ML20196F766
| ML20196F766 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 07/13/1977 |
| From: | Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Baer R, Butler W, Grimes B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20196F442 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-87-854, TASK-03-02, TASK-03-03.A, TASK-03-03.B, TASK-03-03.C, TASK-03-04.C, TASK-03-06, TASK-03-07.A, TASK-03-07.B, TASK-03-07.C, TASK-03-07.D, TASK-03-08.D, TASK-03-11, TASK-05-12.A, TASK-3-11, TASK-3-2, TASK-3-3.A, TASK-3-3.B, TASK-3-3.C, TASK-3-4.C, TASK-3-6, TASK-3-7.A, TASK-3-7.B, TASK-3-7.C, TASK-3-7.D, TASK-3-8.D, TASK-5-12.A, TASK-RR NUDOCS 8803040181 | |
| Download: ML20196F766 (18) | |
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jg 13 HEMORANDUM FOR:
Robert Baer, Chief, Reactor Safety Branch. OT/00R Walter Butler, Chief, Plant Systens Branch, OT/00R Brian Grimes, Chief. Environmental Evaluation Branch, OT/ DOR Lawrence Shao, Chief, Engineering Branch, OT/00R FROM:
Darrell G. Eisenhut, Assistant Director for Operational Technology, 00R SUBJr.CT:
SYSTEMTIC EVALUATION PROGRAM (SEP)
REFEPENCES:
1.
SECY 76-545. The Systematic Evaluation of Operating Nuclear Power Plants 2.
Task Force Report on the Systenatic Evaluation of Operating Nuclear Power Plants, November 1976 Enclosed for your information and review are the Comprehensive List of SEP Topics, Revision 2 dated July 7,1977, and definitions of the topics, that will be the bases for the proposed Systematic Evaluation Program for operatino nuclear power plants.
This list, conbined with the definitions, represents a composite of known topics of safety concerns and safety issues that are presently applicable to operating Light Water Reactors. For man-agecoility, the topics have been organized in the fomat of the Standard Review Plan Table of Contents.
Some specific issues have been combined where they were closely relcted or would logically be reviewed together, y
The introduction to the list identified the principal sources of the topics, the basis for the categorical deletion of some topics, and the generic items that are being evaluated by others.
Generic items are retained on the topic list only for purposes of followup by SEP and appropriate integration into plant specific reviews.
The list will now be culled based on judgement of safety significance and applicability to specific plants. Some items may also be added as the plant reviews progress.
No items relevant to operating ligtt water reactor safety have been deleted.
The batic objectives of the SEP as approved by the Connission include:
1.
To assess the safety adequacy of the design and operation of curror.tly licensed nuclear power plants.
2.
To docur.ent how each operating plant compares with current criteria on significant safety issues, and provide a rationale for. acceptable departures from these criteria, and 8803040181 080229 PDR FOIA COWr;3R87-054 PDR l
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To provide the capability to nake integrated and balanced decisions with regard to any required backfitting.
The program is to be of sufficient detail so that backfit decisions can be based on a balancing.of relative safety improvements against the inpact of impleienting them but is expected to be considerably more limited than a review using the entire Standard Review Plan.
The method selected for accomplishing the SEP is to revie,< operating reactors against a selected list of licensing requirements or safety concerns.
The method of review and the criteria for deternining "lesser safety significance" are described in greater detail in the enclosed draft responses to questions raised by the Consnission.
lie now need to delete topics of lesser safety significance to reduce the list to those topics of sufficient safety significance to warrant consideration in the SEP evaluations. This step will involve consideration of the pros and cons of retainino each topic and in assessing the value/ impact of each topic.
To aid in the decision process, each author of a definition that rersains on the topic list and is not identified as generic (Categories G-1 or G-2, topics under review and periodically reviewed) is requested to pro-vide arguments both for dropping and retaining the topic for SEP review.
To be most useful the reviewer must make a sincere effort to develop the best arguments pro ated con, independent of the reviewer's personal opinions.
