ML20154B647

Insp Repts 50-498/88-46 & 50-499/88-46 on 880711-15,25-29 & 0808-12.Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verifications,Electrical as-built,electrical Components/Sys Work Observation & Records Review

ML20154B647
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	09/01/1988
From:	Robert Evans, Gagliardo J, Vickrey R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20154B634	List: ML20154B631 ML20154B647
References
50-498-88-46, 50-499-88-46, NUDOCS 8809140070
Download: ML20154B647 (10)

See also: IR 05000498/1988046

Text

. , _ .

..

'. .

. .

APPENDIX A

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-498/88-46 Operating License: NPF-76

50-499/88-46 Construction Permit: CPPR-129

Dockets: 50-498

50-499

Licensee: Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P)

P.O. Box 1700

Houston, Texas 77001

Facility Name: South Texas Project (STP), Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: STP, Matagorda County, Texas

Inspectioncondctep: f July 11-15 and 25-29, and August 8-12, 1988

I

I

'

Inspectors: [ ,

'

$

Date

,\F. BPrd.

grams'yckrey,'

Section Reactor Inspector, Operational

M h 'I I 37

RY Evahv ReactorVInspector, Operational Date

Progr ms Section

I

Approved: i I . py

J. E. Gaglyrdo, Chief, Operational Programs Date

Section

Inspection Sumary

Inspection Conducted July 11-15 and 25-29, and August 8-12, 1988

(Report 50-498/88-46; 50-499/88-46)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of operational safety

verifications, electrical as-built, electrical components / systems work

observation, and records review.

Results: Within the three areas inspected, one apparent violation was

U3itTTied (paragraph 2).

8809140070 880902

PDR ADOCK 05000498

Q PDC

_ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _

__ .

. .

. .

2

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

HL&P

J. Bailey, Manager, Engineering and Licensing

M. L. Duke, Staff Engineer

J. E. Geiger, General Manager, Nuclear Assurance

A. W. Harrison, Supervising Project Engineer

S. M. Head, Supervising Project Engineer

T. J. Jordan, Project Quality Assurance (QA) Manager (Unit 2)

A. R. Mikus, General Superintendent, Construction

D. Parker, Startup Engineer

G. L. Parkey, Plant Superintendent, Unit 2

M. F. Polishak, Lead Engineer, Project Compliance

D. M. O'Gara, Project Compliance Engineer

S. L. Rosen, General Manager, Operations Support

J. A. Slabinski, Unit 2 Operations Quality Control (QC) Supervisor

W. G. Westermeier, General Manager

M. Wisenburg, Plant Superintendent, Unit 1

Bechtel Engineer Corporation (BEC)

L. W. Hurst, Assistant Project Manager

K. P. McNeal, Project QA Engineer

C. F. O'Neil. Unit 2 Engineering Manager

Ebasco Service, Inc.

R. A. Moore, Assistant QC Site Superintendent

P. E. Phelan, QC Structural and HVAC Suprvisur

E. P. Rosol, Site Manager

R. C. Sisson, Site Resident Engineer

All the above listed personnel attended the exit interview.

The NRC inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel including

administrative, maintenance, operations, and QA personnel.

'

2. Operational Safety Verification (Unit 1)(71707)

The NRC inspectors made several tours through the plant observing work in

progress on the diesel generator modification 3. Several efforts were made

to verify that fire door checks were being made at the appropriate

,

intervals. During the course of these tours, one security door failed to

'

close completely and it was noted that security responded to the area

within a few seconds to take oroper action.

L

i

.

.

)

, .

3

The NRC inspectors spent several hours in the control room observing shift l

turnover, watchstander actions, and recording of logs. The NRC inspectors

observed the shift briefing and operator control during a power increase

from 90-98 percent power. The NRC inspectors were present in the control

room to observe the 100 percent planned trip. Prior to the trip, a formal

briefing was conducted for the watchstanders. Those in observation were

i properly informed of the events and where they could make their

observations without interference with plant operations. The NRC

,

inspectors observed the 100 percent trip, operator actions, and plant

responses and found the test to be well planned and successfully

conducted. Comunications were well maintained and the operators acted in

,

a very professional manner throughout the evolution.

! During the obsersation of the weekly EICII battery surveillance, the NRC

inspectors noted that 67 of 68 closure bolts were not installed in the

,

hinged door of the battery room duct heater (Fquipment No. 3VIllVHX012).

