ML20147G679
| ML20147G679 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 09/17/1986 |
| From: | Kammerer C NRC OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS (OCA) |
| To: | Asselstine, Roberts, Zech NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20147E883 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-87-737 NUDOCS 8801220166 | |
| Download: ML20147G679 (1) | |
Text
J UNITED STATES E h > c., (i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION E
WASHING ton. O. C. 20555
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'%, j,, /j g,4 September 17, 1986 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chairman Zech Comissioner Roberts
/
Comissioner Asselstine g'
j Comissioner Bernthal
/
Comissioner Carr j<
FROM:
Carlton Kamerer, Director Office of Congressional Affairs
SUBJECT:
HOUSE INTERIOR COMMITTEE ORDERS H.R.5192 REPORTED The House Interior Comittee today ordered reported H.R.5192, "The Nuclear Power Emergency Response Data System Act of 1986". Three amendments offered by the principal sponsor, Mr. Huckaby (D-LA), were agreed to during the markup session.
The amendments, attached, would:
1.
Clarify the intent that no other entity would supersede the Federal government in providing an emergency response system; 2.
Make clear that NRC does not have the authority to intervene in plant operations or relieve a utility of responsibility to maintain his reactor in a safe operating condition; and 3.
Make funding for the establishment and operation of the emergency response system subject to normal existing NRC appropriations.
Future action on the bill is not known at this time. Absent separate Rules Comittee approval for floor consideration, the bill could be offered as a floor amendment to an appropriate bill in the House.
Attachment:
As stated cc:
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oFFN:E oF THE May 10, 1985 CHAIRMAN The Honorable Alan Simpson, Chairman Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation Comittee on Environment and Public Works United States Senate Washington, 0..
20510
Dear Mr. Chairt.an:
The FY 1984-85 NRC Authorization Act stipulated that the Commission consider four issues in its efforts to upgrade its technical data acquisition capabili-ties for response to emergencies at licensed nuclear power plants:
"(A) the appropriate role of the Comeission during abnormal conditions at a nuclear reactor licensed by the Comission; (B) the information which should be available to the Commission to enable the Commission to fulfill such role and to carry out other related functions; (C) various alternative means of assuring that such inforsation is available to the Comission in a timely manner; and (0) any changes in existing Commission authority necessary to enhance the Commission response to abnormal conditions at a nuclear reactor licensed by the Comission."
The Commission has carefully considered and resolved each of these issues.
The enclosed materials provide a description of these considerations and the conclu-sions reached.
These materials are being provided to each of the Congressional comittees with oversight responsibilities for NRC.
Sincerely, Origir.21 sir.ed by Iunzio J. Pall-d'r.o yg&,f,, j -I7 n,
Nunzio J. Palladino Chairman C04 cc4 PM RLLER
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Enclosures:
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/8s s//[/8s Responses to Issues Delineated in Correspondence cleared with FY 1984-85 NRC Authorization Act Comrs' Offices by C/R Ref:
CR-85-32.
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- q Identical letters to be sent to:
The Honorable Morris K. Udall, Chairman Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs United States House of Representatives Washington, D. C.
cc: Rep. Manuel Lujan The Honorable Edward J. M rkey, Chairman Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power Committee on Energy and Commerce United States House of Representatives Washington, D. C.
20515 I
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RESPONSES TO ISSUES DELINEATED IN FY 1984-85 NRC AUTHORIZATION ACT "The appropriate role of the Commission during abnormal conditions at a (A) nuclear reactor licensed by the Commission."
The revised role of this agency during a nuclear emergency has been defined in NUREG-0728, revised, which was forwarded to the Congress in Briefly, the agency's role is fourfold.
The NRC monitors February 1983.
the licensee to ensure that appropriate recommendations are being made The NRC informs other Federal with respect to offsite protective actions.
agencies and entities and in coordination with other public affairs groups, informs the news media of the NRC's knowledge of the situation.
The NRC provides adviso_ry support to the licensee and State and local authorities, including confirming the licensee's recommendations to Finally, in some rare and unusual situations, the offsite authorities.
NRC may find it necessary to intervene by providing limited direction to the licensee.
The Commission believes that this role can best be fulfilled by sending a team of experts to the site of an emergency, with the Headquarters Operations Center providing the initial response during the 2 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> that the Site Team is in transit and providing support and analysis to the Site Team once it arrives.
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(B) "The information which should be available to the Commission to fulfill such role and to carry out other related functions."
A list of parameters has been compiled and subjected to limited testing to evaluate its value in enabling the Commission to fulfill its designated role.
This data set is designed to provide sufficient knowledge of (1) reactor coolant system conditions to assess the likelihood or extent of core damage, (2) containment building conditions to assess the likelihood of its failure, (3) radioactivity releases to assess the immediacy and degree of public danger, and (4) meteorological conditions to assess the distribution of potential or actual impacts on the public.
The lists of parameters for Pressurized Water Reactors and Boiling Water Reactors are provided in Tables 1 and 2, respectively.
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(C) "Various alternative means of assuring that such information is available to the Commission in a timely manner."
The Commission staff considered five options for acquiring this data.
These were:
1.
A fully automated system for direct acquisition of data from plant sensors and transmission in standard format to NRC (this is a scaled down version of the Nuclear Data Link (NDL) concept, addressing only the new data list).
2.
A licensee initiated transmission of selected parameters from exist-ing electronic data systems, which h' ave been provided by the licensees for their own emergency response facilities.
3.
A computer terminal at each site for manual entry of manually ac-quired data that would be transmitted electronically to the Operations Center in a standard format.
4.
A telefax system for transmitting image facsimile of manually com-piled data sheets.
5.
An upgraded voice li.1k, employing specially trained and qualified personnel as communicators.
Criteria for comparing these options were developed from problems encoun-tered during the agency's response to events and exercises and from previous criticism of the NDL concept.
These criteria involve accuracy, reliability, timeliness, completeness, costs (in dollars and expert personnel), and backfitting requirements.
These criteria have been more
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specifically delineated in Table 3.
The five options have been compared against these criteria in Tables 4a through 4e, and the comparisons are summarized in Table 5.
On the basis of these considerations, the Commission staff has determined that the second option enumerated above provides the most appropriate means to support its emergency response role.
Because of the emphasis on utilizing the electronic data systems already being developed by the licensees for their own emergency response facilities, this option has been named the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS).
Under the ERDS concept, an electronic transmission system would be indi-vidually fashioned for each site.
It would accept from the licensee's electronic information system (s), in the licensee's format, those parame-ters that are on the NRC's emergency data list.
During declared emergen-cies, the ERDS would be activated by the licensee to begin transmissions to the Operations Center.
Because the role performed by the licensees at their emergency response facilities (in particular their Emergency Operations Facilities, EOF) is similar to the role of the NRC during emergencies, the licensees' data systems already incluoe most of the parameters desired by NRC.
Those few parameters that are not included on a particular licensee's system can be communicated by voice over the existing Emergency Notifica-tion System (ENS), thus avoiding requirements on that licensee to backfit the data system to include those parameters.
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With the cooperation and assistance of the Duke Power Company, the EROS Electronic concept was tested in a limited exercise during July 1984.
data transmissions from the McGuire plant were provided by Duke's "Crisis Management Data Transmission System," utilizing a data list specifically restricted to parameters on NRC's emergency data list.
This exercise demonstrated that there is great value in using ele-tronic data transmis-sion to obtain a very modest set of reliable, time-tagged data at modest NRC's assessment activities were initiated sooner and pro-frequency.
gressed more rapidly throughout the exercise.
Data errors were eliminated.
The Reactor Safety Team and the Protective Measures Team exhibited major improvement in their abilities to focus on the significant factors and to predict the course of the events relevant to protecting the public.
Questions addressed to the licensee were better focused, and the burden on the licensee's telephone communicator was substantially reduced.
If the implementation of the ERDS concept makes a new regulatory requirement necessary then, prior to implementation of any new requirement, the concept wou.ld be developed further and made available for comment in accordance with NRC's rulemaking procedures.
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"Any changes in existing Comission authority necessa (D) by the Comission."
7 The Comission does not require any changes to its existing statutory authority in order to properly respond to abnormal conditions at licensed The role, as detailed in NUREG-0778, revised, is well within the Comission's authorities under the Atomic Energy nuclear reactors.
1954, as amended, to potentially direct all safety-related aspects ofU 3
amended.
operation during an emergency. licensees are primarily responsible for ensurin However, the Comission has the. authority to order a licensee during an emergency to take any number of possible protective actions, facilities.
O ranging from obtaining NRC concurrence before th operation of the facility by the Conuaission.
the~ licensee to take certain actions stems from Section 161 o Energy Act, as amended (42 U.S.C. S 2201), which aut;.rizes the Comm to issue orders governing the use of radioactive material and operation of Section 186c of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended nuclear facilities.
(42 U.S.C. 5 2236(c)), authorizes the Commission "[i]n cases found by th Commission to be of extreme importance... to the health and safety of the public" to "enter upon and operate the facility prior to any of the f
procedures provided under the Administrative Procedure Act."
The reference to the Administrative Procedure Act in Section 1 the general rule applicable to all NRC orders that, in ordinary circum-stances, the Commission is required to afford the licensee notice and an opportenity to be heard before the licensee is bound to a prior opportunity to be heard, the Commission has the authority to iss action.
orders that are effective upon issuance to require a See Administrative Procedure Act S 9(b),
The use of imediately effec-public health and safety.
5 U.S.C S 558(c); 10 CFR 2.762(f) and 2.204.
tive orders aust be justified by the emergency nature of the situation and by an overriding need to protect public health and safety by immedia action.
Notwithstanding this broad authority, the Commi This role emphasizes the functions discussed under Question A above.
licensee's responsibility to operate its facility in a manner so as to protect the public health and safety, and it emphasized the NRC's res h t the Sibility to closely monitor the licensee's actions to assure t a public health and safety is being protected to the best extent poss during abnormal situations.
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TABLE 1 PWR PARAMETER LIST Primary Coolant Preso'are System Temperatures - hot leg Temperatures - cold leg Temperatures - core exit thermocouples Subcooling margin Pressurizer level RCS charging / makeup flow Reactor vessel level (when available)
Reactor coolant flow Neutron flux - startup range Secondary Coolant Steam generator levels System Main feedwater flows Auxiliary / Emergency feedwater flows Safety Injection High pressure safety injection flows Low pressure safety injection flows Safety injection flows (Westinghouse)
Borated water storage tank level Containment Containment pressure Containment temperatures Hydrogen concentration Containment sump levels Radiation Monitoring Reactor coolant radioactivity System Containment radiation level Condenser air removal radiation level Effluent radiation monitors Process radiation monitor levels Meteorological Wind speed Wind direction Atmospheric stability 6
TABLE 2 BWR PARAMETER LIST Primary Coolant Reactor pressure Reactor vessel level System Feedwater flow Neutron flux - startup range Safety Injection RCIC flow HPCI/HPCS flow Core spray flow i
LPCI flow Condensate storage tank level Containment Drywell pressure Drywell temperatures Hydrogen and oxygen concentration Drywell sump levels Suppression pool temperature Suppression pool level Radiation Monitoring Reactor coolant radioactivity level Primary containment radiation level system Condenser off gas radiation level Ef fluent radiation monitor Process radiation levels Meteorological Wind speed Wind direction Atmospheric stability 7
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TABLE 3 CRITERIA FOR IMPROVING TECHNICAL DATA ACQUISITION l
Accuracy i
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Minimize errors in acquiring data from plant sensors Minimize errors in transmitting data to Operations Center Reliability Availability for prompt implementation upon occurrence of an event l
Dependability of routine updating i
Timeliness Minimize delay initiating data transmission Minimile time elapsed between data acquisition and availability in Operations Center Completeness Obtain sufficient number of parameters Maintain associations of time and source among various data Cost Obtain favorable cost-benefit comparison with other alternatives Personnel Requirements Minimize number of technical experts needed to operate system Backfitting Requirements Minimize requirements on licensee and intrusion to plant systems 8
TABLE 4a CONSIDERATIONS FOR FULLY AUTOMATED SYSTEM TAKING OATA FROM PLANT SENSORS (NUCLEAR DATA LINK)
Accuracy is excellent because there are no human interfaces.
Reliability is excellent because there are no human interfaces.
Timeliness is excellent because system is immediately available and capable of rapid transmission with frequent updating.
Completeness is potentially excellent because any necessary parameter can be accessed.
Cost is high because a totally new system must be developed for each plant.
No personnel are required for acquisition, transmission, or receipt of data.
Backfitting requirements would be extensive on licensees for equipment at plants.
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A TABLE 4b CONSIDERATIONS FOR AUT0t ATED SYSTEM ACCESSING LICENSEES' EXISTING ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS (EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM)
Accuracy is excellent because there are no human interfaces.
Reliability is excellent because there are no human interfaces, and many systems such as Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) will incorporate automatic data validation.
Timeliness is excellent because the system is immediately available and capable of rapid transmission with frequent updating.
Premptness of in,itiation may vary depending upon licensees' system configurations.
In some cases, activation may not occur until the licensee mans its technical support center.
Completeness is expected to be generally excellent because the primary -
objective of the SPDS requirement is to provide the licensee with a tool for quickly assessing the overall health of the plant; i.e., the same need that the NRC faces.
It is expected that there would be minimal requests for supplemental information to be transmitted by voice.
Cost is relatively low because most licensees are already installing systems to transmit data among their own Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs), but there will be substantial hardware and se,(tware interface requirements at the Operations Center to receive the diverse signals and formats.
