ML20154F703
| ML20154F703 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 09/22/1998 |
| From: | Cruse C BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Meyer D NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20154F695 | List: |
| References | |
| FRN-63FR38865, RTR-NUREG-1633 NUDOCS 9810090350 | |
| Download: ML20154F703 (2) | |
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CHARLES II. CHUSE
t p imore Gas and Electric Company Vice President Cahert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Nuclear Energy
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September 22,1998 l
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION:
Mr. David L Meyer, Chief Rules Review and Directives Branch
SUBJECT:
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit Nos.1 & 2; Docket Nos. 50-317 & 50-318 Request for Comments; Draft NUREG-1633, " Assessment of the Use of Potassium lodide (KI) As a Protective Action During Severe Reactor Accidents" (63 FR 8865. July 20.1998)
We have reviewed draft NUREG-1633," Assessment of the Use of Potassium Iodide (KI) As a Protective Action During Severe Reactor Accidents," concerning the historical use, technical basis, and industry experiences with KI as a supplemental protective action for the general public.
We endorse the draft NUREG's conclusion that careful consideration should be given to whether the use of KI for the public during an emergency is advantageous. The draft NUREG accurately states that "considering" stockpiling or predistribution of K1 as a protective action will not add any significant public health and safety benefit beyond the existing emergency planning practices at commercial nuclear power plants.
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company also agrees with the staff's assessment in SECY 98-061 " Staff Options for Resolving a Petition for Rulemaking Relating to Re-evaluation of the Policy Regarding the Use of Potassium Iodide (KI) by the General Public After a Severe Accident at a Nuclear Power Plant."
We endorse Option 2. This option recommends denying the petition and supports Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee policy statement discussed in draft " Federal Register Notice on Potassium Iodine Policy," COMSECY 97-028, which maintains that evacuation and sheltering are the primary protective actions. We strongly urge the NRC to reconsider its approval of the proposed rulemaking petition.
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CHARLES II. CRUSE
9 * - Hgmore Gas and Electric Company Vice President Caltert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Nuclear Energy C,.
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September 22,1998 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION:
Mr. David L Meyer, Chief Rules Review and Directives Branch
SUBJECT:
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit Nos.1 & 2; Docket Nos. 50-317 & 50-318 Request for Comments; Draft NUREG-1633, " Assessment of the Use of I
Potassium lodide (KI) As a Protective Action During Severe Reactor Accidents" (63 FR 8865. July 20.19981 We have reviewed draft NUREG-1633," Assessment of the Use of Potassium Iodide (KI) As a Protective Action During Severe Reactor Accidents," concerning the historical use, technical basis, and industry experiences with KI as a supplemental protective action for the general public.
We endorse the draft NUREG's conclusion that careful consideration should be given to whether the use of KI for the public during an emergency is advantageous. The draft NUREG accurately states that "considering" stockpiling or predistribution of KI as a protective action will not add any significant public health and safety benefit beyond the existing emergency planning practices at commercial nuclear power plants.
Baltimore Oas and Electric Company also agrees with the staff's assessment in SECY 98-061 " Staff Options for Resolving a Petition for Rulemaking Relating to Re-evaluation of the Policy Regarding the Use of Potassium Iodide (KI) by the General Public After a Severe Accident at a Nuclear Power Plant."
We endorse Option 2. This option recommends denying the petition and supports Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee policy statement discussed in draft " Federal Register Notice on Potassium Iodine Policy," COMSECY 97-028, which maintains that evacuation and sheltering are the primary protective actions. We strongly urge the NRC to reconsider its approval of the proposed rulemaking petition.
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Mr. David L Meyer, Chief September 22,1998 Page 2 Should you have questions regarding this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.
