Text

Amend 163 to License DPR-72,involves Rev to CR3 TS Relating to Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Mitigation,Edg Upgrade & EDG Load Rejection Test & Steady State Loads
	ML20199J286
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	01/24/1998
From:	Hebdon F; NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:	;
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References
	NUDOCS 9802050276
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t UNITED 5TATES

]

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g

WASHINGTON, D.C. SpMH001 ELORIDA POWER CORPORATION CITY 02 ALACHUA ClTY OF BUSHNEti CI"" 0F GA' 9 ESVI

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C: "Y OF K. M MME L CITY OF L EESBURG CITY OF NEW SMYRNA BEACH AND UTILTIES COMMlSSION. CITY OF NEW SMYRNA BEACH Cl"Y OF OCALA ORLANDO UTILITIES COM 15$10h AND CITY OF ORLANDO SEMINGLE ELEC1 HC C00)ERAllVE. INC.

CITY 0: TALLAMASSEE DOCKET NO. 50-302 CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 163 License No. DPR-72 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Florida Power Corporation, et al.(the licensees) dated June 14. 1997, as supplemented August 4. September 2. 17, and 25. November 5. 15. 19. and 21. and December 3, 5, 11. and 24. 1997 and January 15. and 22. 1998, com of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. plies with the standards and requirements as amended (the Act), and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I:

B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission:

C.

There is reasonable assurance (1) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations:

D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public: and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

!R o00bo2 DO P

PDR

2 2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR 72 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Soecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B as revised through Amendment No.163, are hereby incorporated in the license.

Florida Power Corporation shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l

Frederick J. He don, Director ProjectDirectorate113 Division of Reactor Projects - 1/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Chan es to the Technical S cifications Date of Issuance: January 24. 1998

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.163 i

fjCILITY OPERAVING LICENSE NO. DPR 72 DOCKET NO. 50-302 Replace the followin the attached paces. g pages of the Appendix *A" Technical Specifications with 1

The revised pages are identified b contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. y amendment number and The corresponding i

spillover pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

Bemagt Replace iii iii vii vii 3.5 4 3.5 4 3.7 9 3.7 9 3.7 10 3.7 10 3.7-11 3.7-11 3.7-12 3.7-12 3.7 12A 3.7 15 3.7-15 4

3.7 16 3.7 16 3.7 17-3.7-17 3.7 18 3.7 18*

3.7 19 3.7-19 3.7 20 3.7-20 3.7 21 3.7-21 3,7 22 3.7-22*

3.7 37 3.7-38 3.7 39*

3.8-2 3.8 2 3.8-3 3.8 3 3.8 4 3.8-4 3.8-4A 3.8 48 3.8 4C 3.8 4D 3.8 6 3.8 6 3.8 10 3.8 10 3.8 14 3.P-14 3.8 15 3.8 15 3.8 16 3.8 16 3.8-31 3.8 31 3.8 32 3.8 32 3.8 32A 3.8 328 3.8 32C*

G.

O t

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO 163 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR 72 DOCKET NO 50 302 i

i Replace the followin the attached pages. g Jages of the Appendix 'A" Technical Specifications w contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

The corresponding

sp111over pages are also provided to maihtain document completeness.

Eamoxt Etalut B 3.3 44 B 3.3 44 B 3.3 44A*

B 3.3 44B B 3.3 138 8 3.3 138 B 3.5 9 B 3.5 9 B 3.5 9A*

B 3.5 9B B 3.3 13 B 3.5 13 B 3.5 15 B 3.5 15 B 3.5 15A*

B 3.5 15B B 3.5 18 B 3.5 18 B 3.7 23 B 3.7-23 B 3.7-23A B 3.7 23B B 3.7-24 B 3.7-24 B 3.7 25 B 3.7 25 B 3.7-26 B 3.7-26 B 3.7-27 B 3.7-27 B 3.7 27A B 3.7 278 D 3.7-27C B 3.7 270 B 3.7-28 B 3.7-28*

B 3.7-31 B 3.7-31 B 3./-36A B 3.7 368 8 3.7-38 B 3.7-38 B 3.7-38,'.

B 3.7 388 B 3.7-41 B 3.7 41 B 3.7-42 B 3.7 42 B 3.7-43 8 3.7-43 B 3.7-44 B 3,7-44 B 3.7 44A*

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.163 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-72 DOCKET NO. 50 302 Replace the followin the attached pages. g pages of the Appendix *A" Technical Specifications with Tae revised pages tre identified by amendment number 6nd contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

De corresponding

spillover pages are also provided to naintain document completeness.

Remove Reolace B 3.7 44B B 3.7 47 B 3.7-47 B 3.7-48 B 3.7-48 B 3.7 48A B 3.7 4BB B 3.7 49 B 3.7 49 B 3.7 50 B 3.7 50*

B 3.7 52 B 3.7 52 B 3.7-53 B 3.7 53*

B 3.7 54 8 3.7 54 B 3.7-54Aa B 3.7 54B B 3.7-63 B 3.7 63 B 3.7 85 B 3.7 86 B 3.7 87 B 3.7-88 B 3.7 89 B 3.7 90 B 3.8 2A B 3.8 28 B 3.8-0 B 3.8 3 B 3.8 ?:*

B 3.8 3o B 3.8 8 B 3.8 8 B 3.8 9 B 3.8 9 B 3.8-10 B 3.8 10 B 3.8 10A B 3.8 10B B 3.8-11 B 3.8 11 B 3.8 12 B 3.8 12 B 3.8-13 B 3.8 13 B 3.8 14 B 3.8 14 B 3.8 14A B 3.8 14B B 3.8 15 B 3.8 15 B 3.8-18 B 3.8 18

ATTACHMENTTOLICENSEAMENDMENTNO.16)

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR 72 DOCKET NO 50 302 Replace the followin the attached pages. g oages of the Appendix 'A' Technical Specifications with Tw revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding

spillover pa9es are also provided to maintain document completeness.

Egmagg Renlace B 3.8 19 B 3.8-19 B 3.8 22 B 3.8 22 B 3.8 30 B 3.8 30 B 3.8 31 B 3.8 31 B 3.8 32 B 3.8 32 B 3.8 33 B 3.8 33 B 3.8 33A B 3.8 33B B 3.8 34 B 3.8 34 B 3.8-35 B 3.8 35 B 3.8 36 B 3.8 36 B 3.8 67A B 3.8 67B B 3.8 69 I

B 3.8 69 B 3.8 70

{

B 3.8 70 B 3,8 71 B 3.8 71 B 3.8 71A B 3.8 71B B 3.8 72 B 3.8 72 B 3.8 73 B 3.8-73 B 3.8 74 B 3.8 74 i

8 0

1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1

1 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS ReactorBuildings(continued) 3.6.6 Cooling Systems. y and Containment pra

................ 3.6 17 j

3.6.7 Containment Emergency Sump pH Control System (CPCS)..................

3.6 21 4

3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

..................... 3.7 1 3.7.1 Main Steam Safety Valves 3.7 1 Main steam Isolation Valve (MSSVs)..........

1 3.7.2 MainFeedwaterIsolationValv(M51Vs)IVs) s 3.7 4 3.7.3 TurbineSypassValves(T8Vs)..(NF es 3.7 6 3.7.4 3.7 8 3.7.5 Emergency Feedwater (EFW System.......... 3.7 9 3.7.6 Emergency Feedwater EFW Tank.

3.7 13 Nuclear Services Clos (ed ycle Cooling 3.7.7 Water (SW) System................

3.7 15 3.7.8 Decay Heat Closed Cycle Coolin l

l Nuclear) system........g Water (DC 3.7 17 3.7.9 Services Seawater System.......... 3.7 19 3.7.10 Decay Heat Seawater System............. 3.7 21 3.7.11 Ultimate Heat Sink (UH5).............. 3.7 23 3.7.12 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS)

................. 3.7 24 3.7.13 Fuel Storage Pool Water Level 3.7-27 3.7.14 Spent Fuel Pool toren Concentration 3.7 28 3.7.15 Spent Fuel Assembly Storage 3.7 30 -

3.7.16 secondary Specific Activity 3.7-34 3.7.17 Steam Generator Level 3.7 35 3.7.18 Control Complex Cooling System........... 3.7-37 l

3.8.

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS................ 3.8 1

^

3.8.1 AC Sources-0perating

......... 3.8 1 3.8.2 AC Sources-Shutdown................ 3.8 11 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel 011, Lube 011, and Starting Air 3.8 14 3.8.4 DC Sources-0>erating

............... 3.8 17 3.8.5 DC Sources-5 )utdown................ 3.8 21 3.8.6 Battery Cell Parameters

.............. 3.8 23 3.8.7 Inverters-0perating................ 3.8 17 3.8.8 Inverters-Shutdown

................ 3.8 29 3.8.9 Distribution Systems-0perating 3.8 31 3.8.30 Distribution Systems-5)utdown........... 3.8 33 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS.................. 3.9 1 3.9.1 Boron Ccncentration

................ 3.9 1 3.9.2 Nuclear Instrumentation

.............. 3.9-2 3.9.3 Containment Penetratiens.............. 3.94 3.9.4 Decay Heat Removal (DHR) and Coolant Circulation-High Water Level.......... 3.9 6 3

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 111 Amendment No.163

TABLE OF CONTENTS B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS Containment Serge (continued)H Control (CPCS).... B 3.6 B 3.6.7 ncy Sump p B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

..................... B 3.7-1 B 3.7.1 Main Steam Safety Valves Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSSVs).......... B 3.71 5 3.7.2 Main Feedwater Isolation Valv(MSIVs) s

........ B 3.7-7 8 3.7.3 Turbine Bysass Valves (TBVs)..(MFIVs) es

...... B 3.7-13 t 3.7.4

.......... B 3. 7 19 B 3.7.5 Emergency feedwater (EFW System.......... B 3.7 23 Emergency Feedwater Tank)(EFT 2).......... B 3.7-32 8 3.7.6 B 3.7.7 Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling Water System (SW)................ B 3.7 36 B 3.7.8 Decay Heat closed Cycle Cooling Water S Nuclear Services Seawater System... ystem.... B 3.7 41 B 3.7.9

....... B 3.7 46 B 3.7.10 Decay Heat Seawater System B 3.7.11 Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS).............. B 3.7 51

. B 3.7-56 8 3.7.12 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREYS)

................. B 3. 7 60 8 3.7.13 Fuel Sterage Pool Water Level

........... B 3.7 66 8 3.7.14 Spent Fuel Pool Boron Concentration........ B 3.7-69 B 3.7.15 Spent Fuel Assembly Storage............ B 3.7 72 B 3.7.16 Secondary Specific Activity...........

8 J.7-77 8 3.7.17 Steam Generator Level

............... B 3.7-81 8 3.7.18 ControlComplexCoolingSystem...........B3.785l B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS................ B 3.8 1 B 3.8.1 AC Sources-0>erating AC Sources-51utdown................ B 3.8-1 B 3.8.2

.... B 3.8 24 8 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel 011, Lube Oil, and Starting Air.... B 3.8-30 8 3.8.4 DC Sources-Operating DC Sources-Shutdown................ B 3.8 39 8 3.8.5

... B 3.8 49 8 3.8.6 Battery Cell Parameters Inverters-0>erating................ B 3.8 52 B 3.8.7

.... B 3.8-59 B 3.8.8 Inverters-S tutdown................ B 3.8 64 8 3.8.9 Distribution Systems-0)erating

.......... B 3.8 67 B 3.8.10 Distribution Systems-S tutdown........... B 3.8 77 8 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS.................. B 3.9 1 B 3.9.1 Boron Concentration

................B3.91 B 3.9.2 Nuclear Instrumentation B 3.9.3 Containment Penetrations...........

.. B 3.9 5

.. B 3.9 9 B 3.9.4 Decay Heat Removal (DHR) and Coolant Circulation-High Water Level.......... B 3.914 8 3.9.5 Decay Heat Removal (DHR) and Coolant Circulation-Low Water Level

.......... B 3. 9 18 8 3.9.6 Refueling Canal Water Level

............ B 3.9 23 Crystal River Unit 3 vii Amendment No.163

ECCS-Operating 3.5.2 i

1 3.5 EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS) 3.5.2 ECCS-Operating i

LC0 3.5.2 Two ECCS trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICA8ILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One or more trains A.1 Verify the turbine 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months inoperable.

driven emergency feedwater pump and 3

associated flow path an are OPERABLE.

At least 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent E

E to a single OPERABLE ECCS train available.

A.2 Restoretrain(s)to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OPERA 8LE status.

8.

Required Action and 8.1 Be in MODE 3.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time not met.

E i

8.2 Be in MODE 4, 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months i

l

{

l l

1 Crystal River Unit 3 3.5-4 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only i

I t

-=

e

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- -.-. -. -,-~ --

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[FW System 3e7e5 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.5 Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System f

LC0 3.7.5 Two EFW trains shall be OPERABLE.

I i

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, t, 3.

ACTIONS l

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION CONPLET!0N 11ME i

A.

One steam supply to A.)

Restore steam supply 7 days the turbine driven EFW to OPERABLE status.

pump inoperable.

E 10 days from discovery of 4

failure to meet the LC0 a

B.

ASV 5 inoperable.

B.1 Restore ASV-5 to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months i

OPERABLE status.

E unt j

10 days from 4

i discovery of failure 4

to meet the LCO 4

i (continued) 4 4

4 4

Crystal R3ver Unit 3 3.7-9 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only 1

EfW System 3.7.5 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.

EFV-12 inoperable.

C.1 Verify the following I hour are OPERABLE:

QB

1. Train 'B' EFV 13 inoperable.

Emergency Diesel Generator, QB 2.

Train 'B' AC Electrical Power ASV-204 inoperable.

Distribution subsystem, and unt 3.

Train '8' AC l

Vital Bus Subsystem MQ C.2 Restore affected 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months equipment to OPERABLE status.

AtiQ 10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO (continued) i Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-10 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

EFW System 3.7.5 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D.

Turbine drive EFW pump D.1 Verify the following I hour

[

or associated flow are OPERABLE:

path inoperable for

1. SWP 18, reasons other than

2. Train 'B' of the Condition A.

Nuclear Services Seawater System,

3. CHHE.18, and

4. CHP-16.

d M

D.2 Verify both trains of I hour the following are OPERABLE:

1. ECCS,

2. Decay Heat Closed en Cycle Cooling,

3. Decay Heat

Seawater,

4. Emergency Diesel Generators,

5. AC Electrical Power Distributiors Subsystems, and

6. AC Vital Bus Subsystems.

M D.3 Restore Turbine 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months driven EFW pump and associated flow path AliQ to OPERABLE status.

10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-11 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only 4

9

EFW System 30705 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION CONPLETION TINE E.

Motor driven EFW pump E.1 Restore motor driven 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or associated flow EFW pump and unt path inoperable.

associated flow path AliQ to OPERABLE status.

10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LC0 F.

Required Action and F.1 Re in Mode 3.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A.

AND nott B, C, D, or E not met.

F.2 Be in Mode 4.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months G.

Two EFW trains G.1 Initiate action to Immediatelylam inoperable, restore one EFW train to OPERABLE status, i

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY bR 3.7.5.1 Verify each EFW manual power operated, and 45 days automaticvalveineackwaterflewpathat:d in both steam supply flow paths to the turbine driven pump, that is not locked, sealed or othenvise secured in position, isinlhecorrectposition.

SR 3.7.5.t

--- --- NOTE-- --------- --- --

Not required to be performed for the turbine driven EFW pump,tntil 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after entering MODE 3.

Verify the developed head of each EFW pump 45 days on a at the flow test point is creater than or STAGGERED TEST equal to the required developed head.

BASIS (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 3.7 12 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

EFW System 3.7.5

$URVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

$URVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.1.5.3

--- MOTE-Not required to be performed until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months j

after entering MODE 3.

I Verify each EFW automatic valve that is not 24 months locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, actuates to the correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

SR 3.7.5.4

NOTE Not required to be performed until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after entering MODE 3.

l Verify each EFW pump starts automatically 24 months on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

SR 3.7.5.5 Verify proper alignment of the EFW flow Prior to pcths by verifying flow from the EFW tank entering MODE 2 to each steam generator, whenever plant has been in MODE 5 or 6 for

> 30 days Crystal River Unit ?,

3.7-12A Amendment "o.163

~

n,.-

+

i SW System 3.7.7 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.7 Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling Water (SW) System LC0 3.7.7 The SW System shall be OPERABLE with:

a. Two OPERABLE emergency SW pumps and

b. Three OPERABLE SW heat exchangers.

APPLICA61LITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

SWP 1B inoperable.

A.1

.-- NOTE - ------

This inction f s not applicable in MODE 4.

Verify the turbine I hour driven emergency son feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE.

AtiQ A.2 Restore SWP 1B to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OPERABLE status B.

SWP 1A inoperable.

B.1 Restore SWP 1A and SW 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months heater exchanger to non DR OPERABLE status.

One required SW heat exchanger incu rable (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-15 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

,e SW System 3.7.7 s

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACil0N COMPLETION TINE C.

Recuired Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months I ant associated Com Time not met. pletion AND C.2 Be in MODE 5.

36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months l arm i

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMEllTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.7.1

-- -----NOTE--------------------

Isolation of SW flow to individual components does not render the SW System inoperable.

Verify each SW manual, power operated and 31 days automatic valve in the flow path servlcin essential equipment, that is not locked, g sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

SR 3.7.7.2

-- ---< NOTE- --- -------------

Not applicable in MODE 4.

Verify each SW automatic valve in the flow 24 months path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, actuates to the correct position on an actual or i

simulated actuation signal.

SR 3.7.7.3

---NOTE ------- ---- --.---

Not applicable in MODE 4.

Verify each SW pump starts automatically on 24 months an actual or simulated actuation signal.

Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-16 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

DC System 4

3.7.8 4

3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.8 Decay Heat t

.ed Cycle Cooling Water (DC) System LC0 3.7.8 The DC trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

. ACTIONS u

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TINE A.

One DC train A.1

NOTE--- ----

inoperable.

This Action is not applicable in MODE 4.

Verify the turbine 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months driven emergency amt feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE.

AND A.2

---NOTE--------

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LC0 3.4.5, 'RCS Loops MGOE 4 " for required decay heat removal loo >s made inoperable

>y DC train inoperability.

Restore DC train to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OPERA 8LE status.

(continued) l Crystal River Unit 3 3.7 17 Amendment No. int NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 hTy

~__._, '

DC Systen 3.7.8 1

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 8.

Required Action and B.1 Be in Mode 3 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time not met.

Atul B.2 Be in Mode 5.

36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months i

4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 1

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.8.1 NOTE--------------------

Isolation of DC flow to individual components does not render the DC System inoperable.

Verify each DC manual and power operated 31 days valve in the flow path servicing safety related equipment that is not locked sealed,orotherwIsesecuredinpositIon, is in the correct position.

SR 3.7.8.2

NOTE--------------------

i Not applicable in MODE 4.

Verify each DC pump starts automatically on 24 months an actual or simulatet actuation signal, Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-18 Amendment No.163

Nuclear Services Seawater Systen 3.7.9 3.7 PLANT SYSTi.M5 1

3.7.9 Nuclear 3ecticos Seawater System t

LC0 3.7.9 Two Nuclear Services Seawater System trains shall be OPERABLE.

1 APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS i

l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 3-A.

Train "B" of the A.1

NOTE---------

Nuclear Services This Action is not i

Seawater System applicable in MODE 4.

inoperable.

Verify the turbine I hour i

driven emergency unt feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE.

AND A.2 Restore Train "B" of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months the Nuclear Services Seawater System to j

OPERABLE status.

I i

B.. Train "A" of the B.1 Restore Train 'A' of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Nuclear Services the Nuclear Services ont i

Seawater System Seawater System to inoperable.

OPERABLE status.

(continued) i Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-19 Amendment No.163 4

NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

Nuclear Services Seawater Systea 1

3.7.9 I

ACTIONS (conticoed) t CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TINE 4

C.

Required Action and C.1 Be in Mode 3 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months I unt associated Completion 4

Time not met.

Alg1 C.2 Be in Mode 5.

36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months um i

l l

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS j

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY t

SR 3.7.9.1

NOTE--------------------

Isolation of Nuclear Services Seawater System flow to individual components does not render the Nuclear Services Seawater System inoperable.

Verify each Nuclear Services Seawater 31 days System manual valve in the flow path servicing safety related equipment, that is i

not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

i-SR 3.7.9.2

NOTE--------------------

l Not applicable in MODE 4.

l' Verify each Emergency Nuclear Services 24 months Seawater System pump starts automatically

[

on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

J-l i

I i

)

l Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-20 Amendment No.163 f

NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only i

i

Decay Heat Seawater Systea 3.7.10 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.10 Decay Heat Seawater System LC0 3.7.10 Two Decay Heat Seawater System trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: -MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITICH RFQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One Decay Heat A.1

NOTE---------

Seawater System train This Action is not inoprable, applicable in MODE 4.

Verify the turbine I hour driven emergency son feedwater pump and l

associated flow path are OPERABLE.

AHQ A.2

NOTE---------

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LC0 3.4.5, "RCS Loops-M00E 4," for required decay heat removal loops made inoperable by Decay Heat Seawater System l

train inoperability.

Rnstore Decay Heat 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Seawater stem train to OPERAB status.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-21 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

Decay Heat Seawater Systea 3.7.10 l

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i

8.

Required Action and B.1 Be in Mode 3 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Com Time not met. pletion Alg1 B.2 Be in Mode 5.

36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months i

j SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY.

SR 3.7.10.1 Verify each Decay Heat Seawater System 31 days manual valve in the flow path servicing safety related equipment, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

SR 3.7.10.2

NOTE--------------------

Not applicable in MODE 4.

4 Verify each Decay Heat Seawater System pump 24 months starts automatically on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-22 Amendment No.163

Control Complex Cooling Systea 3.7.18 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.18 Control Complex Cooling System LCO 3.7.18 Control Complex Cooling System shall be OPERABLE with:

a.

Two OPERABLE chillers and associated pumps; and b.

Two OPERABLE heat exchangers.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 DuringmovementofIrradiatedfuelassemblies.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRE 0 ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

CHHE-1B inoperable A.1

NOTE---------

E This Action is not

!!!.!!!.I.!".

.b CHP-1B inoperable.

Verify the turbine I hour driven emergency feedwater pt p and associated ow path are OPERABLE.

MQ am A.2 Restore CHHE-1B and 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months CHP-1B to OPERABLE status.

B.

CHHE-1A inoperable.

B.1 Restore CHHE-1A, CHP-7 days IA and Control DE Com>1ex Coolin<

heat exc1 anger to O ERABLE CHP-1A inoperable.

status.

E One required Control Com) lex Cooling heat exc1 anger inoperable.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-37 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only 9

control Complex Cooling System 3.7.18 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.

Required Action and C.1 Place Control Complex Innediately associated Completion Cooling System in Time of Condition A or operation.

Condition 8 not met t

durino movement of 98 1rradlated fuel assemblies.

C.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies.

D.

Required Action and D.1 Be in Mode 3.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A or atH1 Condition 8 not met during MODES 1, 2, 3, D.2 Be in Mode 5.

36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months or 4.

E.

Any combination of E.1 Enter LC0 3.0.3 Ismediately components rendering the Control Complex Cooling System inolerable during MOD ES 1, 2, 3, or 4.

F.

Any combination of F.1 Suspend movement of Immediately components rendering irradiated fuel the Control Complex assemblies.

Cooling System inoperable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-38 Amendment No.163 J

A

Control Complex Cooling Systea 3.7.18 i

i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.18.1 Verify each chilled water pump's developed In accordance i

head at the flow test point is greater than with the or equal to the required developed head.

Inservice Testing Program i

SR 3.7.18.2 Verify the recundant capability of the 24 months i

Control Complex Cooling System to remove j

the assumed heat load.

a j

i 1

t 4

i Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-39 Amendment No.163 4

e n,

y

AC Sources-Operating 3,8.1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i

A.

(continued)

A.3 Restore required 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months offsite circuit to 1

OPERABLE status E

6 days from discovery of failure to meet 100 B.

Train "A" EDG B.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months I mm:

inoperable.

for OPERABLE offsite circuit (s).

E 4

Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter E

B.2

NOTE---------

This Action is not applicable in MODE 4.

mg Verify the turbine I hour driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE.

E B.3 Declare required 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months I am:

feature (s), supported from by the' iaoperable discovery EDG, inoperable when of Condition B its redundant concurrent with required feature (s) inoperability of are inoperable.

redundant required E

feature (s)

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-2 Amendmet No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

AC Sources--Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 4

8.

(continued)

B.4.1 Determine OPERABLE 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months lunt EDG is not inoperable due to common cause failure.

98 8.4.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months I not i

for OPERABLE EDG.

AND B.5 Restore EDG to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months l poa OPERABLE status AND 6 days from discovery of failurn to meet

_.. _..L (costimied) f Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-3 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

AC Sourcer-Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.

Train "8" EDG C.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months inoperable, for OPERABLE offsite circuit (s).

MQ once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter

]

C.2

NOTE--------

This Action is not applicable in MODE 4.

Verify the following are OPERABLE:

I hour 1.

Turbine driven mmt emergency feodwater pump and associated flow path, 2.

ASV-204, 3.

EFV-l?, and 4.

EFV-13 MD C,3 Declare required feature (s), supported 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months from by the inoperable discovery of EDG, inoperable when Condition B its redundant concurrent required feature (s) with are Inoperable.

inoperability of redundant AND required feature (s)

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-4 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

s AC Sources-Operating 3,8,1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.

(continued)

C.4.1 Determine OPERABLE 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months EDG is not inoperable due to common cause failure.

E C.4.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for OPERABLE EDG.

non E

C.5 Restore EDG to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OPERABLE status.

E 6 days from discovery of failure to meet LCO D.

Two required offsite 0.1 Declare required 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Inou circuits inoperable.

featura(s) inoperable from when its redundant discovery of required feature (s)

Condition D Inou are inoperable, concurrent with inoperability of redundant required E

feature (s)

D.2 Restore one required offsite circuit to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months non OPERABLE status.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-4A Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

AC Sources--Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E.

One required offsite

NOTE------------

I unt circuit inoperable.

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of AND LCO 3.8.9, " Distribution Systems Operating," when Train 'A' EDG Condition E is entered with l unt inoperable, no AC power source to one train.

E.1

NOTE---------

This Action is not applicable in MODE 4.

Verify the turbine I hour driven emergency unt feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE.

&HQ E.2 Restore required 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months offsite circuit to OPERABLE status.

QB E.3 Restore EDG to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months I amt OPERABLE status.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-4B Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

AC Sources-Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F.

One required offsite

NOTE circuit inoperable.

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO MD 3.8.g, " Distribution Systems Operating," when Condition F Train 'B' EDG is entered with no AC power inoperable, source to one train.

F.1

NOTE--------

This Action is not applicable in MODE 4.

Verify the following I hour are OPERABLE:

1.

Turbine driven non emergency feedwater pump i

and associated flow path, 2.

ASV-204, 3.

EFV-12, and 4.

EFV-13 MQ F.2 Restore required 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months offsite circuit to OPERABLE status.

Oft F.3 Restore EDG to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months OPERABLE status.

4 (continued) 4 Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-4C Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid until Cycle 12 Only

AC Sources--Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME G.

Two EDGs inoperable.

G.1 Restore one E 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months I unt OPERABLE statDG to us.

H.

Required Action and H.1 8e in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months I unt associated Completion Time of Condition A,

&HQ B, C, D, E, F, or G unt not met.

H.2 Be in MODE 5.

36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months I.

Three or more required 1.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3 ImmediatelM unt AC sources inoperable.

i Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-4D Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

AC Sources--Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.3

NOTES-------------------

1.

EDG loadings may include gradual loading as recommended by the mar.ufacturer.

2.

Momentary transients outside the load rangs do not invalidate this test.

3.

This Surveillance shall be conducted on only one EDG at a time, 4.

This SR shall be preceded by and immediately follow, without shutdown, a successful performance of SR 3.8.1.2 or SR 3.8.1.6.

Verify each EDG operates for 160 minutes 31 days at a load 2 2600 kW and s 2850 kW.

SR 3.8.1.4 Verify each day tank contains 1280 gal of 31 days I

fuel oil l

SR 3.8.1.5 Verify the fuel oil transfer system 31 days operates to automatically transfer fuel oil from the storage tank to the day tank.

(continued) i i

Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-6 Amendment No.163

AC Sources--Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.11

NOTES--------------------

1.

Momentary transients outside the load range do not invalidate this test.

2.

This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2.

However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

Verify each EDG operates for 160 minutes 24 months at a load 2 3300 kW and 5 3400 kW.

I Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-10 Amendment No.163

Diesel Fuel 011, Lube 011, and Starting Air 3.8 3 0

3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.3 Diesel fuel 011, Lube 011, and Starting Af LCO 3.8.3 The stored diesel fuel oil lube oil and startino air subsystem shall be within limits for,each require 3 emergency dieselgenerator(EDG).

APPLICABILITY:

When associated EDG is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTIONS

..................................... NOTES------------------------------

1.

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each EDG.

l 2.

LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One EDG with stored A.1 Verify combined I hour fuel oil level stored fuel oil level

< 22,6,3 917 al and

> 45,834 gal, i

> 19, al in storage t nk.

B.

One or more EDGs with B.1 Restore fuel oil 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months stored fuel cil level level to rithin

< 22,917 al and limits.

> 19,643 al in storage t nk.

AtlQ i

Combined stored fuel oil level < 45,834 gal,

i i

C.

With stored EDG lube C.1 Restore lube oil 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months oil inventory < 280 inventor gal and > 24b gal.

limits. y to within QB Declare both EDGs inoperable.

(continued)

J Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-14 Amendment No.163 v -

Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube 011, and Starting Air 3.8.3 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l

D.

One or more EDGs with D.1 Restore fuel oil 7 days stored fuel oil total total particulates to I

particulates not within limits.

within limit.

E.

One or more EDGs with E.1 Restore stored fuel 30 days i

new fuel oil oil properties to properties not within within limits.

limits.

F.

One or more EDGs with F.1 Restore starting air 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months I

starting air receiver receiver pressure to pressure < 225 psig within limits, and 2 160 psig.

G.

Required Action and G.1 Declare associated Immediately I

associated Completion EDG inoperable.

Time not met.

E One or more EDGs with diesel fuel oil, lube oil, or starting air subsystem not within limits for reasons other than Condition A, B, C, D, E, or F.

l i

Crystal River Unis ;

3.8-15 Amendment No.163 e

Diesel Fuel 011, Lube 011, and Starting Air 308.3 i

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.3.1 Verify each fuel oil storage tank contains 31 days t 22,g17 gal of fuel and combined fuel oil storage level 145,834 gal, SR 3.8.3.2 Verify EDG lube oil inventory is 2 280 gal.

31 days l

I SR 3.8.3.3 Verify fuel oil properties of new and In accordance stored fuel oil are tested in accordance with the Diesel with, and maintained within the limits of, Fuel 011 the Diesel Fuel 011 Testing Program.

Testing Program SR 3.8.3.4 Verify each EDG air start receiver pressure 31 days is 2 225 psig.

l l

i I

i Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-16 Amendment No.163

i Distribution Systems-Operating 3.8.9 i

3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTENS 3.8.9 Distribution Systems-Operating LC0 3.8.9 Train A and Train 8 AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

a

{

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS i

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TINE i

A.

Train "A" AC A.I

NOTE---------

i electrical power This Action is not distribution subsystem applicable in MODE 4.

inoperable.

4 Verify the turbine I hour driven emergency-an feedwater pump and -

associated flow path are OPERABLE.

I L

8 21 A.2 Restore AC electrical-8 hours L

power distribution subsystem to OPERABLE Agl status.

l 16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months from discovery of failure to meet LCO j

(continued) i 4

i i

Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-31 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only i

Distribution Systers-Operating 3.8.9 ACTIONS (cor.tinued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION

. COMPLETION TIME-B.

Train 'B' AC 8.1

--NOTE----- ---

electrical power This Action is not distrioution subsystem applicable in MODE 4.

inoperable.

Verify the following I hour are OPERABLE:

1.

Turbine driven emergency feedwatar pump and associated um:

flow path,

2. ASV-204, 3.

EFV-12, path 4.

EFV-13, M

B.2 Restore AC electrical 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months power distrib:Jtion subsystem to OPERABLE E

status.

16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months from discovery of failure to meet LCO (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-32 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

Distribution Systers-Operating 3.8.9 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.

Train 'A' AC vital bus C.1

NOTE---------

subsystem inoperable This Act'on is not applicable in MODE 4.

Verify the turbine I hour driven emergency son feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE.

M C.2 Restore AC vital bus 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months l

subsystem to OPERABLE status.

M l

16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months from discovery of failure to meet LCO (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-32A Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

Distribution Systems-0perating 308e9 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D.

Train "B" AC Vital Bus D.1

NOTE---------

subsystem inopers.ble.

This Action is not applicable in MODE 4.

Verify the following I hour are OPERABLE:

1.

Turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated am flow ' path, 2.

ASV-204, 3.

EFV-12 EFV-13, and 4.

E D.2 Restore AC vital bus 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months subsystem to OPERABLE status.

E 16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months from discovery of failure to meet LCO E.

One DC electrical E.1 Restore DC electrical 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months laon power distribution power distribution rubsystem inoperable.

subsystem to OPERABLE E

status.

16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months from discovery of failure to meet LCO F.

Required Action and F.1 Be in MODE 3.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months i non associated Completion Time not met.

M F.2 Be in MODE 5.

36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months Iam (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-328 Amendment No. 163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

Distribution Systers-Operating 3.8.9 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION ~ TIME G.

Two trains with G.I Enter LCO 3.0.3 IsmediatelyInoit inoperable distribution subsystems that result in a loss of function.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURviiLLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.9.1 Verify correct breaker alignments and 7 days voltage to required AC, DC, and AC vital i

bus electrical power distribution subsystems.

Crystal River Unit 3 3.8-32C Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

ESAS Instrumentation B 3.3.5 8 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 8 3.3.5 EngineeredSafeguardsActuationSystem(ESAS) Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The ESAS initiates Engineered Safeguards (ES) Systems, based on the values of selected plant parameters, to protect core design and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits and to mitigate accidents.

ESAS actuates the following:

a.

HighPressureInjection(HPI);

b.

Low Pressur2 Injection (LPI);

c.

Reactor Building (RB) Isolation and Cooling; d.

RB Spray; e.

Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Start; and f.

Control complex normal recirculation.

ESAS also provides two signals to the Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) System. &.e signal initiates emergency feedwater (EFW) when an actuation of HPI Channel A and HPI Channel B is present. The other functions to trip the motor driven emergency feedwater pump when an RCS Pressure-Low Low initiation coincident with a loss of offsite power is present.

This trip signal may be manually defeated in certain small break LOCA scenarios. Assuming the single failure of the turbine driven feedwater pump or associated flow path in such circumstances, defeating this trip signal would maintain steam generator cooling with the motor um i

driven emergency feedwater pump. Prior to defeating the trip signal, sufficient capability on the emergency diesel generators to power the required loads would be established as discussed in the BASES for Technical Specification 3.7.5.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.3-44 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

ESAS Irstrumentation B 3.3.5 BASES BACKGROUND The ESAS operates in a distributed manner to initiate the A

(continued) appropriate systems. The ESAS does this by monitoring RCS pressure actuation parameters in each of three channels and RB pressure actuation in each of six channels (3 per actuation train). Once the setpoint for actuation is reached, the signal is transmitted to automatic actuation logics, which perform the two-out-of-three logic for actuation of each end device. However, all automatic actuation logics receive signals from the same channels for each parameter.

