generally felt there was too much " dead time" during the exercise and they could have been more actively involved.
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I 3 EVALUATIONS )
This section presents a more detailed discussion of the performance of the participating agencies and localities, as noted by the observers. The format used follows the ten areas listed in Section 1.6, with state, county, l and municipalities presented separately.
3.1 STATE OF NEW JERSEY l l
3.1.1 Emergency Operations Facility and Resources I I
Tne state emergency response facilities include the emergency opera-tions center (EOC) at the State Police Headquarters in West Trenton, the New Jersey State Police forward command post (NJSPFCP) and the farsite EOF located
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at Lakewood, and the state Bureau of Radiation Protection forward command post (BRPFCP) located in Berkeley Township.
At the s ta t e EOC , facilities and resources were observed to be good.
The internal and external communications were excellent. Contact was main-tained with the contiguous local governments within the EPZ. Prepared tables and forms appeared to be used effectively. The ' facilities appear good, but are somewhat small to allow for all workers and displays. The dose assessment l operations were confined to a small space, and it was observed that an adjoin-ing room may have been available, indicating better use could have been made 1 of available space. l
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Security at the EOC was adequate, but there was some problem in ini-tially setting up the security system. Identification badges were effectively used. l Displays and maps were good and were effectively used at the EOC,
, although display space was somewhat limited. It was observed, however, that the emergency planning and area maps have zone numbers that differ from sector numbers, which can be somewhat confusing.
The NJSP forward command post facilities at L'akewood were observed to
. be good. There was evidence of some minor telephone communications problems, but overall capability of the communications was good.
The major inadequacy was that state police and EOF operations were on separate floors. This caused s6me problems in internal communication and overall operations.
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At the BRPFCP, emergency operations facilities and resources were also observed to be good. Communications consisted of a police radio, state radio, and telephone which were ef fectively utilized. The communications with the state EOC were adequate. The BRPFCP displayed sestus boards and maps showing sampling points, but there were no maps showing population or location of care centers. The major weakness at the BRPFCP was lax security. During the exercise, for example, a member of the press entered unchallenged.
3.1.2 Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff The alerting and mobilization of of ficials and staff in the state EOC were observed to be good. Each officer had instruction packets at his home and of fice which included necessary instructions and telephone numbe rs . The capability of maintaining both 24-hour initial and continuous emergency responses was good. However, availability of enough personnel for 24-hour continuous coverage was questioned for some response agencies. The timely dispatch of a representative to the licensee's near-site EOF was good.
However, a minor deficiency was noted regarding which personnel should be assigned to this task. Some minor training deficiencies were noted in the areas of alerting, notifying and mobilizing emergency response personnel, and in the prompt activation of emergency response communications.
As at the EOC, the NJSPFCP and the EOF showed good alerting and notification capabilities. It was demonstrated that 24-hour coverage could be maintained with present staff. The emergency communications equipment was good and was activated in a timely manner. It was noted that the team sent to the EOF did not have an assessment officer.
At the BRPFCP, it was observed that 24-hour initial response and 24-hour continous response capabilities and personnel alerting procedures were acceptable. The radiological monitoring teams arrived by helicopter and the mobile laboratory arrived about 45 minutes later. Communications were ac-tivated promptly. The only mobilization problem noted was that the deployment
, of one assessment team was slightly delayed due to the unavailability of a vehicle. This situation was quickly rectified.
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3.1.3 Emergency Operations Management The emergency operations management of the state EOC was good and effective cooperation between the state and county was observed. It was effectively demonstrated that emergency response management roles were well known and were conducted well. It was demonstrated that a specific person was authorized to request federal assistance. The governor, his executive staff, and the commissioner of environmental protection were present in the EOC for much of the exercise.
Emergency operations management at the NJSPFCP was good and it was demonstrated that one individual was in charge. It appeared that good primary and support functions were ef fectively assigned and that specific organiza-tions had been assigned to the emergency response.
As in the other areas, emergency operation management at the BRPFCP was good. The Bureau of Radiation Protection radiological (RAD) officer was observed to provide strong leadership in all operations at the forward command post. However, in a prolonged emergency, operations would be facilitated by delegating some of his responsibility to others. The Department of Health effectively charted dosimeter readings and assured that milk samples were obtained. The emergency classification system was consistently used and the
. RAD officer gave good and frequent update briefings to the staff.
Some confusion seemed to exist at the BRPFCP with nomenclature.
Specifically observed was confusion between the terms mR and R, designation of wind directions (does it refer to the direction the wind is blowing toward or direction it is blowing from) and identification of two sampling points.
It was also observed, that while the RAD officer was clearly in charge, and that the BRPFCP was operated in a skillful, effective manner, there was little delegation of functions to a back-up RAD officer.
3.1.4 Public Alerting and Notification
. The public alerting and notification during the exercise were, observed to be weak. Activation of the sirens and the emergency broadcast system (EBS) was coordinated , although the siren activation was delayed about 15 minutes due to an equipment malfunction. The sounding of the sirens was verified at the state EOC through telephone contadt with the county EOC. However, no
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means for verifying the activation of all sirens and the EBS by the state was i
i observed. 1 The EBS messages generally lacked sufficient detail. More frequent i EBC messages should be issued to announce important actions such as the governor's declaration of a state of emergency. Information received from participating radio stations showed that no permanent EBS procedures are in place. The EBS procedures used were devised for this exercise and do not I
conform to established procedures nor have they been approved by the Federal l l
Communication Commission (FCC). '
3.1.5 Public and Media Relations Overall, at the state level, public and media relations were weak.
Ef fective communications between the Joint Media Center and state EOC were not demonstrated. At the state EOC, the public information of ficer (PIO) was isolated from the decision making level and thus the flow of information was not effectively established.
It was not demonstrated that a media spokesperson with access to all
, necessary information had been assaigned and there was no clear plan for transferring information between spokespersons. There were no news releases published during the exercise and except for media coverage immediately prior to the exercise, no other public information program was demonstrated. Hard copies of the EBS messages were not available at the Joint Media Center or county EOC.
Rumor control at the state EOC consisted of five telephone lines and its existence was not publicized during the exercise. The capacity of this system to handle a large number of inquiries is questionable.
3.1.6 Accident Assessment Overall, the state capability in the area of accident' as ses sment was very good. The EOC utilized computer capabilities for radiological calculations and also demonstrated alternate means to check and verify the calculations. There were good posting and utilization of the data.- Decisions relating to recommendations such as protective actions were well thought out and were based on the radiological calculations. The state also demonstrated that, between the mobile van and state radiological laboratory in Trenton, well equipped and available laboratory' facilities did exist.
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As at the state EOC, the forward command post (FCP) at Berkeley Town-ship demonstrated good radiological assessment capabilities. All state and county radiological monitoring data were transferred through the FCP to the Field monitoring teams were judiciously deployed
. state in a timely manner.
from the FCP as was the helicopter equipped with monitoring instruments. The special monitoring team was also well utilized when some questionable moni-toring data required verification. The mobile laboratory was also brought to the FCP in a timely manner. It was well equipped and demonstrated capabili-ties to analyze water, milk, and carbon to distinguish radioactive iodine from noble gases. The FCP had the capability to recommend protective action, but this was not called for during the exercises.
Generally, the pe rformance of the state radiological monitoring teams was good. The teams were equipped with Geiger counters and Reuter-Stokes (R-S) or Sam II instrumentation depending upon whether their monitoring assignment was to be outside or inside the plume. However, the amount of back-up and supplementary monitoring equipment varied between the teams. The vanguard teams did not demonstrate the use of silver zeolite filters or have particulate filters available. The lack of the particulate filters could
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cause radioactive particulates to interfere with the measurement of radioac-tive iodine. One Reuter-Stokes team only had two instruments which measured 0-1000 uR/Hr and 0-50 R/Hr respectively. They did not have any capability to monitor between these levels. The other R-S team had a third instrument that allowed such capability. One vanguard team did not have a ground probe to measure ground contamination. Some teams did not have adequate maps to aid in moving to varicas sampling points. Adequate dosimeters and badges were i
observed so that workers could assess their personal doses. Some teams were I equipped with protective clothing and respirators, but this was not verified for all teams. With the exception of one of the Reuter-Stokes teams, all teams were observed to be adequately trained and appeared to be versed in the operations of the instrumentation and how they were to be utilized.
3.1.7 Actions to Protect the Public The state actions to protect the public were observed to be good. The people involved appeared to follow a logical decision process concerning implementation of protective measures. The Department of Health contacted its i
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representative at the emergency office in Trenton and the staff contacted hospitals and nursing homes, and simulated an evacuation of the persons in these institutions. The decision to evacuate was personally reviewed by the governor and implemented at his direction.
3.1.8 Health, Medical and Exposure Control Measures The health, medical and exposure control measures generally were good.
There seems to be good knowledge concerning the purpose of potassium iodine (KI) for emergency workers and the possible use of KI by the general populace was reviewed. Emergency workers were not issued KI during the exercise, but generally were aware of where to obtain KI (Department of Health) and also knew they would be notified when and if they were actually to administer potassium iodide. The Department of Health seemed to have good capability of maintaining 24-hour dosage records.
The reporting of monitoring team worker exposure to the BRPFCP was only edequate and was not done on any consistent basis. While all monitoring team members had dosimeters and badges , not all reported frequent readings to the ERPFCP. In some cases, readings were taken by workers when they were in the plume, but not when they were outside of the plume. At least one team knew the maximum dose they could receive before reporting and requesting further instructions concerning the need for decontamination. It was not determined whether other workers knew this information.
3.1.9 Recovery and Reentry Recovery and reentry operations were not observed during this exercise as it was terminated prior to simulating reentry. This was partly due to the short duration of the exercise. A rather detailed discussion of this phase was held at the state EOC and included state police, state environmental protection, and the Departments of Agriculture and of Health. The personnel seemed to understand the recovery process. No reentry activities took place ,
, at the forward command post. l'
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3.1.10 Relevance of the Exercise Experience The exercise did show areas of strength and areas where improvements should be considered. It showed that federal, state, county and municipal 1
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efforts can be coordinated to provide an effective response to a nuclear power plant incident. It afforded an opportunity to evaluate many areas critical to !
1 a proper public response to a possible nuclear incident including deployment, mobilization, accident assessment and communications.
Some aspects of the plan, most notably reentry and recovery, were not adequately exercised. Some participants felt that there was too much " sitting around" and that the scenario could have provided better testing of backup capabilities and response to changing wind directions.
3.2 OCEAN COUNTY, NEW JERSEY 3.2.1 Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources The county emergency operations facilities and resources were evaluated as good. The communications systems are excellent and the Emergency Manage-ment Radio (EMRAD) system is the primary means linking the county with the state and municipalities. Backup systems include the sheriff's radio net which is monitored in all municipal police stations, land line telephone to the state. In addition a 25 and 75 meter radio system with municipal EOCs is to be completed within 60 days.
During the exercise, no dedicated " hot line" was available from the EOF to the county or between the state and county EOCs. This was pri-marily due to a last minute change in the location of the county EOC prior to the exercise. The " hot lines" were expected to be installed within two weeks.
The working space at the EOC was good. Amenities, however, were lacking, primarily due to the recent relocation. EOC security was good and there was good demonstration of message handling procedures. The public address system was effectively used to keep EOC personnel informed.
The county EOC had good maps displayed showing population distribution.
However, state maps were not available to identify access control points by number. Access control points had to be identified by road intersections, which is inconsistent with the state idantification system.
3.2.2 Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff Overall the county's alerting and mobilization of officials and staff were observed to be good. In the IOC, the sheriff's office provides 24-hour i
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o initial staffing of communications and notification. Rosters of backup personnel were available and it appears that 24-hour continuous emergency response capabilities are good.
Alerting of EOC personnel was observed to be axcellent. Contact was made using the telephone and pagers.
The county radiological monitoring teams responded in a timely manner to the assembly point. The teams were aware of backup capability and thus it appeared that the county could continuously maintain its own radiological monitoring. The capability to comununicat e with medical support facilities was acceptable. The off-site medical drill ambulance could not directly contact the hospital.
3.2.3 Emergency Operations Management The' county emergency operations management was observed to be good.
The emergency responsibilities were clearly defined and it was evident that specific organizations had been established to handle the emergency response.
The county Emergency Management Coordinator (EMC) was effectively in charge of the emergency response. A backup EMC provided effective 24-hour staffing.
Oral briefings for EOC staff were timely and effective and the public address system was extensively used for this purpose. The emergency classifi-cation system was effectively used.
Excellent participation of elected officials was also demonstrated. The emergency services director was on hand throughout the exercise and elected officials participated in the briefings.
3.2.4 Public Alerting and Notification Alerting and notification of the public by the county was observed overall to be acceptable. The major problem areas are the siren system and public education.
The primary means for alerting the public is through the use of sirens and the emergency broadcast system. During the exercise , neither the county sheriff's radio dispatcher nor the licensee's siren activation repeater had
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private line encoders / decoders (private line encoders / decoders are on order).
There fore, for the exercise, a licensee employee had to physically disconnect the sherif f's re pea ter in order to ac tiva te the sirens. This resulted in a delay in the sounding of the sirens. In addition, the county plan does not include a procedure to verify activation of the siren system. These problems
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indicate that the existing system for disseminating information to the public needs some improvement. A public education brochure for EPZ residents has not been mailed. A limited survey conducted during the exercise indicated that only about 507. of the people surveyed heard the sirens.
3.2.5 Public and Media Relations At the Joint Media Center in Toms River, the public and media relations were observed to be weak. Significant deficiencies were observed in both the flow of infomation bet'veen the state and the county and dissemination of information to the public and news media.
Other than media coverage prior to the exercise, there was no evidence that a public inforestion system for county residents exists. A one page circular concerning the ex erc ise was distributed to some resid ent s , but the >
extent o f overall coverage is not known. Interviews with motel owners,
, however, indicate that there is no formal progran in place to inst ruc t the transient population.
A principal point of contact for the media was not demonstrated during the exercise. The Joint Media Center was inadequately staffed and the county ,
l PIO did not have access to sufficient in forma tion. The joint center lacked I maps, access to rad io s , telephone communic ations with the state EOC, and a backup communications systems.
The county did not issue any news releases during the exercise. The county spokesperson at the Joint Media Center in Toms River was not provid ed ,
I with information about staff emergency information activities and as a result
, could not respond to media inquiries. Further, no fomalized proc,edure for exchanging information within the Joint- Media Center was-demonstrated. -
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3.2.6 Accident Assessment The county accident assessment capabilities were observed to be accep-table. It is recognized that the main duty of the county teams is to support the state teams. However, the county monitoring teams had limited monitoring instrumentation and also experienced some communication problems in trans fer--
. ring monitoring data to the EOC.
The county is limited to measuring only whole body ganana and beta radiation. Some, but not all, of the instruments showed they had been cali-brated. The most recent calibration noted on any instrument was December, 1981. Due to the lack of the appropriate instruments, the county did not demonstrate the ability to measure radioiodine concentration, although this was called for in the exercise scenario.
Further, the county monitoring teams did not have adequate means for monitoring liquids or the ground for radiation contamination. In addition, it appears that monitoring team personnel have not received extensive training in these areas, and thus they are limited in their ability to judge whether they are actually in the plume, or just under the plume.
. During the exercise, some communication dif ficullies were uncovered.
One county team communicated to the sheriff's office who then contacted the EOC. Another team was comanunicating directly with the state BRPFCP due to radio communication problems with the county.
3.2.7 Actions to Protect the Public The county actions to protect the public were generally observed to be good. The initiation of measures was timely and many of the protective l actions were demonstrated. The major problem areas appear to be in the procedures for processing evacuees and the adequacy of relocation facilities.
The capability for implementation of protective measures was good. !
i Decisions were quickly rendered and orderly implementation of protective !
i measures was demonstrated. '
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Written plans and procedures exist regarding evacuation of the mobility impaired and institutionally confined. The plan includes designated trans-portation, evacuation routes, and relocation sites as well as staff to l
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accompany patients from institutions. While the plans exist, these procedures were not called for during the exercise. However, it was evident that written plans do not exist between the county or state and New Jersey transit (NJT) or local bus companies to relocate the populace. Maps are available showing primary and alternate evacuation routes.
Coordinated, well timed actions at the EOC indicated a good capability to select alternate congregate care centers and evacuation routes. This was clearly demonstrated during the exercise. The establishment of relocation centers was confirmed.
Procedures for processing evacuees were adequate and 24-hour staffing capabilities were demonstrated. No procedures were demonstrated regarding disposition of contaminated vehicles and there were no security procedures.
Some reservations were expressed regarding the capability of the congregate care center to handle the number of evacuees expected.
The relocation and mass care facilities that were to be utilized during the exercise were lacking. The actual s i't e to be used' in an emergency is a school which was not available during the exercise. However, it appears that this site could only accommodate 500 persons and nas inadequate amenities (3 showers, no kitchen, insufficient bed space).
3.2.8 Health, Medical and Exposure Control County health, medical and exposure control measures were good.
Deficiencies were indicated in some areas including distribution of potassium iodide, access controls, and the decontamination center.
The county EMC was aware of the need for potassium iodidat for emergency workers. The county medical officer simulated the ordering of KI although there was no KI available at the EOC.
Access control provided by the state police was good. They were in place in a timely manner and control personnel were well aware of procedures and carried protective clothing, maps, barricades. There was some confusion ,
over which intersection was supposed to be access control point 25. Another consideration regarding access control is response. The state troopers must be called in and there was no demonstration of local security elements manning the access control points, prior to the troopers' arrival.
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- The operations and facilities at the decontamination center were observed to be good. Decontamination procedures for both personnel and vehicles were observed to be very thorough and well designed. Personnel were equipped with disposable clothing, respirators and monitoring equipment.
Personnel seemed well trained. The decontamination center was, however, located within the 10 mile EPZ and there was no procedure demonstrated for contaminated runoff from vehicle decontamination. There was only one shower available for decontamination of personnel and that water was not contained but discharged directly to the sanitary sewer.
The response of hospital and medical services and personnel were good.
The ambulance team was properly equipped and well trained. Due to a communi-cations problem, the hospital was not warned ahead of time about the ambulance arriving. However, within 10 minutes after the ambulance arrived, the hos-pital was functioning well.
3.2.9 Recovery and Reentry Operations Recovery and reentry were not demonstrated.
3'.2.10 Re$evanceoftheExerciseExperience The basic scenario was good but t ime constraints inhibited the demon-stration of full capabilities.
The exercise participants expressed satisfaction with their perform-ance. EOC leadership participants believed the exercise tested the emergency response capability. Some areas require further equipment, training, and planning, but overall, participants felt their response capabilities are good.
3.3 OCEAN COUNTY MUNICIPALITIES (TOWNSHIPS AND BOROUGHS)
Twenty local municipalities were involved in the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS) integrated radiological emergency exercise. Six of the localities were active participants as they were located within the hypothetical plume exposure pathway. The other municipalities were not seriously affected and their participation was limited primarily to alert, mobilization and stand-by preparedness.,
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The six participating municipalities are reviewed individually and the fourteen nonparticipating towns are collectively critiqued.
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. 3.3.1 Participating Municipalities Barnegat Light Lacey Township '
Barnegat Township Long Beach Township Harvey Cedars Ocean Township l
3.3.1.1 Barnegat Light 1 o Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources The Barnegat Light Borough EOC facilities and resources are good. The i
communications system included EMRAD and citizen band (CB) radio, and tele-phones. Communicat ions functioned very adequately although at one time a ,
message transmitted to the county EOC was not acknowledged and later the Barnegat Light Borough EOC was requested to retransmit the same information.
The working space is adequate and internal communications and message handling procedures were efficiently demonstrated. Security measures are sufficient
. for this EOC and the map displaying the one evacuation route, relocation centers and shelter areas was good.
l Although not actually demonstrated, the EOC displayed the capability of recording instructional messages to the public for broadcasting over loud speakers.
e Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff Alerting, mobilizing and timely staffing of the EOCs were good. The capability to notify emergency response personnel and to operate continuously was good, e Emergency Operations Management Emergency operations management demonstrated in this exercise was good.
The Emergency Management Coordination (EMC) was clearly in charge of EOC j operations and the First Aid, Dept of Public Works, Police and Fire Depart-ments were all fully aware of their functions and responsibilities. It was not observed whether a consistent emergency classification system was used or
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. if written procedures were prepared for emergency actions but the EMC briefed his small staff frequently in an excellent manner Although not present, the Mayor and the Council President reported in and it was demonstrated by the EMC, that the Mayor could be reached at any time.
e Public Alerting and Notification Public alerting by the Barnegat Light EOC was considered adequate for its circumstances. The personnel were in place for the route alert plan for the public in the plume exposure pathway.
e Public and Media Relations Public and media relations were not observed at Barnegat Light Borough because it is not within the scope of of their plan.
e Accident Assessment Accident assessment capabilities were not observed in Barnegat Light Borough. Responsibilities for this function are in the state and county and
, . the local EOC relies on information from the state.
e Actions to Protect the Public The Barnegat Light Borough EOC did not demonstrate actions to protect the public, but it was evident they had a prepared plan. Two ambulances were in constant contact for the evacuation of mobility impaired persons and the EOC displayed the capability for implementing evacuation procedures through traffic control of their evacuation route. In discussions, the EOC also considered dealing with unforeseen impediments to evacuation such as auto breakdowns, a fire, etc.
e Health, Medical and Exposure Control Measures The Barnegat Light Borough EOC procedures were weak or lacking in health, medical and exposure control measures. No system was demonstrated for distributing monitoring equipment, dosimeters or KI and they had insufficient equipment for 24-hour-a-day monitoring coverage of their emergency workers. i 1
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e Recovery and Reentry Operations The capability for implementing recovery and reentry operations was not observed because of the shortened exercise.
e Relevance of the Exercise Experience The exercise showed ability of the EOC to function adequately despite limited equipment and the need for training.
3.3.1.2 Barnegat Township e Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources Emergency operations facilities and resources in the Township of Barnegat are good. The new building contained good security measures, ample space, and the communications systems were used to establish and main-tain reliable contacts. The observer did not witness internsi communications systems, displays or message handling procedures. There was no map display of evacuation routes, relocation centers and shelter areas but plans were on
, the front desk available for instant use. Additionally, there was no popula-tion distribution map although discussions demonstrated that the year-round population (summer and winter) was acceptably known.
e Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff Alerting aOd mobilization of of ficials and staff were good. The Barnegat Township EOC demonstrated good capabilities for initial and sustained emergency response operations. The EOC staff and emergency workers were notified rapidly in a reliable manner and responded promptly, as did desig-nated emergency response organizations. The EOC demonstrated good counsunica-tions with medical support facilities.
e Emergency Operations Management Emergency operations management was good. The Civil Defense Direc-
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tor was the Emergency Management Coordinator, acting through the police liaison officer. Representatives of several organizations with res ponse l
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- functions participated in the exercise. There were several volunteers and part-time participants, including the Mayor. No use of emergency classifica-tion systems , written emergency action procedures or coordination of ef forts through staff briefings was observed.
- Public Alerting and Notification There were no observations made concerning the efficiency of public alerting and notification.
e Public and Media Relations Public and media relations functions were not observed at the Barnegat Township EOC because they were not included in the scope of plan responsibili-ties or actions.
e Accident Aasessment Accident assessment capabilities are not called for in the Barnegat Township EOC and were not observed.
s Actions to Protect the Public Actions to protect the public, made at the EOC, were not ob se rved.
e Health, Medic'al and Exposure Control Measures Health, medical and exposure control measures within the Barnegat EOC were not observed but they did demonstrate good local and backup medical support services for personnel.
e Recovery and Reentry Operations No recovery and reentry o'perations were observed at the Barnegat Township EOC.
Relevance to the Exercise Experience e
The majority of the participants believed that the exercise experience was good and that the scenario sufficiently tested mobilization capabilities.
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- 3.3.1.3 Harvey Cedars l
e Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources Emergency operations facilities and resources were good. The telephone and EMRAD radio system were used for primary conssunications, with police radio
. backup. The capability was demonstrated by notifying all EOC personnel within 12 minutes of receiving exercise notification and by notifying all stand-by personnel within 10 minutes of Site Emergency condition declaration. The primary working space was good for no more than 10 staff but there is ad di-tional space available in the back if needed. Logs and displays were good.
Message handling was performed well and the maps of evacuation routes, relo-cation centers and shelter areas were displayed effectively. The security of the EOC was suitable for the population at the time of the exercise but would require more personnel during the suusner season. Although the staff knew the population (500 in winter; 11,000 in summer) the EOC lacked maps or displays showing the population distribution.
. ,e Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff Alerting and mobilization of officials and staff were good. Between the hours of 7:00 a.m. and 5 :00 p.m. , the police station is open and would receive any alert notifications. Af ter 5:00 p.m. when the station is closed, the police station at Surf City would notify the Harvey Cedar's Chief who would activate the EOC. Emergency response organizations were' initially alerted to the exercise by radio and telephone systems, in 4 minutes. When the Site Emergency exercise conditions were announced, response personnel were notified in 10 minutes. The EOC was completely staffed within 26 minutes of receiving the alert notification.
e Emergency Operations Menagement Emergency operations management of the Harvey Cedars EOC is good. The emergency management department conducts road checks, assists people during evacuation. The fire department provides support plus 15 staff t' rained to monitor radiation. The police department is charged with traffic control and
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protection of life and property and the public works department has heavy i
equipment for such activities, towing, cars if needed. During the summer, s
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there are 30 lifeguards who are assigned support functions as necessary. The EMC (police chief) is the EOC manager and ef fectively conducted staf f briefings. The Mayor and Deputy Mayor were present and participated in the drill. Written action procedures were good and a consistent emergency classification system was used.
e Public Alerting and Notafication Public alerting and notification were good. Police patrols utilized route alerting to notify the population through the use of mobile loud speakers. The public alerting and notification were carried out in a good, timely and apparently complete manner.
e Public and Media Relations Public and media relations generally were lacking. There was no evidence that any nuclear accident information was distributed to the public within the past year. There were no residential, transient or commercial notices posted relating to a radiological incident although procedures were posted for other events (hurricane, etc.) which would require the same eNacuation system. Other types of press and media relations were not consid-ered within the scope of responsibilities for this EOC.
e Accident Assessment There was no observation of accident assessment capabilities as it was not considered within the scope of this EOC.
e Actions to Protect the Public Actions to protect the public were observed to be good. Implementation of protective measures was good (dosimeters issued to all emergency workers within 6 minutes of decision and all monitoring teams in the field within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 25 minutes thereafter) and evacuation was stated to be good (within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 9 minutes from notice, although in summer this would take. consider-ably longer). The adequacy of methods to protect the mobility impaired and institutionalized residents was not observed.
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- e Health, Medical and Exposure Control Measures Health, medical and exposure control measures generally were not l observed. However, the Harvey Cedars EOC has trained 15 staf f to monitor radiation and the emergency workers were issued dosimeters and cards. There l were no other activities within this category that were observed.
e Recovery and Reentry Operations Recovery and reentry operations were not observed. In a discussion with the Harvey Cedars police chief, recovery and reentry would be implemented by way of monitoring traffic and updating the public on situation status to ensure a safe and ordcely return.
e Relevance of the Exercise Experience The experience gained from this exercise was good. Except for reentry, the scenario tested mobilization capabilities of local and state organizations and demonstrated to the participants that they were capable of an integrated emergency response. Additionally, it provided participants with on-the-job training so that response to a real emergency would be more familiar.
3.3.1.4 Lacey Township e Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources In general, emergency operations facilities and resources were good.
They had an excellent radio system for police, fire, first aid, and public works. This was backed by an EMRAD system and a new SPENZ (State Police Emergency band) installed the day before the exercise. Telephones were also available. The work space was excellent, with space for representatives of response organizations, the Mayor, the emergency coordinator and a separate communications room. Runners were used to distribute messages for the coordi-nator's review and then bac:t to the proper responder, which caused a slight delay although it was not crittctl. Existing displays were good. The master map displayed did not show evacuation routes, relocation centers, shelter
. areas or the population distribution although some points could be charted.
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e Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff Alerting and mobilization of of ficials and staf f were good. The Lacey Township EOC, located in the police department, demonstrated excellent initial response capabilities with 24-hour trained dispatchers on duty. Although no formal Standard Operational Procedure exists, they demonstrated 24-hour continuous operations by short-shift changes of two ke y ind iv iduals. The notification of response organizations was good and key personnel have pagers.
The ability to communicate with medical support faciliti . was acceptable but when they go to mutual-aid, the county switches medical /first aid information to a frequency not possessed by the Lacey police. The police thus lose contact with first-aid facilities. The Lacey EOC was staffed in key positions until the volunteers arrived and the clerical staf f is based upon staff frcan the adjacent township building.
e Emergency Operations Management Emergency operations management was acceptable. The Deputy Emergency Management Coord inator is the police captain and was ef fectively in charge.
. Existing organizations showed an understanding of their particular responsi-bilities and a capability for effective coordination. Although there were no formal emerg ency action procedures in the EOC, the individ alu organizations had their own Radiological Emergency Response Procedures manuals and followed the plan. There were few briefings and that was attributed to the apparent lack of information provided by the county and state. The elected officials were clearly supportive of the EOC operations.
e Public Alerting and Notification Public alerting and notification were weak. The EBS was not heard in the EOC, and the EOC was not aware that the message was being broadcast. They had no provision to monitor the EBS via TV or radio. Because the sirens were not heard in the EOC, response personnel were not aware that the sirens were activated. This caused the failure to dispatch route alerting although they had prepared a procedure. The EOC did simulate use of a helicopter to alert the public to listen to the EBS.
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42 e Public and Media Relations There were no observations of activities within this category at the Lacey Township EOC.
e Accident Assessment The responsibilities for accident assessment are not part of the Lacey EOC plan and, thus, no observations were made.
e Actions to Protect the Public Actions to protect the public generally were not observed. There was a call for evacuation and treatment of utility workers from on-site by the township First Aid Unit and a review of work in progress by the Department of Public Works to catalog potential evacuation impediments. However, there was no other activity or procedure observed that would indicate actions taken to protect the public.
e Health, Medical and Exposure Control Measures Health, medical and exposure control measures were weak in all activi-ties within this responsibility that were observed. The use and knowledge of KI were not demonstrated. Emergency workers were issued dosimeters and film badges but were not informed of how to use them, what the readings mean and how to process them. They received no instructions about protective action guides (PACS) and, at one specific briefing, emergency workers were mis-informed as to levels of allowable exposure. Other workers were not informed.
e Recovery and Reentry Operations The tecovery and reentry activities were not demonstrated.
l e Relevance of the Exercise Experience j l
There were no observations relating to the relevance of the exercise l and benefits to the participants.
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3.3.1.5 Long Beach Township e Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources Emergency operations facilities and resources we re good. Commun ica-
- tions included a Police "9" Backup system, DIRAD, RACES, dedicated phone line to county EOC and telephone lines to other EOCs. Working space was observed to be acceptable, but was somewhat limited . Equipment and message handling were good and displays were acceptable but difficult to see. Security was good with a TV monitor screening entry and uniformed patrolm&n guarding the door. The maps displayed were weak, too few and too seall, with inade-quate indicators of evacuation routes, shelter areas, relocation centers, and j RAD checkpoints.
e Alerting and Mobilization of Of ficials and Staff Overall, the alerting and mobilization of officials and staff were good. Procedures for notifying emergency response perosnnel and organizations were good. Lists of personnel and organizations with their functions delin-eated were published and effectively used. A means of message verifications was id entified . The emergency communications dedicated phone line to the county, backed by EMRAD, performed in excellent fashion during the inc id ent.
A specified person was in charge of activities in maintaining good contact with medical support facilit ie s , and the EOC was completely staf fed promptly after notification in accordance with prescribed procedures.
e Emergency Operations Managenent Emergency operations management was good. The EOC Director was effec-tively in charge. It was observed that certain protective measures unique to this community were not reflected in the city plan. For example, the police department had backup procedures to assist the public in the event that the primary notification system fail'ed. The staff was e f fectively brie fed by the direc tor who was assisted in general EOC operations by the Mayo r.
e Public Alerting and Notification Public alerting and notificatio'n were considered good. In the early stages, EBS messages issued by state PIO at state EOC were timely but later
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slacked off and did not appear to be reliable. The sirens were audible as evidenced by many verification phone calls from the community.
e Public and Media Relations Public and media relations were not observed at the Long Beach EOC because it was not considered applicable to their responsibilities.
e Accident Assessment Long Beach does not have responsibilities for accident assessment and, consequently, no activities were observed, e Actions to Protect the Public Actions to protect the public generally were not observed. However, it was noted that impediments to evacuation were addressed by the town, particu-larly in light of the fact that the plume directly affected only part of the town, and that there was only one evacuation route from the area, e Health, Medical and Exposure Control Measures There were no observations of health, medical or exposure control measures taken by the Long Beach EOC.
e Recovery and Reentry Operations The recovery and reentry operations were not demonstrated.
e Relevance of the Exercise Experience Long Beach had never participated in an exercise before so the experi-
, ence gained was good. It was noted that the second half of the scenario was not enacted (no complete stepdown of operations from state of emergency back to alert), and thus, the communities did not get the full benefits of the operation. ,
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3.3.1.6 Ocean Township e Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources Emergency operations facilities and resources were ac c eptab le. 'he com:aunications systems were good with telephone and radio systems, EMRAD and other Iackup. ne b.ackup systems were used, in many cases, to obtain message verifications frou the county EOC. Dedicated telephone capabilities were not
! d emonst rated , nere was no hard-copy demonstration of message flow from receipt or inception > to the desk of' the leader. Secur ity, in the police station, was acceptable with a guard ; verbally informed to request' identifica-tion although uniformed per sonnel could come and go at will. There were no maps displayed showing evacuation routes, etc. although they were defined in the plans and population distribution was discussed although not , formilized with a map.
e Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff Alerting andnoksilizationofofficials and staff were good. The t imeline s s of notification for alerting and mobilization of initial response and continuous response staf f was good. Communications equipment for contact-ing emergency response pe r sonnel and medical suppo rt facilities was good.
. Activation of the EOC and other facilities was good.
e Energency Operations Management Emergency operations management was good and there was acceptable demonstration that the fire, police, and Departeret of Public Works (DPH) were each assigned specific responsibilities. D <,re w a no evidence, demonstrated or simul ated , that the emergency classili % ic., system consistent with the utility was used. De Mayor and Deputy riayor participated in the exercise, o Public Alerting and Notification ,
Public alerting and notific.ation were good. However, only's limited numbe'r of EBS messages were issued by state PIO at state EOC. It is the state's responsibility to issue EBS messages.
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l e Public and Media Relations Public and media relations activities of the Ocean Township EOC were not observed.
e Accident Assessment Accident assessment was not observed.
e Actions to Protect the Public ,
Actions to protect the, public were not observed.
e Health, Medical and Exposure Control Measures Health, medical and exposure control measures were not observed.
e Recovery and Reentry Operations The recovery and reentry operations were not demonstrated, e Relevance of the Exercise Experience The participants of the Ocean Township EOC believed the exercise was acepetable to test their adequacy but indicated several concerns. Volunteers who were losing work pay mentioned the long delays in the exercise as not beneficial. Several comments were made concerning the need for more equipment.
3.3.2 Nonparticipating Municipalities Beach Haven Borough Pine Beach Borough Beachwood Borough Seaside Heights Borough Berkeley Township Seaside Park Borough Dover Township Ship Bottom Borough Island Heights Borough South Toms River Borough Manchester Township Stafford Township Ocean Gate Borough Surf City Borough .
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1 e Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources In general, emergency operations facilities and resources we re good.
Communicar. ions systems, both primary and backup, were considered acceptable or better with typical systems including police and fire department radio, EMRAD, ,
etc., dedicated phone line and regular phone communications. l Most communities could effectively use additional equipment and several were in the process of obtaining it. Island Heights wa s small and some equipnent was moved into the space for the exercise.
Internal communications and message handling were acceptable, if informal, although several held periodic staff briefings. Displays and maps were weak or lacking.
Beach Haven, Ship Bo t tom , and Surf City had excellent security with buzzer systems controlling access to the EOC. Berkeley and Dover also ex-hibited excellent security and the rest of the towns demonstrated acceptable security for their ciretanstances.
Maps displaying evacuation routes, sampling points, relocation centers and shelter areas were weak and not clearly evident although plans containing the information were available in a number of EOCs. Similarly there was no
, evidence of any population distribution maps although there were scoe indica-tions that the EOCs had considered the problem.
e Alerting and Mobilization of Of ficials and Staff Alerting and mobilization of officials and staff were good. The nonparticipating communities appe ar to have sufficient staffing to perform well on a continuous basis, although a sustained res ponse might impo se a strain on available personnel.
All communities exhibited good capabilities for commun ic ations with emergency response org anizations and employed a variety of means ( rad io ,
telephones, beepers) for assurance of contact. There was evidence of message
- -- - ---- verification plans.--Emergency response personnel were alerted qutrkly 1:hrough - --
sirens, phone, radio or beeper, and were mobilized promptly through use of prepared ready lists. Where observed, there was a good communications system established with medical support" facilities.
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Local governmental units demonstrated that local EOCs possess a good mobilization response capability.
e E:nergency Operations Management Emergency operations management was good. Generally, the organization, leadership, control, decision making and support from elected officials were good at the municipal EOCs. Various degrees of formal operating procedur es were observed to be in place but most functioned well, within their particular c ircumstances , he officials in charge were generally knowledgeable about their community's responsibilities and required response actions.
he commun it ie s relied upon existing organizations to fulfill partic-ular response obligations. Most prominently mentioned were the Police, Fire, Civil De fen se , Department of Public Works and Health Departments who could bring a background of experience in dealing with other emergency situa-tions. Volunteers were used to supplement and to furnish additional expertise.
Most locations opera ted efficiently to accomplish their objectives whether in a formalized organization with a designated leader or in a struc-ture of shared res ponsib ilit ies . he operations appeared appropriate to the local situation. In Island Heights, no specific individual was in charge and no designated replacement was observed .
Although the presence of written plans was not generally denonstrated, emergency res ponse organizations were aware of their functions within the overall community response plan.
A consistent emergency classification system was not observed in use by most nonparticipating municipalities, he EOC staff of Island Heights !
knew the classification terminology but were not aware of differing response requirements for the classification levels.
Consistent with the size and scope of municipal EOCs, there were few documented emergency procedures. Some EOCs had written action pl ans.
In the nonparticipating towns, Beach Haven was ob s erv ed' to have excellent representation and participation by elected officials; while at l Island Heights, participation of elected officials was observed to be minimal, j
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e Public Alerting and Notification Public alerting and notification overall were acceptable. The mun ic i-palities generally demonstrated an acceptable capability to notify the public of an emergency. However, the e f fectiveness of the local alerting system to in form the transient po pul ation . was not d emons t r at ed . The issuance of EBS messages is a state responsibility.
e Public and Media Relations Public and media relations were not observed.
e Accident Assessment Activities to assess the incidence and scope of nuclear accidents were not considered applicable to municipal responsibilities.
e Actions to Protect the Public Actions to protect the public were acceptable. Several municipalities have identified possible impediments to evacuation and made plans to minimize their impact.
Pine Beach had plans prepared for the prompt evacuation o f resi-dents who had impaired mobility or were institutionalized.
In considering emergency actions, there were several areas of concern over imped iment s to traffic flow. Ship Bottom was concerned about the bridge on its evacuation route and began planning the evacuation early in the exercise. Seaside Heights and Seaside Park evacuation routes merge and, in common, hit a potentially severe bottleneck where the road narrows from five lanes to two.
e Health, Medical and Exposure Control Measures Health, medical and exposure control measures overall were weak. Some municipalities had acceptable supplies and equipment while others were lacking. However, it appeared that, aside from general knowledge, almost none had the specific expertise ruquired concerning KI usage, the use of dosimeters and exposure record keeping, and decont' amination requirenents.
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e Relevance of the Exercise Experience Generally, the overall response of the observers indicated that the exercise was very good in measuring the response capabilities of people, equipment, and the necessary coordination of ef forts among numerous operating entities. There was comment that exercise benefits were restricted by inherent limitations in the exercise. Overall, a highly professional attitude was displayed as was the willingness to learn and improve operations.
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SUMMARY
OF SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCIES "Significant deficiencies" are capabilities that may impede an effec-tive response and that were rated either " weak" or " lacking" (see Section 1.7). These "significant deficiencees" must be corrected in a timely fashion to ensure an adequate level of preparedness in the event of an emergency.
4.1 STATE FUNCTIONS Significant deficiencies in state-level functions have lead to the following recommendations.
4.1.1 No significant deficiencies noted.
4.1.2 No significant deficiencies noted.
4.1.3 No significant deficiencies noted.
4.1.4 Public Alerting and Notification
- a. The overall reliability of the system used to alert the public and provide emergency public information must be '
reviewed and improved. It is suggested that a system for verification of siren activation be included within the s capabilities of the state. Equipment should be upgraded to avoid delays in sounding sirens such as that which occurred in the exercise. (Reference NUREG-0654, II.E.5, E.6)
- b. A permanent EBS system should be put in place. The local radio stations should have this system as part of their basic operations and FCC approval should be obtained.
(Reference NUREG-0654, II.E.5, E.6) 4.1.5 Public and Media Relations
- a. The entire operation of the Joint Media Center should be reviewed. This operation was weak during the exercise and did not effectively pass on information to the public or the media. (Reference NUREG-0654, II.G.3)
- b. Public information pamphlets giving information and in-structions for use during an emergency should be printed and distributed to the public. (Reference NUREG-0654, II.G.1) '
- c. A public information program should be initiated within the 10 mile EPZ. Posted notices, etc. should be placed to instruct the public in the proper courses of action.
