ML20147F982
| ML20147F982 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 02/24/1978 |
| From: | Garrett S AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7812260061 | |
| Download: ML20147F982 (231) | |
Text
,
A zQ lQ
- 1 r. t. . : Sc;M4 SP WEW * '2*86 L ) m
.NRC PUBL C DOCUMENT "41TED STATES OF AMERICA To Mtb %4A ROOM 4 ce T1tc r
y,g , N R.c, ow h quirh % *r MTroM UCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION k. .p g u -Fr=(
- R e l re.W wavug,4 b A&M o w wkW. vt *s r eN BEFORE THE DIRECTOR OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REr,ULATI C8 pt %
In the Matter of ) g PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC ) Docket No. 50-344 g ag'l7 CO., et al.
(Trojan Nuclear Plant)
) - y
) NOV 131978 8' h[
REOUEST PURSUANT TO 10 CFR 2.206 TO INSTITUTE PROCEEDINr, TO REi d ..*I o*
- W 5-
)
~'
C 'ERATING LICENSE AND FOR INTERIM RELIEF #
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS N e-
.P00R QUAUTY PAGES inas vuwac it constitutes a reduest oursuant to 10 CFR Secs. 2.200 through 2.206 that the Director effect the following:
(a) Institute a proceeding to suspend those provisions of the Troian 2=' Operating License (No. NPF-1) which permit refueling and consecuent off-loading okspent fuel from the reactor core into an on-site scent fuel storage pool or any other facility until such time as the issues raised in this recuest have been resolved; these orovisions include but may not be limited to License Sec. 2(S) (2), License Technical Soecification Sees.
(Apcendix A) 3/4.9 and 5.6, and Trojan Final Safety Analysis Reoort Sections 9.1.2,9.1.3.2.2.1, and 9.1.4.2.3 incorocrated into the Licenso bv re/erence in License Sec. 2(B) (2).
(b) Gr*.nt necessary interim relief, in carticular immediate suscension of license provisions specified in (a) suora, oendino resolution of the issues raised as the basis for this reauest. Interim relief is recuired be-cause refueling for Trojan is scheduled for about March 17. Peloadinc would render the recuested proceedings ineffective. Because of the time cressures invc1ved. petitioner recuests preliminary telochere notice with resoect to I
781226006\ .
~ _ ..
v _i______._________________________________
the interim relief. It is reouested that the Office of the Director telephone the petitioner, Susan M. Garrett, with notice of the Director's decision regarding interim relief on Friday, March 10, at (503) 774-4166 There are five separate bases for this reouest: (1) The storace of spent fuel for more than approximately four months was not contemolated at the time of the plant.'s initial licensino, and hence violates the implied terms of the license. (2) No Environmental Imoact Statement has been prepared which evaluates the environmental imoacts of spent fuel storage onsite for more than approximately four months and such storace would violate NEPA. (3) If the NRC permits storace of spent fuel for more than approximately four months, it will have oranted a de facto license modification, and provisions of 10 CFR Part 100, Accendix A, not in force during the initial licensing of the plant, must be considered before such a modification is granted. (4) Geolooical information has been generated since the Trojan construction oermit was issued which indi-cates that potentially ha:ardous conditions exist which creclude reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the oublic will not be endancered if spent fuel is unloaded into the spent fuel cool. (5) r,eolooical issues not resolved during the initial construction cennit and licensing proceedinos indicate that potentially hazardous conditions exist which oreclude reason-able assurance that the health and safety of the cublic will not be endancered if spent fuel is unloaded into the spent fuel cool.
I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION Operators of the Trojan Nuclear Plant, Portland General Electric 2-7 .- ,. . . - - - , - , , ,
- w. ,,,w- ,y.,--,v,,,,,.. ,...--y ,- , - - . , , - , , , -
,,,.,,,-.y- - . ,w--y-. . . , ,-y,- , , - - , - ,. . - --c,-*
1 Ccepany (PGE), have recuested an Operating License amendment from the !
NRC to permit expansion of the olant's capacity to store scent fuel. The i plant was originally designed and licensed with a spent fuel ecol capacitv I of 4/3 core; 3/3 was intended to function as a full core reserve cacacity, l l
and 1/3 core was intended to reside for only accroximately four months each year after refueling. Trojan Environmental Report 3.6. j The modified pool, if approved, will have a considerably expanded capacity of 10/3 cores. Moreover, each 1/3 core, removed yearly, will be in continuous storage until removal from the cool at some unscecified and speculative time in the future. No time limit on scent fuel Dool storage, other than the life of the license (to expire 2011) currentiv exists or is planned. It is thus conceivable that up to 10 recions of spent fuel could be in continuous storage in the Troian scent fuel cool until 2011.
This petitioner is a carty to the above license modification oro-ceeding. Hearings en this matter are not excected to reconvene in Dortland until April 17 of this year. During the course of the croceedines to date, both this petitioner and intervenor David B. McCoy attemeted to raise oefore the Atomic Safety and Licensinc Scard information which irdicated that (a) inadecuacies existed in initial seismic studies done #cr the Troian site, and (b) new information has been develooed since Troian was etnstructed which indicates that potentially hazardous seismic conditions exist which could threaten oublic safety if spent fuel is cermitted to reside in "e spent fuel pool for the periods and in the cuantities which the modi #ication would permit. The Atomic Safety and Licensinc Board refused to hear this information, and referred us instead to the Director o# Nuclear :eactor Regulation (Docket No. 50-344, January 18, 1978, Tr. 2401).
t
']l II. JURISDICTION The NRC has stressed that it does not lose jurisdiction of oublic safety issues even after a facility is in operation, and that oublic safety issues are " paramount," the "first, last, and a 'oermanent consider-ation in any decision on the issuance of a license...." Consumers Power Co.
(Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-315, 3 NRCI 101 (2/27/76), see also the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,42USCf2013(d).
Moreover, tre utility bears the burden of proof in a show cause oro-ceeding, once the petitioner comes forward initially with sufficient evidence to cause a reasonable licensing board to incuire further. Consumers Pcwer, suDra.
The Director may grant interim relief while a 2.206 matter is under consideration. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-74-3, 7 AEC 7 (1/21/74); Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. (Indian Point, Unit.e,s1, 2, and 3), CLI-75-8, 2 NRCI 173 (Ers 8/4/75).
A show cause order is " required" where " substantial health and safety issues" are " raised," and the Director must consider "all necessary factors."
Consolidated Edison, suora.
Parties may not use 2.206 proceedings as a vehicle for reconsideration of issues previously decided. Consolidated Edison, suora. All the five bases underlying the instant reouest, however, involve either (a) issues not initially considered at all at the time the Trojan plant was first licensed, or (b) issues not initially considered in the context of oossible storage of up to 10/3 cores of spent fuel for uo to 33 years of cor:inuous storage; this significant change in context effectively makes any cuch issues
_4-g y v w w w
. ..C.Z
..eaon "new issues."
wi In the alternative, should the Director consider e five any of th bases " issues previously decided," this reouest meets th e criteria for reopening of a licensing p.oceeding as enunciated in the Ve nnont Yankee Case at 6 AEC 522, and this petitioner recuests that thi considered. s recuest be so 5 SignificEnt safety issues involving cenuinely e unresolv d e" factual issues are involved with ,all 5 evident as is basesfrom the discussion inf_ra,.
f III.
INTERIM RELIEF Interim relief is necessary to preserve the Director's ju i d rs ction over the issues raised in this request.
Such relief, includino a modifi-cation of license, may be granted when the Director or Comiss n finds that "the public health, safety, or interest soes." recuir In this case, substantial safety, health, and public interest questions no the regard spent fuel pool have been raised.' These cuestions will all be m oot once spent fuel is moved into the pool.
At that ooint the Comission, should it find that on-site scent fuel storage for more than f our months is unsafe or unwise, will be unable to provide any ,effective because relief there is simply nowhere else to store the fuel .
Thus the Director's con-sideration of the issues raised in this request will be ineffect it occJrs after the spent fuel has been moved into the cool .
Trojan's first refueling is currently scheduled for about Ma rch 17, 1078 and may occur even sooner.
Currently, the cool is emoty.
Since it it unlikely that the proceeding requested herein can be completed inter im relief is necessary. y that date, The petitioner believes that grantina of this mn
- n. - - - - . . . , - -
- _ - - - -- .. -. - - = - - - - _ . - --
relief, as well as being in the public interest, will not cause sianificant harm to the license-holder, Portland General Electric Comoany. The Troian operators have indicated in the license modification proceedino relatino to expansion of the spent fuel storage racks, that the actual time of reloading is subject to a certain amount of flexibility. Reloading could take place "in March, April or May," according to recent testimony under ,
oath by PGE representative John Frewing.
Moreover, even if Trojan were reouired to shut down for a period of several months, there is evidence that PGE would not be sianificantiv harmed financially. This year has been a good water year, and hydrocower j is and will be abundant this summer. Current 1v, in fact, excess water is being released at Bonneville because the sucoly of hydropower is exceedino the deraand. There is little doubt that the cheaper hydropower could fill whatever needs are created during a several month shutdown of the Tro.ian plant.
Finally, there is a strong chance of success on the merits. Portland General Electric Co., by seeking to store large amounts of scent fuel on site, indefinitely, is radically changing the function of the scent fuel pool without making either safety or environmental evaluations of the chance.
In so doing, it is in clear violation of both the Atomic Enercy Act and NEPA.
IV. STORAGE IN EXCESS OF FOUR MONTHS IS NOT WITHIN THE IMPLIEn OR EXPLICIT TERMS OF THE LICENSE.
At the time of the initial hearings on the issuance of the Troian i
ccnstructica permit, the possibility of routine extended storace bevond a
four month period was simo1y not anticipated nor considered. The scent fuel pool was specifically designed to accommodate only 1/3 core for approximately four months' time, after which the region was to be shicoed offsite to be reprocessed. The Trojan Environmental Reoort, orecared in conjunction with the initial licensing proceeding, specifically states the following at Section 3.6:
"The spent fuel will be cooled in the reactor plant storace cool for about four months prior to shipment to reduce radioactivity and heat generation in the spent fuel."
The Environmental Report was prepared and submitted by PGE oursuant to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix D. Page 2 of the Oceratino License specifically states that the Operating License must be in accordance with Accendix 0 of 10 CFR Part 50 (now Part 51).
Although PGE now implicitly claims that it has the right to fill the jih entire 4/3 core capacity of the pool with 4 years' worth of routinely of,ficaded spent fuel, this was not the intended use of the cool as oricinally designed and licensed. The additional 3/3 core cacacity in the cool was initially designed and intended to provide full core reserve capacity in the event that inspection of reactor internals necessitated offloadino of the full core. This was typical of industry planning at that time. See 40 FR 42801.
The Trojan Final Safety Analysis Report, also orecared in coniunction with the initial construction and licensing of the olant, specifically acknowledges the distinction between (1) the full core reserve capacity and (2) the 1/3 core capacity to be used as temocrary storage after each annual refueling; the FSAR states at Sec. 9.1.2.2:
"A total of 280 spent fuel assemblies can be accommodated in the SFP. This allows the concurrent storage of a full core of
=
irradiated fuel assemblies (193) and the normal cuantiev of spent fuel assemblies from the reactor durino a refuelino coeratien (65)."
7
- /
An implicit condition is, therefore, that each year's suoply of scent fuel will be removed, at the very least, before the next year's succly of spent fuel is unloaded. FSAR Section 9.1.2.2 is incorocrated by reference as one of the conditions of the Operating License in License Sec. 2(B) (2):
Moreover, PGE represented to Oregon state officials involved in the initial construction and licensing of the plant that storace would be limited to "not more than 3 to 6 months".I %
r ,
" ~
...the Commission... licenses... IPGE/....to...cossess and use...
reactor fuel...in accordance with the limitations for storace...as described in the Final Safety Analysis Reoort...."
Thus, as soon as Trojan offloads its first region of scent fuel on or about March 17 of this year, PGE will be in violation of the terms of its Operating License, since the spent fuel must stay in the cool for more than four months. There will simply be no olace else to out it until, in PGE's most optimistic estimate, the early 1980's, and even that estimate is highly speculative. This license violation is not merely " technical".
The assumption that no spent fuel will be stored in the cool loncer than four months is reflected in the design of the plant itself.
The sper,t fuel pool is subject to less exactino safety recuirements than the reactor vessel in the FSAR, in part because it was desicned to hold not more than one-third core for not longer than about four months.' :icure 3.2-27, for examole, indicates that for the SFP, all nomal service cicino, except for the Service Water System and a small cortion of the Desidual Heat Removal System (RHRS),is seismic catecory II. In contrast, as is shown in Figure 3.2-1, essentially all the cioing to the reactor vessel, including the CVCS, the RHRS, and the Safety Injection System is seismic Category I. The reactor vessel is shielded by a containment which is designed to be imoregnable to almost any kind of external force. See 8
- u;;, , ?
- ?
, , - - - . . - . - -- ., - - - . - . . - _ , -- .w- .-. - - -~
FSAR, Chaptet 3 and 15. The spent fuel pool, on the other hand, is exposed to the atmosphere,and the shed which orotects it from the en-vironment, though Seismic Category I, is little more than a structural steel frame covered by sheet metal siding. Under the assumption that no more than one-third core would be stored in the SFP for not lonaer than about four months, a risk-benefit analysis and an analysis of environmental impact might justify such relatively minimal protection for the scent fuel pool. However, as the mass of fuel in the SFP reaches and exceeds the mass within the containment itself, these risk-benefit analyses will almost certainly reach different results, either mandating extra protection for the spent fuel pool or requiring shutdown of Trojan altogether until off-site storage of waste is available.
IV. OFFLOADING OF SPENT FUEL WHICH MUST BE STORED IN EXCESS OF FOUR MONTHS WILL VIOLATE NEPA, SINCE NO EIS HA5 BEEN FREPARED WHICH CONSIDERS TWE IMPARTS OF SUCH EXTENDED STORAGE.
The original Trojan Environmental Report, as noted above, considered only storage of approximately four months duration. The NRC has recocnized, however, that expanded periods of storage demand scecial consideration under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). At 40 FR 42802, the Commission announced preparation of generic Environmental Imoact Statement (r,EIS) to consider, inter alia, "(o)rdering that generation of scent fuel...be stooeed or restricted" as an alternative to ensite store storace for extended ceriods of time. As of this date, the GEIS has not yet been issued, and its issuance is not expected until the fall of this year, Moreover, the ASLB which is hearing the cresent recuest by D4E for license modification to permit expanded storage cacacity will not even decide the issue of whether a full Y{ site-soecific (as ocoosed to cenerici 9
WWWw- m's 's w me ar rweer e e- g y-m r esywwy --,w aty-g 2,w.--wure,%-yw ww- r gw ,wgwe-aiy -e y vv- anii % g3.wwywymv,i=-,y% .- n, vemrig ugw-,yw w rv- re 4wmag, e,-a g ew m-e, g - gr wevwi-wm , w ww r,--ow y --e w g r* p-
EIS is required for the Trojan until after hearings are concluded. An ,
initial decision in the case is not expected until at least June of this year, long after Trojan will have refueled.
In summary, the NRC has not evaluated to date either (a) the environmental impacts of expanding Trojan's onsite storage capacity, or (b) the environmental impacts of extending the length of time which'any spent fuel must of necessity spend in the onsite pool. Both evaluations are required before Trojan may be permitted to offload scent fuel. Per-mitting indefinite storage of large amounts of highly toxic nuclear wastes onsite is clearly major federal action significantly affecting the human environment. See cenerally NRDC v. NRC, Sa7 F 2d 633 at 640 (0.C.C.A..lo7A1 Because Trojan's basic safety design reflects the four month storace
- assumption as discussed above, the environmental imoact of abandoning this H
=== assumption without modifying Trojan's design will almost certainly be sio-nificant. PGE has admitted that among the impacts associated with exoanded storage for extended periods of time is increased emission of clutonium to the atmosphere.2 Plutonium is, of course, at its most dancerous when breathed, accumulates in the human body and in the environment, and eniovs an extremely long half-life.
Moreover, this and other effects will not be limited to the vicinity of just the Trojan plant. The NRC olans similar spent fuel expansions at virtually every plant in the country. NRC regulations require that the overall cumulative impact of a "ccmplex" of cro.iects be considered when evaluating whether an EIS is required: 10 CFR 51.5(b), recuires that the NRC "shall be guided" by, inter alia, Council for Environmental Ouality Guideline 1500.6(a).
. _ . - . .- - - . . . ~ , . . _ . - . - - - ., .. - - - . _ _ ..- . --... ,.- - . - - - .-..-.-
V. PROVISIONS OF 10 CFR PART 100, APPENDIX A, ARE APPLICABLE BEFOCF '
0FFLOADING OF SPENT FUEL CAN BE PERMITTED.
The provisions of 10 CFR Part 100, Accendix A, which mandates seismic and geologic siting criteria for nuclear olants, were not oublished until December 5,1973, nearly 3 years after the Trojan construction permit was issued in early February of 1971. Consecuently, no seismic or oeolocic criteria were applied to the Trojan site. Even the ASLB which oranted the construction permit noted that the lack of these standards was "a maior handicap" in resolving the "ccmplex issue" of the seismic and geolecical safety of the Trojan site.
However, as was argued in Section III, suora, storace in excess of four months is not within the imolied or exolicit terms of the Ooeratinc in License; hence, permitting offloading of scent fuel on or about March 17, i will amount to a, de, facto, amendment of the Operating License. Moreover, a license modification permitting expanded caoacity, as well as time, c' spent fuel storage may be granted by the ASLB about June of this year. i l
10 CFR Sec. 50.91 recuires that ir. such circumstances the Cemission "...
will be guided by the considerations which govern the issuance of initial licenses or construction permits to the extent acolicable and accrooriate...."
l Since 10 CFR Part 100, Apoendix A, is now cromulgated, any prooosed license modification must meet these safety criteria. Of carticular relevance ;
to the spent fuel pool is Part VI of Accendix A: ,
...The design of the...olant shall also take into account the oossible effects of the Safe Shutdown Earthcuake on the facility foundations by ground disruption, such as fissuring, differential consolidation, cratering....and landsliding.. ..
l l
l l
l
Ground disruption has special imolications for the spent fuel cool, which must of course maintain the integrity of its concrete walls and steel liner to preclude loss of spent fuel coolant. The oublic safety implications of a ground disruption scenario would seem obvious, and yet neither the site nor the design of the Trojan spent fuel cool has been subject to in-depth evaluation of this possibility, despite substantial planned expansions of both amounts and residence times of stored spent fuel. In fact, the ASLB now hearing the Trojan license modification request explicitly refused to consider the issue, claiming that 10 CFR ;
Part 100 standards were inappropriate. The Trojan site, located in a l seismically active 3 region about which little is known oeologically,d may become a de facto waste storage facility for hundreds of tons of scent fuel, without benefit of detailed seismic or geologic study. Under these
.. circumstances, it would indeed seem "approoriate" that, at very minimum, 10 CFil Part 100 standards be applied to the site.
VI. IMPORTANT GEOLOGICAL ISSUES WERE NOT RESOLVEn DIIRINr, INITIAL CONSTDitrTInN AND LICENSING PROCEEDINGS.
A. INTRODUCTORY NOTE.
The issues detailed in this section are not " issues oreviousiv decided,"
and hence are apprcpriate for 2.206 consideration. Many seismic issues were raised prior to the construction permit hearings, but few of them were actually " decided" by the ASLB which eventually aranted the construction permit in January of 1971. That coinion, which soecifically noted that it was hamcered by the lack of seismic site evaluation criteria, based its crder on a very narrow and brief discussion of certain seismic issues, icnorinc
, _ _ _ _ _._.__._-_.-__u_-
many of those which had been raised prior to hearing and at the hearina itself. It thus did not " decide" many issues raised and soecifically noted that no criteria recuired that it do so. Consecuently, due to the AEC's lack of criteria at the time Trojan was initially sited, many issues were not adequately addressed by today's applicable standards, and many were left undecided, remaining as genuinely unresolved issues of fact involvino significant safety issues. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Coro. 6 AEC 522 at 523 (1973).
Moreover, none of the geologic and seismic issues raised durina the initial construction and licensing of the olant were raised in the context of a site usuage involving storage of hundreds of tons of high-level radio-active waste, conceivably for the duration of the coerating license. Such a change amounts to a significant functional change in site ugaae, and at no time has the Trojan site been evaluated geologically for its suitability l
for such a function. As noted above, original clannino and desian, as was j typical of tne times, contemplated storace of only one region at a time for about four months, to be followed by immediate shioment offsite. Uninteruoted storage of uo to 10 regions, by way of contrast, could amount to a ?;-fold increase in cumulative residence time of scent fuel by the time the license expires (11 region-years versus 235 region-years). This constitutes an enormous massing of spent fuel which was in no wav contemolated under either the express or imolied terms of the original license.
l 1
l l
l
f
- a. rJf
.n,L O"J 'A C m' .'iD t. * .C.5'..'
. . C S'l .". 4 :.t : ..M
'v 'I O CP.Ne*f . :n."**, a 4 r8N.-:::..~ ' .5 A rMa A N". .-
M . 'L t#*r P
.. L"*t r a.e ') .C*1. sn 'l O..R.
I
- 1. cr4v=r-s .a. 1.:c. e. :Te..i:1.e ac..:.
. . .n.u.. r oy e.,env. ;r:. tr,: .
This study, c nducted by PSE's censu1* ant 5echtel, discussed severa' Ocssible sites, noting generally:
" Prior :: purchase of any site, a detailed ;eclocic survey sh0u'd be carried cut : establish the absence of indicati*ns # active faultfr:
in the irrediate vicinity." Fage !!!-20; e :hasis added.
