IR 05000309/1986001
| ML20210E055 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 03/18/1986 |
| From: | Elsasser T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20210E040 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-309-86-01, 50-309-86-1, NUDOCS 8603270175 | |
| Download: ML20210E055 (12) | |
Text
._
.
.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Docket / Report: 50-309/86-01 License:
DPR-36 Licensee:
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Inspection At: Wiscasset, Maine Dates:
January 12, 1986 - February 22, 1986 Inspectors:
Cornelius F. Holden, Senior Resident Inspector Jeffrey Rob etson, Resident Inspector
/d Approved:
.
T. C. Elger, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3C
' Ddte Summary:
Inspection on January 12 - February 22, 1986 (Report No. 50-309/86-01)
Areas Inspected:
Routine resident inspection (293 hrs) of the control room, ac-cessible parts of plant structures, plant operations, radiation protection, physi-cal security, fire protection, plant operating records, maintenance and surveil-lance.
Results: One violation was identified pertaining to the operation of a drain valve of an AFW pressure switch line by an unauthorized person (Section 4).
Two areas that will receive Followup Inspections are (1) the modifications to Limi-torque valve operators to ensure environmental qualification (Section 8), and (2) the evaluation of the LPSI/ Spray recirculation line check valve with respect to system reliability (Section 11).
Prompt aggressive actions were taken by the licensee in the identification and correction of environmental qualification de-ficiencies of Limitorque valve operators and also in response to observed tempera-ture differences on the Thermal Margin / Low Pressure calculators (Section 9).
i 9603270175 860321 PDR ADOCK 05000309 O
-
- -
-
-
- - -
-
- - -
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
.-
.
.
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Within this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with various licensee personnel, including plant operators, maintenance technicians and the licensee's management staff.
2.
Summary of Facility Activities On January 12, 1986, at the start of the report period, the plant was at 100%
power.. Power was reduced that day to 75% in order to backwash D waterbox which was experiencing reduced flow due to fouling.
Power was increased and back to 100% on January 13 but was again reduced to 75% due to fouling of an Amertap screen.
Operation at 100% power was resumed January 15.
Power was reduced on January 17th and again on the 18th for Chloride leakage into D waterbox and the steam generators.
Power was further reduced to 54% on the 18th due to a loss of flow to C waterbox.
The following day 100% power opera-tion resumed.
On January 25, tube leakage on D waterbox caused a power re-duction to 75%.
The plant returned to 100% power on January 26.
On February 1, power was reduced to 75% to facilitate eddy current testing of D waterbox tubes.
Power was.further reduced that day to 55% for a test of the turbine driven main feedpump oil pump.
Power was returned to 100% the following day.
Reactor power was reduced below 15% on February 15 to replace a card in'the turbine governor valve EHC limiter.
Power was returned to approximately 100%
on February 16.
Because of main generator hydrogen leakage, power was limited to 83% on February 19, and a reactor shutdown was performed on February 21 to correct the hydrogen leakage problem.
Othermajormaintenanceitems scheduled during the shutdown include main condenser inspection, inspection /
replacement of Limitorque motor jumper wires for environmental qualification concerns, RTD troubleshooting, and concrete block wall inspections and modi-fications for seismic concerns.
The plant remained in hot shutdown until the end of the report period.
3.
Followup on Previous Inspection Findings a.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (UNR 50-309/82-27-01) Adequacy of control of heavy loads.
In a letter dated July 8,1985, t.ie NRC determined that all Phase I submittals for control of heavy loads at nuclear power plants have been satisfactorily reviewed.
Based on the improvements in heavy load handling obtained from implementation of NUREG-0612, no further action by the licensee is necessary.
b.
(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (IFI 50-309/83-02-02) Reanalysis of Con-trol Room habitability using appropriate volume assumption and revision of two associated procedures.
The licensee documented their Radiological reanalysis of the control room using 38,000 cubic feet for the protected volume.
This volume does not include the computer room at did the ori-
.
e
.
ginal analysis which used 56,000 cubic feet as the protected volume.
The result of reducing the protected volume from 56,000 cubic feet to 38,000 cubic feet indicates a reduction in accident doses.
Procedure OP 1-12-6 was revised to specify the required post accident position of control room to computer room door.
A feed and bleed rate is also specified to provide for makeup of air to the control room.