Very truly yours,
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Document Control Desk, NRC H. J. Miller, NRC R. S. Fleishman, Esquire Resident Inspector, NRC J. E. Silberg, Esquire R. I. McLean, DNR S. S. Bajwa, NRC J. H. Walter, PSC A. W. Dromerick, NRC 1
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t, Chief, Rules and Directives Branch Division of Administrative Services Office of Administration United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
Subject:
Comments on Draft NUREG-1633," Assessment of the Use of Potassium lodide (KI) As a Protective Action During Severe Reactor Accidents"
Reference:
Federal Register Volume 63, No.138, Page 38865, July 20,1998 This letter provides Commonwealth Edison (Comed) Company comments on the subject Draft NUREG.
We have reviewed draft NUREG-1633," Assessment of the Use of Potassium lodide (KI) As a Protective Action During Severe Reactor Accidents,"(Federal Register Volume 63, No.138, Page 38865, July 20,1998). Comed strongly supports the comments provided by the Nuclear Energy Institute and the State of Illinois in separate letters dated September 11,1998.
Draft NUREG-1633 supports the position that "considering stockpiling or redistribution of Kl as a protective action will not add any significant public health and safety benefit to the adequate level of protection currently provided by existing emergency planning at and around commercial nuclear power plants."
Comed concurs with this conclusion and recommends that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission review the current position and reconsider the adoption of Option 2 (i.e., the option to not have stockpiling or redistribution of KI as a protective action) of SECY 98-061, " Staff Options for Resolving a Petition for Rulemaking Relating to Re-evaluation of the Policy Regarding the Use of Potassium lodide (KI) by the General Public After a Severe Accident at a Nuclear Power Plant."
Respectfully, R. M. Kric Vice President - Regulatory Services 490 928N N A Unicom Company
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North Atlantic Energy Ser$ ice Corporation s
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September 16,1998 NYN-98108 Mr. David L. Meyer Chief, Rules Review and Directives Branch Mail Stop T-6 D69 Oflice ofAdministration i
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Seabrook Station Drail NUREG-1633, " Assessment of the Use of Potassium lodide (KI)
As a Protective Action During Severe Reactor Accidents,"
(63 Fed. Reu. 38865. Julv 20.1998)
Nonn Atlantic Energy Senice Corporation (North Athmtic), managing agent for the Joint Owners of Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant, endorses the Nuclear Energy Institute's (NEI) comments on the drall NUREG-1633, " Assessment of the Use of Potassium lodide (KI) As a Protective Action During Severe Reactor Accidents," (63 Fed. Reg. 38865, July 20,1998).
North Atlantic believes that the use of KI as a protective action may be detrimental to the implernentation 'of an effective emergency preparedness program that utilizes evacuation as a fundainental action. Therefore, we recommend that the NRC reverse its decision to revise emergency planning regulation to include consideration of KI as a protective measure for the general public.
North Atlantic appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft NUREG. If you should have any questions on North Atlantic's comments, please contact Mr. Donald R. Taillea1, Emergency Preparedness Manager, at (603)773-7359.
Very truly yours, NORTH ATLANTIC ENERGY SERVICE CORP.
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- Q ted C. Feigenbag Executive Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer
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4815 West Markham Street
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- Telephone t501) 661-2000 Sandra H. Nichols, M.D., Director
- Mike fluckabee, Got ernor
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Septernber 1G,1998 Mr. David L Meyer Chief, Rules Review and Directives Branch Mail Stop T-6 DG9 Office of Adtninistration Unites States Nuclear Regulatory Conunission Washington, D. C. 20555-0001
Subject:
Draft NUREG-16333, Assessment of the Use of Potassium lodide (KI) As a Protective Action During Severe Reactor Accidents.
Dear Mr. Meyer:
The Arkansas Department of Health does not agree with the concept of stockpiling and distributing KI to the general public. The State's ; rima:y protective actions in response to an event at a nuclear power plant are " evacuation and sheltering". These actious better ensure the safety of the public and correspond to the " conservative approach" the State takes in response to an event.
