ML20154B647
| ML20154B647 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 09/01/1988 |
| From: | Robert Evans, Gagliardo J, Vickrey R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20154B634 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-498-88-46, 50-499-88-46, NUDOCS 8809140070 | |
| Download: ML20154B647 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000498/1988046
Text
.
,
_
.
'.
.
..
.
.
APPENDIX A
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report:
50-498/88-46
Operating License: NPF-76
50-499/88-46
Construction Permit: CPPR-129
Dockets:
50-498
50-499
Licensee: Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P)
P.O. Box 1700
Houston, Texas 77001
Facility Name:
South Texas Project (STP), Units 1 and 2
Inspection At:
Inspectioncondctep: July 11-15 and 25-29, and August 8-12, 1988
f
I
I
Inspectors: [
$
'
,\\ Prd. 'yckrey,' Reactor Inspector, Operational
'
,
F. B
Date
grams Section
M
h
'I
I 37
RY Evahv ReactorVInspector, Operational
Date
Progr ms Section
I
Approved:
i
I . py
J. E. Gaglyrdo, Chief, Operational Programs
Date
Section
Inspection Sumary
Inspection Conducted July 11-15 and 25-29, and August 8-12, 1988
(Report 50-498/88-46; 50-499/88-46)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of operational safety
verifications, electrical as-built, electrical components / systems work
observation, and records review.
Results: Within the three areas inspected, one apparent violation was
U3itTTied (paragraph 2).
8809140070 880902
ADOCK 05000498
Q
_ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _
. _ _
_ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _
__
.
.
.
.
.
2
DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
HL&P
J. Bailey, Manager, Engineering and Licensing
M. L. Duke, Staff Engineer
J. E. Geiger, General Manager, Nuclear Assurance
A. W. Harrison, Supervising Project Engineer
S. M. Head, Supervising Project Engineer
T. J. Jordan, Project Quality Assurance (QA) Manager (Unit 2)
A. R. Mikus, General Superintendent, Construction
D. Parker, Startup Engineer
G. L. Parkey, Plant Superintendent, Unit 2
M. F. Polishak, Lead Engineer, Project Compliance
D. M. O'Gara, Project Compliance Engineer
S. L. Rosen, General Manager, Operations Support
J. A. Slabinski, Unit 2 Operations Quality Control (QC) Supervisor
W. G. Westermeier, General Manager
M. Wisenburg, Plant Superintendent, Unit 1
Bechtel Engineer Corporation (BEC)
L. W. Hurst, Assistant Project Manager
K. P. McNeal, Project QA Engineer
C. F. O'Neil. Unit 2 Engineering Manager
Ebasco Service, Inc.
R. A. Moore, Assistant QC Site Superintendent
P. E. Phelan, QC Structural and HVAC Suprvisur
E. P. Rosol, Site Manager
R. C. Sisson, Site Resident Engineer
All the above listed personnel attended the exit interview.
The NRC inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel including
administrative, maintenance, operations, and QA personnel.
2.
Operational Safety Verification (Unit 1)(71707)
'
The NRC inspectors made several tours through the plant observing work in
progress on the diesel generator modification 3.
Several efforts were made
to verify that fire door checks were being made at the appropriate
intervals. During the course of these tours, one security door failed to
,
close completely and it was noted that security responded to the area
'
within a few seconds to take oroper action.
L
i
.
)
.
,
.
3
The NRC inspectors spent several hours in the control room observing shift
turnover, watchstander actions, and recording of logs.
The NRC inspectors
observed the shift briefing and operator control during a power increase
from 90-98 percent power.
The NRC inspectors were present in the control
room to observe the 100 percent planned trip.
Prior to the trip, a formal
briefing was conducted for the watchstanders.
Those in observation were
i
properly informed of the events and where they could make their
observations without interference with plant operations.
The NRC
inspectors observed the 100 percent trip, operator actions, and plant
,
responses and found the test to be well planned and successfully
conducted.