(Reference NUREG-0654, II.G.1,, G.2)
l 52
- d. A plan for dissemination of information to the public and the media should be developed. This plan should include provisions such as the issuance of news releases, and transfer of information between spokespersons including the county PIO. (Reference NUREG-0654, II.G.1, G.2, G.4.b)
- e. The state public information officer should have access to all pertinent information so that factual information will be given to the public and the media. (Reference NUREG-0654 II.G.4.a.)
- f. The facilities (display, etc.) at the joint media facility need upgrading and strengthening. (Reference NUREG-0654 II.G.3)
- g. Capabilities for rumor control should be reviewed.
(Reference NUREG-0654, II.G.4.c) 4.1.6 No significant deficiencies noted.
4.1.7 No significant deficiencies noted.
4.1.8 No significant deficiencies noted.
4.1.9 Recovery and Reentry Operations In future exercises, recovery and reentry should be included and fully demonstrated as part of the overall activities. (Reference NUREG-0654. II.M) 4.2 OCEAN COUNTY, NEW JERSEY FUNCTIONS Significant deficiencies in county-level funct ions have lead to the following recommendations.
4.2.1 No significant deficiencies noted.
4.2.2 No significant deficiencies noted.
4.2.3 No significant deficiencies noted.
4.2.4 Public Alerting and Notification
- a. The siren equipment and system should be upgraded to insure that it can be activated in a timely manner. (Reference NUREG-0654, II.E.5)
- b. The county should consider installation of a system to verify siren activation, as this is the major means used -
to alert the public. (Reference NUREG-0654, II.E.5)
{
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t 53 )
, c. A comprehensive public education program should be conducted
, especially in light of the large transient population.
Emergency procedures should be posted in motel rooms and a program should be instituted to insure that both full-time and transient residents receive emergency information.
. (Reference NUREG-0654, II.J.10.c)
- d. A program should be initiated to determine the ef fective-ness of the siren system. Such a program can be a survey of the population af ter a siren test. (Reference NUREG-0654 II.E.6, J.10.c-)
4.2.5 No significant deficiencies noted.
4.2.6 No significant deficiencies noted.
4.2.7 No significant deficiencies noted.
4.2.8 No significant deficiencies noted.
4.2.9 Recovery and Reentry Operations Recovery and reentry events could be performed as a parallel exercise during the afternoons of future exercises to be sure time constraints do not preclude this response. (Reference NUREG-0654. II.M.1 and M.3)
)
4.3 OCEAN COUNTY MUNICIPALITIES (TOWNSHIPS AND BOROUGHS)
, Significant deficiencies in municipal-level functions were uniform for all and are given below.
- a. Sufficient equipment should be procured to enable emergency workers to monitor their exposure to radiation. A plan ,
should also be instituted to train personnel in such areas as exposure monitoring, exposure record keeping, protective action guides, maximum allowable exposure, use of KI, etc.
(Reference NUREG-0654, II.J.10.e, K.3.a K.3.b)
- b. Displays and maps should be Leproved and provided for all EOCs. Maps should show population distributions, evacuation routes, and relocation centers. (Reference
! NUREG-0654, II.J.10.a, J.10.b) 4 e 4
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54 .
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- 5
SUMMARY
OF MINOR DEFICIENCIES
" Minor deficiencies" are capabilities that were rated either " accept-
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able" or " good" (see Section 1.7). Although these minor deficiencies did not prevent the state and local organizations from adequately implementing their radiological emergency response, plans, correcting them will improve prepared-ness or facilitate operations.
5.1 STATE FUNCTIONS Minor deficiencies in state-level functions have lead to the following recommendations:
j 5.1.1 Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources l
At the BRPFCF, emergency operations facilities and resources were observed to be good. Communications consisted of a police radio, state radio, and telephone which were effectively utilized. The communications with the state EOC were adequate. The BRFCP displayed status boards and maps showing sampling points, but there were no maps showing population or location of care centers. The noted weakness at the BRFCP was somewhat lax security.
During the exercise, for example, a member of the press entered unchallenged.
- a. Consideration may be given to increasing the available space allotted to dose assessment operations.
i b. On-the-job training should be implemented to smooth out the procedure of initially setting up security at the EOC.
This will avoid problems such as having unauthorized personnel being in the work areas when EOC staff is attempting to bring the EOC into operation..
- c. More space should be allotted for maps and displays.
- d. Consideration should be given to assigning a separate coding system to the EPZ maps, to avoid confusion with the number designation system given on the sector maps. For example, EPZ maps could have letter designations for the ,
various zones. '
- e. At the NJSP forward command post, it is suggested that the-state police and EOF personnel be physically located
, together rather than on separate floors to improve internal
, communcations and logistics.
. e i
55 ;
- f. A more effective security system should be umplemented at the Bureau of Radiation Protection forward command post.
The system needs to address the problems of free access by unauthorized personnel to the FCP working area.
5.1.2 Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff
- a. It is suggested that manpower planning be reviewed to insure that sufficient personnel are available to sustain a 24-hour continuous emergency response and that personnel can be dispacebed to the licensee's near-site EOF. (Reference NUREG-0654, II.A.I.e., C.2.a)
- b. On-the-job training may be considered to enhance the operations of alerting, notifying and mobilizing emergency response personnel and prompt activation of emergency response communications. (Reference NUREG-0654, II.E.2, F.1.a) 5.1.3 Emergency Operations Management It is recommended that training of personnel be conducted to alleviate the confusion over nomenclature which could hamper and delay effective communications.
5.1.4 No minor deficiencies noted. .
5.1.5 No minor deficiencies noted.
5.1.6 Accident Assessment
- a. The instrumentation issued to field monitoring teams should be reviewed, so that each team will have identical equipment.
Provisions should be made to insure that teams have the capability to measure the air, ground, and water for con-tamination. Uniformity in the issuance of protective clothing, maps, etc., should also be reviewed. (Reference NUREG-0654, II.H.7, I.7, I.8, I.11)
- b. All personnel assigned to off-site monitoring should receive identical training. The training level of personnel should be reviewed and upgraded as necessary. The training should include field measurements for radioiodine.
(Reference NUREG-0654, II.I.7, I.8, I.9) 5.1.7 No minor deficiencies noted.
5.1.8 Health, Medical and Exposure Control Measures
- Training should be initiated for workers in the area of reporting radiation dosages received. This procedure, including reporting intervals, should be included in the training as well as part of the overall plan. (Reference NUREG-0654, II.K.3.b)
S 1
I t 56
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', 5.2 OCEAN COUNTY, NEW JERSEY l
Minor deficiencies in county-level functions have lead to the following recommendations:
5.2.1 Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources State OEM maps should be obtained by the county so that designation of such areas as access control points will be consistent with the state. (Reference NUREG-0654, II.J.10.a) 5.2.2 Alerting and Mobilization of officials and Staff The capability for fixed and mobile medical support facili-ties to communicate with each other should be reviewed and upgraded. This was deficient during the exercise and such communications should be available. (Reference NUREG-0654, II.F.2) 5.2.3 No minor deficiencies noted.
5.2.4 No minor deficiencies noted.
5.2.5 Public and Media Relations The county and state need to develop a plan and facilities which will baprove the effectiveness of the joint media 2 center as a contact for the news media. (Reference NUREG-0654, II.G.3.a.)
5.2.6 Accident Assessment 7
- a. The county should undertake the efforts to improve the equipment used for field radiological monitoring as well as to improve the training of monitoring personnel. This should be done to insure that capabilities meet those required by the county plan. (Reference NUREG-0654, II.H.7)
- b. The county monitoring teams should have the capability
, to monitor solids and liquids for radiation contamination
- and for the presence of radioiodine. (Reference NUREG-0654 II.I.7, I.8, I.9)
- c. Communications systems between the county monitoring teams and the county EOG should be reviewed and upgraded as necessary. This was deficient during the exercise. .
1 (Reference NUREG-0654, II.H.12) 4
57 ,i .
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5.2.7 Actions to Protect the Public It is suggested that the system and procedures for processing evacuees be reviewed. Plans should include facilities for the decontamination of personnel and vehicles and security should be considered for the congregate care centers. (Reference NUREG-0654, II.J.12) l .
i 5.2.8 Health, Medical and Exposure Control l
- a. Training regarding the reporting and maintenance of doses ,
received by emergency workers should be reviewed and upgraded to insure proper dose monitoring. (Reference NUREG-0654, II.K.3.a. K.3.b)
- b. Location and facilities for the decontamination center should be reviewed. Consideration should be given to relocating the decontamination center outside of the 10 mile EPZ. Facilities should be Laproved for containment of runof f decontamination of vehicles and Laproved person-nel facilities such as more showers should be considered.
(Reference NUREG-0654, II.K.5.b) 5.2.9 No minor deficiencies noted.
5.2.10 Relevance of Exercise Experience Optional events should be planned into the scenario to avoid too much " dead time" during one day.
5.3 OCEAN COUNTY MUNICIPALITIES (TOWNSHIPS AND BORD'JGHS)
Minor deficiencies in municipal level functions that apply to most of the municipal level EOCs 1. ave lead to the following recommendations:
- a. A formal system for message handling and internal communica-tions should be implemented. This would assist in accurate and timely dissemination of information.
- b. Training and planning should include more ef fective use of
, staff briefings to coordinate emergency response activities,
- c. Consideration should be given to establishing a program for dissemination of emergency information to the public. This may be considered in conjunction with an overall state and/or county program. (Reference NUREG-0654 II.G.1)
- d. Improve communications systems so that local police do not.
lose contact with first aid facilities. (Reference NUREG-0654 II.F.2)
? .
1
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'e- e. It is suggested that overall formal operations procedures be
, devised which incorporate the existing, individual radiolog-ical emergency response procedures manuals. This can assist in coordinating overall response activities. (Reference
, NUREG-0654, II.D.4)
- f. A more formal security system including written instructions should be considered to limit access of personnel to the EOC.
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6 CORRECTIVE ACTION FOR DEFICIENCIES Sections 4 and 5 of this report listed significant and minor deficien-cies based on the findings of the federal evaluators of this exercise. These evaluations are based on the applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in Section II or NUREG-0654-FEMA-1, Rev 1 (November,1980).
Correction of the minor deficiencies noted is suggested for improved ope r a-tions. .
Both the state and local jurisd ic tions should submit to the RAC the measures they have taken or intend to take to correct significant deficien-cies. If remedial actions cannot be instituted immed iately , then a detailed plan, including dates of completion, for scheduling and implementing remedial actions must be provided.
The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director, State and Local Programs and Su ppo r t , Washington, ,
i D.C., that any significant deficiencie9 noted in the exercise have been corrected and that such corrections have been incorporated into the pl an.
6.1 SCHEDULE FOR THE CORRECTION OF SICNIFICANI DEFICIENCIES (To be supplied by the State of New Jersey) i 9
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POST EXERCISE ASSESSMENT May 24, 1983 Exercise of the Radiological Emergency Response Plans for the State of New Jersey, Ocean County, j and Ocean County Municipalities
, for the OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION September 16, 1983 Federal Emergency Management Agency Region II f
Frank P. Petrone 26 Federal Plaza Regional Director Ne w Yo rk , N.Y . 10278 i ,
t__________.___________._____________________ u____.___.____.____________ .__a
F. -
]
O*
.o CONTENTS ABBREVIATIONS............................................................. y
SUMMARY
.................................................................. vii I INTRODUCTION........................................................... I l.1 Ex e r c i s e Ba c kg r o un d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 1.2 Fe d e ra l O b s e rv e r s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.3 Evaluation Criteria............................................... 4 1.4 Ex e r c i s e O bj e c t iv e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.5 Ex e r ci s e Sc e n a r i o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.5.1 Major Sequence of Events on Site........................... 6 1.5.2 Scenario Summary........................................... 7 1.5.3 Description of State and Local Resources................... 9 2 EVA L U AT I O N S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.1 State of New Jersey............................................... 16 2.1.1 Emergency Operations Facilities and Re sources. . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.1.2 Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff.......... 17 2.1.3 Emergency Operations Management...........................' 18 2.1.4 Public Alerting and Notification.......................... 18 4 2.1.5 Public and Me dia Re la t ions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2.1.6 Accident Assessment....................................... 20
, 2.1.7 Actions to Protect the Public. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2.1.8 Health, Medical, and Exposure Control Measures. . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2.1.9 Re co ve ry and Re e n t ry Ope ra t ions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 2.1.10 Relevance o f the Exe rcise Expe rience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 2.2 Oc e a n Co u n t y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 2.2.1 Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 2.2.2 Alerting and Mobilization of Of ficials and Staf f.. . . ...... 24 2.2.3 Eme rgency Ope rations Managemen t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 2.2.4 Public Ale rting and No tif ication. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 2.2.5 Public and Media Relations................................ 28 2.2.6 Ac c id e n t As s e s s me n t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 2.2.7 Actions to Protect the Public............................. 29 2.2.8 Health, Medical, and Exposure Control Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 2.2.9 Re covery and Reentry Ope ra t ions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 2.2.10 Re levance of the Exercise Expe rience. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 2.3 Ocean County Municipalities....................................... 31 2.3.1 Emergency' Operations Facilities and Re sources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 2.3.2 Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff........... 33 2.3.3 Eme rgency Ope rations Managemen t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 2.3.4 Public Alerting and Notification........................... 35 2.3.5 Actions to Protect t he Pu b l i c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 2.3.6 Health, Medical, and Exposure Control Measures. . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 2.3.7 Reent ry and Re cove ry Ope ra t ions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 2.3.8 Relevance of the Exercise Experience....................... 36 iii
CONTENTS (Cont'd) 3
SUMMARY
OF DEFICIENCIES THAT WOULD LEAD TO NEGATIVE FINDINGS........... 38 4 OTHER DEFICIENCIES..................................................... 39 4.1 State of New Jersey............................................... 39 4.1.1- Eme rgency Operations Fa cilities and Re sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 4.1.2 Public and Media Relations................................. 39 4.1.3 Accident As s e s sme n t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40.
4.1.4 Recovery and Reentry Operations............................ 40 4.2 Oc e a n Co u n t y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 4.2.1 Eme rgency Operations Facilities and Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 4.2.2 Alerting and Mobilization of Of ficials and Staf f. . . . . . . . . . . 41 4.2.3 Emergency Operations Management............................ 41 4.2.4 Public Ale rting and No tifica tion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 4.2.5 Public and Media Relations................................. 42 4.2.6 Ac c i d e n t As s e s sm e n t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 4.2.7 Health, Medical, and Exposure Control Measures............. 43 4.3 Oc e a n Co un t y Mun i c i pa li t i e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 4.3.1 Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources.............. 43 4.3.2 Alerting and Mobilization of Of ficials and Staf f. . . . . . . . . . . 44 4.3.3 Emergency Operations Management............................ 44 4.3.4 Ac tions to Pro t e c t the Public . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 4.3.5 Health, Medical, and Exposure Control Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 5 SCHEDULE FOR CORRE CTION OF DEFICIENCIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 9
e iv
(
e ABBREVIATIONS ANL Argonne National Laboratory BERC N.J. Department of Environmental Protection, Bureau of Emergency Response Coordination BRP N.J. Department of Environmental Protection, Bureau of Radiation Protection DOA N.J. Department of Agriculture DEP N.J. Department of Environmental Protection DOE U.S. Department of Energy DOC U.S. Department of Commerce DOH N.J. Department of Health DOT U.S. Department of Transportation EBS Emergency Broadcast System EMC Emergency Management Coordinator EMRAD N.J. Emergency Management Radio EMS emergency medical system EOC emergency operations center EOF emergency operations facility EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency EPZ emergency planning zone FCP Forward Command Post FDA U.S. Food and Drug Administration FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency GPU General Public Utilities HHS U.S. Department of Health and Human Services INEL Idaho National Engineering Laboratory JMC joint media center KI potassium iodide NAWAS National Warning System NJSP New Jersey Division of State Police NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission OCNGS Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station OCSCD Ocean County Sheriff's Communication Division OEM NJSP Office of Emergency Management PAG protective action guide PIO public information officer RAC Regional' Assistance Committee RACES radio amateur civil emergency service RBCCW Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water RCS Reactor Coolant System RERP Radiological Emergency Response Plan
USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture V
i_________.________________________._______.________.__________________.____________________________________________________________.___.
S UMMARY State of New Jersey The State of New Jersey demonstrated corvetence in directing and controlling the emergency response activities during the exercise. All levels of management demonstrated strong leadership capabilities. throughout the exercise.
The various state f acilities and the emergency operations center (EOC) in particular were effectively utilized and fully staffed throughout the exercise. All emergency operations were conducted in a professional manner.
The Governor and the Commissione r of - Environmental Protection personally participated in the exercise at the EOC. This level of support by an elected official is a good example of the s tate 's commi tmen t to emergency prepared-ness.
The public was progtly notified by sirens, and the emergency broadcast system (EBS) was subsequently activated. In general, the sounding of the sirens at 9:30 a.m. was well coordinated with the airing of~an EBS test message by radio stations. He state EOC demonstrated a very good capability to promptly identify critical information to be used in EBS messages.
However, coordinated arrangements for rumor control still need to be reviewed.
Staffing at the joint media center (JMC) included the Ocean County Public Information Officer (PIO), a State of New Jersey Of fice of Emergency Management PIO, a PIO f rom the Governor's office, and the utility's PIO. This level of staffing ensured that professionals would provide information to the media, orimarily through press briefings, and answer questions f rom the media.
The participation of the Ocean " County PIO and the PIO from the Gove rno r 's office greatly increased the effectiveness of JMC operations. However, coordination among Pios at the State and County EOCs and the JMC should be iceroved to ensure a timely and accurate flow of information.
Ihere was no telecopier at the JMC for the state and county PIDs, and the JFC staff had no hard copies of EBS messages for thems elves or for distri bution to the media. Other equipment, including wall maps and a television for monitoring public information, should be obtained.-
New Je rs ev 's capability to perform accident as ses sment fun c tions'wa s clearly shown. The state demonstrated a good capability to implement etfective emergency management procedures. Rese proce dures included the simulated evacuation of four emergency planning areas affected by the plume and sheltering of four others.
' The simulation of recovery and reentry demonstrated that the present state plan includes two inconsistent criteria for reentry that could possibly igede the decision making process. This inconsistency exemplifies the need vii i
7 for periodic exercises an' for state personnel to update the plan as needed. ..,
It is evident that the set te has continued to develop and refine its planning capabilities.
Ocean Countv. New Jersey Overall, . Ocean County's performance was good. Management capability and leadership were well demonstrated at the county emergen cy operations center. Communications, command and control, and message flow we re all improved since the 1982 exercise. The alerting and mobilization of emergency workers was both efficient and timely.
The congregate care center at Georgian Court was very good. Evacuees were effectively monitored, registered, and decontamina ted as necessary and provisions for their care we re we ll established. These actions we re significantly improved from the 1982 exercise.
The decontamination center for emergency wo rke rs in Ma nahawkin was recently established and functioned well overall. Howeve r, additional training is needed in procedures for the radiological monitoring of emergency workers.
Most people interviewed on the day of the exercise had heard the sirens and received public education brochures. However, some were unaware of the emergency procedures which they are to follow.
Federal observers were advised that public education information will be placed in free newspapers during the summer season. This effort, and continuing brochure distribution, should provide the summer population with adequate informar. ion.
Ocean County's field monitoring teams performed very well. Although one of the radiological monitoring instruments used to detect radiciodine mal-functioned, the training, equipment, and personal dosimetry we re imp roved since the 1982 exercise.
The Ocean County Sherif f's Communication Division, which is the primary concunication link between the Ocean County EOC and municipal warning points, functioned well. However, emergency response personnel need to receive additional training in procedures, checklists, and the use of forms.
Ocean County Municipalities Federal observers reviewed emergency response activities at seventeen township and borough EOCs. The mobilization of local of ficials and staf f was generally timely and the participation by emergency response personnel at the municipal EOCs was commendable. The capability for continuous 24-hour viii
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De emergency response was good in most communities. Local emergency response workers and emergency management personnel were generally knowledgeable about
. their responsibilities and their roles in the plan. In addition, most personnel had received training in radiological emergency response. Some workers had attended courses sponsored by the state and Ocean County.
Substantial progress was evident in response to the recommendations for remedial actions based on last year's exercise. Improved areas include the following:
e Dosimetry eouipment and exposure control; e -EOC maps and displays; e Message handling and internal communications; and e Mobile communications with first aid units.
Several recommendations are offered with respect to the municipal
- EOCs. Consideration should be given to establishing an alternate EOC outside the 2-mile area to coordinate Ocean Township's emergency response activities if evacuation becomes necessary. The communications system used for notifying the municipal EOCs was acceptable. However, some messages between the Ocean County EOC and municipal EOCs were delayed due to the system overloading. To avoid overloading this system, additional training is needed in proper use of the N.J. Emergency Management Radio (DIRAD) network.
The volunteer emergency workers in all the municipalities are to be complimented on their efforts and dedication in preparing for and participating in the exercise.
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1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 EXERCISE BACKGROUND On De cembe r 7, 1979, the President directed the Fede ral Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assume lead responsibility for all off-site nuclear planning and. response.
FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:
e Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of radiological emergency response plans developed by state and local governments; e Determining whether such plans can be implemented, on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans conducted by state and local governments; and e Coordinating the activities of federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning
. process:
- U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC),
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),
- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
- U.S. Department of Energy (DOE),
- U.S. Department of Health, and Human Services (HHS),
- U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT),
- U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and
- U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
Re presentatives of these agencies serve as members of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.
Annex 3 to the State of New Jersey Radiological Emergency Re sponse Plan (RERP) for Nuclear Power Plants is the RERP for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS). It includes detailed state, county, and municipal plans pertaining to that site. This plan was evaluated, and an exercise of the RERP for OCNGS was then held on March 16, 1982.
A second exercise of the RERP for OCNGS was conducted on May 24, 1983, between the hours of 5:00 a.m. and 3:30 p.m. , to assess the capabilities of the state and local emergency preparedness organizations to (1) implement their radiological emergency plans and procedures and (2) protect the public in a radiological emergency involving the OCNGS.
2 A team of 22 observers evaluated the May 24 exercise. Te am leaders coordinated the operations of the teams of observers assigned to evaluate the activities of the State of New Je rs ey , Ocean Coun ty , and Ocean County municipalities.
Following the exercise, the federal observers me t to compile their evaluations. Observers presented observations specific to their assignments, the teams of obse rve rs developed preliminary assessments for each jurisdiction, and team leaders consolidated the evaluations of individual team members. A public critique of the exercise for exercise participants and the general public was held at 7:00 p.m. on Wednesday, May 25, 1983, in the Lacey Munic'oal Building in Lacey, New Jersey.
The findings presented in this repo rt are based on evaluations of federal observers, which were reviewed by FEMA Region II. FEMA requests that state and local jurisdictions submit a schedule of remedial actions for correcting the deficiencies discussed in this report. The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director of State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C., that all negative findings observed during the exercise have been corrected and that such corrections [
have been incorporated into state and local plans, as appropriate. j i
1.2 FEDERAL OBSERVERS Twenty-two federal observers evaluated off-site emergency response functions. These individuals, their affiliations, and their exercise assign-ments are given below.
Observer Agency Exercise Location / Function P. McIntire FEMA FEMA Command Post /Ceneral Observation (Division Chief, Natural and Technological Hazards Division)
R. Kowieski FEMA Exercise Overview /RAC Chairman and Branch Chief, Technological Hazards Branch R. Reynolds FEMA State Emergency Operations Center (EOC)/ Team Leader Y. Klein ANL State EOC/ Communications J. Keller INEL N.J. Department of Environmental Protection, Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP); and State EOC/ Accident Assessment M. Jackson FEMA State EOC; Joint Media Center /Public Information Officer (PIO)
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l 3 l Obse rve r Agency Exercise Location / Function T. Jackson NRC OCNCS near-site Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)/
Liaison A. Mojica FD4A Joint Media Center /PIO; Ocean County / Alert and Notification, Public Information J. Opelka ANL BRP Forward Command Post (FCP)/ Accident Assessment P. Lutz DOT Manchester, New Jersey / Evacuation Bus Route; Garden State Parkway / Access Control; Ocean County Local EOCs/ Surf City Borough, Ship Bottom
.Burough L. Hoffman INEL State Vanguard Team'/ Radiological Monitoring; Lanoka Harbor, New Jersey / State Decontamination Center; Ocean County Local EOC/ Lacey Township R. Conley USDA BRP FCP/ Water Sampling Team, Recovery Reentry Team; ;
Ocean County Local EOC/ Berkeley Township R. Honkus INEL BRP FCP/ Recovery-Reentry Team; Ocean County EOC/ Radiological Monitoring R. Garelik FEM / Ocean County EOC/ Team Leader H. Fish DOE Ocean County EOC/ Communications A. Smith ANL Ocean County Sherif f's Communication Division (OCSCD)/
Communications; Ocean County / Alert-Notification and Public Information R. Bernacki FDA Lacey Township / Bus Evacuation ' Route; Lakewood, New Jersey / Congregate Care Shelter; Ocean County / Alert-Notification and Public Information N. Chipman INEL Ocean County EOC/ Radiological Monitoring; Stafford, New Jersey / Ocean Ctunty Decontamination Center; Ocean County / Alert-Notification and Public Information F. Fishman FE4A Ocean County Local EOCs/ Team Leader; Dover Township / Impediment to Evacuation; Ocean County Local EOCs/ Ocean Cate Borough Seaside Heights Borough, Seaside Park Borough
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Observer Agency Exercise f.ocatton/Punction ..
D. Newsome ANL Ocean County Local EOCs/ Dover Township.
Island lleights Borouch, Pine Beach Borough J . Ta t a r ANL Ocean County Local EOCs/ Beachwood Borough, Ba rnega t Light Borough , Harvey Cedars Borough T. Baldwin ANL Ocean County Local ~.0Cs/ Ocean Township, Ba rnega t Light Bo rough , St af ford Township, Long Nach Township 1.3 EVALUATION CRITERIA Radiological emergency response activities were evaluated by federal observers in accordance with the following scheme:
o Capability outstanding: no deficiencies noted, no imp rove-ments necessa ry.
o Capability good: only ninor deficiencies noted.
o Capa bili t y acceptable: deficiencies noted that limit ef-fective performances.
o Capability weak: significant deficiencies 1oted.
o Capability lacking: response called for but not demon-strated.
- i. EXERCI.9E O!GECTIVES The oblectives of state and local f o r t sd ic t iona in this exercise were to Jemonstra e (!) the adenuacy of radiological e me rgen cy response plans, (2) the capability to mobilize needed personnel and equinment, and (3) f ant liaritv with procedures ret,u i red to cope with an emer3tencv at the Ovs t e r Creek Nuc lea r Powe r Station, which is operated hv General Public Utilities (CPU )-Nuclea r Corp. The New Jersey Division of State Police (NJSP) and the New Jersey Department of Environmental Prntection (DEP) developed the follow-ing state, county and ninicipal of f-site emergency preparedness objectives for this exercise:
- a. Demonstrate the prompt notification and enhilization of eme rgen cy personnel at the state, county, and ninicipa l levels.
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- b. Demor: strate ' the capability to promptly activat'e warning ,
sirena.
- c. Demonstrate ,the activation and fonctioning of the Emergency Brogdcast 3ystem (EBS). .
- d. Evaluate state, county, and municipal EOC operations, in particular the effectiveness of the new message format and procedures.
- e. Evaluate the operation of the rumor control system.
- f. Demonstrate adequate communications between field teams and command locations. '
- g. Demonstrate appropriate communication and coordination between the licensee and federal, state, county, and municipal agencies. ~
- h. Demonstrate a coordinated system of emergency facility displays, maps, and securitt at the state, county and municipal levels.
d-
- 1. Evalaate the operation of the joint media center for effective information access, coordination, and dissemination.
- j. Evaluate the effectiveness of new radiological training programs fo- decontamination, monitoringg dose reporting and record keeping, and personneP prote: tion.
' k. Demonstrate that all response personnel are adequately equipped with equivalent dosimetry, monitoring equipment, and protective clothing.
- 1. Demonstrate a simulated limited evacuation with its attendant evacuee reception, congregate care, and subsequent reentry.
- m. Test the recovery and reentry procedures at the state, w county, and municipal levels; these procedures are to include decision making, dose commitment, area monitoring, r decontamination, and public information.
- n. Demonstrate accident assessment and evaluation, including the calculation of off-site radiation dose.
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- o. Demonstrate the capability of the state to make protective action decisions and the capability of the state, counties, and municipalities to implement those decisions.
- p. Demonstrate the efficient establishment of access control points.
1.5 PLANNED EXERCISE SCENARIO 1.5.1 Maior Planned Seauence of Events on Site Approximate Time Event 5:00 a.m. Unidentified leak to the drywell exceeds 10 gal / min; Notification of Unusual Event emergency classification.
5:45 a.m. Leak rate increases to more than 50 gal / min; Alert emergency classification.
6:45 a.m. Technical Support Center staffed. I 8:30 a.m. Severed recirculation line (Design Basic Accident) mandates escalation to General Emergency emergency classification.
Improper distribution of core spray leads to fuel damage.
8:45 a.m. Pressure has peaked; one loop of containment spray is operable.
Other loop tagged out for maintenance.
9:30 a.m. Fire reported on site.
9:45 a.m. Pressure rises again, torus water temUcrature rises, due to clams blocking heat exchanger intake.
10:00 a.m. !ncreased pressure is released to reactor building through vessel head seal. Atmospheric release through blowout panel. Torus weld cracks, releasing radioactive water to reactor building.
11:00 a.m. Continuing puff releases.
12:00 noon Continuous release through blowout panel.
12:15 p.m. Repairs to containment spray initiated.
12:45 p.m. Containment spray repairs complete; release terminates.
n
, 7 Approximate Time Event 1:15 p.m. Plant declared under control.
1:45 p.m. Exercise clock is stopped to prepare to time jump.
2:00 p.m. Exercise play resumes. Time is 2:00 p.m., exercise day plus three. Off-site reentry and recovery operations begin.
4:00-5:00 Exercise ends.
p.m.
1.5.2 Scenario Summary The Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS) has been operating for 42 days and is currently operating at full power, 640 MWe. All safety systems are operable.
An unidentified drywell leak is measured at approximately 10 gal / min.
The group shif t supervisoe declares an unusual event and begins a controlled shutdown. 2 Pressure in the d rywell measures 1.2 lb/in (psig) and the temperature is 120*F. Unknown to the operators, the leak consists of 5 gal / min of reactor-building closed cooling water (RBCCW) from the drywell cooler and 5 gal / min from the reactor coolant system (RCS). Shutdown is slow due to core limit problems. Operators continue to be unable to determine that the leak is from the RBCCW system. Drywell pressure rises to 1.23 psig and the temperature to 123*F. The operators may speculate that the drywell cooler is leaking.
The operators receive another sump integrator reading which is now greater than 50 gal / min. The group shift supervisor should declare an Alert, resulting in activation of the initial response team. Dryvell temperature is tow 128'F and pressure is 1.4 psig. The leak consists of 40 gal / min RBCCW and 10 gal / min RCS, but the operators are still not aware of this.
Subsequent sump readings remain at 50 gal / min. The drywell pressure rises to 1.6 psig and the drywell temperature to 135'F. Reactor power dropped to 93". Sump samples are inconclusive in identifying the source of the leak.
Just before the break, the sump reading increases to 130 gal / min.
Drywell temperature is 160*F and pressure is 1.85 psig.
A guillotine break occurs in a recirculation line between the vessel wall and the discharge valve (not isolatable), which is a design basis accident. A level loss occurs in the core, causing core spray to initiate.
Area radiation monitors in the reactor building climb steadily and the drywell equipment drain tank monitor is pegged off-scale high, an indication of fuel
8 .
failure.. At this time, the emergency duty officer should declare a General -
Emergency. Operators may mitigate the inventory loss by closing suction or discharge valves on the pumps. Improper distribution of flow through the sparger causes some fuel to melt and be released into the drywell through the leak. Isolation condensers are useless because pressure is being relieved directly to the drywell through the recirculation line shear.
The following events occur shortly after the guillotine break:
e The A & B containment spray loop initiates and immediately trips off. The C & D loop should be manually activated by the control room operator.
e The Control Room receives indication of a smoke and fire alarm from the 480V room, e The Fire Brigade is dispatched.
e The Control Room receives actuation signal for Halon discharge into the 480V room.
e Pressure in the drywell and torus peaks and begins to drop due to containment spray. The containment spray loop heat t exchangers, however, are plugged with clams and their heat transfer capability is severely reduced.
e The Fire Brigade leader reports that the fire was in the insulation for power cable to the breakers for the A& B containment spray pumps. The breakers are damaged.
These events culminate in a recommendation for evacuation of the public in the vicinity of the plant and in some portion of the northern sector.
It has become clear that strong efforts must bn made to get the second containment spray loop into service. Damage control teams are sent to the 480V room to repair the fire-damaged breakers for the A & B containment spray pumps. Pressure in the drywell and torus, which has been dropping as per the FDSAR curve, now starts rapidly increasing as torus water temperature increases. The A &B loop of containment spray is still inoperable due to fire damage in the 480V room.
The drywell pressure peaks at approximately 47 psig and then suddenly drops. Fission products are released through the drywell head seal. The pressure builds up again and then drops due to another release. The first of these pressure releases causes a seal between two reactor building 119' elevation panels to fail. The panels - stay in place, but each subsequent relief of pressure and fission products causes more of a direct release to the environment.-
r
. 9 The Control Room receives a call from Security stating that one of the guards passing by the north side of the reactor building heard a loud noise from the north side top of the reactor building. The guard then observed what appeared to be an opening between two of the wall panels on the 119' elevation.
The damage control team leader reports an estimated 6-8 hours will be necessary to repair the damage.
The pressure releases from the drywell occur more rapidly, indicating that the pressure rise inside the drywell is increasing. The heat source is still significant. Water level in the drywell has risen to the approximate level of the core in the reactor. There are indications of high humidity in the drywell bu t decreases in pressure in the drywe ll are due to releases through the drywell head to the 119' elevation, reactor building.
The damage control team finishes repairs to the breakers for the A & B containment spray pumps. The pumps start almost immediately and drywell pressure and temperature drop. The plant is stabilized and releases are stopped. The 119' panels reseal due to equalized pressure. SBGT system begins to regain negative pressure in the reactor building.
At this point the plant is under control. The reactor vessel and drywell are depressurized. Releases of radioactive material are controlled and not expected to exceed 15 mrem beyond the site boundary. The plant is in the recovery phase. On-site personnel continue to assess the situation and develop alternatives for the long-term recovery of the plant. A time break is introduced for off-site agencies to demonstrate reentry and recovery.
1.5.3 Description of State and Local Resources Conceot of Operations and Control of the Exercise The licensee and the State of New Jersey were to supply official referees or observers for each location where an emergency response is being demonstrated for the exercise. Before the exercise, the referees and observers were to be provided with the appropriate locations, maps, time periods. guidelines, and an evaluation checklist for their exercise assignments.
The exercise initiating events were to be controlled by the lead referee at OCNGS. Hypothesized initiating events consisted of four types of information: (1) data provided to control room personnel by the lead referee or his designee, (2) data provided to OCNGS personnel concerning environmental (e.g., area, air, primary coolant, surfaces) and plant systems radioactivity, (3) on-site and off-site dose rate data ,(simulated gamma and iodine dose rate measurements) provided to the site, state, and county monitoring teams by
10 .
referees, and (4) initiating events for off-site participants, supplied by referees or observers. The lead referee had the authority to determine the time sequence of these initiating events to ensure an orderly and logical flow of exercise events. All other actions during the exercise were to occur as free play responses by the licensee, state, county, and municipal participants to the initiating events.
As the initiating events were provided to the station staff, they were to determine the nature of the emergency and implement the appropriate station emergency plan procedures. These procedures we re expected to include a determination of the emergency classification in accordance with NUREG-0654, FDI A-REP-1, Rev. 1. After the emergency classification had been determined, the appropriate federal, state, county, and municipal authorities were to be notified in accordance with the emergency plan procedures.
Upon notification of the hypothesized emergency at OCNGS, the state, county, and municipalities were to complete their initial notifications and activation of emergency facilities in accordance with their emergency plans and procedures.
The hypothesized emergency was to continue to develop as data were provided to the control room personnel by the lead referee. As the situation developed, follow up information was to be forwarded to the New Jersey State ,
EOC and the- ERP. The BRP was to analyze the information and recommend protec-tive action as they would in an actual emergency. Where information would normally have been confirmed by an independent source, such as National Weather Service for weather data, the confirmation data were to be obtained.
If the confirmation data conflicted with the hypothesized data provided by the site, the hypothesized data were to be used for accident assessment. Any inconsistencies in the initiating events were to be questioned by the state accident assessment team as they would be in a real emergency.
Certain inconsistencies, such as plume width, release duration, the technical reason for the simulated release, may have been requf. red to test the capabilities of the licensee, state, county, and municipalities to the maximum extenc feasible in a limited time frame. If sn inconsistency was known or determined to be intentional, then the accident assessment group was to note i the inconsistency and ignore it. The lead referee had the authority to
. resolve or explain any inconsistencies or problems that may have occurred during the exercise.
With the exception of the aforementioned inconsistencies and the end of the emergency, which is discussed later, the internal operations of the licensee, state, county, and municipal command centers were to be identical with their intended operation in a real emergency.
e
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.o 11 Emergency Response Implementation and Operations Initial Notification. Initial notification was to be performed in accordance with the procedures of the radiological emergency plans.
Activation of Facilities. Activation of state, county, and municipal EOCs and staf fing of the EOCs by emergency response personnel were to occur in accordance with the emergency plans.
Activation of the EOF. GPU Nuclear Corp. personnel were to activate the EOF. Activation and operation of the EOF was to be in accordance with the emergency plan procedures. Normal travel times to the EOF by its staff may have been compressed and staf fing may have been permitted one-half hour after the decision to activate.
Public Notification. The first request to the EBS was to be the test message of the Oyster Creek Radiological Emergency Broadcast System, which was to be broadcast to the public. All messages during the exercise were to be prepared and forwarded to the EBS gateway station, WADB, in accordance with standard procedures. Except for the test message, all exercise EBS messages were to be prefaced by explicit instructions not to broadcast, but to log the message content and time of receipt.
The procedures for public alerting were to be demonstrated by activa-tion of the siren system in conjunction with the broadcast of the EBS message.
Public In forna t ion. Press releases ca the media were to be made in accordance with the respective emergency plans, via the normal press release methods. The press relcases were to contain all necessary information on the current status of the exercise.
Communications. Communications between the exercise participants were to occur in accordance with the procedures of the emergency response plan.
Should any primary communication path become inoperative or prove inadequate, backup means of communication were to be used as appropriate.
Mobilization of Emergency Workers. All emergency response agencies were responsible for ensuring that their resources were actually deployed in adequate numbers to provide a reasonable test of their notification, mobilization, command, coordination, and communications capabilities. Except as noted below, all state, county, and, municipal agencies were to have total authority in determining the degree of mobilization and deployment of their
12 **
resources, consistent with this intent. The decision to actually deploy *-
resources may have been made at the time of the exercise.
When the use of an agency 's resources was simulated, the agency was responsible for ensuring that all steps necessary to use the resources were demonstrated. For example, for an agency to demonstrate the activation of additional personnel, it was necessary to locate the required call list and to either complete or simulate the calls. Then the mobilization time had to be realistically estimated and this estimate forwarded to the appropriate agencies. Use of a resource was to have been demonstrated only af ter the estimated mobilization time had elapsed. In addition, when a resource was demonstrated, the command and control was also to have been demonstrated. All demonstrations were to be carried out to the greatest extent possible, thus determining the need for additional resources such as those used for command, control, and dose record maintenance.
Total counts of eme rgency wo rke rs deployed and those that were hypothesized to have been deployed were to be main taine d . Information regarding which personnel movements were real and which were hypothesized was to be readily available at all times.
The following provides a minimum list of personnel and resources that were to be deployed by the state and local governments to demonstrate their capabilities. Also orovided are specific demonstration obj ectives for hypothesized emergency responses.
Access Co n t ro l . New Jersey was to deploy all the necessary personnel required to man five access control points. Road blocks were not to be set up on the road. but the necessary eauipment was to be deployed along the road side. The access control points were to be secured after one hou r. Fo r training, the access control personnel we re to report to decontamination centers af ter they were secured from their access control duties.
Decontamination Center. New Jersey was to set up two decontamination centers. During the exercise, emergency workers were to check out through the centers after they had completed their exercise _ participation. At the Jecontamination centers, any actions that may have damaged property were to be avoided. All necessarv equipment was to be assembled at the decontamination center and its use was to be demonstrated. Detailed demonstration actions were to be implemented at the center by the decontamination center leader.
Congregate Care Shelter / Decontamination Cen te rs. One congregate care / decontamination center was to be opened and staffed in accordance with the emergency plans. Supplies required for long-term mass care, such as cots, blankets, and food, need not have been. acquired or brought to the shelter.
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.. However, the shelter and registration personnel were to obtain estimates on how many evacuees would be arriving had the exercise been a real emergency.
The shelter and registration personnel were then to estimate supplies required for the potential evacuees, locate sources for the required supplies, and determine the means for transporting the supplies.