If you have require additional informadon or if you have any questions, please call me at (501) 6G1-2301, f
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i o David D. S tellings,Jr., Directo Division of Radiation Control and Emergency Management i
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Atlanta eo g a 30316-0055 Tet (404) s35-7000i
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September 15,1998 Mr. David L. Meyer Chief Rules Review and Directn Branch Office of Administration United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop T-6 D69 Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
Dear Mr. Meyer:
This letter is in reference to your request for comments on the Draft NUREG-1633, " Assessment of the Use of Potessium lodide (KI) As a Protective Action During Severe Reactor Accidents." (63 Fed. F eg. 38865, July 20,1998)
It is the position of the Georgia t mergency Management Agency (GEMA) that the pre-distribution and stockpiling of Potassium ledide (Kl) as a protective measure in the event of a severe reactor accident will not significantly reduce the risk to the citizens of Georgia. The extensive planning and preparedness of local and state governments along with a rigorous public awareness program is the surest method to ensure the safety of the general public living near a Nuclear Power Generating facility.
The problems associated with decision making and the logistical distribution of Kl to the general public in the event of a severe accident may actually have a negative impact on the primary defensive measure, evacuation. Clearly, the most efficient and effective strategy to protect the public is to remove them from the danger.
Any requiroment that may delay this evacuation would be considered counterproductive.
Kl is well recugnized for its ability to protect the Thyroid Gland from exposure to radioactive iodine. As you are surely aware, KI offers no protection for any other Care must be organs and provides no protection from whole body dose exposure.
taken to ensure the public is not lulled into a false sense of security that a pill will provide all the protection they may need. Evacuation, again, is the optimum protective measure and is the key to protecting the public.
The use cf Ki by emergency, workers who may be required to remain in an affected area is well recognized. Appropriate levels of KI inventory at the local level is already incorporated into Georgia's plans for distribution to the emergency workers i
when required.
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tA Mr. David L. Meyer Page Two September 15,1998 Extensive planning, coordination, and preparedness has been accomplished across the spectrum from the utilities through the local communities and at the state j
level. All of these plans and preparations are regularly evaluated by federal authorities to include the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. These emergency plans consider every possible tool for protecting the general public and are evaluated then from a benefit point of view.
When these plans of the state and local governments are implemented, it is felt by this agency that Potassium lodide will not offer any significant protection to the population at best, and at worst, may negatively impact on the execution of other important aspects of those emergency plans.
We appreciate the opportunity to provide comments and opinions prior to the consideration for approval of this new regulation. Should any additional information be required please contact Patrick Cochran at (404) 635-7233.
Sincerely, M,_
GdR' cCONNELL Director GWM/cd
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South Carolina Electric & Gas Company Gary J. Taylor X
gg Virgil C. Summer Nucisar Station Vice President P.O. Box 88 Nuclear Operabons
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' ' NC-98-0165 Mr. David L. Meyer Chief, Rules Review and Directives Branch Mail Stop T-6 D69 Office of Administration United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Dear Mr. Meyer.
Subject:
VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION DOCKET NO. 50/395 OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12
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DRAFT NUREG-1633 COMMENTS
' South Carolina Electric and Gas submits these comments in response to the subject notice. We have a reviewed draft NUREG-1633, " Assessment of the Use of Potassium lodide (KI) As a Protective Action During Se* ero Reactor Accidents," (63 Fed R_eg.
38865, July 20,1998), The draft NUREG reviews the historical use, technical basis, and industry experiences with Kl as a supplemental protective action for the general public.
Draft NUREG-1633 supports the industry position that "considering" stockpiling or predistribution of Kl as a protective action will not add any significant public health and safety benefit to the adequate level of protection currently provided by existing emergency planning at and around commercial nuclear power plants. SCE&G urges the NRC to reconsider its approval of the proposed rulemaking petition.
SCE&G endorses the draft NUREG which concludes careful consideration should be given to whether the use of KI for the public during an emergency is advantageous.