Comunications were well maintained and the operators acted in
a very professional manner throughout the evolution.
,
!
During the obsersation of the weekly EICII battery surveillance, the NRC
inspectors noted that 67 of 68 closure bolts were not installed in the
hinged door of the battery room duct heater (Fquipment No. 3VIllVHX012).
,
There were no maintenance activity tags in the vicinity to indicate work
activity in the area. This observation was made on July 27, 1988, with
the plant operating at 98 percent power.
The missing bolts were about
1/2-inch in diameter.
The door was 3 to 4-foot square and about 1-inch
'
thick. The bolt that was installed in the door was not screwed into the
threaded area of the support flange but was tight from the weight of the
,
j
door resting on it. The installed bolt was on the side opposite the
hinges in the lower corner with that edge of the door showing
approximately 1/8-inch displacement in the downward direction from its
i
apparent weight.
The subject door was located approximately 5 feet
directly over the battery cells.
After the NRC inspectors brought this
l
condition to the attention of licensee management on July 27, 1988, the
i
licensee infccmed the NRC inspectors that no work was in process on the
l
battery room duct heater. The licensee issued a station problem report
(No. 880295) on July 27, 1988, to investigate the reason for removal of
.
the heater bolts. Maintenance work request (MWR-65094) was initiated to
l
replace the bolts.
The duct heater door had apparently been in the
unbolted condition since April 1988. The failure to secure the door with
a
!
the bolts made the batteries very susceptible to significant damage in the
event of a seismic event because the hinges may not be capable of
'
!
supporting the massive door under seismic conditions.
1
The licensee identified, to the NRC inspectors, that the heater bolts had
l
been removed by MWR HE-69441.
The NRC inspectors obtained a copy of
i
the completed MWR HE 69441 for review.
The NRC inspectors review of the
HWR found that:
1
The description of the problem stated "Heaters will not maintain room
a.
J
temperature within limits of 72 to 82 F.
Resetting breaker and
heaters H/S does not help.
Investigate and repair as needed."
'
b.
The MWR was originated and approved on April 2, 1988.
J
l
Additional work instructions were issued on April 2, 1988, to adjust
!
c.
l
the automatic therma' cutout and check the heater elements.
I
,
I
i
)
-
-
-
-
-
-
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
-
..
.
'.
.
4
d.
The final two steps of the additional work instructions were:
(1)
"3.07 if defective elements are found, obtain data from part and
return to supervisor or M/S to obtain part and write additional
work instructions."
(2)
"3.08 if no defective elements are found, ensure cover on heater
cover box is installed, and restore system a nonnal."
e.
QC instructions stated, "Return MWR to 0Q0 for planning if
Step 3.07 (additional work instructions) is required."
f.
The work sumary corrective action stated that "investigations showed
that element No. 64 seemed to be shorted." The sunnary also stated,
that, "Bolts from the heater door were put in the impound area of
grid C-2-A."
1
!
g.
On April 3,1988, additional work instruct 6ns were initiated and
authorized on April 5, 1988, to replace heater element No. 64 and
retest the heater banks.
i
h.
On May 23, 1988, the cognizant system engineer issued instructions to
"Close out MWR-work not required heaters are working properly."
1.
On June 8,1988, additional instructions were issued by the cognizant
3
system engineer to "close out this MWR and write another MWR to
!
repair / replace one heater element at a later date." At this time,
'
the additional work instructions of April 3-5, 1988, were voided.
,
J.
The as-left conditions of the work sumary were "one element shorted.
The element is at T7 r
T8.
New MWR initiated. MWR 45065."
l
k.
On June 8, 1988, the maintenance section foreman signed off the
maintenance work complete section of MWR HE-69441.
I
1.
The NRC inspectors found that an entry had been made on the
licensee's computer system for MWR-HE-45065 on June 10, 1988.