Monitoring Te a ms . The State of New Jersey was to field three radiological monitoring teams and Ocean County was to field three teams. Each of the teams were to be supplied with a referee, who would provide simulated field data for determining local dose rate readings. These teams however, were to be equipped for determining actual area ganma dose rates and airborne radioiodine concentrations.
Data for the environmental samples and dosimeter readings we re to be supplied by a referee at the appropriate time. The monitoring teams were not to be suited up in anticontamination clothing, but were to have such equipment at their disposal.
Volunteer Orizanizations. The members of volunteer organizations, e.g.,
' firemen and rescue squads, have responsibilities such as work that take precedence over their participation in an exercise. Th e re fo re, these
'* 4 volunteer organizations were to participate in their emergency responsibili-ties on an as-available basis. Be cause the exercise plume was to affect specific areas, volunteer personnel in that area were to be notified in advance of their special role in this exercisa, in order to maximize their participation.
Reentry and Recoverv. At a designated time, an announcement was to be made at each emergency facility that the scenario had stopped for 15 minutes.
Th is 15-minute period was to be used to complete the ongoing response, af ter which the exercise was to resume and scenario time was to be clock time plus three days. The results of sample analyses were to be presented immediately to the BRP accident assessment team at the state EOC. At the same time, field demonstrations of the sampling techniques were to begin. The decision making, planning, and implementation for reentry and recovery were to be demonstrated or simulated as appropriate.
Closeout of the Exercise. The exercise was to end with the following actions:
e Emergency wo rke rs were to be secured as soon as possible after they had demonstrated their capabilities. The decision to secure them was to,be made at their controlling EOCs , with concurrence from the state EOC, if applicable.
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Emergency workers were to be directed to check out through -
decontamination centers. Radiological exposure records were to be comleted for each emergency wo rke r in accordance with the standard operating procedures. Evacuee radiation dose records were to be completed for 15 randon volunteers. ne completed dose record forms were to be clearly marked "Fo r Demonstration only" and were to be forwarded to the responsible state agency for review.
e The decontamination center and the congregate care shelter center were to be secured as soon as all emergency workers and volunteers had checked out through these centers.
e Participation of nonessential state, county, and municipa l EOC personnel was to be ended as soon as their emergency response had been essentially co mple t ed . Reducing EOC staff to those responsible for long-term planning and recovery was to have the concurrence of the state EOC director or designee, e he remaining staff were to close out the exercise by developing a course of action for the reentry and recovery period. This course of action was to be a coordinated , 4 effort between the state and the licensee and was to includ e:
- a. Identification of any further samoles in the 50-mile ingestion exposure pathway EPZ zone that need to be taken. Locations to be sampled were to be identified.
Staff needed to conduct the necessary sampling and to transport the samples to the laboratories we re to be identified. These requirements were to be matched against personnel availability.
- b. Development of 24-hour personnel rotation schedules.
These schedules were to include requirements for access control, decontamination, record keeping, and EOC staffing.
- c. Planning for requirements to control the 50-mile ingestion exposure pathway EPZ, such as food inter-diction. This planning was to includ e comparisons of personnel requirements with available personnel.
- d. Planning for crime prevention measures in the evacuated areas.
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.. e - ht en the . state, the counties, the municipalities,. and the ,
licensee were satisfied that- the necessary long-term protective, parallel, and other actions required by the plan could be implemented, the participants were to reach a joint conclusion tc terminate the exercise. A final press release was to be issued signifying the termination of the exercise.
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2 EVALUATIONS '.
2.1 STATE OF NEW JERSEY 2.1.1 Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources The following facilities were observed: the state ECC in West Trenton, the BRP forward command post (FCP) in Bayville, the joint media center in Toms River, and the licensee near-site EOF in Forked River. Each location had good to outstanding facilities, displays, security, and both internal and external communications, with the exception of several minor deficiencies noted below.
The overall adequacy of the state EOC was good to outstanding. The EOC was partitioned into the following rooms: the executive room, an operations room, a support agency room, a dose assessment room, and three communications and message-har.dling rooms. Each room had adequate space, equipment, and amenities for the function assigned to it. The current emergency classification was posted in each room. Status boards were posted in both the operations and support agency rooms and updated as significant events occurred. Maps of the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ were posted in the operations, support, and dose assessment rooms, correcting a deficiency noted a at the 1982 exercise. The deficiency in establishing EOC security noted at the 1982 exercise has been corrected; EOC security was established at 7:45 a.m., during the Alert stage, and maintained throughout the exercise.
Internal message-handling procedures in the state EOC were ef fective.
Incoming and outgoing telephone and radio messages were passed by telephone and radio operators in the message center to the center supervisor, a message log was kept, and a hard copy of each message was filed. Messages were then relayed to the controller in the operations room. The controller directed copies to staff in the operations and support agency room for appropriate action. Staff members routed their responses back to the communications center for transmission to the reques ting agency, typically the Ocean County EOC. On the whole, internal message-handling procedures were executed in an effective, timely manner.
The facilities at the BRP FCP were good, although minor deficiencies were noted. No separate status board was maintained to track changes in eme rgency status, meteorological conditions, or protective action recom-mendations. The status board used to record the location of field monitoring teams was not easily understood by staff at the BRP FCP. Considerable confusion existed about the location of monitoring teams and whether a team was out to lunch. We recommend that BRP staf f receive additional training in procedures for internal communications, especially the effective use of status boards. One trooper was assigned to the BRP FCP to establish security. In an actual emergency, more troopers would be assigned to control the entire cordoned area.
17 External communications involving the several state facilities were good to outstanding. Communications between . the state EOC and the Ocean County EOC were outstanding. Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES) radios and commercial telephones were used as primary systems, with NJSP radio, Emergency Management Radio (EMRAD) and National Warning System (NAWAS) available as backup. A dedicated telephone line to the Ocean County EOC was available in the operations room. The NJSP established three communications systems between the EOC and the NJSP FCP in Lakewood - commercial telephone, dedicated telephone, and NJSP radio.
Communications between the EOC dose assessment room and the EOF were good. Primary systems were commercial telephone and dedicated telephone; DtRAD radio was available as backup.
Communications between the BRP FCP and field monitoring teams were acceptable. A minor deficiency was noted: Middlesex County communications were on the same radio frequency as the monitoring teams and were an occasional source of interference. A radio frequency should be set aside for
- the exclusive use of field monitoring teams.
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'2.1.2 Alerting and Mobilization of Of ficials and Staf f The alerting and mobilization of officials and staff were good. Commu-nications procedures and equipment used for 24-hour initial response were
, . outstanding. The NJSP Communications Division maintains a state warning point on a 24-hour basis. The exercise started during the midnight-8 a.m. shift, and a shift change was implemented on a normal basis st 8 a.m. The comnunica-tions systems available at the NJSP Communications Division to receive initial notification from the GCNGS include dedicated telephone line, com'nercial telephone line, and DtRAD radio. The following procedure was observed: the Notification of Unusual Event call was received at the NJSP Commnications Division at 5:10 a.m. froir the OCNGS control room via dedicated telephone.
The call was verified by commercial telephone; the officer at the NJSP Communications Division verified the caller, the message, and .its status as .a
" drill."
Communications equipment and procedures used for alerting, notifying and mobilizing emergency response personnel were good. Initial notifications .
to several key personnel at the BRP and NJSP Of fice of Emergency Management (ODi) were carried out from the NJSP Communications Division. using commercial telephone; radio and pager systems were available for backup. All other ODi and BRP staff, including field monitoring teams, staff at the BRP FCP, and state BRP staf f assigned to the OCNGS near-site EOF, were notified through a telephone fan-out procedure, which was not directly observed. However, the effectiveness of the notification process can be inferred from the timely activation of all emergency response facilities. Key staff arrived at the state E0C, EOF, and BRP FCP by 7:30 a.m. during the Alert stage; all facilities were fully staffed by 9 a.m.
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The process of transferring communications functions from the NJSP -
Communications Division to the operations and communications staff of the EOC was handled smoothly and effectively. Minor deficiencies in alerting, notifying, and mobilizing response personnel and in promptly activating emergency response communications noted at the 1982. exercise have been.
corrected.
In general, a good capability for 24-hour continuous emergency response operations was demonstrated. Most state functions at the EOC and the BRP FCP were double-staffed for training purposes. Shift changes at these facilities were used to demonstrate' the state's capability of mobilizing staff for continuous 24-hr emergency operations.
2.1.3 Emergency Operations ' Management Emergency operations management was good. The OEM De puty Director demonstrated ef fective leadership at the state EOC, periodically briefing all staff over the public address system. In addition, EOC staff conducted periodic briefings in the support agency, dose assessment, and communications rooms. The Governor, the Commissioner of Environmental Protection, and the
' OEM Director each actively participated .in the exercise.
All agencies designated in the plan were represented at the EOC, BRP -
FCP, and EOF. All agency staff members were aware of their functions and consulted their plans and procedures as needed. The emergency classification system was effectively and consistently used at all facilities.
In the 1982 post-exercise assessment, FEMA recommended personnel training to alleviate the confusion over nomenclature, _ which could hamper effective communication. Consistent terminology was used by field teams and by BRP staff in the 3RP FCP and EOC, indicating that the recommended training has been successfully performed.
2.1.4 Public Alerting and Notification The capability demonstrated at the sta'te EOC ' for public alerting and notification was good. The system for disseminating information to the public via EBS was effective. The PIO activated the EBS by calling WADB, the primary EBS station, by telephone. The PIO and the EBS station _had a book of prewritten EBS messages that included numerically-coded descriptions of evacuation areas within the 10-mile plume exposure ~ _ pathway EPZ. Using this system, the primary EBS station formulated EBS messages for broadcast. The primary EBS station, WADB, automatically activated five other radio stations and the cable television system for the simultaneous broadcast of EBS messages. The EOC received timely confirmation of-both the siren sounding and e
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19 EBS system activation. This orompt confirmation corrects a deficiency noted at the 1982 exercise.
2.1.5 Public and Media Relations Overall, public and media relations are acceptable. The public information officers (Pios) were professional and experienced. Howe ve r ,
coordination between the PIO at the state EOC and state and county PIDs at the joint media center can be inproved.
A joint media center was established at the Elks Clu b in Tons Rive r, N.J., with facilities for federal, state, and local PI0s, and the news media. The news media were briefed upon arrival, and periodically throughout the exercise. However, wall maps of the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ were not available for briefings or individual studv. It is recommended that maps be available in the joint media center for the use of both PIOS and the news media.
At the joint media center, state and county PIDs handled inquiries in a professional manner. PIOS at the joint media center were in contact with
'their respective EOCs to obtain necessary information. However, Pios at the joint media center did not have hard copy of EBS messages, and thus did not have complete information to provide to the news media. The state EOC should transmit hard copy of EBS messages to the joint media center to assure the availability of complete, accurate information.
On one occasion the Pios at the joint media center obtained erroneous
' information about new evacuation areas from the Ocean County EOC. This information was announced to the news media at a briefing without being verified with the PIO at the state EOC, All information about actions by the state should be coordinated with the PI0s at the state EOC to assure the accuracy of information before it is provided to the media.
The public information program is acceptable. A brochure has been distributed to residents within the 10-mile plume exposure oathway EPZ. The transient population, primarily summer vacationers, will receive information via ads to be placed in free newspapers. The brochure will be distributed to real estate offices, libraries, banks, and other locations frequented by vacationers.
The rumor control system was staffed, and the rumor control 800 telephone number publicized. Spot checks by observers showed that the rumor control staff members were very helpful and courteous, although they did not always have correct information. In any case, it is questionable whether the five rumor control lines that were available would be adequate, given the population within the 10-mile plume exposu re pathway E PZ . Coordinated arrangements for rumor control should be reviewed. No television was e
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- available at the ,IMC for monitoring public information. A television should -
be available to enable PIOS to evaluate the accuracy of public information.
2.1.6 Accident Assessment The state demonstrated good capabilities for accident assessment at the EOC, BRP FCP, EOF and in the field, with one minor deficiency noted below.
Three state field monitoring teams we re mobilized from the BRP FCP.
The team that was observed demonstrated a good capability to monitor the whole-body radiation component of the plume. Proper instruments were used, and readings were taken correctly and recorded in the proper units. Radio transmission of data to the BRP FCP was handled smoothly. However, the field monitoring team did not have an adequate capability to measure radioiodine in the plume. The air pump flow rate for collection of iodine on silver zeolite, the simulated sample medi um, was too high, and no correction factor was used ~
to compensate for the decreased retention factor of the absorption medium.
The state is aware of this problem and has placed an -order for the instru-mentation required to more acurately detect radiotodine in the plume. It is recommended that the BRP review its procedures for measuring radioiodine; ' a
_ particulate filter should be placad upstream of the absorber, and a lower sample flow rate should be used. Silver zeolite should be added to the sampling kits for use as a collection medium.
Two water sampling teans were mobilized from the BRP FCP to sa mple water in Oyster Creek. They demonstrated outstanding capabilities; equip-ment and supplies were excellent, the teams had written procedures to follow, and they were knowledgeable and experienced in sample collection.
The BRP FCP functioned well as the central point for the receipt and analysis of field monitoring data and sample media. Data from the field monitoring teams were relayed by the BRP FCP to the BRP dose assessment room in the EOC. Sample media were returned to the mobile laboratory at the BRP FCP for initial analysis. This facility had a good capability to handle the expected types and volumes of samples. Following -initial processing at the mobile lab, sample media were transported to the BRP laboratory in Trenton for complete analysis.
The 3RP .tose assessment staff at the EOC demonstrated a good canability to recommend protective actions before any release occurred; their recommendations we re based on plant status and on meteorological conditions and forecasts. Once releases occurred, BRP personnel were able to quickly assess the magnitude and location of the release and verify the adequacy of protective actions already taken.
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21 2.1.7 Actions to Protect the.Public New Jersey demonstrated a good capability to protect the public. The demonstration of bus evacuation was outstanding. De state EOC dispatched an evacuation bus to tne Lakehurst Naval Station and transmitted the route assignment to the bus coordinator by radio at 9:30 a.m. he coordinator and driver then reviewed the written instructions and detailed route map which were prepared in pamphlet form for that particular route. (ne panphlet was exceptionally well done.) The bus was led along the evacuation route and then to the congregate care center by a NJSP patrol car.
The state EOC demonstrated a good capability to help Ocean County and local jurisdictions coordinate the evacuation of transit-dependent populations and cope with impediments to evacuation. Requests for assistance from local jurisdictions were relayed to the state EOC by the Ocean County EOC. We state EOC procedures for mobilizing the resources of various state and federal agencies were very ef fective. For example, at one point a request f rom Toms Rive r was relayed by the Ocean County EOC for 25 school buses. The EOC message controller forwarded the request to the higher' education desk in the support agency room. Staff at that desk contacted three school districts in Monmouth County and instructed the school bus coordinators at each district to ssimulate sending buses to a school in Tom River. A contact person at that school was identified. After arrangements were made to supply the needed j buses, a confirmatory message was sent to the Ocean County EOC. Several additional requests were handled effectively during the day.
2.1.8 Health, Medical, and Exposure Control Measures Demonstration of health, medical, and exposure control measures was good. Emergency workers - personnel at the BRP FCP, the bus driver, field nonitoring team members, and the NJSP trooper at the access control point --
had low-range and high-range self-reading dosimeters an'd film badges. Dos i-meters we re of appropriate ranges and were read and recorded periodically, correcting a deficiency noted at the 1982 exercise.
The BRP emergency wo rke rs had potassium iodide (KI) in their field kits. The BRP consulted with the N.J. Depart rnen t of Health (DOH) on the use of KI. On the basis of dose projections, DOH authorized KI use for emergency workers and this use was s i mu la ted . We BRP is empowered to authorize exposure of emergency wo rke rs to radiation levels in excess of protective action guides (PACS). In this scenario, howeve r, thyroid- doses were controlled by the simulated use of KI and respirators. Rus, no exposures in excess of emergency worker PACS would have been incurred.
l The decontamination facility for state emergency workers was out-standing. Incoming vehicles were monitored and directed to clean or contaminated areas, and procedures for their decontamination we re demon-strated. Record keeping, decontamination, and the availability of equipment i
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and procedures. f o r. personnel monitoring were very good. Clean and '
contaminated areas were separated and clearly designated. Procedures for control of contaminated clothing and waste were demonstrated. Security at the facility was excellent.
The BRP demonstrated a good capability to estimate total nopulation exposure on the basis of evacuation times, plume travel times, and plume exposure rates.
2.1.9 Recoverv and Reentry Operations Recovery and reentry operations we re acceptable, although one minor deficiency was noted. The state mobilized two recovery and reentry teams f rom the BRP FCP. The teams we re briefed and dispatched at 2:30 p.m. to collect air, soil, water, and vegetation sample s . The teams were well-equipped, knowledgeable of procedures, and performed their tasks effectively. They returned sample media to the mobile laboratory at the BRP FCP for analysis.
At the state EOC, representatives f rom the DOH and the N.J. Department of Agriculture (DOA) discussed measures to be accomplished before reentry.
The BRP advised the Deputy State Director, OEM, on the establishment of areas for restricted and unrestricted reentry. The BRP planned to continue congre-gate care, monitoring, and decontamination until reentry was unrestricted in 0 all sectors. The demonstration of reentry planning was acceptable. However, the state RERP contains two conflicting criteria for clearing evacuated areas for reentry; this inconsistency delayed reentry for a short period. The plan should be reviewed and revised to resolve these conflicts.
2.1.10 Relevance of the Exercise Experience The exercise was beneficial to all participants. The scenario allowed adequate time for reentry and recovery activities, a significant improvement over the 1982 exercise. The hypothesized ' release adequately tested the capabilities of field monitoring and recovery and reentry teams.
2.2 OCEAN COUNTY 2.2.1 c mergencv Operations Facilities and Resources Overall, county emergency operations facilities were good. All neces-sary sys te ms were in place and functioning. Comnunications systems were-properly staffed and, for the most part, functioned well. Excellent progress has been made in completing the EOC, where security and displays were very good. -Ventilation equipment will be ava,ilable at 'the EOC soon. Security and displays could be enhanced at the Ocean County. Sheriff's Communication
.u 23 Division (OCSCD). The OCSCD is currently in temporary quarters; the minor problems with its facilities should be solved when the new quarters are occupied.
Commnications systems at both the ROC and OCSCD we re good. The EOC had dedicated telephone lines to the state EOC a1d the OCNCS near-site EOF.
The sheriff's radio provided commnications with local EOCs . Secondary communication links were available through Rsdio Amateur Civil Emergency Se rvice (RACES), EMRAD, and the fire marshal's radio. The emergency management radio was available for contact with field monitoring t e a ms , and the emergency medical system (EMS) radio provided contact with ambulances and hospitals. ne communications systems supported a large flow of messages that were handled efficiently. Commnications between the EOC and the congregate care center encountered some minor difficulties. The OCSCD had two dedicated lines to the utility. EMRAD and the other radio systems described above could be monitored at OCSCD and used as necessary. OCSCD could also act as a liaison between the EOC and the NJSP. This function was observed when the EOC asked the state police to set up access control points.
Working space and amenities were good at the EOC and acceptable at the OCSCD, which is currently in temporary quarters. The EOC had acceptable space and the movement of personnel did not impede operations. Liaison personnel were provided with adequate operating space and agency representatives had their own desks. Internal commnications at the EOC were good. Telephones were kept in a separate communications room to control noise in the operations room. Ru nne rs were available to relay messages between the operations room and the communications room. Although the ventilation was inadequate, air-handling equipment was to be installed soon.
The OCSCD facility, which is housed in a building under construction, had limited space for the three operators, two observers, and a clerk who recorded exercise-related events. The clerk did not have enough space for a desk. The crowding did not hamoer the efficiency of operations, and the new quarters will have sufficient space even for expanded operations, including observers and extra desks.
The COC kept adequate information displaved on status hoards that were clearly visible and updated as appropriate. Separate status boards were available for weather information, for radiological data, and for each participating organization. An emergency log was also kept but it was somewhat incomplete and could be confusing to the operations staff. The access control point map and traffic control point map should be clearly labeled to prevent confusion between the two. Other maps showed evacuation routes, radiological monitoring points, current population by evacuation area, and relocation and shelter areas. Radiological data were - displayed and updated. The OCSCD does not need extensive displays and maps to perform its comu nications functions. Adequate information on the emergency classifica-tion was kept on the checklists and entered into a separate emergency log by the clerk. Visual displays of emergency status should be considered to aid f
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newly arrived personnel and to remind operators of the emergency classifica-tion. A map of evacuation zones was available at the OCSCD. A larger wall map and possibly copies of maps for all personnel should he considered.
Security at the EOC was good. Access control measures were used and registration was recuired. Badges and individual dosimeters were issued to all personnel. No security measures were used at the OCSCD; personnel did not request identification for entrance. Overall security such as locked doors will be available when the new facility is completed.
Overall, the EOC was able to accommodate about 40 people (15 of these are communications center personnel) with facilities and equipment necessary to carry out the emergency response. Ef fective command and enntrol were also tiemons t ra t ed . As noted above, the OCSCD was crowded but the crowding did not appear to degrade operations. Exercise participants said that headsets might help them hear the telephone calls that were drowned oct by the noise from almost continuous radio commnications.
2.2.2 Alerting and Mobilization of Of ficials and Staf f Alerting and mobilization of officials and staff were good. Ocean County demonstrated the capability to activate the EOC promptly and maintain 24-hour continuous operations. vonitoring teams were ef fectively mobilized d and deployed.
The OCSCD, which was separate from the EOC, oerformed some emergency communications functions. OCSCD was responsible for initial notifications and
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the relav of status update messages to some emergency oersonnel, local EOCs , J some fire stations, county and local police, and first aid districts. The OCSCD also communicated deployment orders to these -local support agencies as requested by the county EOC.
Both the EOC and OCSCD demonstrated a good capability to staff initial emergency response communications on a 24-hour basis and to maintain these commnications on a continuous basis. At the EOC, this capability was demon-strated by call-up rosters and by lists of backup personnel. Eighteen to twe n tv-f ive people per shift would be available at the ROC. The OCSCD normally operates on a continuous 24-hour basis. Two operators are available on each of the three eight-hour shifts and two sheriff's lieutenants are present on the 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. shift. One civilian is also available from noon to 8 p.m. except on Tuesday and Thursday. In an extended emergency, three operators could be available continuously, and the two sherif f 's lieutenants could work 12-hour shif ts. I County monitoring teams were notified by commercial telephone; pagers were available as backups for 24-hour alerting and notification. There were two teams of three members each and four backup personnel. The teams could operate continuously with two members pet' team.
e 25 County procedures for notifying emergency response organizations and personnel were acceptable to good and were implemented promptly. At the EOC, initial notification was received by telephone and verified. The call noted that an exercise, not a real emergency, was in progress. The Alert call was received at 6: 11 a.m.; key personnel were notified starting at 6:15 a.m. and had arrived by 7:15 a.m. EOC personnel were contacted over commercial telephone lines; pagers were available as backups. At the OCSCD, emergency personnel arrived within 20 minutes of notification. At the Alert ene rgency classification, nCSCD nobilized police, fire, and first-aid supervisors and put agency personnel on standby. OCSCD mobilized all personnel upon declara-tion of Site Area Emergency. Personnel were notified by commercial telephone; beepers and police car radios were available as backups. OCSCD staff included complete instructions in each alertine and notification call, noting that the call was for an exercise, not a real emergency. Some minor problems were noted:
e At the OCSCD, some confusion resulted when the call for the Notification of Unusual Event emergency classification was received f rom the County EMC instead of f rom OCNCS or State Police Headquarters as specified on the Unusual Event Checkl is t. After consulting with the County Emergency Management Coordinator (EMC), OCSCD personnel decided to
, treat the call as if it had come from OCNCS. OCNGS was called for verification .and alerting and notification procedures we re implemented. It is recommended that the NJSP OEM, OCNCS, and Ocean County coordinate plans for initial notification, and revise plans and S0ps accordingly, e OCSCD personnel notified local police warning points by radio and then took a roll call to verify receipt of the radio message. At the Site Area Emergency classification, one local police warning point failed to answer the roll call. A telephone verification was made only when the omission was noted by the FEMA observer. It is suggested that ooerators he instructed and drilled to review their checklists to note and rectify any such omissions.
The comnunications eauipment available at both the EOC and the OCSCD was good. Backup communications were available. At OCSCD, a mobile communi-cations van was available to back up the operator's console, if the latter were disabled. Both the EOC and the OCSCD could contact emergency personnel through commercial telephone, the sherif f's radio, and EMRAD.
An EMS radio for communications with ambulances and hospital was operating at the EOC and OCSCD. Ambulances and hospitals could also communicate or relay messages through OC,SCD. At i1:55 a.m., OCSCD was asked to deploy 42 ambulances to simulate the evacuation of a nursing home.
26 Normally, a written ambulance callout plan would be implemented. However, the revised ambulance plan had not been received. OCSCD personnel claimed that they could satisfy the request wi thout the plan. Neve rthe less , the revised ambulance plan should be made available to OCSCD to reduce the likelihood of problems in a real emergency.
2.2.3 Emergency Operations Management At . the county EOC, emergency management and control were good. The county BC and deputy MC demonstrated effective leadership during the exercise in their decision-making procedures and in f requent staff briefings.
Support organizations participated in the exercise and performed well.
Elected county officials also participated in the exercise.
At the county EOC, the county E4C was in charge and was assisted by the deputy B C. Both MCs were well versed in the county RERP and related pro-cedures. The county B C held frequent briefings to keep EOC staff informed of significant developments. Changes in the emergency status were announced and posted on signs clearly visible throughout the EOC. The current emergency status was reported in all communications messages transmitted to emergency response organizations; local EOCs and emergency response organizations were promptly notified of changes in status. EOC staff had check-sheets indicating j the actions to be taken at each emergency classification.
All organizations participated in the exercise and had representatives in the EOC. These representatives made appropriate contacts with their respective agencies and were aware of their responsibilities.
Local elected officials came to the EOC. Initially, representatives of the freeholders were present. Later, the freeholders themselves arrived and coordinated activities.
OCSCD staff were aware of their responsibilitiu for radiological emergencies. This group continued to perform its regular emergency communi-cations functions in addition to those connected 4th the exercise. Communi-catiens for actual emergencies were distinguished by appending a statement such as "this is not part of the drill" to the message.
Written procedures at the OCSCD were acceptable. However, some minor dif ferences with the plan were noted:
i e The OCSCD used a " Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and Checklist for Nuclear Accident" form specific to each emergency classification. The plan calls for completing an
" Initial Contact Message" form at each emergency action level; the Checklist calls for completing the Initial Contact Message form only a t, the Notification of Unusual Event and Alert emergency classifications. Questions on l
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27 the Initial Contact Message form should be included on the SOP and Checklist for Nuclear Accident forms for the Notification of Unusual Event and Alert emergency classifications, as is currently the case for the Site Area Emergency and General Emergency classifications. The plan should be revised to reflect the procedure actually used.
e The Ocean County RERP appears to require that OEM notify OCSCD of the emergency action level, with an additional notification by OCNGS at the Ge ne ral Emergency clas-sification. The checklists used by OCSCD indicate that either State Police Headquarters or OCNGS will inform OCSCD of the Notification of Unusual Event and Alert emergency classifications and the state EOC will inform OCSCD of the Site Area Emergency and General Emergency classifi-cations. During the exercise, the OCSCD's initial notification of emergency action level was received from the county EMC at the Notification of Unusual Event status, from the state OEM at the Alert status, from the County Sheriff's Departments' Communications Officer (at the county EOC) at the Site Area Emergency status, and from OCNGS at General Emergency. The OCSCD pe rfo rmed -
effectively but the plan, checklists, and practice should be consistent. Alternative notification routes should also be considered to avoid the possibility of confusion on the part of operators.
e The SOP and Checklist for Nuclear Accident forms for the Site Area Emergency and General Emergency classifications should have a space to log the verification calls to OEM and OCNGS. Verification calls were made; the checklists should provide space to log these calls.
e A page was missin:; from one alert checklist. This problem was noted and rectified by the sheriff's lieutenant in charge but not by the communications operator. Personnel should be trained to check that all sheets in a set are present.
The lieutenant was clearly in charge at the OCSCD and told both operators when the emergency classification changed. A posted sign would be a helpful reminder, especially when the OCSCD movec to its new, larger facility.
During the shif t change, new operators were not formally briefed on the status of the exercise. Although lack of briefing did not impede their ability to function during this exercise, such briefing should be considered.
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2.2.4 Public Alerting and Notification The public alert and notification system and procedures in Ocean County have improved since the 1982 exercise and were reliable and adequate for notifying and instructing the public.
Sirens were sounded promptly at 9:30 a.m. to alert the general public.
However, no procedure had been established to verify that the sirens had sounded. The siren system was activated from the OCSCD af ter the county EOC's request at 9 :25 a.m. The EOC requested a 5 minute delay to ensure that the sirens would sound before the EBS system was activated. A vehicle was used to alert the area covered by one siren that failed. About 75% of the people interviewed in spot checks on the day of the exercise said they had heard the sirens.
The superintendent at Stafford Elementary School said that the schools under his jurisdiction had not yet received tone alert radios but soon would.
According to the principal, a tone alert radio was available at the Ethel A.
Jacobson Elementary School.
The EBS system was promptly activated from the state EOC after the sirens had sounded.
2.2.5 Public and Media Relations Efforts to inform the public were acceptable and showed a definite improvement since the 1982 exercise. About two-thirds of the people inter-viewed on the day of the exercise had received the puMic information brochure within the past few months. Far fewer people were familiar with the brochure contents. On the basis of limited spot checks, no placards displaying radio-logical emergency information were found in public facilities such as motels, restaurants, real estate offices, and service stations. Two real estate offices did not have copies of the brochure available for renters. One motel owner acknowledged receipt of the brochure but could not find it; a retreat house owner intended to use the material when summer guests arrive. The three schools queried had plans and officials knew what to do in the event of a radiological emergency at OCNGS. Additional public information programs are warranted, particularly for the transient population.
The county PIO at the joint media center handled media briefings and inquiries in a professional manner. Communication between the joint media center and the county EOC was good.
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29 2.2.6 Accident Assessment County field monitoring teams performed acceptably, although minor deficiencies were noted. Deficiencies in training and communications at the 1982 exercise have been largely corrected. Teams were well equipped and had been trained in sampling procedures and field communications. State procedures we re followed. Radioiodine monitoring by county field monitoring teams is not required. However, the procedure for sampling radiciodine needs
, to be improved if the county elects to monitor for this species. Ocean County i needs monitoring equipment and improved procedures for calibration and main-
{ tenance. Equipment for the county, identical to that used by the state, had been ordered and was expected to arrive about two weeks after the exercise.
The county monitoring teams were capable of determining the dose rate from iodine in the field. Sample media we re bagged and labeled for later identification and recounting. A mobile laboratory was available at the BRP FCP for receipt and analysis of sample media. All samples were saved.
Several counting instruments in different ranges were available on loan from the state and were overdue for annual calibration, having last been calibrated in Fe bruary 1982. All equipment except one pump had calibration labels; a check source was available for counters. The SAM-II counting instrument broke after the first air sample was taken and counted. The county's field
, monitoring capability could be strengthened with county-owned equipment and backup, and a more thorough program of calibration and maintenance.
Two county monitoring teams were available. As the plume was defined, movements were coordinated by the BRP FCP, which also received data from the teams. Readings were accurate and were recorded and communicated to the BRP FCP in the proper units. However, radio transmissions were sometimes broken up and messages had to be repeated. These problems should be investigated and
, corrected if feasible.
The field monitoring teams did not have an adequate capability to measure radioiodine in the plume. The air pump ficw rate for collection of iodine on silver zeolite, the simulated sample medium, was too high, and no correction factor was used to compensate for the decreased retention factor for the absorption medium. The state is aware of this problem and has placed an order for the county for the instrumentation required to more accurately detect radioiodine in the plume. Since the county follows state procedures, it is recommended that the BRP review its procedures ~for, measuring radio-iodine; a particulate filter should be placed upstream of the absorber, and a
' lower sample flow rate should be used. Silver zeolite should be added to the sampling kits for use as a collection medium.
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2.2.7 Actions to Protect the Publie
- Actions to protect the public were good. The exercise called for the evacuation of two Ocean County schools and the staffing of a congregate care center. Ocean County demonstrated its capability to implement protective measures, obtaining resources from outside the county as needed to provide ambulances and care for mobility-impaired persons.
Resources, procedures, and personnel at the congregate care center at Georgian Court College in I,akewood, New Jersey, were good. ne ficiencies noted at the 1982 exercise have been corrected. The center was more than 15 miles from the plant, outside the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ. The building and personnel mobilized for the exercise could accommodate and care for about 270 people; a total of 1500, the expected number of potential evacuees, could be cared for on the ca mpu s . Shelter personnel were well-trained. They used good registration and radiological monitoring procedures to process about 20 people. A swimming pool area with tile floor drains and separate showers for men and wo men was available for decontamination. An American Red Cross station and an ambulance were available for health emergencies. Sanitation f acilities were adequate but more toilets are desirable. Drinking water was plentiful. Security was good, with guards at all entrances and exits.
Parking space and comnunications we re available and the center was kept informed of the exercise progress.
The school evacuation was gnod and followed the plan. Both schools were notified prompt ly and relocation procedures were i mplemen ted pro mpt ly .
At Lacey Elementary School, the bus arrived ontv seven minutes af ter it was called. Although no actual evacuation was carried out, a previous drill had indicated that 425 children could be evacuated from the school in 9 minutes.
The' bus departed five atinutes af ter arriving and the trip to the reception center at Lakeview Naval Air Station took 30 minutes. 'the principal of Lacey Elenentary School had radio communication available.
One observer noted signs on side roads indicating the firection people should take in an emergency. Such signs should be an effective aid for evacuation.
2.2.8 Health, ve dical, and Exposure Control Measures Radiological exposure control procedures at the county level were acceptable. Emergency workers had received training in reading and recording '
doses to correct a deficiency noted in the previous exercise. However, procedures could still be upgraded by additional training and equipment.
The exercise called for the use of KI, which was avsilable to the county radiological monitoring teams and at the decontamination center.
Instructions we re provided for using KI. Its use was simulated by the two 6
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31 radiological monitoring teams. VI wbs not required at the decontamination center, since it did not lie in the plume EPZ. '
Emergency. wo rkers we re provided with both low and high-range self-reading eencil dosimeters and a thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) badge, and knew of the procedures for their use. Monitoring teams read and recorded doses at frequent intervals and radioed the results to.the BRP FCP. Dosime te r readings were recorded hourly at the decontamination center. 00simeter readings of field wo rkers passing through the center were also read and recorded.
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A new decontamination center has been established outside the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ. Although monitoring equipment was available, the county should consider obtaining backup monitors. Contaminated clotSine was sealed in plastic bags and water from contaminated vehicles can be held or released.
The manager and personnel of the decontamination center had received j only 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> of training. Although - they knew how to decontaminate personnel
- and equipment, they did not know when to stoo decontamination procedures.
I Additional formal and - on-the-job training of current personnel, and training
.of additional personnel to provide for 24-hour continuous operations would upgrade the decontamination center.
j The congregate care center had action levels for the decontamination of
- people and vehicles. Even though the county EOC was not in the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ , workers in the center had dosimeters. Local EOCs were also contacted for exposure control data b% not; all of the local EOCs.
- responded. The county EOC reauested access cuntrol assistance .f rom the NJSP 1
through the OCSCD, which forwarded the renuest immedia te ly ,
i j 2.2.9 Recovery and Reentrv Operations "
Reentry operations were tested in the scenario and adequate time was provided for them. The county EOC communicated with the state and followed
- he directives for reentry issued by the state OEM as called for in the plan.
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2.2.10 Relevance of the Exercise Experiencei
, The exercise adequately tested basic emergency response functions and required coordination between' agencies at various levels 'cf; government .
Coun ty personnel participated fully in the exercise .and the scenario kept the-county . players active.
Little " dead . time" was noticed during this exercise, which was a problem in the 1982 exercise. The exercise thoroughly tested the capability of county field monitoring teams, the County Sheriff ?s Communica-
, tion Division, and county EOC personnel.
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The players had no prior knowledge of the scenario. Overall, the '
exercise experience benefited both training and testing.
2.3 OCEAN COUNTY SfUNICIPALITIES Federal observers we re assigned to the following township and borough EOCs during the exercise:
Barnegat Township Ocean Township Barnegat Light Borough Ocean Gate Borough 3eachwood Borough Pine Beach Rorough Berkeley Township Seaside Heights Borough Dover Township Seaside Park Borough Harvey Cedars Borough Shipbottom Borough Island Heights Borough South Toms River Borough Lacey Township Stafford Township Long Beach Township Surf City Borough An additional observer was stationed in Dover Township to review the town-ship's response to an impediment to evacuation. Surf City Borough did not participate in the exercise. Island Heights Borough and South Toms Rive r Borough participated in the exercise only to the extent that they received and dispatched communications to the Ocean County EOC. ~
2.3.1 C nergency Operations Facilities and Resources Overall, the emergency facilities and equipment at the municipalities were good except at Beachwood Borough, Ocean Township, and ftafford Township.
Both the Stafford Township and Beachwood Borough EOCs lacked potable water and sewage connections. Both EOCs have limited working space so conducting emergency management operations is difficult. The Ocean Township EOC is located within two miles of the Oyster Creek plant and no alternate facility is available outside the two-mile area for use in coordinating Ocean Township's emergency activities if evacuation of the two-mile keyhole area becomes necessary.
All the municipalities observed had U RAD radios for communications with the Ocean County EOC during the exercise. Initial notification through the County Sh e ri f f 's radio net was good, but communications over the backup EMRAD system experienced some problems. Delays of 10 to 40 minutes were observed between notification at the local warning points via the Sherif f 's radio and notification at the municipal EOCs via EMRAD. Although the EMRAD l system did perform acceptably, the following specific improvements could be incorporated in either the system itself or handling:
4 1
-33 e speed up sessage handling of OCNGS plant status updates and
- protective action recommendations by Ocean County; o' ' train radio operators to keep call-backs to the county EOC via EMRAD to i minimum; e train' radio- operators to reduce message length to a minimum; and ,
e reduce the number of units in the network or open up a new channel on the network.
Most of the municipal emergency management organizations that had to coordinate emergency response and help implement protective actions in their township or borough performed adequately. The EMCs for South Toms River and Island Heights were not able to participate in the, exercise. . The deputy EMCs s
at both EOCs were not fully aware of their responsibilities according to the plan.~- Beachwood Borough and Berkeley Toynship both - displayed a very gooo ability to coordinate their emergency response for protective actions. .
Most municipal EOCs had good working space, amenities, and equipment.
In South Toms River, Berkeley Township, Island itfeights, Pine Beach, and Harvey Cedars, the EOCs were acceptable.. Both South Toms River and Berkeley Township could improve their EOCs by organizing their working area more efficiently.
The EOCs for Beachwood Borough, Ocean Township, and Staffe rd Township . were inadequate for the reasons cited above.
All local EOCs had good to adequate internal communications, message handling, display maps, and status boards.
Local EOCs displayed good to adequate security during the initial stages of the exercise except those at South Toms River, Seaside Heights, Seaside Park, and Ocean Gate, where no security sign-in was provided, and Berkeley Township, where security was not initiated until 9:30 a.m.
2.3.2 Alerting and Mobilization of Of ficials and Staff Mobilization and alerting cf of ficials w:is good to outstanding in most i municipalities where thi3 portion, of the ere{cise was observed. - There were
~
two exceptions: ~
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- e. Upon receiving the Alert'- status message f rom ' the Ocean County Sheriff's Office, the Beachwood Police Department '
dispatcher did not ; begin calling the emergency management officials of the borough. Thus sfull activation of the l Beachwood EOC was delayed 45 minutes to 8:15 a.m.; and l
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e The Long Iteach Township Police Department's dispatcher *
- failed to properly call Barnega t Light and Shipbot tom eme rgency management officials after receiving the Alert status message from the Ocean County Sheriff's Of fice.
All local police department dispatchers should receive training in the proper procedures for notifying response organizations upon receipt of emergency status messages from Ocean County.
All municipalities displayed a good to acceptable 24-hour capability to handle communications and emergency response. Howeve r, some cunicipalities closed their EOC facilities after 4:00 p.m. and therefore, received dispatches via the Ocean County Sherif f's radio at the local warning points. Nevert he-less, they displayed an acceptable 24-hour comnunication and emergency resoonse capability given the objectives of the exercise.
All municipalities that we re properly notified followed correct l procedures in mobilizing their own eme rgency response personnel. .Although initial notification of Reachwood and Barnegat Light was delayed, both EOCs were fully activated by 8: 15 a.m.
In most municipalities, comnu nication to first-aid squads was accom-olished via direct radio contact with the EOC. In the remaining municipal-ities comcunication with these squads was accomplished via Ocean County. The I local EOCs demonstrated good to acceptable capabilities to communicate with mobile medical support teams.
2.3.3 Emergency Operations Management Most participating municipalities established good emergency operations management in their respective communities. Emergency operations management in Lacey Township, Harvey Cedars, and Shipbottom were not observed. Thus none or the following comments apply to those nunicipalities.
In general, the emergency response organizations identified in each of the plans participated actively in the exercise. The exceptions were:
e Surf City did not participate in the exercise.
e There was no evidence that the South Toms River Borough Office of Emergency Management participated. Neither the Manitou Park Fire Company or the Borough Firs t-Aid Squad participated at the EOC.