No personnel are required for acquisition, transmission, or receipt of data on SPDS.
Supplemental voice transmissions are not expected to overburden existing voice links.
Backfitting on plant systems would be minimal in that licensees only would have to provide one additional output port on the SPDS or other ERF data system.
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TABLE 4c CONSIDERATIONS FOR MANUAL DATA ACQUISITION AND TERMINAL ENTRY FOR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION Accuracy is poor because manual data acquisition and encoding is subject to instrument reading errors, handwriting reading errors, and typographi-cal errors.
Reliability is poor because manual data acquisition is easily interrupted.
Initiation would not be prompt because of personnel requirements.
Timeliness it only fair because acquisition and entry are time consuming, but data handling thereafter at NRC is automatic.
Data verification could cause more extensive delays.
Caspleteness is potentially good, but acquisition time may limit number of parameters th:t can be handled.
Costs are modest, including at least a terminal and a modem for each reactor.
Personnel requirements include at least one person knowledge (91e in plant operations to acquire data and one technical typist to enter cata on a terminal. Verification of data would require at least one highly expert individual.
Backfitting of plant equipment would not be required.
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TABLE 4d CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SYSTEM TO TELEFAX MANUALLY ACQUIRED DATA TO NRL Accuracy is poor because manual, data acquisition and entry (at NRC) is subject to instricant reading errors, handwriting reading errors, and typographical er<.srs.
Verification would be difficult because typist would not be in room with plant personnel.
Reliability is poor because manual data acquisition is easily interrupted.
Initiation may not be prompt because of per.sonnel requirements.
Timeliness is only fair because acquisition and entry are time consuming, but data handling thereafter at NRC is automatic. Data verification would require return telefax and more delay.
Completeness is potentially good, but acquisition time may limit number of parameters that can be handled.
Costs are modest, including a compatible telefax in each control room.
Personnel requirements include one person knowledgeable in reactor opera-tions to acquire data and one NRC employee to enter data.
Backfitting to plant systems is not required.
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9 TABLE 4e CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SYSTEM USING MANUAL ACQUISITION AND VOICE TRANSMISSION Reliability is poor because manual data acquisition may be easily inter-rupted.
Initiation would not be prompt because of personnel requirements.
Accuracy has been shown to be marginal for voice relay of data.
Detection of instrument reading errors, handwriting reading errors, and typographical errors (at NRC) would depend on voice link readback for detection and correction.
Timeliness has been shown to be marginal vecause manual data acquisition and voice relay is too slow to transmit required data.
Completeness is poor because transmission time requirements seriously limit number of parameters that can be handled.
Source and time reference have been demonstrated to be difficult to maintain with data relayed by voice.
Costs are not incurred unless additional telephone links are utilized to increase data transmission / verification rate.
Personnel requirements include an individual knowledgeable in plant operations to acquire data at the site and one technical typist to enter data at NRC.
Additional telephone lines would require pairs of additional communicators, Backfitting would not be required.
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I TABLE 5 COMPARISON OF OPTIONS EXPERT OPTIONS ACCURACY RELIABILITY TIMELINESS COMPLETENESS COST PERSONNEL BACKFIT Nuc1ccr Data Excellent Excellent Excellent Excellent High None Extensive for Link Sensor Readouts Emergency Response Excellent Excellent Excellent
- Excellent Moderate None Minor for Data System SPOS Output Manual Terminal Poor Poor Fair But Limited by Moderate Operations None At Site Not Prompt Time Specialist Telefcx Poor Poor Fair But Limited by Moderate Operations None Not Prompt Time Specialist i
Qualified Voice Marginal Poor Marginal Limited by None Operations None Communicators Time Specialist "Note: Activation time may vary depending upon licensees' equipment configurations.
In some cases, activation may not occur until the licensee mans its Technical Support Center.
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STm of CHIO OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR COLUMBUS 43266 060t
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January 14, 1987 Lando W.
Zech, Chairman SET &D JAN 2 31337 Nuclear Regulatory Commission i
Washington, DC 20555 Dear Chairman 2echt As you recall, in August, 1986, I wrote to inform you that I had withdrawn my support from Ohio's plan for responding to emergencies at nuclear power plants because of my concerns about the adequacy of the plan to protect Ohioans.
I appointed a Cabinet level group to re-evaluate the adequacy of the plan.
The Emergency Evacuation Review Team has completed its review, and I am pleased to provide you with a copy of its report.
I an in full agreement with the report's conclusions and recommendations.
The report concludes that the current emergency response plan is inadequate and, as a result, I have decided to pursue every legal and administrative action possible to compel Perry and Davis-Besse to operate at low-power until the deficiencies in the plan are corrected.
In the meantime, I would hope that the Nuclear Regulatory commission would reassess its position and not allow these plants to operate above low-power in the absence of an adequate emergency response plan.
The report also raises serious questions about the basic assumptions underlying current emergency response planning standards.
I intend to work with my colleagues and with Congress to crecte a national blue-ribbon commission of independent experts to investigate the potential for severe accidents, review the existing standards for containment safety, and evaluate the lessons of Chernobyl for U.S.
reactor safety and emergency response.
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Lando W. Zech January 14, 1987 Page two I hope that we will be able to discuss these issues soon.
Sincerely, Richard F. Celeste Governor RFC/fj cc Commissioner James Asselstine l
Commissioner Frederick Bernthal l
Commissioner Kenneth Carr l
Commissioner Thomas Roberts i
3 REPORT OF TER EMERQtNCY EVACUATION REV!BW TRAM ON RMERGENCY RESPONSE PWS Pot TER PEARY AND DAVIS-8BS58 NUCt. EAR POWER PLANTS submitted to Governor Richard F. Celeste January 7, 1997 g
i William Denthan, Chairman Director, Department of Highway Saf et)
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-y-Chairman, Public Ut111 ties Commission MG Raymond calloway Adjutant General r
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i January 6, 1967 The memorable Richard y. Celeste Governor, State of Sie Statehoust Cetwebus, St 4 315 Dear Governer Celeste On behalf of the Dnergency tvacuation Review Team, neebers Thomes h, p.U.C.0. Chairman; Raymond Galloway, Adjutant General; and myself acting as Chairman, the E.I.R.T. report findings and rocceptadations are submitted to you for your review and conalderation.
Earlier today we set with utilities officists, county officials and other We will sentinue to laterested parties to advise them of E.B.R.T.'s report.
aset with the public and news media to fully explata the report, findings and roccesnendations.
Finally, I'd lika to pay a special thanks to Gary No11and, Paul tyder, Bd Mopkins and Jeff McCourt of the Governor's Office and Sharon sigler of the Attorney Genstal's office for their outstanding afforts in providing the g
support, input, assistance and research skills in the preparation and oompletion of this document.
Beepeet 11y suknit j
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. DerDthN Outrana of 5.3.R.f.
I Director, 0.9.N.B.
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l TABL8 0F COWTRIrfs I n t r od u c t i o n............'.............................
1 Conc 1Jsions and Recommendations......................
3 Deficiencies in the Existing Plan 4
Findings........................................
12 Recommendations.................................
Fundamental Emergency Response Planning Assumptions 17 finding 3........................................
20 Recommendations.................................
Appendix A Summary of Litigation as Taken from Statement by Attorney General Anthony J. Celebrette. Jr.
g Appendix 3:
Severe Accidents and Emergency Planning:
Unresolved fasues Appendix C List of Experts and Sources Consulted r
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INTRODOCTION Since August 15, 1986, when you withdrew State support for The Ohio g g 7tescons_e M Radiation tuercencies n Licensed Nuclear Fay 111 ties, the Emergency Evacuation Review Team (TERT) has conduc*,ed an intensive study of the adequacy of the emergency response plan to protect the public.
This report contains the conclusions of our study and our recommendations.
At the outset, it is important to note that we undertook this review within the context of a national policy to accept and promote the use of nuclear technology to produce energy.
therefore, the stRT expresses no opinion as to whether the inherent dangers associated with nuclear energy are so I
significant as to justify a rethinking of that national policy.
The EERT held two well-attended public meetings in early September, one at Lakeland Community College, near the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, and the other at an Oak Marbor public schoo'., near the Davis-lesse Nuclear Power station.
The purpose of these meetings was to hear the suggestions and concerns of people who live near the plants.
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3 Following the public meetings, we met with numerous experts:
representatives from Toledo Edison and the Cleveland tiectric Illumin$ ting Companys nuclear energy specialists from Brojkhaven Institute, Ohio State University and the American Nuclear Society the Sunflower Alliance and the Toledo Safe Energy Coalition, groups that oppose Perry and Davis-lesse the Ohio Association of Public School tmployees, which represents bus drivers; County Commissioners and representatives of ccanty agencies who developed the local emergency responsre plans; and state' agency employees i
responsible for developing the State plan.
We also attended public meetings and met with many private citizens.
t The CERT testified before the NRC in Washington concerning 4
the full power license for the Perry plant on September 4.
On October 28, the RERT attended a day-long informational t
meeting in Washington with representatives of the Federal emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and both NRC Cumnissioner James Asselstine and James Keppler, the NRC Regional Administrator came to Columbus on separate occasions to meet with the CERT.
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4 secause the NRC did not respect your request to withhold approval for full power licenses untti the BIRT had completed its re-evaluation of the emergency response plans, ohto has sought to delay full power operation through the courts.
The stRT's preliminary findings and conclusions became an important part of that ef fort.
Appendix A is a sunnary of the State's legal ef forts to postpone full power operation until the completion of this re-evaluation.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIOMs
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We have concluded that the current emergency response plan for Chio's nuclear power plants is inadequate to protect the g
public and that the promise for planning may be based on unduly optimistic assumptions about the likelihood and consequences of nuclear accidents.
Our findings are divided into two' parts.
The first consists of objective evidence of deficiencies in the existing plan i
and recommendations for improving the plan.
The second concerns the fundamental assumptions on which the plan is based and our recommendations for establishing emergency response measures to take into account the possibility of a f
sudden release of large amounts of radiation.
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DEFICIRNCIss IN TER EXISTING PLAN A.
FINDINGS
- 1. The Willingness and Ability of Bus Drivers to Perform Assigned Functions:
Trained people are essential for transporting school children and others in need of
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transportation during an emergency.
Although the plan assames the participation of large numbers of public school bus drivers, the drivers have indicated through their union that they are unwilling to participate under existing conditions.
i The Ohio Association of Public school tmployees union, 8
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which represents bus drivers, has voted overwhelmingly not to participate in evacuation procedures at Ferry and Davis-lesse.
Most bus drivers have not volunteered for this duty, but have been volunteered by their employers.
According to bus drivees who spoke at our public 4
j hearings and their un'.on representatives, few drivers themselves have made a personal commitment to participate in the plan.
Moreover, the drivers have complained of a lack of training, inadequate protection r
I f rom radiation exposure, and uncertainties about their potential liability.
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2.
Evacuating special Populations:
Additional time, specially trained personnel and specialised' equipment would be needed to evacuate hospitt.1 ptients, nursing home residents, and physically and mentally handicapped individuals.
Information about the location and special needs of the handicapped is essential.
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A brief, informal RERT survey found many handicapped individuals who said that, to the best of their knowledge, no special provisions had been made for their 1
i evacuation.
On that basis, the RERT concluded that there is no comprehensive list of all those individJalt j
who may be in need of special assistance.
Because the
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plan is based on' incomplete knowledge of tihe numbers of handicapped people, tho' EE5T has concluded that
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l sufficient resources are unavailable within the 4
immediate area to evacuate them.
l 3.
Capability of Area sospitals to Treat Victime of Radiation Exposure:
Area hospitals lack the nece'esary equipment and sufficient numbers of properly trained personnel to treat large numbers of radiation victime.
In addition, these hospitals have not been subjected to comprehensive on-site evaluations and their radiologicci emergency plans have not been adequately togted, according to Ohio Department of Health personnel who f
have been involved in the planning and exercises.
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- - The plan's listing of the number of beds in area hospitals has no relationship to that hospital's ability and willingness to treat radiological patients'c The United states Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, has invalidated this methodology for planning arrangements for medical services for contaminated injured individuals.
The plan has not been changed to reflect recent NRC and FEMA guidance.
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Past exercises et the plan have tested the ability of a hospital to treat a single contaminated patient, as if i
that were a realistic demonstration of a hospital's
- ability to cope with the results of a nuclear accident.
l While the hospitals have perforned well in this limited l
test, it does not provide adequate assurance that they are prepared for a ' larger number of radiation victims.
i 4.
Notification of the Public in Case of tuergency:
The EERT is dissatisfied with the execution and testing of the plan's provisions for notifytag the public of failures at nuclear reactors.
At our public hearings in l
t.ake and Ottawa counties, many citizens complained that they have not been able to hear the strens during tests.
Current plans do not provide an adequate level of r
protection for hearing-tapatred individuale.
We doubt
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that the door-to-door notification called for in the plan could be ef fective in alerting the public, particularly in bad weather.
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1 5.
Planning for Recovery and Re-entry:
The emer,gency response plan assumes that contaminated areas could be re-occupied saf ely within a matter of gayg and therefore addresses recovery, re-entry and relocation issues in a This segment of the pian clearly fails summary manner.
to take into account the possibility of a significant release of radiation.
In addition to this fundamentally flawed assumption, these elements of the plan have not been exercised, and recent draf t U.S. EPA guidance on these issues has not
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been incorporated, according to Chio Depar'tment of Health personnel involved in emergency response i
planning.
6.
Decontamination and Waste Disposal These issues are also summarily addressed in the plan.
