ML20155G802
| ML20155G802 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 09/01/1981 |
| From: | Alvarez B, Millar F ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INSTITUTE |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151G994 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8806200105 | |
| Download: ML20155G802 (10) | |
Text
. .
O Environmental Policy Insti'.ute 3U Pennsylvania Ave. S.E. WNerm D C ::.T.2 202,f44 2 MO 4
ANALYSIS OF NRC DATA 05 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT WORKER EXPOSURES TO RADIATION by Fred Millar and Bob Alvarez September 1, 1981 ,
Increases in Worker Exposures: "An All-Time High" The cost recent data co: piled by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cc :ission (NRC) reveals an alar =ing increase of 33% in the average radiation exposures to the total workforce in U.S. nuclear power plants between 1979 and 1980.
While the total number of co=mercial operating nuclear power' plants in 1980 rose by only one new plant, from 67 to 68, the total worker radiation expo-sures for all operating nuclear plants increased from 39,759 person-re:s in s 1979 to 53,797 person-rees in 1980, an increase of 35%. * "The average yearly exposure for all co=mercial nuclear reactors," according to the latest NRC report, dated FSy 28, 1981, "is at an all-time high of 791 person-rees per reactor."
The big 1980 increase was no flash in the pan. Nuclear plant worker radiation doses have been rising steeply for th,e last three years. The 1979 average dose of 593 person-rees per reactor was itself a 20% rise from the year uefore. In addition, the 1979-1980 rise of 35% in total collective dose followed a similar rise of 25% oetween 1978-1979. The data thus provide persuasive refutation to comments by industry and NRC officials who have re-peatedly suggested that some particular problem in the nuclear reactors has been given a "one-shot" fix requiring extraordinary radiation doses to workers, but that similar steep increases will not continue to occur.
NRC collects data annually from nuclear plant operators in two different ways. Data from the most recent reports.show that the long-range trend in
- When radiation doses are measured for large populations, like reactor workers, the unit person-rem is used. This measure is also used in estimating the risk of dying from radiation-induced cancer. Person-recs are derived by multiplying the total number of people exposed times their average dose in rens. Or it can be the actual sum of all doses received. For exa=ple, 10,000 person-re=s is a dose received by 5.000 people exposed to 2 re=s each; or by 10,000 people exposed to one rem.
3 h!k b0K h9 P .
, U.S. nuclear reactor radiation exposures to their workferee has been a rise of 400% over ten years, from an average of less,thou 100 person-tems per reactor in 1969 to nearly 600 person-recs per reactor in 1980.
This high IcVel of total worker exposures was not anticipated by those who have had to calculate the possible costs and benefits of.nuelcar pcVer generation.
As we shall see below, the ecnsequences of the large increases in teres of future cancers, deaths, and genetic damage are extremely serious. The continued exposures at unanticipated high icvels confront the NRC with a clear probic= in terms of its regulatory responsibility for heal.th and safety.
The Results of k'orker Radiation Exposures: Cancers,
. Deaths, Genetic Damage
- s The long-ter: implications of the steep. rise in workers' total radiation exposure are sebering, given the recent scientific esticates on the risks of low-level radiation exposure. Even the most conservative estimates give reason for grave concern.
In the case of reactor workers a total of 53,797 person-recs were accu =u-lated in 1980, representing a 33 percent increase over the 39,759 person-rems accumulated in 1979. The new NRC documents a$alyzed here do not have a breakdown of how many workers were exposed or their individual exposures.
Cancers which have been shown to be initiated by radiation includ,e leukemia, bone narrow, pancreas, lung, large intestine, thyroid, liver and breast. Scien-tists' estimates of the risk of dying from radiation-induced cancer vary
, widely, as the table on the next page suggests.
! In terms of the risk of genetic damage, the risks to workers' children and l future generations are significant. According to the National Academy of l Sciences BEIR I and III reports, if.50,000 person-rems accumulate each year amongreactorworkersfor20 years,[therewillbeasmanyas3,000 excess l human heredity disorders for every 100,000 progeny. Taking these estinates further and assuming that in ten generations no inter arriage with like-damaged' individuals takes place, the 50,000 person-re=s of radiation vould
, . =
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'ESTIMTES OF PADIATIO'-INDUCED CANCER OEA'THS FOR 1980 REACTOR WORKERS * -
BEIR 1 (1972) 2-4 cancer deaths 50-80 mil. person-remsI *)
BEIR 111 (1979).