- In Island Heights Bo rough , only the police department participated in the exercise.
35 Most municipalities demonstrated that specific responsibilities had been assigned for comnunications, fire and rescue, traf fic control, emergency medical service, law enforcement, orotective response, alerting and notification, and operations management. South Toms River and Island n e ights demonstrated that responsibilities were assigned in comnu nica tions , alerting and notification, and law enforcement.
All local EOCs used a conaistent classification system for indicating the status of the emergency exercise. The new message forms developed during the last year were used in nearly all the local EOCs . These new forms were shown to be an ef fective tool in the handling and control of the messages.
Copies of each municipality's RERP were available at each EOC. Fow-ever, emergency management personnel at a number of municipal EOCs found the plan cumbersome and dif ficult to consult during the exercise, partly because the local EOCs had just recently received their plans. A checklist of pro-cedures under each emergency action level would belp emergency management personnel.
Eme rgency management was e f fectively coordinated at all of the local EOCs, except South Toms River and Island Heights, via status boards, periodic briefings, and informal compunication.
, In . general, the participation by ma vo rs , council members, and other municipal officials was outstanding. A number of borough and township of ficials were present at many of the EOCs and actively participated in the
. exercise.
2.3.4 ou blic Alertine and Notification One siren in Be achwood Borough did not operate during the exercise.
Route alerting was simulated by those municipalities that fully participated in the exercise and these activities were good overall.
2.3.5 Actions to Protect the Public The capability of the nunicipalities to implement protective actions ;
(e.g., route alerting, access control, pickup of mobility-impaired persons),
was observed at Beachwood and South Tons River Po roug h s . Peachwood Borough 1 had sufficient resources to implement protective actions. South Toms River has 1 two police petrol cars at its disposal and two officers per shift; these resources may need to be supplemented by Ocean County.
Federal observers saw lists of noninstitutionalized, mobility-impaired persons in the EOCs at Dover Township and Bea chwood , Pine Beach, Seaside Heights, Seaside Park, and Ocean Gate Boroughs. Island Heights did not have a list of noninstitutionalized, mobil'ity-impaired persons. Lists of l l
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noninstitutionalized, mobility-impaired persons should be available to each
- municipal EOC.
In Dover Town ship , federal observers evaluated the resoonse to a simulated traffic incident on an evacuation route. Dover officials at the EOC initiated a timely and appropriate response and kept close track of available equipment and personnel when some of these resources were occupied with the impediment. Police and first-aid sauads from Dover we re at the scene quickly. The municipal response to the evacuation route impediment in Dover Township was good.
2.3.6 Health, Medical, and Exposure Control Measures Most of the local EOCs have received CDV-730, 0-20 R, self-reading dosimeters, as well as permanent record dosimeters and KI; the capability to monitor and control the radiological exposure of local emergency workers was acceptable overall, and represents an improvement over the 1982 exercise.
However, many of the personnel were unfamiliar with the proper use of either the dosimeters or KI, and additional training is reautred. In many cases these dosimeters and radioprotective d rugs .and protective clothing were received at the local EOCs on ly a day or two before the exercise. The following deficiencies were noted at the local EOCs:
e Many of the municipal emergency response managers who are responsible for distributing dosimeters, protective clothing, and equipment to emergency workers need additional training on the proper use and distribution, of that eaui pmen t , as well as the periodic checking and recording of dosimeter readings.
e When protective actions are implemented in sectors around OCNGS, municipal EOCs in those sectors should implement procedures to ensure that contaminated individuals are not allowed access to the EOCs.
, At a number of municipal EOCs, the person responsible for emergency orotection was verv knowledgeable about exposure control (e.g., Barnega t , Berkeley, 3e achwo od , Lacey, and Ocean), but overall the ability to properly handle emergency worker exposure control varies widely. At the federally initiated '
test of an impediment to evacuation in Dover Township, the first-aid sauad had personal dosimetry and were trained in dosimeter use, calibration, and record keeping, while the police responding to the incident had no dosimeters.
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'2.3.7 Reentry and Recoverv Operations All ru nicipalities demonstrated the capability to coordinate reentry
. actions with Ocean County.
2.1.8 Relevance of the Exercise Experience The exercise was a very good test of the prompt notification and mobilization of local emergency personnel by municipalities, communication between Ocean County and the municipalities during a radiological emergency, the availability of protective equipment and dosimetry for emergency workers, and the capability of municipalities to implement protective actions. All municipal EOCs were activated (except Surf City) and eme rgency response personnel we re af fo rded the - opportunity to respond to a radiological eme rgency , except for Island Heights and South To ms Rive r, where the EOCs participated only to the extent that incoming messages were received. The exercise was also a good test of the coordination of ef forts between Ocean County and the nunicipalities. The exercise was good training for the emergency organizations and workers at municipal EOCs that fully participated
.in the exercise.
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3
SUMMARY
OF DEFICIENCIES THAT WOULD LEAD TO NEGATIVE FINDINGS No deficiencies were observed at the state, county, or municipal' level that would cause a finding that off-site emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can and will be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the site in the event of a radiological emergency.
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39 4 OTHER DEFICIENCIES 4.1 STATE OF NEW JERSEY Deficiencies identified at the state level have led to the following recommendations.
4.1.1 Emergenev Operations Facilities and Resources
- a. Minor deficiencies were noted in internal communications at the BRP FCP. We recommend that the BRP s taf f receive additional training in procedures for internal message handling, especially - the effective use of status boards.
Additional status boards should be maintained to track changes in emergency status, meteorological conditions, and protective action recommendations.
- b. Communications between the BRP FCP and field monitoring teams share a radio frequency with Middlesex County. This caused occasional interference. A radio f requency should
. be set aside for the exclusive use of field monitoring teams.
5.1.2 Public and Media Relations
- a. Wall maps of the 10-mi plume exposure pathway EPZ were not available at the joint media center for briefings or individual study. Maps should be provided for use by PI0s and the news media.
- b. PIOS at the joint media center did not have hard copy of EBS messages, and thus did not have complete information to provide to the news media. The state EOC should transmit hard copy of EBS messages to the joint media center to assure the availability of complete, accurate information.
- c. On one occasion the PI0s at the JMC obtained erroneous information about new evacuation areas from the Ocean County EOC. This information was announced to the news media without being verified with the PIO at the state EOC. All information about actions to protect the public should be coordinated with Pios at the str.te EOC to assute the accuracy of info rmation ,- be fore it is provided to the media.
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- d. No television was available at the JMC for monitoring public information. A television should be available to enable PIOS to evaluate the accuracy of public information.
- e. Coordinated arrangements for rumor control should be reviewed.
4.1.3 Accident Assessment
- a. The field monitoring team's capability to measure radio-iodiae in the plume was inadequate. The state procedure needs to be corrected with respect to the air flow rate and the activity calculation. The state is aware of this problem and has ordered the instrumentation required to more accuracely detect radiciodine in the plume. The BRP should revi43w its procedures for measuring radiciodine.
4.1.4 Recovery and Reentry Operations
- a. The state RERP contains two conflicting criteria for <
clearing evacuated areas for reentry; this inconsistency delayed reentry for a short period. The plan should be reviewed and revised to resolve these conflicts.
4.2 OCEAN COUNTY Deficiencies identified at the - county level have led to the following recommendations.
4.2.1 Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources
- The emergency log should be improved, and the access control point map and traffic control point map clearly labelled.
- b. Observers at. OCSCD were not asked for identification.
When the new facility is completed, security will be upgraded and registration and identification should be required. l 1
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o 41 4.2.2 Alerting and . Mobilization of Of ficials and Staf f
- a. The OCSCD missed one verification call during a verifica-tion roll call to local warning points at Site Area Eme rgency classification. OCSCD personnel ,should be instructed and drilled to review their checklists for skipped contacts and omitted verifications.
- b. Part of the revised ambulance plan had not been received by OCSCD. The complete, revised ambulance plan should be made available to OCSCD.
- c. At the OCSCD, confusion resulted when the call for notification of unusual event emergency classification was received from the county EMC instead of from OCNGS or State Police Headquarters as specified on the Unusual Event Ch eckl is t . The NJSP OEM, OCNGS, and Ocean County should coordinate plans for initial notification, and revise plans and SOPS accordingly.
4.2.3 Emergency Operations Management
- a. During the exercise, the CCSCD did not fill out an Initial Contact Message form at Site Area Emergency and General Emergency classifications as called for in the county RERP. Information on OCSCD 's Initial Contact Message forms for Unusual Event and Alert should be included on the corresponding checklists. The plan should be revised' ,
to reflect the procedure actually used.
- b. The county RERP, the OCS CD 's checklists, and practice should be consistent regarding who initially notifies GCSCD of changes in the emergency action level. Although effective action by OCSCD was not impaired, inconsisten-cies among the RERP, the checklists, and practice were noted during the exercise. Consistency would remove the possibility of confusion on the part of communications operators.
- c. OCSCD checklists should provide for all required verification calls. {
4.2.4 Public Alerting and Notification
- a. Schools under the jurisdicti,on of the superintendent at the Staf ford Elementary School should be issued tone alert e
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radios as soon as possible. Acquisition of radios by these schools should be verified.
- b. Procedures for verification of siren sounding should be established.
4.2.5 Public and Media Relations a.- Limited spot checks failed to find placards displaying radiological emergency information in public facilities.
Additional efforts 'to distribute such materials are required.
- b. Limi ted spot checks revealed that about one-third of the people interviewed on the day of the exercise had not received the public information brochure. ' Additional mailings might increase coverage and public familiarity with the brochure's contents.
4.2.6 Accident Assessment
- a. Monitoring instruments had not been calibrated within the past year. Calibration'should be done yearly.
- b. The county field monitoring could be improved by upgrading maintenance procedures to reduce the likelihood of equipment failure. County-owned equipment should be available.
Although Ocean County is not required to have a capability to monitor radioiodine, if it elects to do so the following should be addressed:
e The county followed the state air sampling procedure for radioiodine. However, the state procedure needs to be corrected with respect to air flow rate and the activity calculation. New pumps to correct the air flow problem have been ordered; their receipt should be verified.
Particulate filters should be used in front of the sample.
e Sampling kits did not contain silver zeolite, which would be needed in a real- emergency. The kits should be completed.
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43 4.2.7 Health, Medical, and Exposure Control Measures
, a. 'Ihe manager and workers at the decontamination center did not know when to stop decontaminating persons or equip-ment. Additional training is needed.
4.3 OCEAN COUNTY MUNICIPALITIES Deficiencies identified at the municipal level have led to the following recommendations.
1 4.3.1 Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources
- a. Emergency Operations Centers at Beachwood Bo rough and Ocean and Stafford Townships are inadequate. The Beachwood and Stafford EOCs both lack potable water and
! sewage connections and have cramped working areas. The Ocean Township EOC is within the two-mile EPZ. Ocean Township should select an alternate facility outside the two-mile area for coordinating the township's eme rgency
. response if evacuation of the primary facility becomes necessary.
- b. Communication via EMRAD is adequate, but . bo th the system and operator training should be improved to prevent the 10 to 40-minute delays that were experienced in communica-i tions between the municipalities and Ocean County during the exercise.
i
- c. Deputy EMCs in Island Heights and South Toms River are not
- familiar enough with their responsibilities during
- radiological emergencies to perform adequately in the absence of the EMC; they should receive additional training in radiological emergency management.
- d. The EOC working areas at Berkeley Township and South Toms River Borough should be better organized for emergency management operations.
- e. Security at South Toms River, Seaside Heights, Seaside Park, Ocean Gate, and Berkeley should be implemented once the EOC is activated.
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4.3.2 Alerting and Mobilization of Of ficials and Staf f
- a. Police dispatchers at Beachwood and Long Beach failed to properly follow notification procedures af ter receiving an Alert status message from Ocean County.. Dispatchers should be trained in notification procedures.
4.3.3 Emergency Operations Management
- a. Surf City did not participate in the exercise. South Toms River and Island Heights had very limited partici-pation. All municipalities should fully participate in exercises and drills.
- b. A checklist of procedures under each emergency action level would help emergency management personnel. -
4.3.4 Actions to Protect the Peblic
- a. Island Heights does not have a list of noninstitution-alized, mobility-impaired persons in the EOC; such a list should be developed.
4.3.5 Health, Medical and Exposure Control Measures
- a. Emergency workers need training in the proper use and distribution of. dosimeters and in checking and recording information from dosimeters.
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- b. Municipal EOCs within emergency protection sectors should implement procedures to ensure that contaminated individuals are not allowed access to the EOCs.
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5 SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTION OF DEFICIENCIES Section 4 of this report lists deficiencies based on the findings and recommendations of the federal observers ' at the May 24, 1983 exercise of OCNGS. These evaluations are based on the applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in NUREG-0654-FEMA-1, Rev. 1 (November 1980) and objectives agreed upon for the exercise. The attached table summarizes recom-mendations to correct those deficiencies that we re identified as requiring corrective actions based on this exercise. For purposes of verification, the attached table compares these recommendations with the recommendations based on the March 16, 1982, exercise. The present status is indicated for all recommendations.
The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director, State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C.,
that any deficiencies that require corrective actions have been corrected and that such corrections have been incorporated into the plans as appropriate.
FEMA requests that both the state and local jurisdictions submit the measures they have taken or intended to take to correct these deficiencies. I FEMA recommends that a detailed plan, including dates of completion for
, scheduling and implementing recommendations, be provided if remedial actions cannot be instituted immediately.
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Table 1 Recommendations to Remedy Deficiencies in Radiological Emergency .
Preparedness Identified at Exercises for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station of May 24, 1983, and March 16, 1982 NUREG-0654 Deficiency Planning Identified Present Recommended Remedial Action Standard 1983 1982 Statusa I Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources State (1) The BRP staff at the FCP should re- H.3 X N ceive additional training in pro-cedures for internal message handling, especially the effective use of status boards. Additional status boards should be maintained to track changes in emergency status, meteorological conditions, and protective action recommendations.
t (2) A security system was implemented at H.3 X C the BRP Forward Command Post.
(3) A radio frequency should be set aside F.1.d X N for the exclusive use of field monitoring teams.
(4) Consideration may be given to in- H.3 X C creasing the available space allotted to dose assessment operations.
(5) On-the-j ob training should be imple- 0.1 X C mented to smooth out the procedure of initially setting up security at the EOC.
(6) More space should be allotted for maps H.3 X C and displays.
a legend: New deficiency; observed at the 1983 exercise.
Incomplete; a deficiency observed at the 1982 exercise was repeated in 1983.
Complete; a deficiency observed in 1982 has been remedied.
Not Observed; this item was not ' observed during the 1983 exercise.
/
. 47 Ta ble 1 (Cont 'd)
. . . NUREG-0654 Deficiency-Planning Tdentified Present Recommended Remedial Action Standard 1983 1982 Status
! (7) Consideration should be given to J.10.a X C
- j assigning a separate coding system to the EPZ maps, to avoid confusion with the number designation system given on the sector maps.
f (8) At the NJSP forwa rd command post, the H.3 X NO State Police and EOF personnel should j be physica11v located together rather than on separate floors to improve internal communications and logistics.
Ocean County (9) Emergency logs should be improved. H.3 X N
! (10) OCSCD security should be upgraded. X N (11) State OEM maps should be obtained by J.10.a X X I j the county so that designation of such areas as access control points will be consistent with the State. ,
Ocean County Municipalities (12) Emergency Operations Centers at Beach- H.3 X N wood and South Toms River Boroughs and Be rkeley, Ocean, and Staf ford Town-ships need improvement. " Die Beachwood and Stafford EOCs both ~1ack notable 3 water and sewage connections and have cramoed wo rking areas. The Ocean
- Township EOC is within the two-mile j EPZ and there is no alternate f acilitv for the township outside the two-mile
- area. The EOC wo rking area in Reckeley and South Toms River should be better organized for emergency management operations.
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Table 1 (Cont 'd) -
NUREG-0654 Deficiency Planning Identified Present Recommended Remedial Action Standard 1983 1982 Status (13) Comimanication via EMRAD is adequate, F.1.b X N but improvements should be incorpor-ated into both the system and operator training to prevent the 10- to 40-min-ute delays which we re - experienced in communication between the municipa l-ities and Ocean County.
(14) Training is needed for Deouty Emer- 0.1 X N gency Management Coordinators at Island Heights and South Toms River to familiarize them with their responsi-bilities should the Emergency Manage-ment Coordinator be absent during an emergency.
(15) Security at Berkeley, Ocean Cate, Sea- H.3 X- N l i
side Reights, Seaside Park, and South I Tons River EOCs should be improved.
(16) A formal system for message handling H.3 X C and internal comnunications should be implemented. This would assist in accurate and timely dissemination of in fo rma tion.
(17) Improve comnunications systems so that F.2 X C local police do not lose contact with first-aid facilities.
(18) Displavs and maps should be improved J.10.a X C and provided for all EOCs . Maps J.10.b should show population distribution, evacuation routes, and relocation centers.
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. 49 Table 1 (Cont 'd)
NUREG-0654 Deficiency Planning Identified Present Recommended Remedial Action Standard 1983 1982 Status II Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff State (1) It is suggested that manpower planning A . I .e , X C be reviewed to insure that sufficient C.2.a personnel are available to sustain a 24-hour continuous emergency response and that personnel can be dispatebed to the licensee's near-site EOF.
(2) On-t he-j ob training should be consid- E.2 X C ered to enhance the. operations of F.1.a alerting, notifying, and mobilizing response personnel and prompt activa-tion of emergency response comannica-tions. $
Ocean County (3) OCSCD personnel should be instructed E.1 Y 4 to review their checklists for skipped contacts and omi t ted verifications during roll-call verification. One verification call was missed at " site area emergency."
(4) Part of the revised ambulance plan ; bad L.4 X N not yet been received by OCSCD. The complete. . revised ambulance plan should be made available to OCSCD.
(5) At the OSCSD, confusion resulted when F.1.a X N the call for notification of "unusua l event" emergency classification was received from the county EMC instead of from OCNGS - or State Police Head-quarters as specified on the Unusua l Event Checklist. The NJSP OEM, OCNGS, and Ocean County should _ coordinate plans for initial notification, and revise plans and SOPS accordingly.
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50 Ta ble 1 (Cont 'd) .
NUREG-0654 Deficiency Planning Identified Present Recommended -Remedial Action Standard 1983 1982 Status (6) The capability for fixed and mobile F.2 X No medical support facilities to communi-cate with each other should be re-viewed and u pgrade d . This was defi-cient during the exercise and such communication should be available.
Ocean county Municipalities (7) Training in staff notification and E.1, X N activation procedures is needed at E.2, N achwood and Long Beach; oolice 0.1 dispatchers did not follow planned notification procedures after receiv-ing an " alert" status message from Ocean County.
III Rmergency Goerations ?fanagement !
State (1) It is recommended that training of 0.1 X C personnel be conducted to alleviate the confusion over nomenclature which could hamper and delay effective com-munication.
Ocean County (2) In fo rmation from the Initial Contact E.1, X N Message Form should be included on the E.2 OCSCD checklists for " unusual event" and " alert," as is currently done on the checklists for "s ite area emer- i gency" and " general emergency." !!se of the Initial Contact %ssage Fo rm could then be dropped, so that opera-tors fill out only one form (i.e. , the checklist) for each emergency action level. The plan should also be re-vised to reflect this change.
0 1
. -51
,- Table 1 (Cont 'd)
NUREG-0654 Deficiency Planning Identified Present Recommended Remedial Action ' Standard 1983 1982 Status (3) The county plan, OCSCD checklists, and E.1, X N actual practice should be consistent. E.2 (4) Checklists should provide space for E.1 X N recording all required verification calls.
Ocean County Municipalities (5) Full participation in the exercise is~ N.I.a X N necessary to develop and demonstrate emergency operations management skills._ Full participation is sug-gested for Su r f Ci ty , South Toms River, and Island Heights.
(6) Stunicipal procedures should be D.4 X X I
, developed, including a checklist for I each emergency classification.
(7) Training and planning should includ e A.I.d X C more ef fective use of staff briefings to coordinate emergency response activities.
IV Public Alerting and Notification State (1) The overall reliability of the system E.5, X C used to alert the public and provide E.6 emergency public information nust be revised and improved. It is suggested that a system for verification of siren activation be included within the capabilities of the State. Eq ui p-cen t should be upgraded to avoid delays in soundine sirens such as that which occurred in the exercise.
(2) A permanent ERS system should be put E.5, X C in place. The local radio stations E.6 should have this system as part of their basic operations and FCC approv-al should be obtained. ,
52 Ta ble 1 ( Co n t 'd ) -
l NtrREG-0654 Deficiency Planning Identified Present Recommended Remedial Action Standard 1983 1982 Status Ocean County (3) It should he verified that all schools E.5, X N under the jurisdiction of the super- E.6 intendent at the Sta f ford Elementary School have received tone alert radios.
(4) The county should establish procedures E.5, X X I to verify siren sounding. E.6, J.10.c i
I (5) The siren equipme'nt and system should E.5 X C be upgraded to insure that-it can he activated in a timely manner.
V Public and Media Relations State (1) Wa ll maos of the 10-mile plume expo- G.3.a X V sure pathway EPZ were not available at the joint media center for briefings or individual study. Maps should be provided for use by PIDs and the news media.
(2) PIDs at the joint media center did not G.4.a X N have hard copy of EBS messages, and thus did not have complete information to provide to the news media. The state EOC should transmit hard copy of EBS messages to the joint media center to assure the availability of com-plete, accurate information.
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, 53
- 1e 1 (Cont 'd)
- NUR$G-0654 Deficiency Planning Identified Present Recommended Remedial Action Standard 1983 1982 Status (3) On one occasion, the PIDs at the joint G.4.a X N media center obtained erroneous G.4.h information about new evacuation areas from the Ocean County EOC. This information was announced to the news media without being verified with the PIO at the State EOC. All information about actions to protect the public should be coordinated with Pios at the state EOC to assure the accuracy of information before it is orovided to the media.
(4) No television was available at the G.4.c X N joint media center for monitoring public information. A television should be ava. table to enable Pios to
, evaluate the accuracy of public infor-mation.
(5) Coordinated arrangements for rumor G.4.c X X I control should be reviewed.
(6) Public information pamphlets giving G.1 X X I information and instructions for use during an emergency should be printed and distributed to all members of the public.
(7) A public information program should be G.1 X X [
initiated within the 10-mile EPZ. G.2 Posted notices should be placed in hotels, motels, and other places frequented by transient persons.
(8) The State PIO should have access to G.4.a X C l all pertinent information so that factual information will be given the public and the media.
9 e
54 .
Ta ble 1 - (Cont 'd) .
NUREG-0654 Deficiency Planning -Identified Present Recommended Remedial Action Standard 1983 1982 Status Ocean County (9) A comprehensive public education pro- .I.10.c X X I gram should be conducted, especially in ' light of the large transient population. Emergen cy procedures should be posted in motel roons and in public facilities. A program should be instituted to insure that both full-time and transient residents receive emergency information.
VI Accident As sessment State (1) Procedures for measuring radioiodine I.9 X N in the plume should be reviewed and e required instrumentation obtained.
(2) The instrumentation issued to field H.7, X C.
monitoring teams should be reviewed, I.8, so that each team will have the capa- I.ll bility to measure 'the air and ground for contamination. Uniformity in the issuance of protective clothing, maps, etc. , should also be reviewed.
(3) All personnel assigned to off-site I.7, X C monitoring should receive identical I.8, training. The training level of I.9 personnel should be reviewed and upgraded as necessary.
Ocean County (4) Calibration of nonitoring instruments H.10 X N had not been done within the past year. Calibration should be done yearly.
(5) The county should upgrade maintenance H.10 X N procedures to reduce the likelihood of equipment failure.
r 4
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, 55 .
i
Table 1 - (Cont'd) .g NUREG-0654 Deficiency Planning -Identified Present Recommended Remedial Action Standard 1983 1982 Status (6) County-owned field monitoring equip- H.7 X N ment should be obtained.
(7) The county monitoring teams should I.7, X C have the capability to monitor for- I.8, radiation contamination. I.9.
(8) Communications systems between the H.12 X C' county monitoring teams and the county EOC should be reviewed and upgraded as necessary. This was deficient during the exercise..
(9) ' Although Ocean County is not required to have a capability to monitor radioiodine, if it elects to do so the following should be addressed:
e The county followed the state air. I.9 X N sampling procedure for radioio-dine. However, the state pro- ;
cedure needs to be corrected with j respect to air flow rate and the j calculation of activity. New i pumps to correct the air flow-problem have been ordered; their receipt should be verified.
o Sampling kits should contain I.9 X N silver zeolite cartridges.
VII Actions to Protect the Public Ocean County (1) It is suggested that the system and J.12 X C procedures for processing evacuees be reviewed. Plans should include facil-ities for the decontamination of per- !
. sonnel and vehicles, and security should be considered for . the congre-gate care centers.
9 r
4 56 ,
Table I (Cont'd) .
NtrREG-0654 Deficiency 1
P1arning Tdentified Present Recommended Remedial Action Standard 1983 1982 Status i
Ocean County Municipalities
- (2) Lists of noninstitutionalized, mobili- J.10.d X N
- ty-impaired persons should be avail-l able at each municioal EOC.
4 VIII Health, Medical, and Exposure Control Measures State i
j (1) Training should be initiated for wo rk- K.3.b X C
- ers in the area of reporting radiation
] dosages received. This procedure, in-I cluding reporting intervals, should be
- included in the training as well as part of the overall plan.
Ocean County
} (2) The manager and workers at the decon- -K.S.b X N tamination center did not know when to '
- stoo decontamination efforts on per-sons or equipment. Additional train-
- ing is needed.
(3) Training regarding the reporting : and K.3.a X C l maintenance of doses received by K.3.b l emergency wo rke rs should he reviewed and upgraded to insure proper dose monitoring.
i (4) Location and facilities for the de- K.5.h X C contamination center should be -re-
} viewe d. Consideration should be given co relocating the decontamination.
jl center outside the '10-mile EPZ.
j Facilities should be improved. for
- ' containment of runoff decontamination of vehicles, 'and improved personnel i
. facilities such as more showers should '
{ be considered. '
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. Table 1 (Cont 'd)
NUREG-0654 Deficiency Planning Identified Present Recommended Remedial Action Standard 1983 1982 Status-Ocean County Municipalities (5) Training of emergency wo rkers in' the R.3.h X X I proper use, distribution, checking and recording of information from dosi-meters is needed.
(6) Municipal EOCs within protective X. S .a X X I action areas should implement proce-dures to ensure that contaminated individuals are not allowed access into the EOCs .
IX Recovery and Reentry Operations State (1) The State RERP contains two conflict- LI X N ing criteria for clearing evacuated areas for reentry; this inconsistency delayed reentry for a short period.
Th e plan should be reviewed and revised to resolve this conflict.
(2) Recovery and reentry should be M.1, X C included and fully demonstrated as M.3, part of the overall activity. M.4 X Relevance of Exercise Experience Ocean County 6
(!) Optional events should he planned into N.I.a X C the scenario to avoid too much " dead time" during the day.
9 4
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/(Q'; Federal Emergency Management Agency Region II 26 Federal Plaza New York, New York 10278
[s. -[. /
DATE: September 11, 1984 MEMORANDUM TO: Margaret Lawless, Project Officer n
FROM: . er .KowieskIIChairman Regional Assistance Committec
SUBJECT:
Oyster Creek NGS Exercise In accordance with New Jersey state law which requires a full-scale exercise on an annual basis, the Oyster Creek NGS exercise was held May 10, 1984. A copy of the exercise scenario is enclosed. Although the 1984 exercise was not scheduled for regular RAC observation, a limited evaluation was made of selected deficiencies in order to give the state and county an opportunity to remove some deficiencies this year rather than having to wait until 1985.
The following individuals constituted the RAC observer team:
- 1. Roger Garelik - Ocean County EOC
- 2. Paula Cammarata - Public Information field observation and interviews
- 3. Nancy Kelly - Joint Media Center
- 4. Al Smith - Ocean County Sherif f's Communication Division (OCSCD) facility Of sixteen observed items, eight received a better rating following the exercise than they had previously received on the Remedial Action Table submissions. For example, improvement was noted in security at the Ocean County Sherif f's Communication Division f acility and there was improvement in the equipment available at the Joint Media Center. One item received a lower rating. The actual evaluation of the observer team were incorporated in the updated Oyster Creeks Remedial Action Table forwarded to you August 31, 1984.
Enclosure 1
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SECTION I EXERCISE SCHEDUI.E FOR 1984 NRC OBSERVED OCNGS EXERCISE Thursday - May 3,<!984 10:00 a.m. - New Jersey Observers / References Briefing at New Jersey State Police Division Headquarters.
Thursday - May 10, 1984 Beginning approximately 4:00 p.m. - 0.C.N.G.S.
Exercise.
Friday - May 11, 1984 1:00 p.m. - New Jersey Observers / Referee and Participant Critique at N.J. State Police Division Headquarters.
10:30 a.m. - Internal De-briefing for State 0.E.M. i staf f at N.J. State Police Division Headquarters.
SECTION II A. 1984 Oyster Creek NCS Exercise Objectives The objectives for the May 10, 1984 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Exercise are intended , to address those minor deficiencies identified in the May 24, 1983 exercise.
As is specified in NUREG 0654/ FEMA-RERP-1, the exercise will for energency response.
test .the integrated capability Therefore, the exercise play will involve the major planning standards of the State Radiological Emergency Response Plan, the 1.icense's Emergency Plan, and test major portions of their basic elements. The following provide the basis for the post-exercise evaluation of the participating organizations' plan implementation capabilities and of the adaquacy of the emergency plans.
B. Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources
- 1. Demonstrate the effectiveness of New Jersey state, county, and municipal emergency operations centers as well as the joint media center, the EOF, and the State Police FCP at Tuckerton S t'a t ion.
- 2. Demonstrate thct the communications systems (primary and backup) between the Licensee; State, County, and municipal
- EOCs; Federal Agencies; and contiguous states.
t 2
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- 3. Demonstrate that each State, County, and municipal emergency response f acility has adequate access control; that adequate security can be maintained; and that each facility has equip-ment and supplies adequate for its mission.
C. Altering and Mobilizatier and Officials and Staff
- 1. Demenstrate the ability of the State, County, and municipal-ities to promptly activate and staff their EOCs as appropriate when notified of existing emergencies.
- 2. Demonstrate that the State. County, and municipalities can establish appropriate notification and communications links.
D. Erercerev Operations Mar.are crt
- 1. De enstrate that ecssages are transeitted and logged accurate-ly and that status bcards are accurately maintained and updcted. Insure that briefings are held and incoming EOC personnel are briefed and updated.
- 2. Decenstrate that the designated official at each EOC is in charge of t h'e EOC and in control of overall coordinated respense.
- 3. Demonstrate that all agencies are capable of 24-hour op-erations and make sure all personnel with emergency respon-sibilities can operate from their assigned locations.
- 4. Decenstrate effective coordination between Federal, State, C o un t',. Agencies, and the Licensee.
- 5. Evaluate the effectiveness of placing OEM staff at the EOF for purpeses of a liason with Licensee's Ecergency Response Teac.
E. Public Alerting and Notification
- 1. De :nstrate that the State's decision te notify the public can be cade in an effective ad timely manner.
- 2. Deconstrate the public notification procedure by activating the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) to transmit an EBS test cessage and a preplanned statement about the exercise.
- 3. Decenstrate that the transmission of the EBS message can be properly coordinated with activation of the prompt notifica-tion siren systec.
F. Public and Media Relatiens
- 1. Detenstrate the abilit. tc establist a public information center and produce accurate and timely press releases and briefings and that proper procedures are utilized.
3
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- 2. Demonstrate efficient information sharing among Pin represen-tatives for the Licensee State Police', Governor, and County.
- 3. Denenstrate the ability to (1) telefax all EBS messages from
~
State EOC to the' Joint Media Cthter, (2) copy and distribute
. EBS messages, and (3) handle press inquiries concerning EBS message. ,
- 4. Demonstrate. that the Joint Media Center is properly equipped (maps, displays, cedia monitoring, telefax, and reproduction). .
- 5. Dernens t ra te the ef fectiveness of rumor control at'the State t
EOC ', and the timely update of information for rucer control cperatiens.
C. Accidert Assessr.ent ...
- 1. Decor s t ra t e the capability of Ocean Couqty to perfore field -
conitoring fr. an effective and timely manner.
- 2. Demonstrate the ability of the State rp- understand the cause of the accident. r Deconstrate the ability of the State te eva}uate and' make 3.
decisions te take protective action based ony recorcendations .
from the Licensee and/or other independent accident assess- 3 ments.
4 Deconstrate com=unication between the $1censee and the State ,_ s accident assessment personnel.
- 5. Deconstrate that the state field renitoring teams ,can be dispatched and deployea it a timely mar.ner; that cocrunica-tions are adequate; that radiolefical monitoring equipment is functional; that simulated data are accurately obtained and transmitted through their respective channels.
- 6. Deconstrate the state field conitering capability for: (1) predetermined area radiation levels (2) air sacpling and analysis for radio iodine and participants in the plume expo-sure EPZ for pluce exposure rate verification, . (3) tracking the plur.e.
- 7. Deconstrate the ability to determine whether the food, water. _ ,
and milk are suitable f or human consumption and if _ livestock feed'is suitable for anical consucption. ,.
~
- 8. Decorstrate that. sacples can be f orwar ded - to a ' laboratory.
I-131 concentration in ellk will be predetermined to demon +
strate that the results cf such analys+5 guld te effectively ured to dete-rine ingestien protectior actier. rece_cendations. '
~
- 9. Demonstrate the ability of the Bureau,of Radiation Protection to evaluate field saepling data criteria for acceptable 4
~
j L. . . -
A .
radioactive contacinatton levels for reentry and/ot recovery
- (under Federally accepted guidance criteria).
H. Actions to Protect the Public the State,
- 1. Deconstrate that the designated officials of County, and municipal 1taes will provide timely support and that local off-site agencies such as first aid squads, police (including crire prevention in evacuated areas), and fire companies will previde timely support on an as-available basis.
- 2. Demonstrate the timely activation, staffing and full operation cf decentarinatier and cengregate care centers.
- 3. Pe enstratc recitering, decontacinatien activities, record keeping, and care of evacuees.
4 Deeenstrate the capability to respend ef fectively to irpedi-cents te evacuatien.
- 1. Health, Medical, and Exposure Control Measures .
- 1. Decenstrate the ability to perfore persennel monitoring and show that designated officials at various levels of government can provide prompt support with service such as police and fire protection and first aid.
- 2. Deconstrate that the first aid squads and the designated hospital can handle contacinated patients and that anbulances and related 9 quip:ent can be decontatinated.
- 3. Deconstrate that e:ergency workers are briefed on how to use potassiue iodine (KI) and dosimeters before they are assigned.
Deconstrate the authorization and siculated use of KI through-out the exercise as well as the maintenance of permanent exposure records.
- 4. Demonstrate the decision chain that has been established to authorize exposure for emergency workers in excess of the PAGs.
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6 .
SECTION III.
\
MAPS, LOCATIONS, ADDRESSES AND TELEPHONE NUMBERS l
A. State of New Jersey Facilities State EOC State Police Division Headquarters (MAP 15) River Road West Trenton, NJ 08625 NJSP Forward Command Tuckerton Station Post West Creek, NJ Bureau of Radiation 380 Scotch Road Protection Trenton, NJ 08625 (MAP 15)
BRP Forvard Command Post Berkeley Public Safety Center (MAP 7) Pinewald-Keswick Road Bayville, NJ Joint Media Center Toms River Elks Club (MAP 10) Washington Street Toms River, NJ B. Ocean County Facilities County EOC Miller Air Park (MAP 8) Rt. 530 Berkely Twp., NJ C. Congregate Care Shelter (MAP 13) Brick Twp. High School .
Chambers Bridge Road Bricktown, NJ D. Decontamination Centers Emergency Workers Ocean County Utility Authority (MAP 2) Rt. 9 Stafford Twp., NJ Bayville First Aid Rt 9.
Bayville, NJ E. Licensee Facilities (MAP 13) J.C.P. & L. Business Office River Road Lakewood, NJ 6
L_
c 6 .
F. Municipal Facilities Ba rnega t Light Boro Fire Heuse (MAP 1) 10th a Central Avenue Barnegat Light, NJ Barnegat Township Police Headquarters (MAP 2) 900 West Bay Avenue Barnegat, NJ Beachwood Borough EOC Locker Street Beachwcod, NJ (MAP 7)
Berkeley Tevrship EOC Public Safety Center (MAP 7) Pinevald-Keswick Read Eayville, NJ Brick Tevnship EOC 401 Cha:bers Bridge Road (MAP 12) Brick, NJ Dover Tevnship EOC Police Headquarters (MAP 10) . 33 Washington Street Tots River, NJ Harvey Cedars Boro EOC Police Headquarters (MAP 1) 7606 Long Beach Blvd.
Harvey Cedars, NJ Island Heights Boro EOC Police Headquarters (MAP 6) 115 Sucrit Avenue Island Heights, NJ Jackson Township EOC Public Works Building (MAP 14) Route 528 & Conventry Rd.
Jackson, NJ Lacey Township EOC Police Headquarters (MAP 7) 800 West Lacey Read Forked River, NJ Lakehurst Boro EOC 207 Ele Street (MAP 9) Lakehurst, NJ Lakewood Twp. E0C 231 3rd Street (MAP 13) Lakewood, NJ Long Beach Twp. EOC Police Station (MAP 14) 6805 Long Beach Blvd.
Beach Haven, NJ Manchester Twp. EOC Pelice Headquarters (MAP 9) 1 Colonial Drive Lakehurst, NJ 7
Ocean Township EOC Police Headquarters (MAP 5) 50 Railroad Avenue
,Waretown, NJ Ocean Gate Borough EOC Police Headquarters (MAP 6) East Long Port Avenue Ocean Gate, NJ Pine Beach Borough EOC Municipal Building (MAP 7) 599 Pennsylvania Avenue Pine Beach, NJ Seaside Hts. Borough EOC Public Works Building (MAP 6) Grant Avenue Seaside Heights NJ Seaside Park Borough EOC Police Headquarters (MAP 6) 5 th Avenue & West Central Avenue Seaside Park, NJ Ship Bcttom Borough EOC Police Headquarters (MAP 14) 17th Street & Long Beach Blvd.
Ship Bottom, NJ South Toms' River Police Headquarters (MAP 10) 144 Mill Street South Toms River, NJ Stafford Township EOC Township Building (MAP 2) Bay Avenue Manahawkin, NJ Surf City Borough EOC Police Headquarters (MAP 1) 9th Street and Long Beach Blvd.
Surf City, NJ 8
s .
1984 OCNGS EXERCISE TELEPHONE LIST EOF (Emergency Operations Facility) (201) 367-8812.14.05.8771 Rumor Phone (800) 792-8314 Joint Media center (201) 240-6380 (NJSP)
(201) 240-6350 (FEMA)
County EOC (201) 341-3451 (609) 693-4908 Lanoka Harbor Decontamination Center (609) 693-9854 Stafford Decontamination Center (609) 597-4105 (Ocean County Utility Authority)
Lakehurst NAEC - 24 hr. Duty Office (201) 323-2308 Lacey Middle School (609) 693-4409 Garden State Rehabilitation Cer.ter (201) 244-3100 Georgian Court College (201) 364-2200 State Exercise Controller (609) 292-7698/94 BRP FCP (609) 341-1177,1188 N.J. Transit (609) 365-8820 Ocean County Sheriff Comm. Division (201) 349-2010 EBS (WADB News Room) (201) 681-3800 Ocean County College (201) 255-4292 Municipalities Barnegat Townsh'ip (609) 698-7832 Barnegat Light Borough (609) 494-0806 Beachwood Borough (201) 349-0245 Berkeley Township (201) 244-7400 Brick Township (201) 477-3000 Dover Township (201) 341-1000 Harvey Cedars Borough (609) 494-2843 Island Heights Borough (201) 270-6415 Jackson Township (201) 928-1200 Lacey Township (609) 693-7489 Lakehurst Borough (201) 657-4141 Lakewood Township (201) 364-2500 Long Beach Township (609) 494-2153 Manchester Township (201) 657-8121 Ocean Township (609) 693-3302 Ocean Cate Borough (201) 269-3466 Pine Beach Borough (201) 349-6425 Seaside Heights Borough (201) 793-9100 Seaside Park Borough (609) 793-0234 Ship Bottom Borough (609) 494-2171 (201) 349-0403 South Toms River Borough (609) 597-7350 Stafford Township j Surf City Borough (609) 494-3064 9
e SECTION IV PARTICIBATING AGENCIES 1984 NRC OBSERVED OCNGS EXERCISE A. State Participants Of fice of the Governor NJSP, Office of Emergency Management NJSP, Field Operations Section NJSP, Communications Bureau NJSP, Marine Law Enforcement Bureau Office of The Attorney General Departnent of Defense Department of Environmental Protection Department of Health Department of Transportation New Jersey Transit B. Private Agencies American Red Cross Conrail C. Federal Agencies Federal Aviation Administration Federal Emergency Management Agency (unofficial observer)
Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Coast Guard D. Local Participants (County and Municipal)
Ocean County Board of Chosen Freeholders Ocean County Department of -Emergency Services Ocean County Bureau of Emergency Management Ocean County Departmental emergency response personnel Governing of ficials and emergency response personnel f rom:
Barnegat Light Borough Barnegat Township Berkeley Township Harvey Cedars Borough Lacey Township Long Beach Township l
Ocean Township Stafford Township Surf City Borough 3 9
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a .