If a serious lear accident occurred, it is unlikely that the procedures outlined in the plan would be adequate to j
i decontaminate large numbers of people or to dispose aafely of large amounts of radioactive waste, simply sonitoring sewers for radiation, for example, one of the t
principal measures called for in the plan, is an l
unacceptably passive approach for dealing with these i
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problems.
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7 Ingestion sono planning Chio has not completed planning for ingestion sono activities, accord'ing to the ohto Disaster Services Agency.
In the event of a serior.s accident, the State would have to protect food and water supplies through 31 hoc actions, building on a skeletal plan.
In effect, the current plan consists only of a "plan-to-complete-a-plan.'
FEMA has I
acknowledged that national guidance on these issues has been inadequate and that improving this guidance will be a priority for the Agency.
l 8.
Radioprotective Drugs:
The emergency response plan's discussion of radioprotective drugs does not meet the minimal preparedness requirements of FfMA's planning S
guide.
ohio's policy on radioprotective drage has been under reconsideration since February,1985, when the Director of the Ohio Department of Health rescinded the policy i
established by his predecessors.
The Ohio Department of Health is now reviewing a new draf t requistion, and we expect it will be issued in early 1987.
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t Currently, there is no method by which the starte could coordinate the administering of these drugs to the general population or off-site emergency workers.
No provision has been made for administering these drugs to those individuals whose immediate evacuation may be infeasible or extremely difficult.
These capabilities are required by FEKA's planning guidance.
9.
Evacuation During Adverse conditions:
We question whether the emergency response plan provides adequate protection if, a nuclear accident were to occur under abnormal conditions.
Severe snowstorms, flooding and earthquakes are among the events that could create conditions that would greatly hinder rapid, orderly evacuation.
The potential for soae of these events to occur in areas where Ohio's nuclear power plants are located is significant and did not receive adequate attention in the plan's formulation.
The NRC is also concerned about the potential flooding problems at Davis-lesse as a result of historic high water levels in Lake Erie.
The Commission budgeted funds for a study of extreme flood probability but later r
canceled it for lack of money.
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i 10.
Planning in Adjaoent Jurisdictions:
Particularly in heavily populated arose, planning sust take into account the potential for a large influx of evacuees into nearby In Northeast Ohio, for example, it is reasonable f
areas.
to assume that large numbers of people-- even from areas beyond the ten-mile Emergency Planning tone-- might flee to, Summit or Cuyahoga Counties.
County officials have indicated that they would be unprepared to c'pe with the o
To date, these counties have not been closely evacuees.
involved in the emergency response planning efforts.
11.
Decision-making Responsibilities:
The plan gives principal authority for of f-site emergency response to county commissioners, and in many cases the State acts g
as advisor.
i This f ramework for making emergency response decisions is unrealistic because it fragments decision-making and I
diffuses responsibility amon'g local and state officials, creating the potential for delays in responding.
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addition, it permits county of ficials authority for making key emergency response decisions which could i
af f ect citizens f ar beyond local political boundaries.
I This arrangement undermines the authority vested in the l
executive branch of state government.
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12.
Notification of Goeernmental Authoritie1 Executing tisely emergency response measures depends on providing governmental of ficials with immediate, accurate information about incidenta at nuclear reactors.
But the plan contains no provision for providing State of ficials with a source of independent information about radiation releases from nuclear reactors.
l Analysing accident sequences properly and accurately predicting outcomes is essential to selecting appropriate emergency responses.
Uncertainty about,.
accident precursor sequences can lead to delays in taking emergency measures or to taking inappropriate I
actions.
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While the current plan includes some criteria for determining appropriate of f-site emergency actions, it does not give state authorities the ability to assess l
changes in reactor conditions and decido earlier, by referring to established thresholds, if a particular emergency re'sponse may be appropriate.
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toththeseproblems--lackoftimelynotificafionand inaccurate classification a problem-- occurred 'during the accident at Davis-lesse on June 9, 1985.
While lives were not directly threaten'ed on this occasion, delays in providing information, and mietnformation, could prevent the quick responses necessary to protect the public.
Chio's experiences demonstrate that this aspect of the plan is seriously flawed: it has lost the confidence of the public and the State.
13.
Public Information about tuergency Response Plane We have found that many people are uninformed and misinformed about the plan.
Many people at the EERT's public hearings in Lake and ottawa counties said that in case of an emergency they would not know how to respond.
2 The methods of disseminating information aboJt the plan, and the quality of that information, have been inadequate.
l 3:
At:OMENDATIONS Based on these conclusions, we recommend that the State work with the utility owners of Davis-lesse end Perry apd local jurisdictions to correct the deficiencies noted in the existing plan as set forth above.
Further, neither plant i
should exceed five percent of its operating capacity until l
these deficiencies are corrected.
1.
randicapped, stok, and elderly:
Provisions for identifying and evacuating especially vulnerable populations should be improved, and a procedure should be developed for updating regularly the list of those in need of special assistance.
2.
Monitoring systems A radiation monitoring system should be established to provide the State with independent information on radiation releases in the vicinity of the plante.
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3.
Cost of plan:
Utilities should bear the cost of implementing any improvemen'ts m'ade to the emergency g
response plans.
u 4.
Bus drivers:
The state should obtain the written agreement of individual bus drivers who will participate l
in the evacuation.
Appropriate training and protective equipment should be agreed to by the utility, the union This representing the bus drivers, and the state.
training should be updated f rom time to time as deemed appropriate by the utility, the union, and the state, to be used, the If public school bus drivers are not utilities' proposed alternative should receive express
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approval of the State.
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-9 5.
Communleation links A direct computer link should be created between the state and the nuclear fatilities' control rooms to provide the State with direct information about reactor conditions.
__J The plan should be amended to include the identification of thresholds in various accident sequences which, when exceeded, would trigger specific energency response actions.
This would help reduce uncertainty and potential delay in responding and provide a greater margin of saf ety for the public in case an evacuation
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were required.
6.
Complete full plant Segments of the plan addressing S
ingestion sono planning, recovery and re-entry, and decontamination and waste disposal need to be completed.
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Other counties Planning must take into account the potential tapact of an accident on cuyahoga, sumatt, Portage and Lucas counties.
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sospitals:
The state should make on-site reviews of the capability of hospitals to treat victims of rgdiation exposure and make specific euggestions for improvements.
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9.
Public notification / Warning eirens:
The State should conduct an independent test of the warning sirens and other components of the public notification 6ystem.
10.
Public education The state should conduct a campaign to improve the public's understanding of emergency response plan procedures.
11.
Radioprotective drugs:
The Ohio Department of Health should finalize its draft regulations on radioprotective drugs.
Chio should be prepared to provide these drugs to of f-site' ' emergency workers and those individuals whose evacuation might be especially difficult or time-consuming.
Chio should encourage pharmacies to 8
carry these drugs for the convenience of the public and require the utility to subsidize their purchase.
12.
Role of States The plan should be altered to make the state the principal point o't contact and responsibility I
for making smorgency response decisions.
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13.
PDCo monitoring:
The Public Utilities commission of I
chio should monitor actively the etnagement of nuclear r
energy f acilities to enable it to foresse potential safety problems.
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Carrying out this recommendation would recognise that management desleiencies can be symptoms of looming safety problems.
14.
state position on plant operations:
The State should continue to oppose full power operation at the plants untti these recommended improvements are completed.
Should the utility owners not agree to these recommendations and fail to remedy the plan's deficiencies prior to full power operation, the state should oppose full ' ower operition through litig'ation, p
administrative action, and by working with other state, i
local, and federal of ficals 't'o establish more appropriate nuclear energy policies, i
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PgggAM3NTAL EMBRCBNCY RSSPCMSR PLANNING A88UMPi!0W8 11.
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FINDILOS 1.
Arbitrary Planning Guidance: 'This plan, like emergency response pleas for nuclear reactors in other states, was developed on the basis of uniform, nationally prescribed guidance, NUREG-0654.
While this guidance may result in 1
I an adequate plan in some situations, it falle short 1
elsewhere because it does not take into account unique l
local conditions.
The peculiar risks inherent in t
individual reactor designs, local demographics, weather *- -
conditions, traditional political relationships between governments, transportation networks and other f actors all suggwst that one model emergency response plan will not fit all circumstances.
While some have advocated reductions in the size of 1
Emergency Planning tones, we think, for the reasons set forth below, that even when plannino nones are tailored for specific plants, their site should not be reduced from the current requirements, r
4 14 -
Adequacy of taste Meusptions for emergency P11 inning 2.
We have learned thats (1) there is still no consensus within the scientific community on the possibility, likelihood, and consequences of severe accidents at U.S. nuclear power plants that would produce large, sudden releases of life-threate'ning radiation (2) the HRC's own assessment of a range of questions
(
about severe accident phenomena is far from complete, and that a range of independent experts have sharply criticised its approach to those questions:
I (3) non-Communist European countries have acted quickly i
to install safety measures that are still only 1
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under review in the United States
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(4) the severe accident at the Chernobyl plant--
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notwithstanding the well-known dif f erences between l
U.S. and Chernobyl-type soviet reactors-- may have r
l extremely important implications for emergency response planning, i
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( Appendix 5 contains a discussion of these findings.)
We have concluded that, at the very least, the limited current knowledge of severe accidents and their consequences forced us to assume that severe accidents leading to sudden and massive releases of radiation are possible.
We have concluded that individual states like Ohio must rely on national expertise to assess properly,
severe accident phenomena, but that we cannot rely I
exclusively on the NRC for this exper,tise.
Thus we believe that planning for severe accidents must a
be the basis'for adequate emergency respon'se planning and that the accidents at Three Mile Island and l
Chernobyl reinforce the need for the most conservative emergency planning response, a response that assumes that a worst-case accident.
These accidents, even if unlikely, are possible, and their consequences are potentially so grave that they must be planned for.
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RECOMMBNDATIONS Because of what we perceive to be very serious unresolved questions about severe accidents and their possible implications for emergency response, we believe
, that these issues should be subjected to a renewed national debate.
The complexity of these issues and the
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nation-wide use of nuclear power suggest that the federal government undertake these tasks, but with active involvement of concerned states.
4 In addition, current federal-state arrangements under the Atomic Energy Act generally f ail to take into g
account the important role states have in protecting public health.
This issue also needs to be debated at the federal level.
We recommend that the following ideas form a part of that national debate The NRC should 1.
Site-specific taergency Planning tones:
develop criteria for f ashioning Emergency Pipnning tones based on site-specific factors.
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Although emergency planning should be shaped to meet local conditions, current information does not warrant any relaxation of existing safety guidelines.
In no case should Emerger.cy Planning tones be smaller'than ten miles in radius.
In f act, extensions of both generic and site-specific Emergency Planning gones may be warranted.
2.
National Commission:
A national blue-ribbon commission should be established to investigate the potential fo.r severe nuclear reactor accidents involving sudden and
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large release's of Yadiation and related esorgency response issues.
l It should represent the broadest possible range of expert opinions its mandate should include, but not be confined tos (1) a review of NUREG-1150, the draf t version of the NRC's new reactor safety study which is due to be released in early 1987; (2) a review of existing standards for containment safety, ands
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(3) an evaluation of the lessons of the Chernobyl accident for U.S. reactor safety and emergency planning, as well as current European actions to improve safety.
In the attermath of the Chernobyl accident, renewed and increased scrutiny of severe reactor accidents is an urgent national need.
The NRC and FEMA are conducting studies, but because of their narrow regulatory functions and because of the lack of p blic confidence in their c'oility and willingness to evaluate these questions with coreplete objectivity, they should not be charged with carrying out a thorough, independent
- review, g
The commission could be sponsored by Chio and other i
states and localities who share an interest in n*iclear safety.
l 4.
Price Anderson Act:
The financial liability for nuclear l
accidents under the Prico Anderson Act, which limits liability in case of accidents, should be expanded.
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Licineing:
The rights of states should be expanded in the licensing procedure for nuclear plants
s locause governors are specifically charged wfth the responsibility for protecting public health and safety, we recommend that states have expanded legal rights to become involved in the licensi.ng of nuclear power plants.
The current system of. licensing nuclear power plants gives states many responsibilities but few legal rights.
As Chio has discovered, the NRC of ten chooses not to use its discretion to permit states limited involve.mont in licensing f acilities.
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Arts.nUAA A
SUMMARY
OF LITIGATION TAKEN FROM STATEMENT SY ATTORNEY GENERAL ANTMONY J. CELEBRE!!!, JR.
TEST! MONY OF ANTHONY J. CtLEltEE!t, JR.,
ATTotNEY GENERAL OF 0510, SEFORE'TEI NotTHEASTERN CHIO CoteGRE8510NAL DEt,30ATION CONCERNING THE PEREY NUCLEAR POWEE PLANT,.
.(DECEMBER'14. 1984 REARING)
I appreciate the opportunity to address this hearing.
My office is presently involved in a litigation effort to prevent the Petty Nuclear Power Plant from exceeding 54 power until 1
such time as t$ere are adequate assurances of protection for those citizens located in the vicinity of the Perry Nuclear j
Power"Plant in the event of a radiological emergency.
A review team appointed by the Goveract is presently in the process of reviewing and reevaluating the current plan.
This review team has uncovered numerous,as well as serious flaws in the plan.
i In September,1904, Governor Celeste requested my octice to initiate an attempt ~ to intervene in the Perry licensing proceeding.
On September 5, 1986 I filed a petition with the g
Nuclear Regulatory commission seeking to inter'vene 'as the
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represe::tative of an interested state pursuant to the commission'a tulos of Practice.