Wi-h regard t the Trejan site s:ecifically, the reecrt cbse-ved:
"Since the Trojan site is founded on bedre:k, there s'ould be -.c i licensing ::r:blem unless #aults are dis :ve-ed...." Dace II:-35; emenasis added. ,
5echtel's subsecuent casual a: rcach :: fault dis::ve-v arc investi:stien '
. will be detailed infra. l
. ' ' . . OC. C:::.
.. . , 10. 'e .- :r.'.
.. T. :1 u"u' 'n' t . . " :Y A.' '."m"i v N C :. 7'". N. ". A~, n i ~ N , '-". m. VC7_ :.
1 . ~3J int '.N 'c.F : r c.'. . M.n.::.:a*v , " _'^: ~ 21 ^ , -a.v '. s a .
t.N D .: . ' .t.w.1 C. . C.^.N"'u"a v* N t - . .
sanuary, 1ree. ,
a Tnis study reaches the fellcwing c:nclusica.: ;
"The area is seismically active and the re:Ords indi:ste an eart"cuake vi:n a maxir..: ;;re:anie intens1:y Of VI!! *:.:s te considered. e evaluati:n cf f:undatien conditions and seisni: -ist: v c# t"e area ,
0 . 'i . ". s- h *'.J ^ * ' a- ..="a.*.'.=*.*.
.w,.
4.s.e....es un .. . ... .
3 sk.r#.=*.*. . = *
- al a r.= *. i ^. P. -
.w.. - .
- . '.9 e .~w a"
- l a. a r a. l .= - *. .= ". . d **=.*. . .* val".a.
- *: " s".. ' ="a
- . a r d. a.s # -*w . . . ... . ...
a::elerati:n is rec:crended f:r safe snutd:wn. . . .!y .
, N o *,s
. eal e , d. .-. . . . d." '. *. d. a n s " .= v a_ ". a. n. a. #.~'"~
. c. . i a. v . " l .* . . a. . '. ". .. *. ._. ***-...- ,
structicn of a .uclear ::wer iant a: :.e :rt:csed site...." ",0; !
g_ wss4.s
... .,wae4 se .
Tne study at;:arently based inis cenclusten Oriearily en :nly de data seur:es:
(1) a general study of the seismic hist:ry :# the area a-d, (2) crflline c' i
- These initial sur# ace a :eleration *iguresa=ere ir fa:t th:se tra were #i ally
,s. .. .gs e.. P . .m. u , ~i . .< ., n . e e. g . a.
. r. . .. , u.n a. s ., n. ~a t.a., .~ eno..a..e :.
... ..u..,
w.., ?~:: ._ .a. -
SSE). Trojan .:5AR Sec. 3.7.1.1.
.l a. I t
. - . . - - - - , .-y -w y , - . - . .
- y. . . - . - . - , --..~y ..- -..w- , . , , , , . - . -
only 4 holes at the site. Although some " geologic investications" and geophysical surveys" are vaguely mentioned, the recort does not indicate what, if any, work was involved beyond a visual surface examination of the site. Indeed, the context in which these " investigations" and" surveys" ,
are introduced on page 1 suggests that they were done crimarily as enaineerino foundation studies, and not specifically to check for faulting that could constitute seismic hazard.
A " boomer" survey conducted in May of 1967 was referenced in the study.
The boomer survey was conducted by the engineering firm of EG&G for the sole purpose of mapping the contours of the bottom of the Columbia River adiacent to the site, and was not intended to probe beneath the bedrock in any way.6 It was thus useless for determining whether any faulting existed beneath l the Columbia River adjacent to the olant, although accarently the survey ,
=. revealed extremely irregular and precipitous terrain under the river in the area surveyed (page 4). l l
The report also notes, in discussing the seismic history of the recien, that two earthquakes of intensity VIII occurred in 19a0 and 1065, at only 70 and 95 miles northeast of the site, respectively. These earthauakes caused "th7eavy damage, deaths, and injuries." Study at 8.
l
- 3. APRIL 30, 1970: " SUPPLEMENTAL GEOLOGIC STUDY," Source uncertain, oossibly Amendment 6 to Trojan PSAR. .
1 This study, probably done by Bechtel consultants, details additional l effort made in early 1970 "to locate and further evaluate all faults sieni-l ficant to the Trojan site." Study, at 20-1. In summary, the technicues used by the investigators were limited to the following: (1) a literature survey', (2) cerial reconnaissance and study of aerial photograohs, (3) visual
1 surface examination of possible or confirmed fault areas ("ceolceic macoinc and field reconnaissance"), (4) conversations with two geologists whose writings in the literature had indicated possible faults, and (5) a two-line survey of the contour of the bedrock across the valley adjacent to, and west of, the Trojan ridge.
l Investigation was a::parently confined entirely to surface features, with the exception of the two-line survey of bedrock west of the Ridee.
At no time did the study involve subsurface probing technicues, such as trenching or drilling of suspect or confirmed fault creas. Since surface l l
terrain was often obscurred by vegetation or debris (study at 2n 4,5), this omission was particularly significant.
Not surprisingly, the study uncovered no new indications or extensions of faults or fault :enes. The areas checked were the alluvial-filled valle.v g.f; directly west of the Trojan Ridge, the banks of the Columbia D.iver (discussed 1
infra), and the area to the east of the recogni:ed Clatskanie Fault, which is thought to terminate about six miles west of Rainier. The survey of the I alluvial valley, as noted above, was cenfined to a surface sounding of the profile of the bedrock beneath the alluvium; the survey was accarently con-fined to only two lines, and no technicue was emoleyed to oenetrate beneath the surface of the bedrock. Investigation of the Clatskanie Fault recien
. was seriously hampered by thick vegetation, and was accarently limited to a visual reconnaissance of road cuts that hapoened to exist in the area.
Of two existine faults cited in the literature, the investicators were entirely unable even to locate one (the "Kelso Fault," discussed at co. 20-2,31 Despite a small amcunt of superficial trenching they were unable to trace or l 1
determine the extent of displacement of the other (the "Kelso Ocadcut for
InterchangeJ Fault," 4.7 miles from the site, discussed at op. 20 0 throuch 12); nevertheless, they determined that the fault was "not significant to the Trojan site."
A particularly striking example of this superficial aoproach was the investipation of the possibility of faulting beneath the Columbia River.
! The investigators made what they described as a " concentrated effort" to find any evidence of a fault in the river, "by a literature study, study of aerial photographs, and by mapoing rock outcrops and attitudes on both sides of the river up and downstream from the Trojan site." Study at 20-6, 7.
The actual riverbed was not probed in any way. Not surprisinalv, the study l concluded that " N he available geologic evidence" did not indicate the existence of any such fault. Study at 2D-1. Certainly, the investicators l did very little to add to the "available geologic evidence."
.a
- 4. MAY 21, 1970: M.J. ADAIR, BECHTEL CORP., " GEOLOGY, SEISMOLOGY, AND FOUNDATION CONDITIONS " report presented before the Oregon Nuclear Plant
. Siting 'ask Force for PGE.
This report presents a "brief summary" of the investigations and conclusions by Bechtel regarding the geology, seismology, and foundation conditions of the site.
The report is somewhat misleading in that engineerinc foundation studies involved drilling and excavation at the site which were not soecifically j undertaken or evaluated to determine seismicity; the report, however, tends to lump the foundation studies and the seismic studies tecether, oroducina the somewhat misleading impression that more specifically seismic work was done than was actually the case. Althouch Adair cites drilling of 56 holes at the site, the text is unclear as to how many wera drilled to soecifically check for seismicity; a careful reading indicates that as few as a, and as
. . ~ - . - - - . _ . - - _ . , . . . _ - , - - . . . _ _ - . . . . . - . , , _ , _ . . - _ , . , . . . _ . _ , _ - , _ . ~ . . . _ _ , . . - . . - - . . - . , . .
m many as 16, may have been drilled specifically for this purpose. The con- ,
fusion is further compounded since the number of holes Adair claims were drilled, for whatever purposes, totals 60, and not 56 as the text claims.
The remainder of Adair's report merely summarizes the results detailed in the April 30, 1970 study, discussed suora. He concludes with a careful qualification: "...there is no known reason, on the basis of geologic or seismologic conditions, why a nuclear plant should not be located at the Trojan site" (emphasis added).
- 5. GENERAL CRITICISMS.
The bottom-line criticism with regard to Bechtel's initial testina is that, with the exception cf the drilling of a to 16 holes, none of Sechtel's seismicity investigations involved more than mere surface exam-ination of the terrain or the bedrock. Furthermore, most of the investicatien ,
that was done was confined to a very limited area around the site.
By way of contrast, note some of the presently aoplicable seismic 4
siting criteria of 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A: i "IV. (a)... investigations shall include the following:
(1) Determination of the... structural geologic conditions of the 3
site and the region surrounding the site, includinc its ceolecic nistory; I
l (2) Identification and evaluation of tectonic structures under-
! lying the site and the region surrounding the site, whether buried -
or, exoressed aji the surface.. . .
, (3) Evaluation of physical evidence concernino the behavice durinc i prior earthcuakes of the surficial geologic materials and the substrata l underlying the site.. .. !
- (a) Determination of...orocerties needed to determine the behavior '
of the underlying material during earthcuakes and the characteristics of the cuake-induced motions to the foundations of the olant, such as seismic wave velocities, density, water content, corosity, and ,
strength, 18-P I
,,,,,,,w,nw,n,-,wav,,,,n,,, - -,e w,m .. - w-pr.w w.x ,,,m ew,,+ m m m -,-,,,,e,,,vw,,,w-,e-w'*-=s~~-**c-www-
i l
l l
i
~ ~ ~
_ (5) Listing of all historically recorted earthauakes which have affected or which could reasonably be exoected to have affected the site....
(6) Correlation of epicenters...of historically reported '
earthquakes, where possible, with tectonic structures any part of which is located within 200 miles of the site.... i (7) For faults, any part of which is within 200 miles of the site and which may be of significance in estabTTshing the Safe Shutdown Earthquake, determination of whether these faults are ~ l to be considered as cacaole faults.... !
l CNOTE: A " capable fault" is one which has exhibited one or l more of characteristics enumerated at Accendix A, Sec.III(c): ;
"(1) Movement at or near the ground surface at least once l within the past 35,000 years or movement of a recurrina '
nature within the past 500,000 years.
(2) Macro-seismicity instrumentally determined with records of sufficient precision to demonstrate a direct relationshio ,
with the fault.
(3) A structural relationshio to a capable fault...."]
(8) For capable faults greater than 1000 feet long, any cart of l which is located within 5 miles of the site, determination of:
w=
(i) The length of the fault; (ii) The relationship of the fault to regional tectonic structures; (iii) The nature, amount, and geologic history of disolacements along the fault...
(iv) The outer limits of the fault established by macoino Quaternary fault traces for 10 miles alonc its trend in both directions frem the point of its nearest accroach to th e s i te . . . .
VI....The design of the nuclear power clant shall also take into account the possible effects of the Safe Shutdown Earthcuake on the facility foundations by ground disruotion, such as fissurino, differential consolidation, cratering, liouefaction, and landslidino...."
(emphasis added).
During the ASLB Corstruction hearino on the Trojan construction permit, held in St. Helens, Oregon in Ncvember,1970, PGE's seismic excerts admitted that their geologic maccing only encomcassed an area of one to 'wo miles around the site "on a few sides." Tr. at 3684-5. One of P9E's witnesses was asked what was done to locate cossible hidden faults at the site that l
i i
4 might not be b ediately visible on surface examination. The witness reso0nded:
...it would be difficult in the subsurface exolcratien like a drill hole to determine whether a rock was faulted or not because of the i types of rock and...the way they were laid cown....So we stuck to the i tried methods, searching the surface outcrees...'a'e did not do blanket drilling in search of some unfereseen feature...." '
Mr. Content, Tr. at 649-50.
Dr. Ocbrin, another witness for PGE, admitted that there are some six standard geophysical tests which geologists and seismologists nonna11y use to determine whether or not a fault exists in a given area. These tests are ,
(1) seismic reflection, (2) seismic refraction, (3) gravity orofiling, (a) aeremagnetic surveying, (5) the electrical rescect method, and (6) resisti- ;
vity sounding.6 (Tr. at 3724.) l PGE's witnesses explicitly admitted under cross-examination that five ,
of these six standard studies had not been done, descite reconnendations by '
ether geologists. (Tr. at 3725, 3728, 3730-1, 3745, 3762, 3770-2.) They e
further admitted that there had been absolutely no monitoring of the site '
i with a seismometer (Tr. at 3760), nor had they studied the ceolocy of recent t
sediments under the river (Tr. at 3735) or the geology of the bedreck (Tr. !
at 3736) under the river adjacent to the site, although there were several accepted ways in which this could have been dere. They also acmitted that ,
there had been no c re drilling beneath the river (Tr. at 3739 41). Further- l more, no trenching or drilling had been dene to stucy a linear gully fcund
- enly about 900 feet from the site area. (Tr. at 3752-3.)
PGE's emissions were even more notable in the c:ntext of testimony of I i
l Crs. Senson and Palmer, Portland ceologists f amiliar with local Orecen l
geology. Dr. Senson testified that in his coinien there was a " rchability" that faulting was present in the vicinity of the site, and that ceclecical
.= signs .in the area indicated " reasonable cessibiliW" of a naicr #ault beneath the Colur.bia P.iver which demacded investigatien. (Tr. at 3781, 37 7-Q.1 l
l
_. - _._. . _ , , - - - - . _ . . _ - - . _ _ . _ _ _ - _ . _ , - . _ . _ . _ _ _ . . _ ~ _ . _ _ . _ . . _ . _ _ _ _
Dr. Palmer introduced a detailed discussion of regional geologic data compiled over a three-year period, and concluded on the basis of this data that a probably " zone of weakness" exists in the area of the Columbia River in the vicinity of the Trojan site. (Tr. at 632-50.)
The importance of sub-strface investigation is emphasized by rescon-sible geologic authorities:
2 " Field studies have brought to licht cases where fault fractures do not penetrate from the bedrock to the overburden. Weathered rock and soil near the surface sometimes absorb the differential slio, a spectacular example of which comes from the 19f4 Alaskan Earth-
- cuake. Reverse faulting on the Patton Bay fault oroduced a scaro 2.5 m. high in the gravel covered bedrock at the level of the beach, but at the top of a sea cliff traversed by the fault, no comparable scarp could be observed. Thus, the weathered rocks, through a distance of about 20 m., absorbed over 2 m. of total disolacement."
Oregon geologists R.W. Couch and R.P. Lowell have succinctly emchasized this concern:8
~~
z.. . " Faults associated with earthouakes do not always intersect the surfacf and, hence, are not always visible."
The Bechtel geologists downplayed the results of even the small amount of sub-surface drilling that they did do. PGE's witness admitted noticino
...slickensides which are, in lay terms... striations on joint planes, which again is a textbook definition of a fault...." (Tr. at 5a7.) Nevertheless, even these indications were considered "of no significance." No basis was given for this determination.
Bechtel geologist Adair confirmed during cross-examination that the only work done to check the possibility of faulting under the Columbia River was (a) a visual examination of the beds on the ' sides of the river, and (b) a check of the literatur2. (Tr. at 529-30). Generally historical review of the literature is considered inferior to actual sub-surface field investigation as a predictor of future seismic activity. This is carticularly true for Oregon, which has a very brief seismic history extending only to i
the late 1800's, and where reporting has clearly been deoendent on the si:e r
- and distribution of the population.9 According to Ceuch and Lowell, "The seismic history of Oregon is too short to be used as an accurate credictor of earthquake size, number, and distribution."9 This difficulty with !
purely historical study is not confined to Oregon geology; in most of the world, historical records do not cover a sufficiently long period to allow valid extrapolations of future seismic activity, esoecially on a highly localized level where recorded history often scans 100 years or less.
Field generated actual geologie data, d utilizing trenching and boreholes to field-map, is generally considered more reliable than historic data.D It may be recalled that the PGE (Bechtel?) geolocists checked a fault 4.7 miles from the site which they called the "Kelso Roadcut" fault, and were unable, despite aerial examination and some superficial trenching which did not penetrate much below weathered rock, to trace its direction
~
1.::.~
or displacement. However, the Oregon State Geologist at that time, Raymond E. Corcoran, was present during the investigation, which was undertaken in part at his request. His impressions were somewhat different from those j of the PGE geologists: i "Most of the geologic concern regarding the Trojan site is involved with the areal distribution of cotential fault :enes that may occur in this part of the State. The most obvious such :ene is exposed in '
- a high roadcut on Interstate 5 a few miles south of Kelso, Washincton.
At the request of the State Geologist and members of the adviserv Comittee on Reactor Safety, Portland General Electric Company had some shallow ditches dug along the bench and hillside above the road-cut in order to expose the.. bedrock more clearly. Althouch these ditches were not dug deeply enouch to show as much of the unweathered 4
material as I had wanted, they did indicate that the mein fault at this locality has a stronc northwest direction. There is seme seismic and incirect ceolecle evicence tnat ne Scrtland Hiiis. wnien nave a nortnwest cirection, also carallel a maior fault rene. Inis 1s 'urtaer evicence tnat most of the ioneer faults in :nis cart o* Urecen ena Wasnincton nave a nortnwesteriv trenc as rotec in crevious mencranda;
_ _ . . . _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ , _ _ . _ _ _ - _ _ ~ . _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ , _ , .
I have recently received some high altitude aerial chotograohs from the U.S. Geological Survey covering the general recion surroundino the proposed Trojan site. Both R.G. Bowen, Decartment ceochysicist, and I examined these photographs and have noted a number of northwest-trending lineations. One of these lines cuts directly throuch the north edge of the Trojan site....
The geologic reports prepared for PGE by the Bechtel Corocration state that they were unable to see any evidence of faults or fault lines from the air.. ..
The major factor still to be determined, however, is the recency of movement along these fault olanes, if the lineations we see on the photos are surface expressions of faults...." (Emohasisadded.1 The testimony of Bechtel's geologist Adair was oddly inconsistent with recard to the Kelso Roadcut fault. Although he claimed at one coint that examiners were unable to trace its direction (Tr. at 522-3), the fault was "insionificant,"
he said, " principally because of its trend, or its direction" (Tr. at 527).
Regardless of the reasons for Mr. Adair's inconsistencies of memory, it was precisely this northwesterly trending which gave State Geologist Corcoran cause for concern.
C. GEOLOGIC AND SEISMIC STUDIES PRIOR TO CONSTRUCTION DERMIT ISSUANCE:
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION STUDIES.
- 1. JULY 8, 1970: REPORT OF THE U.S. COAST AND GEODETIC SimVEY (accended to the AEC's Trojan Safety Evaluation Recort of 10/19/70).
The U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey issued a reoort which was orinarily a literature review and an historical survey; no reference is made to any independent field examinations by survey personnel, although the work of PGE (Bechtel) geologists, discussed above, is reviewed in the recort. The predictive limitations inherent in purely historical seismic study have been discussed suora in Sec. V(B)(5).
The Survey noted:
"This proposed site is located in a region that has exoerienced moderate to strong eartheuakes at freauent intervals...lTJhis site is located within the Circum-Pacific Seismic Belt with great earthauakes having occurred both to the North...and to the South....
An earthquake of intensity IX...must be considered as havino the potential of occurring in the Puget Sound area and as near as Sn miles from the olant site. . . ."
Study at 85-6; emphasis added. It was observed that Portland has experienced approximately 20 earthquakes with intensities as high as VII within .iust l the short time encompassed by historical records, and the study concludes that seismic events of this level are to be presumed "in tb1 imediate vicinity of the site." Study at 86-7. The Survey recommends, accarentiv C66
- c on the basis of its study, OBE standards of 0.15 g and VI, and SSE standards W of 0.25 g and VIII, standards which were eventually adopted. Trojan FSAR Wf g,A l a Sec. 3.7.1.1.
.== % w}
The study also evaluated PGE's (Bechtel's) investigations of possible faulting in the area. It was noted that a ," postulated brtnch" of the Portland l
l Hills fault is shown on the 1969 Tectonic Map of North America (compiled bv King), trending up the Columbia River for 50 miles north of Portland, cassina very close to the Trojan site, and then up the Cowlitz Valley into Washincton.
This part of the Tectonic Map, according to testimony of Dr. Benson durina l the November 1970 construction oermit hearings in St. Helens, was creoared under the direction of P.D. Snavely of the U.S. Geological Survey, who was
" eminently qualified" in the geology of the Northwest. According to n.
r Benson, " Studies...suggest that the fault is a zone consistina of a number of en echelon (non-continuous, but trending in the same directier] faults rather than a single break....a regional fault zone...." (Tr. at 610).
o ,
l l-
Nevertheless, in a carefully qualified apology, the Survey chose to sidestep the issue: PGE's " detailed" photo and areal studies and helicooter reconnaissance had " failed to_
o detect any direct evidence to succort existence of fault along this lineament," said the survey. No additional studies that might not have " failed to detect" supporting evidence were suggested or recommended.
- 2. JULY 9,1970 (date of cover letter): U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY REVIEW OF TROJAN SITE GEOLOGY, prepared by H.H. Waldron and P.J. Carcenter (apoended to the AEC's Trojan Safety Evaluation Report of 10/9/70).
This review apparently was limited to three site inspections by USGS personnel and a review of the work of PGE's geologists. Again, as with the USC&GS report suora, there is no indication that any indeoendent field tests l
were conducted by the USGS. '
~
The conclusions are carefully and suggestively cualified. The study noted that no active faulting "in the imediate vicinity" of the site had been "cositively identified" by investigators. Report at 2; emchasis added.