Only by considering the best arguments for deleting or retaining a topic car, we reasonably assure sound decisions.
The basis for deletion or reten-tion of topics will eventually be added to the definitions prepared for each topic.
Subsequently, an action plan will have to be prepared for the review and resolution of each remaining topic or group of topics for management approval.
The arguments, pro and con, for retention of each topic in the Comprehensive List of SEP items should be provided in writing via the author's Section i
Leader and Branch Chief to the SEP coordinator in your Branch by July 22, 1977.
The arguments for topics for which more than one OT Branch has review responsibility will be coordinated by the SEP Technical Coordinators.
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Darrell G. Eisenhut, Assistant Director for Operational Technology Division of Operating Reactors I
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July 13,1977 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Robert Baer, Chief, Reactor Safety Branch. OT/ DOR Walter Butler, Chief, Plant Systems Branch, OT/00R
\\ Brian Grimes, Chief. Environmental Evaluation Branch, OT/ DOR Mawrence Shao, Chief, Engineering Branch, OT/00R FROM:
Darrell G. Eisenhut, Assistant Director for Operational Technciogy, D0R
SUBJECT:
SYSTEMTIC EVALUATION PROGRAM (SEP)
TsEFERENCES:
1.
SECY 76-545, The Systematic Evaluation of Operating Nuclear Power Plants 2.
Task Force Report on the Systematic Evaluation of Operating Nuclear Power Plants, November 1976 Enclosed for your infonnation and review are the CompreNnsive List of SEP Topics, Revision 2, dated July 7,1977, and definitions of the topics, th6t will be the bases for the proposed Systematic Evaluation Program for operating nuclear power plants.
This list, combined with the definitions, represents a composite of known topics of safety concerns and safety issues that are presently applicable to operating Light Water Reactors.
For man-ageability, the topics have been organized in the fonnat of the Standard Review Plan Table of Contents.
Some specific issues have been combined where they were closely related or would logically be reviewed together.
The introduction to the list identified the principal sources of the topics, the basis for the categorical deletion of some topics, and the generic items that are bein(, evaluated by others.
Generic items are retained on the topic list only for purposes of followup by SEP and appropriate integration into plant specific reviews. The list will now be culled based on judgement of safety significance and applicability to specific plants. Some items may also be added as the plant reviews progress. No items relevant to operating light water reactor safety have been deleted.
The basic objectives of the SEP as approved by the Comission include:
1.
To assess the safety adequacy of the design and operation of currently licensed nuclear power plants.
2.
To document how each operating plant compares with current criteria on significant safety issues, and provide a rationale for acceptable departures from these criteria, and
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Multiple Addressees July 13, 1977 3.
To provide the capability to make integrated and balanced decisions with regard to any required backfitting.
1 The program is to be of sufficient detail so that backfit decisions can be based on a balancing of relative safety improvements against the impact of implementing them but is expected to be considerably more limited than a review using the entire Standard Review Plan. The m6thod selected for accomplishing the SEP is to review operating reactors against a selected list of licensing requirements or safety concerns.
The method of review and the criteria for determining "lesser safety i
significance" are described in greater detail in the enclosed draft responses to questions raised by the Comission. We now need to delete topics of lesser safety significance to reduce the list to those topics of sufficient safety significance to warrant consideration in the SEP evaluations.
This step will involve consideration of the pros and cons 1
of retaining each topic and in assessing the value/ impact of each topic.
To aid in the decision process, each author of a definition that remains on the topic list and is not identified as generic (Categories G-1 or G-2, topics under review and periodically reviewed) is requested to pro-vide arguments both for dropping and retaining the topic for SEP review.
To be most useful the reviewer must make a sincere effort to develop the best arguments pro and con, independent of the reviewer's personal opinions.
Only by considering the best arguments for deleting or retaining a topic can we reasonably assure sound decisions.
The basis for deletion or reten-tion of topics will eventually be added to the definitions prepared for each topic.