We were attempting to preserve out opportunity to participate in the remainder of the Perry licensing proceedings as a formal participant.
In'the petition we advised the Ntc that the solo issue concerning the state was the adequacy of off-site energency preparedness at the Ferry plant.
On September 19, 1984 the Cleveland Electric Illuminating r
i Co. ("Ct!'), the operator and part ovner of the Petty plant, responded to the p'etition, urging its denial, on september 23.
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1946 the NRC staff also responded. noting that the adjudicatory proctedings were closed.
I replied to these requests,for j
sussarydismissalofourpetitionandconcernson8thenber29 1906.
In that reply I informed the Commission that while the adjudicatory proceedings were closed the. licensing proceedings vere not.
The commission had not yet completed its *issediate ef fectiveness review" which is required before allowing an operating license to issue to a commercial nuclear facility.
We informed the Commission that the state of chio was j
requesting an opportunity to advise them on the state of energeney preparedness at the party plant.
It was ay belief t' hat cooperation between the State. the utility and the NRC could only enhance the licensing process and f acilitate the adoption of an adequate evacuation plan.
Since the full-power license had not yet issued, it was vell within the commission's g
disnetion to allow the State to intervene in order to allow it to formally advise the Consission as to its concerne before the full-power license issued.
In an attempt to keep the commission apprised of the State's review
- progress I supplemented my earlier filings with two subsequent memora'nda, the first dated Octobe"c'21.1946 and the second dated October 29, 1946.
These submissions set forth Chio's preliminary conclusions that the emergency plan was seriously flawed in several crucially important respects.
In r
each memoranda ! again pressed our request that the party plant not be permitted to exceed $% power satil the Ohio esylew 2-1
process had been completed.' The deadline set for submission.of the review team's findings to the' Governor is Decembte 31, itse.
Despite these submissions. on October 30,1984 the Commission denied the state of Ohio's Petities for Leave to Intervene in the Perry licensing proceedings sa the ground of untineliness, on November 7.
19s6 I petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the sixth circuit to review the NRC's final order denying intervention.
I also moved the Court to issue an energency stay of NEC action on the full-powgr licensing of Perry, pending review of the scrits of our case.
The Sixth Circuit at first issued the stay late en Friday Nove')her 7th but dissolved it the following weeh. eiace the actual full-power licensa had not then issued.
OnNovenser7, 1984 the $osinission vot'ad 4-1 to authorise
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the NRC staff to issue a full-power license for Forty. The g
license was issued on 'Nevember 13. 1984.
On that same da te'/ '
the sixth Circuit, finding the primary consideration to be public safety, ordered a stay of the full-power license for the i
Ferry Nuclear power Plant which would have allowed it to exceed its curreggive percent power level, our petition to review the full power license was filed Novenher 17. 1984.
The Court consolidated both chio petitions with an unrelated appeal of a citizen group challenging the seismic design of the plant and set an expedited briefing schedule, r
All briefing was completed by November 20. 1986.
The primary issues addressed were whether the NRC's order denying 3-
the State of Ohio formal intervention status in the party operattag 11eenstag proceeding was arbitrary, caprietous, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not inaccordancefithlaw, and whether the'NRC's issuance of a full-power license to party was an abuse of discretion and not in accordance with law.
I argued that this is a unique case, a ca'se where the author and implementor of an off-site energency plan has found flaws in its own plan.
While the state conceded it was attempting to intervene late in the licensing proceedings, it was doing so in a timely fashion.
The state did not attempt intervention until it had serious concerns relating to energency p1.anning.
The l
state responsibly cooperated with the utility and the Ntc t
during the entire licensing proceedings.
It was not until the
(
State uncovered serious deficiencies in the evacuation plan that it attempted to intervene and to keep the plant from exceeding 5% until the evacuation plan has basa reevaluated' and E
improved.
The Sixth Circuit heard oral arguments on the merits on December 3, 1946.
The stay remains in effect pending the resolution of the matter.
I an avalting the outcome.
In the meantime the State's review team is diligently reviewing the Perry of f-site emergency plan, and work is advancing according to schedule.
The review team has assured me that their l
iincings will be submitted to the Governor on December 31, 1986.
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s This is an up.te-date summary of the legal ef fort is the Ferry licensing proceedlags.
I hope that itwillassistyodin
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your asseessent of the effect of the Ferry plant on.the affected ceamunity.
Once again I wish to express my' appreciation for the opportunity to address this hearing.
Respec~tfully submitted.
ANTHONY J. CELEBREZZE, JR.
ATTORNEY GENERAL or CHIo SS : scy, 3047E O
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AFFENDIE B SEVER.5 ACCIDENTS AND BN8h0RMCY PUJINING: mtRR80 LWD !$3033 No Consensus on Severe Accidents l
The nuclear utility industry and some scientists have asserted that severe accidents are impossible, or so improbable that emergency planning need not be based on them.
1 They have also asserted that a Chernobyl-type accident is not possible at a U.s. reactor.
While also emphasizing the differences between Chernedyl-type reactors and most U.S. reactors, the NRC and FEMA have asserted the importance of understanding a range of severe accident phenomena and the implications of the accidents at Three Mile Island and at Chernobyl for U.S. reactors and emergency response planning.
The NRC staff in 1986 completed a major study of source terms (i.e. the type, amount, and timing of radiation releases associated with some accident i
sequences).
A draf t NRC report on severe accident sequences',
designed as successor to the Reactor Safety study of 1975, is due for release early in 1987.
Both reports are almost certain to be used to evaluata and possinly revise current assumptions about emergency response planning.
The EERT welcomes the opportunity this NRC work may' provide for public discussion of the possibility and consequences of severe accidents at U.S. nuclear plants.
However, many l
independent experts have made serious criticisms of the NRC's l
treatment of severe accident phenomena-- criticisms that have i
sometimes been supported within the NRC itself.
(Appendix C consists of a list of experts and a selected bibliography consulted in the preparation of this part of the report.)
This criticism has been aimed at excessively eptimistic NRC assumptions about the possible se'quences of severe accidents (accidents resulting in serious core damage), containment performance, and radiation releases, as well as the adequacy of NRC methods for evaluating the risk to the public.
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3 Ngtted Accident Secuences Steam twolosions~
and other Phenomena Accident sequences involving steam explosions he've been neglected by the NRC in its assessment of severe accident phenomena.
The NRC's current position, apparentip, is that steam explosions that threaten containment integruty are virtually impossible.
According to some of the experts the RERT consulted, however, this NRC optimism is based on the evaluation of its steam Explosions Review Group (StRG), and this evaluation is not credible.
sERC members were simply asked to make a subjective quantitative guess of the probability of a severe in-vessel steam explosion rupturing containment, with their guesses varying by many orders of magnitude and with no consensus on how to model steam explosion phenomena.
Dr. Marshall Berman, Supervisor of the Severe Accident Containment Response Division of Sandia National Laboratories, which performs major research for the NRC, stated !.n a recent letter that he and his colleagues agreed that the benefits of nuclear power outweighed the currently understood risks.
But he also wrote thats we believe that the understanding of steam explosion phenomena is currently too weak to enable realistic assessment of risk due to such explosions.
We also believe that the Chernobyl
' steam explosion' may shed some light on this 8
situation.
However, en objective analyst would err
~
if he took an extreme approach based on a position that either the Chernobyl accident is directly relevant or has no relevance to American reactors.
And, in a October 8,1986 paper titled 'Chernobyle Where do we go f rom here?", Dr. terman states that, "To conclude that Western light water reactors are not vulnerable to steam explosions based on the~ presumed absence of an explosion at TM1 is to make a grave error."
Steam explosions are not the only potentially dangerous accident sequences that have received inadequate attention from the NRC others are high-pressure melt injection, station blackout, containment by-pass, and hydrogen explosions.
Different nuclear plants may be more or less vulhorable to some of these sequences, but some hydrogen or steam explosions could, conceivably, rupture even the strongest containments, and even lead to a sudden and large release of l
radiation.
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Controversy over Reactor Containments In addition to the debates aboat the nature and possibilities of severe accidents, the EERT is 3130 greatly concerned about the continuing controversy over the ability of. reactor containments to contain radiation releases.
Daniel Hirsch of the University of California at Santa Crur, has criticised the NRC's Containment Performance Design Objective panel for refusing to establish an explicit containment performance goal, because the goal that had been considered-- a ten percent chance of containment f ailure during a core melt accident and a 40 percent chance of a core meltdown over the lifetime of the current generation of nuclear plants-- was one unlikely to be accepted by the public if made explicit.
Furthermore, according to Nirsch, this core meltdown l
7 probability is based on the assumption that individual reactors have a core melt probability of one in 10,000 per j
reactor-year, but that actual risk analyses of individual plants have generally predicted a core melt probability)which is three timos higher (three in 10,000 per reactor-year.
of course, the greater the possibility of a core meltdown, the-more urgent is the need to establish adequate standards of containnent peeformance,
~
controversy over Accident Risk As'sessment controversy among experts over containment performance is one q
part of a broader debate over the NRC's methods for 46seasing reactor safety and the consequences of severe accidents.
In particular, the adequacy of probabilistic risk assessment, and how much it should be used to shape safety policy, is at the heart of the debate on nuclear s6fety.
- Briefly, probabilistic risk assessment assumes an accident, transient (i.e., a change of conditions, in temperature or pressure, within a nuclear reactor), or external event.
It then identifies human or mechanical f ailures affecting the safety systems that control or reduce the consequences of the initiating event and determines the probability (or range of probability) of failure for each' system.
The Union of concerned Scientists report, The Source Tern Debate, says it is still not possible to make precise, quantitative statements about overall reactor risks...
The underlying tool of nuclear risk analysis -
probabilistic risk analysis - suf fers from a range r
of shortcomings which in light of the enormous complexity of nuclear power plants, may never be overceae... Even the simple identification - f or each plant - of all the important accident sequences, internally as well as externally initiated, that should be examined is a daunting task and may not, in principle, be solvable.
Modeling the vast number of non-equilibrium chemical and physical processes and interactions that constitute these sequences is also beyond today's capabilities.
Indeed it is by no means clear that all of the physical phenomena that are important in the development of these accidents have even been identified.
NRC Commissioner James E. Asseletine has rejected the NRC's use of probabilistic risk assessment to minimise the threan to the public from severe accidents.
In his dissent from tne NRC's 1985 policy statement on severe accidents, Asselstine writes that the range of probabilities for core meltdown at a typical reactor can range fro ~a one in one thousand per reactor-year to one in 100,000.
The reliability of probabilistic risk assessment has been further reduced by its neglect of f actors that could have great importance in overall plant satety-operator training, plant maintenance, l
equipment deterioration due to age, human error, and seismic conditions.
In his July 1$, 1986, letter to Cart-Walske (Atomic Industrial Forum), Assels. tine says "To convey an impression that Chernobyl-type releases are impossible 'in this country is as inaccurate as conveying an impression that a similar i
disaster is a certainty..
we do not fully understand the risks of nuclear power, und we should not be fearful of g
saying so.'
Risk is the product of probability and consequences, and so even a very low probability accident could present great risk to the public if the consequences are severe enough.
The great uncertainty and controversy around severe nuclear accidents, especially those leading to early and massive releases of radiations the immense implications of such accidents for emergency planningt public lack of confidence in the NRC's willingness or ability to satisf actorily resolve [
these questions: and, the inability of individual states to completely evaluate these extraordinarily complex technical and scientific questions on their own makes imperative anindep severe accidents at nuclear plants.
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-3 Severe Accidents end' Emergency Plannine i
TheChernobylaccidentsuggestshowsevereaccide[tsmay force revision of our current emergency planning assumptions.
While controversy over the long-term health effects of the Chernobyl accident continues, it is clear that f all-out levels exceeding the U.S. protective a'ction guides (PAGs) occurred, not only at ten miles or less, but as far as 1000 miles from the accident site.
Moreover, one analyst has raised the possiblility that if wind conditions had been dif ferent, early f atallties could have occurred in Kiev== 130 kilometers from the Chernobyl site.
The differences between soviet and U.S. reactors have been stressed repeatedly, but a worst-case accident at a U.S. reactor, with breach of containment, could conceivably have similar long-distance effects depending on weather conditions.
The lessons of the Chernobyl accident.for U.S. nuclear plants are far from exhausted.
some countries have already developed new policies because of the accident: West Germany has set up a system to monitor radiation levels throughout the country and to inform the public what measures--interdiction of milk and fresh vegetables, drinking rainwater, disposing of air filters,. etc --may be necessary i
in certain accidents..
According to NRC Commissioner Asselstine, European countries have acted quickly to require more safety measures-- ouch as installing dedicated decay heat removal. systems or filtered vents-- at existing nuclear plants to increase phbile safety.'
In contrast, he has said, the NRC has studied such measures indefinitely.
These European safety improvements, some of which antedate the Chernobyl accident, appear to be based, at least implicitly, on the assumption that severe accidents with sajor of f-site consequences are possible.
The possibility of severe nuclear plant accidents at U.S.
nuclear power plants, especially.with early containment failure and sudden releases of radiation, forces a re-calculation of al cet every aspect of emergency response The issue of the appropriate size of the Emergency planning. Planning tone is the most obvious element of the pica to be While the WKC and FEMA think that no immediste affected.
health effects would be experienced beyond a range of ten miles-- and that is a conservstive estimate, in their view--
'for Sandia National Laboratories estimated in 1982 that, severe core melt accidents, early f atalities wouTd generally not occur beyond about 15 miles, and in the worst case, would be confined to about 2$ miles, while early injuries would probably(be confined to downwind distances of about 50MUR miles" criteria Development,' Sandia National Laboratories, December, 1982).