This
provided a description title (in part) of "the element that is
terminated at terminals T7 and T8 is shorted. Needs to be repaired
or replaced . . . .
(This problem was discovered while working MWR
I
No. 69441)."
i
m.
On June 10, 1988. MWR HE-69441 was signed off by maintenance support
section for document review.
n.
On June 13, 1988, the MWR HE-69441 was signed off by the responsible
)
!
maintenance section authority for work package review.
4
The NRC inspectors found that another entry had been made on the
o.
licensee's computer system for MWR HE-45065 on June 14, 1988, that
the MWR was "cancelled per system engineer . . . heaters working
properly."
-
.- - . - -. - -
-_ - - -. - __. - - - ... --
--
,
-
_ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
.
.
5
p.
On June 20, 1988, the same cognizant system engineer signed off
MWR HE-69441 for document review.
q.
On June 24, 1988, operations QA signed for document review.
Weekly battery surveillance tests provided five or six opportunities for
the licensee to discover the missing bolts prior to the NRC discovery.
Station Procedure OPGP03-ZM-0003, "Maintenance Work Request Program,"
Paragraph 4.13.9, requires that the maintenance support division "enter
document numbers left open in Section X of MWR."
This was done on
June 10, 1988, when the new MWR 45065 was generated and on the computer
system; however, since the MWR had not been approved by the (work start)
approval authority, it was not a valid document in accordance with
Paragranh 4.6.1.
The failure to have instructions or procedures to include appropriate
quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that
the above example is an apparent violation (y accomplished as denoted in
important activities have been satisfactoril
498/8846-01).
Two weeks after the above discovery, the NRC inspectors toured the other
battery rooms.
During this tour, the NRC inspectors noted that a pull box
cover located above battery E1A11 had only one screw holding the cover on.
The utility identified the cause to be a failure to reinstcll the screws
after installation. The utility issued MWR XE-48664 to replace the
missing screws.
3.
Electrical As-Built Inspection (Unit 2) (37051)
An inspection of electrical cables, raceways, and conduit was performed to
determine whether the as-built design documents correctly reflected the
as-built condition of the STP, Unit 2 plant. A total of 18 cables,
36 termir.ations, 11 conduits, and 23 raceways were compared to design
documents.
A representative sample of Class 1E electrical cables were selected for
the inspection.
The sample included power, control, and instrumentation
cables.
Specific as-built cable attributes inspected included:
cable
type, cable routing, cable identification, divisional separation,
conductor colors, termination points, and heat shrink tubing (if used). A
total of 18 cables and 36 terminations from 6 systems were inspected.
Attachment A lists the cables and terminations inspected, the associated
systems, and coments about the cables.
The as-built documents used as
references included:
standard site procedures, cable termination cards,
cable installation cards, elementary diagrams, and some vendor supplied
wiring diagrams.
All cables inspected were :ompared to elementary diagrams.
The elementary
diagrams showed the associated cables, cable types, to and from locations,
and conductor numbers.
The elementary diagrams did not show wire colors
or actual termination points.
Some vendor drawings reviewed show the
termination points.
(Two vendor drawings were noted to differ slightly
_ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_____________ ___________
.
.
__
_
_ __
_
_
_ _ _ _ _
.
.
' .
.
6
fromtheas-builtconditions.) The termination installation cards
(referred to as EE580 cards) were as-built documents used to show cable
numbers, conductor numbers, conductor colors, and termination block / point
i
locations.
During the inspection, two minor cable termination card errors
were noted.
Standard Site Procedure SSP-26 (Revision 2), "Termination of Electrical
Cable," requires cable markers on each end of a cable, but does not
require each conductor to be labelled, unless the conductors are of the
,
same color. The NRC inspectors noted all cables were correctly labelled,
but the conductor labelling was inconsistent. Approximately 1/3 of all
conductors inspected were individually labelled and two terminations had
incorrect conductor labels.