There were no maintenance activity tags in the vicinity to indicate work

activity in the area. This observation was made on July 27, 1988, with

the plant operating at 98 percent power. The missing bolts were about

1/2-inch in diameter. The door was 3 to 4-foot square and about 1-inch

'

thick. The bolt that was installed in the door was not screwed into the

,

threaded area of the support flange but was tight from the weight of the

j door resting on it. The installed bolt was on the side opposite the

hinges in the lower corner with that edge of the door showing

i

approximately 1/8-inch displacement in the downward direction from its

apparent weight. The subject door was located approximately 5 feet

directly over the battery cells. After the NRC inspectors brought this

l

condition to the attention of licensee management on July 27, 1988, the

i

licensee infccmed the NRC inspectors that no work was in process on the

l

battery room duct heater. The licensee issued a station problem report

(No. 880295) on July 27, 1988, to investigate the reason for removal of

the heater bolts. Maintenance work request (MWR-65094) was initiated to

replace the bolts. The duct heater door had apparently been in the

.

l unbolted condition since April 1988. The failure to secure the door with

a

!

the bolts made the batteries very susceptible to significant damage in the

' event of a seismic event because the hinges may not be capable of

! supporting the massive door under seismic conditions.

1

The licensee identified, to the NRC inspectors, that the heater bolts had

l been removed by MWR HE-69441. The NRC inspectors obtained a copy of

i the completed MWR HE 69441 for review. The NRC inspectors review of the

HWR found that:

1

a. The description of the problem stated "Heaters will not maintain room

J temperature within limits of 72 to 82 F. Resetting breaker and

'

heaters H/S does not help. Investigate and repair as needed."

b. The MWR was originated and approved on April 2, 1988. J

l

l

! c. Additional work instructions were issued on April 2, 1988, to adjust

l

the automatic therma' cutout and check the heater elements.

I ,

I

l

i

)

- _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -

..

.

'. .

4

d. The final two steps of the additional work instructions were:

(1) "3.07 if defective elements are found, obtain data from part and

return to supervisor or M/S to obtain part and write additional

work instructions."

(2) "3.08 if no defective elements are found, ensure cover on heater

cover box is installed, and restore system a nonnal."

e. QC instructions stated, "Return MWR to 0Q0 for planning if

Step 3.07 (additional work instructions) is required."

f. The work sumary corrective action stated that "investigations showed

that element No. 64 seemed to be shorted." The sunnary also stated,

that, "Bolts from the heater door were put in the impound area of

grid C-2-A."

1

! g. On April 3,1988, additional work instruct 6ns were initiated and

authorized on April 5, 1988, to replace heater element No. 64 and

retest the heater banks.

i

h. On May 23, 1988, the cognizant system engineer issued instructions to

"Close out MWR-work not required heaters are working properly."

3

1. On June 8,1988, additional instructions were issued by the cognizant

! system engineer to "close out this MWR and write another MWR to

'

repair / replace one heater element at a later date." At this time,

the additional work instructions of April 3-5, 1988, were voided.

,

J. The as-left conditions of the work sumary were "one element shorted.

The element is at T7 r T8. New MWR initiated. MWR 45065."

l k. On June 8, 1988, the maintenance section foreman signed off the

maintenance work complete section of MWR HE-69441.

I 1. The NRC inspectors found that an entry had been made on the

licensee's computer system for MWR-HE-45065 on June 10, 1988. This

provided a description title (in part) of "the element that is

terminated at terminals T7 and T8 is shorted. Needs to be repaired

or replaced . . . . (This problem was discovered while working MWR

I

No. 69441)."

i m. On June 10, 1988. MWR HE-69441 was signed off by maintenance support

section for document review.

) n. On June 13, 1988, the MWR HE-69441 was signed off by the responsible

! maintenance section authority for work package review.

4

o. The NRC inspectors found that another entry had been made on the

licensee's computer system for MWR HE-45065 on June 14, 1988, that

the MWR was "cancelled per system engineer . . . heaters working

properly."

--

-

.- -_._- -._- -

-

-_ - - -. - __. - - - ... -- ,

_ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

. .

5

p. On June 20, 1988, the same cognizant system engineer signed off

MWR HE-69441 for document review.

q. On June 24, 1988, operations QA signed for document review.

Weekly battery surveillance tests provided five or six opportunities for

the licensee to discover the missing bolts prior to the NRC discovery.

Station Procedure OPGP03-ZM-0003, "Maintenance Work Request Program,"

Paragraph 4.13.9, requires that the maintenance support division "enter

document numbers left open in Section X of MWR." This was done on

June 10, 1988, when the new MWR 45065 was generated and on the computer

system; however, since the MWR had not been approved by the (work start)

approval authority, it was not a valid document in accordance with

Paragranh 4.6.1.

The failure to have instructions or procedures to include appropriate

quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that

important activities have been satisfactoril

the above example is an apparent violation 498/8846-01). (y accomplished as denoted in

Two weeks after the above discovery, the NRC inspectors toured the other

battery rooms. During this tour, the NRC inspectors noted that a pull box

cover located above battery E1A11 had only one screw holding the cover on.

The utility identified the cause to be a failure to reinstcll the screws

after installation. The utility issued MWR XE-48664 to replace the

missing screws.