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4-In the opinion of several experts the EERT consulted, the l
present research conducted by the NRC and others.cn source terms does not justify relaxing existing safety standards or.
any reduction in the eine of the Emergency Planning tone-- an action which some utilities have proposed and which NRC staff is apparently considering.
In fact, several experts the EERT consulted f avor an extension of the planning sone.
j Another example of the implications for energency response planning of considering a wider range of severe accidents scenarios is that less time might be available to take emergency measures.
The current plan for the Perry plant states that the two-mile area immediately surrounding the plant could be evacuated within 160 minutes under optimum weather conditions, a period of tLao which, the plan implies, would provide an adequate degree of protection.
Independent nuclear safety experts the EERT consulted, however, have said that only 30 minutes might be available before a radiation release results from a core meltdown.
In l
i the worst cases, the time between the start of an occident and a massive release of radiation could be as little as an-(
hour.
Even if the probability.of such accidents are low, --
gesat uncertainty about their probability and their severe consequences means that emergency planning must take them into account.
Our conclusion that sudden, large releases of radiation must be considered possible suggests that 4 r*Yormulation of the entire emergency response plan might be in order if the public is to be provided adequate protection f rom such events.
l l
l r
APPENDIX C LIST OF EXPERTS AND SOURCES CON 80LThD -
i I.
Exnerts i
1)
Dr. Jan Beyes, Senior Staff scientist, Na'tional Audobon society.
2) steven sho11y, NHS Associates (energy consulting fira); co-author of source legg Debate of the Union of Concerned Scientists.
3)
Daniel Eirsch, Director, Stevenson Program on Nuclear Policy, University of California at Santa C ru s.
4)
Dr. Gordon Thompson, Executive Director, Institute for Resource and Security studies, Cambridge, KA.
5)
John Austin, technical aide to NRC Commissioner James Asselstine.
6)
Dr. Christoph Mohenesser, Prof essor of Physics, Chair, Program on Esvironment, Technology, and Society, Clark University.
7)
Robert Pollard, Nuclear Safety Engineer, Union of concerned Scientists.
g 8)
Dr. Marshall Berman, Supervisor, Severe Accident Containment Response Division, Sandia National Laboratories.
9)
Dr. Richard Wilson, Professor of Physics, Harvard University.
- 10) Gary Wright, Illinois Defartment of Nuclear Safety.
- 11) Nichael Marriote, Acting Executive Director, N'Jclear Information and Resource Service.
- 12) Ray Fraley, Staf f Director of Advisory Committee on Reactor Safety.
- 13) Dr. James Nackensie, World Researces Institute.
r
- 14) Robert M. Ryan, Director of the of fice of Radiation and Nuclear safety at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.
l
- 15) Thomas 3. Cochran, senior staf f Attorney of the National Resources Defense Council.
+
t II.
Documents (Partial Listino) 1.
Reassessment of the Technical Bases 'or Estimatino source Terms, Final Report (NUREG-01b 6 ).:
0.3.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, July 1986'.
2.
ACRS Comments on NUREG-0956, "Reassessment of the Technical Bases for Estimating Source Terms - Oraf t Report for Comment *, Advisory Committee on Reactor Saf eguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Counission, December 12, 1985.
3.
Summa'ry Report on the Post-Accident Review Neeting on the Chernobyl Accident.
International Safety ~
Advisory Group, September 1986.
4.
"Chernoby1 An Early Report," C. Hohenester et al, Invironment, June 1986.
5.
"The accident at Chernoby1:
A report on risk management at a local hot spot in West Germany,'
Annual meeting of the society for Risk Analysis, Boston, November 1986.
t 6.
. Chernobyl and the U.S. nuclear industry,' Bulletin of the Atomic _ Scientists. November 1986.
7.
A cuide Book to Nuclear _Reaeters, Anthony V. Nero Jr., University of California Press, 1979.
I The Source' Tern Debate, Steven Shelly and Dr.
s.
Ior3on Thompson, Union of' Concerned scientists, 1986.
9.
'The Lessons of Chernobyl,' Science, September 1986.
10.
' Implications of the Chernobyl-4 Accident for Nuclear Emergency Planning for the State of New York," prepared for the State of New York Consumer Protection Board by MHB Technical Associates, June 1946.
11.
'Chernoby1:
Assessing the Accident," Dr. Richard Wilson, Issues in Science and Technolooy, Fall 1986.
12.
' Summary Paper on the Chernobyl Transi(nt overpower Accident and its Implications for U.S. Power Reactors," Argonne National Laboratory, Reactor Analysis and safety Division, August 1906.
13.
Technical Guidance for sitino criterLa bevelopment, sandia National Laboratories, 1952.
- HU Rt0/CR-2 2 39
S AND81-1541).
. _. ~ _ _. -.. -. _
a
( )
14
- policy Statement on Severe Reactor Ace'idents Regarding Future Designs and Existing Plants,' with Dissent of Commissioner James K. Asseletine, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, August 1985.
15.
"Comments on Oraft Report, Reassessment of the Technical seees der totimatino source Terme, NUREC-0956,' Illhnots Depa.rtment of Nuclear Safety, January 1986.
16.
"Comments on NUREC-0956' by MHs Technical Associates for Suffolk County, New York, January 1944.
17.
Memorandum, "Steam Explosions," Joram Hopenfeld, Reactor Systems Research Branch, Division of Accident Evaluation, NRC, January 1985.
18.
Letter to W. M. Trevor Pratt, Brookhaven National Laboratory (10-30-86 dissent from final report of the NRC's containment Performance Design Cojective, panel) and ' Assessing the Need for Containment Performance Design Objectives for U.S. Nuclear
(
Reactors *(July 29, 1986) by Daniel Hirsch, Director, Program on Nuclear Policy, University of California at Santa Cruz.
19.
"Implications of the Chernobyl-4 Accident Lor Accident Management," "Charnoby1: Where Do We Go g
From Here?," 1986; ' Comments on Draf t Summary of the steam Explosion Review" (16 January 1985) and
- i Commentary on the Deliberations and Conclusions of l
i the steam Explosion Review Group (StRG)* (28 February 1985), Dr. Marshall terman, severe Accident Containment Response Division, sandia National Laboratories.
20.
Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radioloolcal emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Sucoort of Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG-0654/FEKA-REP-1 Rev. 1, 1980.
r l
a, y/7/27 3^..
[bo12em/fA
).
PREPARED TESTIMONY SUBMITTED BY UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION TO SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES CONCERNING NRC LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, THE NUCLEAR POWER EME'GENCY RESPONSE DATA SY37EM ACT OF A
- 987, AND THE WESTERN LOW-LEVEL RADI0 ACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL COMPACT
[ffls'21 9
PRESENTED BY 7
LANDO W.
ZECH. JR.
CHAIRMAN
,,:3'
. y.,
St;EMITTEO:
MAY 7, 1987
'4 tir. Chairman, Members of the Subcomittee I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss four legislative proposals that the NRC submitted to Congress this year, the "Nuclear Power Emergency Response Data System Act of 1987," as well as the pecposed Western Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Compact.
The Commission is grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, fo'r introducing our legislative proposals, and we are most appreciative of the Comittee's interest in cur legislative recommendations. Our testimony will begin with a discussicn of the NRC legislative proposals.
NRC Legislative Propos,f 1.
H.R. 1316--Unauthorized Possession of Firearms Three of the proposed bills seek to enhance our abil;;y to prevent or deter theft or sabotage of nucle'ar equipment and materials.
H.R. 1316 would authorize the Commission to promulgate regulations which would prohibit a person who has not obtained prior authorization to carry, transport, or otherwise introduce or cause to be introduced any dangerous weapon, explosive, or other dangerous instrument into any facility, installation, er real pecperty regulated by the Commission.
Violation of the regulation would constitute a fecerai crime punishable by a 55000 fine, imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, The Commission in prceulgating implemen:1ng regulaticrs would be ?uthorized to determire the scope of the prohdbition.
The C ynission't intent woulo be to limit tre a plicability O' inote r+gulations to those
s 2
licensed nuclear facilities and materials which must be protected against theft or radiological sabotage.
This legislation is needed because there have been an increasing number of reported incidents where persons without authorization have brought fireanns into protected areas of NRC regulated sites. There were, for example, eleven such incidents in 1985 and twelve in 1986. While, the Commission currently can and does impose sanctions against licensees for permitting unauthorized weapons or other dangercus instruments to enter the site, there is no federal law permitting the imposition of criminal sanctions against the person responsible for bringing the weapon or other dangerous instrument to the site.
We believe enactment of H.R.1316 would assist our licensees in their efforts to safeguard those licensed nuclear facilities and materials which must be protected against nuclear theft or sabotage.
In addition, enactment of this legislation would promote the national policy of maintaining comparable safeguards for similar nuclear materials and facilities in the public and private sectors.
Under section 229a. of the Atomic Energy Act, unauthorized introduction of weapons or other dangerous instruments at nuclear facilities owned by the Department of Energy would corstitute a federal crime. Enactment of H.R. 1316 would permit similar safeguards with respect to unauthorized introduction of weapons at non-CCE nuclear facilities.
1
0 3
2.
H.R. 1318--Sabotage During Construction of a Facility The second legislative prcposal, H.R.1318, would amend section 236 of the Atomic Energy Act to make it a crime to sabotage or attempt to sabotage a nuclear production or utilization facility durin,g its construction where the action, if it went undetected, could affect public health and safety.
Currently, section 236 covers acts of sabotage to a utilization facility only ofter it has received its operating license.from the Commission.
Sabotage during the later stages of construction, particularly during pre-operational testing, can be equally serious.
For example, in 1984 a bag containing some parts was found inside a oice which had been welded closed af ter it had undergone several pre-welding checks at a plant under construction. While this incident was determined to be negligence rather than sabotage, !t demonstrated that an act of sabotage during construction could pctentially have an adverse effect on public health and safety.
Sabotage during the late stages of construction is of special concern since most inspections which would have discovered the sabotage would have already occurred.
Therefore there is the possibility that the sdbotage might not be discovered prior to operation.
In draf ting this legislation we tave narrowly defined the type of sabotage which would constitute a federal offense. The sabotage or attempted sabotage must be serious enough to have a possible effect on cublic health and safety if not discovered orier to cperation.
t
, o a
4 We therefore believe that enactment of H.R. 1318 is warranted to provide greater protection for the public health and safety by enacting criminal sanctions to deter such sabotage.
3.
H.R. 1319--Protection of Sensitive Generic Safeguards Information The third safeguards-related bill is F.R. 1319. This legislation would amend section 147 of the Atomic Energy to provide that the Conrnission is authorized to protect from public disclosure certain categories of sensitive generic safeguards information when disclosure could compromise or negate site-specific security measures required by the Commission to pr'otect nuclear materials and facilities aoainst theft, diversion or sabotage.
In 1980 Congress added section 147 to the Atomic Energy Act.
In that section Congress provided important protections against unauthorized disclosure of a licensee's or applicant's sensitive information related to the security of specific nuclear facilities and special nuclear materials.
However, Congress did not enact a broadly written provision for withholding generic informaticn on safeguards matters from public disclosure.
As a result of i*.s experterce in implementing se: tion 1U, the Comissicn is aware of an ambiguity in that section relating to the Comission's autnority to
5 protect from public disclosure generic information that would be likely to endanger specific safeguards measures implemented by NRC licensees.
In its Diablo Canyon operating license proceeding, the Comissio'n concluded that certain generic information regarding the design basis threat, specifically, that part of the design basis threat relating to the number of armed adversaries against which security plan characteristics are developed was an integral party of the licensee's security plan.
The Comission determined that release of that infomation could reasonably be expected to provide substantial assistance to a potential saboteur of the Diablo Canyon facility.
The Comission further determined, that the information, although nominally generic, was properly considered a detailed portion of the applicant's plan and that the Commission was authori:ed under secticn 147 to protect that infomation from public disclosure.
The Commission believes that its interpretation of section 147 is correct. An interpretation contrary to the Comission's could negate the important protections provided by Congress for sensitive safeguards information.
Accordingly, the Comission believes it would be useful for Congress to codify its authority to withhold and protect generic infermation of the nature discussed.
I
6 The Commission's concern is not litrited to the Diablo Canycn situation addressed above.
The Commission is also concerned that a ccurt could find that section 147 does not provide a basis for withholding from public disclosure generic reports, studies and analyses of sabotage vulnerabilities. Such a holding would be inconsistent with the nationa.1 interest in preserving effective safeguards.
Moreover, it appears that without clarification of section 147, a federal court which disagreed with NRC's interpretation of section 147 could order the NRC to release security-related information similar or identical to-that being protected Dy the Department of Energy pursuant to section 148 of the Atomic nergy Act.
Even though it could be argued that NRC safeguards information is not as sensitive as 00E infornation because DOE facilities are of greater national security significance, public disclosure of certain sensitive gereric safeguards information relative to NR', facilities could be of substantial assistance to one who contemplated sabotaging a 00E facility because the information might be identical. Accordingly, failure to amend section 147 could significantly negate the Congressional purpose underlying the enactrent of section 148.
Because the language of H.P. 1319 is closely related to tne protections already enacted by Congress this legislation, if enacted, wculd r et significantly increase the ability cf the Co mission tc withholc infcreat'.c ' rem tae ; c i1c.