SCE&G agrees with the staff's assessment in SECY 98-061, " Staff Options for Resolving a Petition for Rulemaking Relating to Reevaluation of the Policy Regarding the Use of Potassium lodide (KI) by the General Public After a Severe Accident at a
- Nuclear Power Plant." We endorse Option 2. This option recommends denying the petition and supports the FRPPC policy statement discussed in COMSECY 97-028 which maintains that evacuation and sheltering are the primary protective actions.
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i USNRC NRG-1633 RC-98-0165 Page 2 of 2 If administered promptly, Kl can be effective in blocking the thyroid and preventing radiciodine uptakes. The population most at risk in the situation are children through age 15. However, most emergency plans suggest precautionary evacuation of schools and day care facilities at declaration of a Site Area Emergency. Under these conditions, there is no imminent release of radioactive material that will exceed EPA Protective Action Guidelines beyond the site boundary. If children are evacuated, there is no opportunity to further reduce risk through distribution of potassium iodide.
A major impediment to Kl distribution to school children is coordination and administration of the program, e.g., the actual decision-making process to administer Kl or evacuate, parental approval and record keeping, identification and mitigation of allergic reactione and the availability of a qualified medical professional to administer the potassium iodide.
The U.S. federal agencies, nucl ear industry, state and local emergency response organizations have developed the most effective and sophisticated emergency preparedness plans in the world. The U.S. model recognizes that evacuating an area is the most effective response for protecting the public health and safety. Where evacuations are performed, potassium iodide would not add any measure of safety to this proven approach, and could actually complicate and hinder emergency response.
Very truly yours, e
N 0b u s 1;-
Gary J. Taylor RAM /GJT/vjk c:
J. L. Skolds W. F. Conway R. R. Mahan R. J. White L. M. Padovan M. K Batavia L. C. Hipp (505)
V. J. Kelley (507)
RTS (NRG 1633)
File (611.10)
DMS (RC-98-0165)
NUCLEAR EXCELLENCE - A SUMMER TRADmON!
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Charlotte. NC 28201 1006 M. S. Tuckman (MU 382-2200 arnct y-nmy~ ;] 3 99 (my 3gy.435g,
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Ju/y'.20, /f/f September 10, 1998 Mr. David ~L.
Meyer Chief, Rules Review and Directives Branch j
Mail Stop.T-6 D69 Office of' Administration U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission j
Washington, DC 20555-0001 i
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Subject:
Draft NUREG-1633, " Assessment of the Use of Potassium l
Iodide (KI) As a Protective Action During Severe Reactor Accidents," (63 Federal Register 38865, July 20, 1998)
Duke Energy offers the following comm6nts on Draft NUREG-1633, l
" Assessment of the Use of Potassium Iodide (KI) As a Protective l'
Action During Severe Reactor Accidents," (63 Federal Register 38865, July 20, 1998). The Draft NUREG provides an evaluation of the use of potassium iodide as a supplemental protective action within the plume exposure pathway.
The Draft NUREG-1633 provides a researched conclusion that the proposed rule change, requiring stockpiling and prophylactic issue of KI, will not effectively improve protective actions for the public.
In some instances, KI may slow evacuations or even be administered unnecessari)y as a result of the rule.
lf Unnecessary administration of KI may have significant health L
consequences.
Duke Energy urges the NRC to reconsider its l'
approval'of the Petition for Rulemaking filed by Mr. Peter G.
Crane (60 Federal Register 58256, November 27, 1995).
Consequences of Chernobyl are often cited as a reason that the United States should distribute KI.
This NUREG states that most of the thyroid dose at Chernobyl was from ingestion pathway.
This emphasizes the importance of existing emergency planning for 4
the ingestion pathway,-rather than KI. For severe accidents with containment failure, the whole body doses are hazardous, not just j
the thyroid doses.
Evacuation is more effective in reducing the 4
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September 10, 1998
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Page 2
. dose to-the whole body.