Four parameters are used for actuation:

Low Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure; a.

i (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.3-44A Amendment No.163 l

. -, _ =. _ -..

d ESAS Instrumentation B 3.3.5 BASES s

i 4

4 i

i 4

i i

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 4

1 t

4 4

1 I

(continued) 1 Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.3-44B Amendment No.163 l

PAM Instrumentation i

B 3.3.17 BASES LC0

18. Core Exit Temnerature (Backun)

(continued) followine a steam generator tube rupture or small breakLOCA. Operator actions to maintain a controlled cooldown,suchasadjusting0TSG1evelorpressure, would be prompted by this indication.

19.

Eu ronnev Feedwater D 3 EFW Flow instrumentation is provided to monitor operation of decay heat removal via the OTSGs. Ths EFW injection flow to each OTSG (2 channels per OTSG, one associated with each EFW injection line is detemined from a differential pressure meas)urement calibrated to a span of 0 gpa to 1000 spa. Each differential pressure transmitter provides an input to a control room indicator and the plant computer.

EFW Flow is used by the operator to determine the need to throttle flow during acident or transient

- conditions to prevent excessive RCS cooldown rates l

when low decay heat levels are present.

EFW Flow is also used by the operator to verify that the EFW System is delivering the correct flow to each OTSG.

However, the primary indication of this function is provided by OTSG 1evel.

These instruments are not assumed to provide information required by the operator to take a mitigation action specified in the safety analysis.

As such, they are not Type A variables. However, the monitors are deemed risk significant (Category 1) and are included within the LC0 based upon this consideration.

4 (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.3-138 Amendment No.163 1

9

-,.m._

.,w.

..,r.---_,_---..,.-----..-..o

,.,,m

ECCS-Operating 8 3.5.2 8 3.5 EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)

B 3.5.2 ECCS-Operating BASES BACKGROUND The function of the ECCS is to provide core cooling to ensure that the reactor cere is protected after any of the following accidents:

1.

Loss of coolant accident (LOCA);

2.

Steamgeneratortuberupture(SGTR): and 3.

Steamlinebreak(SLB).

There are two modes of ECCS operation:

injection and recirculation.

In the injection phase, all injection is 1

boratedwt.terstoragetank(BWST). initially added to the Ree from the This injection added via the RCS cold legs and core flood nozzles to the reactor vessel. After the BWST has been depleted to s 15 feet but > 7 feet, the ECCS recirculation phase is entered as the ECCS suction is manually transferred to the reactor butiding emergency sump.

Two redundant,100% capacity trains are provided.

Each train consists of h1 ressureinjection(HPI)1,t,and3,

-and low pressure irjection (

subsystems.

In MODES

>otle trains must be E BLE. This ensures that 100% of the core cooling requirements can be provided even in the event of a single active failure.

Certain size-small break LOCA scenarios-require emergency I

feedwater to maintain steam ponerator cooling until core decay heat can be removed so ely by ECCS cooling.

Further, with the turbine driven EFW pump or associated-M flow path inoperable, SWP-1B, train "8 of the Nuclear Services Seawater System, CHHE-18, and CHP-18, as well as both trains of ECCS, Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water, Decay Heat Seawater, Emergency Diesel Generators, AC Electrical Power Distribution Subsystem, and AC Vital Bus SubsystemsarerequiredOPERABLE(Ref5).

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.5-g Amendment No.162 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 only

m

_._ _.~.. -.. _. _.. _. _ _.

ECCS-Operating 8 3.5.2 BASES BACKGROUND A suction header supplies water from the BWST or the reactor (continued) building emergency sump to the ECCS pumps. Separate piping sup>1ies each train.

Each HPI subsystem discharges into eac1 of the four RCS cold legs between the reactor coolant pump and the reactor vessel. Each LPI subsystem discharges into its associated core flood nozzle on the reactor vessel and discharges into the vessel downcomer area. Control valves are set to balance the HP! flow to the RCS. This flow balance directs sufficient flow to the core to meet the analysis assumptions following a small break LOCA in one of the RCS cold legs near an HPI nozzle.

The HPI pumps are ca)able of discharging to the RCS at an RCS pressure above tie opening setpoint of the pressurizer l

i (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.5 9A Amendment No.163

ECCS-Operatin B 3.5.

BASES THIS PAGE IN1ENT10NALLY LEFT BLANK e

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.5 9B Amendment No.163

-~v.

~~ ~

~^

ECCS-Operating B 3.5.1 SA5ES i

LC0 Conversely, not all portions of the HP! system satisfy the (continued) independence criteria discussed above. Specifically, the HPI system downstream of the HPI/ Makeup pumps is not separable into two distinct trainJ, and is therefore, not independent. This conclusion is based upon analysis which shows, that in the event of a postulated break in the HPI injection piping, injection flow is required through a minimumofthree(3)haminimumoftwo(2)injectionlegs, injection legs, assuming one pump operation, or throug assuming two HPI pump operation. When considering the impact of inoperabilities in this portion of the system, the same concept of maintaining single active failure protection must be applied. When components become inoperable, an assessment of the HPI systems ability to perform its safety function must be performed.

If the system can continue to perfom its safety function, without assuming a single active failure, then the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months %ss of redundancy ACTION is appropriate.

If the inoperability renders the system, as is, incapable of performing its safet postulating a single active failure, y function, withoutthen the plant is in a condition outside the safety analysis and must enter LC0 3.0.3 immediately.

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, an ECCS train consists of an HPI subsystem and an LPI subsystem. Each train includes the piping instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path ca,pable of taking suction from the BWST upon an ESAS signal and manually transferring suction to the reactor building emergency sump.

During an event requiring ECCS actuation, a flow path is provided to ensure an abundant supply of water frosi the BWST to the RCS via the HPI and LPI pumps and their respective discharge flow paths to each of the four cold leg injection nozzles and the reactor vessel.

In the long tem this flow path may be manually transferred to take its supply from the reactor. butiding emergency sump and to supply its flow to the RC5 via two paths, as described in the Background' section.

The flow path for each train must maintain its designed degree of independence to ensure that no single active failure can disable both ECCS trains.

O tinued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.5-13 Amendment No.163

1;-

ECCS-Operating j

B 3.5.2 i

BASES (continued) i i

ACTIONS M

With one or more ECCS trains inoperable and at least 100% of the flow e available,quivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train i

prompt action within I hour is necessary to i

i ensure that the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERA 8LE for steam generator i

cooling.

If the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump or i.

associated flow path is not OPERABLE, then the capability to remove sufficient core decay heat can not be assured and Condition 8 is applicable. Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1, OPERASILITY is verified by 4

am ensuring the associated surveillance (s) has been i

satisfactorily completed within the required frequency and j

the equipment is not otherwise known to be inoperable.

I j

Due to the severity of the consequences should a small break LOCA occur in these conditions, the I hour Completion Time j

to verify the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and I

associated flow path are OPERABLE ensures that prompt action will be taken to confirm core decay heat removal capability.

The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is 3

potentially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions.

1 U

i 1

With one or more ECCS trains inoperable and at least 100% of 1

the flow e available,quivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train I

the inoperable components must be returned to L

OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion 4

Time is based on NRC recommendations (Ref. 3) that are based i

on a risk evaluation and is a reasonable time for many-j repairs.

An ECCS train is inoperable if it is not capable of delivering the design flow to the RCS.

i 4

i The LCO requires the OPERABILITY of a number of independent subsystems. Due to the redundancy of trains and the diversity of subsystems, the inoperability of one component in a train does not render the ECCS incapable of performing its function. Neither does the inoperability of two different components, each in a different train, necessarily result in a loss of function for the ECCS.

The intent of this Condition is to maintain a combination of equipment i

~

(continued)

Crys.tal River Unit 3 8 3.5-15 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only s

ECCS-Operating B 3.5.2 BASES ACTIONS Al (continued)

Inott such that the safety injection of a single train remains availa(SI) flow equivalent to 100%

ble. This allows increased flexibility in plant operations under circumstances when components in opposite trains are inoperable.

An event accomsanied by a loss of offsite power and the failure of an EDG can disable one ECCS train until power is restored. A reliability analysis (Ref. 3) has shown the risk of having one full ECCS train inoperable to be sufficiently low to justify continued operation for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

With one or more components inoperable such that the flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train is not available, the facility is in a condition outside the accident analyses. Therefore, LCO 3.0.S must be immediately entered.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.5-15A Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

ECCS-Operatinf 8 3.5.

BASES THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BL g

=---

.

,r Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.5-158 Amendment No. g

t ECCS-Operating 8 3.5.2 BASES i

SURVEILLANCE sR 3.5.2.5 REQUIREMENTS (continued)_

This Surveillance ensures that these valves are in the proper position to prevent the HPI pump from exceeding its l

runout limit. This 24 month Frequency is acceptable based l

on consideration of the design reliability (and confirming operating experience) of the equipment.

i 1R 3.5.2.6 4

This Surveillance ensures that the flow controllers for the i

LPI throttle valves will automatically control the LPI train flow rate in the desired range and prevent LPI pump runout as RCS pressure decreases after a LOCA.

The 24 month Frequency is acceptable based on consideration of the design reliability (and confirming operating experience) of the i

equipment.

SR 3.5.2.7 Periodic inspections of the reactor building emergency sump suction inlet ensure that it is unrestricted and stays in-proper operating condition. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perfcra this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and to preserve access to the location.

This frequency has been found to be sufficient to detect abnormal degradation and has been confirmed by operating experience.

.~

i i

REFERENCES 1.

10 CFR 50.46.

l 2.

FSAR, Section 6.1.

3..

NRC Memorandum to V. Stallo, Jr., from R.L. Baer,

" Recommended Interin Revisions to LCOs for ECCS Components," December 1,1975.

4.

American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, Inservice Inspection, Article IWP-3000.

5.

FT! 51-1266138 01, Safety Analysis Input to Startup 4

Team Safety Assessment.

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.5-18 Auendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

EFW System B 3.7.5 e

i 8 3.7 PLANT SYSTENS 8 3.7.5 EmergencyFeedwater(EFW) System i

BASES I

BACKGROUND The Emergency Feedwater EFW

-adequate flow to one or b(oth) steam generators (OTSGs) fo decay heat removal with the generators at the maximum operating pressure of 1050 psig plus suitable margin for i

post-accident pressure increase (Ref.1, 2).

The principal function of the EFW system is to remove decay heat from the i

Reactor Coolant System upon the unavailability of normal feedwater supply.

This is accomslished by supplying water 3

from the emergency feedwater tan t, secondary side via the high nozzles (EFT-2) to the OTSG Steam produced in the OTSGs is condensed in the main condenser via the turbine bypass valves or, it the atmospheric dump valves (ADVs) or 4

main steam safety valves (MSSVs) have actuated, discharged directly to the atmosphere.

2 The EFW System consists of one motor driven EFW pump and one steam turbine driven EFW pump, each having a nominal 100%

capacity (Ref. 3). The motor driven EFW pump is powered from the 4160 volt ES bus 3A. The turbine driven EFW pump receives steam from one main steam line per OTSG via connections upstream of the associated main steam isolation valve. An alternative source of steam is available from the fossil units, Crystal River Unit 1 and 2 (Ref.1), but cannot be relied upon to consider the EFW train OPERABLE.

The diverse motive power of the two trains enhances both system availability and reliability. The preferred water source for both EFW pump trains is the Seismic Class I, missile protected dedicated EFW tank. Backup supplies of emergency feedwater are provided by the condensate storage tank and the main condenser hotwell. The pumps tie into common discharge headers providing the capability to feed either or both of the OTSGs.

The pumps and OTSGs are protected from excessively high flow induced problems by cavitating venturis (EF-62-F0 and EF 63-FO) in the pump discharge lines, designed to limit EFW flow to the steam generators regardless of steam gerftrator pressure (Ref.7).

(continued) l Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-23 Amendment No.163 l

l

- - -. -. -. -. -,. _ ~. _. -., _, -.,

. -. ~. -, - -. -. - -. -. -

EFW System B 3.7.5 BASES BACKGROUND DC powered block and control valves are actuated to feed the (continued) appropriate steam generator by the Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) System.

"he capacity of either EFW pump is sufficient to remove decay heat and cool the plant until the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure and temperature are low enough to place the Decay Heat Removal (DHR) System in service or until core decay heat can be removed solely by ECCS.

unt For certain small break LOCA scenarios also involving a loss of offsite power, securing the motor driven EFW pump would provide capability on the emergency diesel generator to load the "A" train low pressure injection pump and other required loads (Ref 6).

I i

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-23A Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

=.. -. - - - -.

EFW System B 3.7.5 BASES i

i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK f

}

e (continued) 4-Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-23B Arandment No.163

EFW System B 3c7.5 BASES BACKGROUND Automatic actuation of the EFW System occurs on the (continued) following:

1.

Trip of both main feedwater pumps with reactor power greater than 20% or the NI/RPS not in shutdown bypass:

2.

Low level in either OTSG;.

3.

Low pressure in either OTSGI 4.

Trip of all four reactor coolant pumps:

5.

High pressure injection (HPI) actuation on both Channel A and B Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESAS) channels;and 6.

AMSAC actuation.

The EFIC is a " smart' system which will feed either or both OTSGs with indications of low levels, but will isolate EFW to a faulted steam generator having a significantly lower steam pressure than the other.

The EFW System is designed to ANSI B 31.1 ES Seismic Class I and in accordance with General Design Criteria 2, 4, 5, Ig, 44, 45, and 46 (Ref. 3, 4).

APPLICABLE The EFW System is sized to provide sufficient decay heat SAFETY ANALYSIS removal capabtlity to cooldown the RCS to the temperature

. and pressure at which the DHR System can be placed in service or at which core decay heat can be removed solely by ECCS for any of the following events:

a loss of main feedwater (LMFW);

LMFW with loss of offsite power; main feedwater.line break; main steam line break; and small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA).

=_

=

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-24 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

a EFW System i

B 3.7.5 l

i BASES APPLICABLE The EFW System is designed to remain functional following SAFETY ANALYSES the maximum hypothetical earthquake.

It will also remain l

(continued) functional following a single failure in addition to any of the above events with the exception of the loss of all AC Power (Ref. 3). No single failure prevents EFW from being supplied to the intact OTSG nor allows EFW to be supplied to i

the faulted.0TSG. Note that in most cases of a main feedwater break or a steam line break, the depressurization i

of the affected DT5G would cause the automatic initiation of EFW. However, there will be some small break sizes for which ltomatic detection will not be possible.

For these i

smal'. oreaks, the operator will have sufficient time in which to take appropriate action to teritinate the event i

(Ref.1).

i The EFW System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement, 1

s LCO Two independent emergency feedwater pumps and their associated flow paths are required to be OPERABLE. The OPERABILITY of the EFW pumps requires that each be capable of developinfi its required 6!scharge pressure and flow.

The OPERA 81L TY OF ASV-5 is addressed by Condition B.

The OPERABILITY of ASV 204 is a portion of EFP 2 OPERABILITY and is addressed as by Condition D.

~

The motive power for the turbine driven pump is steam supplied from either OTSG from a main steam header upstream of the main steam isolation valves so that their closure does not isolate the steam sup:1y to the turbine.

Both j

steam supply flow paths throug) MSV-55 and MSV-56 (Condition A) to the turbine driven pump are required to be OPERABLE.

i The OPERABILITY of the associated EFW flow paths requires all valves be in their correct positions or be capable of actuating to their correct positions on a valid actuation signal.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-25 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only v ww w w

-,r,+<-

-.-e

,-.-w-,-,..i.<,,,w,

,.im-.,

.-.,6.--m,,,,,

-,r-.

-,,,,,-.w..,m i m e - e

--.---w--m,-we---mc-.-v,-3,-.,.-.------.w--------

\\

i EFW system 8 3.7c5 8ASES f

LC0 Ln certain small break i

(continued)

Failure as the loss of (OCA scenarios, assuming the sin 21e 8" train Class IE direct current i

power manual operator action would be taken to mainta,insteam ganarator cooling by feeding the steam generators using tho turbine driven EFW Dump.

I1 this i

c'rcumstan h manus' gerstyation valves, and elpen *he r action would >e taten to non -

j c'.ose the h train iso crosstie va ve

FV

' Condition C and feed 3he steam generators via,tlie ; { Crain flow pd) h.

4 e

y Inoperability of decayheatremova[.heFFWSystemmayresultininadequate fo lowing a tranpien which main feedwater < s not avanlab e. t or accident during The resultino RCS

=

heatun and pressure increase can potentially result In sientficant loss of coolant through the pressurizer code safety valves or the PORV.

APPLICABILITY In 4

ES1,dlofunclionintheeventthatmainfeedwateris 2 and 3 the EFW System is re.,1uired to be' OPE Lt an e

lost.

In addition enough makeup water, the EFW $ystem is reouired to suppl;r--

to replace the secondary side inven;ory lost as the plant cools to M00L 4 conditions.

BS 4 5

nd 6 ther,efore,theEFWSystemisnotrequiredtobethe OTSG nee tSe i.

OPERABLEintheseMbDES.

ACTIONS Ad With one of the two steam sup> lies to the turbine driven EFW pump inoperable $LE status within 7 days.- A'lowino 7 days in action must >e taken to reatore the steam supply to OPERA this Condition is r asonable based on the redundint-

- OPERABLE steam su p y to the, pump and the 'ow probability of an event occurrin hat would require the <noperab'e steam supply to the tur ine driven EFW pumps.

s

- The sucond Conoletion Time for Required Action A.1 estab'ishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any comb' nation of Conditions to be entered durine any cont'nuous failure to meet this LCo The 10 day Completion Time provides a limitation time allo.wed in this s'>ecified Condition after discovery of failure to meet the

.CO.