Yet, by explicitly authorizing the withholding of a small class of sensitive
7 safeguards information, Congress could help prevent the disclosure of
-information that could be of great assistance to a saboteur.
4 H.R. 1317--Reporting of Violations or Defects Our fourth legislative proposal. H.R.1317, pertains to the Commission's ability to receive proper notice of defects or regulatory violations at nuclear pcwer plants and other regulated activities, where such defects or violations could create substantial safety hazards.
Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 provides that any individual director or responsible officer of a firm constructing, cwning, operating, or supplying ccmponents of any facility or activity licensed or regulated under the Atomic Energy Act or the Energy Reorganization Act must promptly notify the Commission of violations of the Atomic Energy Act or any applicable regulation, order or license condition relating to substantial safety hazards or any defect which could create a substantial safety hazard.
Any person who knowingly and consciously fails to provide notice is subject to a civil penalty.
Pased on more than a decade of excerience in icplementing this statutor,ii orovision, we believe that scre changes in section 2C6 pe warranted.
First.
we believe that the section shculd be revised to provide that the firm, as well
8 as individual directors and responsible officers should ce resnonsible for notifying the Comission. This assigr.trent of responsibility would be more in accord with the general approach to regulation under the Atomic Energy Act, which imposes responsibility on the licensee, rather than individual corporate officers for compliance with regulatory requirements. Under our proposal the current provision that a civil penalty rJy be levied against individual directors and responsible officers for a knowing and conscious failure to notify the Commission would be retained.
Powever, the proposed legislation would subject a firm to sanctions for any failure to notify, regardless of its intent or degree of negligence in failing to comply with the Commission's regulations. This would ensure that the failure to report viol Ation : or d3fects, regardless of the reasons for the reporting failure, would be subject to possible civil sanctions.
This approach is in accord with section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act, which authorizes civil penalties for violations without regard to whether they are knowir.g and conscious, h.R.1317 would also clarify the Comission's authority to promulgate regulations, issue orders, and conduct inspections and investigations under section 206. These provisions would codify existing practice ard remove any questions regarding the Comission's authority to take recessary actions to it'plement section 206.
The croposed legislation would also clarify that a 'irm, #ePer it te 3 licensee or a non-licensee, may be subject to a civil penalty for violatir.g
9 Commission regulations or orders issued to implement ard enforce section 206, as well as for violations of section 206 itself. The current statute is ambiguous regarding whether the Commission is authorized to impose sanctient against non-licensees, such as reactor vendors, f
L R'
H.R. 1317 would also make other amendments to section 206.
The bill would clarify that the requirements of section 206 must be prominently posted on the premises of any firm affected by the section, and not simply at facilities licensed under the Atomic Energy Act.
This would cover suppliers of components and other firns who are covered by section 206 but who are not regulated diri.ctly Under the Atcmic Energy Act.
n Finally, the proposed legislation would subject the Department of Energy to the requirements of section 206 to the extent that 'he Department's activities, facilities or materials, are licensed by the Commission.
The Commission believes the Department of Energy to the extent it is subject to NRC licensing should be subject to the same regulatory requirements as sur other licensees.
P In conclusion, the Commission believes (Fat the adoption of these a:renc ents would clarify the scope of secticn 206 and thereby ensure that the Commission has sufficient author 5ty to i Die ent effectively the notification recuire ents c.andated by Congress.
4 d
10
/% b s NL,,w H.R.1570--The Nuclenr Power Emeroency Pesconse Cata Systern Act of 1987 H.R. 1570 would require the creation of an Emergency response Data System
("ERDS").
This system would permit direct electronic transmission of selected parameters from nuclear power reactors to the Ccmmissien, The system would be used only during emergencies.
The Commission supports enactment of legislation such as H.R. 1570 because such legislation would substantially enhance our incident response capability.
The Commission has determined that NRC's primary role in an emergency is to monitor and advise. Our monitoring role is in two areas.
We monitor the licensee to assure that appropriate recommendations are made with respect to offsite actions.
We also monitor the licensee to assure they are taking the appropriate on-site action to mitigate consequences of the incident.
Another cspect of our role is advisory.
We support botn tre licensee enc tne ensite
.'.RC re ncnse tear.. t r technical analyses, idvice ard logistical cuo; ort.
e U
11 We also support offsite authorities including confirming licensee's recomendations to offsite authorities.
Agency advice or recomendation will be made by,the NRC's Chairman (or his designee) to a licensee manager or the appropriate state or local decisionmaker.
In addition to the above, NRC is the single federal focal point for keeping other Federal agencies and entities and the media informed on the status of the incident.
The effectiveness of the NRC in performing its role is decendent on the cuality and timeliness of the event information the agency receives.
The types of information the agency needs for emergency response are:
reactor systems conditions, containment building conditions, radioactivity release rates, and the plant's meterological data.
It may also be appropriate to provide state and local authorities with the meteorological and radiological data as this data is useful given their role and expertise.
Currently, the cata is transnitted to the NRC ' rom the licensee by s*.and5rd voice telephone ccmmunications.
Two primary Pone links are used. One is dedicateo for reactor data; the other is primarily for radiological snd
12 meteorological data. Our experience with voice-only emergency comunications--, starting with TMl and reinforced numerous times since then.-, is that it can be too slow and can be error prone.
Information is misunderstood, frequently creating false issues which at best divert experts from the real problems. Even worse incorrect data can cause NRC to respond to the licensee or offsite efficials with inaccurate er outdated advice, j
l NRC's thinking on how to enhance its incident response capability has evolved over several years.
The NRC has considered options varying from the Nuclear a
Data Link, involving extensive continuous transmission of a large quantity of parameters from all facilities, to the current system in which we rely on telephonic communications.
The system determined by the Commission to provide the data in an accurate, reliable, and timely manner wnile minimizing the l
impact on our licensees is the Emergency Response Data System envisioned by this bill. We have successfully conducted tests of the EROS concept with Duke Power Company at the McGuire facility and with Comonwealth Edison at the LaSalle facility.
Both tests confirmed the advantages of having direct electronic transmission of a selected set of parameters.
Based on these successful tests of the concept, the NRC initiated an EROS Requirements Analysis.
The effort consisted of visits to the licensees to deterdine the design of the site data systems and the availability of the cata requested by the G C.
13 Based on the results of the surveys, the Commission believes the EROS concept
~
can be implemented with relatively little difficulty at essentially all sites.
Ease of implementation will vary dependino on type and utilization of licensee equipment.
Implementation at some sites may require a delay until other equipment upgrades are completed.
In view of the large potential benefit to the NRC incident response capability i
from the EROS and the results of the survey indicating the relative ease of implementation,' the NRC currently plans to begin implementation of the system on a voluntary basis. While we expect the majority of licensees will see the benefits of the system and will participate, there is no guarantee.
H.R. 1570 would make implementation mandatory for all licensees.
H.R.1570 would require complete implementation within 3 years of passage. The current NRC implementation plan is phased over a longer period to accommodate curreat licensees' schedules for equipment upgrades.
Passage of H.R. 1570 would require scee licensees to accelerate their current schedules.
f H.R.1570 establishes the Emergency Response Data Systea Fund which provices for full reimbursement of EROS costs and increased funding assurance for the
!;R C.
14 We believe H.R.1570'would be ' improved if Congress provided greater guidance regarding the establishment of the fund.
The legislation should indicate who is to pay into the fund, when are payments to be made, and provide a formula or criteria for determining how much each licensee should pay.
It would be difficult to establish the fund without such direction.
In conclusion, H.R.1570 would provide for expeditious and consistent implementation of an Emergency Response Data System and would greatly enhance our incident response capability.
If H.R.1570 is enacted, we plan to initiate a rulemaking proceeding to define the nature of the system to be required, and we wculd work closely with the States to help assure, to the extent possible, that any special data needs for their emergency response decisions are accommodated.
H.R. 1530 Western Low-level Waste Disposal Comoact H.R.1530 is before Congress so that the States of Ari:ena, South Dakota, and certain other eligible States, may obtain Congressional consent as recuired by the Constitution to enter into an interstate compact regarding the disposal of low-level radioactive waste.
Since tne passage of the Low-Level Racioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980 (Public Law 97-573) we have seen most of the States wc. ing to fulfill their obliga-tions to provide disposal capacity for low-level racicactive waste.
All of this effort has led to the Congressional consent to 7 compacts covering 35
15 states in Title II - Omnibus Low-Level Radioactive Waste 'nterstate Compact ConsentAct(PublicLaw99-240). Both Arizona and South Dakota have been working hard since 1980 to achieve provisions for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste in their States. Arizona participated in negotiations with the Rocky Mountain States and California before it settled with'its current partner, South Dakota, in the Western Compact. Additionally, Arizona has accepted the responsibility to become the host State and is in the process of enacting the necessary siting legislation.
During this same time frame South Dakota investigated the possibility of hosting a site at Igloo to be developed by Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc. South Dakota also considered, along with North Dakota, a two-State compact. These efforts did not materialize so South Dakota then negotiated separately with both California and Arizera to form a Western Compact. Only the one with Arizona came to fruition with both States enacting the required compact legislation. Our analysis of the Western Ccepact considers the historical record of the development of this policy issue in the two States.
The Comission supports the basic policy of encouraging regional solutions to the disposal of low-level radioactive waste.
We believe that regional sites are preferable from a public health ard safety standooint to a proliferation of smaller, an: possibly economically marginal facilities.
Also, as we beve testified previously, tnere should be a home for all waste generated within the States. Given the historical developments of the compactirg process in the two States, we have no overall etjections frce health, safety, ard environmertal l
corsiderations of the two States, Arizona and South Dakota, forming the Western
16 Compact.
In fact, it would be desirable to include California and North Dakote as well. A more complete discussion of this rationale is given in the enclosure to my testimony.
Our major concerns with the details of the Western Compact relate to several of the definitions contained in the Compact. We would prefer that those definitions conform more closely to the language of the low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, to avoid any confusion. A more complete discussion of our concerns as well as a number of other comments that we believe may be helpful is given in the enclosure to this testimony.
In conclusion, we support Congressional consent of the Western Low-Level Waste Disposal Compact and commend Arizora and South Dakota for the efforts they have made during the past 7-years in arriving at a satisfactory solution to the difficult task of fulfilling their respcnsibilities of providing for low-level waste disposal capacity.
Mr. Chairman, that completes my personal statement.
J
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9'o, UNITED STATES Ty
' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3c i
WASHmGTON. O. C. 20555
'/, A A
N
,l
.\\
.s May 11, 1987 i
i MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chaiman Zech Comissioner Asselstine Comissioner Bernthal Comissicner Carr FROM:
John Bradburne, Director i
Congressional Affairs, GPA
SUBJECT:
UDALL SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING ON hRC LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS On Thursday, May 7, the Subcomittee on Energy and the Environment held hearings on four NRC legislative proposals, the Arizona-South Dakota Compact and the Nuclear Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) bill. The hearing was chaired by Rep. Udall, the witness list is attached.
Chairman Zech read the Comission's short statemer.t into the record, then responded to questions from the Subcomittee. The Chainnan indicated that the Comission supported the ERDS bill and that he _would not objec_t._if_.
states have additional, off-site data to assist them during emergencies.
He would also succort orandfathering existing state data systems.
Edward Jordan indicated that the NRC is planning voluntary imp 15nentation of the
~
ERDS system over the next five years.
Mr. McMeekin indicated that Duke Power had questions concerning the need, practicality and cost for near real time data transmission. A copy of his testimony is attached.
CONTACT: Frederick Combs x-41443 Attachments:
As stated cc:
-y m y f
my
- GPA/H. Denton C. Kamerer, SLITP J. Fouchard PA J. Shea, IP
e 1
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT HEARING -
ON H.R.
- 1316, H.R.
1317, H.R.
1318 H.R.
- 1319, H.R.
1530 AND H.R.
1570 Thursday, May 7, 1987 Room 2203 Rayburn HOB 9:45 a.m.
WITNESSES The Honorable Lando W. Zech, Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission I
Mr.
T. C. McMeekin, Chief Engineer, Electrical Division, l
Design Engineering Department, Duke Power Company H.R.
1316 To amend the Atomic Energy Act to make it a Federal crime to carry or otherwise introduce or cause to be introduced any dangerous weapon or other dangorous instrumentality onto sites regulated by the Nuc1 car i
Regulatory Commission H.H.
1317 To amend the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 to clarify notification requirements for noncompliance, and for other purposes H.R.
1318 To amend the Atomic Energy Act to provide criminal sanctions for an l
act of sabotage of a nuclear powerplant during its construction which l
would effect the public health and safety were it to go undetected i
H.R.
1319 To amend the Atomic Energy Act to clarify that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is authorized to protect from public disclosure certain senstive generic safeguards information, the disclosure of which could negate or compromise site specific security measures H.R.
1530 Western Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Compact Consent Act H.R.
1570 Nuclear Power Emergency Response Data System Act of 1987
i STATEMENT OF T.
C.
MCMEEKIN ON H.R.
1570 - NUCLEAR POWER EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM ACT OF 1987 BEFORE U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT MAY 7,
1987 I.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND My name is T.
C.
McMeekin.
I am Chief Engineer.
Electrical Division. Design Engineering Department of Duke Power Company.
I appreciate the invitation to appear before this subcommittee.
The purpose of my testimony is to provide Duke Power's perspective on H.R.
1570 - Nuclear Power Emergency Response Data System Act of 1987 and on the subject of Emergency Response Data Systems in general.
I made similar testimony to this subcommittee on H.R.
5192 on August 11, 1986.