3. Electrical As-Built Inspection (Unit 2) (37051)

An inspection of electrical cables, raceways, and conduit was performed to

determine whether the as-built design documents correctly reflected the

as-built condition of the STP, Unit 2 plant. A total of 18 cables,

36 termir.ations, 11 conduits, and 23 raceways were compared to design

documents.

A representative sample of Class 1E electrical cables were selected for

the inspection. The sample included power, control, and instrumentation

cables. Specific as-built cable attributes inspected included: cable

type, cable routing, cable identification, divisional separation,

conductor colors, termination points, and heat shrink tubing (if used). A

total of 18 cables and 36 terminations from 6 systems were inspected.

Attachment A lists the cables and terminations inspected, the associated

systems, and coments about the cables. The as-built documents used as

references included: standard site procedures, cable termination cards,

cable installation cards, elementary diagrams, and some vendor supplied

wiring diagrams.

All cables inspected were :ompared to elementary diagrams. The elementary

diagrams showed the associated cables, cable types, to and from locations,

and conductor numbers. The elementary diagrams did not show wire colors

or actual termination points. Some vendor drawings reviewed show the

termination points. (Two vendor drawings were noted to differ slightly

_ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_____________ ___________ . . __ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

. .

'

. .

6

fromtheas-builtconditions.) The termination installation cards

(referred to as EE580 cards) were as-built documents used to show cable

numbers, conductor numbers, conductor colors, and termination block / point i

locations. During the inspection, two minor cable termination card errors

were noted.

Standard Site Procedure SSP-26 (Revision 2), "Termination of Electrical

Cable," requires cable markers on each end of a cable, but does not

require each conductor to be labelled, unless the conductors are of the ,

same color. The NRC inspectors noted all cables were correctly labelled,

but the conductor labelling was inconsistent. Approximately 1/3 of all

conductors inspected were individually labelled and two terminations had

incorrect conductor labels.

Using cable installation cards, conduit layout plans, and cable tray  !

plans, several cables were physically walked down to verify correct

routing. Cable B2RC10C9PB was noted not to enter raceway B2XC4CTXAA, ,

contrary to the routing suggested by the cable installation card. '

However, Standard Site Procedure SSP-27 (Revision 3), "Installation of

Electrical Cable," allows a 3-foot variation in cable routing, i

Cable B2RC10C9PB met this criteria.

t

Eleven conduit and twenty-one raceway segments that carry Class 1E cables  ;

were inspected. The conduit and raceways were compared to layout plans  !

and specifications. The following attributes were inspected: location [

and routing of conduit and raceways, divisional separation, conduit and

raceway identification, and cable loading. Attachment B lists the conduit <

and raceway segments inspected. L

It was noted that the conduit configurations do not conform exactly to the

conduit layout plan drawings. The layout plans show the general path the ,

conduit must take. However, the conduit is field routed in the areas  ;

shown on the layout plan drawings. Field routing allows the conduit path l

to vary from original design to avoid obstructions and to maintain  ;

physical separation criteria, j

!

No violations or deviations were identified in the area of as-built

'

electrical verification. However, several areas require further NRC l

review: conduit and raceway supports, the design change process and i

administrative controls. These areas will be reviewed during a future NRC

inspection. [

4 Electrical Components and Systems - Work Observations and Records (Unit 2)

T51053and51055) (

With safety-related electrical conponents and systems being 99 percent l

,

complete and no work available to be observed, the NRC inspectors observed l

QC performance of an area turncver for separation. This was conducted in [

the reactor containment building at elevation 37 3 and area 4B. During  ;

the course of this observation, the NRC inspectors located a cable in an  ;

adjacent area that was apparently exceeding its bend radius. This cable j

was identified to QC and subsequently written up on Honconformance

i

t

. _ _ __ - - - - - - - _ _ - -

. .

, .

7

i

Report SE-7618. The NRC inspectors considered this an isolated case as it l

appeared that the cable was probably originally installed with the proper

bend radius.

Various pull cards and associated records used in the as-built

verification were examined to detennining proper documentation. l

Aoproximately ten cable receipt inspection records associated with items  ;

of Attachment A were also examined to determine proper documentation and

traceability. The NRC inspectors toured various areas checking the status

of electrical installations for abnormal conditions. During these tours, ,

the NRC inspectors found an NWR tag No. 56930 on a battery room heater. l

When the utility was questioned about the work going on, it was discovered i

that the MWR had been voided without the tag being removed as it should

have been per the maintenance work request program.

l The NRC inspectors questioned QC about their requirements for free air l

. cable support. After a discussion with several QC personnel, the utility l

agreed that SSP-27 (installation of electrical cable) was not clear on its

definition. The utility subsequently issued a change ICN No. (AK)39 to  ;

SSP-27 to clarify free air cable support requirements in the procedure.