SECTION V GUIDELINES FOR CONDUCT OF-1984 NRC OBSERVED i OCNGS RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY EXERCISE A. Purpose This docueent . provides guidance for the conduct of the 1984 radiological emergency exercise. It shall be used by all participating State, County, and municipal agencies.
It j
provides specific methods for demonstrating emergency response ecpability, conducting the exercise, and evaluating results.
i E. Concept of Operatiens and Control of the Exercise The licensee and the State of New Jersey will supply official references and/cr observers for each location where an emer-gency response is being demonstrated for the exercise. Prior j
to the exercise, the references and observers will be provided with the appropriate locations, maps, time periods, guide-lines, and an observer evaluation checklist for their exercise assignments.
The exercise initiating events will be centro 11ed by the lead reference at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS). Hypothesized initiating events will consist of four types of information: (1) information and data provided to control roor personnel by the lead reference or his designee.
(2) information provided to. OCNGS personnel concerning i envirencental (e.g., areas, air, primary coolant, surfaces) and plant systers radioactivity, (3) onsite and offsite dose '
J rate data (simulated gammaL and iodine dose rate measurements) l provided to the site, State and County monitoring teams by referees and (4) referee / observer supplied " problems" for offsite participants. The lead referee has the authority to determine the time sequence of these initiating events to ensure an orderly and logical flow of exercise events. All other actions during the _ exercise will occur through a free play response as the licensee, State, County. . and municipal participants respond to the initiating events.
As the initiating events are provided to the station staff ,
they will determine the nature of the emergency and cause the !
implementation of the appropriate station emergency plan procedures. These procedures are expected to include a deterrivation of the emergency classification in accordance with NUREG-0654, Rev.1 FEMA Rep. Rev.1. After the emergency classificatien has been detercined, the appropriate Federal.
i State, County, and municipal autherities vill be' notified in accordance with the emergency plan procedures.
l
{
11
OCNGS, the Upon notification of the hypothesized emergency at State, County, and the municipalities will complete their initial notifications anda activation of emergency f acilities in accordance with their emergency plans and procedures..
The hypothesized emergency will continue to develop based on data and information provided to the control room personnel by l As the situation develops, follow up the lead referee.
information will be forwarded to the New Jersey State EOC and the New Jersey Bureau of Radiation Protection. The Bureau of Radiation Protection will analyze the informatien and recom-mend protective actions as they would in a real emergency.
Where information would normally be confirmed via an indepen-dent scurce (such as National W(ather Service for weathcr data), the confirnation data will be obtained. If the confir-matier. date conflicts with the hypothesired data provided by the site, the hypothesized data will be utilized for accident assesscent purposes. If any inconsistencies are noted in the initiating events, they should be questioned by the State accident assessment team as they would be in a real emergency.
Certain inconsistencies (such as plume width, release dura-tion, technic'al reason for the simulated release, etc.) may be intentional and required to provide an exercise basis which tests the capabilities of the licensee, the State, the County, and the municipalities to the maximum extent feasible in a limited time frame. If an inconsistency is known or de-termined to be intentional, then the accident assessment group will note the inconsistency and ignore it. The load referee i
shall have the authority to resolve or explain any inconsis-1 tencies or problems that may occur during the exercise.
When the exception of the aforementioned cited and potential inconsistencies and the closeout of the emergency (which are discussed later), the internal operations of the licensee, State, County, and municipal command centers shall be identi-cal with their intended operation in a real emergency.
C. General Guidance for the Conduct of the Exercise Participants shall avoid taking any acticns during the exer-cise which would actually reduce plant or public safety. The potential for creating a real radiological ecergency or endangering the public shall be specifically avoided.
- 1. Simulating Emergency Actions Since the exercises are intended to provide deconstration of actual abilities as closely as is reasonably possible, the pa r t icipar.t e should act as they veuld durir; a rea; eterger.cy.
All actual actions shall be taken where pessible. Simulation will be utilized only when it is not feasible to perform the actual action.
12
e L' hen orders are given to others during drills and exercises, the order should centain the word " Simulate" as the first word, if that is what is meant. For example, the order to put out a fire that is being hypothesized would st te " simulate discharging the fire extinguisher." k'he re such actions are being taken, it is suggested that participants inform any observers in t.e area of what action would be actually taken had the energency been real. Emergency workers will process through decontamination centers.
Actual evacuation of a segment of the general public for exercise purposes is undesirable due to the unnecessary public ha:ard created and great public inconvenience of such action.
Ne actual evacuatier.s of the public art plant.ed. However, a nurher of volunteers sufficient to test two congregate care shelters, will be utilized.
- 2. Avoiding Violation of Laws Intentional violation of laws is not justifiable during any exercise. To implement this guideline, the following actions cust be taken. prior to conduct of all exercises:
- a. All observers and potential drill participants cust be specifically inforced of the need to avoid intentional violation of all Federal, State and local laws, regu-lation, ordinances, statutes, and other legal re-strictions. The orders of all police, sheriffs, or other authorities should be followed as would normally be the case.
- b. Drill participants shall not direct illegal actions be taken by other drill participants or members of the general public,
- c. Drill participants shall not intentionally take illegal actions when being called out to participate in an exer-cise. Specifically, local traffic law's such as speed laws i shall be observed.
- d. Agencies shall inform their participants of any laws, ,
regulations, statutes, etc., that may likely apply during ,
conduct of drills. )
1
- 3. Avoiding Personal and Property Endangerment Part icipar't s and observers shall be instructed to avoid endangering property (public or private), other personnel responding to the exercise, members of the general public, anicals, ar.d the envirentent.
1 1
13 l 1
- 4. Action 'to Minimize Public Inconvenience It is not the intent, nor is it desirable or feasible to effectively train or test the public response during the conduct of radiological emergency exercises. Public inconve-nience is to be minimized.
The actions of Federal State, County and municipal agencies, and nuclear power plant operators receive continuous public notice and scrutiny, therefore the conduct of an exercise could arouse public concern that an actual emergency is occurring. In order to minimize public inconvenience and concern, the following actions are being included in the exercisc plans:
- a. A few days prier to the exercise, the public within the affected area vill be informed of the icpending conduct of a radiological emergency exercise. Press releases froc GPt' Nuclear will be used to accocplish this. Prior to the exercise, the public shall be inforced of the f ollowing as a minimum:
(1) the purpose of the exercise and that it is a routinc periodic function not interded to inconvenience the public unnecessarily; (2) the exercise requires no public action or involve-ment; (3) the exercise will be conducted at a preselected ti=e during a specifically stated tite period; (4) the siren system will be activated.
- b. During the exercise press releases will be provided by GPU Nuclear and New Jersey stating that an exercise is in progress,
- c. Agencies sheuld make every ef fort to prevent the public froc being misinformed about the nature of the exercise.
Therefore it is important to infore ceebers of the public that an exercise is in progress and that their involvement is not required, whenever direct public contact occurs in the field. In addition, it is important to preface, interj ec t , and conclude conversations that can be over-heard by the public with the words, "This is an exercise, repeat, this is an exercise" or sicilar state =ents.
Conversations that can be monitored by the public include those on telephones, radios, loudspeakers, telegraph, etc.
- 5. Maintaining Energency Readiness During the performance of an exercise, the ability to recog-nize a real emergency, terminate the exercise, and respend to the new situation must be maintained. Therefore, the exercise 14
scenario and actions of participants shall not include any actions which seriously degrade the ' condition of systems, equipment or supplies, or affect the detection, assessment, or response capability to radiological or other emergencies.
If a local emergency occurs during an exercise requiring the local agency to terminate its participation in the exercise, the agency should notify the State and County Emergency Operations Center of the situation and terminate its par-ticipation. The State shall then inform all other agencies involved in the exercise of the situation. All messages about real events shall be clearly identified as such. For example precede a real message with "This is NOT, repeat, NOT an exercise cessage."
D. Emerge :y Respense Implerentation and Operations
- 1. Initial Notification Initial notification shall be performed in accordance with the procedures of the radiological emergency plans.
- 2. Activation of Facilities Activation of State, County, and municipal EOCs and manning of the EOCs by emergency response personnel shall occur in accordance with the emergency plans.
- 3. Activation of the EOF GPU Nuclear personnel will activate the EOT. Activation and operation of the EOF will be in accordance with the emergency plan procedures. Normal travel times to the EOF by its staff may be compressed and staf fing will be permitted, one hour after the notification to acti,,te.
4 Public Notification The first request to the Emergency Broadcast System will be the test message of the Oyster Creek Radiological Emergency Broadcast System which will be broadcast to the public. The text of this message is as follows:
THIS IS A TEST OF THE OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY BROADCAST SYSTEM. THIS SYSTEM HAS BEEN DEVELOPED BY THE NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF EE RGENCY MANAGEMENT IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE RADIO STATIONS IN THE AREA, TO KEEF THE PUBLIC INFORMED IN THE EVER OF AN EMERGENCY AT THE OYSTER CREEE NUCLEAP GENERAT-IN7 STATION. HAD TF.'.F EEEN AN ACIL AL EMERGENCY, YOU WOULO HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED WHERE TC TUNE YOUR RAPIO DIAL FOR FURTHER INFORMATION. THIS HAS BEEN ONLY A TEST.
All messages during the exercise shall be prepared and for-warded to the Emergency Broadcast Systee gateway station 15
b (WADB) in accordance with standard procedures. Except for the test message, all exercise EBS messages shall be prefaced by explicit instructions not to be broadcast, but to log the message content and time of receipt.
The procedures for public alerting will be deconstrated by activation of the siren system in consonance with the broad-cast of the EBS message.
- 5. Public Information Press releases to the media shall be made in accordance wfG.
the respective eeerrency plans, via the normal press release retheds. TI,c press sht)) cortain all necessary infernation on l
the current status of the exercise.
- 6. Corrunications Cor unications between the exercise participants shall occur in accordance with the procedures of the emergency response plan. Should any primary cce=unication path (telephones) becoce inoperative or prove inadequate, backup means (radio) of coc=unication will be utilized as appropriate.
E. Mobilization of Emergency Workers It is the responsibility of all emergency response agencies to ensure that their resources are actually deployed in adequate numbers to provide a rea:anable test of their notification, robilization, coceand, coordination, and coc=unications capability. Except as noted below, all State, County, and municipal agencies shall have total authority in determining the degree of mobilization and deployment of their resources, '
consistent with this intent. The decision to actually deploy resources may be cade at the time of the exercise.
When the use of an agency's resources is sieulated, it is the respensibility of the agency to ensure that all steps neces-sary to utilize the resources are demonstrated. For example, for an agency to demonstrate the activation of additional personnel, it is necessary to locate the required call list and to have the calls either completed or simulated. Then a realistic estimate of the mobilization tire cust be made and forwarded to the agencies which need to know this time esti-mate. Use of a resource may be demonstrated only af ter the estimated mobilization time has elapsed. In addition, when a resource is deconstrated the com=and and control must also be demonstrated. It is desirable to carry out all deconstrations to the greatest extent possible, thus detercining the need for additienal resources su:P as those used fer coteand, control, dose record caintenance, etc.
Total counts of emergency workers deployed and those that are hypothesized to have been deployed shall be maintained.
16
. s e a .
Inf ormation regarding which personnel movements are real and <
vhich are hypothesir.ed shall be readily available at all times.
The following provides a minimum list of personnel and re-sources that will be deployed by the State and local govern-ments to demonstrate the capabilities of their resources.
Also provided are specific demonstration objectives for hypothesized emergency rqsponses.
- 1. Decontacination Center New Jersey and Ocean County will set up two decontamination ec-tors. Dur ir:g the exercise the centers vill' be used principally for ecergency uorkers to check out through after they have completed their exercise participation. At the decentamination centers, any actions which cay damage property vill be~ avoided. All necessary equipment will be assembled at the decontamination center and its use vill be demonstrated.
Detailed demonstration actions will' be implemented at the center by the decontamination center leader.
- 2. Concregate Care Shelter / Decontamination Centers ,,
Two conErsagate care / decontamination centers will be opened and staffed in accordance with the emergency plans. Supplies required for long term mass care (cots, blankets, food, etc.)
med thq.1;u aquired or brought to the shelter. However, the shelter and registration personnel should obtain estimates on how many evacuees would be arriving had the exercise been -a real emergency. The shelter and registration personnel should then make the necessary estimates of supplies required for the potential evacuees. Sources for th.r required rupplies should then be located, and the means for t ransport a t ion- To f the supplies should be determined. -3
- 3. Monitoring Teams -
The State of New Jersey will field approximately three radiological, monitoring teams and Ocean County will field approximately two teams. All of the teams will be supplied with a referee. The referees will provide simulated field i data which will be used to determine local dose rate readings. l These teams however, vill be equipped with the necessary l equipment which would enable them to determine actual area '
gamma dose rates and airborne radioiodine concentrations.
Data for the environmental saeples and TLDs will be supplied by a referee at the appropriate time.
The monitoring teams will not b: a,uited up in an-ti-contamination clothing, but will have such equipment at j their disposal, i l
17
The taking of ingestion pathway zone samples will be demon-strated by designated teams. It will be demonstrated that the samples can be sent to the appropriate laboratories as they would in a real emergency. Analysis of the tsmples will not be performed. Hypothetical data for some semples will be provided as an off site initiating event in order to demon-strate that the results of sample analyses could be used to determine ingestion pathway protective action recommendations.
- 4. Volunteer Organizations The members of volunteer organizations, e.g. firemen and rescue squads, have responsibilities such as work that take piccedence ever their participation in an exercise.
Therefore, these volunteer organizatiers will participate in ,
their energency responsibilities on an as-available basis.
Because the exercise pluce will impact specific areas, volunteer personnel in the affected zone will have advance knowledge of their special role in this excrcise, in order to maxicize their participation.
F. Reentry and Recovery The decision-making, planning, and implecentation for reentry and recovery will be demonstrated or siculated as appropriate.
The results of sample analyses will be presented to the BRP Accident Assesscent team at the State EOC. Field demon-strations of the sampling techniques which would normally generate the data used in accident assessment will begin concurrently.
G. Clesecut of the Exercise Closecut of the exercise will be accomplished by the following actions:
- 1. Ecergency workers will be secured as soon as possible after they have demonstrated their capabilities. The decision to secure them will be made at their controlling EOC, with concurrence from the State EOC, if applicable.
Ecergency workers shall be directed to check out through decontamination centers. Emergency worker radiological exposure records will be completed for each emergency worker in accordance with the standard operating proce-dures. Evacuee radiation dose records will be completed for 15 random volunteers at each site. The completed dose records forms shall be clearly carked "For Demonstration j Only" and shall be forwarded to the responsible State agency for review.
- 2. The ecergency workers decontacinatien centers and the congregate care shelter / decontamination center will be '
secured as soon as all emergency workers and volunteers have checked out through these centers. .
1 18
- 3. Participation of nonessential State, County, and municipal EOC personnel will be ended as soon as their emergency response has been essentially completed. Reducing EOC staff to those responsible for long term planning and recovery shall have the concurrence of the State EOC director or his designee.
- 4. The remaining staff will close out the exercise by devel-oping a course of action for the Reentry and Recovery period. This course of action shall be a coordinated ,
effort between the State and the licensee. It shall include:
(a) Any further ingestien zone sanples that need te be taken shall be identified. Locatiens to be sarpled shall' be identified. Personnel requirerents to ,
conduct the necessary satpling and to transport the sacples te the labor: tories shall be identified.
Those requirecerts shall be catched against persennel availability.
(b) Twenty-four hour personnel radiation schedules shall be develeped. These schedules will include require-cents and canning capabilities for access control, decontacination record keeping and EOC staffing, i (c) Ingestion pathway control requirecents such as food interdiction shall be planned. This planning shall include comparisons of personnel requirecents with available personnel.
(d) Crice prevention ceasures in the evacuated areas shall be plant.ed.
- 5. klen the State, the Counties, the municipalities, and the licensee are satisfied that they could have icplemented the necessary long tere protective, parallel,'and other actions required by the plan, the participants shall reach a joint conclusion to terminate the exercise. A final press release shall be issued signifying the termination of the exercise.
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19
SECTION VI MEV JERSEY OBSERVER LIST FOR THE 1984 OCNGS EXERCISE Numbers.
of Facility Location Observers
- 1. EOF Lakewood 1
.2. EOC West Trenton 3 (NJSP Hdqtrs.)
- 3. BRP Forward Corrand Post Berkeley 1 (Public Safety Ctr.)
- 4. Field Menitoring Teams (State) Berkeley 5 (Public Safety Ctr.)
- 5. Field Monitoring Teams (County) Berkeley . 3 (Miller Air Park)
- 6. Joint Media Center Toms River 1 (Elks Club)
- 7. Ocean County Sheriff's Toms River 1 Communication Division
- 8. Ocean County EOC Berkeley 2
- 9. Decontacination Centers OCUA 1 (Manahawkin)
-Bayville F.D. 1 (Bayville)
- 10. Congregate Care Shelters Pinelands Regional H.S. 1 (Tuckerton)
Brick High School 1 (Bricktown) l l
20
ACTUAL AND SIMUI.ATED OFFSITE EVENTS MATRIX Event
- Actual Simulated
- 1. Notification of Federal County, Municipal. X and Private Agencies
- 2. Activation of State, County, Municipal EOCs X
- 3. Accident Assessment X
- 4. Field Monitoring X X
- 5. Access Control State persennel
- 6. EBS Test Message X
- 7. EBS Message Prepared But Not Transmitted to the Public x
- 8. Public Notification (Siren Activation) X
- 9. Ecergency Werker Decontacination Center Activation X
- 10. Evacuee Congregate Care Shelter /
Decontamination Center Activation X
- 11. Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Ecergency Workers Y
- 12. Personnel Dose Record Keeping X
- 13. Personnel Dosimetry Issuance X X
- 14. Evacuation of Volunteers X
- 15. Ingestion Pathway Sampling X
- 16. Ingestion Pathway Sacples Analyses X
- 17. Traffic Control, Law Enforcecent and Crime Prevention, Public Health and Sanitation, Fire Control and Rescue X .X
- 18. Reentry and Recovery Sacpling, Assessment, Decisien Making X
- 19. Aerial Survei11ance X OF X (weather dependent)
- 20. Reentry & Recovery Implementation X 21
e SECTION VII
SUMMARY
OF OFFSITE INITIATING EVEhTS During the exercise, offsite initiating events will be pre-sented by State observers / controllers to exercise players. These events will be provided for all participating agencies located in the State EOC, Ocean County, and municipal Emergency Management Coordinators. All events will be prograr:ned to occur at a des-ignated time and keyed to the expected emergency action level. If the expected emergency action level is not in effect, the observer will have instructions to delay input of the initiating event. The esents will be designed, at the State leve;. to test assigned agency rcles as detailed in the eeergency plar. County and cunici-pal events will be designed to stress energency response capabil-ities by requiring siculated manpower expenditure, use of matual aid agreements, and support requests to high levels of governcent.
Exaeples of typical local initiating events include:
.autocobile accidents
. fires
. hazardous material incidents
. power outages
. response personnel vehicle breakdowns
. road closures due to repair work or damage
.crities requiring police response
. crowd control situations
. individual requests for information/ assistance
.e=ergency health care situations
. lost children Examples of support agency initiating events include:
.information requests
. equipment requests
. personnel requests
. response personnel vehicle problets
. response personnel health problets 22
CONFIDENTIAL SECT'ON VIII ,
EXERCISE TIME LINE
- 1. Plant has been operating at 100% power for eight months.
- 2. Containment Spray System I has just been declared inopera-ble due to failure of Torus Spray Valve; the Drywell Spray Valve is stuck open (normal position) and both pumps have
! been tagged out of service to support corrective mainte-nance 4:00 pt A tinor treter is felt onsite (0.lg).
UNLSUAL EVEN! EMERGENCi ACTION LEVEL.
4:02 pm MEDICAL EMERCENCY result s f rom t remor ef f ects.
No contacination involved.
4:30 pm Radwaste Operator reperts an unidentified leak rate of 50
' ~ ~
gpm from the drywell sump. ALERT EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL.
Reactor shutdown is init'iated 5:30 pm Technical Support Center is manned. A second, more severe tremor occurs (0.2g) resulting in a loss of offsite 34.5 kv power (start-up transforcer supply). Emergency diesel generators I and II start and idle.
5:35 pm Diesel generator I reported to be on fire due to leak in
--~~~
fuel line. Diesel trips, apparently disabled.
SITE AREA EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL.
6:00 pm A third treter (0.3g) results in a coeplete break ef the Control Rod Drive (CRD) return line in the drywell. Fuel damage results and reactor scrams on Main Steam Line High radiation alare. (A bus fault occurs on 4160v bus D disabling Cottainment Spray System II).
, 6 05,pm Torus breaks causing a_ release to Reactor Building.
'> Aybarir release occurs through ._st_g.ck. Standby Gas
.; 4
,,g Treatment System initiates.
8:00 pm Reactor is in cold shutdown. Environmental releases _
~'
t e rmina t e . Onsite and offsite re-entry and recovery operations begin.
10:00 pm EXERCISE TERMINATES.
to 11:00 pc 23
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LACEYT0hNSHIPINITIATINGEVENTS Time ,
7:00 pm 1. House fire reported on Kennebec Road believed to be caused by leaking gas.
6:05 pm 2. Three houses reported collapsed on Beach Boulevard near Palm Beach Drive.
6:15 pm 3. Operator of a dur.p truck veered off of Lacey Road overpass of Carden State Parkway crashed onto north bound lanes. Five other vehicles beside truck involved. There are three fatalities and seven injured.
8:30 pm 4. Altercation reported at Duffy's Yacht Bar.
6:30 pm 5. Power outage reported in Lanoka Harbor area.
9:00 pm 6. Van reported visible in JCP&L cooling channel no occupants visible.
6:45 pm 7. Power lines reported across roads at these locations Lake Drive at Center Street Haines Street at Harwood Drive Laurel Bou?evard at Birch Road 5:15 pm 8. Fire reported in shopping center at Peute 9 ar.d Beach Avenue.
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- 8:00 po 9. Bomb threat called in at Lacey Conrunity Building.
5:35 pc 10. Power outage reported in Murray Grove area.
', 7:30 pm 11. Beach Boulevard caved in at Club House Road, street residents reported gas odor.
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OCEAN T7n'NSHIP INITIATING EVENTS Time 8:00 pm 1. House collapsed at Lighthouse and Cable Drives.
6:45 pm 2. Two houses reported on fire on Beacon Drive.
7:45 pm 3. Railroad Street reported caved in, person calling in reported gas odor.
5:45 pm 4. Accident involving two cars and a pick-up report on Bay Parkway and Tiller Road, one fatality three injured.
5:15 pm 5. Anti nuclear demonstrators are stopping traffic on Route 9 to pass out literature near Dry Dock Restaurant.
6:05 pm 6. Wharf at Waretown Fishing Station collapsed ten people fell into the bay, only six have been retrieved. .
6:30 pm 7. Roof collapsed at Ocean County Vocational Technical School two students injured.
7:15 pm 8. Power outage reported along Barnegat Beach Drive. ,
8:30 pm 9. Power lines reported across Pancoast Road near Hamilton Road.
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9:00 pm 10. Conrail line along Route 9 caved in.
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e BARNEGAT TOWSSHIP INITIATING EVENTS Time 6:05 pm 1. Roof of toll plaza in Barnegat Township collapsed no injuries reported but only two lanes can be used for through traffic.
7:00 pm 2. County Route 609 reported caved in near Creek View Road.
7:30 pm 3. Power outage reperted in Lincoln Park section.
8:00 pm 4. Calls from residents near Oak and Pine Avenues reporting gas odor.
6:15 pm 5. Pavilion at municipal beach collapsed, board walk and portion of parking lot caved into bay.
5:15 pm 6. Anti-nuclear protestors stopping traffic along Bay Avenue.
5:30 pm 7. Reports of tires slashed on ten cars on Nauhus Drive.
8:30 pm 8. Break in reported at 23 Beverly Court. .
6:30 pm 9. Electric line reported down on Fairway Drive.
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9:00pm10.'AccidentatRot$te9andBayAvenueinvolving.avanand two cars one fatality fire injured.
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STAFFORD TOWNSHIP INITIATING EVENTS Time 8:45 pa 1. Fire reported in restaurant at Route 9 near Route 72.
5:15 pm 2. Bomb threat called in at 0.C.U.A. from anti-pollution organization.
7:15 pm 3. Electric lines down on the following roads:
Neptune Drive at Sextant Road Windjammer Drive at Cypress Avenue Windjammer Drive at Breaker Avenue 7:45 pm 4 Fire reported in house on Bay Avenue near police station.
5:15 pm 5. Accident involving a truck and motorcycle on Myrtle Drive operator and passenger of motorcycle injured.
5:55 pm 6. Anti-nuclear protestors are trying to stop traffic on Causeway.
6:30 pm 7. Report of five cars with tires slashed on Walnut Street.
6:45 pm 8. JCP&L truck fire bombed on Mill Creek Road no injuries to work crew.
6:05 pm 9. Power outage reported in Fawn Lakes area.
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5:30 pm 10. Anti-nuclear protectors have throw debris onto Route 9 near Bay Shore Road,.
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SURF CITY INITIATING EVENTS Time 5: 15 pm 1. Vandals stole a dump truck from a construction site and dumped three tons of gravel onto Long Beach Boulevard at Division Avenue. The truck was left parked in the traffic lane, the keys are missing.
5:45 pm 2. Automobile crashed into gravel three occupants injured.
7:45 pm 3. House fire reported to Central and 17th Avenues.
6:30 pm 4. Bocb reported'at post office, caller said they were from a group wanting the US to stop nuclear power and involvement in Central America.
7:00 pm 5. Pahaquarry Township School Superintendent called and said a group of students on a field trip to Surf City did not report home at expected time asked if we could locate them. They are in a yellow and black van carked Pahaquarry Township Board of Education.
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HARVEY CEDARS INITIATING EVENTS Time 7:45 pa 1. Break-in reported at 108 Cedar Avenue.
5:15 pm 2. Auto achident on Essex Avenue vehicle collided with a utility pole, three injured.
6:05 pm 3. House fire reported at 85th and Beach.
6:30 pm 4. JCP&L truck vandalized at 69th and Boulevard.
7:00 pm 5. Pahaquarry Township School Superintendent called, student did not report back from a field trip, she is not sure which town they may be in. The students were in a black and yellow van marked Pahaquarry Township Board of Education.
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s BARNEGAT 1.IGHT BORO INITIATING EVENTS Time 7:15 pm 1. Residents called claimed he planted a bomb at the fire station. Wants an end to nuclear power and deficit spending.
8:00 pm 2. Driver of a Pahaquarry Township School van called said van had brcken down and students were wandering around the town, asked help in retrieving them. Van is at the State Park.
6:45 pm 3. Fire reported at Bayview and 14th Avenues.
6:05 pm 4'. Accident at 4th and Broadway, four persons injured.
5:30 pm 5. Anti-nuclear protestors are staging a no nukes beach party near 20th Street. There are about thirty and they are causing a cajor disturbance.
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- r Is LONC BEACH TOWNSHIP INITIATING EVENTS Time -
6:30 pm 1. Arnold Boulevard caved-in, residents are cut of f.
7:00 pm 2. Power line down on Laguna Lane.
5:15 pm 3. Accident on Route 007 in North Beach area vehicle struck utility pol., two injured.
7:30 pm 4. Residents in vicinity of Arnold Boulevard want to be evacuated until road is restored.
6:05 pm 5. Elec~tric lines on Route 607 at accident site.
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BERKELEY TOWNSHIP INITIATING EVENTS Time 6:30 pm 1. Propane truck overturned on Serpentine Drive near Trenton Avenue South, driver injured.
8:30 pm 2. House fire at Station Road and Woodland Avenue person reports fire said there is a strong gas odor.
6:05 pm 3. Eastern Boulevard collapsed at Latiner Street approximately twenty feet of roadway missing.
8:00 pm 4. Accident at Bayview and Sloop Avenues four fatalities and two injured.
5:15 pm 5. Anti-nuclear demonstrators stopping traffic on Route 9 at Harbor Inn Road.
7:30 pm 6. Break-in reported at Bayview Avenue and Midway Drive. .
9:00 pm 7. Fire reported in brush near Bar Harbor Avenue.
7:00 p. 8. Motorist crashed into antique store on Route 9 near <
Serpentine Drive. .
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5:45 pm 9. Bomb reported in McDonalds on Route 9.
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(
) POST EXERCISE ASSESSMENT I'
O-([$)
June 5,1985, Exercise of the Radiological Emergency Response Plans of the State of New Jersey, Ocean County and Ocean County Municipalities for the OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION August 22,1985 Federal Emergency Management Agency 4 Region H l.
FRANK P. PETRONE 26 FEDERAL PLAZA Regional Director e gg' S _ New York, N.Y.10278 var
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l tl l POST EXERCISE ASSESSMENT June 5,1985 Exercise of the Radiological Emergency Response Plans for the State of New Jersey, Ocean County, and Ocean County Municipalities
- w for the OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION August 22, 1985 Federal Emergency Management Agency Region II l
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. 1 Frank P. Petrone 26 Federal Plaza Regional Director New York, N.Y.10278 b - - - , . - - .- ,- .- . , , , - - . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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Participating Governments The State of New Jersey Ocean County Barnegat Township Barnegat Light Borough Beachwood Borough Berkeley Township Dover Township Harvey Cedars Borough Inland Heights Bororugh Lacey Township 8
. Long Beach Township Ocean Township Ocean Gate Borough 8\ Pine Beach Borough Seaside Park Borough -
Ship Bottom Borough South Toms River Borough Stafford Township Surf City Borough Non-Evaluated Participating Governments i Beach Haven i Seaside Heights Nonparticipating Governments None 4
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CONTENTS E
LIST OF ABB REVIATIONS AND AC RONYMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
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SUMMARY
1 I NT RO D U CTIO N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 1.1 Exercise Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.2 Federal Observers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.3 Evaluation Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
, 1.4 Exercise Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.4.1 State of New Jersey Emergency Operations Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.4.2 New Jersey Bureau of Radiation Protection - Emergency i Operations Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.4.3 BRP-Forward Command Post . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.f.4 Radiological Field Monitoring Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.4.5 State of New Jersey / Field Implementation of Actions to Pro tect the Public . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.4.6 Joint Media Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1.4.7 Ocean County Emergency Operations Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1.4.8 Ocean County Field Implementation of Activities to Pro tect the Public . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 1.4.9 Ocean County Municipal Emergency Operations Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 1.5 Exercise Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 1.5.1 Major Sequence of Events on Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 ns 1.5.2 Sc e nario Su m m ary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 1.5.3 Description of State and County Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 i 1.5.3.1 Concept of Oparations and Contrn1 of the Everr' ige . . . . . . . . 14 1.5.3.2 Emergency Response Implementation and Operations . . . . . . . 15 2 EXE RCISE EVA LU ATIO N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2.1 New Jersey State Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 i
2.1.1 StateEOC................................................... 21 2.1.2 New Jersey Bureau of Radiation Protection - Emergency Operations Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 2.1.3 B RP-Forward Co m m and Post . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 2.1.4 Radiological Field Monitoring Teams'. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 2.1.5 State of New Jersey /Fleid Implementation of Actions to Pro t ec t t he P u blic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 2.1.6 Joint Media Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 2.2 Ocean County Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 i 2.2.1 Ocean County Emergency Operations Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 1 2.2.2 Field Implementation of Actions to Protect Publie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
- 2.2.3 Ocean County Municipalities Emergency Operations Centers . . . . . . . . 41
'* 3 SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTING DEFICIENCIES; JUNE 5,1985, EXERCISE .... 45 4
I 4 SU M M A RY OF DEFICIE NCIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
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TABLES
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T 4 3.1 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station - Remedial AcElon Schedule:
State of New Jersey-Emergency Operations Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 .
3.2 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station - Remedial Action Schedule:
, State of New Jersey-Emergency Operations Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 3.3 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generation Station - Remedial Action Schedule:
State of New Jersey - Bureau of Radiation Protection - Forward Command Post................................................................. 50 1
3.4 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station - Remedial Action Schedule:
State of New Jersey - Radiological Field Monitoring Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 3.5 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station - Remedial Action Schedule:
State of New Jersey - Field Implementation of Actions to Protect the Public............................................................... 52 l
] 3.6 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station - Remedial Action Schedule:
4 State of New Jersey - Joint Media Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 4
3.7 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station - Remedial Action Schedule:
State 'of New Jersey - Ocean County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 ,,
I 3.8 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station - Remedial Action Schedule:
State of New Jersey - Ocean County Field . . . . . .* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 / ,.
3.9 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station - Lemedial Action Schedule:
Ocean County Municipalities - Emergency Operations Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
.. 4.1 Summary of Recommendations to Remedy Deficiencies in Off-Site Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness at Exercises for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station: State of New Jersey -
Emergency Operations Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 4.2 Summary of Recommendations to Remedy Defielencies in Off-Site Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness at Exercises for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station: Near-Site Emergency i Operations Facili ty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 i i '
i 4.3 Summary of Recommendations to Remedy Deficiencies in Off-Site Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness at Exercises for the i Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station: Bureau of Radiation l t Protection - Forward Co m m and Post . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
! 4.4 Summary of Recommendations to Remedy Deficiencies in Off-Site
- Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness at Exercises for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station: Radiological Field -
Moni toring Te a m s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 ,
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i 1 TABLES (Cont'd)
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4.5 Summary of Recommendations to Remedy Deficiencies in Off-Site
' Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness at Exercises for the
- Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
- Field Implementation of Actions to Protect the Public . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
, 4.6 Summary of Recommendations to Remedy Deficiencies in Off-Site Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness at Exercises for the j Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station: Joint Media Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 4.7 Summary of Recommendations to Remedy Deficiencies in Off-Site Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness at Exercises for the
- Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station: Ocean County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 4
4.8 Summary of Recommendations to Remedy Deficiencies in Off-Site l Radiological Emergency Response Preparedr.ess at Exercises for the l Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station: Ocean County Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 4.9 Summary of Recommendations to Remedy Deficiencies in Off-Site Radio-i logical Emergency Response Preparedness at Exercises for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station: Ocean County Municipalities -
Emergency Operations Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 4 \
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4 LISTOF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ,
, ANL Argonne National Laboratory
. BERC N.J. Departme'nt of Environmental Protection, Bureau of Emergency Response ' Coordination BNL Drookhaven National Laboratory BRP N.J. Department of Environmental Protection, Bureau of Radiation-Protection DOA N.J. Department of Agriculture DEP N.J. Department of Environmental Protection DOE U.S. Department of Energy DOC U.S. Department of Commerce g DOH N.J. Department of Health DOT U.S. Department of Transportation
,EACC Environmental Assessment Command Center EBS Emergency Broadcast System EMC Emergency Management Coordinator EMRAD N.J. Emergency Management Radio EMS Emergency Medical System EOC Emergency Operations Center 1 b EOF Emergency Operations Facility l EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency EPZ Emergency Planning Zone FCP Forward Command Post FDA U.S. Food and Drug Administration FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency GPU General Public Utilities HHS U.S. Department of Health and Human Services INEL Idaho National Engineering Laboratory JMC Joint Media Center KI Potassium Iodide NAWAS National Warning System NJSP New Jersey Division of State Police NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- OCNGS Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
. OCSCD Ocean County Sheriff's Communication Division OEM NJSP Office of Emergoney Management PAG Protective Action Guide PIO Public Information Officer RAC Regional Assistance Committee IX
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS (Cont'd) e s
-? ~;.
RACES Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service
- RBCCW Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water -
RCS Reactor Coolant System RERP Radiological Emergency Response Plan SOP Standard Operating Procedure SRAO State Radiological Assessment Officer TLD Thermoluminescent Dosimeter
, USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture e
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,,j . ilt.I! *E' 10:53 IU STATE KLICE Cet p,m m
. RECEWED r meu uua.., c.,,,,em il i Nuclear x23 g ao$15 ~ m "- - see
, Route 9 South g h gi.' . hbT Forked River,New Jersey 00731-o388 HANAGEHENT eos 97i.<co wnters Direct DW Number: *'
SECTION 609-9h -4020 ally 19,1985 Mr. R!ter H. &Sperson Radiological Emergency Response Planning Unit Division Wadquarters P.C. Box 7068 West Trenton, NJ 08625 .
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Dear Pete:
Beginning with the first issues after Memorial Day, GPU Nuclear has placed ads in the folicwing publications: 1he Lacey Beacon, The Beach Haven Times, The Sandpaper and The Toms River Reporter. Those ads will run through Labor Day or longer depending on contract variations with some of the papers who were able to give us discounts for a longer period. When it was prucent to do so, ne extended the ad run through the end of September.
I am enclosing a copy of the ad which is a duplicate of the ao from previous summers.
I hope this information is nelpful.
~
Sincer%y yours, i
I Min T. Fidler Manager-(bmmunication Services
. Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station JTF:dh/07330 ,
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AL.25 65 10:54 IG STATE F t!.~.E Rf1 .
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@$We went you to enjoy your odey' FOR YOUR ..
,,,,. oor ,,,,, . ,,.nt SAFETY -
' Tlw * "Ocean
' " ' County
- * ' Ofkm
" " "of *Emwgency **'! <
Meneoement hei detened sun ior deshno
. WOSM-AM 1170 ;~ e naturaland menende emergwdse. ;
WOSM-FM 92.7 we s ist you know if thwe's a prouem , ;
then m#n anea your emety -
t WM AM 1310 a ye new e H acesse asesbet sken l
' g g ,y g g g inne, er stor sirsus auf herus, hoe b l
eseaf teseleastroseshusestrleere ,
i WADB FM 96 hsareness. , ,
WARZ-FM 100 OCEAN COUNTY OR4CE 'OF I
-i EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT j l
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IUL.22 '65 09:26 ftJ STATE F0 LICE COI p,gt
'C'" 16, 95 14:43 4 to.010 002 -
Y . . _ _ __
. r EMERGENCY INFORMATION ron masIDENTS AND VISITOR 8 IN OCEAN COUNTY Each year emergency information brochures are mailed to tesidents and businesses in the 10 mile radius of the Oyster Creels Nuclear Generating Station in Forked River, NJ. The brochure has specific informatten about what to do in the event of an emergency, whether at ofster Creek or elsewhere in Ocean County.
- RI5! DENTS-A brochure was mailed to you if your addreas
. is within 10 miles of Forked River. If you did not receive a i brochure, can Your municipal office, Ocean County Emergency
, Management.or the Cooan County 1,1brary e V!stTORS--Brochures were mailed to hotels and motels within 10
- zn11es of Forked River. Additional copies may,be obtained from Ocean County Emergency Management or the local municipal otace.
i ty YOU HEAR A STRADY SIRIN TONI FOR 3 TO 6 MIN 7t'ES, TURN ON TOUR f agaa to oNI oF T5338 STAfloN8: '
0
. . j 1170 WOBM-AM 94,3 WJLE FM i 92.7 WOBM-FM 96 WADB-FM
. 1310 WJLE-AM 100 WJRZ-FM *
, l QB IF YOU HAVE SEMVICE BT CLEAR TV CABLE ASSOCIATES. TURN ON TOUR TE!Jtvtsson.
IF YOU DON'T HAVE ACCESS TO A RADIO OR TV cat.I.1-800 792 6314.
This is a rumor control hotline provided by the State of New Jersey.
. l This information is provided to you as a public service by 18FU Nuclear Corporation. Por additional iniormation, can New Jenner State Police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .292. . . .7710 Ococm County OfSco of Emergency Management........... 341 3461 GPU Nuclear Corporation..........e. - cmmn------- a
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,gt_ 2,2 '85 09:04 r4J STATE PC4_ ICE CO1
! i ATTENTION!!!
IF YOU HEAR A STEADY SIREN r u
BLAST OF 3 TO 5 MINUTES, U
IT MEANS:
That Emergency Management Officials ,
have important information for you
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and you should turn your radio to one of these stations:
~
1170 WOBM AM 94.3 WJLK FM i 92.7 WOBM-FM 96 WADB FM f s 1310 WJLK-AM 100 WJRZ FM Clear W Cable
$P 37A If yOU don't have access to a radio, call 1 - 800 - 792 - 8314.
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SUMMARY
. State of New Jersey I Overall, operations at the State EOC were outstanding; the facility was organized, and effectively controlled with respect to security, traffic flow, and noise. ,
Command and control was well managed by the Deputy State Director who continuously j consulted and exchanged information with key staff members. Message handling and internal and external communications were prompt and appropriate. Decision making and implementation of protective actions were timely and promptly communicated to affected areas. Staff was fully informed by updated status boards, maps, and periodic I briefings.
l The Bureau of Radiation Protection Headquarters was activated in a timely fashion, and coordinated activities with the State Emergency Operation Center until the a
Emergency Operation Facility (EOF) was activated. BRP provided advice to the Deputy State Director throughout the exercise. l Alert and Notification of the public including siren sounding and the development i of EBS messages were timely and well-coordinated. However, messages should be reviewed for clarity (such as radioactive release information), and evacuation data should
? - be properly referenced to the public brochure. l The evacuation of transit dependent population was demonstrated by two (2) New
' Jersey Transit buses. The buses were accompanied by New Jersey State Troopers. Bus drivers assisted by State Troopers were able to complete their routes successfully.
However, bus evacuation route maps should be reviewed and revised as appropriate to assure consistency with existing street network and signs. The knowledge of dosimetry I varied between the two (2) bus drivers and State Troopers. All emergency personnel Involved in evacuation should be trained in the proper use of dosimetry.