Procedure 3.17.5 was reviewed to ensure all requirements of Technical Specification 4.11.B.2 (Control Room Recirculation and Breathing Air Ventilation System Operability) are met.
c.
(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (IFI 50-309/83-02-04) Vendor documenta-tion on details of computer code certification.
The inspector reviewed a memorandum dated 12/18/85 from Yankee Atomic Electric Company to Maine Yankee which reviewed the analysis done for the two feedwater supports in question.
A reanalysis for these supports was conducted utilizing a computer code which was acceptable.
The analysis of this code was performed in accordance with licensee procedural requirements.
d.
(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (IFI 50-309/83-10-04) Revision of train-ing programs to incorporate a method for revising training based on changes in plant equipment.
The inspector reviewed training procedures 18-380-1, Revision of Training Programs and Materials, and 18-380-4, Identification of On going Training Needs.
These procedures provide for training revisions based upon changes in plant equipment, Unusual Occur-rence Reports, Plant Information Reports, etc.
The Training Department researches the item and affects changes to instruction material.
e.
(Closed) Violation (VIO 50-309/83-12-01) Failure to establish admini-strative control procedures for the In-service Test (IST) Program; fail-ure to establish master surveillance schedules for engineering surveil-lance tests; and failure to fully document IST test results.
Corrective actions, as stated in the licensee's response letter dated September 2, 1983, were verified and found to be adequate.
The Plant Engineering Department (PED) developed and implemented an ad-ministrative procedure (3.17.8) te control the IST program.
This proce-dure defines the responsibilities and methods for scheduling, review and approval, document control, and program changes.
A set of 16 procedures are used to conduct the specific tests or processes.
These test proce-dures outline the methods for evaluation of the completed IST data.
Master surveillance schedules have been established for surveillance tests performed by the Maintenance Department and inservice tests per-formed by PED.
f.
(Closed) Violation (VIO 50-309/84-11.01) Non-automatic fire suppression in reactor MCC rooms.
Modifications to the carbon dioxide fire suppres-sion system in the reactor MCC rooms were completed in December, 1984, which make system initiation automatic, as stated in the licensee's re-sponse letter dated February 15, 1985.
Corrective actions were verified and found to be adequat e
-
!
r
g.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (UNR 50-309/84-11-02) Permanent fix for cable separation concerns on the main charging pump lube oil pumps.
The motor driven charging pump lube oil pumps have been replaced with lube oil pumps driven from the main charging pump shaft.
This mod'fication nas
.
been completed on all three of the main charging pumps.
h.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-309/84-11-06) Emergency lighting enhance-ment.
Emergency lighting in tne protected switchgear room and in the yard outside the auxiliary feed pump room may not have been adequate.
The licensee has placed additional emergency lighting in these areas and also in many other areas throughout the plant.
The emergency lighting in the areas identified by this item were reinspected and found to be adequate.
i.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-309/84-15-05) Modifications to fire doors nullified the UL rating of the doors.
Doors 2401 (PAB to Locker Room)
and 2203/2204 (personnel hatch to Valve House) contained open bolt holes from previously removed hardware.
These doors were reinspected and found l
to be satisfactory, as stated in NRC Inspection.hpcrt 50-309/84-11, Paragraph 7.4.1.
Additionally the licensee has fulfilled its commitment to install a sprinxler above the monorail on the truck bay side of door 3401/3402 (PAB to Fuel Handling Building).
This modification was com-pleted in January 1985.
j.
(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (IFI 50-309/85-20-01) Review Deficiency Reports (DR) performed for personnel safety reasons for interference with safety-related systems.
This review was initiated because en AFW suction line hanger was found in a degraded condition as a result of work per-formed for personnel safety.
This review was performed by the Plant Engineering Department of all DRs written by the Industrial Safety En-gineer.
No other problems were identified.
l 4.
Routine Periodic Inspections a.
Daily Inspection During routine facility tours, the following were checked: manning, ac-cess control, adherence to procedures and LCOs, instrumentation, recorder
,
'
traces, protective systems, control rod positions, Containment, tempera-ture and pressure, control room annunciators, radiation monitors, radi-ation monitoring, emergency power source operability, control room logs, shif t supervisor logs, and operating orders.
b.
System Alignment Inspection Operating confirmation was made of selected piping system trains.
Ac-cessible valve positions and status were examined.
Power supply and breaker alignment was checked.