A further caveat was added:
"However, tectonically and geologically this cart of Oregon and ad.icinino ;
Washington is very poorly known, principally due to the thick cover of !
soil and vegetation but also owing to the caucity of subsurface data and the lack of detailed geologic maccing. "
l Study at 2; emphasis added. Despite this "caucity of sub-surface data," l 1
the USGS recommended no additional field work to supplement the surface l
reconnaissance of PGE's geologists.
The report did briefly address the possibility of an extension of the Portland Hills fault in a section which was also cuoted in the USCAGS study:
"The closest known major fault is the Portland Hills fault, an ancient northwest-trendinc fault that borders the northeast flank of the Tualatin Mountain anticline. According to Schlicker & Deacon (1967, o.36), this fault can be traced for at least 50 miles, and it may extend for more than 150 miles in northwest Oregon and southwest Washincton.
The projected trace of this fault in northwest Gregon would accroach to within approximately 15-18 miles southwest of the site...."
Report at 2. The USGS dismisses this somewhat ominous hycothesis with a carefully qualified observation that PGE had failed to " detect any direct evidence" of faulting through photo, areal, and helicooter reconnaissance.
Repert at 2; emphasis added. Again, no further study was recommended, and no independent study was done by the USGS.
The SER confines itself almost entirely to evaluations of work done by PGE, the USGS, and the USC&GS, almost all of which, as we have noted above, involved either purely historical or literature studies or superficial reconnaissance of the terrain. The only independent work which the AEC claims to have done involved some discussions with PGE and its Bechtel consultents involving the two Kelso faults and the inferred Columbia River fault. The only PGE studies it cites are (a) a photo study to detect tocographic lineations, and (b) trenching allegedly done in areas of known or inferred faulting. The latter reference is somewhat confusina, since the only trenchino apparently referenced elsewhere is the superficial digoinc done at the Kelso Roadcut fault.
Not surprisingly, the AEC concludes on the basis of this somewhat skimpy data and " field observations" of its own geologists and consultants !
(USGS and USC&GS; report at 9,10) that no signs of fault activity, surface displacement, or evidence of inferred faulting were discovered. Study at 0,10 i
l VI. FAULTS DISCOVERED DURING FOUNDATION EXCAVATION.
I
Sometime during 1970, probably in late summer, four fractures or shear zones were observed during foundation excavation for two Catecory I structures, the fuel building and the containment. One of these fractures passed directly under the section of the fuel building foundation where the spent fuel pool is now located. Trojan FSAR Fig. 2.5-16, Attachment 81.
Examination of these fractures was cursory. Geologic witnesses for PGE admitted during the construction permit hearings of November 1970 in St. Helens that no studies were done to determine the length of these shear zones, and one witness further volunteered, "We don't care." (Tr. at 541, 3710). It was observed, however, that the fractures disolayed _ . th-westerly orientation. Nonetheless, on the basis of cursory examination, it was detemined by PGE that the fractures were "insionificant" (Tr. at 541),
and no further studies were initiated.
State Geologist Corcoran, however, visited the site to examine these
=
fractures on October 12, 1970. He was not content to merely let the matter drop:
"The State Geologist visited the site on the 12th of October in order to examine the area where the excavations for the reactor containment ,
building and auxiliary buildings have now been comoleted. As was noted on the large-scale Bechtel geologic mao orepared in August 1970, several shear zones having a northwesterly trend can be seen in the basalt flows that are exposed in the excavation walls. These shear zones show considerable secondary alteration and recementation but the amount of disolacement could not be determined. Also the lencth of the faults alona tne strike could not ce seen because most of tne ground is covered by gravel or crushed rock away from the excavated area.
The most critical factor to determine is the recency of movement along these shear zones at or near the surface... Striations showing direction ,
s of movement in the lavas along some of these shears is essentially l horizontal and would indicate that these may be cart of a series of i
( [. j richt lateral transform faults (Couen,1968)...It is sucgested that one i L or more of tnese snear zones be monitored with accrocriate seismic !
apparatus after all site preparation has been comoleted to determine I if any sort of continuing right lateral movement can be detected...." l Emphasis added. ]
_=
l l
1 l
l It should be noted that had 10 CFR Part 100, Aeoendix A, criteria been in effect at the time of the Trojan excavation, determination of the cacability ,
of these faults would have been required. Accendix A, Part IV(a)(7). '
l Determination of the recency of movement, as recommended by Corcoran, would -
have helped determine capability of the faults; Accendix A, Part III(c) defines a " capable fault," inter alia, as one which has displayed " movement at or near the ground surface at least once within the past 35,000 years."
It appears, however, that Corcoran's recommendations were never carried out, and that neither the length, nor displacement, nor recency of movement of those fractures is known to this day.
OCTOBER 7, 1974: THE AEC'S SUPPLEMENTARY SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT:
Despite this continuing ignorance, the AEC on October 7,197a issued a suoplementary Safety Evaluation Report which concluded, in a cleverly
=- qualified statement, that "no evidence was found" to indicate that these faults were capable "as defined bv" 10 CFR Part 100, Apoendix A. Part III (a).
That was quite true; no evidence was found, because it was never seriously scught. The SER cited an " examination" by a USGS reviewer on October 1,107n, who concluded that the shears were " minor" and " discontinuous" faults: no investigations beyond " examination" were cited, and one is left to wonder how it was concluded the faults were " discontinuous" if, as Corcoran noted during a site visit only days later, the length of the faults could not be determined.
The slipshod study of the fractures directly underlyino the contain-ment and fuel building foundations is particularly significant in view of the NRC's present mandate of 10 CFR Part 100, Accendix A Part VI, which new requires:
. _ _ - _ _ . _ _ - _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ . . . . . _ - . _ _ . _ ~ . _ . - . . . . _ - - . - _ ..._ _ -._. _
=-. . . . _.
"The design of the nuclear power plant shall also take into account the possible effects of the Safe Shutdown Earthouake on the facility foundations by ground disruption, such as fissuring, differential consolidation, cratering...."
Such disruption of the fuel building foundation due to underlying faultino could result, in a Norst case" scenario, in complete loss of scent fuel coolant; yet Trojan designers were not required to consider for this contin :
gency, since Part 100 was not in effect at the time.
State Geologist Corcoran's concerns focused cuite souarely during the Sumer of 1970 on the possibilities of surface disruption:
"Our primary concern in this area is the potential damace that could be caused by an earthquake at or near the site. It is a well known l
fact that the Portland-Olympia trough has had an active seismic 4 history over the past 100 years.... l
...The PGE engineers have assured me that there is sufficient structural safety built into the plant so the containment vessel could not he broken from horizontal earthquake vibrations...The only real concern therefore seems to be whether there is a oossibility of surface dis-ruotion beneath the olant itself or closely boreering it."
Emonasis )
a-- added. I The aerial photo study carried out by Mr. John Ivey and Dr. Howard Coombs shows that there are numerous linear features at the Troian site, some of which may be surface indications of fault zones. I have therefore reouested that a microseismic survey be made alono some of these lineations to determine whether there is any evidence of active movement...."
Again Mr. Corcoran's recomended studies, in this case a microseismic study, were never carried out.
VII. THE CORCORAN CONCERNS.
l Throughout the early history of Trojan licensing, eersistent concerns expressed by State Geologist Raymond E. Corcoran of the Orecen Decartment of Geology and Mineral Industries (00GAMI) figured orominentiv in deliberations by state officials over the suitability cf the Tro.ian site. A chronoloov of
those concerns follows:
March 3, 1970: Memorandum from Corcoran to nevernor McCall, states "much more field work" needed to :
answer "cuestions...as to the erobabilitv ,
of faultino...in or near Troian." r,eolocists *
"of the Federal Survey also share mv concern...
almost certain they too will recommend more detailed cecchysical surveys be made...
it is a well known fact that the West Coast of the U.S. is seismically ouite active and we might have a destructive temblor in north-west Oregon at any time...."
April 4,1970: 00GAMI Governing Board meetino. Exoressed I "some concern over the possibility of faults at or near the site."
May 21, 1970: Memo from Corcoran to 00GAMI Governing Board.
States USGS aerial chotos show "a number of northwest-trending lineations," one of which
" cuts directly throuch the north edce of the Trojan site."
Notes that the Kelso Roadcut fault has a "strono northwest direction." ,
Notes evidence that the Portland Hills, which 1 also have a northwest direction, also carallel a " major fault zone."
Recommends a study by an indeoendent aerial
- hoto interpreter.
Raises the oossibility that the entire Troian Ridge (or Trojan Island) is actually a "larce slide block which broke away frem the main mass to the west...Even thouch the island may be stabilized at the present time, there is always the oossibility that another earthcuake could trigger movement of the block if it is lying on softer sediments." Comolains that this possibility does not seem to have been
" seriously considered" by the Bechtel ceolocists.
July 10,1970: 00GAMI Governing Board Adenda maating acenda.
Corcoran recorrends,46EIsiTsmic s suNvev of site lineations bj-R.M. Couch. ' T1 draft letter to PGE ner "sunrari:ine the Departmerrv(9F General
'y sv3 .1on on the Troiar site."
/
. ' h ,
July 27, 1970: Letter.from Corcoran to PGE VP General Itschner. States that ma.ior concern is "cossibility of surface disruotion beneath the plant itself or closely borderino it."
Is "recuesting" a microseismic survey be made by Dr. Couch.
August 2.1, 1970: Internal DOGAMI memo from Ed Groh to corcoran.
Summarizes Groh's concerns recardino Troian site:
Inspection df the site revealed slickensides along fractures in the bedrock, Neither amount of displacement nor time of last move- '
ment could be determined.
Ravine 1/2 mile north of site "may recre-sent a fault zone or some other erodable '
weakness."
" Numerous northwest trending lineations" represented by vegetation and stream alian-ments may indicate a "probably fault" that may continue from the Portland Hills to the northwest to a line "about ten miles to the southwest of the Trofan site." Coniectures
=== that "this probable fault and other northwest trending lineations, some of which are most likely faults, may be the result of strike-slip movement along a ma.ior fault in the basement of the Pacific Northwest which is '
distributed through a system of subsidiarv faults..."
Speculates that a hicher acceleration should be considered for the Troian plant than the
" presently recommended" levels, and that an intensity of "around IX and accelerations in the neighborhood of 0.59" should not be ruled out.
OCTOBER 16, 1970: DOCUMENT ISSUED TITLED " STATEMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF GEOLOGY AND MINERAL INDUSTRIES REGARnING PROPOSED PGE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT AT TROJAN."
(Attachment #2)
This report accears to be a summarv statement of D0GAMI concerns, possibly creoared in anticipation of the NRC construction oermit hearings to be held in St. Helens in November 1070
The opinion is quite lengthy, itemizina er
~
a number of concerns which DOGAMI is apparently unwilling to consider resolved. I The opinion refuses to endorse the site, and concludes:
"THE BECHTEL REPORT DOES NOT, IN MY ESTI-MATION, PROVIDE ENOUGH NEW AE0 LOGIC DATA, PARTICULARLY IN REGARD TO FAULTED STRUCTilRES, TO MAKE ANY REASONABLY VALID DETERMINATIONS AS TO GEOLOGIC INTEGRITY OF THE SITE. THE ,
WHOLE MATTER OF THE NUCLEAR PLANT IS MUCH l TOO IMPORTANT TO BE TREATED LIGHTLY.. . 1 ALTHOUGH DETAILED GEOLOGIC MAPPING IN NORTHWEST OREGON IS DIF;ICULT AT BEST, ann SUBJECT TO DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS, THERF IS CERTAINLY A NEED FOR HIGH OHALITY INVFSTI-GATIONS OF THIS TYPE IF WE ARE TO OBTAIN THE KINDS OF INFORMATION NECESSARY TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THIS . . .l3ITFJ. . . . "
Somewhat inexolicably, the recort was acoarently withdrawn or never formally issued, and the followina was substituted in its place:
.=. October 16, 1970: Document issued, also titled " Statement of Department of Geology and Mineral Industries Regarding Proposed PGE Nuclear Dower Plant at Trojan." The document is unsigned, and reads in whole as follows:
"THE DEPARTMENT OF GEOLOGY HAS RECEIVEn THE GEOLOGICAL REPORTS DONE FOR PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC BY THE BECHTEL COMPANY AND CONSilLTANTS JOHN B. IVEY AND HOWARn A. COOMBS.
BECAUSE OF THE LIMITATIONS 0 THE RTA;; ann FACILITIES, THE DEPARTMENT 0 GEGLOGY IS :
NOT IN A POSITION TO SUBMIT AN OPINION 0F THE TROJAN SITE. WE WILL ACCEPT THE OPINIONS OF THE 11.5. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY."
(Emphasis added.)
NRC Construction permit hearings were held in St. Helens in November lo7n.
On Febru'ary 8,1971, the NRC issued a construction oermit to Portland Aeneral Electric, holding in its ASLS opinion of January 28, 1971:
"We find that the Trojan site has been adecuately investicated as to r geology and seismicity and that it is suitable for the crocosed desian."
l
Nothing more was apparently heard from Corcoran.
However, in April of 1972, a curious memorandum was issued by W.
Kelly Woods, coordinator of the State Nuclear and Thermal Energy Council (NTEC), which had state jurisdiction over the siting of nuclear plants in
- Oregon. The memo sunnarizes alleged results of a meeting between Corcoran, Woods, NTEC members Elfstrom and Luch, and NTEC staff members Pollock and Vermeere. Carefully qualifying his conclusions, Woods states that
"Bearino in mind the restrictions on the extent to which Mr. Corcoran was able eersonally to study the site, Mr. Corcoran believes that tne site is, in, all probability, geologically adecuate....
Mr. Corcoran regrets that microseismic measurements were not taken to characterize the site prior to excavation...he believes that such measurements should have been taken, and, along with data at other sites, would eventually form a meaningful cattern... Chairman E1'strom, Mr. Luch, and the staff all concluded...that the State Geolocist had :
no hidden reservations about the safety of the Trojan site and that '
there was no basis for considering a revaluation (sic 7 of the ceolocical considerations which led to the issuance of a construction oermit 16 m months ago." Emphasis added.
The memo is signed by Woods. Beneath Woods' signature Mr. Corcoran has written "Noted and concurred. R.E. Corteran, Apr. 27, 1072."
The memorandum smacks strongly of bureaucratic flank-covering, and Corcoran's subsequent activities or positions are unclear from documentation currently available to the public. However, about 6 weeks later, a letter j was received by Woods from state Senate Democratic Leader Ted Hallock, dated 1 June 8, 1972 (Attachment #3). Hallock, unlike Woods and the NTEC members, t
is apparently not privy to Corcoran's innermost thoughts, and is still un-certain of wt4. Corcoran's position is with regard to the Trojan site:
"...I would endorse the Council's from elicitina from Corcoran a flat clean bill of health for the site or an ecually clean cut expression of his reservations.
1 i
_...---__.-_...-__._..-...-____~.,_..-...,-_..---.-_...._,.._.__..,._.-.._._.____-,,.-.--..__.,I
I hate to use language like this, but someone is either lyino or simply not being forced into the whole truth...if the Council has to hiace Corcoran under oath, I think it should be done. It is my understanding in an informal conversation, that Corcorcan or one of his men flatly told a Columbia County emoloyee that they were very worried about the /Trojar17 site. Corcoran admits that we have had no state geological survey because we could not afford it....
Finally, if the Council wants them, I would be very pleased to forward a compendium of letters... speaking to assertions by PGE that...
they "had approval" from most state and federal agencies involved with Trojan. In essence, the letters refute using such lanouage...."
VIII. AUGUST,1972: THE GE0 PHYSICAL ADVISORY BOARD REPORT (THE "00nnS STunY").
On May 2,1972, intervenors against the construction of the Trojan plant before the NRC signed a " Memorandum of Agreement" with PGE. In exchance for a promise to never again challenge the construction or coeration of the Trojan plant, the intervenors in turn received certain concessions from DGE.
One of these concessions was that a " Geophysical Advisory Board" of three persons chosen by the parties and paid by PGE would preoare certain seismic studies notably absent from the initial PGE/Bechtel evaluation of the site.
The Board was to arrange for (1) a seismic refraction test, (2) a resistivity sounding, (3) an aeromagnetic survey, and (d) a gravity orofilino.
Unfortunately, the Memorandum of Agreement was orecared primarily bv representatives of the intervenors who were not professionally trained in geology, and the requirements the study was to meet were somewhat loosely drawn. Although the report of the Geophysical Advisory Board was meant to resolve many of the issues that had initially caused many Portland area geologists concern, in point of fact the study was very limited in scoce and effect, and responded to those issues oniv within the very narrow scoce of its incuiry.
- 1. THE SEISMIC REFRACTION TEST.
This particular test, intended to probe beneath the bedrock under the Columbia River for evidence of faulting, in fact involved only one linear profile across the river itself. Moreover, although the 1968 EG&G " boomer" survey (which had mapped the topograohy of the river botton adjacent to the site) had indicated a fairly irregular terrain, for some reason the line which the Board chose to sound stretched across a fairly even, unremarkable section of the riverbed. Furthermore, although such studies can penetrate to thousands of feet below the bedrock, this carti-cular study penetrated only to a deoth of about 500 feet.
It may be recalled that geologists expressing concern about the oossi- ,
bility of faulting beneath the Columbia noted that faulting need not be '
continuous, and that en echelon faulting was common of the region. A sinole *
== linear shot across a fairly even stretch of riverbed would not necessarily turn up any particularly suggestive evidence, and not surorisingly, the coard did not find any. It is instructive to note the carefully oualified conclu-sion of the study:
"Within the limits of the... method no evidence of a maior shear zor.e" I was ciscoverec, accoFding to tne Board. (Emohasis added.)
Translated, this means that no evidence was discovered at that particular line across the river; the study neither oroved nor discreved the existence of a fault zone beneath the Columbia.
- 2. THE RESISTIVITY SOUNDING.
Only two points were sounded, one west of the Tro.1an Ridee, and one west of a similar rock mound on the cocesite side of the river. Acain, no new information was developed.
i f
i 2
- 3. THE AER0 MAGNETIC SURVEY.
Again, the area covered by this particular survey was extremely limited, and covered a cuandrangle 5 1/2 miles to the north of the site, 1 1/2 miles to the west, 21/2 miles to the east, and one mile to the south. The results within this narrow range did not indicate changes .
l "such as might accompany a major fault coincident with the river bottom" j (emphasis added).
- 4. THE GRAVITY PROFILING.
The Board concluded from this test that the Trojan Ridge was a "ricid and competent body." At no time, however, did the Board address the oossi-bility, expressed by Corcoran and other local geolocists, that the entire Trojan Ridge might be a large landslide block that had slid from the higher terrain to the west of the Ridge and stabilized at a lower level nearer the River. Corcoran expresses this concern at length in his May 21, 1970 memo to the DOGAMI Governing Board:
"The question has been raised as to whether the basaltic " bedrock" that comprises the Trojan sito may not be a 1arce slide block which broke away from the sain mass to the west at a time when the river was considerably lower than its present level. This cossibility does not seem to have been seriously consider,ed by the Bechtel geologists because they do not mention it anywhere in their recorts.
It is a well known fact that landsliding is common along the Columbia Rivir and in some places fairly large-sized blocks have been involved.
Even though the island may be stabilized at the cresent time, there is always the possibility that another earthquake could trigger move-ment of the block if it is lying on softer sediments."
Large landslides or landslide blocks are not an uncommon feature of Columbia River topography. The well-known Rooster Rock, located slichtiv upstream from Portland, is a large land-slide block that has stabilized at a level much lower than its original locus. The northern end of the menneville Dam is located on a landslide. Furthermore, the extremely wide and unusual l
l s
U-s,haped gap between the Trojan Ridge and the higher hills to the west of the Ridge suggests that something may once have filled that gao. l
- 5. 'THE KELSO ROADCUT FAULT. l The Board incidentally investigated a fault they referred to as the l "Longview Interchange" fault, and observed "no major fault zones" cutting rock younger than 12 to 14 million years old.
The Board's choice of this fault as a target for investigation is somewhat puzzling. It was a fairly insignificant east-west trending l
fracture. The Board may have mistaken it for the "Kelso Roadcut" fault which had been the subject of earlier unresolved inquiry, and which trends i northwest, with an offset of approximately 100 feet.13 In any event, the so-called "Longview Interchange" fault does not seem to acoear anywhere else in the documentation available to the public, or to have been the sub.iect of sh:
any controversy.
- 6. THE BOAP.D'S CONCLUSIONS.
The Board had a fairly tight deadline for comoletion of the study. The
" Memorandum of Agreement" was signed in May of 1072, and the study was to be completed by August, a period of only about four months. By this time, basic foundation excavations at the site had been completed, all foundations for the plant and the cooling tower had been poured, the frames of buildings were in place, and approximately $20 million had already been scent on the Trojan construction.l4 It is within this context that the Geochysical Advisory Board's conclusion to its study must be evaluated.