As a result of post-accident evaluation of the March, 1979 accident at Three '411e Island, there was significant activity in the development of e m e r g e n c :.
response capabilities.
These activities resulted in numerous indu try and NRC initiatives.
This activit' culminated in the development af several documents including NUREC 0737 (Clarification c: TMI Actien Plan Requirements). Supplement 1 to the NUREC 0737 (Requirements for Emergency Response Capability) and associated ':UTAC (Nuclear Utility Task Action Committee) Guidelines on Emergency Response Capabili-ties.
i u
H.R.
1570 - NUCLEAR POWER EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM ACT OF 1987 PAGE 2 II.
CRISIS MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHY The Duke Crisis Management Plan was developed on the basis that lour basic functions must be carried out in an emergency.
They are:
Plant Operation Accident Assessment Emergency Management Protective Action Recommendations In the event of an accident, all functions are initially the responsibility of the station.
After activation of the Crisis Management Center (CMC), t h e' station is relieved of Emergency Management and development of Protective Action Recommendations.
The station is always responsible for Plant Operation and Accident Assessment.
This approach was adopted because dynamic plant conditions can only be effectively assessed and managed by the on site staff.
This staff has available current plant information which includes readings from plant monitors, measurements from test equipment, out of service status, physical damage assessments, and other subtlw indicators.
Such current information cannot be effectively trans-mitted off site.
III.
DUKE EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM Duke, and the industry in general, has implemented crisis management plans, operating procedures, and related hardware to substantially improve emergency response effectiveness.
These plans, procedures and systems were developed based on NUREG 0737 Supplement I requirements and associated NUTAC guidance and submitted for NRC review and approval.
The Duke Emergency Response Data system desian considerations included user responsibility, importance of data validity, system reliabilit:. etc.
The system provides for en site real time data acquisition and c:f site data subsets which are p e r i o d i c a l l ', updated.
On site NRC representatives i
have access to this same real time data and the at:
j site NRC rerresentatives have access to the i
periodically updated data subsets.
l i
A H.R.
1570 - NUCLEAR POWER EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM ACT OF 1987 PAGE 3 IV.
DUKE POSITION ON H.R.
1570 While we are always interested in evaluating better techniques for emergency response and in sharing plant information with the NRC, we have concerns with H.R.
1570.
Although H.R.
1570 represents an improvement over H.R.
- 5192, we have several concerns related to the need, practicality, and cost for near real time data transmission to off site facilities.
The concerns are summarized below:
Eief o
Given that plant information is currently avail-able to the on site NRC staff through real time monitors and to the Region and Bethesda offices through periodically updated data subsets, we question the benefit of mandating an automatic electronic data transmission system.
Praiticallig o
As a p rac tical mat ter, automatically transmitted data will necessarily be incomplete as it relates to total plant status.
It is simply impractical to transmit total plant status off site.
Any type of electronic data transmittal will require voice supplement to ensure proper perspective.
Recog-nizing the i= practicality and that management of dynamic conditions must be done on site, we feel that near real time off site data transmittal is unnecessary.
Eosi o
Depending on the scope of the system; i.e.,
the number of measurements and the frequency of update; utilities could incur a substantial cost to develop and maintain an interface between the plant and the Emergency Response Data 5yste.
itat11111 o
To fully realize the benefits c: the substantial modifications to plant design and operatin:
procedures installed since the TMI accident.
.t is important that the industry have a period of regulatory stability.
s o
H.T.
1570 - NUCLEAR POWER EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM ACT OF 1987 PAGE 4 o
Other In addition to the comments above, we have the following additional concerns on H.R.
1570:
o It includes no clear limitations on the scope of the system or who the users may be, o
Further, it would require additional informa-tion in support of electronically transmitted data which might further burden the utility in an emergency.
o The proposed system is not limited to emergency use.
o It is not clear that the official NRC recommen-dations would be limited to a single communica-tion channel (e.g.,
the Senior NRC official at the CMC),
o To date, the Emergency Response Capability requirements have been issued via a NUREG and utilities responded to an associated generic letter.
The resulting action plan was confirmed through an NRC confirmatory order.
If further emergency response requirements are warranted, we think a similar process would be appropriate.
V.
SUMMARY
In summary, we have concerns related to the need, practicality, cost, and numerous scope uncertainties related to this Bill.
'a' e believe that current Crisis Management Plans adequately provide data for the licensees and the N'RC to fulfill their responsibil-ities.
In light of these comments, we do not feel that this Bill would be in the best interest of the nuclear industry.
To the extent that enhancements are to be considered. we belteve that the existina regulatory process is appropriate to evaluate and implement as appropriate.
I urae this subcommittee to consider these conments in tour deliberations.
Thank you for the opportunit: to appear before you today.
MAY 2 21987 MEMORANDUM FOR: William G. Mcdonald, Director Office of Administration and Resources Management Edward L. Jordan, Director Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data FROM:
Victor Stello, Jr.
Executive Director for Operations
SUBJECT:
CONLZ-87-29: EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM CONTRACT I concur with Comissioner Bernthal's suggestion to ensure that computer systems and telecomunications are fully integrated with long range plans for the entire agency and that automated systems be developed with as much flexibility and compatibility as feasible.
Accordingly and to assure clear lines of responsibility and authority are maintained. I am directing the following actions be taken:
(1) AEOD continues to be the lead office for development and implementation of EROS; (2) AEOD is to coordinate with IRM, and to activel procurement and implementation of this system; (3) y involve IRM in the IRM is to establish and maintain an active and visible role in the procurement and management of ERDS, including establishing a point of contact to accomplish this objective in support of AE00. As an initial step, the ERDS contract (Section F.1.1, Deliveries and Performance) should be modified to provide that a copy of the monthly letter report be delivered to IRM.
Finally,' I expect problems develop. you to keep me informed of your progress and if significant Original signed by, Victor Stell4p Victor Stello, Jr.
Executive Director for Operations cc:
E. Halman, ARM /DC 67572.fl82I l
PREPARED TESTIMONY SUEMITTED BY L'NITED STATES NUCLEAR PEGULATORY COMMISSION TO SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND POWER COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES CONCERNING H.R. 2683 (NRC LEGISLATIVE PROPCSALS) and H.R. 1570 (THE NUCLEAR F0WER EMERGENCY RESPONSE CATA SYSTEM ACT OF 1987)
H.R. 3025 (APPALACHIAN LOW-LEVEL RADI0 ACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL COMPACT CCNSENT ACT)
PRESENTED BY LANDO W. IECH, JR.
CHA!RMAN
-00hltYY' Yh SUSMITTED:
OCTOBER 1, 1937
/Vl
O Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcomittee. I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss H.R. 2683--which consists of four legislative proposals that the Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC) submitted to Congress this year, H.R.1570--the "Nuclear Power Emergency Response Data System Act of 1987", and H.R. 3025--the "Appalachian low-level Radioactive Waste Disposal Compact Consent Act."
The Comission is most appreciative of the Comittee's interest in these legislative proposals. Our testimony will begin with a discussion of H.R. 2683--the NRC legislative proposals.
H.R. 2683--NRC's Lecislative Proposals 1.
Section 1--Protection of Sensitive Generic Safeguards Information The first section of H.R. 2683 would amend section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act to provide that the Comission is authorized to protect from public disclosure sensitive gereric safeguards informat. ion when disclo-sure could comproJ!<e or negate site-specific security measures reouired by the Comission to protect nuclear materials and facilities against theft, diversion or sabotage.
j In 1980 Congress added section 147 to the Atomic Erergy Act.
In that section Congress provided important protections a ginst unauthorized disclosure of a licensee's or applicant's sensitive infonnation related to the security of specific nuclear facilities and special nuclear materials. However, Congress did not enact a broadly written prevision 7
'9 i
2 for withholding gensric information on safeguards matters from public disclosure.
As a result of its experience in implementing section 147, the Commission is aware of an arrbiguity in that section relating to the Comission's authority to protect from public disclosure generic information that would be likely to endanger specific safeguards measures implemented by t
NRC licensees.
In its Diablo Canyon operating license proceeding, the Comission concluded that certain generic information regarding the design basis threat, specifically, that part of the design basis threat relating to the number of armed adversaries against which security plan characteris-i tics are developed was an integral part of the licensee's security plan.
The Comission determined that release of that information could reason-ably be expected to provide substantial assistance to a potential saboteur of the Diablo Canyon facility. The Comission further deter-mined that the information, although nominally generic, was properly I
considered a detailed portion of the applicant's plan and that the Commission was authorized under section 147 to protect that information from public disclosure, i
a I
The Cemission believes that its interpretation of section 147 is correct, An interpretation contrary to the Comission's could regate the f
important protections provided by Congress for sensitive safeguards j
3 t
information. Accordingly, the. Commission believes it would be desirable for Congress to codify its authority to withhold and protect generic information of the nature discussed.
F The Commission's concern is not limited to the Diablo Canyon situation addressed above.
The Commission is also concerned that a court could find that section 147 does not provide a basis for withhelding from public disclosure generic reports, studies and analyser of sabotage vulnerabilities. Such a holding would be inconsistent with the national interest in preserving effective safeguards.
I Moreover, it appears that without clarification of section 147, a federal court which disagreed with NRC's interpretation of section 147 could order the NRC to release security-related informatien similar to or identical to that being protected by the Departeent of Energy pursuant to section 148 of the Atomic Energy Act.
Even though it could be argued that NRC safeguards information is not as sensitive as DOE information because DOE facilities are of greater national security significance, public disclosure of certain sensitive generic safeguards information relative to NRC facilities could be of substantial assistance to one who contemplated sabotaging a DOE facility because the information might be identical. Accordingly, Failure to amend section 147 could significantly I
negate the Congressional purpose underlying the enactment of section 148.
l t
t 1
l
)
t 4
This legislation, if enacted, would not significantly increase the scope of information which the Commission may withhold from the public. Yet, by explicitly authorizing the withholding of a small class of sensitive safeguards information Congress could help prevent any possibility that an alternative interpretation of section 147 could result in the disclosure of information that could be of assistance to a saboteur.
2.
Section 2--Unauthorized Possession of Firearms l
Section 2 of this bill would authorize the Commission to promulgate i
regulations which would prohibit a person who has not obtained prior authorization to carry, transport, or otherwise introduce or cause to be introduced any dangerous weapon, explosive, or other dangerous instrument into any facility, installation, or real property regulated by the l
Commission. Violation of the regulation would constitute a federal crime punishable by a $5000 fine, imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. The Commission in promulgating implementing regulations would be authorized to determine the scope of the prohibition.
The Commission's intent would be to limit the applicability of those regulations to those licensed nuclear facilities and materials which must be protected against i
theft or radiological sabotage.
This provision is needed because there have been an increasing number of l
reported incidents where persons without authorization have brcught firearms into protected areas of NRC regulated sites.
'nhile the L
a
. I t
Comicsion currently can and does impose sanctions against licensees for j
t permitting unauthorized weapons or other dangerous instruments to enter the site, there is no federal law permitting the imposition of criminal sanctions against the person respcnsible for bringing the weapon or other l
dangerous instrument to the site.
We believe enactment of this proposal would assist our licensees in their 1
efforts to safeguard those licensed nuclear facilities and materials which must be protected against nuclear theft or sabotage.
In addition, enactment of this legislation would promote the national policy of raintaining comparable safeguards for similar ruclear materials and facilities in the public and private sectors. Under section 229a. of the Atomic Energy Act. unauthorized introduction of weapons or other
]
dangerous instrumen?s at nuclear facilities owned by the Department of Energy would ccnstitute a federal crime.
Enactment of this legislation would permit similar safeguards with respect to unauthorized introducticn I
of weapons at NRC regulated nuclear facilities.
l 3.
Section 3--Sabotage Ouring Construction of a Facility The third section of H.R. 2683 would amend section 236 of the Atomic Energy Act to make it a crime to sabotage or attempt to sabotage a nuclear production er utilization facility during its ccnstructicn where the acticn. if it went undetected, could affect public health and safety, j
Currently, section 236 covers acts of sabotage to a utilizatien facility only after it has received its operating license from the Commission, f
i l
. 1 Sabotage during the later stages of construction, particularly during pre-operational testing, can be equally serious.
For example, in 1984 a bag containing some parts was found inside a pipe which had been welded closed af ter it had undergone several pre ' welding checks at a plant under i
construction. While this incident was determined to be negligence rather I
than sabotage, it demonstrated that an act of sabotage during cons:*uction could potentially have an adverse effect on public health and safety.
Sabotage during the late stages of constructien is of special concern since most inspections which would have discovered the sabotage would 1
2 have already occurred. Therefore, there is tre possibility that the sabotage might not be discovered prior to cperation.
This proposed legislation narrowly defines the type of sabotage which would constitute a federal offense.
The sabotage or atte:npted sabotage must be serious enough to have a possible effect on public health ar.d safety if not discovered prior to operation.
We believe that enactment of H.R. 2683 is warranted to provide greater i
protection for the public health and safety by enacting crimiral sanctions to deter such sabotage.
l l
l A
Q
. 4 Section 4--Reporting of Vi.olations or Defects The fourth section of H.R. 2683 pertains to the Comission's ability to receive proper notice of defects or regulatory violations at nuclear power plants and other regulated activitie's, where such defects or violatiors could create substantial safety hazards.
Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 provides that any individual director or responsible officer of a firm constructing, cwning, operating, or supplying components of any facility or activity licensed or regulated under the Atomic Energy Act or the Energy Reorgani-zation Act must promptly notify the Comission of violations of the Atomic Energy Act or any applicable regulation, order or license condi-tion relating to substantial safety hazards or any defect which could create a substantial safety hazard. Any person who knowingly and consciously fails to provide notice is subject to a civil penalty.