3-15 cancer deaths70-353 per' mil. person-remsI *)
BEIR III (1980) 3-10 cancer deaths77-226 per mil. person-rems (*
UNSCEAR ' (197 7) 5 cancer deaths 100 per mil. person-rens )
Padic.rd (1981) 10-30 cancer deaths 200-600 per mil. person-rems ")
Cofman (1977) 200 cancer deaths 3771 per oil, perscn-rems (
Morgan (1979) 350 cancer deaths 7000 per mil. person-rems (*)
o
- The 53,797 person-rees reported by the NRC has been rounded off to 50,000 a) National Academy of Sciences Advisory Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR Com.mittee), reports for 1972, 1979-and 1980. .
b) United' Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) 1977.
c) Radford, E., Science, August 7, 1981.
d) Gofman, J.W., Health Physics, July 1981. ~
e )' Morgan, K.Z., Bulletin of Atomic Scientists September 1979. -
(Morgan's estimates, unlike the above, are based on the Hanford data of Mancuso, Stewart, and Kneale, published in Health Physics, Novem- .
. ber 1977).
~
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., , ultimstely produce as many as 1.5 millien living children with heredity disorders and 4,600 recognized miscarriages in excess of*.thU normal number. ~
"Used-up k*orkers" Outpace Electricity Production Are the huge increases in nuclear plant worker exposures matched by in-eteases in electricity produced? Not by a long shot. Data from an NRC study released in I! arch 19S1 (.W.EC-0713) show that during the period 1969-1979, the number of U.S. operating reactors increased 950%, from 7 to 67 reacters.
Total deses to workers, however, rose four times as f ast, nearly 3200%, f rom 1247 persen-rems in 1969 to 39,759 percon-rems in 1979. Total electricity generated during the period did not keep pace with worker exposures; the former rose 2321'.', from 1289 negawatt-years in 1969 to 29,920 meshwatt-years in 1979. _
Nuclear plants each have "used up" more and more radiation workers; the
, average number of radiation workers exposed in a single nuclear plant in 1969 was 145, whereas in 1979 the average was 1010 horkers exposed, a rise of 696%.
_ The rcperted average dose for individual workers which is regulated by the NRC, has been kept well within regulatory limits, in fact has ranged frem a high of 1.03 rems in 1969 to .73 rems in 1979. This level has been accom-plished, however, by the using up of a totsi of 64,073; radiation workers in U.S. nuclear plants in 1979 compared with 744, in 1969, a rise of 8600 %. The total amount of radiation to the workforce is not regulated by the NRC or ,
any other agency, u'nlike the amount of a nuclear plant's radiation releases to the environment, whichisregula'tIdbylimitsset by U.S. EPA. .
Even so, official estimates of average radiation doses to individual workers have over time been proven seriously below the actual experience of nuclear workers. In 1972 the EPA predicted that the greatest increase in occupational radiation exposure's would not be from the rapidly expanding medical applica-tions, but from industrial uses, particularly nuclear power plants. EPA '
sugge'sted that the average annual dose to individual reactor workers by the year 2000 would not exceed .225 rem. By 1979 the NRC reported the average annaul individual exposure to be .680 rems, more than three times the EPA prediction for the end of the century. .
, vnar Exclains the Recent Large Worker Radiation E::posure Increases?
s There is no one answer, but some educated guesses can be rade. In the first place, NRC data reveals that one major type of nuclear reactor is cuch hotter overall for its workers than.the other cajor type.
Soiling-water reactors (3'a'Rs) exposed their workforce in 1980 to nearly double the average yearly exposures co= pared with pressurized-water reac-tors (PWRs). The 1979-1980 increase in average exposures per boiling-water reactor was 55%, from 733 to 1136, while the pressurized water reacter increase was 13%, from 510 to 578 person-re=s. Understanding the exposure differences requires a closer look at what is going on at the 68 operating U.S. ce=sercial reactors: tany SWRs ' ave needed several specific major repa.ir jobs requiring workforce exposures to many person-rems of radiation.
a Sete Plants Are "Hotter" Than Others: Frecuent Repairs Needed "It should be noted," stated a 1981 NRC report, "that there are signifi-cant differences in nuclear plant designs, even between plants of a given type."-
Some individual plants have been much "hotter" in radiation exposures (in person-re=s) for their workers than others. The hottest of 30 pressurized water reactors (and their 1979/1980 exposure totals) were: San onofre (150/2400),
Surry (1800/1950), Robinson (1200/1850), Connecticut Yankee (1150/1350), Had-dam Neck an'd Turkey Point (830/820). The hottest of 18 boiling-water reactors (and their 1979/1980 exposure totals) were: Pilgrim (1000/3650), Quad Cities (1100/2400), Hillstone (1800/2160), Fitzpatrick (850/2050), Brunswick (1300/
1950), and Oyster Creek (470/1730). .