Subsequently, an action plan will have to be prepared for the review and resolution of each remaining topic or group of topics for management approval.
The argurnents, pro and con, for retention of each topic in the Comprehensive List of SEP items should be provided in writing via the author's Section Leader and Branch Chief to the SEP coordinator in your Branch by July 22, 1977. The arguments for topics fo which more than one OT Branch has review responsibility will be coo nated by the S P Technical Coordinators.
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G).Eis 1 2 11 Y re utPAssTsWn't Director for Operational Technology Division of Operating Reactors
Enclosures:
3 1.
Comprehensive List / Definitions i
2.
Oraft Responses cc:
V. Stello i
i SEP Members
DEFINITION TOPIC:
111-2 Wind and Tornado Loadings 1.
Definition:
Review the capability of the plant structures, systems and components to withstand design wind loadings in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A.
The review includes the following:
A:
Design Wind Protection; B:
Tornado Wind and Pressure Drop Protection; C:
Effect of Failure of Structures not Designed for Tornado on Safety of Category 1 Structures, Systems and Components; D:
Tornado Effects on Emergency Cooling Ponds.
2.
Safety Objective:
To assure that Category I structures, systems and components are adequately designed for tornado winds and pressure drop, that any damage to structures not designed for tornado generated forces will i
not endanger Category I stnJctures, systems and components, and that tornado winds will not prevent the water in the cooling ponds from 1
acting as a heat sink.
3.
Status:
This review applies to all plants.
There are no ongoing reviews concerning this matter.
4.
Reference:
s:
1.
10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 2 2.
Standard Review Plans 3.3, 3.8, 9.2.5 3.
Regulatory Guides 1.76, 1.117
DEFINITION
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TOPIC:
111-3.A Effects of High Water Level on Structures 1.
Definition:
If the high water level for the plant is reevaluated and found to be above the original design basis, then review the ability of the plant structures to withstand this water level.
2.
Safety Objective:
To provide assurance that floods or high water level will not jeopardize the structural integrity of the plant seismic Category I structures and, that seismic Category I systems and components located within these structures will be adequately protected.
3.
Status:
This review applies to all plants.
There are no ongoing reviews concerning this matter.
4.
References:
1.
10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 2 2.
Standard Review Plans 2.4, 3.4, 3.8 3.
Regulatory Guide 1.59, 1.102 1
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DEFINITION I
TOPIC:
111-3.8 Structural Consequences of Failure of Underdrain Systems i
1.
Defini tion:
Some plants rely on underdrain systems to limit the water table elevation at the plant to a safe level. Review underdrain systems of those facilities in which they are used.
2.
Safety Objective:
To assure that the integrity of underdrain systems is maintained because a failure could lead to a rise in water table elevation which, in turn, could jeopardize the integrity of structures, i
3.
Status:
The structural consequences of the failure of underdrain systems were thoroughly reviewed during the CP review of Douglas Point Units 1 and 2 and Perry Units 1 and 2.
There are no ongoing reviews of this topic for operating facilities.
4.
References:
1.
10 CFR $0, Appendix A, 6 DC 2 2.
Standard Review Plans 2.4.13, 3.4 and 3.8 i
DEFINITION TOPIC:
III-3.C Inservice Inspection of Water Control Structures i
1.
Defini tion-i Review the adequacy of the inservice inspection program of water control structures for operating plants to assure conformance with the intent of R. G.1.127.
2.
Safety Objective:
To assure that water control structures of a nuclear power facility (e.g., dams, reserynirs, conveyance facilities) are adequately inspected and maintained so as to preclude their deterioration or f 311ure which could result in flooding or in jeopardizing the integrity of the ultimate heat sink for the facility, 3.
Sta tus:
This review 6pplies to all plants.
There are no ongoing reviews concerning this matter.
4.
References:
1.
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DE INITION TOPIC:
III-4.C Internally Generated and Site Proximity Related Missiles (Including Aircraft) 1.