At the conclusion of the exercise the Deputy State Director briefed the l representatives of the Department of Environmental Protection, Bureau of Radiation Protection, and the Departments of Health and Agriculture regarding recovery and reentry procedures.
Emergency Operations Facility
} The New Jersey Bureau of Radiation Protection's Radiological Assessment staff assigned to the Emergency Operations Facility arrived in a timely manner and the facility was functional within ninety minutes following the Alert declaration. Space was adequate; but at least one additional telephone line is suggested. Revision of one status board format and use is needed. Twenty-four hour staffing capability was demonstrated by presentation of a roster showing adequate staff reserve.
, s The New Jersey Department of Health approved the use of Potassium Iodide by i emergency workers in a timely manner. The decision was promptly communicated to the New Jersey Forward Command Post.
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At one point during the Site Area Emergency, the State Radiological Officer, based on his analysis of the situation, decided that a precautionary sheltering protective
- action recommendation would be appropriate. However, he did not communicate this to ,
State EOC in Trenton as a decision for implementation, thereby falling to execute the ,
required command and control function. At all other times, command and control was ,
adequately demonstrated by the State Radiological Assessment Officer.
A lack of adequate data collected by field monitoring teams prevented confirmation of projected population doses based on reactor release rates during the General Emergency Classification. This lack of field Information delayed determination of whether protective actions using only reactor status information should be extended in distance.
It appears that the flow of reactor status information from the reactor site to the Emergency Operations Facility was inadequate and that the GPU dose projection methodology may need to be revised following critical peer review.
Additional reactor status information contained in the scenario, if it had been transmitted to the EOF, would have improved the caliber of protective action decisions.
Calculated dose projections based on stack release rates were high when compared to values based on field team data. The cause for this discrepancy should be identified and ,
eliminated.
Joint Media Center >s The Joint Media Center was staffed and activated in a timely manner. Repre-sentatives of _the Governor's Office, State OEM, Ocean County and the Utility were present and conducted briefings for the media every half hour during the exercise.
~ Coordination of information between representatives in the Joint Media Center and County EOC was handled effectively, clearing up a past deficiency. Maps were adequately displayed and frequently referenced during each of the briefings. This demonstration clears up another past deficiency. The State PIO representative handled all inquiries from the press in an excellent manner. However, the County PIO needs more training on the County Plan. On two (2) occasions, he supplied incorrect infor-mation to the press with regard to participating municipalities and stren failure.
Ocean County The County response to the Oyster Creek exercise was, in all areas, prompt and thorough. All functions were effectively managed by the Ocean County Emergency Management Coordinator at the County Emergency Operations Center. He conducted periodic briefings within the EOC to share information with all participating agencies. ..
This practice assured that everyone was advised of developments in the exercise in a ,
timely manner.
Agency representatives were well trained in the use of standard operating - -
procedures and were knowledgeable about activities that required interaction between xil i :
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(
agencies. Agency representatives were also familiar with the use of the Ocean County
,' Emergen~cy Operation Center message forms. Internal communications within the EOC ;
- were facilitated by message controllers who coordinated the flow of information between
. agencies. All outgoing communications were routed through the message controllers to I . the communications room for relay to the municipalities. ,
The communications room was fully staffed during the Alert stage and was ;
equipped with Emergency Management Radio (EMRAD), a SECURE system to the State l Office of Emergenay Management, a Fire Band, Emergency Medical Services Network to communicate with the Field Monitoring Teams, RACES, telephone lines and a telecopier. ;
All of these networks were fully covered for the duration of the exercise by a competent !
staff. However, municipalities were not notified prior to siren activation.
The Message Controllers handled the message flow efficiently and promptly. All messages were logged and dispatched in a timely manner. Message runners were :
consistently available to pick up or deliver messages.
Status boards were maintained with accurate information and agency repre- :
sentatives demonstrated good knowledge of actions as they were being implemented. It {
' was evident that the EOC staff have been well trained to carry out their emergency functions and to coordinate their response activities as a team. - !
j i - The Director was clearly in control and did not permit himself to be distracted l by various details. l
!o' Ocean County activated two congregate care centers as part of the field activities. (Brick Township High School and Pinelands Regional High School.) Each of these facilities was adequate for sheltering evacuated persons, and determining whether evacuees had been exposed to- radiation. We recommend however, that additional 4 training be conducted to improve ~the ability of personnel to detect possible contamination. The County also activated one decontamination center for emergency workers in Ocean County Municipal Utility Authority. This operation was excellent in all j respects. The staff was thoroughly familiar with its duties and the facility was adequate for this function.
Ocean County Municipalities
! Emergency response activities were reviewed at seventeen municipalities within the 10 mile EPZ. In addition, two municipalities which are outside the 10 mile EPZ, l Beach Haven and Seaside Heights chose to participate; these two EOCs were not evaluated by federal observers. Most of the municipalities participating in the exercise clearly showed that they were familiar with radiological emergency plans and
- , procedures. The mobilization of staff was timely. in general there was a distinct improvement in the performance of the officials in charge of the Emergency Operation Centers. While there were examples of outstanding performance, a few municipalities
- require additional improvement and training in radiological monitoring procedures to detect possible contamination. l l
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The seventeen municipalities within the 10 mile EPZ were evaluated on sixteen ;
specific emergency response tasks. Most of thest: tasks were successfully accomplished
- i by the local officials. ,
Significant progress has been made in correcting the deficiencies identified at the 1983 exercise. Some of the deficiencies corrected by the municipalities include the .
following e The staffs have been trained in notification procedures.
e Time delays in communications between municipalities and the county have been reduced. However, the county should further improve its capability in notifying the municipalities in a timely manner of all key events. For example, strens were activated prior to alerting the municipalities.
e Security for access control to the EOC has been improved.
Finally, it should be noted that previous difficulties involving the lack of adequate facilities and space for municipal EOC operations have been partially resolved.'
Adequate space is now available in the new Stafford EOC, and most of the municipalities ,
are performing radiological monitoring of personnel entering the EOC. - t J g O
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j 1 INTRODUCTION
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I 1.1 EXERCISE BACKGROUND
['
'; On December 7, 1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assume lead responsibility for all off-site nuclear planning and response.
FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:
e Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning and in the review
- and evaluation of radiological emergency response plans developed i by state and local governments; 4
l e Determining whether such plans can be implemented, on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans conducted by state and local' governments; and e Coordinating the activities of federal agencie,s with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:
I
- U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC),
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),
- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
- U.S. Department of Energy (DOE),
, - U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS),
- U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT),
- U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and
- U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
- Representatives of these agencies serve as members of the Regional Assistance
! Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.
Annex B to the State of New Jersey Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) for Nuclear Power Plants is the RE.RP for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS). It includes detailed state, county, and municipal plans pertaining to I
that site. This plan was evaluated, and an exercise of the RERP for OCNGS was tlien held on March 16,1982.
A second exercise was conducted on May 24, 1983, to assess the capabilities of the state and local emergency preparedness organizations to (1) . implement their radiological emergency plans and procedures and (2) protect the public in a radiological emergency involving the OCNGS.
. At an exercise conducted by the State on May 10,1984 and partially observed by
- FEMA, certain remedial actions were corrected (see Reference Tables 4.1-4.9). i l
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2 A third full-scale exercise of the RERP for OCNGS was conducted on June 5, 1985, between the hours of 4:00 p.m. and midnight. A team of observers consisting of '
personnel from FEMA Region II, the RAC, Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), Brook- .
haven National Laboratory (BNL), Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL), and ,
federal and state agencies evaluated the June 5 exercise. Twenty-four observers were .
assigned to evaluate activities of state and local jurisdictions. Observers were trained in New Jersey radiological emergency planning concepts and given an evaluation kit, which included information on exercise objectives, the exercise scenario, and other issues relating to the exercise. Team leaders coordinated the operations of teams observing activities of the State of New Jersey, Ocean County, and Ocean County municipalities.
Following the exercise, the federal observers met to complie their evaluations.
Observers presented observations specific to their assignments, the teams of observers developed preliminary assessments for each jurisdiction, and team leaders consolidated the evaluations of individual team members. A public critique of the exercise for exercise participants and the general public was held at 11:00 a.m. on Friday, June 7, in the Lacey Municipal Building in Lacey, New Jersey.
The findings presented in this report are based on evaluations of federal observers, which were reviewed by FEMA Region II. FEMA requests that state and local jurisdictions submit a schedule of remedial actions for correcting the deficiencies discussed in this report. The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to - :
< the FEMA Associate Director of State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C., that all negative findings observed during the exercise have been corrected and that such corrections have been incorporated into state and local plans, as appropriate. s ,
i 1.2 FEDERAL OBSERVERS Twenty-four federal observers evaluated off-site emergency respons.e functions.
i These individuals, their affiliations, and their exercise assignments are given below.
Observer Agency Exercise Location / Function R. Kowieski FEMA Exercise Overview /RAC Chairman R. Acerno FEMA . State Emergency Operations Center (EOC)/
Team Leader H. Fish USDOE State EOC/ Communications M. Jackson FEMA State EOC/PIO P. Cammarata FEMA ' Joint Media Center C. Amato NRC Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)/ EOF ,
Operations .
9
..e . . _ _ _ . - _ _ - , , . - . . _ . - . _ _ , _ _
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. J. Keller INEL EOF / Accident Assessment
. L. Koehler EPA N.J. Department of Environmental Protection, Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP);
. BRP Forward Command Post (FCP)
B. Salmonscn INEL Ocean County EOC/ Radiological Monitoring Team; Pineland H.S./ Congregate Care Center; Manahawkin, N.J./ Decontamination Center R. Zantopp BNL Ocean County EOC/ Radiological Monitoring Team; Brick H.S./ Congregate Care Center P. Kier ANL New Jersey State Police Forward Command Post R. Reynolds FEMA Ocean County EOC/ Team Leader J. O'Sullivan FEMA Ocean County EOC/ Communications T. Baldwin ANL Ocean County EOC/ Communications, Operations F. Kay ANL Ocean County Municipal EOCs/ Team Leader; Ocean County Municipal EOCs/ Berkeley
. Township, South Toms River, Dover Township i' .
R. Bernacki EPA Ocean Township EOC; Lacey Township EOC; Ocean Township / Impediment to Evacuation J. Nagle ANL Lacey Township EOC/EOC Activation; Ocean Township / Route Alerting; Ocean Township /
Mobility Impaired; Ocean Township / Traffic Control Points J. Smith USDOT Lakehurst, N.J./ Bus Evacuation; Alert Notification and Public Information B. Vinikour ANL Lakehurst, N.J./ Bus Evacuation; Alert Notification and Public Information ,
J. Tatar ANL Barnegat Township EOC; Stafford Township EOC J. Opelka ANL Ocean County Municipal EOCs/ Ocean Gate
. Township, Pine Beach Borough, Beachwood
. Borough, Island Heights Borough; Alert Notification and Public Information P. McIntire FEMA Ocean County Municipal EOCs/Barnegat Light, Harvey Cedars, Surf City; U.S. Coast Guard Station; Alert Notification and Public Information
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4 A. Hart USDA Ocean County Municipal EOCs/ Ship Bottom, Long Beach Township; Alert Information and Public .
Information R. Walsh FEMA Seaside Park EOC; Alert Notification and '
Public Information .
1.3 EVALUATION CRITERIA The evaluations presented in Sec. 2 are based on applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in NUREG-0654-FEMA-1, Rev.1 (Nov.1980), Sec. II. '
Following the overview narrative for each jurisdiction o.r activity, deficiencies and accompanying recommendations are presented. Deficiencies are presented in two categories. The first category includes those deficiencies that would cause a negative finding, that is, a finding that off-site emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living near the site in the event of a radiological emergency. A negative finding would be based on at least one deficiency of this type.
The second category ' includes all other deficiencies where, although demonstrated (and observed) performance during 'the exercise was substandard and i corrective actions are necessary, other factors give FEMA reasonable assurance that, in . :
a real radiological emergency, the health and safety of the public could be protected.
These other deficiencies also include all other problem areas where performance was considered adequate but where a correctable weakness was observed. Correction of the weakness would enhance the ability of the organization to respond to radiological emergencies. -
1.4 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES
\
The licensee, GPU Nuclear, the State of New Jersey, Ocean County, and Ocean County Municipalities planned a coordinated exercise of their emergency plans for both on-site and off-site support agencies on June 5,1985.
The exercise was intended to demonstrate many, but not necessarily all, of the-capabilities of the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS) to respond to a wide range of emergency conditions. This scenario was designed to activate the OCNGS and NJSP Headquarters emergency plans through their various action levels. Although this scenario accurately simulated operating events, it was not intended to assess all of the operator's diagnostic capabilities, but rather to provide sequences that ultimately demonstrated the operator's ability to respond to events and that resulted in exercising both on-site and off-site emergency plans and procedures. Free play was encouraged and .
the controllers were to interfere only !f operator or player action would have terminated ,
the exercise prematurely or deviated excessively from the exercise schedule.
i The following objectives were developed for this exercise and have been .
referenced in the narrative - of the exercise evaluation -in Sec. 2 of this report by organizational abbreviation and by number, for example, SEOC 2.
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5 1.4.1 State of New Jersey Emergency Operations Center (SEOC)
- 1. Demonstrate the ability to receive and verify the initial and
. follow-up emergency notifications from the licensee.
- 2. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize, staff, and activate the State EOC in a time,1y manner.
- 3. Demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing in the EOC on a 24-hour basis by roster.
- 4. Demonstrate that State, Counties, utility, and municipalities can establish appropriate communication links, using either primary or backup systems.
- 5. Demonstrate that messages are transmitted in an accurate and timely manner, that messages are properly logged, that status boards are accurately maintained and updated, that appropriate briefings are held, and that incoming personnel are briefed.
- 6. Demonstrate that the designated official is in charge and in
- . control of an overall coordinated response. -
- 7. Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.
- 8. Demonstrate the ability to identify the need for and request, Federal assistance.
- 9. Demonstrate the ability to" make appropriate protective action recommendations to the public based on utility recommendations, independent recommendations from the accident assessment group, and offsite factors such as evacuation time estimates and traffic conditions.
- 10. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate public alerting and instructional messages to,the counties and municipalities prior to broadcast over EBS network.
- 11. Demonstrate the pub"c notification system by' activation of the ,
stren system and activation of the EBS to transmit an exercise test l message.
. 12. Demonstrate the ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ, including the water part of EPZ and disseminate an initial instructional message within 15 minutes of the Governor's or his designee's decision to initiate a protective action.
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- 13. Demonstrate the ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public in a timely manner. .
- 14. Demonstrate that the transmission of the EBS message is properly
- timed to begin within one minute of the end of the siren sounding. ,
- 15. Demonstrate the means to implement a decision to authorize exposure for emergency workers in excess of the general public PAGs once the decision has been made by DOH.
- 16. Demonstrate the means to implement the decision, based on predetermined criteria, whether to issue KI to emergency workers.
- 17. Demonstrate the coordination between the Department of Health (DOH) and the BRP for establishing the authorization of dosages for emergency workers, in excess o.f general public standards. Also demonstrate the decision process for issuance of Potassium Iodide (KI).
- 18. Demonstrate the decision process to establish authorization for emergency workers to receive exposures in excess of the public PAGS. .
- 19. Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor emergency worker s
exposure including proper use of personnel dosimetry. ,
- 20. Demonstrate overall knowledge of the PAR, which has been explained by the BRP at the EOF, and communicate the information to the OEM at the EOC-1.4.2 New Jersey Bureau of Radiation Protection - Emergency Operations Facility (BRPEOF)
- 1. Demonstrate the ability to activate the BRP - HQ and.
communicate with BRP staff in transit to both the EOF and i Forward Command Post (FCP).
f 2. Demonstrate that the BRP - HQ is in charge and responsible for accident assessment decision making processes until the EOF /NJBRP is activated.
l
- 3. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate State ,
functions at the EOF in a timely manner. ,
- 4. Demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing of State functions in .
the EOF on a 24-hour basis.
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7
- 5. Demonstrate that the emergency response facilities have adequate
,' space, equipment, and supplies to support emergency operations.
. 6. Demonstrate that messages cre accurately logged, status boards
- are maintained and updated, appropriate briefings are held, '
incoming personn'el are briefed, and messages are transmitted in an accurate and timely manner. -
- 7. Demonstrate that the designated official is in charge and in control of the overall response of BRP function in the EOF.
- 8. Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.
- 9. Demonstrate the ability to make appropriate protective action recommendations to OEM for the public based on independent in-plant engineering and effluent release analysis and com' paring those results with the Utility and NRC to obtain a unified PAR.
- 10. Demonstrate the decision process for issuance of Potassium Iodide (KI) with OEM and State Health.
l: -
- 11. Demonstrate the capability of the BRP liaison at the. State EOC to understand PAG recommendations and to report such actions to
- ' the Director of OEM or his designee. .
1.4.3 BRP-Forward Command Post d3RPFCP)
- 1. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate the Forward Command Post in a timely manner.
- 2. Demonstrate the ability of the FCP to mobilize and deploy field monitoring teams in a timely manner.
- 3. Demonstrate that the emergency response facilities have adequate space, equipment and supplies to support emergency operations.
- 4. Maintain staffing at FCP on 24-hour basis including staffing of Field Monitoring Teams, by roster.
- 5. Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate
. locations, organizations, and field personnel.
- 6. Demonstrate the ability to communicate to both BRP-HQ when that station is in command and to the BRPs representative at the EOF when it activates.
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- 7. Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control i l
einergency worker exposure including proper use of personnel -
1 dosimetry in conjunction with the Health Department field- -
representatives. .
l 8. Dem'onstrate the appropriate equipment and procedures for
' determining ambient radiation levels.
- 9. Demonstrate the ability to supply and administer KI, once the decision has been made to do so. ;
- 10. Demonstrate that the designated official is in charge and in
- control of an overall response of the BRP function at the FCP.
- 11. Demonstrate that messages are transmitted in an accurate and timely manner, that messages are properly logged, that status boards are accurately maintained and updated', that appropriate briefings are held, and that incoming personnel are briefed.
1.4.4 Radiological Field Monitoring Teans (RFMT) f
- 1. Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and procedures for.
measurement of airborne radiolodine concentraticas as low as 0.1 picoeuries/cc in the presence of noble gases. . '>
- 2. Demonstrate. the ability to use proper field practices and the proper radiation detection equipment, i.e., SAM-II (scintillators), GM tubes to determine Noble gas and Iodine concentrations within the plume.
- 3. Demonstrate the proper field methods of knowing when you are immersed in a radioactive plume or measuring deposition of a plume that has already passed.
1.4.5 State of New Jersey /Fleid Implementation of Actions to Protect the Public (NJFIELD)
- 1. Demonstrate the resources necessary to manage an orderly -
evacuation of all or part of the 10-mile EPZ.
- 2. Demonstrate that the permanent population has received information on how they will be notified and what their actions .
should be in the event of a radiological emergency and that this .
Information is updated on an annual basis.
- 3. Demonstrate that hformation on . emergency actions has been provided to resident and transient populations.
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9 1.4.6 Joint Media Center (JMC)
- l 1. Demonstrate the ability to - mobilize, staff, and activate State functions at the Joint Media Center in a timely manner.
- 2. Demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing of State functions in the JMC on a 24-hour basis by roster.
- 3. Demonstrate the ability to brief media in a clear, accurate, and timely manner.
- 4. Demonstrate the ability to provide advance coordination of information released.
- 5. Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated manner.
1.4.7 Ocean County Emergency Operations Center (OCEOC)
- 1. Demonstrate that the emergency facilities have adequate space, equipment, and supplies to support emergency operations.
- 2. Demonstrate that the State, counties, and municipalities can s' establish appropriate communication links, both primary and backup systems.
- 3. Demonstrate the ability to receive initial and followup emergency notifications.
- 4. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate the EOC in a timely manner.
- 5. Demonstrate that ability to maintain staffing in the County EOC on ,
24-hour basis (roster only).
- 6. Demonstrate that messages are transmitted in an accurate and j timely manner, messages are properly logged, that status boards are ;
accurately maintained and updated, that appropriate briefings are h' eld, and that incoming personnel are briefed.
I
- 7. Demonstrate the ability of the designated official to determine the I
. need for and the ability to obtain State assistance.
- 8. Demonstrate the ability to activate the prompt notification siren system in coordination with State instructions.
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' 9. Demonstrate the organizational ability to manage an orderly * -
evacuation of all or part of the 10-mile EPZ. .
- 10. Demonstrate the organizational ability to deal with impediments to ,,
evacuation, such as inclement weather or traffic obstructions. .
- 11. Demonstrate ' the organizational ability necessary to effect an ;
orderly . evacuation of schools within the 10-mile EPZ. This
) .
demonstration will be communications procedures only.
- 12. Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.
- 13. Demonstrate the ability to provide - advance coordination of information released.
- 14. Demonstrate that the appropriate official is in charge and in control of an overal2 cooidinated response. -
- 15. Demonstrate the ability to effect an orderly evacuation of onsite
+ personnel.
f 1.4.8 Ocean County Field Implementation of Activities to Protect the Public (OCFIELD)
- 1. Demonstrate the ability to provide backup public alerting procedures, if necessary, in the event of partial stren system failure.
- 2. Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure including proper use of personnel dosimetry.
- 3. Demonstrate the ability to supply and administer KI. If and when i the decision has been made to do so.
I
- 4. D=monstrate adequate equipment and procedures for l
! decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles including adequate provisions for handling contaminated waste.
- 5. Demonstrate the resources necessary to deal with impediments to -
evacuation, such as inclement weather or traffic obstructions.
- 6. Demonstrate the ' resources necessary to effect an orderly -
evacuation of the mobility-impaired individuals within the 10-mile '
EPZ. .
l 11
- 7. Demonstrate the resources necessary to offect an orderly
- evacuatior, of schools within the 10-mile EPZ. This demonstration will be communications procedures only. .
- d. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate Congregate l
- Care Shelter / Decontamination Center in a timely manner.
- 9. Demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing at the Congregate Care Shelter and at the Decontamination Center on a 24-hour basis l (by roster). i
- 10. Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures for registration and j radiological monitoring of evacuees. ;
- 11. Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities for mass care of evacuees.
I 1.4.9 Ocean County Municipal Emergency Operations Centers (OCMEOC)
- 1. Demonstrate the ability to receive initial and followup emergracy notifications.
- 2. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate the i municipal EOCs within the County in a timely manner.
~
- 3. Demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing in the municipal EOCs within the County on a 24-hour basis by roster, g i
- 4. Demonstrate that the emergency response facilities have adequat'e l space, equipment, and supplies to support emergency operations.
- 5. Demonstrate that the State, counties, and municipalities can i establish appropriate communication links, both primary and backup !
systems.
- 6. Demonstrate that the emergency response facilities have adequate access control and that security can be maintained.
- 7. Demonstrate that messages are transmitted in an accurate and timely manner, messages are properly logged, that status boards are accurately maintained and updated, that appropriate briefings are held, and that incoming personnel are briefed.
, 8. Demonstrate that the appropriate official is in charge and in control of an overall coordinated response. . l
- 9. Demonstrate the ability to communicate .with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.
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- 10. Demonstrate the ability of the designated official to determine the need for and the ability to obtain county or State assistance. ,
- 11. Demonstrate the ability to provide backup public alerting ~
procedure, if necessary, in the event of partial siren system fa'ilure.
- 12. Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control erergency worker exposure including proper use of personnel dosimetry.
- 13. Demonstrate the ability to supply and administer KI, once the decision has been made to do so.
- 14. Demonstrate the resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of the mobility impaired individuals within the 10-mile EPZ.
- 15. Demonstrate the resources necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation, such as inclement weather or traffic conditions.
! 16. Demonstrate that traffic control points can be established in a timely manner. -
1.5 EXERCISE SCENARIO ,
1.5.1 Major Sequence of Events on Site i
! .Given below is a listing of exercise events, the approximate. times that they were projected to occur by the scenario, and the actual times that they occurred.
1 Approximate Time Projected by Actually Scenario Occurred Event 1550 NRa Notification of an Unusual Event.
1624 1615- Operator indicates a manual SCRAM. Alert Classification 1745 NR Fire indicated in Reactor Building. .
1750 1745 Site Area Emergency classification. -
1854 NR Loss of aahc accident occurs at Reactor "
Recirculation Pump E.
1905 1903 P >tification of General Emergency classification.
- - - ~ '
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13 Approximate Time ,
- Projected by Actually Scenario Occurred Event 1910 1914 Radioactive release begins via SBGTS. This release continues for two days with a decreasing source term.
2150 NR Break for two day time advance.
2330 NR Compress time two day advance.
2330 2300 Recovery plan developed. End of Exercise.
aExact time not rexrted.
1.5.2 Scenario Summary The OCNGS is operating at 90% power having operated continuously between 75% and 100% power for the past six (6) months. All systems are operating normally with the exception of the Core Spray Systsm I, which has been out of service for the past four (4) days and the AOG is bypassed. A power ascension is in progress at the request of the System Operator, the wind is present1[r out of the Northeast at 5 mph. ,
There is a loss of feedwater heating transient when the main instrument air line of the main Turbine extraction relay dump valve ruptures. This causes a loss of air to the feedwater heater extraction steam reverse flow check valves and moisture removal valves which results in a reduction in feedwater temperature to the reactor. Reactor power increases from 90% to 108% of rated power and fuel clad perforations occur.
Recirculation flow must be decreased to its minimum control point and control rods must be inserted to return power below the rod block setpoint. Power is now 65%.
The air ejector off-gas monitor begins to show an increase of fission products released to the reactor coolant. The off-gas activity increased by more an 666 mr/hr within 30 minutes resulting in a declaration of an Unusual Event (Time approximately 1540).
The off-gas activity climbs to 15,000 mr/hr which initiates an automatic closure of the off-gas discharge valve, V-7-31, after a 15 minute time delay. This forces the operator to initiate a manual SCRAM. An . Alert classification is declared (time approximately 1615).
All systems operate normally during the reactor SCRAM, the turbine - Generator is shut down and electrical loads transfer normally.
It is Cecided that the containment should be purged to allow for a dry well entry
. and Vessel Head removal to inspect the fuel. As the purge begins, indications of a fire in the Reactor Building are received in the control room. The fire _ is on the Reactor
' ' 14 Building at 23'6" elevation in MCC-1AB2. The fire is brought under control in a short time with no injuries. A Site Area ' Emergency is declared per EP1P-1, " Fire affecting the function of any plant safety system" (Time approximately 1750). :
During the fire and prior to the deenergization of MCC-1AB-2, the loads fed by this MCC begin to spuriously operate. The Reactor Water Clean Up System and both l Isolation Condensers will isolate and will not return to service due to loss of control.
l Reactor pressure begins to increase and can only be controlled by manual operation of the EMRV's.
After a number of cycles of the EMRV's a loss of coolant accident is experienced on the suction side of Reactor Recirculation Pump E. The LOCA results in high dry well i pressure, decreasing reactor water level and initiation of all safety systems. All drywell isolation valves are required to shut. The Cleanup System Inlet Valve V-16-1 had previously failed to close and the Drywell Vent Valve V-27-1 failed to close completely.
Based on plant conditions a General Emergency is declared at approximately 1905 per EP1P-1 " Loss of 2 of 3 fission product barriers with protected loss of the third.
As the reactor water level decreases below the top of the fuel, hydrogen builds
- up in the drywell due to Zirconium water reaction. The level builds to explosive l
concentrations, then explodes. This damages the drywell and causes a release in Secondary Containment and subsequently to the Stack via SBGTS. The known activity at the stack will result in Protective Actions recommendations being made to evacuate out . :
to (5) miles downwind. This release to the atmosphere will continue for two (2) days with a decreasing source term. '
t A two-day compression will be used so that the EOF can interface with the State
- and County on area restriction plans. (Time approximately 2250) Recovery Plan developed (Time 2330) 1.5.3 Description of State and Local Resources 1.5.3.1 Concept of Operations and Control of the Exercise The licensee and the State of New Jersey were to supply official referees or observers for each location where an emergency response is being demonstrated for the exercise. Before the exercise, the referees and observers were to be provided with the appropriate locations, maps, time periods, guidelines, and an evaluation checklist for their exercise assignments.
The exercise initiating events were to be controlled by the lead controller at OCNGS. Hypothesized initiating events consisted of four types of information: (1) data "
provided to control room personnel by the lead controller or his designee, (2) data ~
provided to OCNGS personnel concerning environmental (e.g., area, air, primary coolant, surfaces) and plant systems radioactivity, (3) on-site and off-site dose rate data (simulated gamma and lodine dose rate measurements) provided to the site, state, and -
county monitoring teams by referees, and (4) initiating events for off-site participants,-
_. _ _ - ~ . . . - , _._,_ - _ . _ .
15 supplied by referees or observers. The lead controller had the authority to determine the
!,' time sequence of these initiating events to ensure an orderly and logical flow of exercise
- events. All other actions during the exercise were to occur as free play responses by the o licensee, state, county, and municipal participants to the initiating events.
As the initiating events were provided to the station staff, they were to determine - the nature of the emergency and implement the appropriate station emergency plan procedures. These procedures were expected to include a determination of the emergency classification in accordance with NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1.
After the emergency classification had been determined, the appropriate federal, state, i
county, and municipal authorities were to be notified in accordance with the emergency plan procedures.
Upon notification of the hypothesized emergency at OCNGS, the state, county, and municipalities were to complete their initial notifications and activation of f emergency facilities in accordance with their emergency plans and procedures. I The hypothesized emergency was to continue to develop as data were provided to the control room personnel by the lead controller. As the situation developed, follow-up informat!on was to be forwarded to the New Jersey State EOC and the BRP. The BRP was to analyze the information and recommend protective action as they would in an actual emergency. Whern information would normally have been confirmed by an
- - independent source, such as National Weather Service for weather data, the confirmation data were to be obtained. if the confirmation data conflicted with the hypothesized data provided by the site, the hypothesized data were to be used for accident assessment.
Any inconsistencies in the initiating events were to be questioned by the state accident assessment team as they would be in a real emergency.
Certain inconsistencies, such as plume width, release duration, the technical reason for the simulated release, may have been required to test the capabilities of the licensee, state, county, and municipalities to the maximum extent feasible in a limited time frame. if an inconsistency was known or determined to be intentional, then the accident assessment group was to note the inconsistency and ignore it. The lead controller hvi the authority to resolve or explain any inconsistencies or problems that may have occurred during the exercise.
With the exception of the aforementioned inconsistencies and the end of the emergency, whicli is discussed later, the internal operations of the licensee, state, county, and municipal command centers were ta be identical with their intended operation in a real emergency.
1.5.3.2 Emergency Response Implementation and Operations Initial Notification
,. Initial notification was to be performed in accordance with procedures specified
. In the radiological emergency plans.
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Activation of Facilities
- Activation of state, county, and municipal EOCs and staffing of the EOCs by -
emergency response personnel were to occur in accordance with procedures specified in the emergency plans. "
Activation of the EOF GPU Nuclear Corp. personnel were to activate the EOF. Activation and operation of the EOF was to be in accordance with the emergency plan procedures.
l Normal travel times to the EOF by its staff may have been compressed and staffing may have been permitted one-half hour after the decision to activate.
Public Notification The first request to activate EBS was to be for the actual broadcast of a test message of the Oyster Creek Radiological Emergency Broadcast System. All messages during the exercise were to be prepared and forwarded to the EBS gateway station, WADB, in accordance with standard procedures. Except for the test message, all exercise EBS messages were to be prefaced by explicit instructions not to broadcast, but I
to log the message content and time of receipt.
The procedures for public alerting were to be demonstrated by activation of the , ,
siren system in conjunction with the broadcast of the EBS message.
Public Information '
e Press releases to the media were.to be made in accordance with the respective i emergency plans,.via the normal press release methods. The press releases were to contain all necessary information on the current status of the exercise.
Communications l Communications between the exercise participants were to occur in accordance i with the procedures of the emergency response plan. Should any primary communication i path become inoperative or prove inadequate, backup means of communication were to j be used as appropriate.
Mobilization of Emergency Workers l All emergency response agencies were responsible for ensuring that their resources were actually deployed in adequate numbers to provide a reasonable test of their notification, mobilization, command, coordination, and communications capabilities. Except as noted below, all state, county, and municipal agencies were to have total authority in determining the degree of mobilization and deployment of their -
resources, consistent with this intent. The decision to actually deploy resources may have -
been made at the time of the exercise. .
e m . . m -
17 When the use of an agency's resources was simulated, the agency was responsible
- for ensuring that all steps necessary to use the resources were demonstrated. For
'~
example, for an agency to demonstrate the activation of additional personnel, it was necessary to locate the required call list and to either complete or simulate the calls.
Then the mobilization time had to be realistically estimated and this estimate forwarded i
- to the appropriate agencies. Use of a resource was to have been demonstrated only_ after the estimated mobilization time had elapsed. In addition, when a resource was I
demonstrated, the command and control was also to have been demonstrated. All demonstrations were to be carried out to the greatest extent possible, in order to determine the need for additional resources such as those used for command, control, and dose record maintenance.
Total counts of emergency workers deployed and those that were hypothesized to have been deployed were to be maintained. Information regarding which personnel movements were real and which were hypothesized was to be readily available at all times.
The following provides a minimum list of person'nel and resources that were to be deployed by the state and local governments to demonstrate. their capabilities. Also i provided are specific demonstration objectives for hypothesized emergency responses.
Traffic Control Points (TCPs)
A Federal evaluator was to provide information to a municipal Emergency Management Coordinator (EMC) on the location of traffic control points to be f demonstrated during the course of the exercise. The municipal EMC was then to request
- the demonstration of the TCP activation.
1
- Impediments to Evacuation Federal evaluators were to introduce free play events to test procedures for
, removal of impediments for evacuation routes. This demonstration was to include the actual dispatch of a police or other emergency vehicle to the scene, report from the scene to the EOC requesting appropriate resources, identification of the EOC requesting I
appropriate resources (e.g., tow truck, public works equipment) estimating the time of arrival at the scene and for clearing the impediment. EOC staff was expected to quickly analyze the situation and select an alternate evacuatica route, if required. in addition, an appropriate EBS message should have been issued to inform the population about the j impediment (s).
. Bus Evacuation Routes Federal evaluators indicated which bus routes were to be demonstrated during the exercise. Upon notification by the state, the bus drivers would assemble at their normal dispatch location, be assigned appropriate routes, briefed and deployed in accordance with the appropriate procedures. Upon completion of routes to the
. appropriate congregate care centers, the buses and drivers would then be secured.
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18 Evacuation of Non-Institutionalized Mobility-Impaired Federal evaluators were to select several addresses for mobility-impaired '
persons in Ocean County. A vehicle for the transportation of the mobility-impaired was -
to be dispatched to these addresses for simulated evacuation. No mobility-impaired 4 evacuees were to be picked up for purposes of this demonstration.
Back-up Notification System The federal evaluation team leader at the Ocean County EOC was to introduce free pts, simulating a limited failure of the siren system. It was expected that local governments would demonstrate an effective use of the back-up notification system (e.g., route alerting). .
Decontamination Center i Ocean County was to set up one d.e contamination center. During the exercise, 1 emergency workers were to check out through the center after they had completed their exercise participation. At the decontamination center, any actions that may have '
, damaged property were to be avoided. All necessary equipment was to be assembled at the decontamination center and its use was to be demonstrated. Detailed demonstration l actions were to be implemented at the center by the decontamination center leader.
Congregate Care Shelter Two congregate care shelters were to be opened and staffed in accordance with -
the emergency plans. Supplies required for long-term mass care, such as cots, blankets, and food, need not have been acquired or brought to the shelters. However, the shelter and registration personnel were to obtain estimates on how many evacuees would be arriving had the exercise been a real emergency. The shelter and registration personnel
- were then to estimate supplies required for the potential evacuees, locate sources for the required supplies, and determine the means for transporting the supplies.
Monitoring Teams The State of New Jersey was to field two (2) radiological monitoring teams and Ocean County was to field two teams.* Each of the teams were to be accompanied by a controller, who would provide simulated field data for determining local dose rate readings. These teams however, were to be equipped for determining actual area gamma -
dose rates and airborne radioiodine concentrations.
Data for the environmental samples and dosimeter readings were to be supplied l by a controller at the appropriate time. The monitoring teams were not to be suited up in anticontamination clothing, but were to have such equipment at their disposal. .
- The county teams were to use this exercise for training, and their actions were not to be evaluated. f i
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19 Volunteer Organisations The members of volunteer organizations, e.g., firemen and rescue squads, have responsibilities that take precedence over their participation in an exercise. Therefore, these volunteer organizations were to participate in their emergency responsibilities on
- an as-available basis. Because the exercise plume was to affect specific areas, volunteer personnel in that area were to be notified in advance of their special role in this exercise, in order to maximize their participation.
Exercise Termination The exercise was to end with the following actions:
e Emergency workers were to be secured as soon as possible after
)
they had demonstrated their capabilities. The decision to secure them was to be made at their controlling EOCs, with concurrence from the state EOC, if applicable. Emergency workers were to be i directed to check out through decontamination centers. Radio-logical exposure records were to be completed for each emergency j worker in accordance with the standard operating procedures.
e The decontamination center and the congregate care shelter center I
' ' ' were to be secured as soon as all emergency workers and volunteers
. had checked out through these centers.
1 ,
e-e Participation of nonessential state, county,. and municipal EOC personnel was to be ended as soon as their entergency response had been essentially completed. Reducing EOC staff to those responsible for long-term planning and recovery was to have the concurrence of the state EOC director or designee.
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- I 2 EXERCISE EVALUATION !
.- 2.1 NEW JERSEY firATE OPERATIONS 2.1.1 State EOC Overview The New Jersey State Police Headquarters in West Trenton was notified of an alert at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS) at approximately 1615.
This message, as well as_ sutnequent updates, was received and verified in a timely MSW. th's &wgutL3 the exercise objective (SEOC 1) regarding emergency notifickun
. Notification of the EOC staff and state agencies was completed by approximately 1627 and the EOC was operational by approximately 1643. This met one of the exercise objectives (SEOC 2). Additionally, a good capability for 24-hour 3
continuous staffing was demonstrated by the presentation of a roster (SEOC 3). The i staff present appeared adequately trained and knowledgeable of their responsibilities.
. The State OEM Deputy Director was clearly in charge and in control of an over-all coordinated response. He demonstrated effective leadership at the State EOC, sat-isfying an exercise objective (SEOC 6). The State EOC procedures for mobilizing the
resources of Federal agencies were demonstrated, thus meeting another objective (SEOC 8).
l . As in the past, communications equipment and procedures were gen'erally good.
Commercial telephones were used as primary systems of communication between the State EOC and the Ocean County EOC. Backup communication systems included the 2 Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service radios (RACES), NJSP radio, Emergency Management Radio (EMRAD), and the National Warning System (NAWAS). A dedicated telephone line to the Ocean County EOC was available in the operations room.
! Communication between the SEOC and the NJSP FCP were conducted by dedicated telephone line. A commercial telephone was used as a backup on one occa-s:cn. These activities adequately demonstrated the exercise objective (SEOC 4) regarding communications systems.
Communication with the field personnel was also demonstrated effectively, satisfying another objective (SEOC 7). This communication was carried out via radio, exhibiting improvement over the last exercise.
The SEOC and the SPFCP both demonstrated that messages were transmitted
- and logged in a timely manner. Status boards were maintained quite well, and updated regularly with appropriate information. In both locations, staff were fully informed of
', the exercise status. These actions effectively demonstrated exercise objective SEOC 5.
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b 22 SEOC l l
l The New Jersey State EOC demonstrated an adequate capability to protect the )
public. Protective action decisions were coordinated with utility recommendations, ,
Independent recommendations from the accident assessment group, and a variety of off- '
site considerations. These protective action recommendations were promptly com-
- municated to the public, satisfying objective SEOC 9. 1 The SEOC demonstrated an adequate capability for public alerting and notification. The system for disseminating information to the public via Emergency .
i Broadcast System (EBS) was effective. The PIO activated the EBS by calling WADB, the primary EBS station, via a dedicated telephone line. The PIO had a complete set of ;
prewritten EBS messages, that included numerically-coded descriptions of evacuation areas within the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ. With this system, the primary EBS station can quickly identify which EBS message,to broadcast and the possibility of a misunderstanding is minimized. Hard copy of all EBS messages were transmitted via l telefax to the gateway EBS station for confirmation. This demonstrated the objectives to coordinate public alerting (SEOC 10 and 13). ,
The gateway EBS station, WADB, automatically activated five other radio stations and the cable television station for the simultaneous broadcast of EBS messages.
The state PIO reported that an EBS test message was broadcast by the six radio stations ,
at 1803,1808, and hourly thereafter throughout the exercise. The EOC received timely i confirmation of both the siren sounding and EBS system activation. This prompt confirmation corrects a deficiency noted at the 1982 exercise. Management of . .
coordinated siren activation and EBS broadcasts, which was included in two of the exercise objectives (SEOCs 11 and 14), was effectively demonstrated. The strens were
~
activated at 1801,'immediately followed by the EBS message at 1803. The Coast Guard Station in Barnegat Light was alerted by the State OEM and prepared to alert the public within the water part of the 10-mile EPZ. The exercise objective (SEOC 12) to
^
disseminate aa initial instructional message to the public within 15 minutes of the Governor's decision was accomplished.