This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which other Conditions are entered concurrentl;r. The

'MD' connector between 7 days and 10 days l""

bom Completion Times apply simultaneously,dic;ates that and the more restrictive must be met.

1 (cont _inued)

I crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7 26 Amendment No.163 h0TE - Valid Until Cycle 12 only w m-w = e yv-' w -e - g-1-pgg my W

gp y,-ww m & w y e+ w e, g-m.---l-><

-q.-,-

rr vrw y wa greews=e--+ew+y wiee--ai vm,--w---M-r4=Wm<wmt-g e w-%y v.e m -p-app--w-e-4's-me

=4

-k-eset--+p-,

s'-up-perw-w*'tt-w-ee

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EFW System 8 3.7.5 BASES ACTIONS L.1 (continued)

If ASV-5 is inoperable, prompt action must be taken to restore ASV 5 to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time is reasonable, based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the EFW System, time needed for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period.

The second Completion Time for Required Action B.1 established a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of Conditions to be entered during any continuous failure to meet this LCO. The 10 day Completion Time provides a limitation time allowed in this ssocified Condition after discovery of failure to meet the.C0.

This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which other Conditions are entered concurrently. The

'MQ' connector between 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months and 10 days dictates that mort both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive must be met.

L.1 If ASV-204, EFV-12, or EFV-13 is inoperable, prompt action must be taken within I hour to ensure the following are OPERABLE:

Train 'B' Emergency Diesel Generators (TS 3.8.1)

Train 'B":

AC Electrical Power Distribution Subsystem (TS 3.8.9, anci Train'B')ACVitalBusSubsystem(TS3.8.9)

Consistent with the Bases for Surveillarce 3.0.1, OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated surveillance required freq(s) has been satisfactorily completed within the uency and the equipmeret is not otherwise known to be inoperable.

If the abovo Train "B' equipment is not OPERABLE with ASV-204, EFV-12, or EFV-13 inoperable,be assured and Condition the capability to remove sufficient core decay heat cannot is appilcable.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7 27 Amendment No.163 NOTE Valid until Cycle 12 Only

EFW System B 3.7.5 BASES ACTIONS M (continued)

Due to the severity of the consequences should a small break LOCA :. cur in these conditions, the I hour completion Time to verify the above Train 'B' equipment as OPE LABLE ensures i

that prompt action will be taken to confirm core decay heat removal capability. The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is potentially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions.

M i

If ASV 204, EFV 12, or EFV 13 is inoperable, prompt action must be taken to restore the valves to OPERAB.E status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time is reasonable, based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the EFW System, time needed for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period.

The second Completion Time for Required Action C.2 established a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of Conditions to be entered during any continuous failure to meet this LCO.

The 10 day Completion Time provides a limitation time allcwed in this specified Condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable-for situations in which other Conditions are entered concurrently.

The 'AliD' connector between 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months and 10 days dictates that Eth Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive must be met.

M If the turbine driven EFW pump or associated flow path is inoperable, prompt action must be taken within I hour to ensure the following 'B' train systems are OPERABLE:

SWP 1B (TS 3.7.7),

Train 'B' of the Nuclear Services Seawater System (TS3.7.9),

CHHE-1B and CHP 1B (TS 3.7.18)

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-27A Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only gw--,

.,,,c

,.,,..Lw-en~,,-,,.,---,,--,rn n--,--

-,-m_.

..e,.,, -

-,,..,.,..,ne,.,

vg

EFW System B 3.7.5 BASES ACTIONS DJ (continued)

Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.I, OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated surveillance (s) has been satisfactorily completed within the required frequenc to be inoperable.y and the equipment is not otherwise known If the above listed "B" train components are not OPERABLE with the turbine driven EFW pum) or associated flow path inoperable,ll brea c LOCA mitigation can not be assured and the ca) ability for :0G load management to improve sma Condition F is applicable.

Due to the severity of the consequences should a small break LOCA occe* in these conditions, the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time to verify the above listed "B" train components as t

OPERABLE ensures that prompt action will be taken to confirm EDG load management. The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is potentially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions.

DJ If the turbine driven EFW pump or associated flow path is inoperable, prompt action must be taken within I hour to ensure both trains of the following are OPERABLE:

ECCS TS 3.5.2,

Decay (HeatClos)edCycleCoolingWater(TS3.7.8),

Decay Heat Seawater (TS 3.7.10 Emergency Diesel Generators (TN 3.8.1 AC Electrical Power Distribution Subsy)s,tems (TS 3.8.9),

and

- AC Vital Bus Subsystems (TS 3.8.9)

Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1, OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated surveillance s required freq(ue)nchas been satisfactorily completed within the to be inoperable.y and the equipment is not otherwise known If both trains of the Lbove equipment are not OPERABLE with the turbine driven EFW pump or associated flow path inoperable, the capability to remove sufficient core decay heat can not be assured and Condition F is applicable.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-278 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

s s

EFW System i

8 3.7.5

~

BASES r

{

ACTIONS M _ (continued) i Due to the severity of the consequences should a small break l

LOCA occur in these conditions, the I hour Completion Time to verify both trains of the above equipment as OPERA 8LE i

ensures that prompt action will be taken to confirm core i

decay heat removal capability. The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is potentially exposed to a 4

LOCA in these conditions,

!j i

M If the turbine driven EFW pump or associated flow path is 1

inoperable, action must be taten to restore the required aquipment to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months i

Completion Time is reasonable, based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the motor driven EFW pues.-time needed for repairs, and the low probability of a 1)SA occurring during this time period, unt c

L 4

The second Completion Time for Requirsd Action D.3 l

establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any 1

combination of Conditions to be entered during any 3

continuous failure to meet this LCo. The 10 day completion i

Time provides a limitation time allowed in this s>ecified Condition after discovery of failure to meet the.00.

This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which other Conditions are entered concurrently. The '8 0' connector between 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months and-20 days dictates that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive must be I

met.

L 3

T' w

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-27C Amendment No.163-

+

NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only i

--e-.---re6

.'-w w

.,ew,-.m-.

w-r-.r

., w w er v.

~er.-,

--.'-,..-v-w---m--r+~,--ev,,---,.r w--w-,e--,~*w-v-5--m--

-+-.v.w-

--m=--g-

--ww---ww

EFW System S 307.5 BASES ACTIONS L1 (continued)

If the motor driven EFW > ump or associated flow path is an inoperable, action must >e taken to restore the required equipment to OPERA 8LE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time is reasonable, based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the EFW pump, time needed for -

repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period.

I" The second Completion Time-for Required Action E.1 lM establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any 0.hination of Conditions to be entered during any continuous failure to meet this LCo.

The 10 day Completion Time provides a limitation time allowed in this specified Condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which other Conditions are entered concurrently. The'gD' iE connector between 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and 10 days dictates tnat both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive must be met.

F.1 and f.2 w

if Required Actions A.1 B.1, C.1, C.2 E.1 cannot be completed,within the asso. D.1, 0.2, D.3, or ciated Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience to reach the required plant conditions from full power, conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

L1 l mn With both EFW trains inoperable, the plant is in a seriously degraded condition with no safety related means for conducting a cooldown.

In such a condition plant operation should not be perturbed by a forced ac, tion, including a For this reason, power change, that might result in a trip.the Technical Specif cations do not mandate a plant shutdown. Rather the ACTIONS allow the plant to dictate the most prudent course of action (including plant shutdown condition) for the situation. The seriousness of this requires that action be initiated immediately to restore at least one EFW train to OPERABLE status.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-270 Amendment No.163 NOTE - htid Until Cycle 12 only i

LD

EFW System i

8 3.7.5 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.5.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the EFW water and steam supply flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths exist for EFW operation. The valves verified by this SR include valves in the main flow valve in a branch line. paths and the first normally closed This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since those valves are verified to be in the correct i

position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. There are several other exceptions for valve position verification due to the low potential for these ty>es of valves to be mispositioned.

The va've types witch are not verified as part of this SR inclue vent or drain valves outside the RB, relief valves outside ;he RB, and instrumentation valves (both inside and outside the RB. This SR also does not apply to valves that cannot be ) inadvertently misa11gned, such as check valves.

This Surveillance does not hequire any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. The 45 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is consisterf with the Frequency established for SR 3.7.5.2.

SR 3.. 5.2 requires extensive EFW valve manipulation in order to perform the pump flow rate verification, such that a flow path verification is necessary following each performance.

SR 3.7.5.2 This SR verifies that the EFW pumps develop sufficient discharge pressure to deliver the required flow at the full open pressure of the MSSVs.

Because it is undesirable to (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-28 Amendment No.163

4 EFW System B 3.7.5 SASES i

t SURVEILLANCE SA 3.7.5.5 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS 1

j of EFW flow paths must be demonstrated before sufficient core heat is generated that would require the operation of l

the EFW System during a subsequent shutdown.

The Frequency is reasonable, based on engineering judgment, in view of L

other administrative controls to ensure that the flow paths are OPERABLE. To further ensure EFW System alignment, flow i

I path OPERABILITY is verified, following extended outages to i

determine no misalignment of valves has occurred. This SR ensures that the flow path from the EFW tank to the OTSGs is properly aligned. This requirement is based upon the s

1 recommendation of NUREG 0737. The Frequency was modified slightly during ITS development to provide an SR 3.0.4 type excep(prior to entering MODE g) i tion. As written, the SR allows the plant to achieve and maintain MODE 3 conditions in order to perform the verification.

i REFERENCES

1. Enhanced Design Basis Document for the Emergency Feedwater and Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control System, Revision 1, dated September 27, 1991 with Temporary Changes 156, 230, 247, and 24g.

~

2. BAW-10043, ' Overpressure Protection for B&W Reactors',

dated May 1972.

1

3. FSAR, Section 10.5.

4.10 CFR 50, Appendix A.

5. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, Inservice Inspection, Subsection IWP.

6. FT! 51-126613P-01, Safaty Analysis Input to Startup Team Safety Assessment.

7. FPC calculation 18. -8%

Rev 5.

I 1

.-m l

n i

~

Crysta' River Unit 3 8 3.7-31 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only e*-w v+

SW System B 307.7 BASES BACKGROUND For certain small break LOCAs with a concurrent loss of (continued) offsite power, securing SWP-1A and RWP 2A to provide capaht11ty on the emergency diesel generator to load the

'A' train low pressure injection pump and other required loads. These pumps would be manually secured and locked ant 1

out to preclude automatic retnitiation.

In these situations, SWP 18 and RWP-2B are relied upon to provide continued flow for the SW and Nuclear Services Seawater systems.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-36A Amendment No.163 NOTE Valid Until Cycle 12 Only z

.....m

SW System B 3.7.7 BASES THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-36B Amendment No.163

l SW Systeo i

8 3.7.7 1

l BASES APPLICABILITY Three of the four heat exchangers must be OPERABLE to (continued) accommodate the design system heat load requirements.

I In MODES 5 and 6, the SW System is not required to be OPERABLE due to the limitations on RCS temperature and pressure in these MODES. Additionally, there are no other Technical Specification LCOs supported by SW which are appitcable during these plant conditions.

ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 With SWP-18 inoperable, prompt action must be taken within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months to ensure that sufficient capability is available on

'A" train emergency diesel small break LOCA scenarios. generator for SWP-1A in certain In such circumstances the motor driven emergency feedwater pump would be secu, red and the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path would be required OPERABLE to provide ster >

generator cooling.

If the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is not OPERABLE to permit securing motor um driven emergency feedwater pump, the ca> ability for EDG load management to improve small break.0CA miti cannot be assured and Condition C is applicable.gation i

The operability of the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is not required in MODE 4.

Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1, OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated surveillance s) has been satisfactorily completed within the required freq(ble.y and the equipment is not othe uenc to be inopera Due to the severity of-the consequences should a small break LOCA occur in these conditions the I hour Completion Time to verify the turbine driven em,ergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE ensures that prompt action will be taken to confira EDG load management capability for small break LOCA mitigation improvement. The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is potentially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time for restoring SWP 18 OPERASILITY is consistent with other ECCS Specifications for a loss of redundancy Condition and, has been shown to maintain a suitable limit on risk. As such consistent with industry-accepted practice.g judgment and,is this Completion Time is based on engineerin (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-38 Amendment No.16'4 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 OnTy

'i

SW System 8 3.7.7 BASES ACTIONS RJ (continued) nott With SWP 1A and/or one of the required heat exchangers inoperable the heat removal capacity of the SW System is degraded.,In this Condition, adequate cooling of the containment and ES equipment served by SW cannot be assured following.an accident coincident with a worst case single active failure. Therefora action must be taken to restore CompletionTimeforres(s)lo0PERA8LEstatus.

the affected component The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months torin full SW System 0PERABILITY is consistent with other ECCS S ecifications for a loss of redundancy Condition and, ha been shown to maintain a suitable limit on risk. As such, this Completion Time is based on engineering judgment and is consistent with industry-accepted practice.

c.1 and C.2 l unt If-the inoperable-SW com>onent(s) cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within tte-associated Com 1stion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which tse LCO does not apply. To achieve this status the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ,and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without-chal16 aging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.7.1 ALQUIPEtENTS This SR is modified by.a Note indicating that the isolation of the SW flow to individual components may render those components inoperable, but does not affect the OPERABILITY of the SW System.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-38A Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

~.

-.___..__E,._..____

SW Systen B 3.7.7 BASES l

l THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7 388 Amendment No.163

DC System E 3.7.8 5 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.8 Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water System BASES BACKGROUND The Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water (DC) System fact 11tates the removal of decay heat from the reactor core.

The system also removes process and operating heat from safety related components associated with deca heat removal during noimal plant cooldown and following a t)ransient or accident. During plant cooldown below approximately 250'F the DC system provides core heat removal by transferring heat from the )ecay Heat Removal (DHR)ivided into twoSystem.to the De Heat Seawater System. The system is d independent and redundant trains each capable of supplying 100 percent of the required norma,l and post accident cooling.

Each train contains a pump, a surge tank pressurized with nitro pn for mlume and pressure control, and a heat exchanger w11ch rek <es heat from the DPJt system and rejects it to the Decay Heat Seawater System.

The design and operation of the DC system, along with a list of the components served, can be found in FSAR Section g.5.2.2 (Ref.1). For normal operation the DC pumps are started manually. However in an emergency both DC pumps start automaticaily upon re,cei at of an Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESAS). The )C system supports long term-reactor decay heat removal following a loss of coolant accident (LDCA) when the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) is recirculating water from the RB sump to the I

reactor core through the DH heat exchanger.

The DC System also supports post accident containment cooling by supplying cooling water to the reactor building spray pump motor coolers and bearings. Other loads supplied by this system are the DHR (LPI) pumps and motors, DC and decay heat seawater pump motors and two of the three make-up and purification (HPI) pump motors. The DC System supplies cooling to these pump motor heat exchangers, lube oil coolers, gear lube oil coolers, bearings, or air handling units to prevent overheating of the associated components (Ref.3).

Certain small break LDCA scenarios require emergency feedwater to maintain steam generator cooling untti core decay heat can be removed solely by ECCS cooling.

a Further, with the turbine driven EFW pump er associated flow path (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-41 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

DC System l;

B 3.7.8 BASES BACKGROUNG inoperable, SWP-1B, train '8" of the Nuclear Services

+

(continued)

Seawater System, CHHE 18, and CHP 1B, as well as both -

trains of ECCS Deca Decay Heat Seaw,ater,y Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water, Emergency Diesel Generators AC M

Subsystems are required OPERABLE. ystems, and AC, Vital B Electrical Power Distribution Subs F

As a closed system, the DC System also serves as an intermediate barrier to radioactivity releases to the environment from potential leaks in interfacing systems.

l i

1 APPLICABLE The DC system provides cooling for components essential to SAFETY ANALYSIS the mitigation of plant transients and accidents. An ESAS i

initiation signal will start both DC pumps.

This ensures that the required cooling capacity is provided to the essential equipment following a steam line break, steam generator tube rupture, makeup system letdown line failure, or LOCA.

conjunction with an associated DC heat exchanger, rejec)tThe runnin heat to the Decay Heat Seawater System to ensure the necessary cooling flow to components required for reactor decay heat removal. By cooling the RB spray pumps and pump motors following a LOCA or SLB, the DC system supports the i

RB Spray System by ensuring the pressure and temperature in i

containment are maintained within acceptable limits. The OPERABILITY of the RB Spray System is addressed in 100 F

3.6.6, " Reactor Building Spray and Containment Cooling

[

Systems".

During normal and post-accident cooldown operations, when RCS temperature and pressure are reduced to allow the alignment of the DHR System to the RCS, DC System operation i'

facilitates core heat removal by transferring heat from the DHR System to the Decay Heat Seawater System.

The Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water System satisfies 4

l Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

i LCO The requirement for two DC trains to be OPERABLE assures adequate normal and post-accident heat removal from the j

reactor core and essential components, considering a worst i

rase single active failure.

One of the OPERABILITY considerations regarding these independent and redundant trains is that each valve in the flow path be in the correct post-accident position. Additionally, each DC pump must be capable of being powered from its emergency power supply and be capable of automatically starting on an ESAS actuation.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-42 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only m

s

DC System B 3.7.8 BASES (continted)

APPLICABILITY In MODF'. ( 2, and 3, the DC System is not a normally operatm9.; stem, but sast be capable of performing its post-ac m ant sa Nty functions, which include providing cooling water to components required for RCS and containment heat removal. Two independent 100 percent capacity DC trains must be OPERABLE to accommodate the design system heat load requirements and satisfy reliability considerations assuming a single failure.

In MODE 4 although RCS temperature and pressure are reduced, there remains sufficient stored energy that the occurrence of an accident would necessitate t te post-accident cooling functions of the DC System. When temperattre and pressure have been reduced sufficiently to allow alignment of the DHR System to the RCS, the DC System is no longer required for post-accident component cooling, but must continue to provide cooling to the DHR heat exchangers. Therefore, two trains of the DC System must remain OPERABLE throughout. MODE 4 to ensure emergency preparedness and/or decay heat removal, assuming a single active failure.