In all of the hottest P,WRs with the exception of Connecticut Yankee, ab-norcally high 1979 and 1980 radiation exposures can almo'st certainly be at-tributed to the expensive, lengthy, and extraordinary inspection and repair operations required by the premature corrosion and leakage ,of the radioactive steam generators, a generic problem which also afflicts nearly all PWRs in the U.S. and Europe. The replacement of only one plant's failed steam generators, at the two Surry reactors in Virginia, cost hundre(s of workers in 1978-79 a total of over 2000 person-re=s.
The other "hottest" PWRs have undergone similar costly large scale re-pairs or the leaks in their extre ely radioactive stpac lenerator tubes have been frequently "plugged" at great cost in worker exposures. Recently de-veloped remote "robot" equip =ent cay soon be able to reduce worker exposures screwhat in the major repair jobs wh'ich cany nuclear plants will eventually have to undergo, but repair techniques developed in the lab for steam generator problems have not always worked in actual on-site re' pair opcratiens (e.g., tube welding in the 1980-81 San Onof re "sleeving") .
Major repairs on such failed co=penents and safety-related modifications required by NRC have cicarly assumed a greater and greater importance for experurcs to nuclear workers. One category of NRC worker exposure data, "Spe-cial :Sintenance", accounted for only 19% of the annual colle.ctive radiation dose in 1975, but has doubled to around 40% in recent years. NRC does not, however, require nuclear utilities to submit detailed regular reports'on
, which specific repair or caintenance jobs led to large worker exposures.
NRC officials can only guess, therefore,' about what factors account for the large increases in worker radittion doses that numerous nuclear plants of both types are experiencing. The 1981 NRC report 1RJtEG-0731 says:
Usually, when a plant reports a large annual collective dose, and a large can-rees to cegawatt-year ratio as well, it indicates tl.at extensive maintenance or modifications were undertaken during the year. Also, numerous plants re-ported increases in their collective doses as a result of the actions that the NRC required operating reactors to take b'e-cause of the Three Mile Island 2 accident and NRC's concern -
for seismic design deficiencies in safety-related piping. And aga., in 1978, several PWRs reported substantial collective doses associated with the inspection and repair of steam generator tubes. Some major activities at BURS that accounted for a portion of the 1979 collective dose were inspectioncnd caintenance of shock suppressors, and maintenance and repair of various valves.
I Sevetal NRC officials, however, report that safety-related codifications required from the "lessons learned" at Three Mile Island have not yet begun at most nuclear plants, so that these NRC requirements are not yet a signi-ficant explanation for increased worker doses. (In general, older nuclear plants are hotter for their workers because more of the reactor piping and other equip:ent has been irradiated during o'peration. But the recent i
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,_ SRC data does not allow an analysis of exactly how much hotter the older plants.are.) g .
The "ALARA" Philosophy k'ithout an absolute regulatory li=it on total exposures to ,their nuclear workers, the nuclear industry is constrained only by what is terced the "ALARA" philesephy. "As low as reasonably achievable" radiation exposure to workers is the goal towards which NRC pushes the nucicar utilities. Despite .en years of nucicar reactor experience, h'cucver, the nuclear ir.dustry has not 1: proved its ability to reduce the total worker radiation exposures ceasured
.. s c.
against the amounts of electricity produced. The average ratio over the eleven-year period 1969-1979 has hovered around a level of 1.3 person'-rems per megawatt-year. The 1979 figure wa: 1.3, up from a ten-year low in 1978 e ,
of 1.0 person-rees per reactor year. Some NRC officials say that the "more progressive" nuclear plants are coepiling books on history of various re-pair jobs in different plants, in order to learn how worker exposures can be reduced.
The key question is obvious: what does "reasonably achievable" cean?
Shielding workers from radiation can be a very expensive problem for nuclear canage=ent. The NRC has not required nuclear utilities to report how much coney they are spending to reduce worker exposures to "ALARA", nor has NRC
=ade a rule as to how much a ut115ty is required to spend in order to reduce a given acount of such exposures'. Rather than strict cost-benefit analysis, utilities use "cocmon-sense" approaches as to what works to reduce exposures,
, according to NRC. NRC does not, moreover, independently monitor the accuracy
'/
of utility-reported radiation exposures, although a more s!gorous NRC effort
' ~~
in this area is be'ing contemplated.~
A significant number of nuclear plant workers are transient workers, about '
3200 each year who worked at from two to nine different nuclear facilities during 1977, 1978 and 1979. Only a small number of nu'elear workers (27 in 1977, 9 in 1978, 21 in l'979) received reported exp,osures above the allowed ,
quarterly limits. NRC has only "limited" data on the "career doses" of nuclear workers, since it collects data only for employees "terminating" with a nuclear
_. _ 1 _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ . _ _ , _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ - - . _ _ _ _ __ _ __ __ _
g.