Using cable installation cards, conduit layout plans, and cable tray
!
plans, several cables were physically walked down to verify correct
routing. Cable B2RC10C9PB was noted not to enter raceway B2XC4CTXAA,
contrary to the routing suggested by the cable installation card.
,
However, Standard Site Procedure SSP-27 (Revision 3), "Installation of
'
Electrical Cable," allows a 3-foot variation in cable routing,
i
Cable B2RC10C9PB met this criteria.
t
Eleven conduit and twenty-one raceway segments that carry Class 1E cables
were inspected.
The conduit and raceways were compared to layout plans
!
and specifications. The following attributes were inspected:
location
[
and routing of conduit and raceways, divisional separation, conduit and
raceway identification, and cable loading. Attachment B lists the conduit
<
L
and raceway segments inspected.
It was noted that the conduit configurations do not conform exactly to the
conduit layout plan drawings.
The layout plans show the general path the
,
conduit must take.
However, the conduit is field routed in the areas
shown on the layout plan drawings.
Field routing allows the conduit path
l
to vary from original design to avoid obstructions and to maintain
physical separation criteria,
j
!
No violations or deviations were identified in the area of as-built
'
electrical verification. However, several areas require further NRC
l
review: conduit and raceway supports, the design change process and
i
administrative controls. These areas will be reviewed during a future NRC
inspection.
[
4
Electrical Components and Systems - Work Observations and Records (Unit 2)
T51053and51055)
With safety-related electrical conponents and systems being 99 percent
l
complete and no work available to be observed, the NRC inspectors observed
l
QC performance of an area turncver for separation.
This was conducted in
[
,
the reactor containment building at elevation 37 3 and area 4B. During
the course of this observation, the NRC inspectors located a cable in an
adjacent area that was apparently exceeding its bend radius.
This cable
j
was identified to QC and subsequently written up on Honconformance
i
t
.
--
-- ---
- - - - - - -
- -
- - - - -
-
.
.
,
.
7
i
Report SE-7618. The NRC inspectors considered this an isolated case as it
l
appeared that the cable was probably originally installed with the proper
bend radius.
Various pull cards and associated records used in the as-built
verification were examined to detennining proper documentation.
l
Aoproximately ten cable receipt inspection records associated with items
of Attachment A were also examined to determine proper documentation and
traceability.
The NRC inspectors toured various areas checking the status
of electrical installations for abnormal conditions.
During these tours,
,
the NRC inspectors found an NWR tag No. 56930 on a battery room heater.
l
When the utility was questioned about the work going on, it was discovered
i
that the MWR had been voided without the tag being removed as it should
have been per the maintenance work request program.
l
The NRC inspectors questioned QC about their requirements for free air
l
cable support. After a discussion with several QC personnel, the utility
l
.
agreed that SSP-27 (installation of electrical cable) was not clear on its
definition.
The utility subsequently issued a change ICN No. (AK)39 to
SSP-27 to clarify free air cable support requirements in the procedure.
4
No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program
'
area.
5.
Exit Interview (30703)
I
!
The NRC inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in
!
'
paragraph 1 on July 29 and August 12, 1988, and surparized the scope and
'
findings of the inspection.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary
l
'
any of the information provided to or reviewed by the NRC inspectors. An
NRC resident inspector was present at both meetings.
,
,
i
)
'
.
l
L
l
f
l
J
1
d
!
!
.
r
__
. , ,
,
.
.g
,
ATTACHMENT A
CABLES INSPECTED
NOTE:
Unless othemise stated, both terminations of each cable were inspected.
Cable
System
Coments
C2AF05C3WC
Conductor U1 is not shown on vendor
Drawing 8367-00163, at termination
'
point TB25-2. Walkdown of cable
routing to be performed later.
Terminations verified correct.
'
D2AF09C1WD
Cable routing verified correct.
!