Based on more than a decade of experience in irrplementing this statutory provision, we believe that some changes in section 206 are warranted.
First, we believe that the section should be revised to provide that the firm, as well as individual directors and responsible officers should be responsible for notifying the Comission.
This assignment of responsi-bility wculd be more in accord with the general epproach to regulation under the Atomic Energy Act, which imposes responsibility on the licensee, rather than individual corporate officers for cortpliance with regulatory requirements. Under our proposal the current provision that a
s
- civil penalty may be levied against individual directors and responsible officers for a krowing and conscious failure to notify the Cocmission would be retained. However, the proposed legislation would subject a firm to sanctions for any failure to notify, regardless of its intent or degree of negligence in failing to ccmply with the Commission's regulations.
?his would ensure that the failure to report violations or defects, regardless of the reasons for the reperting failure, would be subject to possible civil sanctions.
This approach is in accord with section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act, which authorizes civil penalties for violations without regard to whether they are knowing and conscious.
H.R. 2683 would also clarify the Commission's authority to promulgate regulations, issue orders, and conduct inspections and investigatiert under section 2C6.
These previsions would codify existing practice and remove any questions regarding the Commission's authority to take necessary actions to implement section 206.
The proposed legislation would also clarify that a firm, whether it be a licensee or a non-licensee, may be subject to a civil penalty for violating Commission regulations or orders issued to irplement and enforce section 206, as well as fer violations of section 206 itself.
)
The current statute is ambiguous regarding the Conmission's i
authority to impose sarctions against non-licensees, such as reactor
- vendors, i
J
-9 Section 4 would also make other amendments to section 206.
The bill would clarify that the requirements of section 206 must be prominently posted on the premises of any finn affected by the section, and not simply at facilities licensed under the At'omic Energy Act. This would cover suppliers of components and other firms who are covered by section 206 but who are not regulated directly under the Atomic Energy Act.
Finally, the proposed legislation would subject the Department of Energy to the requirements of section 206 to the extent that the Department's activities, facilities or materials, are licensed by the Comission.
The Comission believes the Department of Energy, to the extent it is stbject to NRC licensing, should be subject to the same regulatory requirements as our other licensees.
I In conclusion, the Comission believes that the adoption of these amendments would clarify the scope of section 206 and thereby ensure that the Comission has sufficient authority to implement effectively the notification requirements mandated by Congress.
H.R.1570- The Nuclear power Emergency Response Data System Act of 1987 H.R.1570 as reported by the Comittee on Interior and Insular Affairs, would require the creation of an Emergency Respense Data System (ERDS).
This system would provide fer direct electronic transmission of selected parameters from nuclear power reactors to the Comission.
j t
! i The Comission supports ensetment of legislation for a system similar to that which would be required by H.R. 1570 as originally proposed because such legislation would substantially enhance our incident response capability.
The Cocrnission has determined that NRC's primary role in an emergency is to monitor and advise. Our monitoring role is in two areas:
We monitor the licensee to assure that appropriate recomendations are made with respect to offsite actions, i
We also monitor the licensee to assure they are taking the appropriate onsite actic.: to mitigate censequences of the incident.
Another aspect of our role is advisory:
We support both the licensee and the onsite NRC response ter.m with technical analyses, advice ar.d logistical 4
support.
I We also support offsite authorities including ccnfirming licensee's recocerendations for protective actions to l
t offsite authorities.
i
. Agency advice will be made by the NRC's Chairman (or his designee) to a licensee manager or the appropriate state or local decisionmaker.
In addition, NRC is the single Federal focal point for keeping other Federal agencies and entities and the media infom'd on the status of the e
incioent.
l i
The effectiveness of the NRC in performing its role is dependent on the quality and timeliness of the event inform 6 tion the agency receives. The types of information the agency netos for emergency response are:
reactor systems conditions, containment building conditions, radio-activity release rates, and the plant's meteorological data.
Currently, the data is transmitted to the NRC from the licensee by standard voice telephone comunications.
Two primary phone links are used. One is dedicated for reactor data; the other is primarily for radiological and reteorological data. Our experience with voice-only emergency cormunications--starting with TMI and reinforced numerous times since then--is that it can be too slow and prone to error.
Information may be miscomunicated, frequently creating false issues which can divert attention from the real problems.
Even worse, incorrect data can cause NRC to respord to the licensee or offsite officials with inaccurate or i
cutdated advice.
NRC's thinking of how to enhance its incident response capability has evolved over several years, The NRC has considered various options i
i i
l ranging from extensive continuous transmission of a large quantity of parameters from all facilities, to the cur <ent system in which we rely on telephone cortconications.
The Commission has determined that an emergency response data system will provide the data. in an accurate, reliable, and timely manner. We have successfully cenducted tests of an ERDS concept with Duke Power Corrpany at the McGuire facility and with Comonwealth Edison at the I,aSalle and Zion facilities. Both tests confirTned the advantages of having direct electrcnic transmission of a selected set of parameters.
Based on these successful tests of the concept, the NRC initiated an ERDS Requirements Analysis. The analysis consisted of visits to the licensees to determine the design of the site data systems and the availability of the data reouested by the t;RC.
Based on the results of the surveys, the Comission believes an EROS concept can be implemented with relatively little difficulty at essen-tially all sites.
Ease of implementation will vary depending on type and utilization of licensee equipment.
Implerrentation at sece sites may require a delay until other equipment upgrades are completed.
In view of the large potential benefit to the NRC incident response tpability from the ERDS and the results of the survey indicating the relative ease of implementation the fRC currently plans to begin
.- implementation of the system en a voluntary basis. While we expect the majority of licensees will see the benefits of the system and will participate, there is no guarantee.
H.R.1570 would make implementation of a. system mandatory for all licensees.
H.R. 1570, would require complete implemsntation within 3 years of passage.
The current NRC implementation plan is phased over a longer period to accommodate current licensees' schedules for equipment upgrades.
Passage of H.R. 1570 would require some licensees to accelerate the r current schedules.
However, there is :le aspect of the bill against which we caution:
H.R. 1570 would require the Emergency Response Data System to be activated upon implementation and, thereafter, to transmit data to the NRC continuously except during system maintenance outages.
This goes well beyond the NRC's concept of a data system designed solely to enable the NRC to carry out its emergency response role. The NRC had envisioned a system activated by the plant operator upon recognizing an Alert, Site Area, or General Emergency condition. Our estimate is that implementation cots for a system that continually transmits data might be five times that of the system envisioned by the NRC and because of its complexity might take an additional year to install.
H.R. 1570 thus would require installation of an emergency response data system that is more complex than we contemplated and would be considerably more expensive to operate. When compared to the system recommended by the NRC, it would not appreciably increase the NRC's capability to perform its proper role in an emergency.
b Attached to this testimony is an analysis of the costs of various alternative approaches.
It is our understanding that the Interior'and Insular Affairs Committee adopted the continuous monitoring requirement because it believed that it w.,uld be useful to preserve certain pre-event data for NRC analysis. We believe this objective of transmitting to the NRC pertinent plant data, well in advance of the development of potentially serious plant conditions, could be achieved without continuously monitoring plant conditions.
To accommodate the Congressieral concern, we would recommend that the system be activated at the "unusual event" classification level.
This classification occurs approximately 200 times per year and is at a sufficiently low threshold that our experience shows that data transmission would begin, in all cases, well before any serious plant emergency cenditions develop.
In conclusion, we strongly support legislation which wnuld require expediticus implementation of an emergency response data or similar system.
This would greatly enhance our incident response capability.
Of the possible approaches, we prefer the modified approach described above because we believe continuous transmission of data is unnecessarily costly and more difficult to implement.
If legislation is enacted, we will work closely with States to help assure that the Emergency Response Data System supports them in attaining cur common ccamitment to protect the health and safety of the public.
L H.R. 3025--Appalachian Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Compact Consent Act-
^
H.R. 3025 is before Congress so that the States of Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware and West Virgitiia, may obtain Congressional consent as required by the Constitution to enter into an interstate compact regarding the disposal of low-level radioactive waste.
We have reviewed the Compact and the proposed consent language and support enactment of H.R. 3025. Mr. Chairman, that completes my testimony.
'S Sckground e
On Wednesday, July 1,1987, the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs reported H.R. 1570, the Emergency Response Data System (EROS) bill.
The bill was amended to require the EROS to be activated upon implementation and to function continuously except during maintenance.
The current NRC Emergency Response Data System (EROS) concept is a direct electronic data line from the electronic data systems of nuclear power facilities to the NRC Operations Center for use only during emergencies at the facilities.
The data to be transmitted would be a limited set of parameters most likely available on the existing data computers at the sites.
NRC would accept the data in a transmission format and at an update frequency convenient to the licensee and the licensee would control activation of the system.
The amendment to the bill would require the continuous transmission of data from all sites to the NRC Operations Center at all times with the capability of being monitored at the Operations Center.
The following analysis provides cost estimates for the data transmission options described above.
The ERDS implementation cost estimate reflects the' current budgetary proposals.
The implementation cost estimate for H.R. 1570 EROS is based on comparison estimates done in 1983 for the Commission and Congress.
As with any estimate of this type the larger and more costly the system the greater the margin for error-Cost Summary NRC EROS H.R. 1570 EROS Implementation
$5.7 Million
$25.0 Million 1 FTE 2-3 FTE Operation N/A
$3.0 Million/ Year N/A 7 FTE Maintenance
$570K/ Year
$2,500 K/ Year
Cost Estimate NRC EROS:
The estimate for implementation of the NRC EROS concept is $5.7 Million over a five year implementation period.
This includes NRC hardware, software, and contractor assistar.ce.
This does not include the effort by the licensees to modify their systems to output a data stread of the selected parameters to a modem for transmission to the NRC.
This also does not include NRC FTE which is budgeted at one for the duration of implementation.
H.R. 1570 EROS:
An estimate for implementation of the H.R.1570 EROS concept is $25.0 Million.
This includes NRC hard*.re, software, and contractor assistance.
This assumes continuous transmission from all the facilities with a processing, screening, storage, and display system for this data at the NRC Operations Center.
This does not include the effort by the licensees to modify their systems to provide a continuous data stream.
This does not include the NRC FTE required to monitor implementation which would probably be increased by one or two.
Operation:
NRC EROS:
Normal operating costs of the NRC EROS are expected to be minimal.
Data transmis-sion costs are anticipated to be able to be incorporated in the current NRC communications requirements.
No additional continuous staffing of the NRC Operations Center would be anticipated to be required.
EROS activations would be expected to average ten or less per year (the number of declared Alerts at the facilities).
H.R. 1570 EROS:
Normal operating costs of the H.R. 1570 EROS would require significantly more communications capability.
Data transmission costs for approximately 100 dedicated lines operating continuously would be about $3.0 Million per year.
Due to the continuous transmission of data in this system the on shift staffing of the Operations Center should be increased by one which requires an increase in FTE of seven.
Maintenance:
NRC EROS:
System annual maintenance costs are estimated to be approximately 10% of implementation costs.
For the NRC EROS concept this is $570K/ year.
H.R. 1570 EROS:
$2,500K/ year.
'i tra$&l E
/
UNITED STATES 4
O l'
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION L5
(
,I WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 g[
k +.... #
Jd October 2, 1987 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chainnan Zech Comissioner Roberts Comissioner Bernthal Comissioner Carr Comissioner Rogers FROM:
John Bradburne, Direc r Congressional Affair GA
SUBJECT:
SHARP SUBCOMMITTEE.EET$ONEMERGENCYDATASYSTEM, SAFEGUARDS AND APPA AC IAN COMPACT BILLS On Thursday, October 1, the Subcomittee, n Energy and Power held hearings on H.R. 1570, which establishes an emergency response data system for nuclear reactors; H.R. 2683, the NRC's legislat'ive proposils for improving safeguards and reporting defects; and H.R. 3025, the "Appalachian ftates Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact Consent Act." The Subcomittee later marked up and reported the NRC's legislative proposals and the Appalachian compact without amendment.
The emergency response data system bill will be marked up next week.
The hearing was chaired by Rep. Philip Sharp (D-IN).
Rep. Jerry Huckaby (D-LA) testified on behalf of his original data system concept, one that would be turned on only during emergencies at nuclear plants, rather than the continuous monitoring system reported by the Interior Comittee. The Comission also favored the original system, but offered to require the system to be turned on during an "unusual event." The Comission urged approval of its legislative proposals and endorsed the Appalachian Compact.
Dr. Terry Lash, Director of the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety, said that the Department has been continuously monitoring cperations at comercial nuclear plants in Illinois for the past 2i years. He endorsed continucus tronitoring and felt that other states should be able to develop their own systems as long as those systems are compatible with the system required by the NRC.
Mr. Ron Harris, representing Cuke Power company and ANEC, opposed H.R.1570 because it appeared to move towards centralized control of reactor operations by the NRC. He added that continuous monitoring would weaken the operators' authority and responsibility and could shift nuclear power regulation from the NRC to the states.
He suggested that as an alternative, utilities could store plant operating data for a few days, then "dump" the data to the data system in the event of an accident requiring monitoring.
Copies of written statements are available at CA.
CONTACT: Frederick Combs x-41443 estustpee s g h
i,
J cc:
EDO SECY OGC GPA/ H. Denton C. Kamerer, SLITP J. Fouchard, PA J. Shea, IP AE00 NMSS
,