4

No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program

'

area.

5. Exit Interview (30703)

I

!

'

The NRC inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in  !

'

paragraph 1 on July 29 and August 12, 1988, and surparized the scope and

findings of the inspection. The licensee did not identify as proprietary l

'

any of the information provided to or reviewed by the NRC inspectors. An

,

NRC resident inspector was present at both meetings. ,

i

'

)

.

l

L

l

f

J

l

1

d

!  !

.

r

__

. , ,

, .

.g ,

ATTACHMENT A

CABLES INSPECTED

NOTE: Unless othemise stated, both terminations of each cable were inspected.

Cable System Coments

C2AF05C3WC Auxiliary Feedwater Conductor U1 is not shown on vendor

Drawing 8367-00163, at termination '

point TB25-2. Walkdown of cable

routing to be performed later.

Terminations verified correct.

'

D2AF09C1WD Auxiliary Feedwater Cable routing verified correct.  !

A2MB01CISB Main Control Boards Only one termination verified. The

second termination point was inside a <

,

cor. trol board plug.

l A2NIO1C1XV Nuclear Minor error noted on cable installa-

Instrumentation tion and termination cards

NSSS PROC

'

CAB 01 is incorrectly described as

NSSS PROC CAB 01A. ,

'

B2NIO1C1XC Nuclear Minor error rated on cable installa-

Instrumentation tion and termination cards: NSSS <

PROCESS CAB PROT SET III incorrectly

i

described as NSSS PROCESS CAB PROT

SET II.

A2RCABCILA Reactor Coolant Cable routing verified correct. The  !

colors of conductors in cable could ,

not be verified as phases A, B, C. In

'

l

i

the field, the leads are identified by

a color. On electrical schematics,

the leads are identified by A, B, or

,

C. No correlation between conductor

j color and phase (A, B, C) could be  !

'

identified.

1

A2RC05C1WG Reactor Coolant Walkdown of cable routing to be  !

4 performed later. Terminations

verified correct. [P

A2RC10CAXC Reactor Coolant One termination of cable A2RC10CAXB

also verified correct. ,

i

(cable A2RC10CAXB is spliced to [

cable A2RC10CAXC)  ;

t

l

'

,

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . __

l

,

.

.. .

2

A2RC10C5PB Reactor Coolant Cable routing verified correct.

82RC10C5PB Reactor Coolant Cable routing verified correct.

B2RC10C6PC Reactor Coolant One termination of cable B2RC10C6PB

also verified correct.

(cable BERC10C6PB spliced to

cable B2RC10C6PC)

B2RC10C9PB Reactor Coolar'. Cable routing verified correct. Cabla

does not enter raceway B2XC4CTXAA.

A2SI29CIPA Safety Injection Cable routing verified correct. One

termination of cable A2SI29CIPE also

verified correct (cable A2SI29CIPA is

spliced to cable A25129CIPE). Two

conductors (NCO2,NC05)of

cable A2SI29CIPA were mislabelled as

WH01, WH02.

C2SIAGC1HB Safety Injection Cable routing verified correct.

C2SI12C3SB Safety injection The conductors on one end of cable

were labelled with wire numbers, but

the other end was not.

A2SP16CGSE Solid State Protection Cable routing verified correct.

l A2SP16JGSA1 Solid State Protection This cable consisted of 14 jumper

wires. Most conductors had incorrect

> wire numbers (missing number "0").

Cable routing correct per termination

'

installation card (EE580 cards).

'

Vendor drawing of wire terminations

j differs from EE580 cards (no change in

logic).

I

! A2SP27 CASE Solid State Protection No coment.

i

!

!

l

i

!

l

- -

- _ _ _ _ _ _ __ ____ _ _______ __ _ ___

• '

..

. ..

i

ATTACHMENT B

RACEWAYS AND CONDUIT INSPECTED

NOTE: The raceways and conduit identified with a (*) were inspected for cable

loading.

Raceways Raceways Conduit

• A2XC3ATYAD *B2XC4ATXAK *A2XC3ARYO14 ,s

A2XE2BTSVF *B2XC4ATXAL *A2XC3CRX107

A2XE2BTTAD *B2XC4CTXAA *A2XC3CRX122

A2XE2BTTAE D2XElGTSAA A2XC3 CRY 678

A2XE2CTTAV D2XElGTSAB *B2XC3ARX008

• B2XC4ATXAE D2XElGTSVA *B2XC3CRX115

• B2XC4ATXAF *D2XE2CTSAH *B2XC3CRX145

• B2XC4ATXAG *D2XE2CTSAL B2XE3BRX026

• B2XC4ATXAH D2XE2GTSAG B2XE3BRX032

• B2XC4ATXAJ *D2XE2GTSAK D2XElGR5064

• D2XE2GTSBA *D2XE2CRSD03