In addition, the EBS message was effectively received and monitored at the SEOC, correcting another deficiency from a previous exercise. The actual EBS messages could have been clearer in a few cases. For instance, the rumor control telephont -
i number was used in only one EBS-message during the exercise; EBS messages should consistently include or exclude this information. EBS messages should refer to public education brochures; EBS #2 should clarify that the release was on-site; and EBS #3 should refer to " previous message" rather than "EBS #2."
Individuals were interviewed from a sample of 14 facilities as part of the i
exercise to gather data and information on tone alert receivers. The sample was derived from the revised Ocean County Plan (9 facilities) and from a list prepared by the utility (5 facilities). The list included 9 schools, 3 school superintendant offices, one hospital, and one sheriff's office. Six of these facilities had tone alert receivers available. At ,
these six facilities, there was, in general, knowledge of operating and maintenance ,
procedures. Eight of the facilities did not hsve tone alert receivers.
Limited data is available as to whether the tone alert receivers functioned .
properly at approximately 10:05 a.m. on June 6,1985 (out of sequence with the l
__ . _ ~ .
23 SEOC scenario). In the Lacey Township School District, five tone alert receivers are in place
, and three did not function on June 6.
Following a projection of high lodine content, the BRP representative at the EOF recommended use of potassium iodide (KI) for emergency workers. The BRP llals'on at
- the State EOC passed this information on to the Department of Health (DOH), and a valid technical discussion followed. The New Jersey DOH approved the use of KI by emergency workers in a timely manner. This demonstrated the exercise objectives to implement the decision to issue KI (SEOC 16), and for the BRP and DOH to coordinate the decision to administer KI(SEOC 17).
The objectives to demonstrate the decision-making process and means to.
Implement a decision to authorize excess exposure to emergency workers in excess of general public PAGs (SEOC 15 and 18) were not evaluated because whole body exposure levels were not projected high enough to warrant action by the exercise players. Thus, these objectives were not demonstrated for this exercise. The objective to. demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor emergency worker exposure control (SEOC 19) was not evaluated by the observer because the State EOC is not located within the plume '
EPZ, thus demonstration of this activity is not necessary. The objective to demonstrate knowledge of PARS and to communicate the information from the BRP representative at the EOF to the OEM staff at the State EOC (SEOC 20) could not be observed and thus was not evaluated at the State EOC.
- ~
Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed at the SEOC during this exercise. -
Other Deficieneles
- 1. Deficiency: The rumor control telephone number was not included in all of the EBS messages.
Recommendation: Determine whether the rumor control telephone number is to be included as part of EBS messages and follow consistent procedures with regard to this policy for all EBS messages. Also, consider including reference to public information brochures in EBS messages.
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24 BRP-EOF 2.1.2 New Jersey Bureau of Radiation Protection - Emergency Operations Facility (BRPEOF)
The Bureau of Radiation Protection Headquarters (BRP-HQ) was activated and [f
,j staffed in a timely manner. Communleation channels were opened and maintained with l
the field teams en route to their locations via radio. Reception was clear and com- -l '
munications were continuous, thus accomplishing exercise objective BRPEOF 1.
l j The BRP-HQ also demonstrated its ability to be in charge until the EOF /NJBRP was activated, fulfilling objective BRPEOF 2. BRP-HQ received the alert notification at j
1617. The BRP staff assembled in the BRP conference. room, was briefed as to plant status, meteorological data, etc. Based on this data, field monitoring teams and accident l
assessment teams were dispatched, and the call list to contiguous states and other field i agencies was completed.
] During the period of transit to the EOF and BRP Forward Command Post (FCP),
- the field teams were updated via radio. Staff at the BRP office in West Trenton, New Jersey communicated with command and control and kept them informed of the need for protective actions. When the staff arrived at the EOF and took command, the BRP-HQ shifted its location to the State EOC.
State functions at the EOF were activated in a timely manner, with full staffing being in place within 90 minutes of the declaration of the alert emergency classification - -
level. The BRP functions at the EOF were operational and the OEM liaison had arrived
- prior to this time. This met the objective (BRPEOF 3) concerning activation of the EOF. -
- The BRP demonstrated the ability to maintain staffing at the EOF by presenta-l tion of a roster which included titles and names of the second shift staffing at the EOF, FCP, and the State EOC. Exercise objective BRPEOF 4 was thus accomplished.
Space at the EOF allocated for BRP use was adequate, although somewhat limited considering the number of BRP staff present. The equipment and supplies were sufficient with the exception of outside telephone lines. Several telephone problems
- occurred during the exercise. The ring down telephone between the plant, EOF and Trenton BRP headquarters, which was operational initially, failed; another telephone was
- only operational for incoming calls. The additional telephone line apparently used during previous drills was not available. These problems resulted in objective BRPEOF 5 being only partially met.
The initial responding BRP personnel obtained available Information from the
{ utility Environmental Assessment Command Center (EACC) staff promptly and compre-hensive briefings for the later arriving staff were held. During the exercise, the State
- Radiological Assessment Officer (SRAO) held several briefings of his staff so that all BRP were fu::y informed of the status of the emergency. Information was transmitted to *,
the FCP and the BRP representative at the state EOC on a regular basis. The projected '
l plume was plotted and as field data became available it was placed on the plume plot map. One display board on plant status which is an aid in decision-making was initially .
used, but was not kept up to date, resulting in an objective (BRPEOF 6) being only .
partially met. The board also should be reworded to simplify interpretation of the plant status.
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25 BRP-EOF The SRAO was in control for most of the exercise, however, at one point during
- the Site Area Emergency classification, based on his analysis of the situation, the SRAO
,- decided that a precautionary sheltering PAR would be appropriate. However, he did not ,
i communicate this recommendation to OEM via the BRP representative at the State EOC.
The objective (BRPEOF 7) concerning control of the overall response of BRP functions in the EOF was only partially met.
Commercial telephone was the primary method for routine contacting other locations (i.e., Forward Command Post, State EOC). There was a back-up radio available l
and operational to contact the BRP representative at the FCP, if needed. On several
! occasions there was considerable delay (up to 20 minutes) in contacting the BRP representative at the State EOC by commercial phone, thus the objective (BRPEOF 8) 3 was partially me,t.
The BRP staff at the EOF used two independent computer-based doae projection models for the projection of potential dose to the public. Plant status information was obtained from the utility as it became available by BRP nuclear engineers and this information was included in the PAR decision process. During the early stages of the exercise, there were delays in obtaining plant status information due to the fact that the ,
utility does not fully activate the EOF with a nuclear engineer until the Site Area 1 Emergency classification.
The use of field teams to verify dose projections was not efficient. Information i flow from field teams needed to verify the dose projections was slow. This was due to the fact that the field teams were not used effectively to obtain this information for an e - extended period of time. While the preliminary or initial assessment of potential dose i projection of both the utility and BRP Indicated extremely high offsite doses, the subsequent computer-based, projections were considerably lower. The GPU dose projection methodology may need to be revised following a review. The field teams, if effectively used, could have made confirmatory measurements without receiving excessive radiation exposure. Furthermore, if. additional reactor status information contained in the scenario had been transmitted to the EOF, the caliber of protective action decisions would have improved. Thus, the objective concerning protective action recommendations (BRPEOF 9) was only partially met.
The BRP staff at the EOF promptly requested approval to use KI for emergency workers as soon as it became clear that there was a potential for a large radiolodine release. The BRP field personnel were informed promptly when the DOH approved the use of KI, thus meeting objective BRPEOF 10.
The BRP Liaison Officer at the State EOC was stationed near the command and -
control center, eliminating any delay in the presentation of protective action recommendations to the Deputy State Director. The BRP Liaison Officer passed information directly to the Deputy State Director, and communication between these two was prompt and effective. Objective BRPEOF 11, therefore, was accomplished. l 4
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26 BRP-EOF i
Defleiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding There were no deficiencies that 'vould lead to a negative finding related to BRP .
operations during this exercise. .
Other Deficiencies -
- 1. Deficiency: Emergency response facility did not have enough tele-phone lines to support emergency operations.
Recommendation: Utilize the additional telephone line which was
- apparently available during drills. Identify and resolve the problem with the ring down telephone.
- 2. Deficiency: One display board on plant status, which is an aid in decision making, was initially used but was not kept up to date.
Recommendatiom If the plant status display board is to be retained, it must be kept current so as not to be misleading.
Additionally, this board should be reworded to simplify inter-pretation of the status of the plant.
- 3. Deficiency: The designated official at the EOF was not clearly in charge of communicating PARS to 0,EM for implementation. .
Recommendation: The BRP SRAO at the EOF should be clearly in charge of communicating PARS to OEM for implementation.
- 4. Deficiency: On several occasions there was considerable delay in contacting the BRP representative at the State EOC by com-mercial telephone.
i Recommendation: Identify the cause of the delay in contacting the BRP representative at the State EOC by commercial telephone l and implement a method to avoid repeat occurrences of delays in making these contacts. l S. Deficiency: During the early stages of the exercise, there were delays in obtaining plant status information due to the fact that i the utility does not fully activate the EOF with a nuclear engineer l until the Site Area Emergency classification.
r
- Recommendation
- The State should arrange with the utility to ~
have the utility augment the initial EOF staffing by adding one l
nuclear engineer so that the BRP staff will be able to obtain plant .
status information as soon as BRP arrives at the EOF. .
l
27 BRP-EOF
- 6. Deficiency: Field teams were not used effectively to obtain
- Information needed to verify dose projections for an extended period of time.
Recommendation: The field teams must be effectively used to
- define the plume with respect to both size and strength. Several measurements of the plume strength should be made at or near plume centerline, as determined by measurements, .so that the projections can be verified or modified as necessary. By this verification process, PARS can be adjusted accordingly.
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l 2.1.3 BRP-Forward Command Post (BRPFCP)
Activation and staffing of the Bureau of Radiation Protection Forward Command ;
Post (BRP-FCP) at the Berkeley Public Safety Center was accomplished in a timely
- manner, meeting one of the exercise objectives BRPFCP 1. The FCP was operational with partial staffing by approximately 1745. A shift change at the FCP was not demon- l strated, but a call list was provided to demonstrate 24-hour staffing capability (BRPFCP 4).
The field monitoring teams were mobilized within 30 minutes of FCP activation (satisfying BRPFCP 2), but their deployment awaited arrival of the county moniteing teams who were in transit.
Messages at the FCP were properly logged, and status boards were accurately maintained and updated. Periodic briefings were held to keep personnel up to date.
These actions satisfied exercise objective BRPFCP 11, and cleared up a deficiency from a pre'lous exercise. However, the status board listing protective actions, and the map showing emergency planning areas were, not always visible.
I The FCP had both radic and telephone contact with BRP-HQ and the EOF. A single person isolated from the operations room and radio noise, transmitted all information to the EOF and received messages. This system worked well satisfying objective BRPFCP 6. , ,
Overall, personnel were knowledgeable in 'the proper use of dosimetry. They were welt equipped with low and high range dosimeters, and knew how to read them. -
These readings were taken every half hour. However, not all field personnel were equipped with TLD badges. Additionally, some field workers did not know what the maximum allowable dose was for emergency worker exposure without authorization.
Thus, objective BRPFCP 7 was not completely met.
The equipment supplied to the teams had been recently calibrated and was operational when tested, thus correcting a previous defielency.
The message to simulate the administration of KI was sent to the field teams as soon as this recommendation was received at the FCP. The teams were equipped with an l
adequate supply of KI, satisfying an exercise objective (BRPFCP 9).
f Control of the FCP operations was handled by an individual from the state l emergency response division. He consulted with the health physics representative and the health representative as appropriate. He was clearly in charge, satisfying the objective (BRPFCP 10). .
Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding .
There were no deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding observed at the BRP F- vard Command Post during this exercise.
1 l
29 BRP-FCP l I
i Other Deficieneles l Deficiency: Some emergency workers did not have TLD badges. !
.' 1.
Recommendation: Regular briefings should be given to emergency field workers to assure that proper use of dosimeters and record keeping of doses are applied.
- 2. Deficiency: Some emergency workers were unfamiliar with the maxlmum exposure allowed without proper authorization.
Recommendation: Emergency workers should be trained to know the maximum exposure levels at which they will be required to notify their supervisor and be authorized to receive additional exposure if necessary.
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- 30 - RPMT 2.1.4 Radiological-Field Monitoring Teams (RFMT)
The New Jersey BRP' activated and deployed the radiological field-monitoring .
teams in a timely manner. Two field-monitoring teams were evaluated during the -
exercise. The state monitoring teams are to be mobilized as follows:
. a) The utility notifies the New Jersey State Police at West Trenton of a possible radioactive release situation.
b) The State Police Headquarters notifies the BRP.
c) The BRP then notifies the officials in charge of the state radiation-monitoring teams.
d) The official then notifies each individual team member.
Equipment for both teams was in good condition, and capable of measuring radiciodine as low as 0.1 picoeuries/cc in the presence of noble gases, satisfying an exercise objective (RFMT 1). Actual air sampling was simulated due to the adverse weather conditions.
The field monitoring teams demonstrated their ability to use open and closed GM detector readings to determine the plume location, as well as the appropriate field . .
sample collection procedures and counting methods to determine the presence of radioiodine. This satisfied an exercise objective (RFMT 2), and corrected a previous deficiency.
! The field teams used open and closed detector readings to enable them to differentiate whether they were in the plume. Measurements at three feet and ground l
level, in conjunction with open and closed window readings, were used tor determining j
ground deposition. Thus, the exercise objective (RFMT 3) was satisfied.
Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding There were no deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding observed at the-Radiological Field Monitoring Teams during this exercise.
Other Deficiencies There were no other deficiencies observed at the Radiological Field Monitoring Teams during this exercise.
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l 31 NJFIELD 2.1.5 State of New Jersey /Fleid Implementations of Actions to Protect the Public (NJFIELD)
The resources demonstrated in the field were adequate to manage an orderly i
,' evacuation of the 10-mile EPZ. Two evacuation teams participated, and both performed
. quite well. The bus drivers and state troopers were familiar with the evacuation route and pick up points, satisfying the exercise objective (NJFIELD 1). It was suggested by one bus driver to improve the maps by including street name and number on route sheet, indicating mileage between points on map, siting landmarks, and improving quality of the maps.
The state, working jointly with the utility has provided the emergency information material to permanent residents and for the transient population. This information includes brochures, placards and advertisement in weekly newspapers.
Despite these efforts, most people interviewed in a limited sample were unfamiliar with emergency information. Specifically, some residents did not know that if the sirens sounded, they are supposed to tune to an EBS station for further information. In addition, hotels did not have appropriate emergency information available in the lobby or in rooms.
Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding i .
There were no deficiencies observed at this exercise that would lead to a negat_ive finding of the State of New Jersey /Fleid Implementation Actions to Protect the Public.
Other Deficiencies
- 1. Deficiency: Despite the public education efforts undertaken by the state and utility, the public awareness concerning radiological .
emergency procedures appears to be low.
Recommendation: The State working jointly with the utility should explore additional avenues to educate the public about the meaning I of the siren signal, Emergency Planning Areas, and protective action options. This could be accomplished by placing an advertisement in telephone directories, including the information in calendars, posting road signs, and making radio and TV announcements. .
O 1
32 JMC. ,
2.1.6 Joint Media Center (JMC) .
The Joint Media Center was established at the Toms River Elks Club in Toms *
' River. The mobilization of the staff was timely, meeting exercise objective JMC 1. "
Representatives from the following organizations were present:
e Governor's Office e State Office of Emergene" Management e Ocean County e General Public Utilities (GPU)
The ability to maintain staffing of state functions at the Media Center on a 24-hour basis was demonstrated by the presentation of a coster listing trained personnel for -
all functions. This satisfied an exercise objective (JMC 2).
Each individual demonstrated the ability to present a clear, accurate briefing, satisfying an objective (JMC 3). On two occasions, however, the Ocean County PIO gave' incorrect information to the press. This individual should become more familiar with the county plan so he can provide accurate information to the media.
Diagrams and maps were posted in the press briefing room and were referenced during the briefings, thus correcting a previous deficiency. -
e For the most part, information released to the press was coordinated in advance.
There was, however, one exception. At 2005, an EBS message stated that a release had occurred and evacuation plans were implemented. However, when the press questioned them, the PIOS were unable to give any additional information other than reading the message.
Overall, the PIO staff performed well in most other circumstances.' On one occasion, erroneous data regarding dose rates were sent from the state to the JMC in a news release and was challenged by PIO personnel. They recogn'Ized the problem and prevented this news release from being alred to the public. Their overall actions accom-plished the exercise objective (JMC 4) concerning advanced coordination of information released.
Each News Release and EBS message which was sent through the telefax was automatically verified at the State EOC by the machine, clearing up a past deficiency.
The rumor control number was activated throughout the exercise. The JMC received very few calls, and most of these were forwarded to the State EOC at the 800 number which appears in the brochure., This meets an exercise objective (JMC 5).
e
_ - - - - . , _ _ _ - - - , - . . , , - - , ,..wm__..,,,--,m ,_ ,,. . . . -.. ., _ . __, - . . , . , _ , . _ . , . . _ _ , . ~ , _ _ .
33 JMc Defleiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding
- There were no deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding observed at the. ;
Joint Media Center during this exercise.
Other Deficiencies There were no other deficiencies observed at the Joint Media Center during this exercise.
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34 OCEOC 2.2 OCEAN COUNTY OPERATIONS .
2.2.1 Ocean County Emergency Operations Center (OCEOC) ,
The Ocean County Sheriffs Communication Division (OCSCD) serves as the .
Ocean County Warning Point. The OCSCD has been relocated to new improved facilities ,
since the last exercise. The new facility is located in a spacious dedicated room with partitioned sound-proof offices that will allow for meetings that will not interfere with the communication activity. The communication room has three communication panels that are currently operational with ample additional space for two more panels. The panels are spaced far enough apart and in such a configuration as to prevent noise inter-i ference with each other. The room is well lighted and is equipped with backup power.
Each communication panel is established to provide current state-of-the-art communi-cation with Police, Fire and EMS radio networks, EMRAD radio and commercial tele- ,
phone. A status board was available and was utilized to display the current Emergency Classification Level (ECL) as notification of the level was received from the State EOC.
Emergency response facilities at the Ocean County Warning Point have adequate space,
- equipment, and supplies to support emergency communication (OCEOC 1).
} The Ocean County Emergency Operations Center (OCEOC) demonstrated
]
excellent capability to communicate with the designated state, and county municipal crganizations satisfying an exercise objective (OCEOC 2). The communication cap-abilities included a SECURE radio system dedicated to the Offlee of Emergency Management (OEM), an emergency network to communicate with the Radiological Moni- . . ,
toring Teams and EMRAD communication to all local EOCs with the exception .of Stafford Township. The OCEOC communicated with Stafford Township on a 2 Meter l
radio frequency band because the Stafford EOC was recently relocated and has not had an opportunity to connect with EMRAD. The OCEOC communication capability also included Fire Band, Emergency Medical Services Band and twelve telephone lines, half of which were dedicated for incoming calls while the other half were dedicated for outgoing messages.
The Notification of an Unusual Event was received from the New Jersey Emergency Operation Center at the OCSCD at approximately 1612 hours0.0187 days <br />0.448 hours <br />0.00267 weeks <br />6.13366e-4 months <br />, approximately 20 minutes after the State was notified. The notification was received over a dedicated i communications line and was verified using standard operating procedures. All
[ subsequent notifications of the event were completed to emergency response personnel l within approximately eleven minutes. The OCSCD communications officer verified the j
notification of the Unusual Event with the state OEM at the State Police Headquarters in 1 West Trenton, New Jersey. State and County OEM procedures have been revised since the last exercise and personnel at the OCSCD are aware of notification and verification procedures for the Unusual Event. .
The notification of the Alert level was received at the OCSCD at approximately .
1631 hours0.0189 days <br />0.453 hours <br />0.0027 weeks <br />6.205955e-4 months <br />. Following this notification the OCSCD notification to all municipalities and
- I primary county response personnel was completed within ten minutes. All designated '
agencies were notified of the Alert within a thirty minute period following notification l
1
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35 OCEOC to the OCSCD. The police, fire and EMO organizations were notified via plecktron pagers equipped for receipt of voice transmission. -
During the entire portion of the exercise beginning with the Notification of Unusual Event through the Alert notification, Ocean County demonstrated the ability to receive initial and followup emergency notifications in a timely manner (OCEOC 3).
The Ocean County EOC was activated at 1638 hours0.019 days <br />0.455 hours <br />0.00271 weeks <br />6.23259e-4 months <br /> approximately seven minutes after the OCSCD received the Alert notification. Upon notification from the OCSCD, county staff and the designated agency representatives promptly reported to the Ocean County EOC thereby demonstrating the ability to mobilize staff and activate the EOC in a timely manner (OCEOC 4).
The OCEOC was well-staffed with the appropriate emergency response i organizations and agencies including:
o County OEM e Department of Health e Sheriffs Department e Civil Air Patrol e American Red Cross e Education
> - o Salvation Army e Prosecutor e Fire Coordinator e Road Department Staff representing the above agencies at the OCEOC had rosters of backup personnel that could be called upon to maintain the staffing of the OCEOC during a prolonged emergency on a 24-hour basis (OCEOC 5).
The objective (OCEOC 6) was met to demonstrate that messages are transmitted in an accurate and timely manner and properly logged, that status boards are accurately maintained and updated, that appropriate briefings of OCEOC staff are held periodically and that incoming personnel are briefed. The notifications of the Unusual Event and Alert were properly logged and transmitted to the appropriate agencies and personnel at the Ocean County Warning Point (OCSCD). The OCSCD also displayed the alert level on two status boards that had high visibility in the communications room. At the County EOC (OCEOC), the agency representatives were familiar with the use of standard OCEOC message forms. Communication within the OCEOC was facilitated by message controllers who coordinated the flow of information among the agencies. All outgoing communication was logged and routed through the message controllers to the communi-cation room established for this purpose. The message control clerk in the communi-cations room demonstrated an outstanding ability to keep up with the message flow.
Each message received or transmitted in the communication room was logged. Outgoing messages were dispatched promptly. The new procedure of logging communications, both in the communications room and at the message control center, corrected a deficiency noted at a previous exercise. The Ocean County Emergency Management Coordinator and the State Liaison Officer in his absence frequently conducted informative briefings which updated the EOC staff when important information became available. Status
36 OCEOC 4
boards were maintained with accurate information. It was evident that the EOC staff i had been well trained to carry out their emergency functions and to coordinate their . ,
parallel actions as an integrated emergency response team. ;
Once the OCEOC was activated, the Emergency Coordinator maintained =
frequent contact with the State over a dedicated " hotline" as well as through normal ;
communleation channels. While in communication with the State, the Coordinator i
reviewed the status of events with State personnel. The County Emergency Management Coordinator was clearly in a position to determine the need for state assistance and the apprcpriate communication network was in place to solicit state assistance should it be i required (OCEOC 7).
1 The Ocean County Emergency Management Coordinator promptly activated the s*ren system after notification by the State of the Site Area Emergency declaration. The l siren system was activated at approximately 1800 hours0.0208 days <br />0.5 hours <br />0.00298 weeks <br />6.849e-4 months <br /> fulfilling an exercise objective (OCEOC 8). In addition, Ocean County verified the sounding of the strens correcting a deficiency identified at a previous exercise. It wr.s determined that one siren in Stafford Township had not sounded. To handle the failure of this siren, route alerting was simulated for that area in Stafford Township as well as for the area included in the stren failure freeplay message.
The County adequately demonstrated the organizational ability to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the 10-mile EPZ (OCEOC 9). All agency represent- , ,
atives stationed at the OCEOC were promptly notified in the operations room of the evacuation decision. The EMC effectively coordinated each agency response and coordi-1 nated the responsive actions of the municipalities. The State Liaison Officer provided i the appropriate assistance to the EMC in the performance of these tasks. During the simulated evacuation, an evacuation route impediment freeplay message was introduced.
The impediment was quickly analyzed by county staff and corrective action was taken by the EMC, his Operations Officer and the County Fire Coordinator thus demonstrating the '
county's capability to deal with evacuation impediments (OCEOC 10).
4 The County adequately demonstrated the communication procedures and the organizational ability necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of schools within the 10-mile EPZ (OCEOC 11). A freeplay message was received from the State Office of Emergency Management (OEM). The OEM advised the OCEOC of the necessity for school evacuation. The situation was evaluated at the OCEOC with primary input from the Department of Education. An evacuation of the schools was not conducted since the schools were closed.
The county demonstrated an excellent capability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel (OCEOC 12). The communi-
! cations network included a secure dedicated radio frequency to the State OEM, EMRAD i to the municipalities with 2 meter FM radio as backup as well as an emergency network
- j to communicate with field personnel. Also included are of 12 telephone lines (6 '
- dedicated to incoming calls and 6 for outgoing calls), fire band, emergency medical
- services, and a telecopier. ,
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_, . .- . _ _ _ _ _ ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _
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37 OCEOC The . county demonstrated the ability to provide advance coordination of
- information released (OCEOC 13). All messages transmitted by the county either to the
.' municipalities or to field personnel were authorized by signature by a designated OCEOC official, the Emergency Management Coordinator, or his designee. He was clearly in control of the overall county response and conducted periodic and thorough briefings for
- all the OCEOC agency staff. He demonstrated leadership in making decisions, including prompt response to freeplay messages, use of the State Liaison and appropriate and timely coordination and utilization of county resources. The exercise clearly demonstrated that an appropriate official was in charge and in control of an overall coordinated county response (OCEOC 14).
The objective to demonstrate the ability. to effect an orderly evacuation of onsite personnel (OCEOC 15) was not observed.
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38 OCFIELD 2.2.2 Field Implementation of Actions to Protect the Putdie Ocean County demonstrated the ability to provide backup public alerting ".
procedures with field personnel in the event of a partial stren failure (OCFIELD 1). The -
OCEOC directed route alerting for an actual stren failure in Stafford Township and a simulated siren failure in Ocean Township. In both cases county field personnel ,
responded promptly to these situations and adequately demonstrated the capability for route alerting.
The Ocean County exercise objective to demonstrate the ability to continuously ,
monitor and control emergency worker exposure including proper use of personnel dosimetry (OCFIELD 2) was not demonstrated because the EOC is located outside the 10 mile EPZ.
Ocean County only partly met an objective to demonstrate the ability to supply and administer KI when such a decision was made (OCFIELD 3). A message to notify all emergency workers within the 10-mile EPZ to simulate taking KI was received at the OCEOC at 1937 hours0.0224 days <br />0.538 hours <br />0.0032 weeks <br />7.370285e-4 months <br />. The county responded to this message by relaying a message at 1958 hours0.0227 days <br />0.544 hours <br />0.00324 weeks <br />7.45019e-4 months <br /> to most of the appropriate field agencies (i.e., EOCs, police, fire, first-aid Rad teams and Health Department) to take KI. However, the OCEOC relayed the message only on the Fire Band and Emergency Medical Services communication system.
In addition, the message should have gone to all emergency workers and should have been transmitted via EMRAD and the RACES. , ,
The Ocean County Municipal Utility Authority (OCMUA) decontamination center in Manahawkin provided an excellent demonstratloa af ' adequate equipment and .. ,
procedures for decontamination of emergency workers, ses and equipment inclusive of adequate provisions for handling contaminated waste (ovflELD 4). All the necessary facilities and equipment for decontamination of emergency workers was available and set up in a timely manner. The staff was knowledgeable and thorough in their individual assignments and the decontamination center group leader was competent in directing the decontamination activity. All facets of vehicle monitoring and decontamination procedures were demonstrated. Contaminated waste from the vehicle washing was directed to a sewage treatment facility. The decontamination personnel demonstrated that they knew at what level decontamination efforts should be terminated, thus correcting the deficiency from in a previous exercise.
Ocean County demonstrated the resources necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation introduced as a free play by the federal observer (OCFIELD 5). The County demonstrated the ability to promptly notify the appropriate municipality of the impediment to evacuation. The County immediately transmitted a follow-up message to ,
the municipality when they failed to respond, asking the municipality if they required assistance to counteract the impediment.
In order to test Ocean County in the capability to effect an orderly evacuation of mobility-impaired individuals within the 10-mile EPZ, a freeplay message was introduced. The message specified five mobility-impaired individuals at five different ,
addresses in Ocean Township. However, the county sent a message to Ocean Township .
requesting a pick-up of only one mobility-impaired person at one address. Ocean
- i. 39 OCFIELD 4
i Township confirmed the communication within a four minute period. Immediately after receiving the confirmation, the county corrected the error and notified Ocean Township l[
that it had dispatched a van to pick-up the mobility-impaired individuals at the other four addresses, therefore meeting the exercise objective (OCFIELD 6).
j Ocean County. demonstrated the resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of schools within the 10-mile EPZ utilizing communication procedures .
l (OCFIELD 7). A free-play message simulating the need for schoool evacuation was t !
introduced at the state EOC. The state OEM then notified Ocean County that the !
Department of Education had been advised to notify,the schools and simulate the school j<
evacuation. i The exercise objective to demonstrate the ability to mobilze staff and activate 1
Congregate Care Shelter and Decontamination Centers in a timely manner was met at Pinelands High School, Brick Township High School, and the Manahawkin decontaminatloa l
center (OCFIELD 8). The responsible agenices were notified to activate these facilities '
between 1925 and 1940 hours0.0225 days <br />0.539 hours <br />0.00321 weeks <br />7.3817e-4 months <br /> during the General Emergency EAL. Agency representa-tives at the EOC were briefed that the Congregate Care Shelters were to be fully operational by 2100 hours0.0243 days <br />0.583 hours <br />0.00347 weeks <br />7.9905e-4 months <br />. The Pinelands High School' Congregate Care Shelter was set i
up and operational in the proper time frame. All functional areas within the facility 1
were demonstrated and additional resources were identified to supplement those set up for demonstration purposes. The Brick Township High School Congregate Care Shelter '
'
- was activated and staffed in a timely manner. The Decontamination Center at Manahawkin was also established in the proper time frame.
At the Brick' Township High School' Congregate Care Shelter, no written roster j was available to assure that staffing could be maintained on a 24-hour basis. Although discussions took place regarding 24-hour staffing at the Pinelands Congregate Care
! Shelter and the Manahawkin decontamination center, there was no indication that a I written roster was available. Thus the objective (OCFIELD 9) to have available a roster ;
i to assure 24-hour staffing was partially met.
1 .
I Ocean County only partly met the exercise objective of demonstrating the adequacy of procedures for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees .
! (OCFIELD 10). At the Pinelands High School Congregate Care Shelter, the registration j procedures were good and the radiological monitoring procedures were basically adequate i in that they could determine whether or not a person was contaminated. The limits used
- for determining contamination were lower than those specified in SOP 403, section 2.13 l (basically they were using the suggested background reading found in sections 2.2 and j 2.6). However, the radiation monitors did not have a good understanding of the operation j of the survey instruments (e.g., the function of the range selector switch). They were j unable to answer questions concerning the meter reading when given a particular meter i indicator needle reading and a specific range selector setting. The instruments were
- l. turned off between uses to conserve the batteries, therefor =, there is no guarantee that l l
- the instruments would always be returned to the correct range setting to correspond with 2
the selected contamination limits. Also, the detectors were held 4' to 6 inches from the i*
body while conducting the contamination survey as well as being moved too rapidly to detect " spot" contamination. The radiation monitors should receive additional training l
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40 OCFIELD on the operation of'the survey instruments and the proper procedures for contamination surveys.- , ,
An interview with the Red Cross Shelter Manager at the Pinelands High School
- Congregate Care Shelter indicated that the facility for mass care of evacuees could adequately accomodate 200 evacuees thereby fulfilling an exercise objective (OCFIELD .
11).
Defleieneles That Would Lead to a Negative Finding i
No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed at the Ocean County EOC, Ocean County Sheriffs Communication Division or Ocean County Field Activity sites.
Other Defieleneles
- 1. Defleiency: There was no iniilcation that a written roster was l available at the Pinelands and Brick High Schools Congregate Care Shelters or at the Manahawkin decontamination center to assure that staffing could be accomplished on a 24-hour basis.
! Recommendation: A roster should be available at these facilities to ensure 24-hour staffing capability. .
- 2. Deficiency: A message to notify all Emergency Workers within the 10-mile EPZ to simulate taking KI was not relayed by the county l to all Emergency Workers and was transmitted only on the Fire l Band and the Emergency Medical Service radio frequencies.
Recommendation: The message should go to all Emergency Workers and should be transmitted on EMRAD and the RACES.
- 3. Deficiency: Radiation monitoring personnel at the Pinelands High School Congregate Care Shelter did not have adequate experience in the use of radiation monitoring instrument operation and proper procedures for determining radiation contamination levels of individuals.
Recommendation: Radiation monitor personnel should receive additional training on the operation of radiation monitoring instruments and proper procedures for radiation contamination
- surveys. ,
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41 OCMEOC 2.2.3 Ocean County Municipalities Emergency Operation Centers (OCMEOC)
- Federal observers evaluated activities of the following municipal EOCs in Ocean County during the exercise.
e Barnegat Township e Ocean Township e Barnegat Light Borough e Ocean Gate Borough e Beachwood Borough e Pine Beach Borough e Berkeley Township e Seaside Park Borough e Dover Township e Ship Bottom Borough e Harvey Cedars Borough e South Toms River Borough e Island Heights Borough e Stafford Township ,
o Lacey Township e Surf City Borough e Long Beach Township e
- In addition, two municipalities which were outside the 10 mile EPZ, Beach Haven and Seaside Heights chose to participate in the exercise. These two EOCs were not evaluated by federal observers._ .
Overview .
The ability to receive the initial and followup emergency notification was demonstrated by the municipalities where this portion of the exercise was observed. This met the exercise objective OCMEOC1 and corrected a deficiency from the previous exercise. In general, mobilization and activation of the EOCs (OCMEOC2) was demonstrated. This corrected two deficiencies from the previous exercise. Island !
Heights however did not have full staff participation. Twenty-four hour staffing capability was demonstrated by presentation of a roster showing adequate staff reserve (OCMEOC3) except in Barnegat Township and Stafford where the EMCs in charge were ;
not aware of a twenty-four hour roster.
The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of the municipalities emergency facilities in Ocean County (OCMEOC4) was met to various degrees. New facilities were provided in Stafford, Beachwood, and Ocean Township in response to recommendations
. from a previous exercise. However, Beachwood still does not have potable water, which .
. continues to be a deficiency from the previous exercise. The Barnegat Township EOC l has sufficient space; however, the operations room was not organized in a manner to l assist emergency operations. Only one telephone was available and the one table was taken up with maps.
e
42 OCMEOC The communications equipment at the Ocean County Municipalities was good.
' The EOC's demonstrated both primary and backup communication systems (OCMEOCS). .
EMRAD was the primary system and telephene was the backup system. EMRAD was not '
l used at Stafford Township because the EOC was recently relocated and EMRAD was not ~
' connected. The OCEOC communicated with Stafford Township by the RACES frequency.
The communication messages were transmitted in a timely manner, which corrects a deficiency from the previous exercise.
[,
i Access control and security at the municipal EOCs (OCMEOC6) was partially demonstrated. All the EOCs had access control which corrects a previous deficiency.
Seven of the EOCs (Ocean Township, Barnegat, Ocean Gate, Pine Beach, Beachwood, Island Heights, Dover) did not perform monitoring to prevent contaminated individuals from entering the EOC. Although five of these municipalities were not in direct line of
} the plume, emergency workers responsible for monitoring should have asked questions of l each arriving individual to determine if the individual had passed through a contaminated area. This continues a deficiency reported during the previous exercise.
Internal communications within the EOCs were generally effective (OCMEOC7).
l l'
Messages were written on a standard message form. All messages were 'promptly numbered, logged and used for updating status board. Pine Beach and Island Heights EOCs however missed some of the early messages when the communications operators were away from the EMRAD system.
- e I The Emergency Management Coordinators (EMC) or their deputy were in charge and coordinated overall operations at the municipal EOCs (OCMEOC8). In general the EMCs were knowledgeable of emergency a'etivities. However, there were three
- l exceptions. The EMC or the deputy in charge at Island Heights, Pine Beach and Barnegat
! Township EOCs were recently assigned and were not familiar with the Emergency l Response Plan. Checklists were not available at Beachwood, Pine Beach, and Ocean Gate, which continues to be a deficiency from the previdus exercise. Lists of non-institutionalized mobility-impaired persons were not available at Barnegat, Pine Beach, Island Heights, Ocean Gate and Dover. This continues a deficiency that was identified in l the previous exercise.
i The objectives to communicate with appropriate organizations and determine the need for state and county assistance were adequately demonstrated (OCMEOC9 and 10).
' Simulated failure of siren #45 in Ocean Township was incorporated into the
! exercise by a free play message. The Ocean Township EOC had detailed directions for
! route alerting for each sector. The route alerting was carried out in a timely manner l fulfilling an exercise objective OCMEOC11.
I i The capability to monitor and control radiological exposure of local emergency j workers (OCMEOC12) was demonstrated at most of the EOCs. There were three
~
l
- exceptions.
l e Dosimeters were not distributed at the Stafford EOC until the EMC ,
was notified of the deficiency. .
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43 OCMEOC e Dosimeters were not distributed at South Toms River EOC.
.' e Dosimeters were not distributed to all emergency workers at Ocean
. Gate EOC.
This continues a deficiency as reported in a previous exercise.
The Ocean Township EOC was given a free play message to evacuate mobility impaired. Ambulances were dispatched and to appropriate locations and therefore, meeting the exercise objective OCMEOC14.
i Traffic control points at Rt 9 and Seneca and Rt 9 and 532 were observed. The police officers were knowledgeable of evacuation routes, relocation centers, and with reading and recording of dosimeters. The Traffic Control points were established in a timely manner, fulfilling the exercise objective (OCMEOC16). l The message to take KI was transmitted only on the Fire Band and Emergency Medical Services communication system. The message should have also gone out over EMRAD' and the RACES. Six EOCs, Lacey Township,' Ocean Township, Barnegat, Staf-ford, Pine Beach and South Toms River, were not familiar with the procedures for taking KI.
Defielencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding a
No deficiencies that would lead' to a negative finding were observed at the OCMEOCs during this exercise.
Other Deficiencies
- 1. Defleiency: Full participation in the exercise is .necessary to develop and demonst' rate emergency operations management skills. Full participation is suggested for Island Heights.
Recommendation: The State should contact the Island Heights Mayor and recommend full participation.
- 2. Defleiency: Twenty-four hour staffing by roster was not available at Barnegat and Stafford.
Recommendation: A twenty-four hour staffing roster should be prepared and be made available for review.
\
. 3. Defleiney: The working area at Barnegat Township EOC should I be better organized to facilitate emergency operations.
Recommendation: The state in its training should recommend efficient use of space.
44 OCMCOC
- 4. Deficiency: Pine Beach and Island Heights missed some of the -
early messages when the communication operator was away from ~
the radio. ,
Recommendation: The EMRAD radio should be manned at all ,
times when the EOC is activated.
- 5. Defielency: Training is needed for newly assigned EMCs or the Deputy in charge of Island Heights, Pine Beach and Barnegat Township EOCs ty familiarize them with their responsibilities.
Ilecommendation: The State should provide additional training for EMCs and deputies in charge of emergency response at the EOCs indicated above.
- 6. Defielency: Six municipal EOCs were not familiar with the procedure for administering KI.
Recommendation: The state should incorporate the procedures for taking KI into the municipalities' procedures and provide training in its distribution and use.
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45 3 SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTING DEFICTNCIES
. Section 2 of this report lists deficiencies based on the findings and recom-
. mendations of a federal observer team comprised of FEMA, Agency representatives to the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), and contractrs at the radiological emergency preparedness exercise for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Jenerating Station held on June 5,1985. These evaluations are based on the applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-1, Rev.1 (Nov.1980) and objectives 4
for the exercise agreed upon by the state, FEMA, and the RAC.
The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director, State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C., that any deficiencies that require corrective actions have been " corrected and that such corrections have been incorporated into the plans as appropriate.
FEMA requests that both the state and local jurisdictions submit a schedule of actions they have taken or intend to take to correct these deficiencies. FEMA recommends that a detailed plan, including dates of completion for scheduling and implementing recommendations, be provided if corrective actions cannot be instituted immediately. FEMA further recommends that an additional effort be made by alllevels of government to improve intergovernmental coordination in all aspects of the
'
- emergency planning process. A meeting between state, county, local and FEMA officials is advisable.
No ilfiie c encies were observed that would cause a finding that off-site-emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appro-priate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the site in the event of a radiological emergency.
The deficiencies observed at the June 5,1985,6 exercise for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, as well as outstanding deficiencies from previous exercises, require that a schedule of corrective actions be developed. These deficiencies are summarized in Tables 3.1 through 3.9. The deficiencies in these tables have been cross-referenced to the corresponding deficiencies and corrective actions specified in Tables 4.1 through 4.9. These cross-references appear at the end of each defielency/
recommendation in Tables 3.1 through 3.9 and indicate the number of the item as it appears in Tables 4.1 through 4.9.
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1 l-1 TAst.E 3.1
. OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR CENERATING STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCHEDULE June 5, 1985, Deficiencies and Outstanding Deficiencies from Previous Esercises State of New Jersey - EMERCENCY OPERATIONS CENTERS
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- 3: 1 10 231 0 34 i j yt *, 3 8A
&R3 83 n;Olt 2 il 3::23 N RAC Recommendatica corrective Actica Ud 'g State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION) Md5 FEMA Evaluation of State /Cointy Response 24/ M STATE OF NW JERSEY EMERCENCY OPRATIONS CEN N i
M.I 1. The State RERP contains two con- X t
flicting criteria for clearing evacuated areas for reentryl this inconsistency delayed reentry for a short period. The plan should be reviewed and revised to resolve this conflict. (Table 4.18 3) 4 C.2.c 2. The rumor control telephone number X p
!$ was not included in all of the EBS ,
o
' messages. Determine whether the i rumor control telephone number is to be included as part of EBS messages and follow consistent procedures i with regard to this policy for all EBS messages. Also, sonsider in-riuding reference to public infor-
.. mation brochures in EBS messages.