Definition:
Review the probability of missile generation and the extent to which safety-related structures, system and cogonents are protected against the effects of missiles.
The review should consider internally generated missiles (inside and outside containment), and site proximity related missiles (including aircraf t).
2.
Safety Objective:
To provide assurance that in the event of probable missiles, the integrity of the safety-related structures, systems and components will not be impaired and may be expected to perform necessary safety functions.
3.
Status:
This review applies to all plants.
4.
References:
1.
10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 2 and 4 2.
Standard Review Plan 3.5 3.
Regulatory Guides 1.115 and 1.117
DEFINITION TOPIC:
III-6 Seismic Design Considerations 1.
Definition:
Review and evaluate the original plant design criteria in the following areas:
Seismic Input, Analysis and Design Criteria, Qualification of Electrical and Mechanical Equipment, Seismic Instrumentation, Seismic Categorization and the effect of failure of Non-Category I structures on the safety of Category I structures, systems and components.
2.
Safety Objective:
To ensure the capability of the plant to withstand the effect of earthquakes.
3.
Status:
Humboldt Bay and San Onofre plants are currently undergoing seismic review.
Technical Assistance Contracts:
1.
Seismic Conservatism (LLL) 2.
Elasto-Plastic Seismic Analysis (LLL) 3.
Seismic Review of Operating Plants (Newmark) 4.
References:
1.
Standard Review Plan, Sections 2.5, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10 2.
Regulatory Guides 1.60, 1.61, 1.92, 1.122
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DE/INITION TOPIC:
III-7.A Inservice Inspection Including Prestressed Concrete Contaimeents With Either Grouted or Ungrouted Tendons.
1.
Definition:
Review licensee's inspection program for all Category I structures including steel, reinforced concrete and prestressed concrete containments.
The program should include investigations for possible corrosion and cracking of steel containments, excessive cracking of concrete structures, lif t-off tests of tendons, periodic testing of prestressing tendons for containments with grouted tendons, possible deterioration of prestressed contain-ments.
2.
Safety Objective:
To assure that the licensee's inspection program will detect any damaging deterioration of the structures and that they will be capable of performing as required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix A.
3.
Sta tus:
This review applies to all plants.
There are no ongoing reviews concerning ths matter.
4.
References:
1.
Standard Review Plan 3.8 3.
Regulatory Guides 1.35 and 1.90
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III-7.B Design Codes, Design Criteria, Load Combinations, and Reactor Cavity Design Criteria 1.
Definition:
Review the design codes, design criteria and load combinations for all Category I structures (i.e., containment, structures inside containment, and structures outside containment).
2.
Safety Objective:
To provide assurance that the plant Category I structures will withstand the NRC specific design conditions without impairment or stnJctural integrity or the performance of required safety functions.
3.
Status:
This review applies to all plants.
There are no ongoing reviews concerning this matter.
4.
References:
1.
10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 2 and 4 2.
Standard Review Plan 3.8 i
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4 DEFINITION TOPIC:
Ill-7.C Delamination of Prestressed Concrete Containment Structures 1.
Definition:
Review the design of prestressed concrete containment structures to assess the likelihood of delamination occurring in the shell-walls or dome and to evaluate the consequences, if any.
2.
Safety Objective:
To assure that the licensee's destgr. and construction methods have provided a structure which will maintain its integrity and will i
perform its intended function.
Delaminations (internal cracking l
of concrete in planes roughly parallel to the surface) could possibly reduce the capability of the concrete to withstand compression.
3.
Status:
This review applies to all plants with prestressed concrete containments. A delamination occurreo in the domes of the Turkey Point and Crystal River prestressed concrete containments.
No l
evidence of such occurrences have been reported at other plants; however, no specific inspection have been made for any delaminations.
It is not clear if the Structural Integrity Test or the existing 151 Programs would discover the existance of any delaminations.
4.
References:
1.