In MODES 5 and 6, the DC System is in operation performing l

its normal safety function of RCS decay heat removal. The various means of removing reactor decay heat in MODES 5 and 6 are addressed in LC0 3.4.6, "RCS Loops - MODE 5 Loops Filled";

C0 3.4.7, 'RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Not Filled";

LC0 3.9.4, "DHR and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level";

and LCO 3.9.5, "DHR and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level".

In other words, the OPERABILITY requirements for the DC. System are determined by the systems it supports.

Therefore, this LCO is not applicable in MODES 5 and 6.

ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 With one DC train inoperable, prompt action within I hour is necessary to ensure that the-turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are availab a for steam generator cooling.

If the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are not available, unt the capability for cora decay heat removal has not been assured and Condition B is applicable. The operability of the turbine driven emergency feedwater puan is not required in MODE 4.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-43 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

DC System B 3.7.8 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued)

Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1, OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated surveillance the required (s) has been satisfactorily completed within frequency and the equipment is not otherwise known to be inoperable.

Due to the severity of the consequences should a small am break LOCA occur in these conditions, the I hour Completion Time to verify the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE ensures that prompt action will be taken to confirm core decay heat capability.

The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is potenti 11y exposed to a LOCA in these conditions.

Required Action A.2 is modified by a Note indicating that I am the ap 3.4.5,plicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO "RCS Loops - MODE 4," be cntered if an ino train results in an inoperable required DHR loop.perable DC This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6 and ensure:;.the sroper actions are then for an inoperability of a required DiR loop.

With one DC train inoperable, action must be taken to restore the train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE DC train is adequate to perform the heat removal function.

The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time for restoring full DC System OPERABILITY is the same as that for the ECCS Systems, whose safety functions are supported by the DC System. This Completion Time is reasonable, based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE train and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

B.1 and B.2 If the inoserable DC train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status wit 11n the associated Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply.

To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-44 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

DC System B 3.7.8 BASES SURVEILLANCE SW 3.7.8.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the isolation of the DC flow to individual components may render those components inoperable, but does not affect the OPERABILITY of the DC System.

Verifying the correct alignment for manual and power operated valves in the SW flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths exist for DC operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since they are verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing.

The valves verified by this SR include valves in the main flow paths and the first normally closed valve in a branch line. There are several other exceptions for valve position verification due to the low potential for these types of valves to be mispositioned. The valve types which are not verified as part of this SR include vent or drain valves outside the RB, relief valves outside the RB, and l

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-44A Amendment No.163

DC Sys15n B 3.7,8 BASES l

l THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

\\

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-44B Amendment to.163 d

Nuclear Services Seawater Syste]

B 3.7.9 BASES BACKGROUND The Nuclear Services Seawater System is designed to seismic (continued) category I requirements, except for the standpipe drain line. - The design and operation of the Nuclear Services Seawater System along with a list of components served by SW during normal and emergency conditions, can be found in FSAR Section g.5 (Ref. 2).

Following an Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESAS) actuation, SW System flow paths are realigned to provide a reliable source of cooling to essential safeguards equipment which may be cupplied by non-safety cooling water systems during nomal operations. To ensure these additional heat loads can be accommodated, both emergency pumps are started simultaneously by an ESAS signal to provide adequate cooling in the. event o failure which disables one emergency pump.f a single active For certain small break LOCAs with a concurrent loss of 1

offsite power, securing SWP-1A and RWP-2A would provide capability on the emergency diesel generator to load the "A" train low pressure injection pump and other required I

loads.

These pumps would be manually secured and locked out to preclude automatic reinitiation.

In these situations, SWP-1B and RWP-2B are relied upon to provide continued flow to the SW and Nuclear Services Seawater systems.

APPLICABLE-The Nuclear Services Seawater System supports the SW System SAFETY ANALYSES in providing cooling for components essential to the mitigation of. plant transients and accidents.

The system has two separate 100 percent capacity underground intake conduits, independent emergency pumps, and underground discharge conduits to allow for a single failure while still providing the required flow. An ESAS signal will start both emergency pumps. This ensures the required cooling capacity is provided to the SW System following a steam line-break, steam generator tube rupture, makeup system letdown line failure, or loss of coolant accident.

The Nuclear Services Seawater System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-47 Amendment No. 163 NOTE - Valid until Cycle 12 Only

Nuclear Services Seawater System B 3.7 g BASES (continued)

LCO The requirement for the OPERABILITY of the Nuclear-Services Seawater System including two emergency nuclear services seawater pumps provides redundancy necessary to ensure the system will provide adequate ost-accident heat removal in the event of a coincident sin le failure.

Emergency nuclear services seawater pump OPERAB,

!Y requires that each be capable of being powered 1 m separate OPERABLE emergency buses. OPERABILITY of the ai,ciated-flow paths requires that each valve in the flow path must be aligned to permit sea water flow from the intake canal to the SW heat exchangers, and subsequently to the discharge canal. The OPERABILITY of the SW heat exchangers, required to ensure proper heat removal capability, is addressed in LCO 3.7.7, " Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling Water System".

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1 through 4 the SW and Nuclear Services Seawater Systems are normally cperating systems which must be prepared to provide post-accident cooling for components required for RCS and containment heat removal, equipment essential in providing the capability to safely shutdown the plant, and equipment required for adequate spent fuel pool cooling. The Nuclear Services Seawater System must be capable of providing its post-accident cooling assuming a single active failure. Therefore, both emergency pumps are required to be OPERABLE during these MODES.

In MODES 5 and 6, the Nuclear Services Seawater System is not required to be OPERABLE due to the limitations on RCS temperature and pressure in these MODES. Additionally, there are no other Technical Specification LCOs supported by the system which are applicable during these plant conditions.

ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 With train "B" of the Nuclear Services Seawater System inoperable, prompt action must be taken within I hour to ensure that sufficient capability is available on "A" train (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-48 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

Nuclear Services Seawater G/ stem B 3.7.9 BASES ACTIONS A.1'and A.2 (continued)

-of emerger.cy diesel generator for RWP-2A in certain small break LOCA scenarios.

In such circumstances, the motor driven emergency feedwater pump would be secured and the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump would be required OPERABLE to provide steam generator cooling.

If the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is not OPERABLE to permit securing motor driven emergency feedwater pump, the capability for EDG load management to improve small break LOCA mitigation can not be assured and Condition C is' applicable. The operability of the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is not required in Mode 4.

Consistent with the Bases for Surycillance 3.0.1, OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated um surveillance (s) has been satisfactorily completed within the required frequency and the equipment is not otherwise known to be inoperable.

Due to the severity of the consequences should a small break LOCA occur in these conditions, the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time to verify the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE ensures that prompt action will b taken to confirm EDG load management capability.

The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is potentially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions.- The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time for restoring-full Nuclear Services Seawater System OPERABILITY is consistent with that for ECCS Systems, whose safety functions are supported by the system.

e This Completion Time is based on engineering judgment and is consistent with accepted industry-accepted practice.

L1 With train "B" of the Nuclear Services Seawater System inoperable, action must be taken to restore the pump to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time for restoring full Nuclear Services Seawater System OPERABILITY is consistent with that for ECCS Systems, whose safety functions are supported by the system. This Completion Time is based on engineering judgement and is consistent with accepted industry-accepted practice.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-48A Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 OnTy

Nuclear Services Seatater Syster.

B 3.7.9 BASES 4

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-48B Amendment No.163

Nuclear Services Seawater Systea B 3.7.9 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) l non If the inoperable emergency nuclear services seawater pump cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR

3. 7.,9.d REQUIREMENTS This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the f 4 tion of the seawater flow to individual components may r%u ir M

those components inoperable, but does not affect the O

OPERABILITY of the Nuclear Services Seawater System.

Verifying the correct alignment for manual valves in the nuclear services seawater flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths exist to support SW operation.

This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or othentise secured in position, since they are verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. The valves verified by this SR include valves in the main flow piths and the first normally closed valve in a branch line. There are several other exceptions for valve position verification due to the low potential for these types of valves to be mispositioned. The valve types which are not verified as part of this SR include vent or drain valves, relief valves, instrumentation valves, and sample line valves. This SR also does not apply to valves which cannot be inadvertently misa11gned, such as check valves.

This Surveillance does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in their correct position.

The 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation, and ensures correct valve positions.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-49 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only I

J

Nuclear Services Seawater Systet B 3.7.9 BASES SURVEILLANCE

_SR 3.7.9._1 REQUIREMENTS (continued)

This SR verifies proper automatic operation of the emergency nuclear services seawater pumps on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The RW System is a normally operating system that cannot ba fully actuated as part of routine testing during normal operation.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

Therefore, the Frequency is acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

The SR is modified by a note indicating the SR is not E

applicable in the identified MODE. This is necessary in order to make the requirements for automatic system response consistent with those for the actuation bstrumentation.

REFERENCES 1.

Enhanced Design Basis Document for Nuclear Services and Decay Heat Seawater System, Revision 2, November 21, 1991 including temporary Change 193 dated Apr 8,

)

1992.

2.

FSAR, Section 9.5.

3.

FSAR, Section 14.2.2.

4.

Enhanced Design Basis Document for Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling Water System, Revision 2, July 29, 1992.

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-50 Amendment No.163

Decay Heat Seawater System B 3.7.10 BASES BACKGROUND Certair, small break LOCA scenarios require emergency (continued)

'feedwater to maintain steam genarator cooling until core decay heat can be removed solely by ECCS cooling.

Further, with the turbine driven EFW pump and associated flow path inoperable, SWP-1B, train "B" of the Nuclear Services Seawater System, CHHE-1B and CHP-1B, as well as ont both trains of ECCS, Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water, Decay Heat Seawater, Emergency Diesel Generators, AC Electrical Power Distribution Subsystems, and AC Vital Bus Subsystems are required OPERABLE.

APPLICABLE Tle Decay Heat Seawater System supports the DC System in SAFETY ANALYSIS pnviding cooling for components essential to the mitigation of plant transients and accidents. The system has two separate 100 percent capacity underground intake conduits, independent pumps, and underground discharge conduits to provide for a single failure while still providing required flow.

An ESAS initiation signal will start both decay heat seawater pumps-upon low Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure and/or high contain.nent pressure. This ensures that the required cooling capacity is provided to the DC System for cooling of components required for reactor heat-removal following a steam line break, steam rupture, makeup system letdown line failure, generator tube or loss of coolant accident.

During normal and post-accident cooldown operations, when RCS temperature and pressure are reduced to allow the alignment of the DHR System to the RCS, the Decay Heat Seawater System is placed in service to support decay heat

}

removal.

The Dee?v Heat Seawater System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Pei

., Statement.

LCOs The requirement for OPERABILITY of both decay heat seawater trains provides redundancy necessary to ensure the system will provide adequate post-accident heat removal in the event of a coincident single failure.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-52 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

Decay Heat Seawater System B 3.7.10 BASES LCOs The OPERABILITY of the decay heat seawater pumps requires (continued) that they each be mpable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus.

Each valve in the flow path must be in its correct position for pe mitting sea water flow from the intake canal to the DC 1 eat exchangers, and subsequently to the discharge canal. The OPERABil.lTY of the DC System, required to unsure proper heat renioval capability, is addressed in 1.C0 3.7.8. "Dacay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water System."

APPLICABILITY In douts 1, 2, unt 3 i.he Oc wd Cmv Huai Seavuter Systems may not he apuestin;, bet most 50 preparad to perform post.

accichnt safety fund.io. wh % m.'ada'pto,iding cooling water to compuc.ats +pm +; Tur #$ and c.ontaiment heat rencnl The 0 fcc N.i. ?:qwd ' Sysie. gust be capab% of provleib:s its pW s: 'jent coC Ng Assaing a single ru g 2

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h. y W;. U M.8 5 no 3 u 3 a.idrassao l e if.0.i. i. fi. ncs '.,. ;

e P ' b., ' :,to 1.4.7, "RCS Loops M00: 5, 2 09 3 flot F,

iad; ;.00 3.9.4, "0HR and Coolant Circu!.> tic.)

T h 'id er level': and U,0 3.9.5, '0HR 9

and Coolant Cir mlatica Lc'et W tur :. m i' la othe v,~is, the OPERABlurt co sirewn;s for the 0C System are determined by the systems it supports. Therefore, this particialar LCO is not anplicable in NODES 5 and 6.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3./-53 Amendment No.163

\\

__J

Decay Heat Seawater Systes B 3.7.10 BASES (continued)

ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 With one Decay Heat Seawater train inoperable, prompt action is necessary to ensure that the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE for steam generator cooling.

If the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are not OPERABLE, the capability to remove core decay heat can not be assured and Condition B is applicable. The operability of the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is not required in MODE 4.

erE Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1, OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated surveillance (s) has been satisfactorily completed within the required frequency and the equipment is not otherwise known to bo inoperable.

_l Due to the savarity of the consequences should a small break LOCA occur in these conditions, the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time to verify the turbine drhen mergency feedwater pump and tssociated flow path are OPERABLE ensures that prompt action will be taken to confire '.on decay heat removal capability.

The Completion Ilme minimizes the time the plant is penthily ecose1 to a 10CA in these contiittons.

hquired Action A.2 is undifiad by a Note iadicating that l MTE tha vplicable renditions and Required Actions of LCO 1.4.5, 'RCS Lnops MOOK 4," siiould be antered if an inopareble decay haat snawater train results in an inoperable iequired @9 loop.

This is an exception to LC0 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for an inoperability of a required DHR loop.

If one of the decay heat seawater trains is inoperable, action must be taken to restore the train to OPERABLE status with h 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

To this Condition, the romaining QPERABLE train is adequate to geform the heat removal function. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Co:apletloa Tbne ice castcring full Decay Heat Seawater Systen. OPERAHILIf7 is the same as that for the ECCS Systems, whose safety functions are supported by the Decay Heat Seawater System. This Completion Time is reasonable, based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE train and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-54 Amendment No.

NOTE Valid Until Cycle 12 dn9y m

Decay Heat Seawater SysteJ 1

B 3.7.10 i

BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued)

If the inoperable decay heat seawater train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.10.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying the correct alignment for manual valves in.ne Decay Heat Seawater System flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths exist for DC operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since they are verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing.

The valves verified by this SR include valves in the main flow paths and the first normally closed valve in a branch line.

There are several other exceptions for valve position verification due to the low potential for these types of valves to be mispositioned. The valve types which are not verified as part of this SR include vent or drain valves, relief valves, instrumentation valves, and sample line valves. This SR also does not apply to valves which cannot d '

i i

(continued) i i

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-54A Amendment No.163

Decay Heat Seawater Systen B 3.7.10 BASES THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK l

l (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-54B Amendment No.163

CREVS B 3,7.12 i

-BASES LCO c.

ductwork, valves, and dampers are OPERABLE, and air (continued) circulation can be maintained.

The ability to maintain temperature in the Control Complex is addressed in Technical Specification 3.7.18.

l 1

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 the CREVS must be OPERABLE to ensure that the control, complex will remain habitable during and following a postulated DBA. During movement of irradiated fuel resemblies, the CREVS must be OPERABLE to cope with a release due to a fuel handling accident.

- ACTIONS 8.1 With one CREVS train inoperable, action must be taken to restore the train to OPERABLE status within 7 days.

In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE CREVS train is adequate to i

perform the control room radiation protection function.

However, the overall reliability is reduced because a failure in the OPERABLE CREVS train could result in loss of CREVS ful.ction. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and ability of the remaining train to provide the required capability.

B.1 and B.2 In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, if the inoperable CREVS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which i

the LCO does not applv To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at le.ast MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

4 (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-63 Amendment No.163 i

ontrol Complex Cooling System 8 3.7.18 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.18 Control Complex Cooling System BASES BACKGROUND The Control Complex Cooling System provides temperature control for the control room and other portions of the Control Complex containing safety related equipment.

The Control Complex Cooling System consists of two redundant chillers and associated chilled water pumps that provide cooling of recirculated control complex air.

Redundant chillers and chilled water pumps are provided for suitable temperature conditions in the control complex for operating personnel and safety related control equipment. The Control aplex Cooling System maintains the nominal temperature b< tween 70*F and 80'F.

A single chiller and associated chilled water pump will previde the required temperature control for either heat exchanger. The Control Complex Cooling System operation to maintain control complex temperature is discussed in the FSAR, Section 9.7 (Ref.1).

For certain small break LOCAs with a concurrent loss of offsite power, it is necessary to provide capability on i

the emergency diesel generator to load'the "A" train low pressure injection pump and other required loads.

In ant these situations, CHHE-1B and CHP-1B would be relied upon to provide required cooling.

APPLICABLE The Control Complex Cooling System consists of redundant, l

SAFETY ANALYSIS safety related components, with some common piping. The Control Complex Cooling System maintains the temperature between 70*F and 80*F. A single active failure of a Control Complex Cooling System component does not impair the ability of the system to perform as designed. The Control complex cooling System is designed in accordance with Seismic Category I requirements. The Control Complex Cooling System is capable of removing heat loads from the control room and other portions of the Control Complex containing safety related equipment, including consideration of equipment heat loads and (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-85 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

~

=

Control Complex Cooling System B 307.18 BASES APPLICABLE personnel occupancy requirements, to ensure equipment SAFETY ANALYSIS OPERABILITY.

(continued)

The Control-Complex Cooling System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO Two redundant heat exchangers and two redundant chillers and associated pumps of the Control Complex Cooling System are required to be OPERABLE te ensure t1at at least one of each is available, assuming a single failure disables one redundant component. Total system failure could result in the equipment operating temperature exceeding limits.