Visual inspection of major components l
w -
-
- -
- - - - -
-
-
.
.
.
-
-
-
-
-
'
,
.
-
,
was performed.
Operability of instruments essential to system perform-ance was assessed; the High Pressure Safety Injection System was selected for this review.
No unacceptable conditions were noted.
c.
Biweekly Inspections During plant tours, the inspector observed shift turnovers, chemistry sample results and the use of radiation work permits and Health Physics procedures.
Area radiation and air monitor use and operational status was reviewed.
Plant Housekeeping and cleanliness were evaluated.
No deficiencies were noted.
d.
Plant Maintenance The inspector observed and reviewed maintenance and problem investigation art;vities to verify compliance with regulations. administrative and maintenance procedures, codes and standards, proper QA/QC involvement, safety tag use, equipment alignment, jumper use, personnel qualifications, radiological controls for worker protection, fire protection including alarm recommendations, fire protection, retest requirements, and report-ability per Technical Specifications.
The following maintenance items were reviewed:
(1) Troubleshoot Channel C RTD due to high temperature indication.
(2) Plant air compressors.
(3) Loops 1 and 3 Tc at Alternate shutdown panel.
No deficiencies were noted.
e.
Surveillance Testing I
The inspector observed parts of tests to assess performance in accordance with approved procedures and LCOs, test results, removal and restoration of equipment, and deficiency review and resolution.
Procedure 3.1.24, Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Surveillance Test, was reviewed.
No discrepan-cies were noted.
f.
Auxiliary Feedwater Check Valves The inspector attended a Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) meeting on February 7, 1986. Among topics discussed was-a change to the system prints for the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system..A change was necessar because two check valves for the steam driven AFW pump (P-258) were re y moved from the drawings.
The check valves were identified by a system walkdown.
In addition to putting the check valves back on the system prints, testing of the valves was required to, prove their operability s
i
?
,
.
in accordance with the In-Service Testing Program.
The Plant Engineering Department was assigned the responsibility of developing a test procedure for these twe check valves.
On February 10, 1986, during a routine tour of the plant, the inspector observed an engineer from the Plant Engineering Department (PED) exiting the AFW pump room with a pressure gage.
The engineer stated he had taken a pressure reading on the common discharge header for AFW.
The inspector then went to the control room and asked what maintenance was planned for the AFW system.
Control Room operators were aware that PED was develop-ing a method to test two check valves in the AFW system, but no work had been authorized.
The inspector again questioned the engineer who stated he had operated one valve in the AFW system to take the pressure reading.
Operations Procedure 1-26-4, Responsibilities and Authorities of Operat-ing Personnel, revision 0, places the responsibility for equipment operation and monitoring on the Auxiliary Operator who is responsible to the Shift Operating Supervisor.
Engineering procedure 17-25, System and Component Pressure / Leak Test, Rev. 2, Section 7, states that the Operation Department is responsible for reviewing the proposed test boundaries, determining Technical Specification restrictions and pro-viding the necessary alignment.
Operation of a plant valve by an un-authorized person is considered a violation (VIO 309/86-01-01).
Although the impact of operating one drain. valve on a pressure switch line has minimal safety significance in this instance, the possibility exists that important safety related equipment could be unknowingly compromised.
g.
Control Room Alarms On February 3, 1986, during routine tour of the control room, the in-spector reviewed the alarm conditions on the main control board.
The plant was at 100% power at the time of the inspection.
The following alarm conditions existed:
ALARM CAUSE High Energy Line Break (HELB) Low temperature in the spray' building *
"A HELB "B" Low temperature in the spray building *
Nitrogen header pressure low Nitrogen header is pressurized only while in use
'
- 3 Rod drive cooling fan off Only two fans are run during normal operations
^This alarm has a low and high setpoint.
There is no significance to low temperature actuation which occurs during. cold weather due to low building ambient temperature.
The licensee is currently investigating methods of adjusting the low setpoin :
- - - - - - - - - -
.
.
'
Average Temperature / Reference Loop 1 cold leg temperature reading several
~
Temperature mismatch degrees higher than the other loops causing the mismatch alarm.
The temperature de-tector is scheduled for repair / replacement during the next shutdown.
High Power Rate of Change Automatically bypassed when operating at Channel Bypass greater than 15% power.
Delta Temperature Power Alarms were defeated because of loop 1 (cards pulled)
channel A & C cold leg temperature.