Where evacuations are performed, KI would not add any measure of safety to the existing emergency response,.and could actually hinder emergency response by decreasing-the speed of evacuation.
Administration of a drug.without medical supervision to a broad population is a.significant departure from the norm in emergency response, which is evacuation.
In addition, the population most sensitive to radiciodines is children.
One impediment to KI distribution to children in day cares and schools is the logistics associated with obtaining parental approval and having sufficient, qualified medical personnel available to administer l
the KI.
Most offsite emergency plans call for precautionary evacuation of schools and day cares when a Site Area Emergency is declared.
Under these conditions, offsite doses should not exceed a small fraction of the EPA protective action guideline l
levels of 5 Rem Thyroid CDE offsite,.
i and should be much lower than the EPA's protective action guideline for the administration of stable iodine (25 Rem Thyroid CDE).
In order to achieve maximum thyroid blocking, KI has to be taken just prior to a release. The dose reduction is only a factor of 2 if KI is taken 3 to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after exposure, which would more typically.be the case if KI were given outside the Emergency Planning Zone when people arrive at a reception center.
l Severe accident studies have shown that even if there is serious l
damage to the core, there may not be a large release to the environment.
The information included on the likelihood of a severe accident, and what (small) fraction of those result in a large early release, needs to be emphasized.
In all four of the examples sited, the release occurred more than 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> after the initiating event, allowing time for evacuation to be completed l
prior to the release, eliminating the need for KI.
The draft NUREG states, "If containment integrity can be maintained for 24
-hours or more, the offsite risk is limited because of decay and in-cont ainment removal processes. "
Duke Energy has implemented Severe Accident Management to help achieve that end in the unlikely event of a severe accident.
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Mr. David L.
Meyer September 10, 1998 Page 3 If there are any questions regarding the comments provided, please contact Tina Kuhr by telephone at (704) 382-3151.
Yours truly, K. 561 M.
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Tuckman
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j August 24, 1998 Dr. Ernest L, Mazzaferri, M.D.
Department of Internal Medicine 213 Means Hall The Ohio State University 1654 Upham Drive Columbus, Ohio 43210-1228 1
Dear Dr. Mazzaferri:
1
Subject:
USE OF POTASSIUM IODIDE BY THE PUBLIC IN THE EVENT OF A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT It was a pleasure to meet with fou on August 20, 1998, in order to discuss the issue of public distribution of potassium iodide (KI) for nuclear power plant l
accident use. We were glad to learn of your interest in reviewing the Chio Department of Health draft policy on KI public distribution, as well as your interest in responding to the request by the NRC for comments to their draft report, NUREG-1633. A copy of both are enclosed.
During our meeting we mentioned the wording of the package insert for THYRO-BLOCK, the stable XI tablet that we currently distribute for use by emergency workers and institutionalized populations in the 10-mile emergency planning zones around nuclear power plants. We also mentioned that the NRC recently sent a letter to the FDA requesting their assistance in considering mass distribution of KI to the public, (Frank J. Congel to Michael A Friedman, M.D.,
Acting FDA Commissioner, July 29, 1998.) A copy of both documents are enclosed.
In consideration of the information provided and your own e.xpert knowledge, research and experience, we would appreciate your response to the questions that the NRC posed to Dr. Friedman and your consideration of other aspects listed in the attachment. The NRC has requested comments on NUREG-1633 by September 15, 1998 We would appreciate getting your comments, so that we may forward them to the NRC. If you have any questions, please contact me or Harvey Brugger at (614)644-2727.
Sincerely, i
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Roge L. Suppes, Chief Bureau of Radiation Protection RLS/HBB/hb l
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To: Dr. Mazzaferri, M.D. August 24, 1998 QUESTIONS FOR YOUR RESPONSE i
S 1.