The Board concluded that "with the submission of this recort, cecchvsical tools have been applied to the development of the geolocic settings for the Trojan Nuclear Plant g the most cractical extent and no further work is
warranted" (emphasis added). Three points should be noted with reference to
=
the underifned qualifiers:
(1) " Geophysical tools" are not the only tools which may be used to evaluate site or regional seismicity. Many other types of investications could have been done. Moreover, similar geoohysical investigations of more extended scope could also have been undertaken. Moreover, cecchysical techniques are subject to notable limitations of interpretation:15 "It is quite a widespread illusion, oerhaos because of the sensitivity of the apparatus emoloyed and the accuracy of certain calculations, that geophysis can provide us with accurate information that would enable us to solve the problems of deep structures, or, in a wort, enable us to see right through the rocks. However, we cannot disauise ;
the fact that the data furnished by geophysics, assumino that all instrumental and operational corrections have been nrocerly made, depend only rather indirectly upon the structure being investicated and that these data introduce many other factors. Interoreting a geophysical survey involves visualizing a geoloaic structure consis-tent with measurements made at the surface, but in some cases more than one interpretatien may fit the data. Geophysics enables us to test a particular hypothesis and show whether or not it is comoatible with
= the measurements. It can oniv very rarelv establish that a civen hypothesis is the only one." (Emphasis added.)
(2) Exactly what the Board meant by the qualifier "to the most oractical extent" is unclear. Did it mean this acolks to the time constr4ints under which the Scard was forced to work? Did it refer to any monetary constraints?.
Did it relate to the extent to which clant construction was alreadv comoleted? l Would it have been more " practical" to do more extensive studies before any excavation or construction work at all had been initiated? Or if there had l 1
been no time constraints?
l (3) Why was no further work " warranted"? By what criteria--was further 1 work not warranted, perhaps, because the Memorandum of Agreement was not drawn tightly enough to demand more?
Answers to these and other questions are recuired before the real m implication of the Board's study can be apprecicted.
~ - .-.. -. - - - - + .. _- -. - - - - -- ..- ..
Moreover, the overriding limitation of the Board's study was its g
geographically limited scope: it was confined very severely to an examin-ation of just the immediate locus of the plant site. No attemot was made to. study features of a recional character.
- 7. THE NEWTON CRITICISMS.
A review of the Board's study by V.C. Newton, a member of the nO4aMI staff, December 6,1972, adds the following criticisms:
L (1) Some faults of " moderate displacement had been accarentiv observed ,
by the investigators but were not shown on the maos oreoared #cr the studv.
(2) The study contained no discussion of what investications were conducted to uncover evidence of faulting.
(3) " Deep depressions" to the north and south of the olant in the bedrock of the Columbia River channel, and in the abandoned river channel to the south of the plant, were not considered or exclained. Newton indicated that the possibility that a " fault offset" might have caused blockace o# the abandoned channel was not considered.
(4) The study offered no interpretation of the "deeo linear trench along the north border of the Trojan Ridge."
1 (5) The scaro of Drays Mound (a rocky ridge on the Washincton side o# l the River) could be interpreted as evidence of a fault, and not as an erosional j I
manifestation.
(6) The crest of an " anticlinal structure trendinc throuch the Troian )
1 Ridge" and the Columbia Valley "must be dcwn-faulted."
IX. NEWLY DEVELOPING REGIONAL EVIDENCE OF :aULT 70NES.
. -- - _ . - . - . -. . - - - - - a -- - .- .- -,. .. ,. . . . - .
The most notable omission of the early studies of the Trojan site was the absence of any genuine regional focus. Cursory visual surface studies were made of areas within several miles of the plant site, but aenerally investigation.was confined to a very site-specific focus.
Since the early 1970's geologists have developed a new aooreciation for the importance of large-scale geologic features due to the emerging importance of the plate tectonic theory. Two Portland geologists, J.E.
16 Allen and J.D. Beaulieu, discuss this shift of persoective in a 1976 article:
"During the past decade the plate tectonics theory has revolutionized geologic thinking... Basically, it proposes that the Earth's crust and upoer mantle...are made up of several large, more or less indeoendent, ,
plates. Movements of the plates relative to each other and the result- !
ing interactions at their edges largely control the world distribution of earthquakes, volcanic activity, and mountain buildino....
The theory of plate tectonics provides the geologist with a variety of l conceptual tools with which to reinteroret the ceoloav of selected recions....
Using LANDSAT imagery with individual frames coverina as much as 25,000 square kilometers, one can usually see many major maoced faults and structures, but one can also see more obscure linear features which have not been previously mapped or fully aooreciated. Study of these lineaments in the Northwest has orovided vet another tool for our understandino of the ceoloov of Orecon. Preliminary broad exclanations (mega-nypotheses) for these large-scale features should be recarded as tentative until verified or rejected on the basis of further work.
On the cast record, however, one can iudce that a sienificant oercentace of the mecahyootheses now beino orocosed will be acceoted as valid....
~
Lineaments are apparent alignments of features on the ground as re %
vealed by remote sensing images. Lineaments may be major faults or fault systems, patterns of vegetation, topograohic features or man- -
made features, or they may be optical illusions. The lineaments dis"-
ussed here are relatively large and have associated with them suffi-cient ceolocic evidence to succest that thev reoresent maior structuret of the Eartn's surface. Precise interoretations remain to be workea out on tne ground. If the linears are of fault origin, they may recre-sent active or inactive crustal deformation and possibly even maior boundaries bettveen blocks of crustal material of different ages and origin...." (Emphasis added.)
A map to which Allen and Beaulieu refer the reader is attached at Attachment
- 4 The approximate region of the Trojan site has been circled. It should
- .= -__. .- __- - - - . ,
be noted that the map traces a partly-confirmed and partly-inferred fault zone that stretches diagonally across the state, trending uoward in a north-westerly direction, and passing not far from the Trojan site. This lineation I is coded "1" (Brothers Fault Zone), "13" (Sisters Fault Zone), and "24" (Portland Hills Fault--Clackamas Lineament) on the map. One of the first lineaments which the authors discuss is this particular configuration:
"The longest lineament in the Northwest is the Brothers Fault zone...
(Greene and others, 1972), which runs for 300 kilometers on 3 north-west trend through central Oregon (Lawrence, 1974,1976) and its oossible '
extensions. It is a zone up to 20 kilometers wide in which multiole, en echelon faulting suggests deep-seated, right-lateral shear movement
~T o two crustal blocks. It has been extended to the southeast for another 350 kilometers into Nevada by Stewart and others (1975). To the northwest the zone may swing to a more norther 1v trend to include the Sisters fault zone...and possibly even the anomalcusly straight valley of the Clackamas River, and the Portland Hills fault (Basillie and Benson,1971; Schmela and Palmer,1972; Beeson and others,1975).
In crossing the Cascade Range, the lineament may be reoresented by an extension of several parallel north-trending faults (Hamond, personal
.= comunication ,1976) . A total lenoth of the combined features is nearly 900 kilometers. If related to olate tecntonics, tne zone must continue ",
fartner to tne northwest off the coast of Washinoton to merce with clate boundaries on the sea floor." (Emohasis added.) .
Two points should be noted: (1) the studies and references cited are all post-1970, and (2) Ors. Benson and Palmer, who testified at the Troian construction permit hearings on behalf of more extended and extensive study of the site, are referenced.
00GAMI, which published the above recort, also oublished in 1973 f ts
" Geologic Criteria for Siting Nuclear Power Plants in Orecon," by V.C.
Newton (who, it may be recalled, authored. criticisms of the 1972 Geoohysical Advisory Board study) and N.V. Peterson. This document, creoared for the state NTEC, further emohasized the imoortance of regional study:
" Broad regional evaluations must be followed by detailed studies for specific locations. Such work will involve a comolete array of
- geologic, hydrologic, and seismologic investigations besides includino data from other disciolines....
41-
_e_______
Seismicity of the site should be thoroughly. investigated, as is ,
- 4 now required by AEC regulations, and~ micro-seismic measurements l
== 1hould'5e~matie where there is a history of earthouakes.... I Recent discussions of structural integrity of. nuclear oower olants have centered on the postulation that offset ruoture occurs in the ;
foundation rock beneath the containment structure. The structures )
are designed to withstand small displacements in the foundation materials but design for more than a small displacement would increase construction cost exponentially in relation to the amount of expected displacement (Housner,1971). Sites should avoid rocks where rupture and offset could occur....
Where reactor facilities are within a few tens of miles of a known active fault, or where the site lie 6 within a fairly active seismic region, instrumentation should be installed to measure earth move-ments. Such instrumentation would include seismometers, tiltmeters, and microseismic recorders, geodetic strain and and crecise levelino equipment...." (Emphasis added.)
These excerpts demonstrate two things: (1) an increased awareness of the importance of regional focus, and (2) that 00GAMI had considerably solidi- l l
fied and elevated standards since the Trojan siting. Most of 00GAMI's e reconrnendations in the above passages were not met by PGE when Tro. fan was sited.
Numerous studies beside that of Allen and Beaulieu reference either l
(a) the Portland Hills fault and a possible extension or (b) a possible Columbia River fault zone. The New Tectonic Mao of the United States (Kina, 1969), referenced suora, indicated an inferred fault extendino from Portland to the vicinity of Centralia, cassing very close to the site. Beeson and Johnson (1975; the " PEG-II" study)l7 speculated that the Portland Hills fault zone could have "a potential length of from 100 km to 306 km." l Using half the fault length as the rupture length, and fault ruoture length versus magnitude, they made the following earthouake macnitude estimates:
100 km: 5.6; 200 km: 6.4; 300 km: 6.8. They admit that this is speculative 1
but indicate that existing data "should at least suggest further study of this '
structure." Beeson and Johnson at 89-90. The Schmela and Palmer study (1072:
l
.? 2 .
" Geologic Analysis of the Portland Hills-Clackamas River Alignment, Oregon," Ore Bin., Vol. 34, No. 6) indicates the hypothesis that the Portland Hills-Clackamas River alignment indicates "that a major fault system... extends for considerable distance across much of Oregon."
Moreover, " magnetic anomalies consiptent with the Portland Hills-Clackamas River alignment further suoport the presence of an underlying geologic structure," according to the authors. S_e_e also Balsillie, J.H.
and Benson, G.T. , " Evidence for the Portland Hills Fault," 00GAMI ,
Ore Bin, vol. 33, No. 6. June 1971. The oossibility has been expressed that a fault zone exists stretching from the Sandy River, through Lack'amas Lake, the Lewis River, and the controversial Kelso fault zone that PGE's geologists were unable to find.18 See Mundorff, M.J., "Geolocv
"' and Groundwater Resources of Clark County, Washington," U.S.G.S. Open File Report, August,1959, which mentions the possibility of such a fault which, if it did exist, would be roughly in line with the Trojan site.
The most recent outline of newly developed evidence and issues which could be relevant to the Trojan site has been crecared by Dr. Palmer for the present State Geologist, and is attached as Attachment 55. This outline ;
suggests numerous areas for further study, and concludes:
"The Trojan site study is...most blatantly lackina in any of the normal ,
geological infor: nation. No Dretext was ever made that any geolooical ')
criteria for siting were followed....
I seriously doubt that any logical decision about the relative site safety can be made from existing data. However, you mich*, easilv !
decide whether previous decisions were crecerly Y, sed ucen data...." l I
43 pe.,,,,,.,p- y , , , ,. _ , , , _ , , . _ . _ . _ _ _ , __
, . ...,i...,..
..u s.
- u, Cn tne basis of the foreg ing ir.#:r aticn and any 09.er data whic" the Director may deem relevant, I urge that the relief asked in the #f est secticr. Of this recuest be granted. Cenial c' such relief will result in violati0n Of the At:mic Energy Act Of 1952, which re uires tha: I c0nsiderati:ns of the public health and safety ta'<.e rececence 0fer Orc cti:n and nurturance of the nuclear industry.
Res:ectfully submi::ed,
- g. .- A' si
~
i ii f . u"-si . ;
.,. i.c; & L -- '
Susan ti. Garre n
- . Pro Se la:ed tc.is 24th :ay of .:ebruary, 1973 4
1
.4*
n-., - - - - - . + , , - , -
-\t.,, - , , .
g' REFERENCES 1 Beulah Hand, KINK radio, Coming Up For Air, Jan. 8,1978.
2 Lentsch, J.,
preffled testimony in hearings before the NRC, Docket No.
50-344, on the issue of PGE's request for license modification to expand spent fuel storage capacity.
3 Bechtel Corp., "Evaltation of Foundation, Ground, Water, and Seismic Conditions: Troj an Powder Co. Property," Job 6218, Oct.1967, revised '
Jan. 1968; AND Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries (DOGAMI), " Geologic Criteria- for Siting Nuclear Power Plants in Oregon," orecared by V.C.
Newton, Jr. and N.V. Peterson, January,1973.
4 00GAMI, " Statement of Department of Geology and Mineral Industries Regarding Proposed PGE Nuclear Power Plant.at Trojan." See Attachments.
S letter from PGE President Frank Warren to Frederick Taylor, Publisher, Wall Street Journal, March 1,1972.
6 Albee and Smith, paper presented to the Association of Engineering Geologists.
Anaheim, California, Oct. 18-23, 1966.
. , . 7 Bolt, B.A., et al., Geological Hazards (Springer-Verlag, New York,1975).
8,9 Couch, R.W. and Lowell, R.P., " Earthquakes and Seismic Enercy Release in Oregon," Ore Bin, Vol. 33, No. 4, April,1971. ;
10 A11en, C.R., " Geological Criteria for Evaluatino Seismicity," Geolecical Society of America Bulletin, Vol. 86, po.1041-57, August, 1975. l II Memorandum from Raymond E. Corcoran, Oregon State Geolocist, to the Governinc '
Board of DOGAMI, May 21, 1970.
I2 Letter from R.E. Corcoran to PGE Vice President Itschner, July 27, 1970.
13 Letter from Dr. Leonard Palmer to Oregon State Geologist, Don Hull, Feb. 7, 1978. See Attachments.
14 Hillman, R., KINK radio, Coming Up for Air, Jan. 8,1978.
15G oguel, Jean. Tectonics. (W.H. Freeman and Co. , San Francisco,1062).
16A11en J.E. and Beaulieu, J.D., " Plate Tectonic Structures in Orecon," I Ore Bin, Vol. 38, No. 6 June 1976. ,
i 17 Beeson, M. and Johnson, A. , " Portland Envircnmental Geology--Fault Identi'icatien," )
Sponsored by USGS, Contract No. 14-08-0001-14832, December , 1075. -)
~
l 1
1
_ _ .. __ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . -_ _ _ _. . ~ .
- ' ATTACHMENTS l
1 If we knew all the laws of nature or having known, had the power to obey them in thought, word, and deed, we would be God himself, and not need to do anything at all.
As it is, we hardly know the laws and have little power to obey them.
" . Gandhi, Acril 7,1027 l
i
)
- . . . . . . , - . - , . - , . . , . . . - . . - . . . ..- . - . - . . . - . . . - , . , . _ . . , . , . . - - . . . . . - - - , . - . - . . .,....e-.-..-- ,
AMACEM 41 c.
s IC
.u.
.? na C
.z. m= - ,e l i"Il 1
,,\ .{
6 '
,1 1
.i 'i l, s >.
h; < -
i , hp. i .
i d 11 #{I.i -
11, i.
ir
.'s.
~
-:n
,, i l'il,lll L,o i
t
- I}'
. t g4 ii
- . 7 '> 5 AE t
- \\,
.~. ,. .l... . . r ta xi.. ,
6 - * -
~~:
,-y
- % ,'._. N ' -
v
+,
5 . .,.
. 7 iA..
e .
D .
\
, i. .,'. .5W. i. .
b S,
,'-".0*
.?'JC
%lmt-::N An w, .p 'u .
i, -
,, . t,. . .dh.fv. .w w
b i
, ,; j r1 . . :w._
' ' .g : ,
lt],
~
. . . /; . 3 * 's, M
.. . g ,
y
.. s. -.
- f
';' . s- <
. 3 . ' .:,
t:s. *s.~.~
Y. 'O ,'* ', y, ,
Y.idl D....
,i.., **
.?
T,-
, i.
~ ,
g- -,.' . Al.
j.* l %. , . .
- f. .
'g ,. ,-. g-
] i.,
,s
. 4.,. .
'y . .
s j .,.,..
s.,
t I ,.
g * , s,
.. . gi.a
[*'.
{ ,
r, g .-
s w st
'4 5 1 ,
g5 .
, A .
~' l W< $
.s
. -- 9 i'* *
.t .
,f
.-vg >
o g...
.k,* '{ s
., 3* '. N ',
p' *-
,D ,. f.,
- s .s . ~
t . -*
J.f. y'
,, i;
. k *. ' ~
[Y4 . .i j ' .
.e ...-r-
- 4 i
- ,.S., ,, , +
- j
. . 6 1
F..., ".5 .. % .
. . .' %. ' .. \. k , , . . ., %. .. . . .
.f .
%s;i;. . } .,
- 6. % *
.. . s.c\
6 ..**
%.. ' h . '. . . . - -
I.. -
Q
- p. . ,1 1
...-d.*. .
% ,,k n},..
e N,,
A'
. ... . . , a .: .m, c..; . , i_s.y +- .e ._* : ;
t
---<.---wn, , , - , , . ,,-,,,.-,-----,<e,,--,,, .v,.-
- a. .
s./s
./
ATThCEENT 42 i
i'
- STATEMENT OF DEPARTMEhT OF CEOLOTl AND MI!*ERAL INDi'STRIIS RECARDING PROPOSED PCE NUCLENI PCVER PLANT AT TRCJA1 October 16, 1970 t The T.ojan nucicar plant site is located approximstely 30 miles north of Portland near a small town called Prescott. The site occupies a vol- !
canic " island", one mile long and about one-quarter of a mile wide, which ;
is bordered on the eestern side by the Columbia River and on the western side by a broad marshy slough. Land grid coordinates are NWh NWh sec. 1, T. 6 N., R. 2 W. :
The bedrock that underlies Trojan is composed of a series of basalts and agglecerates which have been assigned to the Ceble volcanics of late .
Eocene (?) age. The name 'toble Volcanic Series" was proposed by Vilkin- ,
son, Lowry and Baldwin (1946) for a thick section of bassitic flows, I pyroclastics and minor a~.nounts of sediments which are best exposed in the '
vicinity of the town of Cobic approximately 2 miles to the south. A section of more than 5,000 feet of Coble volcanles was measured by Lowry and Baldwin along Pacific 111ghway between Kelso and Woodland, Washington, >
across the Columbia River from Trojan (Lowry and Balduin,1951). The
. volcanics are considerably altered and contain secondary miner:1s, such .
as calcite and severst varictics of zeoli:es.
The highly altered nature of the Gobic lavas helps to distinguish them from the younger sequence of basalts assigned to the Columbia River
=
Group also videly exposed in this part of Oregon. The regional primsry bedrock structure has a general northwesterly fabric and is casily disectned on high altitude serial photographs. Much of the stream drain-age appears to follow similar northvcst-trending linescions which presuu- I ably reficet either faulting at or near the surface or strong jointing j vithin the volcanic scquence. Folding of the lavas probsbly began in the l Oligocene or Miocene epochs and 'may have continued intermittently through- !
out much of the Cenosoic era. Some crustal adjustments may be taking place l at the present time, following late Quaternsry uplift. 1 The Trojan site lies within what is considered to be a major tectonic structural ene which is referred to as the "Willamette-Puget Trough". l This zone has had a long period of seismic activity as evidenced by the i number of carthquakes that have been reported along the trough over the pasr l 100 years. Since 1341, at 1 cast 160 carthquakas have been recorded in Oregon, not including those originating out of the State or at sea, and most of them have occurred near Portland (Schlickce,- Ocacon and Tuc1ker,1964)
(Berg and Bakce,1962) (Dehlinge r . and Be rg , 1962) . The stronges t carthquake to be icit in the vicinity of Trojan came on the 13th of April 1949. Epi-center of this quake was in the Scattic-Tacoma stea but there was consider-able damage at Longview, approximstely 6 miles from Trojan, and some stir.ht damste at Rainice, only 3S miles avsy. These temblors may be the result of strike-slip movement siong s major fault zonc in the basement reeks of {
.n the Pacific florthwest which is distributed throu;,b a system of subsidiary P f aults in the overlying volcanic-sedinentary cover. ,
. . . _ . ~_~~ l
- f .
ATTAC5ENT 192, p. 2 The geologic probicms involved in the location of a nucicar power plant are fundamentally no different from those for other types of instal-lations. They f all into four main categories : (1) foundation stability, (2) landslide and slope stability, (3) shaking due to carthquakes, and (4) surface faulting. Basically the AEC requires that all featurcs of the.cnvironment, geologic conditions, and scismicity at a particular site be such that no conceivabic natural catastrophe or its side effects could result in so damaging a nucicar power station or its facilities as to pre-vent safe shutdown or rupture of the barriers against reicase of radio- ,
active material.
The primary geologic concern in the area of the proposed plant site therefore is the possibility of damese because of carthquake or other sur-face movement either to the containment vessel or piping and other connec-tions sufficient to cause rupture and release of ionizing radiation. The Atomic Energy Commission, in setting forth its regulatory critera fer scismic and geologic siting, discusses at some icngth the requirements for determining faulting or fault movement at a proposed plant location.
For all sites, the vibrational effects of possibic carthquakes must bc
.cvaluated as well as the possibility of surface rupture. The vibration effcets are made at two different icvels. The.first is the Operating
. Basis Earthquake, termed OBE, for which all Class 1 structurcs, piping ,
and equipment and their supports must remain within clastic limits. The Operating Basis Earthquake is taken as the largest historic event in the
- .g~'
general area. A larger carthquake is also considered which roughly repre ,
sents the greatest crustal movement which can be conceived as occurring at the site considering the historiu record along known active faults or in the tectonic province. This larger carthquake is referred to as the Design Basis Earthquake or DEE. To quote from the AEC regulatory criteria: ;
~~
~ "The Design Basis Earthquake for a reactor site is that which produces the j vibratory ground motion for uhich those featurcs of a nucicar power plant l necessary to shut down the reactor and emintain the plant in a safo condi-tion without undue risk to the health and safety of the public are desici.ed )
to remain functional." l The AEC gives considerabic weight to location of faults or faulting that may occur beneath or in the vicinity of a proposed plant site, partic-ularly with respcet to the possibiitty that one or more faults could be considered canabic of causing surfacc rupture. Again to quote from the .