(Table 4.18 10) 1 -
4 o
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TABLE 3.2 OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR CENERATINC STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCHEDULE June 5,1985, Deficiencies and Outstanding Deficiencies fr'on Previous Exercises State of New Jersey - NEAR-SITE EMERCENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY a
4 da E
g S.-
. : ==i 3:
om o- 1. :.
83j
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N N;t $3 mw
- o. w
!! State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION) MOS FEMA Evaluation of State /Cowity Response Elf SS '
W RAC Recosamendation Corrective Action EMERCENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY t.1 1. Emergency response facility did not I -
have enough telephone lines to support emergency o pe ra t i on s.
Utilize the additional telephone line which was apparently available during drills. Identify and resolve 4 the problem with the ring down tele-phone. (Table 4.2; 1)
H.3 2. One display board on plant status X $
which is an aid in decision making was initially used but was not kept up to date. If the plant status display board is to be retained, it must be kept current so as not to be misleading. Additionally, this board should be reworded to simplify interpretation of the status of the plant. (Table 4.23 2)
A . .' .a 3. The designated official at the EOF X was not clearly in charge of com-municating PARS to OEM for imple-mentation. The BRP SRAO at the EOF should be clearly in charge of com-municating PARS to OEM for impl e-mentation. (Table 4.2; 3) 9 6
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TABLE 3.3 OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR CENERATINC STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCHEDULE June 5,1985. Deficiencies and outstanding Deficiencies from Previous Esercises i State of New Jersey - BUREAU OF RADI ATION PROTECTION . FORNARD COMMAND POST i
k
- a !
i ^E k 4
a b $ 3
- 33 3 10 23! q :3 a *t 3A Sli sa og gO RAC Recosaseadation Corrective Actica
?
Ud 3
4 :5 State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION)
&&S US$ FEMA Evaluation of State /Consity Resposise t il Eld @ at 3::23 -l ;
l ste-romuAto coeuMD rest K.3.a 1. Some emergency workers did not have X TLD badges. Regular briefings l
should be given to emergency field I workers to assure that proper use of ,
dosimeters and recard keeping of I doses are applied. (Table 4.33 1) .
l
- K.2 2. Some emergency workers were unf ami- X l
J liar with the manimum esposure I allowed without proper authoriza-Lion. Emergency workers should be u t
O
- trained to know the manimum esposure .
4 levels at they will be required to l
notify their supervisor and be authorized to receive additions.1 '
esposure if necessary. (Table 4.33 ,
- 2) -
l l 6.1.d 3. A radio frequency sho*ald be set X N/Ob aside for the esclusive use of field monitoring teams. (Table 4.33 4) 8 .
- 8
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9 TABLE 3.5 OYSTER CREEK NUCl. EAR CENERATINC STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCHEDULE June 5, 1985, Deficiencies and Outstanding Deficiencies from Previous Esercises State of New Jerse,y - FIELD IMPLEMENT 4 TION OF ACTIONS TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC 2 G e h. *
- 8 *l ~
3" g 10 "3? O 34 30 3" 83i tuR of t3
.: RR" 2G it;:lt3 E! - UO "g**g State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION) M0$ FEMA Evaluation of State /Comty Response EAA QM NN RAC Reccumendation Corrective Action ACTitmS TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC C.! 1. Despite the public education ef f orts X X C.2 undertaken by the state and utility, the public ausreness concerning radiological emergency procedures appears to be low. The State working jointly with the utility should ex-plore additional avenues to educate ,
the public about the meaning of the siren signal, Emergency Planning Areas, and protective action o p- u tions. This ros.ld be accomplished N by placing an advertisement in tele-phone directories, including the infromation in calendars, posting road signs, and making radio and TV announcements. A public information progras should be initiated in the 10-mile EPZ. Posted notices should be placed in hotels, motels, and other places frequented by transient persons. Public information pa m-phlets giving information and in-struction for use during an emer-gency should be printed and dis-tributed to all members of the public. (Table 4.5; 1)
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c nli l o ehs he ut rhocloct fa o l u)a r a
A b t d t no7 d c s at e , e f c eh 1 l u
de crb o e ro i e r eb s e i pi 8 a o i
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cv e t e u a ,ow l o at l i) r o g Hst a hpb r C o el nl f d
e lu o ia e
sl b t o7 o eio n et c t mc(T i e C vd f i .
n cl e e k s1 .
e na ah o
i yl e t pn e a sbl p r 8 e c n mies cp .
f e i e u ad re m or d g n
4 t
e c
O oat dh osour c id eu h p p i e ire .
d t r cech t rf l el d pvb .
e hg e i wii ml a e
s ro s erd otd woer aiT n ud o s s hi arinel Tar pwaNf t hv e S s(
oet e
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e l uood .
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l TABLE 3.8 (Cont'd)
I a
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N BAC Recommendation Corrective Action US Sd State (S)/Consity (C) Response (ACTIGII) 20$ FEMA Evaluation of State /Conalty Response Elf M
- 4. There was no indication that a X
) A.4 l
written roster was available at the Pinelands and Brick High Schools
- Congregate Care Shelters or at the
, Manahawkin decontamination center to I assure that staf fing could be acc.
plished on a 24-hour basis. A l
j roster should be available at these 2 facilities to ensure 24-hour staffing capability. (Table 4.8; 3)
J.W. 5. A message to notify all Emergency X y
F.I.d Workers within the 10-mile EPZ to *
!. simulate taking Kl was not relayed by the county to all Emergency 5
. Workers and was transmitted only on the Fire Band and the Emergency Medical Service radio frequencies.
i, The message should go to all Emer-gency Workers and should be trans-mitted on EMRAD and the RACES.
(Table 4.81 14) 9 e
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s di e ab t mr a c sC evf e d r n a au T A
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t gct stf t s nS noune a a e d c g y u
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TABLE 3.9 OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR CENERATINC STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION SCHEDULE
, June 5, 1985, Deficiencies and Outstanding Deficiencies from Previous Esercises Ocean County k nicipalities - ENERCENCY OPERATIONS CENTERS e C O e Q' g*
a O E *2 *3
- 32 10 231 ; 23 j.
30 *E *A 831 ;;&:t
- : 223 g gi g gg U RAC Recomme s tlan corrective Action UEe 40 State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION) UdS FEMA Evaluation of State /Consity Resp mse Elf M OCRAN (IMMTY NWICIPALITIES W OrWATIO N CMTERS W.I.a 1. Pull particiption in the esercise I I is necessary to develope and demon-strate emergenc y operations manage-ment skills. Full participation is suggested for Island Heights. The State should contact the Island Neights Mayor and recommend full participation. (Table 4.93 10) s.n u.3 2. The EOC at Reachwood lack potable I I water. (Table 4.95 11)
F.3.s 3. Naici pt EOCs within prot ec ti ve I I action areas should implement pro-cedures to ensure that contaminated individuals are not allowed access into the EOCs. (Table 4.91 12) p.4 4. Nnicipal procedures should' be I I developed, including a checklist for
- each emergency classification.
(Table 4.91 13)
J.19.d 5. Li st s of noninstitutionalized I I mobility-impaired persons should be available at each mani ci pal EOC.
(Table 4.95 14) 9 h
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t f ed u a ra nst e 9 h e t t ei .
d e osrs uor o . m9 i i t d c a aeb C n g ce f td g 4 kcl rOi tan4 e ch ef i t d O .
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4
SUMMARY
OF DEFICIENCIES 1 .
Section 3 of this report provides a schedule for the correction of deficiencies
. noted during the June 5,1985, remedial exercise. Table 4.1 through 4.9 summarize
- recommendations to correct those deficiencies. For purposes of verification, the tables include these recommendations and the recommendations based upon previous exercises.
The ' current status of Al recommendations is Indicated. Each deficiency /
recommendation for the 1J85 exercise and the previous exercises of radiological emergency preparedness at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station is cross-referenced in this table to the section(s) of the postexercise report (s) in which that deficiency is described. These cross-references appear at the end of each deficieney/
recommendation in Tables 4.1 through 4.9.
g .
1 0
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-. ,.e- - . .-- . - - , - - - . -,,-----n-- --.--,,----,wn .-,.g. - - - -. - ---, - - - - - -,.ve----- , .
64 1
I TABLE 4.1 Summary of Deficiencies and Recommendations to Remedy Deficiencies in Off-Site Radiological Emergency R:sponse Preparedness at Exercises for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station: STATE OF IEW JERSEY - . ;
EMERCEllCT OPERATIONS CElffEE .
l 6/5/85 .
Deficiency Identified .
NUREG-0654 FEMA-REP-1 State D Deficiency and R?v. 1 Exercise Exercise Exercise Exercise Present N2. Recommended Corrective Action Reference
- 3/16/82 5/24/83 5/10/84 6/5/85 Status *
- 1. On-the-job training should be imple- 0.1 X C mented to smooth out the procedure of initially setting up security at the EOC. (5.1.1.b)
- 2. More space should be allotted for maps H.3 x C and displays. (5.1.1.c)
- 3. The State RERP contains two ' conflict- H.1 X I ing criteria for clearing evacuated N/Obj( 65) areas for reentry; this inconsistency delayed reentry for a short period.
'The plan should be reviewed and re-vised to resolve this conflict. (Table
- 1. IX 1)
- 4. Consideration should be given to J.10.a x C . ,
assigning a separate coding system to th EPZ maps, to avoid confusion with the number designation system given on the sector maps. (5.1.1.d) .
- 5. On-the-job training should be con- E.2 X C sidered to enhance the operations of F.1.a alerting. notifying, and mobilising response personnel and prompt activa-tion of emergency response communi-cations.- (5.1.2.b)
- 6. It is recommended that training of 0.1 X C personnel be conducted to alleviate the confusion over nomenclature which could hamper and delay ef fective com-munication. (5.1.3)
- 7. The overall reliability of the system E.5 X C used to alert the public and provide E.6 emergency public information must be revised and improved. It is suggested that 'a system for verification of stren activation be included within
.the capabilittee of the State. Equip-ment should be upgraded to avoid delays in sounding strens such as that which occurred in the exercise.
(4.1.4.a. 4.2.4.d) e 0
65
. TABLE 4.1 (Cont'd) 6/5/85
. STATE 80C
. Deficiency Identified NUREG-0654 b PEMA-REP-1 State Exercise Exercise Exercise Present Deficiency and Rev. 1 Exercise 5/24/83 $/10/84 6/5/85 Status" Reference
- 3/16/82 No. Recommended Corrective Action C
A permanent ESS systes should be put E.5, X
- 8. E.6 in place. The local radio stations should have this systes as part of their basic operations and FCC ap-pravel should be obtained. (4.1.4.b)
C Recovery and reentry should be in- H.1, X
- 9. M.3, cluded and fully demonstrated as part of the overall activity. (4.1.a) M.4 X 1 The rumor control telephone number was C.2.c 10.
not included in all of the EBS mes-sages. Determine whether the rumor control telephone number is to be in-cluded as part of EBS messages and follow consistent procedures with regard to this policy for all EBS mesesses. Also, consider including reference to public information bro-chures in EBS messages. (Sec. 2.1.1,
- p. 23)
- NUREG-0654, FEMA, REP-1, Rev. 1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Energency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Part II.
bDeficiancies were not intended to be identified st the state exercise only verification of state-selected corre6.tve actions from previous exercises occurred.
N/R No NUREG-0654 reference.
"C Remedial action complete.
Is Remedial action incomplete.
N/Obj(81): Not an objective of the 1983 exercise.
N/Ob)(85): Not an objective of the 1985 exercise.
Remedial action complete as a result of 5/10/84 state exercise.
C(84):
4 e
0 a
66 TABLE 4.2 Summary of Deficiencies and Recommendations to Remedy Deficiencies in Off-Site Radiological Emergency P.esponse Preparedness at Exercises for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Stations IIEAE-SITE StERCE30CY ,
OPERATIONS FACILITY ,
6/5/85 Deftetency Identified ',
NUREC-0654 FEMA-REP-1 State b Deficiency and Rev. 1, Exercise Exercise Exercise Exercise Present No. Recommended Corrective Action Reference" 3/16/82 5/24/83 5/10/84 6/5/85 Status'
- l. Emergency response facility did not F.1 1 1 have enough telephone lines to support emergency operations. Utilize the additional telephone line which was apparently available during drills.
Identify and resolve the problem with the ring down telephone. (Sec. 2.1.2
- p. 26)
- 2. One display board on plant status H.3 X 1 which is an aid in dectaton making was initially used but was not kept up to date. If the plant status display board is to be retained. it must be kept current so as not to be mislead-ing. Additionally. this board should be reworded to simplify interpretation of the status of the plant. (Sec.
- 2.1.2. p. 26)
- 3. The designated official at the EOF was A.2.s X 1 not clearly in charge of communicating .
PARS to Oth for implementation. The BRP SRA0 at the EOF should be clearly in charge of consnunicating PARS to ODI for implementation. (Sec. 2.1.2 p.
26) 4 On several occasions there was con- F.! X 1 siderable delay in contacting the BRP representative at the State EOC by commeeical phone. Identify the cause of the delay in contacting the BRP representative at the State EOC by commercial telephone and implement a method to avoid repeat occurrences of delays in making these contacts.
(Sec. 2.1.2. p. 26)
- 5. During the early stages of the euer- C.2 X 1 cise. there were delays in obtaining plant status information due to the fact that the utility does not fully activate the EOF with a nuclear engineer until the Site Area Emergency classification. The State should arrange with the utility to have the utility augment the initial EOF staf f-e ing by adding one nuclear engineer so that the BRP staff will be able to '
2.1.2. p. 26) e
,e
w 67
. I TABLE 4.2 (Cont'd)
~
, BEF-SOF 6/5/85 e Deficiency Identified
. FEMA-REP-1 State b Deficiency and Rev. 1 Exercise Exercise Exercise Exercise Present No. Recommended Corrective Action Reference
- 3/16/82 5/24/83 5/10/84 6/5/85 Status"
- 6. Field tessa were not used effectively 1.8 I I to obtain information needed to verify dose projections for an extended period of time. The field tease must be effectively used to define the plume with respect to both size and strength. Several measurements of the plume strength should be made at or near plume centerline, as determined by measurements. so that the pro-jections can be verified or modified as necessary. By this verification process. PARS can be adjusted accordingly. (Sec. 2.1.2, p. 27) 7 Consideration may be given to in- H.3 X C creasing the available space allotted to dose assessment operations.
(5.1.1.a)
- 8. It is suggested that manpower planning A.L.e, X C be reviewed to insure that sufficient C.2.a personnel are available to sustain a
. 24-hour continuous emergency response and that personnel can be dispatched to the licensee's near-site EOF.
(5.1.2.a) a NUREG-0654, FEMA. REP-1, Rev. 1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants Part II.
b Deficiencies were not intended to be identified at the state exercise; only verification of state-selected corrective actions from previous exercises occurred.
N/R No NUREG-0654 reference.
cC Remedial action complete.
It Remedial action incomplete.
N/Obj(83): Not an objective of the 1983 exercise.
N/Obj(85): Not an objective of the 1985 exercise.
C(84): Remedial action complete as a result of 5/10/84 state exercise.
y n ~ + + ,y o - - + ~ -
' 68 TABLE 4.3 Summary of Deficiencies and Recommendations to Remedy Deficiencies in Of.f-Site Radiological Emergency
- WREAD OF BADIATION ,
i Response Preparedness at Exercises for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station: ,
PRorgCTION - POEMARD CGetAND POST
- 6/5/85 .
Deficiency Identified .
NUREG-0634 FEMA-REP-1 State b Exercise Exercise Exercise Exercise Present Deficiency and Rev. 1, 3/16/82 5/24/83 5/10/84 6/5/85 Status" Recommended Corrective Action Reference" No.
X I Some emergency workers did not have X.3.a
, 1.
' TLD badges. Regular briefings should be given to weergency field workers to assure that proper use of dosimeters j and record keeping of doses are applied. (Sec. 2.1.3, p. 29)
X I Some energency workers were unfamiliar K.2 2.
with the maximum exposure allowed
! without proper authorization. Ener-genef workers should be trained to know the maximum exposure levels at which they will be required to notify their supervisor and be authorised to receive additional exposure if neces-sary. (Sec. 2.1.3, p. 29)
C . ,
At the NJSP forward cosumand post, the H.3 X 3.
State Police and EOF personnel should be physically located together rather than on separate floors. to taprove -
internal coussonications and logistics.
Note Since the 1982 exercise the NJSP Forward Command Post is no longer I at the EOF, thus no additional action l'
is required. (5.1.1.e) 1 F.1.d X
- 4. A radio frequency should be set aside N/Obj(85) for the exclusive use of field mont-toring teams. (Table 1 I 3)
C H.3 X
- 5. The BRP staff at the FCP should re-ceive additional training in pro-cedures for internal message handling, especially the effective use of status boards. Additional status boards should be maintained to track changes
- in emergency status, meteorological conditions, and protective action recommendations. (Table I, I I)
{
1 0
8 1 .
l l
l
- - . - - -.__-__..m- _ _ _ . . , _ . . . . _ - , , _
m.. _ . - .-.._-.._.,.3.__ . , _, _ , _ . . . , , , _ _ _ , . , - - _ _ _ , _ ,..-,, ,, _,,..,.--.__.~.r , _ , _ .
]
69 TABLE 4.3 (Cont'd) e BRP-FCP 6/5/85
- e
' Deficiency Identified
- FD4A-REP-1 State b Deficiency and Rev. 1, Exercise Exercise Exercise Exercise Present C
No. Recommended Corrective Action Reference" 3/16/82 5/24/83 5/10/84 6/5/85 Status A security system was implemented at H.3 X C 6.
the BRP Foward Command Post. (5.1.1.f)
Training should be initiated for 'K.3.b X C 7.
workers in the area of reporting radiation dosages received. This procudure, including reporting intervals, should be included in the training as well as part of the overall plan. (5.1.8)
- NUREG-0654, FEMA, REP-1. Rev. 1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Part II.
bDeficiencies were not intended to be identified at the state exercise; only verification of state-selected corrective actions from previous exercises occurred.
N/R No NUREG-0654 reference.
c:c Remedial action complete.
It Remedial action incomplete.
N/0bj(83): Not an objective of the 1983 exercise.
N/Obj(85): Not an objective of the 1985 exercise.
C(84): Remedial action complete as a result of 5/10/84 state exercise.
o 4
e
70 TABLE 4.4 Summary of Deficiencies and Recommendations to Remedy Deficiencies in Off-Site Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness at tuercises for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generation Station: BAD 10tAGICAL FIEla
- NONIT0 TING TEaIIS .
6/5/85
- Deficiency Identified NUREG-0654 FEMA-REP-1 State b Deficiency and Rev. 1, Exercise Exercise Exercise Exercise Present Reference" 3/16/82 5/24/83 5/10/84 6/5/85 Status
- No. Recommended Corrective Action K C
- 1. Procedures for measuring radiciodine I.9 in the plume should be reviewed and required instrumentation obtained.
(Table 1, VI 1)
H.7, K C
- 2. The instrumentation issued to field monitoring teams should be reviewed, I.8, so that each team will have the capa- I.11 bility to measure the air and ground for contamination. Uniformity in the issuance of protective clothing, maps, etc., should also be reviewed.
(5.1.6.a)
C
- 3. All personnel assigned to off-site 1.7, 1 nonitoring should receive identical I.8, training. The training level of I.9 personnel should be reviewed and up- - -
graded as necessary. (5.1.6.b)
- NUREG-0654, FEMA, REP-1, Rev. 1. Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response ,
Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants Part II.
bDeficiencies were not intended to be identified at the state exercises only verification of state-selected corrective actions from previous exercises occurred.
N/R: No NUREG-0654 reference.
c:
c Remedial action complete.
Resedial action incomplete.
Is N/Obj(83): Not an objective of the 1983 exercise.
N/Obj(85): Not an objective of the 1965 exercise.
C(84): Remedial action complete as a result of 5/10/84 state exercise.
e O
e
._m.,.,._..e_m , _w,
..-._e ..a.e.==.=.,,e-o,.m.
71 TABLE 4.5 Summary of Deficiencies and Recommendaticas to Remedy Deficiencies in Off-Site Radiological Emergency
- Risponse Preparedness for the Oyster Greek Nuclear Generating Station: FIEIA DEFIBEElffATION OF ACf10Ng TO
- PR0fECT THE PUBt.IC 6/5/84
- Deficiency identified NUREG-0654 FEMA-REP-1 State b Deficiency and Rev. 1, Exercise Exercise Exercise Exercise Present C
N a. Recommended Corrective Action Reference
- 3/16/82 5/24/83 5/10/84 6/5/85 Status
- 1. Despits the public education efforts G.1, X X X I undertaken by the state and utility, G.2 the public awareness concerning radio-logical emergency procedures appears to be low. The State working jointly with the utility should explore addi-tioned avenues to educate the public about the meaning of the siren signal.
Emergency Planning Areas, and protec-tive action options. This could be accomplished by placing an advertise-dent in telephone directories, includ-ing the information in calendars, posting road signs, and making radio and TV announcements (Sec. 2.1. 5, p.
31(85)]. A public information program should be intriated in the 10-mile
. . EP2. Posted nott.*e should be placed in hotels, motels, and other places frequented by transient persons
[4.1.5.c(82); Table 1, V 7(83)]. Pub- *
- 'lic information pamphlets giving in-formation and instruction for use dur-ing an emergency should be printed and distributed to all members of the pub-lic [4.1.5.b(82); Table 1. V 6(83)].
- NUREG-0654, FEMA, REP-1, Rev. 1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants. Part 11.
b Deficiencies were not intended to be identified at the state exercise; only verification of state-selected corrective actions from previous exercises occurred.
N/R: No NUREG-0654 reference.
"C: Remedial action complete.
1: Remedial action incomplete.
N/Obj(83): Not an objective of the 1983 exercise.
N/Obj(85): Not an objective of the 1985 exercise.
C(84): Remedial action complete as a result of 5/10/84 state exercise.
o e
l e
6 -e-- -mm m en _ e-a-- e e se
72 TABLE 4.6 Summary of Deficiencies and Recommendations ,to Remedy Deficiencies in Off-Site Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness *at Exercises for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating 9tation: JOINF IEDIA G NFER .
6/5/85 .
Deficiency Identified .
FEMA-REP-1 State b Deficient.y and Rev. 1, Exercise Exercise Exercise Em ecise Present No. Recommended Corrective Action Reference" 3/16/82 5/24/83 5/10/84 6/5/85 Status *
- 1. No television was available at the G.4.c X C(84) joint media center for monitoring public information. A television should be available to enable P10s to evaluate the accuracy of public information. (Table 1, V 4)
- 2. The facilities (displays, etc.) at the G.3.s X X C joint media facility need upgrading the strengthening. Wall maps of the IO-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ were not available ti G. j- M sedie cealer for titefings or individual study. Maps should be provided for use by P10s and the news media.
(4.1.5.f; Table 1, V 1) .
- 3. F10s at the joint media center did not G.4.a X X C(84) have hard copy of EBS messages. and . .
thus did not have complete information to provide to the news media. The state EOC should transmit hard copy of -
EBS messages to the joint media center .
to assure the availability of com-plate, accurate information.
(4.1.5.a; Table 1, V 2)
On one occasion, the P10s at the joint G.4.a X
- C 4
media center obtained erroneous infor- G.4.b mation about new evacuation areas from the Ocean County EOC. This infor-nation was announced to the news media without being verified with P10 at the State EOC. 411 information about actions to protect the public should be coordinated with Plos at the state EOC to assure the accuracy of infor-nation before it is provided to the media. (Table 1. V 3)
G.4.C X X C
- 5. Coordinated arrangements for rumor control should be reviewed. (4.1.5.g; Table 1. V 5) h
73 j
TABLE 4.6 (cent'd) 6/5/85 <
e Deficiency Identified NUREG-0654 FEMA-REP-1 State b
- Deficiency and Rev. 1 Exercise Exercise Exercise Exercise Present
- . No. Recommended Corrective Action Reference
- 3/16/82 5/24/83 5/10/84 6/5/85 status" G.4.a C
- 6. The State PIO should . have access to X all pertinent information so that factual information will be given the public and the media (4.1.5.d.
4 4.1.5.e)
- NUREG-0654, PDtA, REP-1, Rev. 1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Darc II.
bDeficiencies were not intended to be identified at the state exercise; only verification of state-selected corrective actions from previous exercises occurred.
N/R: No NUREG-0654 reference.
cc Remedial action complete.
It Remedial action incomplete.
N/Obj(83): Not an objective of the 1983 exercise.
N/obj(85): Not an objective of the 1985 exercise.
C(84): Remedial action complete as a result of 5/10/84 state exercise.
A
= ,
9dP &
r- ,
.~ &
J
.e t
% e e
4 W .,.,..he$ w *w . - - .w. , _ ,. . , , , .,
,_-mee.'.=-.a,.= w - -se -, .
- %--ww..e. ,%
,,- , , . . . . .,, , c -
.74 TABLE 1,7 Summary of Deficiencies and Recommendations to Remedy Deficiencies in Off-Site Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness at Exercises for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station: OCEAN COUWrY .
6/5/85 .
Deficiency Identified NUREC-0654 b FEMA-REP-1 State Deficiency and Rev. 1, Exercise Exercise Exercise Exercise Present e
No. Recommended Corrective Action Reference" 3/16/82 5/24/83 5/10/84 6/5/85 Status EMERGENCY OPERATION CENTER C
- 1. Emergency logs should be improved H.3 X (Table 1. I 9).
- 2. OCSCD security should be upgraded N/R X C(84)
(Table 1, I 10).
State OEM maps should be obtained by J.10.a X X C(84) 3.
the county so that designation of such areas as access control points will be consistent with the State (5.2.1; Table 1 I 11).
4 OCSCD personnel should be instructed E.1 X C(84) to review their checklists for skipped contacts and omitted verifications during roll-call verification. One verification call was missed at " site . .
area emergency" (Table 1. II 3).
Part of the revised ambulance plan had L.4 X C(84)
- 5.
- not net been received by OCSCD. The complete, revised ambulance plan should be made available to OCSCD (Table 1. II 4).
F.1.a X C
- 6. At the OSCSD, confusion resulted when the call for notification of " unusual event" emergency classification was received from the county DiC instead of from OCNCS or State Police Head-quarters as specified on the Unusual Evo t Checklist. The NJSP ODt. OCNGS, and Ocean County should coordinate plans for initial notification, and revise plans and SOPS accordingly (Table 1, II 5).
I
- 7. The capability for fixed and mobile F.2 X N/obj(85) l medical support facilities to communi- '
I cate with each other should be re-viewed and upgraded. This was deficient during the exercise and such communication should be available (5.2.2).
1 e
+
75 Table 4.7 (Cont'd) 6/5/85 Deficiency Identified NUREG-0654
- FEMA-REP-1 State D
- Deficiency and Rev. 1, Exercise Exercise Exercise Exercise Present ,
Recommended Corrective Action Reference' 3/16/82 5/24/83 5/10/84 6/5/85 Status" No.
- 8. Information from the Initial Contact E.1, X C(84)
Message Form should be included on the E.2 OCSCD checklists for " unusual event" and " alert," as is currently done on the checklists for " site area amer-gency" and " general emergency." Use of the Initial Contact Message Form -
could then be dropped, so that opera-tors fill out only one form (i.e., the checklist) for each emergency action level. The plan should also be re-vised to reflect this change (Table 1 Ill 2)
E.5 C
- 9. The siren equipment and system should X be upgraded to insure that it can be ,
activated in a timely manner (4.2.4.a).
C
- 10. Communications systems between the H.12 X
. . county monitoring teams and the county EOC should be reviewed and upgraded as necessary. This was deficient during the exercise (5.2.6.c) e
- C
- 11. Optional events should be planned into N.I.a X the scenario to avoid too much " dead time" during the day (5.2.10)
X C
- 12. The county plan, OCSCD checklists and E.1, actual practice should be consistent E.2 (Table 1. III 3).
E.1 X C
- 13. Checklists should provide space for recording required verification calls (Table 1, 111 4).
aNUREG-0654, FEMA, REP-1, Rev. 1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Part II.
bDeficiencies were not intended to be identified at the state exercise; only verification of state-selected corrective actions from previous exercises occurred.
N/R: No NUREG-0654 reference.
C C: Remedial action complete.
Is Remedial action incomplete.
N/Obj(83): Not an objective of the 1983 exercise.
N/Obj(85): Not an objective of the 1985 exercise.
C(84): Remedial action complete as a result of 5/10/84 state exercise.
e 0
, - - - - - - , , , - - - ,, , , , - , , -w-, , -
-,x es - , , ,.--,,, , . , , - , - w- + - s- ~r ,e
76 i
TABLE 4.8 Summary of Deficiencies and Recommendations to Remedy Deficiencies in Of f-Site -Radiological Emergency OCEAN COUWff FIEIA Response Preparedness at Exercises for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station: -
6/5/85 .
Deficiency Identified NUREC-0654 FEMA-REP-1 State b ,
Rev. 1 Exercise Exercise Exercise Exercise Present .
Deficiency and Status
- Reference
- 3/16/82 5/24/83 5/10/84 6/5/85 No. Recommended Corrective Action E.5, X X I
- 1. It should be verified that all schools under the jurisdiction of the super- E.6 intendent at the Stafford Elementary School have received tone alert radios (Table 1. IV 3; Sec. 2.1.1).
X X C The county should establish procedures E.5, ,
2.
to verify siren sounding (4.2.4.b; E.6 Table 1, IV 4). J.10.c I
X X
- 3. A comprehensive public education pro- J.10.c N/Obj(85) gram should be conducted, especially in light of the large transient popu-lation. Emergency procedures should i be posted in motel rooms and in public facilities. A program should be instituted to insure that both full-time and transient residents receive emergency information (4.2.4.c; Table 1, V 9). . .
X C
- 4. Calibration of monitoring instruments H.10 had not been done within the past year. Calibration should be done
- yearly (Table 1. VI 4).
X C
- 5. The county should upgrade maintenance H.10 procedures to reduce the likelihood of equipment failure (Table 1. VI 5).
X C
- 6. County-owned field monitoring equip- H.7 ment should be obtained (Table 1 VI 6).
s e
- " * * ****=ge ** e,++. ,,,,,p,,, ,,
77 TABLE 4.8 (Cont'd) 6/5/85
,' OCEAN COUWrY FIsla 9 Deficiency Identified
- FEMA-REP-1 State b Exercise Exercise Exercise Exercise Present Deficiency and Rev. 1 Status C Reference
- 3/16/82 5/24/83 5/10/84 6/5/85 No. Recommended Corrective Action
- 7. Although Ocean County is not required to have a capability to monitor radio-iodine, if it elects to do so the fol-loving should be addressed (Table 1, VI 9):
K I a) The county followed the state air I.9 N/Obj(85) sampling procedure for radio-lodine. However, the state pro-cedure 'needs to be corrected with respect to air flow rate and the calculation of activity. New
', pumps to correct the air flow probles have been ordered; their receipt should be verified.
K I b) Sampling kits should contain I.9 N/obj(85) silver soolite cartridges'.
C
- 8. The manager and workers at the decon- K.5.b I .
tamination center did not know when to stop decontamination efforts on per-sons or equipment. Additional train-
, e ing is needed (Table 1 VIII 2).
-1 C
- 9. The county monitoring teams should I.7, have the capability to monitor for I.8, radiation contamination (5.2.6.b). 1.9 C
- 10. Training regarding the reporting and K.3.a~ X maintenance of doses received by K.3.b emergency workers should be reviewed and upgraded to insure proper dose monitoring (5.2.8.a).
t I
- i
78 4
TABLE 4.8 (Cont'd)
. OCEAN COUNFT FIEIA 6/5/85 .
Deficiency Identified NUREG-0654 State
- FEMA-REP-1 Deficiency and Rev. 1 Exercise Exercise Exercise Exercise Present .
No. Recommended Corrective Action Reference
- 3/16/82 5/24/83 5/10/84 6/5/85 Status"
- 11. Location and facilities for the de- K.5.b 1 C contamination center should be re-viewed. Consideration should be given to relocating the decontamination center outside the 10-mile EPZ.
Facilities should be improved for containernt of runoff decontamination of veh)cles, and improved personnel facilities such as more showers should be considered (5.2.8.b).
It is suggested , that the systen and J.12 1 C t 12.
procedures for processing evacuees be reviewed. Plans should include facil- ,
ities for the decontamination of per-sonnel and vehicles, and security should be considered for the congre-gate care centers (5.2.7).
A.4 X 1
- 13. There was no indication that a written
- i roster was available at the Pinelands , ,
and Brick High Schools Congregate Care Shelters or at the Manahawkin decon-tamination center to assure that *
- staffing could be accomplished on a 24-hour basis. A roster should be available at these facilities to ensure 24-hour staffing capability (Sec. 2.2.2, p. 40).
A message to notify all Energency J.9, X 1 14 Workers within the 10-mile- EPZ to F.1.d -
simulate taking KI was not relayed by
< the county to all Emergency Workers and was transmitted only on the Fire Band and the Emergency Medical Service radio frequencies. The message should go to all Emergency Workers and should be transmitted on DtRAD and the RACES (Sec. 2.2.2, p. 40).
i a
I
(
I 4
e 4
79 TABLE 4.8 (Cont'd) -
- OCEAK CocWrf FIsla - 6/5/85 t
e Defteiency Identified NUREG-0654
' FEMA-REP-1 State h
- Deficiency and Rev. 1 ' Exercise Exercise Exercise Exercise Present No. Recommended Corrective Action Reference" 3/16/82 5/24/83 5/10/84 6/5/85 Statup C
- 15. Radiation monitoring personnel at the K.5.b, X 1 Pinelands High School Congregate Care 0.5 Shelter did not have adequate exper-1ence in the use of radiation moni-toring instrument operation and proper procedures for determining radiation contamination levels of individuals. .
Radiation monitor personnel should receive additional training on the operation o f t, radiation monitoring instruments and proper procedures for radiation contamination surveys (Sec.
- 2.2.2, p. 40).
aNUREG-0654, FDIA, REP-1, Rev. 1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Part II.
b Deficiencies were not intended to be identified at the state exercise; only verification of state-selected corrective actions from previous exercises occurred.
e
- N/R: No NUREG-0654 reference.
cC: Remedial action complete.
- I: Remedial action incomplete. .
N/Obj(83): Not an objective of the 1983 exercise. -
r N/Obj(85): Not an objective of the 1985 exercise.
6-C(84): Remedial action complete as a result of 5/10/84 state exercise.
t e
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1 I
80 TABLE 4.9 Summary of Deficiencies s'nd Recommendations to Remedy Deficiencies in Off-Site Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness at Exercises for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station: Ocean County Municipalities - -
s StERGEICy OPERATIOIts CElffEE 6/5/85 .
Deficiency Identified a
' NUREG-0654 b FEMA-REP-1 State Deficiency and Rev. 1, Exercise Exercise Exercise Exercise Present C
No. Recommended Corrective Action Reference" 3/16/82 5/24/83 5/10/84 6/5/85 Status Training and plarning should include 0.4.s X C 1.
more ef fective use of staff briefings A.I.d to coordinate emergency response activities (5.3.b).
Communication via EMRAD is adeq'uate, F.1.b X C 2.
but improvements should be incorpo-rated into both the system and oper-ator training to prevent the 10 to 40 minute delays which were experienced in communication between the munici-palities and Ocean County (Table 1, I 13).
C
- 3. Training is needed for Deputy Emer- 0.1 X gency Management Coordinstors at Island Heights and South. Toms River to familiarize them with their responsi-bilities should the Emergency Manage-ment Coordinator be absent during an emergency (Table 1. I 14).
C -
Security at Berkeley, Ocean Cate, Sea- H.3 X
- 4. ,
side Heights, Seaside Park and South Toms River EOCs should be improved (Table 1, I 15). ,
A more formal security system includ- H.3 X C 5.
ing written instructions should be considered to limit access of per-sonnel to the EOC (5.3.f).
H.3 C
- 6. A formal system for m"ssage handling X and internal communications should be implemented. This would assist in accurate and timely dissemination of information (5.3.a).
F.2 C
- 7. Improve communications systems so that X local police do not lose contact with first aid facilities (5.3.d).
J.10.a C
- 8. Displays and map should be improved X and provided for all EOCs. Maps J.10.b should show population distributions, evacuation routes, and relocation centers (4.3.b).
\
l .
I L 2
81 ,
TABt.E 4.9 (Cont'd) 6/5/85 a
e, ? Deficiency Identified NUREG-0654 b
- FEMA-REP-1 State Exercise Exercise Exercise Exercise Present
- Deficiency and Rev. 1, Status" Reference" 3/16/82 5/24/83 5/10/84 6/5/85 No. Recommended Corrective Action C
- 9. Training in staff notification and E.1, X activation procedures is needed at E.2, Beachwood and 1.ong Beach; police dis- 0.1 patchers did not follow planned noti-fication procedures af ter receiving an
" alert" status message from Ocean County (Table 1 II 7).
- 10. Full participation in the exercise is N.I.a necessary to develop and demonstrate emergency operations management skills.
Full participation is suggested fors (Table 1. III 5; Sec. 2.2.3, p. 43) X X I Island Heights -
C X'
Surf City C X
South Toms River
- 11. Emergency Operations Centers at Beach- H.3 wood and South Toms River Boroughs and Berkeley, Ocean and Stafford Townships e e need improvement. The Beachwood and Stafford EOCs both lack potable water
- and sewage connections and both have.
cramped working areas. The Ocean Town-
' ship EOC is within the two mile EPZ and there is no alternate f acility for the township outside the two mile area.
(Table 1, I 12; Sec. 2.2.10 X X I Beachwood C X
South Toms River C X
Berkeley C X
Stafford X C Ocean Township
- 12. Municipal EOCs within protective action X.5.a X areas should taplement . procedures to ensure that contaminated individuals are not allowed access into the EOCS.
(Table 1, VIII 6; Sec. 2.2.3) X 1 Ocean Township X I Barnegat Township X I Ocean Cate X I Pine Beach X I Beachwood X 1 Island Heights X I Dover procedures should be D.4 X
- 13. Municipal developed, including a checklist for each emergency classification (Table 1, X I III 6; Sec. 2.2.3) I j X Beachwood X I o Pine Beach Ocean Cate t~
e L "*" ..m_. . . . _ _ . . . _ _,, ,, _
82 -
9 TABLE 4.9 (Cont'd) 6/5/85 .
Deficiency Identified NUREG-0654 FDIA-REP-L State b ,
Deficiency and Rev. 1, Exercise Exercise Exercise Exercise Present .
No. Recommended Corrective Action Reference
- 3/16/82 5/24/83 5/10/84 6/5/85 Status
- 14 Lists of noninstitutionalized mobil- J.10.d X ity-impaired persons should be avail-able at each municipal EOC (Table 1 VII 2; Sec. 2.2.3)
Barnegat Township X I Pine Beach X 1 Island Heights X I Ocean Gate X 1 Dover X I
- 15. Training of emergency workers in the X.3.b X X proper use, distribution, checking and recording of information from dosin-eters is needed (5.2.8; Table 1. VIII
- 5; Sec. 2.2.3) X I Staffford X I South Toms River X I Ocean Gate
- 16. Twenty-four hour staffing by roster A.2.a should be available at each munici- A.4 '
- pality (Section 2.2.3; p. 43).
Barnegat Township X I ,
Stafford X I
- 17. The working a.es at Barnegat Township H.3 X I should be better organized to facil-itate energency operations (Sec.
2.2.3. p. 43).
I 18. Some of the early sessages were missed A.2.a
- when the communications operators were away f rom the radio (Section 2.2.3, p.
44).
- Pine Beach X I l Island Heights X I
- 19. Training is needed for newly assigned 0.4.a l Deputy Coordinators (Sec. 2.2.3, p.
44). X 1 Island Heights X I Pine Beach X 1 Barnegat Township i
I
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l
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83 TABLE 4.9 (Cont'd) p'.
Deficiency Identified 0
NUREG-0654 FE4A-REP-1 State b Rev. 1, Exercise Exercise Exercise Exercise Present Deficiency and 6/5/85 Status e Reference' 3/16/82 5/24/83 5/10/84 No. Recommended Corrective Action
- 20. The municipal EOCs should be familiar J.10.f with the procedures for administering KI (Sec. 2.2.3, p. 44). X 1 Lacey Township X 1 Ocean Township X I Barnegat Township X 1 Stafford X I Pine Beach X 1 South Toms River
- NUREG-0654 FEMA, REP-1, Rev.1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Part II.
b Deficiencies were not intended to be identified at the state exercise; only verification of state-selected corrective actions from previous exercises occurred.,
N/R: No.NUREG-0654 reference.
c:c Remedial action complete.
Remedial action incomplete.
I:
N/Obj(83): Not an objective of the 1983 exercise.
e N/obj(85): .Not an objective of the 1985 exercise.
C(84): Remedial action complete as a result of 5/10/84 state exercise.
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