A2MB01CISB
Main Control Boards
Only one termination verified. The
second termination point was inside a
<
cor. trol board plug.
,
l
A2NIO1C1XV
Nuclear
Minor error noted on cable installa-
Instrumentation
tion and termination cards: NSSS PROC
CAB 01 is incorrectly described as
'
,
'
B2NIO1C1XC
Nuclear
Minor error rated on cable installa-
Instrumentation
tion and termination cards: NSSS
<
PROCESS CAB PROT SET III incorrectly
i
described as NSSS PROCESS CAB PROT
SET II.
A2RCABCILA
Cable routing verified correct.
The
!
colors of conductors in cable could
,
l
not be verified as phases A, B, C.
In
'
i
the field, the leads are identified by
a color. On electrical schematics,
the leads are identified by A, B, or
C.
No correlation between conductor
,
j
color and phase (A, B, C) could be
!
'
identified.
1
A2RC05C1WG
Walkdown of cable routing to be
!
4
performed later. Terminations
[
verified correct.
P
A2RC10CAXC
One termination of cable A2RC10CAXB
also verified correct.
,
(cable A2RC10CAXB is spliced to
[
i
cable A2RC10CAXC)
t
l
'
,
.
.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ .
__
l
.
,
- ..
.
2
A2RC10C5PB
Cable routing verified correct.
82RC10C5PB
Cable routing verified correct.
B2RC10C6PC
One termination of cable B2RC10C6PB
also verified correct.
(cable BERC10C6PB spliced to
cable B2RC10C6PC)
B2RC10C9PB
Reactor Coolar'.
Cable routing verified correct. Cabla
does not enter raceway B2XC4CTXAA.
A2SI29CIPA
Safety Injection
Cable routing verified correct. One
termination of cable A2SI29CIPE also
verified correct (cable A2SI29CIPA is
spliced to cable A25129CIPE). Two
conductors (NCO2,NC05)of
cable A2SI29CIPA were mislabelled as
WH01, WH02.
C2SIAGC1HB
Safety Injection
Cable routing verified correct.
C2SI12C3SB
Safety injection
The conductors on one end of cable
were labelled with wire numbers, but
the other end was not.
A2SP16CGSE
Solid State Protection
Cable routing verified correct.
l
A2SP16JGSA1
Solid State Protection
This cable consisted of 14 jumper
wires. Most conductors had incorrect
wire numbers (missing number "0").
>
Cable routing correct per termination
installation card (EE580 cards).
'
Vendor drawing of wire terminations
'
j
differs from EE580 cards (no change in
logic).
I
!
A2SP27 CASE
Solid State Protection
No coment.
i
!
!
l
i
!
- l
-
-
- _ _ _ _ _ _
__ ____ _ _______
__ _ ___
'
..
.
..
i
ATTACHMENT B
RACEWAYS AND CONDUIT INSPECTED
NOTE: The raceways and conduit identified with a (*) were inspected for cable
loading.
Raceways
Raceways
Conduit
- A2XC3ATYAD
- B2XC4ATXAK
- A2XC3ARYO14
,s
A2XE2BTSVF
- B2XC4ATXAL
- A2XC3CRX107
A2XE2BTTAD
- B2XC4CTXAA
- A2XC3CRX122
A2XE2BTTAE
D2XElGTSAA
A2XC3 CRY 678
A2XE2CTTAV
D2XElGTSAB
- B2XC3ARX008
- B2XC4ATXAE
D2XElGTSVA
- B2XC3CRX115
- B2XC4ATXAF
- D2XE2CTSAH
- B2XC3CRX145
- B2XC4ATXAG
- D2XE2CTSAL
B2XE3BRX026
- B2XC4ATXAH
D2XE2GTSAG
B2XE3BRX032
- B2XC4ATXAJ
- D2XE2GTSAK
D2XElGR5064
- D2XE2GTSBA
- D2XE2CRSD03