I AEC report: "Such a fault or fault zonc could have one or more of the following characteristics: (1) creep movement based on instrumental measurements, (2) movement at 'or near the ground surface, at icar.t once in the east 35.000 years,_ (3) movement at or near the ground surface more
~
than onec in the east 500,000 years. (4)' instrumenta11y well determined ' l scismicity for a geologic structure located in the continental United States vcot of the Rocky Mountain front.
1 The geologie report prepared for Portland Cencral Electric Company by the Boc'htel Corporation consists mainly of detailed descriptions of the l l
?g; drill cores put down on the " island"' plus some additional scismic dnd drill :
1
.g' l
, i. l
_O.^ .
, =
, . .. - , -, ~- - - - .-- . . . - - - .
/ . ,/ .
.m.r :un-,Fe, -
4--n - 7
==
hole d:ta across the slouch th:t separates the " island" f ree the es tni:nd to the vest. The 3cchtcl- engineers concluded ths there vere no fsults of any appreciabic size in the vicinity of the pisnt si:c. : qu:: fr:=
their report: " Figure 2.9-1 of sec. 2,9 shews the locatien of these fsui:s in southvcs: Vashington and northwest Orccen wht:h ::c shesn en S:::e ,
geologic = ps of the two states. It is i=pertant to ne:c ths: no rift type faults or extensive centinuous f aults are shewn . . . . The presen:c of cene f:ulting in the arcs is sugges:cd by :epegrsphy but the f u;;inc is c;psrently miner since capped faulting is gener:11y of s=:11 displace-een: . . . . No evidence et post-Pleist:cene f aulting has been found. It is therefore concluded ths the evidence indicates there cre ns cetiv:
faults in the area," AJditienst field verk by the 3:chtel caninects v:s later included as an amendment to the cricinal report but :he tenersi con-clusion assin vss ths there were no f aults of any signific:nce in the genersi regica cround the Trejan site.
Eecause of ===y indications of faulting in this ;ar: c f northvcs:cen Orcp,cn as shown by ex:ensive topographie linestions en :cri:1 phete;rephs, th*. S: ace Ceclogis: requested additional studies of the 7:cj:n ar s.
A report by two scologie:1 censul:snes for ?Cf, Ivey and Ceenb:, seinrw!-
~
edged tha: there was censiderabic evidence fer ner:hv s:-:::qding f aci:s
- or imult :enes en both sf. des of the Colu=bi ?.iver in the vicinity of -
Trojan, Kala =a, and Gobic, sene of which strest te tc =:re than 2 =iles in length. The censultants cade a 1-d:y helicep:ce survey of :he crea gja - bu: they sculd net find sny evidence of re:cn: surf :: =rve=ent leng :ny _. . . :
of the lineatiens or possible f ault sesrps. ,
The AEC requires that a geolegic investig::len shall in:1cde (en:ng other things): (1) identification of :cc: nic ::ru :ures underlying the
" site and the regien surrounding :be site; (!) delines: ten of f aults, f ul: -
zenes, faul: associated monoclin:1 fic::ures c: similar -celegi: :::u::ures. .___.
greater than 1 =ile long, any p::: of which is vi:hin 250 =iles of the sit:,
J and deterninstien O f whether these geologic stru :ures are espebic cf : sus--- -- '
ing surface faulting; and (3) for these geclegi: stru :ures g:::::: :h:n 1 =ile Icag and capable of cau:ing surface faul:ing, any par: Of shich is vithin 2f0 =Lles of the site, de:cenin :len fr:a a field invcs:ig::ien er review of the li:::ature of: (:) the icngth of :he geelegic s: rue:are, (b) reistianship of the geologic strue:ure te region:1 :ce::ni: structur:s, and (c) the na:ure , amount :nd geologic his:ery of dispic:en:n:s 21:ng -he
- geologic structure including parti:uls:1y the esti=2:cd sneunt o f the eaxt=un Qasternary dislocatien, b The State Ccologis: vist:cd the site en the 10th of C:::ber in erder build- i co exanine the area where the exesvstiens for the re:ctor centsinnent >
- - ing and auxiitary buildings hsvc nov been eenpleted. As v:s neced en the ,
targe-scale Occhtel geoloci: nap stepared in Augus: 10 70, severs! shear zones havin- s northsrstcr!y c:caJ can bc :cen in the b::: : f!ess tha: are --
expesed in the excavstion v:lls. These shear nene: shev con:ider:b:e f se conda rv alterstien :nd re:ementat ien bu: the encen: of di:pla:cecn: eculd f not be de cr=ined. Also the ten-th of the faul:: :1:nc the strike ceu;J
(
- w. I not be seen bec:use me:: of the ground is : vered by p. ravel er : rushed roer. '~
away fren the ex svated sees.
- 7. # . ,
ATTACI!ENT #2; p. h.
The most critical factor to deteredne is the recency of movement along these shear zones at or near the surface. There is no doubt that most of the movement probably took pisec during the folding of the volcanic flows during middic or late Cenozoic time but it does not preclude the possi-bility that there may have been more recent slippage during Quaternary
' crustal adjustments. Striations showing direction of mevement in the lavas along some of these shears is essentially horizontal and would indicate that these may he part of a scrics of right lateral transform f aults (Couch,1968) . The only positive statement that can be made about the age of the f ault movement is that it is post-late Cocene and prob.thly pre-Quatcensry. It is suggested that one or more of those shese :enes be monitored with appropriate scismic apparatus after all site preparation has been completed to determine if any sort of continuing right lacerst movement can be decceted. Other fairly obvious fault scarps such as the one that paralicia U.S. 30 approximately threc-quarters of a mile south-vest of the Trojan site should also be studied in greater detail.
Cencral ennelunions
/ Although the Trojan plant site lies within 40 miles of the major metro-i politan center of Oregon, there is unfortunaccly eclatively 11ttic kncvn '
}
about the geologic details of stratigraphy and structures that underlic ;
i this region. This lack of information is due largely to the fact that the ground is heavily covered by vegetation, the relatively high rainfall has /
f caused deep vcathering of the bedrock, and there are few good surface cxposures. -
The f act cannot be ignored, however, that this part of Oregon is in a !
/
scismically active zone and although no destructive carthquakes have yet occurred, there is no proof that such a catastrophe may not happen at some time in the future. 1tistorical records in this country span too short a period of time to be abic to predict periodicity or intensity of carth movements (Coombs, 1953). Byerly, in his scismological report for the Trojan site, uses a maximum intensity of VII for the regions 1 scismicity based on about 100 years of record. From this he recommends a construc'. ion design base acceleration of 0.12g and safe shutdown base of 0.25g.
While it is only a speculation, if the Queen Charlotte Islands seismic zone connects with the Puget-Willamette tectonic trough, then a maximum recorded carthquske magnitude could again occur anywhere along the fault.
The Queen Charlotte quake is reported as magnitude P. 1. Such an event in -
the Olympia-Sesttic area vould produce epicentral intensitics of X to XI and an intensity of IX could be expected at the Trojan site. Cround accci-crations up to 0.53 are indicated for this intensity. '
The 3cchtc1 report does not, in my estimation, provide enough ncv to make any geologic data, particularly in regard to f aulted str'ic turcs ,
reasonably valid detcrminations as to ecologic integrity of the site.
The whole matter of the nuclesr plant is much too important to be treated l
- . . ~ . . . - -
1
., p ~ ,
. . 3 -
/ ATTACHENT #2, p. 5 ,
)
j.s: 11 i tly, not merely because of its proximity to Portland. Trojan is the first site to bc seriously considered for a nucicar power plant in Oregon and foundation excavations are nearly completed. The geologic standards that will be set in this instance vill beceme guidelinus for future appli-
. cations for nuclear plants in the State. Although detailed geologic map-
. ping in northvcst Oregon is dif ficult at best, and subject to differing interpretations, there is certainly a need for high quality investigations '
of this type if we are to obtain the kinds of information necessary to ,
make recommendations for this as well as other nucicar plant sites in the l future. ' '
t References .-
Wilkinson, V.D. , Lowry, V.D. , and Baldwin, E.M.,1946, Geology of the St. Helens Quadrangle, Oregon: Cregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industrics Bulletin 31.
Lowry, W.D., and Baldwin, E.M., 1952, Late' Cenozoic Ccology of the '
Lower Columbia River Valley, Oregon and Vashington: Geological Society of America Bulletin, Vol. 63, No. 1, January 1952, p. 1-24 .
Schlickce, H.G. , Deacon, R.J. , and Twelkc e , N.11. , 1964, Earthquake
.m.. Geology of the Portland Area, Oregen: THE ORE BIN, Vo l . 26, No . 12, .
59 December 1964 Berg, Joseph V. , Jr. , and Baker, Charles D. ,1962,,0regon Earthquake s ,
1841 through 1958: THE ORE DIN, Vol. 24, No. 9, p.143-149,1963 ; Scismo-Logical Society of America Bulletin, Vol. 53, No. 1, p.95-103. -
Dehlinger, Peter, and Berg, Joseph W. , Jr. ,1962, The Portland Earth- -
J quake of November 5, 1962: THE CRE DIN, Vol. 24, No.11, November 1962, -
- p. 185-188
. Couch, Richard W., and Pictrafesa, Leonard J., 1968, Earthquakes off i
.. the Oregon. Coast - January 1968 to September 1968: TliE ORE BEN, Vol. 30, No. 10, October 1968.
t Coombs, Howard A.,1953, A Summary of Washington Earthquakes: Scis=o-
. logical Society of America Bulletin, Vol. 43, No.1, January 1953.
~ l 1
i l
i
=
1
. I l
- yey- vr-~ e-e-+- --
, }
l$ ATTACB'ENT 03
$ :* L.
Ted Hallock Y% F/ ~ ~,
5(NAf t Q(aaQC$Afic LlaQtt
. 2 4 A $ N. W, j R Vl N C PC R T L AN D. O R E C ON 97 1o TEtt PMcN E 224 171:
Mr. Kelly Woods Coordina tor Nuclear and Thermal Energy Council 4263 Commercial S.E.
Salem, Ore. 97310 l
Dear Kelly:
For months now I have vondered what inf ormation I could give you of value from four file cabinets of nuclear power data. Probably not much tha t is new.
However, re the attached clip, I would endorse the Council's eliciting from Corcoran a flat clean bill of health for the site or an equally clean cut expression of his reservations.
I hate to use language like this, but someone is either lying or 4: simply not being f orced into the whole truth. It seems hyper-dramatic, h;:. but if the Council has to place Corcoran under oath, I think it should be done. It is my understanding in an informal conversation, that I Corcoran or one of his men flatly told a Columbia County employee that they were very worried about the site. Corcoran admits that we have had no state geological survey because ve could not aff ord it. Carl Gohs' Oregonian article spoke to distinct earthquake zone characteristics. l The only survey I know about was commissioned by PGE. A geologist, from l Spokane, who did lots of Hanf ord work, has reservations on the site. l l
I assume also the t the Council is looking carefully into bringing b= fore it those Bechtel employees and f ormer employees who have raised questions about the back-up cooling system depending on one pipe. l Finally, if the Council vants them, I would be very pleased to forward I a compendium of letters solicited and gotten by me last April, speaking to assertions by PGE that, generally speaking, they "had approval" f rom l most state and federal agencies involved with Trojan. In essence, the I le tters refute using such language.
S
/ p erely, '
)
l eens te[na11ock E' D Irwii e
- n p: p ...,.. 3 TH/hj b N 7 .-- -
- . _ ~ _ . . _.__. _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _
o o *
- e ,
ATTACHENT #k 1
I I
i i -
I b F
1 i Y -
y a 5 4 I I I eI li!lyll I f I!
! II -
i!
- s lr
! i l g i 11 j -l i ti s
- 1,,1. j g-la- 1 1 v 5 l . i ,. e!!!!~e11k 1
E 3 6
!! us l!!!$!!!!!!s acasiaegisisisissa
!g=gg en s
i o .
as l I
l g :t.e:-" *_. $ E-=Q-se _3 1 / g
- au s
cco <a==es=
q -= _ _- =e=1 _
5 oa~ G 9%O ---
- c&.= ~$I.,/ ' ;
o e a -
o oc 5 f, E-.o -a ' . 5
== te i
y g j,I j/ ,
s a G 0 :$ 9* l /. Y ,\. /
/ 5 e d ,,/ @ .
s oc / g
. r e.
A cc c / h ,/ ,, ar-f \
I smE / N:. ,, 4 ._ _ . i, I a i ~ t r _ ~. t .:
.eL f'
, 4 -
/ */ @ \., < $
.i .
- ,. $, - ,- </ .
- a Cc
/ -
[
[
s
(<
e~o .
g CO O tf /
- e Q40m c$* j l I w
.O e-C 4 -
.,1 SE e
1 ;l , .
@ .O L l $
@299 s f cv a y 0 /
W
/
- /
= iN! e /
g g ., = ---*-o _9v g )f (d,%'s -[
\
3N M p'\ / / + e Q [ / ! -
r i ,- - J
.s: t oe ,</,d ~
l
/^<
m C 2 --e ~
g\
sW
/
8"3 e A E - "7 j ,\
t 7'
g m.,.. e, _
>, x< v. .
.. %e >
O e
% --,, \s 1 'M ct2 '
g
't,' ..n@ m_ _
m-m. . --#r. - -, _ _ . . - . . . _ , , . . .....-....--..,,.,:.-~.i._,-,-. . . . . - ...%..,. . . . . . _ _ , _ , . _,,,,....,,,%-. ,..y,-_, .,z...--,,.,..y,-- - -
\
.' i PCRTLAND Of NER AL ELECTRIC CoM*ANY Ms. Dawn Dressler March 13, 1978 ,
Pace Four % ..
i We have over the past month furnished the State Geologist with r.aterial for his current review, and we have every anticipation of once again beir.g given a report which favorably recognizes the scope of and conclusions to the studies which were done.
We appreciate this opportunity to respond to Mr. E111 man's statenent.
Sincerely,
-- ,-> > .g J//)
W. J. Lindblad Vice Presidest Engineering-Construetion WJL/RE/jdh/ 3. lA7 9
4 s
1ts as r. o @ ; R W_ _ ._
- -- ~
^
at m g q,p6e6s Y
9g\ q;c*c n
~
u ;
,\ ,,- e,
, s,assiv~r ,.
q 1
m\ av.i W e q \
\
8 . 3. v we, y/,-
8
\
\
y ,
,.y 4
ag. O= , M p,<
~"^
s vereAl
\K s\ a.
h f 4 " h, g ,*
- X
\
. . . . - _y, am***~" . . -
e we.r- -w - --
y , - , , - - - .
l ATTACHENT #5, p.1 !
i
, / fL- :
a?.y .
February 7,1978 1
Donald A. Hull State Geologist Departnent of Geology and Mineral Industries ,
1069 State Office Building Portland, Oregon 97201
Dear Mr. Hull:
In resoonse to your certified letter requesting factual data for review of the Trojan Nuclear Power Plant site, I must first emchasi:e i that the site is best known for its lack of factual data on geology. ,
- Specifically, no mappihg of any surficial units of an age which !
',could define recent faulting or tectonics defomation is known to ,
me in that area, though strea6 terrace and channel deposits, and soil units exist all around the site.
The faults which underlie the reactor and power plant have apparently not been mapped to detemine their extent, or their relation to younger geologic units, nor other necessary characteristics to verify their relative activity. >
Geologic information that is known is limited, and often is fec=
sites distant from the Trojan site. Some of the info mation indicates >
1 relative tectonic stability in Pleistocene units, and other infomation indicates active tectonic defor.ation. .
Known geologic infomation relevant to the Trojan site stability includes the following: ,
- 1. .Geomorphic lineations at the Trojan site and in the Portland area show strong statistical alignnent with regional tectonic trends.
(Palmer,1970 Trojan hearing - detailed maps, Schmela and Palmer,1972, Ore Bin).
- 2. Known alignment of faults and of unexplored lineations (50% of all ,
linears) is dominantly northwesterly (geologic maps in region).
- 3. First motion studies of local earthcuakes indicate right lateral motion along northwesterly faults (Dehlinger cl. al.,1963; Westchal, 1962; Gallagher,1969).
,. . =,
.e o,--,, p - ,->c,. r -.- n .e - ~ w n.em , , ., vnr.-e- - - + - - .e ., -,m---w-v,, . , ,--,w . - ~ , - - - - , - , --,----,.-n-r,,v. - . , - , , , - , - - , n -,-n,--e-,. -
ATTACHENT #5, p. 2 Donald A. Hull, February 7,1978
- 4. . Gravity data show possible offset along the Portland Hills Fault (Schmela, uopub. MS thesis, PSU; state gravity map (Berg), 'and recent studies by Ansel Johnson et. al.). -
- 5. Accelerated erosion, gu11ying, and landsliding occur prominently along the Portland Hills Fault in Portland (Schlicher, Ore Bin article er. earthquake - at about the time of Alaska earthquake (?), and Portland Environmental Geology #1, by Hammond etl al. . Such steep-unstable and weak slopes could not long endure Tn tiie)high rainfall of Portland - inferring undercutting by erosion or faulting.
- 6. Straightness of the Portland Hills Fault escarpment is about 1:500 or more, for 15 miles (Portland, Linnten, Sauvie Island topographic maps). Fault, or faultsline escappment is implied; river scarps are more curved and not comoatible with such linearity.
- 7. Sandy River diversion from westerly alignment )n the "Kelso" surface (Springwater Formation) to a northwesterly alignment with subsequent entrenchment (Camas, Washougal, and Sandy topograohic ouadrangles)
(MS studies, Ron Lee, and in-progress work, Len Palmer).
s u.
- 8. Lacamos Lake Fault Kp1bma escarpment.lineation, and Deer f.sland linear fault ingullyWashington - all aligned'and, state withrreported
-thwesterly(trending, 100 3007) footalign with offset of laterite soil. (Map of faults near Trojan by Howard Coombs, with descriptions, compilations from published literature). I don't have my copy, but this fault extracolation reouired consideration of major ground displacement faulting through the Trojan site and allowed calculation of some factor of safety numbers, of about 1 chance in 50 of a major geound breaking earthouake (?). This [
data was prepared for Trojan hearing but not delivered due to settlement by interveners.
- 9. Northwesterl '
County, OregonRon (y faults cut laterite Jackson, fig. 1B,and soiland
- p. 224 hori:
p.ens 228,inOre Columbia Bin, '
1972(?)). "The ore hori:en contained .many faults havino slickensides, well-defined strikes and nearly v.trtical dips, ... striking in a northwesterly direction." i.
\
This data is compatible with regional structure elignment, active i strith-slip faulting, and proximity to the Trojan site. Ron Jackson i was hired by Ken Dodds at my suggestion to try to further document these soil-cutting faults - but he was not able to locate any. His \
original work involved extensive trenching which was not possible \
later, which may explain his later failure to confim. However, this ,
documents the applicability of trench mapping for site stability \..
evaluations, as so strongly advocated by Lloyd Cluff's people. .h
,, m.. . , , _ . , - - - , . _ , - m .-, . - , - - - - - , _..-,_ . - .-- ,- -
ATTACIOGNT #5,. p. 3 Donald A. Hull, February 7,1978
- 10. The interchange' fault, nc mapped by the Trojen crew until An.dy ?'
l.
' Corcoran pointed it out, and then mapped as a point (Trojan geologic map; I have a copy, PSAR Fig. 2.8-20). <
This fault is big, with large offset of stratigraohic units (100's of feet), has northwest strike (Corcoran letter), and is associated with road failure (soft zone? or active fault movement (?)) (I have !
photo documentation of road repair). This is not the fault illustrated '
and studied in the Doddl report. ;
This fault is one of the best jokes of the 1970 hearing. It was ignored blatantly. l l
- 11. Aerial photo 1.1.mee.cs, of the Trojan site show extensive ^11 nears, not exploned (1970 hearing testimony) (MZTRO 69 photo #23-97 and J 23-98 in my file). ,
l
- 12. Sea-level-base level of Pleistocene was 250-300 feet lower, Columbia River trenched to 300 feet at Portland (Portland Water Bureau drill hole data). Deep entrenchment of river channel during Wisconsin time.
~
- 13. Slow filling of Columbia River Channel to -50 feet at Mazama Ash time (Ken Robbins, tem paper for my class 1971, in preparation for Oregon Academy of Science 1978).
- 14. Major landsliding in Columbia River occurs along about 1/3 of its '
recent GSA paper by Palmer course (1977)). (USGS Individual Prof. slides Paper up toby 18Johnson m1 (?)$ active to present.
- 15. Morphology of Deer Island (Trojan site) and drill hole data show form and faulting comnatible with landslide origin for the whole island (Palmer 1972 letter to Kelly lloods, Nuclear and Themal Energy Counci1*, March 1972).
River undercutting and flood velocity flow (see Trimble p. 67),
where entire Spokane F&ood was restricted by valley fem.
IS. Morphology of Columbia River channel contains large unexplained i
escarpments (Dodds report seismic profile).
- 17. Unexplained anomalous bedrock islands in Columbia River are not compatible with normal river channel development 9 Coffin Rock and Dray's Mound (?) across from Trojan site.
- 18. Earthquake recurrence interval for this area is shown by defeca-tion structures in young lacustrine sediments to be between 23 and 2G6 years over a period of 1971 years (John Sims, USGS, unpublished manu-script, in my file).