The Control Complex Cooling System is considered OPERABLE when the individual redundant components that are necessary to maintain control complex temperature are OPERABLE. These components include the cooling coils, water cooled condensing units, and associated temperature control instrumentation.

In addition, the Control Complex Cooling System must be OPERABLE to the extent that air circulation can be maintained (See Specification 3.7.12).

1 APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the Cor. trol Complex Cooling System must be OPERABLE to ensure that the control complex temperature will not exceed equipment OPERABILITY requirements. During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies the Control Complex Cooling System must be OPERABLE to cope with a release due to a fuel handling accident.

ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 With the CHHE-1B or CHP-1B inoperable, prompt action must be taken within I hour to verify the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path is M

OPERABLE to (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-86 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only m

Control Complex Ccoling System 8 3.7.18 f

BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued) provi-:le steam generator cooling.

If the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are not i

OPEMBLE, the capability to provide EDG load management for small break LOCA mitigation im and Condition D is applicable.provement cannot be assured The operability of the i

turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is not required in M00E 4.

1 i

Due to the severity of the consequences should a small break i

LOCA occur in these conditions, the I hour Completion-Time to verify the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE ensures that prompt i

action will be taken to provide the capability for EDG i

load management for small break LOCA mitigation unt improvement. The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is potentially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions, i

Consistent with the Bases for Surve111ance.3.0.1, OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated i

surveillance (s) has been satisfactorily completed within the

-required frequency and the equipment is not otherwise known to be inoperable.

With CHHE-18 or CHP-1B inoperable, action must be taken to restore its OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . -In this Condition, the remaining OPERA 8LE Control Complex Cooling System redundant components are adequate to maintain the

. control complex temperature within limits. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a failure in the OPERABLE Control Complex Cooling System components could result in a loss of Control Complex Cooling System function.

The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time is based on the low probability of an event occurring requiring the Control. Complex Cooling.

System and the consideration that the remaining redundant components can provide the required capabilities, i

a 1

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-87 Amendment No. 163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only 4

o

Control Complex Cooling System B 3.7.1B

]

[~

BASES ACTIONS Rd (continued)

With CHHE-1A, CHP-IA or one Control Complex Cooling heat exchanger inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days.

In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE Control Complex Cooling System equipment is adequate to maintain the control complex temperature within limits. However, the overall-reliability is reduced because a failure in the OPERABLE Control Complex Cooling System redundant components could result in a loss of "N

i Control Complex Cooling System function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of an event occurring requiring the Control Complex Cooling System and j

the consideration that the remaining components can provide the required capabilities.

l C.1 and C.2 During movement of irradiated fuel, if the required Action and Completion Times of Condition A or Condition B can not -

be met, the Control Com operation immediately. plex Cooling System must be placed in This action ensures that the remaining Control Complex Cooling System components are OPERABLE, and that any active failure will be readily j

detected.

An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to immediately suspend activities that could release radioactivity that l

might require the isolation of the control room. This places the' plant in a condition that minimizes accident risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.

L-I I'

i-i (continued) a Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-88 Amendment No.

NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Ok l

l

Control Complex Cooling Systes 8 3.7.18 BASES ACTIONS D.1 and D.2 (continued)

In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, if the inoperable Control Complex Cooling System component cannot be restored to OPERABLE-status within the required Com)letion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the.00 does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in MODE S within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Tf.mes are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner without challenging unit systems.

L1 If any combination of components that would render the Control Complex Cooling System not capable of performing the intended function, the unit is in a condition outside the accident analyses. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

Ll During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, with any combination of components inoperable that would render the Control Complex Cooling System not capable of performing the intended function, action must be taken to immediately suspend activities that could release radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room.

This places tne unit in a condition that minimizes accident risk. This dias not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.

i (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-P9 Amendment No.163

,,y--

Control Complex Cooling System B 3.7.18 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.18.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying that each Control Complex Cooling chiller's developed head at the flow test point is greater than or equal to the required developed head ensures that chiller's performance has not degraded during the cycle.

Flow and differential pressure are normal tests of centrifugal pum performance required by Section XI of the ASME Code (Ref.p 3). This test confirms one point on the and is indicative of overall wrformance. pump design curve Such inservice

]

tests confirm component OPERA 31LITY. trend performance, and detect incipient failures by indicating abnormal performance. The Frequency of the SR i' 'n accordance with the ' Inservice Testing Program.

SR 3.7.18.2 This SR verifies that the heat removal capability of the system is sufficient to meet design requirements. This SR consists of a combination of testing and calculations. A 24 month Frequency is appropriate, as significant degradation of the system is slow and is not expected over this time period.

REFERENCES 1.

FSAR Section 9.7.

2.

FTI 51-126612-01, Safety Analysis Input to Startup Team Safety Assessment.

m 3.

ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI.

I Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-90 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1

^

BASES BACKGROUND Certain small break LOCA scenarios require emergency (continued) feedwater to maintain steam generator cooling until core decay heat can be removed solely by ECCS cooling.

Further, with the turbine driven EFW pump or associated flow path inoperable, SWP-18, train "B" of the Nuclear Services Seawater System, CHHE-1B and CHP-1B, as well as both trains of ECCS, Decay Hest Closed Cycle Cooling Water, Decay Heat Seawater, Emergency Diesel Generators, AC Electrical Power Distribution Subsystems, and AC Vital Bus Subsystems are required OPERABLE. With ASV-204, EFV-12, or EFV-13 inoperable Train "B" Emergency Diesel Generators. Train "B" AC Electrical Power Distribution Subsystems, and Train 'B' AC Vital Bus Subsystems are required OPERABLE.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-2A Amendment No.163 i

NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only L

1

0 AC Sources-Operating-B 3c8.1 BASES THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-2B Amendment No.163

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES BACKGROUND.

Provided an ES signal is present, certain required ES loads (continued) are returned to service in a predetermined sequence in order to prevent overloading the EDG in the process. Withio 35 seconds after the initiating signal is received, all loads needed to recover the plant or maintain it in a safe l

condition are returned to service.

The service ratings of the EDG are:

O to 2850 kw on a ecntinuous basis 2851 to 3200 kw on a cumulative 2000 hour0.0231 days 0.556 hours 0.00331 weeks 7.61e-4 months basis l

l 3201 to 3400 kw on a cumulative 200 hour0.00231 days 0.0556 hours 3.306878e-4 weeks 7.61e-5 months basis l

3401 to 3500 kw on a cumulative 30 ninute basis.

I Loads powered from the 4160 V ES buses are listed in Reference 2.

i Steady state load does not include loads imposed by the i

starting of motors such as during block loading, and short i

duration loads such as motor operated valves, battery charger surges, and short duration pump surge flows.

Loads imposed by the starting cf motors are not included in the t

service ratings and are less than the EDG manufacturer limits of 3910 kW for such loading, i

APPLICABLE The initial conditions of DBA and transient analyses i-SAFETY ANALYSES in the FS/2, Chapter 6 (Ref. 4) and Chapter 14 (Ref. 5),

assume ES systems are OPERABLE. The AC electrical power sources are designed to provide sufficient capacity, ccpability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ES systems so that the fuel, RCS, and containment design limits are not exceeded.

These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS); and Section 3.6, Containment Systems.

1 i

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-3 Amendment No.163

.~ --

AC Sources--Operating 8 3.8.1 BASES APPLICABLE The OPERABILITY of the AC electrical power sources is SAFETY ANALYSIS consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident (continued) analyses and the design bcsis of the plant. This results in maintaining at least one train of the onsite or offsite AC sources OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:

a.

An assumed loss of all offsite power or all onsite AC power; and (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8 34 Amendment No.163

AC Sources-Operating 8 3.8.1 BASES THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK l

9 (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-38 Amendment No.163 A

AC Sources-Operating i

B 3.8.1 SASES l

i ACTIONS U (continued) additional 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months cnopleterestoration(oftheLC0.for a total of 9 days) allowed prior to i

The 6 day Completion Time provides a limit on the time allowed in a specified condition after discovery of failure to meet the LC0. This 4

limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently.

As in Required Action A.2, the Congletion Time allows for an ex;tution to the normal " time zero for beginning the allowed outage time ' clock." This will result in establishing the ' time zero' at the time that the LC0 was Initially not met, instead of at the time Condition A was entered.

M 4

To ensure a highly reliable power source in the event one EDG is inoperable. It is necessary to verify the availability of the OPERABLE offsite circuits on a more frequent basis. Since the Required Action only specifies

" perform," a failure of SR 3.8.1.1 acceptance criteria does

+

not result in a Required Action being not met (Condition F).

However, if a circuit fails to pass SR 3.8.1.1, it is inoperable. Upon offsite ::1rcuit inoperability, additional Conditions and Required Actions must then be entered.

M With Train 'A' EDG inoperable, prompt action within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is necessary to ensure that the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are available for a

stea9 generator cooling.

If the turbine dr*Ven emerqency fu.4 water gump and associated flow path are not avai' able, the capabi.ity for core decay heat removal has not been assured and Condition H is applic dle.

The operability of the turbine driven emergency fndater pump is not required in MODE 4.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-8 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS M (continued)

Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1, OPERABILITY is verified by eMuring the associated surveillance (s required freque)ncy and the equipment is not otherwise knownh to M inoperable.

Due to the severity of the re equences should a small break LOCA occur in these co..witions, the I hour Completion Time to verify the turbine driven amergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE ensures that prompt unt ation will be taken to confirm core decay heat capability.

The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is pottatially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions.

M Required Action B.3 is intended to provide assurance that a loss of offsite power, during the period that a EDG is inoperable, does not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical redundant required features. These features are designed with redundant safety related trains.

Redundant required feature failures consist of inoperable features associated with a train, redundant to the train that has an inopersbis EDG.

Single train systems (from an electrical perspective), such as the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump, are not included.

The Com>1stion Time for Required Action B.3 is intended to l"

allow tie operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities.

This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal " time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time " clock." In this Required Action, the Completion Tiite only begins on discovery that both:

a.

An EDG is inoperable; and b.

A required feature on the other train is inoperable.

If at any time during the existence of this Condition EDG inoperable) a required feature subsequently becomes(one inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8 9 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

s AC Sources-Operating 83.8; BASES ACT!0NS RJ (continued) lasit Declaring the required features inoperable within four hours from the discovery of items 'a' and 'b' existing concurrently is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before subjecting the plant to transients associated with shutdown.

In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE EDG and offsite circuits 'M adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Cl as IE distribution system. Thus, on a component wasis, single-failure protection for the required feature's function may have been lost however, function has not been lost. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time takes into account the OPERABILITY of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable 4

1 required feature. Additionally, the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

B.4.1 and B.4.2-ant Required Action 8.4.1 provides an option to testing the OPERA 8LE EDG in order to avoid unnecessary testing.

If it can be determined that the cause of the inoperable EDG does not exist on the OPERABLE EDG, SR 3.8.1.2 does not have to be perfo;ued.

If the cause of inoperability exists on the other EDG, the other EDG would be declared inoperable upon discovery and Condition E of LCO 3.8.1 would be entered.

if the common cause failure evaluation is indeteminate (the cause of the initial inoperable EDG cannot be confimed not to exist on the remaining EDG), performance of SR 3.8.1.2 is adequate to provide assurance of continued OPERASILITY of that EDG.

The Completion Time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is reasonable to confim that the OPERABLE EDG is not affected by the same problem as the inoperable EDG and is based on the recommendations of Generic Letter 84 15 (Ref. 7).

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-10 Amendment No.163 HOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

l AC Sources-Operatin -

B 3.8.

i l

BASES ACTIONS 11

_(continued) lmm According to the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.93

}

i

'Ref. 6 limited)loaperiodnottoexceed72 hours. operation with one EDG inop:

j i

l In Condition B, the remaining 0PERABLE EDG arid offsite i

circuits are adeouate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class lE distribution system. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Cempletion Time takes into account th capacit;r and capability of the i

remaining AC sources, a reasonable line for repairs and the low probability of a 08A occurring during this p,eriod.

The second Completion Time for Required Action B.5 i

estab?lshs a limit on the maximum time allowed for any

'M i

combit.at on o' required AC power sources to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failure to meet the LCO. Refer to the Bases for Recuired Action A 3 for additional information on this CompTetion Time.

C.1. c.2. c.3. c.4. and c.5 j

Refer to the Bases for Actions B.1, B.3, B.4 and 8.5 for i

thediscussionforthecorrespondingBasesofRequired

-Action C.

For Actica C.2 with Train "B" EDG ino prompt action within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is necessary to ensure t$trable, turbine driven 1

at the emergency feedwater pump, associated flow path, ASV 204, EFV-12, and EFV 13 are available for steam generator

cooline, if the required equipment is not available the capabilit'r for core decay heat removal has not been a,ssured and Condihion H is applicable.

The operability of the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is not required in i

MODE 4.

Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1, OPERABILITY is verified-by ensuring the associated surveillance s) has been satisfactorily completed within the required freq(ble,y and the equipment is not otherw uenc to be inopera i

Due to the severity of the consequences should a small break LOCA occur in these conditions, the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time to verify the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE ensures that prompt action will be taken to confirm core decay heat capabilit;r. The Completion Time minimizes the time the p1Lnt is poSentially f

exposed to a t,0CA in these conditions, l

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-10A Amendment No. m NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 OnTy

AC Sources-0perating 8 3.8.1 BASES l

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-108 Amendment No.163

i AC Sources-0perating i

B 3.8e1 BASES' ACTIONS D.1 and D.2 (continued) lum i

Required Action D.1, which applies when both required Iam offsite circuits are inoperasle,-is intended to provide assurance that a DBA, coincident with a worst case single failure, will not result in a complete loss of redundant required safety functions. The Completion Time for declaring the redundant required features inoperable is 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ; reduced from that allowed-for one train without offsite power (Required Action A.2).

The rationale for the reduction to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is that Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6) allows a Completion Time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for two required

-offsite circuits inoperable, based upon the assumption that two complete safety trains are OPERABLE.

When a concurrent redundant required feature failure mists this assumption s

is no longer valid, and a shorter Co.apletion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is appropriate.

These features are powered from redundant AC safety trains. Single train features electrical perspective), such as the turbine driven (from an emergency feedwater pump, are hot included.

The Com:1stion Time for Required Action D.1 is intended to l um allow t se operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the nor:a1 " time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time ' clock."

In this Required Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:

a.

All required offsite circuits are inoperable; and b.

A required feature is inoperable.

If at any time during the existence of Condition C two offsite circuits inoperable) a required feature beco(mes inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-11 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS D.1 and D.2 fcontinued)

I unt According to the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.g3 (Ref.6) operation with two required offsite circuits i

inoperable should be limited to a period not to exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

In thii. condition, the offsite electrical power system does not have the capability to effect a saf6 shutdown and to mitigate the effects of an accident; however, the onsite AC sources have not been degraded. This level of degradation generally corresponds to a total loss of the immediately accessible offsite power sources.

Because of the normally high evailability of the offsite sources,_ this level of degradition may appear to be more suvere than other combinations of two AC sources inoperable that involve one or more EDGs inoperable. However, two factors tend to decrease the severity of this level of degradation:

i a.

Tha configuration of the redundant AC electrical power system that remains available is not susceptible to a single bus or switching failure; and b.

The time required to detect and restore an unavailable offsite power source is generally much less than that required to detect and restore an unavailable onsite AC source.

With both of the required offsite circuits inoperable, sufficient onsite AC sources are available to maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition in the event of a DBA or transient.

In fact, the simultaneous loss of offsite AC sources coincident with a LOCA, and a worst-case single failure were postulated as a part of the original licensing basis. Thus, the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time provides a period of time to effect restoration of one of the offsite circuits commensurate with the importance of maintainina an AC electrical power system capable of meeting its design criteria.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8 12 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

,ew-y.-

www.-e=-wr---

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+--. -.. - - -,-

,-.m-=.

-~.-----+...--.*-w.-..--.-+.-

.-----tv--<

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AC Sources-0perating B 3c8.1 BASES ACTIONS D.1 and D 2 -(continued)

Iam If one required offsite source is restored within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months power operation may continue in accord &nce with the required Actions of Condition A.

L1 With Train 'A' EDG inoperable $e tur>ine driven emergency prom >t action within I hour l

1s necessary to ensure that t feedwater pump and associated flow path are availab e for steam generator cooling.

If the turbine driven emergen:y feedwater p and associated flow path are not aval able, the capabil for core decay heat removal has not been assured and C ndition H is applicable. The operability of the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is not required in MODE 4.

Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1, OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated surveillance s has been satisfactorily completed within the required (fr)equency and the equipment is not otherwise am known to be inoperable.

Due to the severity of the consequences should a small break LOCA occur in these conditions to verify the turbine driven em. the I hour Completion Time ergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERA 8LE ensures that prompt action will-be taken to confim core decay heat capability. The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is potentially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions.

E.2 and E.3 -

Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6 the distribution system ACTIONS.

would not be entered If the de-energiration of the busses was due to all AC sources to them being inoperable.

Therefore, indicating that when Condition E is entered withthe Requ by a Note am no AC sources to one train, the Conditions and Required Actions for LCO 3.8.9, " Distribution Systems-Operating,'

must be immediately entered. This allows Condition E to Iam provide requirements for tne loss of one offsite circuit and one EDG whether or not a train is de energized.

LC0 3.8.9 provides the appropriate restrictions for a de energized train.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8 13 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

l AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1

[

BASES I

ACTIONS E.2 and E.2 (continued) lmm

)

According to the recomendations of Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref.6),operationwithoneonsiteandoneoffsite circuit inoperable should be limited to a period not to exceed 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

1 In Condition E, individual redundancy is lost in both the Iam l

offsite electrical power system and the onsite AC i

electrical power system. However, since power system i

redundancy is provided by two diverse sources of power it may appear the reliability of the power systems in this Condition is higher than that in Condition D (loss of both I ""

required offsite circuits case since this difference). This is not necessarily the in reliability is offset by the i

susceptibility of this power system configuration to a single bus or switching failure. The 12 aour completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, reasonable time for repairs, ar.d the inW probability of a DBA occurring during this period, i

Ed With Train "B" EDG inoperable, prompt action within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months s

is necessary to ensure that the tursine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are available for-i steam generator cooling.