. plant, not for ongoing workers.
Those NRC officials charged with =aintaining worker radiation exposures s
"ALAP.A" seem to feel beleaguered by the recent onrush 'o'f high radiation-impact de= ands in nuclear plant operation. And the future looks grimi a NIOSH report prepared by health phys.icist David Scott, dated March 30, 1980, suggests that the trend of increasing person-rem exposure will be drar.atic.
Scott projects current trends and calculates that within the n, ext 7 years 105,000 reactor workers cay annually be receiving measurable radiation deses.
How Much Radiation, And For Whom?
Early estimates of hew =uch total radiation nuclear plant workers would get were very low. NRC officials now report that their most recent Environ-rental Impact Statements for newly-licensed nuclear plants"contain much higher o s estimates of future worker exposures, reflecting the regrettable experience of recent years.
How =uch total radiation exposure to a workforce should be tolerated in the centralized production of electricity? This seems to be a question no one has asked in any effective way. Nucicar plant managers report that their main question is whether they can keep the plant operating. Recent repair operations such as the Surry steam generator rep [ lace =ent operation, requiring hundrads of workers and record levels of total exposure (2020, person-re=s for this one repair operation, despite elaborate dose-reduction techniques), .
seem to indicate that total worker exposures are not considered to have any foreseea'ble limit from the utilities' current cost-benefit perspective. A possible limit on the numbers of some skilled craftspeople might be the most compelling factor in this area.
As long as major repair operations are required for flaws in highly radio-active nuclear reactor piping and other components, "nothing much can be done" .
to reduce total workforce exposures to previously anticipated levels, according _
to NRC officials.
Finally, just one of the dile= mas in nuclear power safety is hat when nuclear plants imple=ent ceasures to control radiation released to the public and the environ =ent surrounding the plant, more radioactive am'terial is kept r
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. t.", .,a:" . :'. ... .
9
-S-inside the plant, thus to scce extent shifting the radiation burden to nuclear plant workers. This is not, however, a =ajor cgntributor to the workers' overall exposures, the majority of which fi from increased radio-activity in per:anent nuclear plant components.
Resources Our brief analysis of occunational radiation exposures is not a co:prehen-sive survey of the problem. The following resources contain valuable data and analysis that cc=ple=ent this EPI study.
NUREG - 0713, "Occupational Radiation Exposure at Cc::ercial' Nuclear Power Reactors, 1979: Annual Report." B.G. Brooks, Office of Management cnd Progra: Analysis, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Co= mission. Latest in a series of
, annual reports including plant-by-plant data (1978 version was NUREG-0594).
Available for about $5.00 from National Tec'hnical Information Service.
Springfield, VA 22161.
"Preliminary LWR D;posure Data for 1980", Memo f rom Charles Hinson, Radio-logical Assessment Branch to William E. Kreger, Assistant Director for Radia-tion Protection, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, dated Fay 28, 1981.
.10 pp. with charts showing historical trends. Xerox available from Environ-mental Policy Center, 317 Pennsylvania Avenue, S.E. , Washington, D.C. 20003.
"A Review of Radiation Protection Principles and Practices and the Potential for Worker Exposure to Radiation: A Research Report for the National In-stitute for Occupational Safety and Health", David M. Scott, Health Physicist,
! Rockville, Md. , March 30, 1980. 122 pp. An excellent discussion, especially
[ -
of the Three-Mile Island accident's icplications for worker' exposures. Good critique of current federal regulatory activity.
"Atomic Worker's Guide to the Most Unsafe Atomic Power Plants in 1977".
Public Citizen Health Research Croup, Dr. Sidney Wolfe, Dept. 411, 2000 P Street, N.W. , Washington, D.C. 20036, (202)872-0320. $2.00 each. Somewhat 1
l
dated, but a valuable discussion of the overall situation which goes beyond this brief analysis. 23 pp. , ,e "Plutonium and the k'orkplace: An Assessment of Health and Safety Proce-dures For L'orkers at the Kerr/McGee Plutonium Fuel Fabricatian Tacility,"
by Kitty Tucker and Elli k' alters, March 1979, p. 103. A detailed analysis of utilizing official documents and' worker interviews of worker, health and safety at a commercial plutenium fuel fabrication facility. A ticely re-port in the face of renewed cupport by the Reagan Administration for the cc==crcfal develop =er.t of plutonium fuels. Available from the Environmen-tal Policy Institute.