Auxiliary Boiler #1A Boiler shutdown during normal operations.
Auxiliary Boiler #18 Boiler shutdown during normal operations.
Heat Tracing Alarm Indicates alarms in on four'of_the seven heat tracing panels.
Individual watch-stander logs annotate the system conditions.
Sump level circulating pump Pumps failed ~ Maintenance working.
house
.
Hi Demineralized Water Tank Tank filled to high level alarm.
level Hi vacuum priming sump level Sump pump inadequate to keep sump level down.
Pump was awaiting repairs.
Waterbox #1A level Inoperable since refueling outage.
Re-pairs are platined for next shutdown.
Waterbox #1B level Inoperable since refueling outage.
Re-pairs are planned for next shutdown.
No significant system deficiencies were identified from the review of control room alarms.
5.
Observations of Physical Security-Checks were made to determine whether security conditions met regulatory re-quirements, the physical security plan, and approved procedures.
Those checks included security staffing, protected and vital area barriers, vehicle searches and personnel identification, access control, badging, and compensatory meas-ures_when required.
No deficiencies were noted.
.
.
6.
Radiological Controls Radiological controls were observed on a routine basis during the reporting period.
Standard industry radiological work practices, conformance to radio-logical control procedures and 10 CFR Part 20 requirements were observed.
Independent surveys of radiological boundaries and random surveys of non-radiological points throughout the facility were taken by the inspector.
The licensee had planned to ventilate containment on February 14, 1986 in the event that additional repairs to the turbine electrohydraulic control (EHC)
system were required on February 15.
The licensee planned.to take advantage of the maintenance time and conduct an inspection of limitorque valves 'in
containment (see item 8 below).
Since the maintenance opportunity would be limited to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, the licensee calculated the amount of dilution of the u ntainment atmosphere and determined that on-line purging of containment was not practical for such a short maintenance period.
The plans for on line purging were cancelled.
When the main generator hydrogen cooling leak rate increased requiring a shutdown to repair, the licensee again made plans to on-line purge containment on February 21, 1986.
The expected length of the shutdown was five days.
The on line purge involved several release permits since the rate. of gaseous release can be increased as activity levels decreased.
The inspector reviewed the release permits.
No discrepancies were found.
The inspector also re-viewed the Containment On-Line Ventilation Procedure, 1-12-1A, Revision 2, and conducted a walkdown of the system.
No discrepancies were noted.
7.
Steam Generator Chloride The plant reduced power several times during this inspection period because of steam generator chloride in-leakage.
When chlorides are detected, the plant reduces power to 75 percent and removes the suspect main condenser waterbox from service.
Using a' helium detection method, the leaking tube (s)
are plugged and the plant is returned to full power.
On January 17, 1986, the plant reduced power and plugged _one tube in D water-box.
The highest chloride level reached in the steam generator was 1.7 parts per million (ppm).
On January 18, the plant reduced power and plugged two additional tubes in D waterbox.
The highest chloride level reached in the steam generator was 1.1-ppm.
On January 25, the plant reduced power and found another tube in D waterbox which required plugging.
The highest chloride level reached in the steam generator was.6 ppm.
As precaution against fur-ther leaks,160 tubes were plugged in the high impingement tube area of D waterbox.
Eddy current inspection of D waterbox was. planned for the earliest date available.
The main condenser waterboxes at Maine. Yankee were replaced last outage with titanium tube sheets and tubes.
The replacement of the main condenser was due in part to the pitting in old condenser tubes which allowed leakage of
F
.
.
chlorides into the condensate and eventually into the steam generators.
Chlorides are known to contribute to corrosion of the steam generator tubes and they tend to concentrate there.
Every effort is mada to eliminate chlorides in the steam generators by eliminating all sources of chloride in-leakage.
A failure of one of the 9892 tubes in each waterbox would cause chloride concentrations to increase in the steam generator by 20.5 ppm per minute.
Normal chloride levels in the steam generators are less than.02 ppm.
On February 1,1986, the plant reduced power and removed waterbox D from ser-vice.
An eddy current inspection of D waterbox tested the 160 tubes pre-viously plugged as well as approximately 100 additional tubes.
The results of this inspection identified five tubes which were leaking (including the four that had previously-been identified).
An additional 10 tubes were found dented and were plugged as well.
The cause~of the denting was attributed to foreign object damage on the condenser side of the tubes.