If the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump, associated flow path, ASV-204. EFV-12, and EFV 13-are not available, the capability for core decay heat removal has not been assured end Condition H is applicable.

The operability of t u turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is not required in M30E 4.

Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1, OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated surveillance (s requiredfreque)nchas been satisfactorily completed within the to be inoperable.y and the equipment is not otherwise known Due to the severity of the consequences should a small break LOCA occur in these conditions, the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time to verify the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE ensures that prompt action will be taken to confirm core decay heat capability. The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is potentially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.B.14 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

AC Sources-0peratin B 3.8.

BASES ACTIONS F.2 and F.3 (continued)

Refer to the Bases for Actions E.2 and E.3 for the unt discussion for the corresponding Bases of Required Actions F.2 and F.3.

L1 I unt With the Train A and Train B EDGs inoperable, there are no qualified onsite standby AC sources. Thus, with an assumed loss of offsite electrical power, there would not be sufficient standby AC sources available to power the minimum required ES systems. Since the offsite electrical power system is the only source of AC power for this level of degradation, the risk associated with continued operation for a very short time is balanced with that associated with an immediate controlled shutdown (the immediate shutdown could cause grid instability, which could result in a total lossofACpower). However, since any inadvertent generator trip could also result in a total loss of offsite AC power, the time allowed for continued operation is severely restricted. The intent here is to avoid the risk associated with an immediate controlled shutdown and to minimize the risk associated with this level of degradation.

1 The 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Completion Time is consistent with the recommendations of Reference 6.

H.1 and H.2 l *E If the inoperable AC electrical power sources cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operatin; experience, to reach the reqaired MODES from full power cond'+1ons in an orderly manner and without challenging plant :ystems.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8 14A Amendment No NOTE-ValidUntilCycle12Ynby

AC Sources-Operatin B 3.8.

BASES l

l t

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-148 Amendment No.163

AC Sources-0perating 8 3.8.1 BASES ACT10NS id (continued) lam Condition I corresponds to a level of degradation in which I ant all redundancy in the AC electrical power supplies has been lost.- At this severely degraded level, any subsequent failures in the AC electrical power system will cause a loss of function condition, and potentially, a station blackout.

Therefore the unit is required to enter LC0 3.0.3 immediatelyandprepareforacontrolledshutdown.

l i

SURVEILLANCE The AC sources are designed to permit inspection and REQUIREMENTS testing of all important areas and features, especially those that have a standby function.

This is consistent i-l with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18 (Ref. 8). Periodic component tests are supplemented by extensive functional tests during outages (under simulated accident conditions Where the SRs for this LCO specify voltage and frequency ).

tolerances, the following is applicable.

The minimum steady state output voltage of 3933 V is 94.5% of the nominal 4160 V output voltage. This value allows for voltage drops to motors and other equipment down through the 120 V level where minimum operating voltage is usually specified as 85%

to 90% of name plate rating. The specified maximum steady state output voltage of 4400 V is equal to the maximum operating voltage specified for 4000 V motors.

It ensures that for a lightly loaded distribution system, the voltage -

at the terminals of 4000 V motors is no more than the maximum rated operating voltages. The specified minimum and maximum frequencies of the EDG are 58.8 Hz and 61.2 Hz, respectively. These values are equal to 2 2% of the 60 Hz nominal frequency and are derived from the recommendations givcn in Regulatory Guide 1.g (Ref. 3).

Regulatory Guide 1.g requirements are satisfied by monitoring EDG output.

SR 3.8.1.1 This SR ensures proper circuit continuity for the offsite AC electrical power supply to the ensite distribution network and availability of offsite AC electrical power. The breaker alignment verifies that each breaker is in its (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-15 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only e

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.4 REQUIRENENTS (continued)

This SR provides verification that the level of fuel oil in the day tank is adequate. The level is expressed as an equivalent usable volume in gallons, and is selected to I

ensure adequate fuel oil for a minimum of I hour of EDG operation at a loading which bounds the postulated worst case accident.

The 31 day Frequency is adequate to assure that a sufficient supply of fuel oil is available, since low level alarms are provided and an automatic level control system is included l

in the design SR 3.8.1.5 This Surveillance demonstrates that each required fuel oil transfer pump-operates automatically to transfer fuel oil from its associated storage tank to its associated day tank.

This is required to support continuous operation of the EDG.

This Surveillance provides assurance that the fuel oil transfer pump is OPERABLE, the fuel oil piping system is intact, the fuel delivery piping is not obstructed, and the controls and-control systems for automatic fuel transfer are

-OPERABLE.

The design of fuel transfer systems is such that pumps will operate automatically in order to maintain an adequate volume of fuel oil in the day tanks during or following EDG operation. The 31 day Frequency is based upon engineering judgement and has been shown to be acceptable by operating experience.

SR 3.8.1.6 See SR 3.8.1.2.

SR

3. L.L1 Transfer of each 4160 V ES bus powr.r supply from the normal offsite circuit to the required siternate offsite circuit demonstrates the capaht11t> of the alternate circuit distribution network to power the shutdown loads. The (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8 18 Amendment No.163 IA

AC Sources-0perating 8 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.7 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS 24 month Frequency is based on engineering judgment, taking into consideration plant conditions needed to perform the Surveillance. Operating experience has shown the 24 month Frequency to be adequate. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.8.1.8 Each EDG is provided with an engine overspeed trip to prevent damage to the engine. Recovery from the transient caused by the loss of a large load could cause diesel engine overspeed, which, if excessive, might result in a trip of the en3ine. This Surveillance demonstrates the EDG load response characteristics and capability to reject the largest single load without exceeding predetermined voltage and frequency and while maintaining a specified margin to the,overspeed trip.

For the CR-3 EDGs, the largest single load is less than 750 kW. The surveillance test will have a minimum rejected load of 750 kW. According to IEEE-308 increase)in diesel speed does not exceed 75% of the(Ref.13,

difference between synchronous speed and the overspeed trip setpoint, or 15% above synchronous speed, whichever is lower.

For CR-3, the acceptance criteria of 66.75 Hz is based on 75% of the difference between synchronous speed and the overspeed trip setpoint. The time, voltage, and frequency tolerances specified in this SR are derived from Regulatory Guide 1.9 during load sequence (ntervals.Ref 3) recommendations for response i

The 3 seconds specified for voltage is equal to 60% the 5 second load sequence interval associated with sequencing of the largest load.

Four seconds for frequency is likewise based on Regulatory Guide 1.9 recommendations. SR 3.8.1.8.a corresponds to the maximum frequency excursion, while SR 3.8.1.8.b and SR 3.8.1.8.c are Regulatory Guide 1.9 specific voltage and frequency values to which the system must recover to following load rejection. Regulatory Guide 1.9 specifies nominal voltage and frequency values which are 4160V and 60 Hz respectively. The 24 month Frequency takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 83.819 Amendment No.163

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLAht.E SR 3.8.1.10 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS This SR is modified by three Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the EDGs during testing.

For the purpose of this testing, the EDGs may be started from standby conditions, that is with the engine coolant and oil continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recomniendations for EDGs. The reason for Note 2 is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and potentially challenge safety systems. However, Note 2 acknowledges that should an unplanned event occur in MODES 1, 2 or 3, following verification that the acceptance criteria of the SR are met, the event can be credited as a successful performance of this SR. Note 3 is an SR 3.0.4 type allowance to place the plant in MODE 4 for the purposes of performing this Surveillance.

This is necessary in order to establish the pre requisite plant configuration needed to perform the SR.

SR 3.8.1.11 This Surveillance demonstrates the EDGs are capable of synchronizing and accepting a load greater than or equal to the maximum expected steady state accident loads, which are the automatically connected accident loads and required manually ap)1ied accident loads. However, the upper limit of the 2001our service rating is still available for flexibility in post accident EDG ioad management, including short duration loads. The test load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the FDGs.

Routine overloading may result in more frequent teardown inspections, in accordance with vendor reconsnendations, in order to maintain EDG OPERABILITY.

The 60 minute run time is provided to stabilize the engine temperature. - This ensures that cooling and lubrication are adequate for extended periods of operation.

The 24 month Frequency takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This Surveillance is modified by two Notes. Note I states that momentary traastents due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. The reason for Note 2 is that during (continued)

[

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-22 Aruendment No.163 I

l

+

i' Diesel Fuel 011, Lubs 011, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 4

B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS i

B 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel 011, Lube Oil, and Starting Air

{-

- BASES BACKGROUND Each emergency diesel is provided with a fuel oil storage tank. generator CEDG) fuel oil capacity of The combuned both storace tanks is sufficient to operate one diesel for a period of 7 days while the EDG is supplying the upper limit i

of its 200 hour0.00231 days 0.0556 hours 3.306878e-4 weeks 7.61e-5 months rating l

calculated using the ass (Ref.1). The fuel oli supp1p isumption that one

=

to supply sufficient post accident loads.

In certain small break LOCA scenarios, both EDGs are relied upon for I

accident mitigation. This onsite fuel oil capacity non ensures adequate time is available to replenish the onsite supply from outside sources prior to the diesel running out of fuel.

Fuel oil is transferred from the storage tank to the day tank by either of two transfer pumps associated with each EDG. The pum of one pump, ps and piping are redundant to preclude failure or the rupture of any pipe resultinginthelossofmorethanoneEDG, valve.'or tank I 1 outside tanks and piping are located underground to pre Nde consideration of the effects of missiles in then design.

For proper operation of the EDGs it is necessary to ensure the pro er quality of the fuel oll. - CR-3 has a Diesel Fuel Oil (DF ) Testing Program which is an overall effort to purchasing, quality of the fuel oil. The program includes ensure he on-site receipt acceptance testing of new fuel, offsite analysis of new fuel accepted, and periodic testing (both onsite and offsite Additionally, the program) of the stored fuel oil.ncludes water removal a i

addition to control bacteriological growth, and performance checks of the cathodic protection system for underground storage tanks. CR 3 is not committed to Regulatory Guide 3

1.137 or ANS 59.51 fANSI N195), hcwever, these standards were utilized as guidance in the development of the DF0 Testing Program.

The EDG lube oil subsystem is designed to provide sufficient lubrication to permit proper operation of its associated EDG under all loading conditions.

The system is required to circulate the lube oil to the diesel engine working surfaces and to remove excess heat generated by friction during l

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-30 Amendment No. ga NOTE - Valid until cycle 12 OnTy

ie e v

--w r,*r-.w-y,,-ar w +.

.,,n.,y-,.-,y,-gyyv-,,,,~.

,-+-,,-,.<w

,-ve,y.cy,-w-wr--

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,,,w-w

+w w

--,yw vy,

Diesel Fuel 011, Lube 011, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 i

BASES BACKGROUND operation.

that contained in the engine cumpThe onsite lube oli storage, in addition to (continued) is su

- 7 days of one EDG supply' ng the up,per limit of its 200-I hour rating.

In certain small break LOCA scenarios, both EDGs are relied upon for accident mitigation. This supply amt wnsures adequate time-is available to replenish lube oil from outside sources prior to the EDG running out of lube oil.

Each EDG has an air start system with adequate capacity for six successive start attempts on the EDG without recharging the air start receivers.

A single EDG start is assured with air receiver pressure 1 150 psig. Additional evaluations have been performed whTch indicate there is substantial margin included in the single start receivet ressure limit (Ref.9).

APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident @BA)d and SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the FSAR Chapter 6 Ref. 6 an Chapter 14 ~(Re. 5)E.,assumeEngineeredSafe(guardfES) d systems are OPERABL The EDGs are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability redundancy and reliability to ensure the availability of ne,cessary powe,r to Es systems so that fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS); and Section 3.6, Containment Systems.

Since diesel fuel oli, lube oil, and 'the air start subsystem support the operation of the standby AC power sources, they satisfy friterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LC0 A sufficient combined stored diesel fuel oil supply is required to be available to ensure the capability to operato a single EDG at the 90Er limit of its 200 hour0.00231 days 0.0556 hours 3.306878e-4 weeks 7.61e-5 months rating for 1

7 days. During an event that requires 7 days operation before replacement fuel oil is obtained,~ manual reconfiguration of loads and transferring the stored fuel oil supply from one tank to the other may be needed to support ope ation of the EDG. Diesel fuel oil is also required to meet specific quality standards.. In certain small break LOCA scenarios, both EDGs are relied upon for ant accident mitigation.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8 31 Amendment No.

NOTE-ValidUntilcycle12dn3

=. -

1 Olesel Fuel 011, Lube 011, and Starting Air j-B 3.B.3 l

l BASES LC0 A sufficient lube oil supply must be available to ensure (continued) the capability to operate a single EDG at the upper limit i

of its 200 hour0.00231 days 0.0556 hours 3.306878e-4 weeks 7.61e-5 months rating for 7 days.

In certain small break LOCA scenarios both EDGs are relied u mitigation. EbGlobeoilsumplevel,ponforaccident i

in conjunction with the on site supply and-the ability to obtain replacement l

supplies within the required timedrame, supports the availability of EDGs required to shut down the reactor and to maintain it in a safe condition for an anticipated I

operational occurrence (A00) or a postulated DBA with loss of offsite power. EDG day tank fuel requirements as well as transfer capability from the storage tank to t$e day 4

i tank are addressed in LC0 3.8.1, 'Ar, Sources-0perating,'

l and (C0 3.4.2, 'AC Sources-Shutdown.'

e The starting air system is required to have a minimum i

capacity for six successive EDG start attem>ts without recharging the air start receivers. As suci, the air start compressorsarenotaddressedasapartofthis(orany other)LCO.

APPLICABILITY The AC scurces (LC0 3.8.1 and LCO 3.8.2) are required in 4

order to ensure the availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition after an A00 or a postulated DBA. Since stored diesel fuel oil lube oil,hese features are required to be and the starting air subsystem supportEDGOPEkASILITY t

withinlimitswheneverlheassociatedEDGisrequiredtobe i

OPERABLE.

1 ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by two Notes. Note 1 indicates separate Condition entry is allowed for each EDG. This is acceptable based upon the fact each EDG is treated as an independent entity for this Specification. Note 2 indicates LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable and MODE changes while in the ACTIONS of this Specification are permitted.

It could be arpued this Note is not required since this Specification al ows indefinite operation. However, to avoid any future confusion on the allowance, LCO 3.0.4 has been specifically excepted. This is considered acceptable since o>eration in accordance with this Specification still means tie EDG is OPERABLE.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8 32 Amendment No, m NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 OnTy

Olesel Fuel 011, Lube 011, and Starting Air i

8 3.8.3 I

l BASES j

ACTIONS L1 (continued)

With usable fuel oil volume in one or more storage tanks

< 22,917 gallons, prompt action must be taken within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months to verif 45,834 gallons.y that the combined fuel oil supply >d to fuel oil However the Condition is restricte level reductions Ihat maintain at least a combined 7 day j-i supply.

In this Condition a period of I hour is allowed-to ensure that sufficient fuel oil supply for 7 days of EDG operation at its upper 200 hour0.00231 days 0.0556 hours 3.306878e-4 weeks 7.61e-5 months ratine is available.

In order to maintain the ability to treat the EDG as independent entitles for thc ACTIONS from a fuel oil pers >ective), an artificial lower 11m[t on store) fuel oil u

has

>een established.

The minimum usable volume specified for each tank is equivalent to 3 days operation and was set to ensure a minimum combined 6 day supply.

S The limit on combined supply recognizes that while one-tank may contain less than 3.5 day supply, the usable volume in the other tank could b1 such that 7 day capacity still exists.

consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1, OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated surveillance (s) has been satisfactorily completed within the r

required frequenc to be inoperable.y and the equipment is not otherwise known L1 With usable fuel oil volume in one or more storage tanks gallo,917 gallons and combined fuel oil supply < 45 834

< 22 ns, sufficient fuel oil supp1 r for 7 da rs of EDG operation at its upper 200 hour0.00231 days 0.0556 hours 3.306878e-4 weeks 7.61e-5 months ra;",ing is no;" available.

However, the Condition is restricted to fuel oil level reductions,ditionthat maintain at least a combined 6 day supp1;r.

In this Con a period of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months is allowed prior "o declaring the asso,ciated EDG inoperable.

In order to maintain the ability"10NS (from a fuel oil pers

>ective), an to treat the EDG as independent entities for the AC artificial lower limit on stored fuel oil has

>een established. The minimum usable volume specified for each tank is equivalent to 3= days operation and was set to ensure a minimum combined 6 day supply.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8 33 Amendment No.163

Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube 011, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES t

ACTIONS L1 (continued) l The limit on combined supply rs:ognizes that while one tank 4

l may contain less than 3.5 day supply, the usable volume in l

the other tank could be such that 7 day capacity still exists.

The 48 hour5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months Completion Time allows sufficient time for obtaining the requisite replacement volume and perfoming the analyses required prior to addition of fuel oil to the tank. This period is acceptable based on the remaining capacity (> 6 days), the fact that action will be initiated to obtain replenishment, and the low probability of an evant occurring during this brief period.

L1 With lube oil inventory < 280 gallons, there is not sufficient lube oil to support 7 days continuous op6 ration of one EDG at the upper limit of its 200 hour0.00231 days 0.0556 hours 3.306878e-4 weeks 7.61e-5 months rating.

However, the Condition is r6stricted to lube oil volume reductions that maintain at least a 6 day supply.

In this Condition, a period of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months is considered adequate to restore the required volume prior to declaring the (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8 33A Amendment No.163

l Diesel Fuel 011, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8 33B Amendment No.163

Diesel Fuel 011, Lube 011, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES ACT!DNS L1 (continued)

EDGs inoperable. The volume specified includes the lube oil contained in the sump as well as the lube oil stored onsite (off-engine.