The Ohio Department of Health (ODH) currently recommends evacuation, if the total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) 13 i
projected to exceed one Rem, or if it is projected that the committed dose equivalent (CDE) to a child's thyroid is expected to exceed 5 Rem. Using the draft ODH policy, when this dose projection is made, a recommendation would also be made to all those people in the areas to be evacuated to take the first 130 mg KI tablet. Previously, the take your KI recommendation was only made to emergency workers and institutionalized populations, and that recommendation would i
be based on a projection of 25 Rem to the thyroid or greater, i
per FDA guidance. Would you comment on the proposed projected dose level for taking KI?
4 2.
In the ODH fraft policy, those who do not have KI when it is recommendec to be taken, would need to go to a reception l
center or elsewhere out of the evacuated area to get it. They would be urged not to delay their evacuation in order to get it in the affected area. If they successfully evacuate before the plume's arrival, of course taking KI would be unnecessary.
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Also, since evacuation would be based on a projection that may not come to pass, many people might be taking KI who would not be exposed or would be minimally exposed. Nor would we expect anyone to be exposed from ingesting radiciodine, since the food supply would be interrupted and people would be urged not to eat locally grown food. In consideration of this situation, would the benefit of mass use of KI outweigh the health risks?
3.
The U.S.
Pharmacopeia and the Physician's Desk Reference make statements concerning contraindications and side effects, as discussed 'in NUREG-1633.
The World Health Organization recommendations also contain some serious warnings on taking it. In light of these cautions, and the ODH recommended use of 130 mg tablets to adults (including pregnant and/or lactating women) and children one year of age and older; and 1/2 of a tablet to babies under 1 year of age (including neonates), for upwards of ten days, what do you think about the benefits versus the risks of taking KI?
4.
Some opponents to mass distribution of KI do not believe thyroid cancer is serious enough to warrant the mass distribution of KI. Would you comment on this in light of your research on metastasized cancer found in children having radiation induced thyroid cancer from the Chernobyl accident in Belarus and other areas?
5.
If the emergency response of the Federal, State and local authorities could indeed prevent ingestion of radiciodines, and since taking KI in the 10-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) cannot protect the thyroid from direct dese from the
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To: Dr. Mazzaferri, M.D. August 24, 1998 QUESTIONS FOR YOUR RESPONSE cloud or ground shine, would mass distribution of KI still be t
warranted?
6.
Figure 1, Page 8 in NUREG-1633 presents time before and afte.
exposure versus percentage blocking of the thyroid with stable iodine. (This figure is taken from NUREG-6310, An Analysis of l
Potassium Iodide (KI) Prophylaxis for the General Public in the event of a Nuclear Accident, USNRC, February 1995. Copy enclosed.) The figure appears to indicate that stable iodine would be capable of up to 95% blocking of the thyroid for perhaps two hours after exposure, but that the blocking diminishes rapidly to 50% in about 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, and zero in about 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. Would you comment on the time frame for which KI would be effective?
7.
Would you comment on the aspects of taking KI at the recommended dosage, versus taking more than one tablet at one
- time, at a time when the person may be stressed by the situation, and therefore not capable of understanding the risks of their action - the potential and effect of over-dosing?
l 8.
Would you comment on the situation that the person who is distributing KI will in all likelihood not be a trained medical person or even capable of observing for side effects and understanding what to do about them if they appeared?
9.
Would you comment on the probability that the mass public could safely store a personal supply of KI over a five year period and.still have it effective when needed? (The Thyro-Block package insert states
" Store at controlled room temperature between 15 and 30 C ( 5 9
- and 8 6
- F). Keep container tightly closed and protect from light."
10.
Would you comment on whether a personal supply of KI can be safely stored by the mass public, in light of the possibility of mistakes that could happen; i.e., including someone very young accidentally taking the entire 10 tablet contents of the bottle?