Safety Evaluaticn Reports for Turkey Point (50-250/251) and Crystal River (60-302)
s DEFINITION TOPIC:
111-7. 0 Containment Structural Integrity Tests 1.
Definition:
Review the licensee's structural integrity testing procedure to assure compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix A.
2.
Safety Objective:
To assure that the licensee's design and constructive methods provide a structure which will safely perform its intended functions.
3.
Sta tus:
This review applies to all plants.
To our knowledge all containments have had a structural integrity test.
This opinion should be verified.
4.
References:
1.
Standard Review Plans 3.8.1 and 3.6.2 1
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DEFINITION l and Irradiation Damage, Use of Sensitized Stainless Stee TOPIC:
III-8.0 Fatigue Resistance Definition:
l internals integrity 1.
Review the safety aspects that affect reactor ve i
damage, use of sensitired stainless steel and fatigue resistance.
Safety Objective:
i and compliance 2.
To assure continued reactor vessel internals integr tyCodes an with 10 CFR Part 50 and applicable inestry rograms relating Status:
i 3.
The Engineering Branch, DOR, currently has no rev ew p to reactor vessel internals integrity.
4.
References:
3.
ASTM A-262-70 1.37, 1.44, 1.61, 1.71 4.
Regulatory Guides l
s DEFINITION TOPIC:
III-lU.D Pump Flywheel Integrity 1.
Definition:
Review the PWR reactor coolant pump flywheel inservice inspection programs of operating plants to assure that they comply with Regulatory Guide 1.14 and review reports of flywheel flaws if found by inservice inspections.
(BWR reactor coolant pumps do not have flywheels).
2.
Safety Objective:
To assure that pump flywheel integrity is maintained to prevent failure at normal operating speeds and at speeds that might be reached under accident conditions and thus preclude the generation of missiles.
3.
Status:
The inservice inspection programs for flywheels of older PWRs have not been reviewed for compliance with the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.14.
4.
References:
1.
1 3
i DEFINITION TOPIC:
111-11 Component Integrity j
1.
Defini tion:
Review licensee's criteria, testing procedures, and dynamic analyses 1
employed to assure the structural integrity and functional operability of category I mechanical equipment under faulted conditions and accident t
- loads, included are mechanical equipment such as pumps, valves, fans, i
pump drives, heat exchanger tube bundles, valve acdJators, battery and instrument racks, control consoles, cabinets, panels, and cable trays.
2.
Safety Objective:
To confirm the ability of all seismic category I mechanical equipment to function as needed during and af ter an earthquake of magnitude up to and including the SSE.
The capability of safety related mechanical equipment to perform necessary protective actions in the event of a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) is essential for plant afety.
3.
Status:
This review is not currently underway in DOR.
4.
References:
1.
10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 2, 4, 14, 15 3.
Standard Review Plan 3.9.2 4.
ASME Section 111 5.
Regulatory Guides 1.20 and 1.68 6.
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DEFINITION TOPIC:
V-12.A Water Purity of Boiling Water Reactor Primary Coolant 1.
Defini tion:
Review the primary water monitoring and reactor water clea capabilities including the water purity, to determine if the maint nup system of the necess,ary purity levels comply with Regulatory limits on quality control and defined provisions in the ev nce Review break through.
emineral <
2.
Safety Objective:
To assure that the water purity level is acceptably low to potential for intergranular stress corrosion cracking of auste m ze the less steel piping in the RCPB of BWRs, including assuring c stain-of the Regulatory Guide 1.56.
mplementatit ;
3.
Sta tus:
i Recommendations for specifying the use of additional cond I
measurements have been submitted to the uctivity measure-n chloride to initiate a revision of Regulator Purity in Boiling Water Reactors", y Guide 1.56, "Maintenance of Waterev has been implemented in the Technical Sp dated June 1973.
plants.
ry Guide 1
y a few operatint '
4.
References:
1.
Memo to R. B. Minogue from R. E. Heineman
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' Request for Revisioa of
,