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MBiORANDUM FOR: R. Wayne Houston, Assistant Director BBrooks y
for Radiation Protection, DSI CHinson RPedersen 1< FROM: Frank J. Congel, Chief EGreenman t Radiological Assessment Branch, DSI XBarr RGreger
SUBJECT:
PRD.IMINARY LWR OCCUPATIONAL DOSE DATA FOR 1981 BMurray yg. .:.. FWenslawski Attached is a preliminary compilation and analysis of occupational radiation doses
@U Feported from 70 light water cooled nuclear rear. tors (LWRs) for the year 1981. The W.' information in this memorandum was derived from reports submitted to the comission in accordance with 10 CFR Part 20.407. Two PWR units Arkansas 2 and North Anna 2, h'6 '
completed their first full year of commercial operation in 1981 and are . included in this year's sumary for the first time. 'In addition, this summary includes
@a', - four urits (Dresden 1. Humboldt Bay Indian Point 1, and Three Mile Island 2) that M #
are currently shutdown for an indefinite period of time. These units have been
@ retained in this summary since they are still licensed and dose is still a,peumulate:
to maintain thm.
{.
r,y,y O.. The total collective dose reported for 1981 was 54,555 person-res, an increase of
- ?.'6 1.'3 percent over the 1980 figure of 53,797 person-rems. This total gives an averag s..
of 779 person-rms per unit, which is slightly lower than the 791 person-rems per W unit reported for 1980. This leveling cff of the average person-rems per unit follows two years' of increases during which the average dose per unit rose from 497 person-ras in 1978 to 791 person-reims in 1980.
In 1981 th: average dose for PWJ units was 656 person-rems, a 13% increase over the 1980 average of 578 person-rems. The 1981 average BWR dose of 988 person-rems per unit.is a.13% decrease from the 1980 average of 1136 person-res. Seventeen plants reported collectiv' dose e reductions 30% or more. Six of these seventeen pia reported 1981 doses per unit that were less than half of their 1980 doses. None of these six plants had a major refueling outage in 1981. For the eighth consecutive
. year, the average annual dose per unit for BWR's reained higher than t e hPWR avera
- Figure 1 shows the trends in average yearly LWR doses from 1969 to 1981. Figure 2 breaks these doses.down to BWR and PWR units for the same time period. Table 1 presents the computed person-rms accumulated at each LWR plant in 1981. Figures 3 4a and 4b give the total doses reported for each plant from 1979 thru 1981.
In an effort to obtain background information on the collective dosa reported by .
the plants, the staff had informal telephone conversations with the radiation prote
--"- staff at several plants. Attention was given to plants whost reported collective doses had shown significant changes, either increasing or decreasing, between 1980 and 1901. We asked the licensees' staff to identify the major dose intensive jobs
- - performed at their plants in 1981. The licensees' staff were also asked to identif M7hNb . .
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a cause for the significant change in dose accurnulrJed at their plants.
On the basis of these calls, no iten could be singled out as a cause for the significantly increased doses. Each plant contacted imp 1ments its own method for categorizing plant activities. Although correlating these activities to trends in dose is difficult, some similarities in the responses can be seen. For BWR's the
- licensees' staff stated that torus modifications contributed significantly to their 1981 doses. Other plants, both BWRs and PWRs, singled out in-service inspections at
>- plant modification (such as pipe hangars, snubbers, fire protection, and post-accidi sampling) as significant contributors. The staff at most PWRs also stated that an T' increasing amount of steam generator work (including eddy current testing and tube plugging) contributed to their dose increases.
1 0, - The most frequent reason given for the observed decreases in dose from 1980 to 1981
( was that the plant did not have a major refueling or maintenance outage in 1981.
?. One individual contacted did state that this particular plant had finished NRC-man-
.". dated plant modifications in 1980, resulting in lower 1981 doses. Several of the f- e licensees' staff menbers, whose plants had no refueling ou' e in 1981, said they M. - anticipated increases in 1982 doses since they still have s eral major modificatic g:. and inspections (such as the torus mods and pipe hangar inspections) to complete.
$. This information was completed by R. Pedersen and C. Hinson, RPS, RAB.
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Frank J. Corigel, Chief Radiological Assessment Branch Division of Systens Integration
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