The object appears to remain lodged along side one of the tubes.
The licensee plans to remove the object at the earliest _ opportunity (requires a plant shutdown to break vacuum and enter the main condenser).
An inspection of the interior of the main condenser on February 22, 1986 re-vealed that the grating on top of the tube bundles was deteriorating under the high steam turbulence conditions at power, and portions of the grating were breaking free and damaging the condenser tubes.
The grating was in-stalled for maintenance convenience and was not necessary for proper condenser performance.
The licensee plans to remove the grating prior to plant startup.
8.
Environmental Qualification of Limitorque Valves The licensee identified a difference between the documentation supplied by the manufacturer of the Limitorque motor operated valves and the equipment qualification requirements of 10 CFR 50.49.
Limitorque motor operated valves are used in a number of safety systems at Maine Yankee.
Some of these valves are required to be environmentally qualified.
The Limitorque valves are de-signed to operate under a variety of conditions and therefore have jumper wires within the control section'of the valve.
These jumper wires determine i
,
how the limit switch and the torque switch on each valve interact to allow the valve to operate.
'
The documentation supplied with each Limitorque valve qualifies the valves in the as-tested condition.
The test conditions show that five types of wire were used for jumpers ~during the environmental' qualification testing.
The manufacturer-supplied information indicates that the vintage of the valves dictates the type of wire used, however, no definitive records are available to prove the pedigree of the jumper wires installed.
The licensee decided to replace the jumper wires with. qualified material to eliminate the ambiguity in the records.
Sixteen valves are located outside of containment and eleven valves are located inside containment.
For the valves outside containment, the licensee removed the valves from service, one or two at a time, and replaced the existing wiring with qualified wiring.
The valves were returned to service and tested satisfactorily.
-
-
- -
-
- - -
-
--
-
.
--
.
.
.
.
Regarding the eleven valves inside containment, the licensee reviewed the work which was performed on the valves during the last outage which' included a limitorque upgrade program.
During this upgrade the limit switches for the valves were changed.
The NRC issued Informatiori Notice 86-03, Potential Deficiencies in Environ-mental Qualification of Limitorque Motor Valve Operator Wiring, dated January 14, 1986.
The licensee, although not required to respond, issued letter MN-86-23 on February 4, 1986, which discussed the present status of Limitorque valves at Maine Yankee, i.e. accessible valves had been checked and jumper wires replaced, and inaccessible valves were scheduled for the next shutdown when conditions permit deenergizing and testing the valves.
On February 13, 1986, the licensee and NRC participated in a conference call regarding L.imitorque valve operators.
As a result of this conference call, the licensee issued letter MN-86-29 dated February 19, 1986 to the NRC which discussed the qualification of the Limitorque valve operators.
On February 21, 1986, the plant shut down to repair hydrogen leakage from the main generator. The licensee plans to inspect the inaccessible Limitorque valve operators during the expected 5 day outage.
The inspector will con-tinue to follow this item during the next inspection period (IFI 50-309/86-01-02).
9.
Instrumentation The plant started receiving high delta temperature (T) power alarms intermit-tently at 100 percent power on channels A and C on January 23, 1986.
I&C in-vestigated the problem and placed a chart recorder on channels A and C and found that some amount of signal noise was present.
The low peaks in the cold leg temperature (Tc) caused the delta T alarms.
The variations in the tem-perature channels were observed to be synchronous.
This raisad a question of independence of channels A and C.
A and C also read approximately 6 de-grees F different (lower) than B and D channels.
I&C investigated the independence of channels A and C and determined that there was not an electrical connection between the two channels.
Channels A and C use the same dual resistance temperature detector (RTD). A dual RTD has two temperature detecting coils located in the same detector.
The Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) called a meeting on January 24, 1986 and discussed the status of channels A and C.
During the meeting the PORC determined that the fluctuations in Channels A and C were the result 67 changes in coolant temperature and not the result of noise and interconnected circuits.
The PORC also discussed the other Reactor Protective System (RPS)
circuits that could be affected by the observed indications.
The Thermal Margin / Low Pressure (TM/LP) channel was determined to be affected by the lower readings of Channels A and C.
The licensee requested the Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC) to analyze the effect of-these lower reading I
.
.
.
YAEC determined that the TM/LP calculator in the RPS assumes a difference of up to 4.4 degrees F between the channels.