If the required stored volume cannot be restored, bo)th EDGs must be declared inoperable since this 4

volume is connon to both EDGs.

The 48 hour5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months Completion Time is acceptable based on the remainina capacity f> 6 daysl the low rate of usage the factthatactionswillbeIndiatedtoobtainreplenIshment, and the low probability of an event occurring during this brief period.

I This Condition is entered as a result of a failure to meet the acceptance criterion for EDG fuel oil particulates.

Normally, trending of pvilculate levels allows sufficient time to correct high particulate levels prior to reaching the limit of acceptability. However poor sample procedures (bottomsampling),contaminatedsamplingequipment,and errors in laborator not follow a trend.y analysis can produce failures that do Since the presence of particulates does not mean the fuel oil will not burn properly and given that roper engine erformance has been recently demonstrated within 31 day ),laring the associated EDG inoperable.it is pruden ime prior to ec The 7 day Completion Time allows for further evaluation, re-sampling, and re-analysis of the EDG fuel oil.

L1 With the new fuel oil properties defined in the Bases for SR 3.8.3.3 not within the required limits, a period of 30 days is allowed for restoring the stored fuel oil properties prior to declaring the associated EDG it. operable.

This period provides sufficient time to test the stored fuel oil to determine that the new fuel oil, when mixed with previously stored fuel oil remains acce may involve feed and bleed, properties. ptable, or t restorethestoredfueloil This restoration filtering, or combinations of these procedures. Even if an EDG start and load was required during this time and the fuel oil properties were outside limits there is a high likelihood that the EDG would still be, capable of performing its intended function.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-34 Amendment No.163

)

Diesel Fuel 011, i.ube 011, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES ACTIONS Ed I

t (continued)

With starting air receiver pressure < 225 psig,does not sufficient capacity for six successive EDG start attempts exist. However as long as the receiver pressure is

> 150 psig, ther,e is adequate capacity for at least one start attempt, and the EDG can be considered OPERABLE while the air receiver pressure is restored to the required limit.

A perind of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months is considered sufficient to complete restoration to the required pressure prior to declarint the t

associated EDG inoperable.

This period is acce> table I>ased l

on the remaining air start capacity, the fact t1st most EDG starts are accomplished on the first attomat, and the low probability of an event occurring during ttis brief period.

With a Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, or one or more EDGs with fuel oil lube oil, or startin airsubsystemsnotwithinlimitsforreasonsother thanadlressedbyCMitionsAthroughF mustbeimmediatelyoeclaredinoperable.,theassociatedEDGl In this case the ACTIONS of Specification 3.8.1 or 3.8.2, as applicable,, are entered.

In the case of stored EDG lube oil bothEDGsmust]

be declared ino>erable since the stored lube, oil volume is r

common to both DGs.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.3.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR provides verification that there is an adequate usable inventory of fuel oil in each storage tank to support operation of one EDG for 3.5 days at the u per limit of its 200 hour0.00231 days 0.0556 hours 3.306878e-4 weeks 7.61e-5 months rating (assuming no offsite power. The SR also verifies combined capacity of the two tank to be > 7 days fuel su > ply. The 3.5 day >eriod (7 day capacity provided by the consined inventory 0 3 >cth tanks is sufficient time to place the plant in a safe shutdown co)ndition, cross connect fuel storage tanks if necessary and to brin 4

replenishment fuel,from an offsfle location. g in The 31 day Frequency is adequate to ensure that a sufficient supply of fuel oil ts available since low level alarms are provided and the likelihood any,large uses of fuel oil during this period would be detected.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8 35 Amendment No.163 4

v....v.

,.,,, ~.-

Diesel Fuel 011, Lube 011, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 1.8.1.1

-REQUIREMENTS 4

(continued)

This Surveillance ensures that sufficient lube oil ihventory is available to support at least 7 days of operation of a single EDG at the upper limit of its 200 hour0.00231 days 0.0556 hours 3.306878e-4 weeks 7.61e-5 months rating. The 280 gallon requirement is based on the EDG manuft:turer consumption values for the run time of the EDG. The specified volume includes the lube oil contained in the sump as well as the onsite stored stock. As such implicit in this SR is the requirement to verify the capa,bility to transfer the lube oil from its storage location to the EDG.

When determining compliance with this requirement, both EDGs may take credit for the same volume of onsite stored lube oil.

A 31 day Frequency is adequate to ensure that a sufficient lube oil supply is onsite since EDG starts and run time are closely monitored by the p,lant staff.

SR 3.8.1.3 The tests listed below are a means of determining whether i

new fuel oil is of the appropriate grada and has not been contaminated with substances that would have an immediate detrimental impact on diesel engine combustion, ifresults from these tests are within acceptable limits the fuel oil may be added to the storage tanks tvithout conc,ern for contaminating the entire volume of fuel oil in the storage tanks.

These tests are to be conducted prior to adding the new fuel to the storage tank (s), but in no case is the time between receipt of new fuel and conducting the tests to exceed 31-days. The tests, limits, and applicable ASTM 5tandards are as follows:

a.

Sample the new fuel oil in accordance with ASTM 04057 88 (Ref. 6)I b.

Verify in accordance with the tests specified in ASTM Dg75 74, Ref. 6 that-the sample has a max.aum of 0.05%byv(olumew)aterandsediment(usingASTMD270g-82)1 SUS,yt,olt viscosity at 100'F of 132.6 SUS and 1

. a Sa 40.

and e flash point of a 125'Ft c.

Verify in accordance with the test specified in ASTM D287-32 that new fuel has an API specific gravity of 28(min)Iand (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8 36 Amendment No.163

Distributio?: Systems-Operating B 3.809 BASES BACKGROUND Certain small break LOCA scenarios require emergency (continued) feedwater to maintain steam generator cooling until core decay heat can be removed solely by ECCS cooling.

Further,h inoperable, SWP-1B, train '8with the turbine driven EFW pump flow pat of the Nuclear Services Seawater System, CHHE-1B and CHP-18 as well as both trains of ECCS, Decay Heat Closed Cycle, Cooling Water AC Ele Decay Heat Seawater, Emergency Diesel Generators ctrical Power Distribution Subs and AC Vital or EFV-13 ino >erable, quired OPERABLE.ystems,ASV-204 EF Bus Subsystems are re With Train "B" Emergency Diesel Generators Train 'B" AC Electrical Power Distribution Subsystems, and,

Train "B" AC Vital Bus Subsystems are required OPERABLE.

l l

(

i (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8 67A Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

Distribution Systems-0perating 8 3.8.9 BASES i

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8 678 Amendment No.163

Distribution Systems-Operating 8 3.8.9 BASES LC0 AC DC and AC vital bus electrical (continued) subsystems are considered OP::RABLE w$ower distribution en the associated buses load centers, MCCs and distribution panels are energIzedtotheirproper, voltages.

In adeltlon tie breakers between 480 V ES bus 3A and 3B must be open,. This provents an electrical malfunction in any power distribution <ubsystem from propagating to the redun<lant subsystem.

If this were to occur it could cause the failure of i redundant subsystem and a loss of essential safety function s).

If any tie breakers are closed the affected reNnda(nt electrical pcwer.tist. lbution subsystems are no longAr Nd4ddant and ono irdin must be considered inoperable-

'bls loplias ic thw onsiin ufsty relsted redundant cl a trical pou r distrll.utloo, subsystems.

It does not, however, b,e the wo uff<ila ch MI.weludo 94rdarit class LE 4] A0 V being po m a

_-.... -.... ~

APPLICABILITY The elm.tr k d ow r v i d e :'.'v i. !ier:.oinyst e tru qtq.0<ed to be OPEpMif b gom.S i 1

Wt t

w:m* tha a.

A,.

tp t in p re

P.: r *< 1; 3.i a !.. y ' ?f..a !.i. s b: t e.; i:n i t.

aj i vas. tor.w:n ant ses cot e.<ese. fed at.: '*-ult g VA,. -.:W e

..t

' m. '. " ',n uid b.

0P d:< m t:.

v.

..n. > ; 8 x... M m.untai.: ant

%s i

W wN* AInM A% 1I

...d t'

-0

.da

,; m.

. ' 4 e(

u.n.1 nor Elect

.:.4

,+

.:,rH.'

MODES i w / S v e

':.rn :-J F.s.. ie... o remai s for 4

c

%: Nr f.0 1 8 10 "ntst.a tut;.., ':y m m t: u..

ACTIONS 8.d,Jih A t., enit. c <

With fra!#, ' A'.'u;

~ 9b*a mp t : <

. w: <c em dl>L'iM W JnMm innecrabic.

m to u oce that the ta ':H: lel.in e,try q r:;.Se e

.Jp v we:atad no gath c.ca ON:d.ili.f Nr w..n..e".r /r a ;.a With Trair r; w A d 'i.. W w b :y s*g.em 4 qocihlo.

B' ;V el>cta %)

w proi.1pt. wtion L.wcn.u s h wat u Umi t!. the ;n ne driven emerJency feedelar Jodn and usociatvl flow path c well as ASV 204, UV 12 W

'! 13 we UPERMI.E for stm generator cooltig.

il b retuired aedpinent is net OPERABl.E, the capability to.wovo coro deccy heet cannot be assured and Condition f is applicable.

Iho operability of the turbine driver emergency feedwater pump is not required in MODE 4.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8 69 Amendment No.163 NOTE Vali? Until Cycle 12 Only

---r

o Distribution Systems-Operating B 3.8.9

~

BASES ACTIONS hJ., A. 2. B. I. and B. 2 (continued)

Due to the severity of the consequences should a small break LOCA occur in these conditions, the I hour Completion Time to verify the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE

,,g ensures that prompt-action will be taken to confirm core decay heat removal capability. The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is potentially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions.

With one AC electrical power distribution subsystem inoperable, the remaining AC electrical power distribution subsystem in the other train is capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to snut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, assuming no single failure. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in tne remaining power distribution subsystems could result in the minimum required ES functions I

not being met. Therefore, the required AC buses, load centers, MCCs, aad distribution OPERA %E status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . panels must be restored to The w st sovere scenario addressed by Conditions A and B is I non an entire train without AC power (i.e., no offsite sower to the train and the u soc 4ted EDG inoperable.

In tiis condition, th6 plant has an increased vulner) ability to a complete loss of AC power.

It is, therefore, imperative that the operator's attention be focused on minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining train by stabilizing the plant, and on restoring power to the affected train. The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months time limit for restoration, prior to requiring a plant shutdown in this Condition is acceptable because of:

The potential for decreased safety if the operator's a.

attention is diverted from the evaluations and actions necessary to restore power to the affected train to the actions associated witn shutting down the plant within this time limit; and b.

The low probability of an event occurring coincident with a single failure of a redundant component in the train with AC power.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8 70 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only z

Distribution Systems-Operating 8 3.8.9 BASES ACTIONS A.1. A.2. B.1. and B.2 (continued) l non The second Completion Time for Required Actions A.2 and B.2 i non establiches a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required distritwtion subsystems to be i

inoperable during any sin failure to meet the LCO. gle contiguous occurrence of If Condition A or B is entered a DC bus is inoperable and I "0" while, for instance,d to OPERACLE status, LCO 3.8.9 may subsequently restore already have been not met for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months . This could lead to a total of 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months ,ibution system.

since initial failure of the LCO, to restore the AC distr At this time, a i_.

continue indefinitely.

DC circuit could again become inoperable, and AC distrioution restored to OPERABLE status. This could The Coupletion Time allows for an exception to the normal

" time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time " clock."

This will result in establishing the " time zero" at the time the LCO was initially not met,15 hour1.736111e-4 days 0.00417 hours 2.480159e-5 weeks 5.7075e-6 months Completion Time is an instead of the time Condition A was entered. The acceptable limitation on this potential to fail to meet the LCO indefinitely.

C.1. C.2. D.I. and 0.2 With Train "A" AC vital bus inoperable, prompt action is necessary to ensure that the turbine driven emergency non feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE for steam generator cooling. With Train "B" AC vital bus inoperable prcmpt action is necessary to ensure that the turbine drlven emergency feedwater pum) and associated flow path as well as ASV-204, EFV-12, and E:V-13 are OPERABLE for steam generator cooling.

If the required equipment is not OPERABLE, the capability to remove core decay heat cannot be assured and Ccndition F is applicable.

The operability of the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is not required in MODE 4.

Consistent with the Bases for Surveillance 3.0.1, OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring the associated surveillance s) has been satisfactorily completed within the required freq(ble.y and the equipment is not otherwise k uenc to be inopera Due to the severity of the consequence.' 2hould a small break LOCA occu' :n these conditions the I hour Completion Time to verify the turbine driven em,ergency feedwater pump and associated flow path are OPERABLE ensures tnat orompt action will be taken to confirm corc decay heat removal capability.

The Completion Time minimizes the time the plant is potentially exposed to a LOCA in these conditions.

(continued)

Crysi.ai Diver Unit 3 B 3.8-71 Amendment No.

NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 by I

Distribution Systems-Operating B 3.8.9 BASES ACTIONS C.1. c.2. D.1. and D.2 (continued)

I am With one AC vital bus inoperable, the remaining OPERA 8LE AC vital buses are capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down tP,e unit and maintain it in the safe shutdown condition. Overall reliability is reduced, however, since an additional single failure could result in the minimum required ES functions not being supported. Therefore, the AC vital bus must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

Condition B represents a condition in which potentially both the DC source and the associated AC source are nonfunctional.

In this situation the plant is significantly taore vulnerable to a complete loss of all non-interruptible power.

It is, therefore, imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the plant, minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining vital buses and restoring power to the affected vital bus.

The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months limit is more conservative than Completion Times allowed for the vast majority of components that would be without adequate AC vital power. However, there are certain affected features Completica Times of shorter duration. The intent of the Improved Technical Specifications is to remain within this Specification only and not take the ACTIONS for inoperable supported systems. Taking this exception to LCO 3.0.2 for components without adequate vital AC power, that would have the Required Action Completion Times shorter than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months if declared inoperable, is acceptable because of:-

The potential for decreased safety by requiring a a.

changeinunitconditions(i.e.,requiringashutdown) and not allowing stable operations to continue; (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.8-71A Amendment No. 163 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 Only

Distribution Systems-Operating 8 3.8.9 BASES THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-71B Amendment.*!o.163

Distribution Systems-Operating B 3.8.9 BASES ACTIONS C.1. C.2. U.1. and 0.2 (continued) l em b.

The pctential for decreased safety by requiring entry

]

into numerous applicable Conditions and Required Actions for components without adequate vital AC power and not providing sufficient time for the operators to perform the necessary evaluations and actions for restoring power to the affected train; and The low probability of an event occurring coincident c.

A with a single failure of a redundant component.

The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months t.om)1etion Time takes into account the importance of restoring tie AC vital bus to OPERABLE status, the redundant ca) ability afforded by the other OPERABLE vital buses, and t1e low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

The third Completion Time for Required Actions C.2 and D.2 l mnt establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required distribution subsystems to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failure. Refer to the Bases for Required Actions A.2 and am B.2 for further discussion of this Completicn Time.

IJ l ant With DC bus (es) in DC electrical power distribution train inoperable, the remaining train is capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, assuming no single failure. The overall reliability is reduced, however, because a single failure in the remaining DC electrical power distribution train could result in the minimum required ES functions not being met. Therefore, the DC buses must be restored to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-72 Amendment No.163 NOTE - Valid until Cycle 12 OnTy

Distribution Systems-Operating B 3.8.9 BASES ACTIONS L1 (continued) l mmt Condition E represents a conM tion in'which one train is I unt without adequate DC power,,

antially both with the battery significantly degraded and the associated charger inoperable.

In this situation, the plant is significantly more vulnerable to a complete loss of all DC power.

It is, therefore, imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the plant, minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining trains and restoring power to the affected train.

The 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months limit is more conservative than Completion Times allowed for the vast majority of components that would be without adequate AC vital power. However, there are certain affected features with Completion Times of shorter duration.

The intent of the Improved Technical Specifications is to remain within this Specification only and not take the ACTIONS for inoperable supported systems. Taking this exception to LCO 3.0.2 for components without sdequate vital AC power, that would have the Required Action Completion Times shorter than 2 hcurs if declared inoperable, is acceptable because of:

The potential for decrm.d safety by requiring a a.

change in plant conditions (i.e., requiring a shutdown) while riluwing stable operations to continue; b.

The potential for decreased safety by requiring entry into numerous applicable Conditions and Required Actions for components without DC power and not providing sufficient time for the operators to perform the necessary evaluations and actions to restore power to the affected train; and The low probability of an event occurring coincident c.

with a single failure of a redundant component.

The 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Completion Time for DC buses is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 3),

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-73 Amendment No.

NOTE - Valid until Cycle 12 OnIy I

Distribution Syste s-0peratin 8 3.8.

BASES ACTIONS U (continued)

I unt The second Completion Time for Required Action E.1 I en establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required distribution subsystems to be inoperable during any single contiguous occuirence of failure to meet the LC0. Refer to the Bases for Required i

Actions A.2 and B.2 for further discussion of this I en Completion Time.

F.1 and F.2 l " ",

If the inoperable distribution subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 wit'nin 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasoneble, based on operating experience, to reach the required MODES from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

U 18E Condition G corresponds to a level of degradation in which I mn redundant safety-related trains have lost power to one or more busses. At this severely degraded level, the plant's ability to respond to an event may be significantly reduced.-

Therefore, if it is determined that redundant trains of a necessary function are concurrently inoperable, no additional time. is justified for continued operation. The plant is required to immediately enter LCO 3.0.3 and begin preparations for a controlled' shutdown.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.8-74 Amendment No. ga NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 12 OnTy f

5 a

,

ML20199J286

Text

Attachment:

.

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