Data was collected near Olympia, Washington.
Paper shows unreliability of linear extrapolation between events in an earthouake record.
---+s - -.- .* - m- - -- .- *. --
ATTA032NT 6 , p. k Donald A. Hull, February 7,1973 ,
~ - "
This study confims the utility of detailed sedimentary structure ;
studies to define local seis=ic recurrence, both here and at other l sites described.
- 19. Site investigation of old Saint Vincent Hospital (by Ken Pcbbins
- and Paul White of Daras a Moore, with cy censultatien) shewed no morphological offset of bedrock profile across the Portland Hills Fault alignment in Portland. Serings did not verify any vertical fault offset. t
- 20. Stream terrace studies of the Clackamas Piver frem Estacada to '
Oregon City show probable defonation tilting of the Springwater Formation - Kelso surface frca probable original 20 feet per mile ,
- gradient to 67 and 114 feet oer mile; tilted uo on Cascade Mountains.
Three 1cwer terraces of age extendin; into Pliocene (?) (Trieb1:'
show stable gradient with dissection'of the velley of over 200 feet.
' Careful field work along the river shcwed no evidence of defor.ation of terrace deocsits or underlying Sandy F.iver Mudstone. l This data indicates early tilting, but later relative tilt stabiltty of this part of the W11116t tte lowland,~ but with uplift (7) or dissection (?). Uolift of 'ther valley floor without tilt defomation
= a visible breaking of surface deposits for 100 to 200 thourand years i
" .mplied. Whether the uplift was concentrated along faults outside f
the area of terraces cannot be shown. Long term stability of the Portland Metropolitan Area is strengly indicated.
- 21. PEG #1 lineation study did field searching :n bicycles to find !
any defomation of streets, curts, sidewalks, etc., alcng suspicious ;
align .ents seen on maps or aerial photographs in the Portland l Metropolitan are.a. ,
Only one area with significant defor atien was f:und, at 5'. Madison between 17th and 18th. The major fracturing of curbs, sidewalks and ;
streets shewed do:inant right lateral is.nse of effset with west side up en a nu.ber of cracks. Street repairs have new partially covered I the site. With two, or better, three sites like this I would be convinced of active defer .ation ca the Portland Hills Fault. BUT, i no other corroboration was found.
Some fracturing alcng old filled stream (vilies was *cund in j northwest Portland, and many fracr.'res fro =" cree roots.
I believe the negative effect of this data en future funding of earthquake studies may have influenced its peer evaluation in the EEg fl report.
l
ATTACH'GNT #5, p. 3 P
Donald A. Hull February 7,1978
- 22. R'egional ' northwesterly alignaent of fault morphology in Oregon indicates disi:entineous, but related faulting from Steens Mountain to the Columbia River at Puget Island (West of Longview), a d'Istance )
of about 300 miles. Fault trends on either side of these alignments ;
do not cross this zone. Portland appears to be in a zone (or l possibly a series of parallel or en echelon) of faults.
- 23. Criteria for evaluating seismicity has shown his*arical records poor, and late Guaternary history valuable in estimating seismic hazard. (Clarence Allen, GSA Presidential Address,1974).
My own experience in seismic site evaluation studies in Califeenia, Arizona, and New York has emphatically confimed this.
- 24. Much Quaternary history of the Columbia River valley is obscured prior to 13,000 BP due to the Spokane Flood which disrupted much of the surface up to 400 feet elevation.
Thus, the Trojan site is a poor place to verify stability prior to
$13,000 BB.
- 25. Flood danger from landsjide or dam failure frem the upstream area was side-stepped (letter to me,' Kelly Woods,1972).
=
Conclusien Tne incomplete and scattered evidence is not consistent, as one might expect with the incomolete studies in an area covered with so much mud and brush. .
The Trojan site study is, however, most blatantly lacking in any of the normal geological information. No pretext was ever made that ,
any geological criteria for siting was fo11cwed (1970 hearing records, I have a copy).
Items listed above show the viability of geologic studies to confirm the history cf past events and to estimate site scability.
! Some data (items listed above) show evidence indicating seismic
'and fault activity. Other data show apparent stability where studies were done (items 29,22,22). We might hcpe to show by Quaternary strata studies that the Trojan site is a relatively safe site. It , l would be tragic to waste the investment. The criminal cover up of '
i the state geologist's concerns, however, requires that a comolete- g,merr geological investigation of site conditiens be demanded. No comittee can change geological hazard realtty. d l
l J
em . * ~ - - .._L ,1 . .-- -4 l
1 ATTACHh2NT # 5, p. 6 l Donald A. Hull, Bebruary 7,1978
. Please . excuse the. hurried fom of this reply. I have not attempted to cover all infomation, such as geophysical. Dan Cash and Ansel Johnson should certainly by contacted. ,
9 I seriously doubt that any logical desision about the relative site safety can be made from existing data, llowever, you might %
easily decide whether previous decisions were properly based upon data, e P? ease feel free to call on me if I can be of further assistance.
Sincerely,
, Leonard Palmer Associate Professor of Geology ,
- LP:vp, NM'[htd M l : .
i 4
6
$ I e
' e i
s
/
$. 1 I
\
l
/
i
/
l l
l
PonTLAxo Gnxenat EtecTarc COMPANY lalS.W. SALMON STRCCT PORTLAND,CACOoN 37204 WILLIAM J. LIN D 3 LAD voca sessesar March 13, 1978 Ms. Dawn Dressler, Chairperson Energy Facility Siting Council 12701 S. E. Salmon Court Portland, OR 97233
Dear Ms. Dressler:
TROJAN NUCLEAR PLANT Testimony of Mr. Frederick R. Hillman on February 14, 1978 hr. Frederick R. Hillman, presented testimony to the Energy Facility Siting Council on the subject of geologic and seismologic investigations associated with the Trojan Nuclear Plant. The allegations contained in Mr. Hillman's testimony is the subject of this letter.
As Mr. Hillman admits his presentation was based on only part of the public record, i_t is av purpose hertto,s.upp.lerJtat,the gaps -d' I,do, however, wish to
~ ' ~
- ~"er c' first aske the f oflowing fundamental observations:
- 1. The geologic and seismologic evaluation of the Trojan Plant was the product of a team of consultants whose professional reputa-tions are outstanding. Their effort has been supported by the critical review of the U. S. Coast & Geodetic Survey (consul-tants to the then Atomic Energy Commission); the U. S. Geological Survey (also consultants to the Atomic Energy Com=ission); the expert consultant staff to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; and Mr.~Raymond Corcoran, State Geologist. It is of interest that the U. S. Geological Survey, and the consultant l staff to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards were (and b l
in the case of the ACRS consultants, still are) reviewers of NC l every nuclear plant site application in the United States. pq(g(u([ tc g j Thus, Trojan was subjected to a uniform application of standards l for acceptability. JlIO Cf Vrt AA yupF ef ,- !
- 2. In all of Mr. Hillman's Larrative, the single most interesting .4 gji3[ 7 l fact is that he has not of fered one new piece of geologic !
evidence. e, 7 ~s~~.7 ... )
1' <b^ :"rur Alluding to some of Mr. Hillman's specific remarks I would further ~
comment as follows:
January 26, 1972 Wall Street Journal Article This subject is not a new revelation. As a matter of record, a report on this article was made to the Nuclear and Thermal Energy Council on March 7,1972 by Mr. Doug Heider, who was et the time for PCE, Manager of Public Affairs.
,e -
Fbrtand General Decinc l
l Ms. Dawn Dressler March 13, 1978 Psge Two l
Eariv Toundation Excavation The inference here is that PGE presumed a licensing decision without ,
an adequate site review. The early excavation was done at PGE's risk. " - -
It followed over 2 years of study by Company consultants. The geologic and seismologic review by regulatory experts of Trojan began with the .
submission of the PSAR in June of 1969. These reviews were finally ,
concluded with the issuance of the October 1974 Safety Evaluation i Raport. During the intervening 5 years and 4 months, the reviewers visited the site on a number of occasions, forwarded many questions to l i
be addressed, took into account all issues raised by outside parties and assured. themselves that all substantive issues were properly addressed and disposed.
1 Microseismic Tests i At the time Mr. Corcoran made this request (not recommend), the site was already under excavation and the results of any micro-seismic study would be masked since the site was undergoing elastic i
rebound. Ultimately, Mr. Corcoran did express his approval of the site studies when he signed the NTEC correspondence of April 27, I 1972. The Hillman statement also does not acknowledge the geologic. :
investigations carried out two years af ter Mr. Corcoran's sugges tions under the direction of the Trojan Geophysical Advisory Board which :
l are overwhelming in regard to any geologic and seismologic evaluation of the site itself. Q % d l' w va.7 yx A.d. -. .~ c m 4 , , ,,
/ {
Fault Scarps Parallel to U. S. 30 Near Troian a /,a ,((. .
This feature was studied in detail by a 3echtel geologist and concluded not to be a fault. The discussion of their review is on .
page 2.5-21 of the FSAR.
I
, Seismic Design Basis This subject by Corcoran is quoted out of context from the October 16, ;
f Mr. Corcoran was speculating about the 1970 Corcoran memorandum. >
t i
seismicity of the Queen Charlotte Islands' seismic zone and its i relationship to Puget Sound. The subject of 2eismicity in the i j Queen Charlotte Islands was addressed by the U. S. Coast and '
4 Geodetic Survey in their letter of July 8,1970. More recently, l studies of the above area in conjunction with the Satsop Site for Washington Public Power Supply System and the Skagit Site for Puge ,
1 Sound Power & Light Company, confirmed again the earlier findings.
- The conclusion by the NRC in each case was the same; that is, the l l Queen Charlotte area is seismically distinct from the Puget Sound area and one cannot move the seismicity from one area into an ,
adjacent area.
1 L
1 l
1
- - ' - * -~
W+99m-Tm - y v- tr --at*gNt11t m wes= y+ c*mf *-- g 7 c - ggeg,iT'"If *"JllE'WFTEU1""T &**F"*"'"'*tf""#WM'*"9T '
'*"'W'***D*"987'W"*'st*'F"-"**FI'*"'"*"W****VT*WW**"'T'9' 8' MW'N'**" M** TWY*"-'*1"""'F"W F'4"'**d'"*-"# 'N***'*r* * * ' * *
- d
~
Rdand General Bectnc Ms. Dawn Dressler March 13, 1978 Page Three Olympia Earthquake of 1949 and Intensity at Troian The historic seismicity of the Puget Sound area and its effect on the Trojan Site is discussed on page 2.5-18 of the FSAR and also in the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey letter of July 8,1970.
The intensity of earthquakes assigned to all felt reports is based on damage reports which are descriptors of the Modified Mercalli scale and not as Mr. Hillman would have you believe, the Rainier Postmaster.
Troian Response Spectra John Blume The Trojan PSAR submitted the original response sper.tra.
and Associates, Engineers, who were consultants to tLe Atomic Energy Commission, concluded in early 1970 that the proposed spectra did not
" adequately represent possible seismic. motions at the retetor site"-
and recommended specific modifications. The recommendation on response spectra and the recommendations of USGS on base ground acceleration were used as the basis for PGE's proposed Trojan seismic criteria. These criteriaAt were subsequently accepted by the AEC Staff their 123rd meeting in July 1970, these and their consultants.
criteria were reviewed and approved by the ACRS.
Geophysical Work of 1972
' The allegation here is that this work did not entail a full geological investigation. This is true. The total scope of geological investi-gation is the sum total of all work performed by all consultants.-
The purpose of the geophysical work performed under the direction of the Trojan Geophysical Advisory Board was to direct the specific the geophysical studies requested by the intervenors and interpret results. As su ch , this eff ort was only one element of the total studies.
~
Kelso-Longview Fault
) This f eature was studied 'by Bechtel Corp. and their conclusion is that this f ault zone "is not significant to the Trojan Site". This
';/ is presented on page 2.5-28 of the FSAR. This conclusion was further substantiated by studies of the Trojan Geophysical Advisory Geophysical i this f ault zone is con-
' Advisory Board. On page 59 of their report,This was further reviewed and cluded to be 10-12 million years old.
' accepted by the AEC in their Safety Evaluation Report of October 7,1974.
< f w tp ..c 3
97 j e cs.
g W .* Ces
4 PoRTbAND OENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY Ms. Dawn Dressler March 13, 1978 Page Four We have over the past month furnished the State Geologist with material for his current review, and we have every anticipation of once again being given a report which favorab.ly I.ecogniz_es._ ,the scope of and conclusions to the studies which were done.
We appreciate this opportunity to respond to Mr. H111 man's statement.
Sincerely, M. -- A!
W. J. Lindblad Vice President Engineering-Cons truetion WJL/m/jdh/3.1A7
/. : y % ; L 5 >F- es:st. k:..a..:, ,
T'S l .' :
~ f w .:' N . - .u,lE ' o u ) % c v,'hh u ek li, ea .'-n= c5 ;)- * = " ? % s b-
- ' ; ;s
. . ... . -n.: u >$ e~:(nk s. Ja o ya, -Se-6 -'
s
==* p h V'NYh b 4C y 1
e e ,-4,--,.y-. ..- , , . .m,e,- .+,,,.s, , yew w -,,.,-.,---c.m.,,.,.c--w., ,mm-y-%,,ev.** e- ,. - - , .w. .,,-+-4,-v-e <- -- e. e.-.n- ~ -
s PonTLAxn C.ExcnAL ELucTarc COMPANY let S.W. S ALwoM SrmerT PCRTLAND,CREOCN 97204 wn tuAM J. UN o3 LAD mer e.esican March 13, 1978 Ms. Dawn Dressler, Chairperson Energy Facility Siting Council 12701 S. E. Salmon Court Portland, OR 97233
Dear Ms. Dressler:
TROJAN NUCLEAR PLANT Testimony of Mr. Frederick R. Hillman On February 14, 1978 Mr. Frederick R. Hillman, presented testimony to the Energy Facility Siting Council on the subject of geologic and seismologic investigations associated with the. Trojan Nuclear Plant. The allegations contained in Mr. Hillman's testimony is the subject of this letter.
As Mr. Hillman admits his presentation was based on only part of the public record, it is my purpose here to supplement the gaps. I do, however, wish to first make the following fundamental observations:
, 1. The geologic and seismologic evaluation of the Trojan Plant was the product of a team of consultants whose professional repuca-tions are outstanding. Their effort has been supported by the
,tritical review of the U. S. Coast & Geodetic Survey (consul-tants to the then Atomic Energy Commission); the U. S. Geological 11urvey (also consultants to the Atomic Energy Commission); the expert consultant staf f to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; and Mr. Raymond Corcoran, State Geologist. It is of interest that the U. S. Geological Survey, and the consultant staff to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards were (and in the case of the ACRS consultants, still are) reviewers of I every nuclear plant site application in the United States.
Thus, Trojan was subjected to a uniform application of standards l for acceptability.
l
- 2. In all of Mr. Hillman's narrative, the single most interesting l fact is that he has not of fered one new piece of geologic l l
evidence.
Alluding to some of Mr. Hi11 man's specific remarks I would further comment as follows:
January 26, 1972 Wall Street Journal Article i This subject is not a new revelation. As a matter of record, a ,
l report on this article was made to the Nuclese and Thermal Energy Council on March 7,1972 by Mr. Doug Heider, who was rt the time for PGE, Manager of Public Af fairs.
l
- . ~-. - - -
. . - . . _ - . . . - - _ . _ _ . . ~ . .. -- -
l i
Pbruand General Doctne i l
Ms. Dawn Dressler March 13, 1978 ,
Page Two l Early Foundation Excavation The inference here is that PGE presumed a licensing decision without an adequate site review. The early excavation was done at PCE's risk.
It followed over 2 years of study by Company consultants. The geologic and seismologic review by regulatory experts of Trojan began with the submission of the PSAR in June of 1969. These reviews were finally concluded with the issuance of the October 1974 Safety Evaluation Report. During the intervening 5 years and 4 months, the reviewers visited the site on a number of occasions, forwarded many questions to be addressed, took into account all issues raised by outside parties and assured themselves that all substantive issues were properly addressed and disposed.
Microseismic Tests At the time Mr. Corcoran mad'e this request (not recommend), the site was already under excavation and the results of any micro-seismic study would be masked since the site was undergoing elastic rebound. Ultimately, Mr. Corcoran did express his approval of the '
site studies when he signed the NTEC correspondence of April 27, 1972.1 The Hillman statement also does not acknowledge the geologic investigations carried out two years af ter Mr. Corcoran's suggestions under the direction of the Trojan Geophysical Advisory Board which are overwhe'iming in regard to any geologic and seismologic evaluation of the site itself.
Fault Scarps Parallel to U. S. 30 Near Troian
_ This feature was studied in detail by a Bechtel geologist and concluded not to be a fault. The discussion of their review is on page 2.5-21 of the FSAR.
Seismic Design Basis This subject by Corcoran is quoted out of context from the October 16, 1970 Cercoran memorandum. Mr. Corcoran was speculating about the seismicity of the Queen Charlotte Islands' seismic zone and its relationship to Puget Sound. The subject of seismicity in the Queen Charlotte Islands was addressed by the U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey in their letter of July 8,1970. Mort recently, studies of the above area in conjunction with the Satsop Site for Washington Public Power Supply System and the Skagit Site for Puget Sound Power & Light Company, confirmed again the earlier findings.
The conclusion by the NRC in each case was the same; that is, the Queen Charlotte area is seismically. distinct from the Puget Sound l area and one cannot move the seismicity from one area into an adjacent area.
-,n
6 Rrtand Gem Eecinc Ms. Dawn Dressler March 13, 1978 Page Three I
at Trojan Olympia Earthenake of 1949 and Intensity The historic seismicity of the Puget Sound area and its effect on the Trojan Site is discussed on page 2.5-18 of the FSAR and also in the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey letter of July 8,1970.
The intensity of earthquakes assigned to all felt reports is based on damage reports which are descriptors of the Modified Mercalli scale and not as Mr. Hillman would have you believe, the Rainier Postmaster.
Trojan Resoonse Soectra John Blume ;
The Trojan PSAR submitted the original response spectra. J and Associates, Engineers, who were consultants to the Atomic Energy Commission, concluded in early 1970 that the proposed spectra did not
" adequately represent possible seismic. motions at the reactor site" and recommended specific modifications. The recommendations on ,
response spectrs and the recommendations of USGS on base ground I acceleration were used as the basis for PGE's proposed Trojan seismic criteria. These criteria were subsequently accepted by the AEC Staff At their 123rd meeting in July 1970, these and their consultants.
criteria were reviewed and approved by the ACRS.
Geophysical Work of 1972 l l
The allegation here is that thisThe work did not entail a full geological tocsi scope of geological investi-investigation. This is true.
gation is the sum total of all work performed by all consultants.
The purpose of the geophysical work perfctmed under the direction of the Trojan Geophysical Advisory Soard was to direct the specific the l geophysical studies requested by the intervenors and interpret I results. As such, this eff ort was only one element of the total I s tudies.
Kelso-Longview Fault This feature was studied by Bechtel Corp. and their conclusion This is that this f ault tone "is not sigaificant to the Trojan Site".
is presented on page 2.5-28 of the FSAR. This conclusion was further substantiated by studies of the Trojan Ceephysical Advisory Geophysical Advisory Board. On page 59 of their report, this f ault zone is con-cluded to be 10-12 million years old. This was further reviewed and accepted by the AEC in their Saf ety Evaluation Report of October 7,1974.
, \ MI is D
6], NOV 13197g3 e
DJ.*!%
W f y ..
GEOLOGIC HAZARDS REVIEW TROJAN NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SITE COLUMBIA COUNTY, OREGON OPEN FILE REPORT 78-1 STATE OF OREGON DEPARTMENT OF GEOLOGY AND MINERAL INDUSTRIES i.
March 14, 1978 Rickg[w _. 94
- , , , -+ --,r- - , , , - - , w --. , , .v-,r--- , - - , , - - p , g y
ERRATA p.12, line 12 - Change to read. . . 0 cents and Ivey reviewed all major 6 lineaments surroundi=g the site.
g p. 12, line 15 - Remove (1972).
Bibliography Add - Coombs to Itschner, June 16, 1970, A geologic reconnaissance of Trojan
Euclear Plant Site.
ERRATA p.12, line 12 - Change to read. . . . Coombs and Ivey reviewed all major lineaments surrounding the site.
- p. 12, line 15 - Remove (1972).
31blichraphy Add - Occabs to Itschner, June 16, 1970, A geologic reconnaissance of Trojan Nuclear Plant Site.
ZRRATA A
- p. 12, line 12 Change to read. . . .0 cents and Ivey reviewed all major lineanen'.s
,,, surrounding the site,
- p. 12, line 15 - Remove (1972).