Although the steady state differ-ence between Channels A and C, and Channels B and D, was less than this, the fluctuations observed on A and C would tend to manifest in the nonconservative direction and may exceed the 4.4 degree F difference assumed in the Safety Analysis.
The PORC declared Channels A and C TM/LP calculators inoperable.
One channel was placed in trip and the other channel was bypassed in accordance with the Technical Specification requirements.
I&C technicians reset the TM/LP calcu-lator coefficients to account for the 6 degree F difference between channels.
The TM/LP channels then met safety analysis assumptions and were returned to service.
No deficiencies were noted.
10.
Maine Yankee Operational Instruction Notice (MYOIN)
The purpose of the MY0IN -is to provide operational information on a location specific basis in order to provide safe and efficient operation of the plant equipment.
Each MY0lN is verified to be correct and signed by the Plant Shift Supervisor prior to posting.
The implementing procedure provides instructions for monthly audits of MYOIN Request Forms to verify applicability and to en-sure that all active MYOINs are posted and legible.
The audit instruction does not specifically require a review to ensure that MY0 ins are accurate and up to date.
This is significant because the MY0IN system is used to post portions of operating procedures, Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) and electrical and mechanical drawings.
Specific examples are:
a.
(MY0lN 83-08) Portions of Operating Procedure for Isolated Control Room Ventilation Operation posted on the control room ventilation panel.
b.
(MY0IN 85-44-1) Portions of Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) for Safety Injection Actuation System posted on the main control board, c.
(MY0IN 83-87 & 88) 480 V and 6900 V electrical drawings posted in the switch gear rooms.
Although a recent change to the Control Room Ventilation Procedure had been issued, it did not affect isolated control room ventilation operation.
The information in the E0P and 6900 V drawing were also current.
The 480 V draw-t ing posted was FE-1H Rev.10; however, the current revision for this drawing is Rev. 13.
This drawing has been out of date for over two years.
These
,
electrical drawings were removed by the licensee and have been removed from the active MY0IN list.
Followup to the MY0IN audits will be performed during routine resident inspections.
i
_. _
_ _. - ___
__
_ -. _
.
.
,
11.
Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI)/ Containment Spray Pump Recirculation The LPSI and Containment spray pumps (2 each) all have a common recirculation line.
In the event of a Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS), these four pumps will automatically start.
The LPSI pumps will run.at shut off head until RCS pressure drops below approximately 200 psig when the LPSI check valves will unseat to allow flow to the RCS.
Until the check valves unseat the pumps are cooled by the recirculation flowback to the RWST via a 6 inch line.
The spray pumps will also automatically start and run on recirculation until a containment spray actuation signal occurs when containment pressure reaches 20 psig.
The common recirculation line has a check valve, two normally open motor operated valves (fail as is), and a locked open manual isolation valve.
The check valve is the only component that is required to change position on an SIAS. A failure of this valve that would result in flow blockage could cause both trains of the LPSI and spray system to fail due to overheating of the pumps.
Failure of the LPSI pumps would also preclude using the Residual Heat Removal System for post accident core cooling.
,
t Partial opening of the check valve (CS-53) is verified monthly during the surveillance of the LPSI and Spray pumps.
A ten year preventive maintenance program has been established to open and inspect the valve beginning 1992.
The inspector discussed the possible consequences of a single failure in the LPSI/ spray recirculation line with plant management.
The licensee has com-mitted to evaluate system vulnerability with respect to single failure cri-teria. The results of this evaluation will be reviewed by the inspector (IFI 50-309/86-01-03).
12. Meeting With Local Officials and Concerned Citizens On January 18, 1986, the inspector met with members of the Citizen's Monitor-ing Network.
The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the NRC Inspection Program at Maine Yankee.
During the meeting numerous questions were asked concerning the status of the fuel leakage at Maine Yankee and the airborne releases from the plant.
The inspectors met with the First Selectman from the Town of Wiscasset on January 23, 1986.
The purpose of the meeting was to familiarize the First Selectman with the Resident Inspectors, discuss the Inspection Program and answer any questions.
Both meetings were informative.
13.
Exit Interview Meetings were periodically held with senior facility management.to discuss the inspection scope and findings.
A summary of findings was presented to the licensee at the end of the inspection.
Preliminary inspection findings were discussed with licensee management periodically during the inspection.
A summary of findings for the report period was also discussed at the conclu-sion of the inspection.
i