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
Omce of Public Mfairs t
Washington DC 20555 Telepbone: 301/415 8000 - E msH: opadEnre. gov i
No. 97-IO2 July,1,1997 l
NRC PSVISES POSITION ON USE OF POTASSIUM IODCDE IN CASE OF ACCIDENT AT NUCLEAR POreR PI AST 1
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has decided to modi.fy its position regarding the use of potassium iodide as a protective measure for the general public in case of a severe nuclear reac:or accident. Tne agency has decided to endorse de Federaj Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee's (FRPCC) recom= ended policy to fedemily fund the pumhase of potassium iodide for sta:es at deir request, and de NRC will provide the funding.
The Commission noted that the federal government recently began stockpiling potassium iodide near major me:ropoli:an areas for use in mitigating the consegences of potential terrorist use of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. 'Ite potassium iodide wou!d be available to any state for any type of radiological emergency at acy time.
If a state wishes to have its scurce of potassium iodide close at hand for use in a pcesible nucler reac:or accident, de federal psemmen: would fand de purchase, under de Commission's revised pohbec.
Peta.ssiern iodide, if :aken in :ime, blocks de dyroid gf and's uptake of radioactive iodine and tus I
could help reduce thyroid diseases that might otherwise be caused by uposure to airbome radioac::ve iodine that could be dispersed in a nuc! ear accident.
Under Se NRC's r:sised cosition, de federal government would purchase potassium iodide, but interested s:a:e and local govemments would be responsib!e for maintenance, dismoution and subsequent :cs:5. NRC licensees would, as part of their emergency response planning, discuss this matter wi6 s:2:e and !cca! govemments who make decisio.s on protec:ive measures as pst; of deir planning for responses to potential emergencies.
f f dnalised by the FRPCC, ie proposed new policy will be published in se Fedeal Register. NRC will work with te Federal Ernergency Management Agency to prepare de final policy state:nent and to cese!cp imn men:2:ica details,inc!uding c:iteria for evalua:ing a state's request for funding t
for potassium icdice.
The cut ent federa: ;olicy was published in me Feder11 Regis:er in 1935. It recomreends da:
potassiu n icdide be s:ockpi: d a*.d dist-ibuted to emergency werkers and insticationa!! zed persens dunng radiciogical emergencies, bu: does not recommend regiring pre. distribution or s:o(gihng for the general public.
The best technica!informa: ice indicates that o ompt evacua:!cc and in place sheltenng are the preferred protecave actions for the general public. However. te state (or in some cases, the local gover cenn bears uittma:ei;. responsibility for the pro:ecuen ofits citizens. Therefore, te de ision for local neckpihn; anc use of cotassium iodide as a pro:ecuse measure for the ge::ent public is lef-ht::../w.ta-c.gowCPMp o.ncrev:97-102.htm 3/[9/97 E
.t02. hen at wwnre. gov ment.
~ co cte discretico of de state or local govem l d i their emergency pf wni g the ese of Currently two states (Tennessee and Alabama)inc u e nde general public.
potassium iodide as a protective ::.casure for 39 on "U.S. Policy onnst:res to reduce w!n i
i In 1995 de White House issued Presidential Decision f
l to de potential use by tare ists of nu: ear, cy W.eagement Agency,with He repett reecemended da: de federal A report wu prepared by a group chared by the Federal Emergen idotes, vaccines for andrax, andbiotics, i
representatives &om the NRC and oWer federal agenc es.
i government purchase and s:ockpile chemical nerve gas mt l ublic i l d potassiumiodide.
potassium iodide and other medicines for use by de ge Teams, each with a full set of medica!
b n established, and de m*6 24 Additionally, $cre wil! be 26 Metropolita= Medical
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these resec: es could be used as a; are m 6: process of being established. nus de s ze an potassium iodide are expected to increase. Potas uclear accident.
i i Wy. Bus potassium His report wu presented to de Pr:sident and approved for distrib redness for terrorism iodide is already available nationally as part of emerger.cy response p
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l invoMag cuclear, biological and ehemical agents.
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