31.,lict-achv Add - Ocombs to Itschner, June 16, 1970, A geclegic reconnaissance of Tre;an Nuclear ?lant Site.
l ll l
1 l
l l
l l
i i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 CONCLUSIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 l 1
RECOMMEN0ATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 e I N D I N GS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Faults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Regi onal Fa ul ts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Site Faults. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Earthquakes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 ,
Mic oearthquakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Mass Movement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Volcanic Hazard. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Fl oo d H a z a rd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 GE0 LOGIC REFERENCES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 ATTACHMENTS a) Letter from Fred Miller to Donald Hull - Jan. 18, 1978 . . . 32 b) Letter from Donald Hull to Fred Miller - Jan. 26, 1978 . . . 33 c) Letter of solicitation from 00GAMI - Jan. 30, 1978 . . . . . 36 d) Memo to 00GAMI staff from Donald Hull - Feb. 23, 1978. . . . 37 e) Recipients of letter dated Jan. 30, 1978 . . . . . . . . . . 38
f) Respondents of letter dated Jan. 30, 1978 January 30 - February 21. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Feb rua ry 21 - Ma rch 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 March 1 - March 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
,, - - , . , w s-.-.,-.-m---,---r -,,---r-e-, 6 r w -s v - - - + , mi-- -,y-,-.-rv -n-.-,w- --%,. w---.-wwww-,-.w.-r-,,vv-vy-4-s-w wwww-,-,1-i.o-w,-, ww- , v vc w <- w e ir -- v -
1_
INTRODUCTION On January 18, 1978, the State of Oregon Department of Energy requested the assistance of the Oregon Department of Geology and Minera; Industries in the evaluation of geologic information relating to the Trojan nuclear power plant site. The specific purpose was to determine whether there were any new facts which reflected on the safety of temporary spent fuel storage or plant operation. A presentation of the findings of the review was requested for the Energy Facility Siting Council in late February or on March 14, 1978.
This report summarizes the conclusions, recommendations, and findings formulated by the Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries in responding to these specific requests.
A concerted effort was made to collect all available information on the Trojan Site and to interpret that data dispassionately. The procedure followed in the investigation included the followirg elements:
(1) Data collection including solicitation of new information from a variety of persons and agencies (Attachments C and D).
(2) Identification of plausible hazards including regional and local faults, earthquakes, microearthquakes, mass movement, volanic hazards, and floods.
, (3) Interpretation of data pertaining to plausible hazards and including geologic analysis and interviews with a variety of persons, both public and private.
(4) Summarization of findings and development of conclusions and recommendations.
_m
4
_2 A list of references consulted in this investigation is included at the conclusion of this report, l
l l
1 l
l
.., l
,- + - , - . , . , - - ,
v~v" . - . ;-- --
- . . . e.. . ... . v , , , e e.vw
.y;, ?:
. ......... , ...:. e, p.
N %. : \.. .
.- ,M mones s
{
j*** ') ' .,
! s..q. .... j) o q#l} -
_ . . i j * , Ne
^
g/
~T'*'"- .,.
=
,fs,. - 5' ;
l ^
i i
.. hs v.
s...
a.
. .**r*
.* .. . L 'e > , grensng
~
saarns '
, {
NG W A S e i ,
J
, y
\
., g '
4
-@**(k/
I m.
la-
.e
~
'~
Q. ,
d;,
ft_, ' '-' - -
. p..m .
,- .w I. .
... .ww . , . . / i __ o-
. i g
\,
u- * .
{ .,
s ..
. ,a ..
p" .
c u ......
i..,*
(
. ,l, .,
- * *
- P
. a , ...
r.
,., h
~
[ ,
. a
-TC -
. .J (
f
..=.
l _ /.h "...
['
'f 0 >R E G 0 N, 3 :
- I y ._ f ~~
,f
= .
[
. 4 0 j
'=s .
' ~
\ f *\
. L i j
\
( ,h.r:. h dt '"' 4
~
_,..s l
'5***^
c --
.j
, ,,7 2.,i.
.. .~i .
TROJAN NUCLEAR PLANT 7tgure 2.1-1 Regional Map from F 5 Ast
e .. a
' I
, ;$) 4f .
a' ap; 4g , y&.
gd uw l,bh ';hf u{,4 ,p ,,o; .,
+ : 1 w[, .g j.
/ '
j gs'sn.fm kkw y /' .e,y>S.
Af1$ , g n" ' , ',
. .c
, 4y ,- ];
]. 7 ?
4 4M(;4s;>>tf.M,m u '. ill y
?
C,y y ,
- u. f.t.b. .p NtQ~Y y n w0 ,'. o '.,
ls .plU q/l / fi s/
1 ol l /.le l
['x e , f.Z -
' g .. -
> ~ / ~
,ye. -,.- i jN e}
g u gtv yi. n
/
,4>1 *
- s. l .
- m. sya ..
4n.lWF. 9 .
t -
',I t*
..; yW -
. m.gr f_,y'lfaQ'"v...i9 t .p i- '.
. ,j 1 1
i; S4 ,h. >
. .cg,.y;M in g ;,,&
/
h '
y [
q, {'y3j L./
'- y,, m. yh9 ,<.~-\
vy y ;'J*1'Y'; 'l
- f t$
l l yn?
vq wl S h{f a;g/w ){
t.
k l
g (
)
{
e l
' Ey e /, ,Ee%
,Y'C .;fw ],4yh,e.g s , ; .
f.,?p:'
f-
- j. ;.
is:A,w3' .y[;su;f D$
.'. ,f ..
y s
- n' ., .
yt. ng:
<i . K.a((m*3-v,7=.pe.2
. /.
j.,y ' i {-
1 . ._
- 1
= .b
.' ..t
.Y
)' ,- .
- 'v 3r {;
., : ; ,d s
', a;.y; - e , .Y h.. '
%.fc.e .r .. . . c. @ r < 3 8.g4' N ; o ,T . . ..
- x $ ('ya ;
' - s
- . f -
,,i.45mLm%
(
c .y,w,, y:; t n,w x' ., '
t 1 2 6;~<2&nn.$wmn%
e.
. .c l
i, # . . g , ,'
-t s
' g
%p p&o 5 .b gw i ,m'q.-. Ei
. . >)
,y cg{$
l
.w
.[,
. } ,
Sd.p&
. y.
sy. '.
b1
,^
4 s
c, -
[y, i w$&i%., .!
.! f,. 4@
).
- f. 7 v\, ,g'M 3 -- .' .
_.v~-&e, p:
-}. , .n ' A n, b ie Q..
- 7
- f. , uyd .
p+,\h,' i.
- 3
- w ;.5.~..-
f.My.. vy/
~W.'.j I'
- ' 3 '
.i a *-v (
,. yp.
. s h{y ,.pt,
. f. mlW:fg xl m'+f. ? ;h s
' . s.\g/ 's. vf ,L
, - f -
% .e y sy m - ,aj'-
't' i .
ew{.. ;(, ..a,'.
- a' - ,
v' - ' _
M g
q yf9u&g.,
- ,1
,o.
p\ \
f, '
.( t
.Q , .
'ij ',, ). .i.
i
. y' -, 'c
,8-
]
- 5 lp'nn;e*gf.> '.
.v y, Rq
) . .-
5t . y, .. , y .t.,'_g. 9m" .- -
j r
T ;y%'-
5 .
t'* '. .
' r . ,
.\ p ,. f
-f. ?.9.i,i f.a tc;/'
.\. .
w;,;I, I
- N<q)
Y( 'f'f.-
,t~
A' , /,'[' -
/
- .']%.
. L:;';'..'.
./ 'l t ,; -
)
_ ,t' 4+ _ ,k
_n.K p .
.* ' . '? ;
-t s.
.f u'*-), +w .. -
. *: y.
g'
}'s , {g. g. <
7%
,. ,[ '
. lh ,q,p, s .",k.-
s' ..
<Y1..,i' t >
t',
.- . . ' it l- : y ,.'{ _
?=i 3;;
l i- l
CONCLUSIONS Geologic understanding of Oregon is continually evolving as new data, new techniques of analysis, and new models of the earth's crust are developed. Final analysis of the adequacy of any site in an absolute sense is therefore not possible. However, best conclusions in terms of given standards at given points in time are possible. Periodic review can insure that new data are considered. Available geologic data viewed collectively support the following conclusions at this time:
(1) Faults are tectonic structures along which differential slippage of earth materials has occurred parallel to the fracture plane.
Lineaments, tectonic stress fields, and plate tectonic theories are coninonly linked with one another to produce structural hypotheses of regional scope. Although these hypotheses guide our evaluations of a site, they do not replace the site specific data gained from traditional mapping techniques. J (2) No active faulting affecting Quaternary units in the area surrounding the site is evident, although geologic maps are available on a variety of scales. In addition, no lineaments cross Quaternary units based on presently available information.
Geophysical studies, including gravity studies, reveal no large faults passing through the slough area or beneath the Columbia River. It is worth noting that similar gravity studies strongly suggest faulting in the Portland area.
l p
1 1
l (3) No new seismic data are available to change the conclusion in the Trojan FSAR that potential seismicity of the site area, as indicated in the historic record and in the regional distri-
^
bution of seismic events, is adequately portrayed in site design._
(4) A microearthquake study at this time would probably produce l ambiguous results in view of expected high noise levels, low historic seismicity, and poorly defined objectives in terms of defined structures or seismic event clustering.
(5) Mass movement does not pose a threat to the facility.
1 (6 i Floods of meteorologic and dam collapse origin are adequately considered in the Trojan FSAR document.
(7) Potential volcanic activity does not pose a significant threat to the facility. !
l (8) Recently developed information on the possibility of landslide dam release of water upstream on the Columbia River (Portland General Electric,1978) reasonably supports the conclusion that landslide dam release does not pose an undue threat to the 1 l
facility. l 1
(9) The most significant geologic data and information that we can 1 foresee being developed within the earth science comunity in the future include: (1) more precise data on laterites and Pleistocene units. (2) improved recognition and interpretation of lineaments and better definition of northwest and northeast 1
trending structures that may exist, (3) a more complete seismic !
1 record for the State through the operation of a statewide seismic f l
I i
- 1
net, (4) more complete information on landslide dams along the Columbia River, (5) more precise province definition, and (6) more precise tectonic models. We respectfully reouest the opportunity to review our conclusions in the event that new information contradicts them and/or necessitates additional studies.
In summary, we know of no geologic reason, based on presently available information. to reasonably question the geologic adequacy of the site for safe plant operation or for temporary storage of spent fuel. The various findings leading to these conclusions are described below.
I 1
I l
l 1
- w- - - - w- h y
f 1
RECOMMENDATIONS Due to the ever increasing volume of pertinent geologic data in Oregon, it is recomnended that the Energy Facility Siting Council con-sider the systematic and periodic review of the geology of the Trojan Site on regular intervals of possibly ten years, or more frequently if significant new data so require, or if licensing procedures so require.
Clear definition of agency responsibility for requesting and initiating such reviews of available new data and clear definition of the means of financing of such periodic reviews is needed.
1
.g.
FINDINGS Faults A fault is a tectonic structure along which differential slippage of the adjacent earth materials has occurred parallel to the fracture plane. Faults can be speculated on the basis of linear features identi-fied by remote sensing techniques. Although movement has not been demon-strated along these features, such movement is regarded as possible.
Plate tectonic theory, as it is applied to the northwestern part of the United States, is suggestive of nany zones of large scale displacement or othemise structural significance. Included are a variety of tectonic models for the northwest trending Brothers Fault Zone (historically not active) in central Oregon and its possible extension to the northwest or the southeast. Also included are the possibility of major north-south structures which truncate the Brothers Fault Zone at its presently mapoed extremities, and the possibility of northeast trending displacements or structural zones. Plate tectonic models of these sorts guide our inquiry into the seismicity of given regions, but do not supplant more rigorous data with regard to given sites.
Lineaments are features at the earth's surface with a variety of plausible interpretations and explanations as to their origin and struc-tural geologic significance. Lineaments of regional extent ccanonly are linked with olate tectonic theories to produce hypotheses of regional displacement for later checking in the field. Regional lineaments of structural significance may represent primary structures, secondary 1
+~m- e owee -e yti---w< =.=v,ys'w ,e-se gr---m"'we--r-ev---r vv em4--et-- - - - - + + , - --r-yv-wee ree,r %w' '
structures, active structures, inactive structures, or assemblages of structures, each of which is subject to a wide variety of interpretive models available for more critical analysis.
With regard to plate tectonic theory and the identification of lineaments, it is noteworthy that northwest trending lineaments have been identified in northwest Oregon and may represent a zone of one or more faults including the Portland Hills Fault. Recent interpretations also suggest that the fault zone in the Portland area may cor*ist of a series of en echelon faults of 10 to 15 kilometers length. The existence of a Portland Hills Fault has been fairly well established by personnel of the Departrent of Earth Sciences at Portland State University. The sig-nificance of linear features of northwest trend outside the Portland metropolitan area generally has not been established as well in terms of structural origin or possible fault activity.
Other linear trends of undetermined significance are also noted.
Researchers at Gregon State University have noted the presence of nortn-east trending lineaments of undetermined significance in the ncr:rwestern part of Oregon and southwestern Washington. They state tnat the lineaments at present pose no serious cuestions as to the geologic suitability of the Trojan Site.
Corcoran (October 16,1970) speculated that tne Queen Charlotte Island Fault may extend soutn of its present mapced distribution as dees Grcn (Maren 21,1970) in an earlier meno to Corcoran. Recent progress in the definition and interoretation of seismo-tectonic provinces indicates tnat tnis particular speculation is not new succcrted by the f acts.
11 -
Regional Faults The tectonic map of North America (Xing,1969) indicates a hypothet-ical fault along the Columbia River in its north trending segment which passes by the Trojan Site. A later version of the map by the same author produced in 1974 does not show such a fault. The State geologic maps of Oregon and Washington show no fault at this location. Present information on the lineament trend in question is better explained in terms of a southwest dipping monocline. The State Bouguer gravity anomaly maps do not indicate a large scale fault in the vicinity of the site along the ri ver. Deflections in the gravity field are indicated in the Portland Hills area where the Portland Hills Fault is mapped, but not nearer the Trojan Site.
A Portland Hills fault at Portland is fairly well documented with a variety of geomorphological, geological and geophysical and geochemical evidence. Seismicity of the fault or of the Portland area is adequately described in the literature. Seismicity of the Portland area, however, has not been directly linked to the probable Portland Hills Fault.
Recent data on buried volcanic ash suggests that near-surface disruption of earth materials is not occurring, but the evidence is in need of further refinement. Historic seismicity of the Portland area is localized and does not extend to the Trojan Site. The extensions of the Portland Hills Fault, if projected to the northwest, pass 15 to 18 miles southwest of the Trojan Site, although there is no geologic evidence available at the present time to support these extensions. L 4[
o wq vy- --
.y---vy.rw-g ,yg ~w- p-wy y-i y ,y g. 9 _g py- r,,, y g wyq9, atopyy...,genrygy,g.%,,saq- --
9- ggwg- ww,,--y a
. . - .. . _ - - = . _ _. .- _ _ .- .. . - = -. - - . . .-
12 -
In the Camas area of Washington, a northwest trending fault is indicated by Mundorff (1959) to cut Pliocene sediments. There is no evidence of great extent for this feature, although it does parallel other lineaments and structures which may have a regional extent according to p some interpretations. Regional evidence from other areas to the eaN I indicates that northwest trending faulting of materials now at the surface in Oregon and Washington ceased 3.5 - 4.5 million years ago.
Northwest trending lineaments of possible_ structural significance to the Trojan Site were noted by Corcoran in March 3,1970, and were mapped 7 W.
by Corcoran in a memo of May 21, 1970. Coombs (1972) inventories ail gy1M faults within 50 miles of the sit _e. The Trojan FSAR reviews all known faults within 200 miles of the site. Coombs and Ivey (1972) review all major lineaments within 150 miles of the site. Corcoran (July 27 and October 16,1970) acknowledged the inventory of linears conducted by Coombs UN 4
and Ivey (1972). Lineaments are subjectively identified and they will b-I continue to be identified as the resolution of remote sensing techniques I
continues to imorove. The significance of lineaments must be carefully evaluated in view of the many possible explanations of their origin.
I Studies are presently proposed to assist in the objective interpretation of the significance of lineaments in Oregon.
The fault at the Kelso interchange is reviewed in the Trojan PSAR and the FSAR; displacement is restricted to Eocene units and the distribution of the fault is local according to presently available information. Similar I structures noted elsewhere in the Coast Range of Washington are considered Y
.en s
I e , w,r i y -w .,*-me-- s .3-,rerm a + um e-ve iin ---c-e -veee ew - - ,a -w ~+ w e v e-r e-e -e e-- i re== *e- -se='r*-w* e - w evee e
- w e w-e-w- se
- w o - + ewe- w-a see w*-we ai- w-v ewe e ve, - e>wer-~--ea-+-m - , + - * "
to be of diapiric origin. Secondary shears in the fault zone trend toward Pliocene sediments which are not affected by faulting. Corcoran (March 3,1970 and May 21,1970) interpreted a northwest trend in the faulting at tne interchange. Cowlitz River terraces of Pleistocene age on trend with the structure are undeformed indicating a pre-Pleistocene age of faulting at that locality if substantial movement occurred. Sense of displacement on the fault at the interchange is normal (PSAR appendix G) rather than strike-slip.
A hypothetical fault along the segment of the Columbia River adjacent to the Trojan Site has been oostulated. Geophysical studies designed to detect large scale faulting included gravity studies, aeromagretic studies, seismic refraction studies and resistivity studies. Evidence was not indicative of a fault in the area suggested. A fault conceivably could still exist at this location but remain undetected by the geophysical studies owing hypothetically to peculiarities of local geologic units. ,
It is noted, however, that smaller scale gravity maps and aeromagnetic maps of the area also do not indicate faulting. Also, a gravity study of similar design in the Portland area did detect faulting in the latter area, although additional kinds of geophysical studies (aeromagnetic studies, resistivity studies, or seismic refraction) were not employed. Studies of these types were performed in the Trojan Site area with negative results.
Possible faulting in the slough west of the Trojan plant is not supported by gravity, seismic refraction, resistivity, or aeromagnetic studies, nor is it supported by examination of the geology of the cliffs
- 14 - ,
h
. on trend with the slough fault postulated by workers. Groh ( August 21, 1970) and the FSAR note that faults are not evident in the cliffs over- .
I looking the slough area. ,
Determination of recency of movement on mapped faults can be pursued .
in several ways including laterite study, volcanic ash analysis, Pleistocene ;
stratigraphic unit analysis, and seismic history correlation. Because !
- laterites are faulted in the region surrounding the site, the age of the laterites provides us with a crude estimate of the time after which faulting
! was still occurring. An early Pliocene to late Miocene age is at present J generally accepted for the age of the laterites. This age determination is most consistent with the geologic and topographic distribution of the laterite but is subject to on-going reinterpretation. Pliocene faulting is !
. i indicated. The distribution of subsurface ash deposits recovered in drill :
cores provides us with time datum with which to bracket the upper ages of l i
possible faulting, provided adequate data en the age of the ash is available.
l Presently the ash data are not complete. The ash layer resulting from the eruption of Mt. Mazama is 6600 years old and is not displaced in the Portlanc a rea. This can be explained either by lack of faulting on :ne Portland Hills Fault or parallel faults, by exclusive strike-slip faulting, or oy 1
- diffusion of fault displacement in the unconsolidated decosits in which the l
ash occurs. Presently recognized differences in elevation and the distri-1 1 bution of tne ash relative to mean sea level can be explained in terms j of pre-existing topography, or environment of deocsitien within a large fluvial system, or structure. Evidence of offset of Quaternary units cas -
d
-ma, n- n n n-- n,ve--av ne~.-n.ene,-.,.-,,,-n-o,, - - - , - - - ,,-,v ---,,-,,,-w,,--,-s,--e-----.w-- .,,~,n-.,-w..n- ,-,n, -w,-- -nne,.r,,~, e
actively sought along faults and lineaments in the investigations for the site. No such offset was discovered. No lineaments noted either by the operator or by others are indicated as passing through Quaternary units.
Quaternary units, as they are presently understood, offer no evidence of Quaternary faulting in the region surrounding the site. Many of the Quaternary deposits are less than 13,500 years old.
Historic earthquakes in the Portland area are consistent with north-west or northeast trending faulting, and are not definitely linked with ,
the postulated Portland Hills Fault. Distribution of the earthquakes is consistent with a variety of possible fault distributions and uniquely ,
supportive of none. The historic earthquake record of the area surrounding the Trojan Site suggests minimal seismic activity in contrast to that of the Portland area.
Site Faults Excavations for construction at the Trojan Site revealed surfaces of small scale displacement of probable pre-Quaternary age as noted by Corcoran (October 16, 1970). No offsets of Pleistocene units are evident.
Data from cores and trenches incorporated into the interpretation of the shear zones are noted in a report by PGE (July 2,1972). The shears average one inch in width and required no dental excavation and filling during the construction phase. Although lineations in Quaternary units were specifically sought with aerial photographs and helicopter reconnaissance, none were found (PSAR Appendix 20). It should be noted laterites are not present at the site and ash deposits are not noted in the core records.
16 -
The shears at the site are mapped and photographed by Content (August 25, )
1970) and are interpreted by Coombs (August 31,1970) to be of probable i'
. Miocene age and to be sympathetic to regional folding at that time.
Earthquakes The Trojan Site is located in the Coast Range Province near the eastern ;
boundary and in a region of historic low seismicity. A map of isoseismals j prepared by Coombs and others (1976) indicated that no intensities greater than VII have affected the site. Preliminary work by Jones (July 8,1970) assigned an intensity in the range of VII to VIII to the site for the Olympia quake but he did not consider the favorable effect of local geology. Woodward and Clyle (1970) interpret a maximum possible intensity of VII for the site.
Byerly (February 5,1969) interpreted a maximum intensity of VII for the site i based on local geology and historic seismicity. The 1872 earthquake in the north Cascades region in Washington State was probably felt at the site with an intensity of IV. Had the earthquake occurred nearer the site at the closest ,
i point within the north Cascades Province, it would have affected the site I with a Mercalli intensity of VI or VII. The complete earthquake history of the site is adequately summarized in supporting documents of the PSAR and the FSAR.
Future projections for seismic activity are based on the historic
. record. Seismically the area is separate and distinct from the Olympia, Washington, area in terms of seismic activity and also is distinct from the 1
Portland area. The largest historic quake of the Portland area could conceivably (
l impact the site with a maximum intensity of VII if it occurred along a specula-tive northwestern projection of the Portland Hills Fault at a point southwest of the site, although a projection of the Portland Hills Fault to this point (
g-,-- -,--wm- -- rym- .,y.,e- -.-w.-- .,,-,e. -,.,,c.--mm-_q.,,,,mv.-,-,-.,-,e3 ..w, ,c w ,.,,,..,--c.&. ,. - , ., -.,_-.-...-,,,,--w. +. - - - - . - -.
i is not supported by present geologic evidence. The competent bedrock nature of the material upon which the site is constructed is favorable in the context of seismic ground response. Studies have shown that bedrock resronse to given earthquakes is generally less severe than the response of unconsolidated materials by a factor of I or II Mercalli Intensities.
Historic acceleration at the site is 0.05 according to Adair (May 21, 1970) and future projected maximum g for the site is 0.11 according to Woodward and Clyde (1970). A local quake of intensity VI could produce an acceleration of 0.15 g according to Jones (July 8,1970) and a distant i
quake producing intensity VII-VIII at the site would yield an acceleration ;
of 0.25 g (Jones, July 8,1970). The site is designed for an OBE of 0.15 g and a SBE of 0.25 g. I Microearthouakes Microearthquakes are small earthquakes in an area which can be detected with special seismic instrument arrays. Analysis of microearthquakes i l
ideally can assist in the interpretation of known structures of special interest or in the interpretation of areas of above average seismic activity.
Corcoran (July 27 and October 16,1970) requests a microearthquake survey for the site.
Design of micreearthquake studies must specifically address the objective being sought and extenuating circumstances at the site in questien.
To identify an active structure, arrays of several kilometers si:e and l capability to monitor events at several kilometers depth are generally I
. required even in areas where specific surface structures or historic or r instrwnentally detected seismic clusters have been identified. Addition-ally, the regional duration of the study is determined in part by the frequency of seismic events and background noise levels. ;
To reasonably identify an active structure results must include a ,
population of seismic events which spatially define a planar surface and for which first motion results are reasonably consistent. With these constraints in mind, it is probable that a microearthquake study at the site would produce ambiguous results in a reasonable time frame. The I historic seismic.ty surrounding the site is very. low and specific objectives in tert..s of known structures or seismic event clusters have not been iden-ti fied. Noise levels are expected to be generally high.
- Completion of a statewide seismic network and operation over a reasonable period of time may identify seismic clusters in Oregon. If such a cluster is located in northwestern Oregon near the Trojan facility, !
microearthquake analysis would possibly be justified.
i Mass Movement Mass movement potential to be considered in the evaluation of the site is the possibility that the bedrock underlying the plant may be a large l
bedrock slide block of regional proportions. This issue is raised in gen- ;
eral terms by Corcoran (May 21,1970).
- Avc'lable geophysical data and geologic information collectively indicate that the site area is underlain by continuous bedrock and that deep mass move- !
ment is not a factor. The site geology differs from large slide blocks
)
\
l
-. - _ . . - - . , - _ _ - . - - . . - , . - . . - . _ . . . . ~ . _ , - - - -
P elsewhere along the Columbia River in general topography and in that the site bedrock is stratigraphically in place. The sloagh area west of the plant is one of a possible set of meanders along this segment of the Columbia River. Drays Mound across the river is an erosional remnant of the Goble Formation similar to that at Trojan Ridge and obviously is not a slide block. Gravity modelling for the site did not produce ambiguous results as would be expected if a slide plane were present at depth. .
Volcanic Hazard Potential volcanic hazards to be considered include ash falls, mudflows, and the release of floodwaters from behind temporary dams of volcanic mud-flow origin. Floodwater release is adequately handled in the FSAR for events on the Lewis River. Mudflows are not a factor at the site due to distance of active or semi-active volcanoes. Ash falls are very improbable owing to the distance from active centers of volcanism and the direction relative.to statistically favored wind directions. Volcanic hazards are under active long-range investigation in the Cascade Range and no new evidence has come to light to require modification of conclusions regarding volcanic hazards as they are presented in the FSAR. ,
Flood Hazard Floods rigorously and adequately analyzed by the FSAR include the following:
. . - - . . - - . - - . . . ~ .-- ., - -.--.-. - ..-- .. - - - .- - .- -
- . . - - . - - _= . - -. - __ . - . -- -
Standard Project Flood (1000 year frequency)
. Ten thousand year flood Probable maximum meteorologic flood Dam failure (Grand Coulee collapse as worst case)
Maximum surge flood Tsunami t Ocean and river surge flood Ice flooding Volcanic dam release of Lewis River Triem (April 11,1972) discounts the possibility of a large landslide dam blocking the Columbia River at Bonneville on the basis of large scale topographic modifications resulting from prior movement on the slide.
In order to complete the public record on potential flooding, on February 24, 1978, a request was placed with Portland General Electric Company to more thoroughly investigate the potential of landslide damming in the Columbia River Gorge regarding the magnitude of future potential slides, if any, and the size of floods that could be generated from such slides if actual damming of the river did, in fact, occur.
Results of the study indicate that " pre-historic landslide movement has essentially removed the cliff forming Columbia River Basalt and Eagle Creek Formations and degraded slopes to a condition which rules out any possibility of a reoccurrance of a quick catastrophic landslide similar to the Bonneville (or Cascade) landslide. On the Oregon side of the Columbia River Gorge all studies indicate that none of the known landslide areas could cause a significant restriction in flow of the river."
G30 LOGIC REFERENCES FOR THE TROJAN NUCLEAR POWER SITE Adair, M.J. (n.d.), Geology, seismology, and foundation conditions: PGE pres.
to ONPSTF on May 21, 1970.
Albee, A.L., and Smith, J.L., 1966, Earthquake characteristics and fault activity in southern California: g Engineering geology in southern California, special pub. af AEC.
Algemiseen, S.T.,1977, Appendix A to U.SGS/NOAA,1977.
Beeson, M., and others, 1975, chapter II, Environmental implications, earthquake hazards and suggestions for further study.
Sechtel Corporation, Oct.1967, revised Jan.1968, Trojan Powder Company prop-erty, Evaluation of foundation, ground water, and seismic conditions.
3enson, G.T., July 2, 1970, Statement.
, July 15, 1970, Letter to R.E. Corcoran.
3 razee, R.J. ,1977, Appendiz 3 to USGS/NOAA,1977.
3romery, R.W., and Scavely, P.D., Jr., 1964, Geologic interpretation of recon-naissance gravity and as.getic surveys in northwestern Oregon: U.S.
Geol. Survey Bull. IlS1-N, scale 1:500,000.
Content, C.S. (n.d.), Progress report on foundation evaluation for the Trojan nuclear power plant site.
Coombs, H. A. ,1953, A sumnary of Washington earthquakes: Bull. Seis. Soc.
America, vol. 43, no. 1, p. 1-5
, Aug. 31, 1970, Letter to L.13. Hodel.
,1972, Paulting in northwestern Oregon and southwestern Washington, with letter of submittal to Kelly Woods by J.L. Williams, dated April 28, 1972.
, Milne, W.G., Nuttli, 0.W., and Slemmons, D.3., 1976, Report of the review panel on the December 14, 1872, earthquake, Appendix A.3.C.
Corcoran, R.E., Mar. 3, 1970, Letter to Governor Oom McCall.
, May 11, 1970, Letter to USGS.
, May 21, 1970, Memo to P. 3ristol, H. 2anta, and R.W. de Weese.
._ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - - _ ~ _ _ __. _ _ _ _ . . _ . - . _ . _ . . _
Corcoran, R.E., May 21, 1970, Letter to Cardonne.
, June 8, 1970, Letter to Wes 3 ruer.
, June 11, 1970, Letter to V. E. Livingston.
, June 16, 1970, Letter to V. E. Livingston.
, July 21, 1970, Letter of transmittal to General Itachner.
, July 21, 1970, Letter to L.F. Williams.
, July 27, 1970, Letter to General E.C. Itschner.
, Oct. 14, 1970, Letter to Lawrence Wilkinson.
, Oct. 16, 1970, Statement of Department of Geology and Mineral Industries regarding proposed PGE nuclear power plant at Trojan.
, Mar. 9, 1971, Letter to Don Willner.
, April 3,1971, Letter to Ted Hallock.
Couch, R.. and Heinrichs, D., July 1972, Gravity survey of Trojan site.
, K=eling, K. , and. Thrasher, G. ,1976, Investigation of the Deschutes Valley, Oregon, earthquake of 12 April, 1976.
Dehlinger, P. , Bowen, R.G. , Chiburia, E.F. , and Westphal, W.H. , 1963, Investi-gations of the earthquake of November 5,1962, north of Portland: cregon Dept. Geology and Min. Ind. Ore Bin, vol. 25, no. 4, scale 1: 334,000.
Docket 50-344 Applicant response to McCoy motion Attachment 2: Excerpts from Trojan Safety Evaluation Report (SER),
issued by the Atomic Energy Commission, dated October 19, 1970.
Attachment 3: U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey letter on Trojan sels-micity, attached as Appendiz D to the above SER.
Attachment 4: U.S. Geological Survey letter en Trojan geology and
- hydrology, attached as Appendix E to the above SER.
Attacb'4ent 5: Excerpts from Trojan Safety Evaluation Report (SER),
issued by the Atomic Energy Commission, dated October 7, 1974.
Attachment 6: Excerpts from "3rief for Petitioners" filed by Portland attorney, John J. Haugh, Case 71-1230, in tne United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (In the Matter of Oregon Environmental Council,
Docket 50-344(cont.)
Northwest Environmental Defense Center. Friends of the 3arth, and Northwest Steelheaders Chapter of Trout Unlimited. Inc.. Petitioners vs. U.S. Atomic Energy ,
Coussission and the United States of America). l Attachment 7. " Memorandum of Agreement" relating to a settlement reached in ASLB proceedings of May 2, 1972 regarding ongoing Trojan construction during detailed NEPA review (Docket 50-344 and Case 71-1230 between Applicants and the Oregon Environmental Council, et al, mentioned above).
Atomic Energy Comunission Agendas November 4, 1970 November 19, 1970 4
McCoy, David B., January 8, 1974, Motion for admission of new contention.
McKeel, Sharon, Paper filed in support of McCoy motion; cites Lawrence,1976; Benson and Balsillie, 1971; and Mundorff, 1959
, Paper filed in support of McCoy motion; discussion of possible strike-elip right latersi fault structures in northwestern Oregon and southwestern Washington.
, Paper filed in support of McCoy motion; discussion of the controversy of the geological siting of the Trojan Nuclear Power Plant in northwestern Oregon.
Energy Pacility Siting Council,1977, Minutes of meeting of Nov. 8,1977, Blue Cross Auditorium, Portland, Oregon.
Exploration Data Consultants, Inc., 1972, Aeromagnetic interpretation for the Trojan Geophysical Advisory Board.
Groh, E.A. ,1970, Letter to R. E. Corcoran dated Aug. 21, 1970.
Halicki, R., Jan.17,197B, Letter to Donald A. Hull.
Hallock, Ted, March 29, 1971, Letter to R. 3. Corcoran.
, June 8, 1972, Letter to Kelly Woods.
Heider, Douglas, March 7,1972, Statement before the Nuclear and Thermal Energy Council.
, April 4, 1972, Letter to Dr. Kelly Woods.
Hendrie, Joseph M., July 17, 1970, Letter to Hon. Glenn T. Seaborg - Report on Trojan Nuclear Plant Unit 1 from Hendrie of Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.
Herron, Robert P., July 3,1967, Letter to Cole R. McClure.
, July 21, 1967, Letter to Cole R. McClure.
,1967, Letter to Cole R. McClure, 3echtel Corporation.
Itschner, 3.0., Sept. 2, 1970, Letter and foundation report to R. 3. Corcoran, with photos.
Jackson, Ronald L.,1971, Description of the ferruginous bauxite ore profile in Columbia County, Oregon: Oregon Dept. Geology and Min. Ind. Ore 31n, vol. 33, no. 12, p. 223-229 Lawrence, R. , and Carter, J. ,1974, Preliminary lineament map of Oregon from ZRTS insgery at 1:1,000,000: Oregon Dept. Geology and Min. Ind. nap.
Livingston, May 8, 1970, Letter to R. 3. Corcoran re Kelso Pault.
, 7.3., June 12, 1970, Letter to R. 3. Corcoran.
lockwood, Kessler, and 3artlett, Inc., July 26, 1972, Operational report -
Aeromagnetic survey at the Trojan Power Plant site, Oregon-Washington.
Mann, Irnn, March 18, 1971, Letter to R. E. Corcoran.
McKean, John W., Sept. 1, 1970, Memo to Larry 3. Wilkinson. I l
, Sept. 21, 1970, Letter to Larry Wilkinson. 1 Morris, Peter, July 27, 1970, Letter to General Itachner re ACRS.
1 Newnann, P. ,1958, ?rovisional map of earthquake zones in the State of Wash-ington.
Newton, 7.0., 1972, Review of geophysical survey report - Trojan Nuclear Power Plant site.
, 1976, Prospects for natural gas production or underground storage of pipeline gas in the upper Nehalem River basin, Columbia and Clatsop Counties, Oregon: Oregon Dept. Geology and Min. Ind. Oil and Gas Invest. 5
,1977, Conference on the 1872 Northwest earthquake, Portland, Oregon, October 28, 1977; personal notes.
Nuclear Plant Siting Task Force, May 21, 1970, Minutes. l
, July 2, 1970, Notice public hearing.
, Cet. 20, 1970, A review of the Trojan Nuclear Power Plant site evaluation.
Oregon Envirennentrl Council, April 4, 1972, Statenent presented to the Oregen h 9 e ud The:T.al Energy Council by the Oregon Environmental Council, at Salem, Oregon
Oregon, State of Agriculture, Department of, Oct. 8, 1970, Letter to Larry F. Wilkinsen ,
from Walter Leth.
Energy, Depe.rtment of,1976, Site certificate application rules for thermal power plants (draft, revised).
Executive Department, Oct. 9,1970, Memo to NTEC frem L.E. Wilkinsen.
, Oct. 9,1970, Memo to Nuclear Plant Siting Task Force by L.W. Wilkinson.
Fish. Connaission, Aug. 11, 1970, Memo to files by James B. Haas re Meulwold letter to NTSC.
Game Commission, Oct. 16, 1970, Statement of Oregon State Game Commission relating to Trejan Nuclear Power Plant.
Geology and Mineral Industries, Department of, Governing 3 card minutes, April 2, 1970; July 10, 1970.
, Oct. 16, 1970, Statement of Department of Geology and Mineral Industries regarding proposed PGE nuclear power plant site at Trojan.
Palmer, Leonard, March 6,1972, Memorandum to Dr. W. Kelly Woods. ;
, Portland State University, Jan. 9,1978, Affidavit of Leonard Palmer Attachment 5 of McCoy motion.
Peterson, R.A. , White, J.E., and Dodds, R. , Aug.1972, Geophysical survey report Trojan Nuclear Power Plant Site.
Portland General Electric Company l Preliminary Safety Analysis Report,1969 Prelisimy Safety Analysis Report, vol.1, April 6,1970.
Appendiz 2D, Supplemental geologic study, 1970.
Trojan Nuclear Plant progress report, PGE activities, Oct.1970.
Trojan Juelear Plant environmental report, vol.1,1971; also amended sections, 1972.
Environmental statement related to operation of Trojan Nuclear 71 ant, Docket 50-3A4, Aug. 1973 i l
Final safety analysis report, vol. 1, June 1976.
Portland General Electric Company (cont.)
Pebble Springs seismic network annual report, Nov.1,1975 to November 20, 1976.
Pebble Springs Nuclear Plant - additional information on the seismicity :
- and tectonics of the Columbia Plateau Attachment 5, n.d. l Press, Edward, M.D., Oct. 7, 1970, Memo to L.E. Wilkinsen.
Stannon & Wilson, Inc., Aug. 7, 1972, Report of electrical resistivity investiga-tion, Trojan Nuclear Power Plant site.
, Aug. 7, 1972, Esport of seismic refraction investigation, Trojan Nuclear Plant site.
Smith, Stewart, Oct. 13, 1970, Letter to PGE re microseismic.
Spies, Kenneth H., Oct. 16, 1970, Statement of Department of Environmental Quality to the Nuclear Development Coordinating Committee regarding the proposed PGE Nuclear Power Plant at Trojan.
Stanford Pesearch Institute,1962, Seismic aftershock investigations - Project 7ELA, Portland, Oregon earthquake of 6 November 1962.
Stover, C.W., 1977, Appendiz C to USGS/NOAA, 1977.
U.S. Atomic Energy Conunission, Division of Reactor Licensing, Nov. 2,1970, Docket 50-344, Summary statement re Trojan Nuclear Power Plant.
,1971, Title 10, Chapter 1, Part 100, Seismic and geologic siting criteria for nuclear power plants; draft by W.B.McCool. j l
, Dec. 5,1973, Title 10, Chapter 1, Part 100, Reactor site criteria.
, 1973, Rules and regulations, Title 10, Atomic energy, Part 100, Heactor site criteria.
U.S. Geological Survey /NOAA, Ad hoc working group on intensities of historic earthquakes, 1977, Maximum intensity of the Washington earthquake of
. Dec. 14, 1872. i 1
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,1977, Affidavit of J. Carl Stepp, Docket Nos.
50-514, 50-515 Wall Street Journal, Jan. 26, 1972, Nucisar power plant in Oregon generates dis-pute over safety; Critics of power plant get an electric response.
Warren, Frank M., March 1,1972, Letter to Frederick Taylor.
Tarren, 7.0., and others,1945, Geology of northwestern Cregon west of the Willamette River and north of latitude 45 15': U.S. Geol. Survey Map CM-42.
l
l l
\
Warwick, H.C. , n.d. , Data Portland to Oregon. j Tells, ?.G., and Peck, D.,1961, Geologic map of Ongen west of the 121st Meridian, 1:500,000.
Theeler, Chris L., Oct. 16, 1970, Statement relating to Trojan Nuclear Power )
Plant site, i Wilkinson, L.3., July 2,1970, Memo to Nuclear Development Coordinating Cc=rittee -
Summation of the public hearing on Trojan Plant, St. Helens, draft.
, July 22, 1970, Memo to Dr. Edward Press.
1
(? ), Jan.12,1970, Trojen Nuclear Plant prognes report, PG3 activities - Dec. 1969 j Wilkinsen, T.D. , Lowry, W.D., and 3aldwin, 3.M. ,1946, Geology of the St. Helens l quadrangle, Oregon: Oregon Dept. Geology and Min. Ind. Bull. 31, 1:62,500. ,
71111sas, J.L., Nov. 16, 1970, Letter to General Itschner.
, Aug. 17, 1972, Letter to Dr. Kelly Woods.
Williams, L.P., July 17, 1970, Letter to R.E. Corcoran. ,
willingham, Jan. 9,1978, Memo to 3111 Toung n WQ-?GE Trojan spent fuel pool j modification.
> Willner, D. , Mar. 5,1971, Letter to a.3. Corcoran.
Woods, W. Kelly, Feb. 14, 1972, Letter to Douglas 3. Heider. I
, Mar. 27, 1972, Letter to Prof. Leonard Falzer. ,
, Mar. 27, 1972, Letter to Paul D. Tries.
, Mar. 29, 1972, Letter to Douglas Heider. i
, April 14, 1972, Letter to Nuclear and Themal Energy Council members.
~
, April 24, 1972, Letter to Leonard Palmer. I i
, April 25, 1972, Draft - Tro:an gecica - Meeting with State Geologist.
, Junw 9,1972, Letter to Ted Halleck.
,1972, Memo to NTEC regarding " Trojan geology - neeting with State Geologist. a ,
Woodward, Clyde and Associates, Nov. 16, 1970, Ground motions, Trojan Ruclear Plant, Oregon.
Unsigned, April 1964, Notes re unlocated boring.
Unsigned, April 22, , Handwritten letter to General Itachner.
n.a., n.d., Answer to question propounded at pre-hearing conference.
n.d., Washington State - Intensity earthquakes from 1365-1951 n.a., n.d., Washington and Oregon, Resume, List of earthquakes 1941-1963.
n.a., n.d., Notes.
S
..,,,-,,,.,-.----.w-,
29 -
Allen, V.T.,1948, Pomation of bauxite from basaltic rocks of Oregon: Econ.
Geol. vol. 43, p. 619-626.
Beeson, M.H., Johnson, A.G., and Moran, M.R., 1975, Portland environmental geology - Pault identification: U.S. Geol. Survey Contract 14-08-0001-14832.
Corcoran, R.E.,1956, Ferruginous bauxite deposits in the Sale:n Hills, Marion County, Oregon: Oregon Dept. Geology and Min. Ind. Bull. 46.
, June 24, 1970, Letter to Debbe Potts, with attachments:
Executive Department approval; re: Authorization to reinstate an elim-insted position, p. g-1.
, July 3, 1970, Memo to Dan Simmons re: Emergency Board request.
, Sept. 24, 1970, Letter to Debbe Potts - Emergency Board.
, cet. 14, 1970, Letter to L.E. Wilkinson.
, Dec. 10, 1971, Letter to Emergency Board.
, May 1,1972, Letter to John D. 3ums.
, and Elfstrom R.L. , June 7,1972, Letter to Energency Board.
, July 7, 1942, Letter to Emergency Board.
, March 15, 1973, Letter to Emergency Board.
, March 15, 1973, Letter to Emergency Board. f Couch, R., Johnson S., and Gallagher, J.,1968, The Portland Earthquake of May 13, 1968, an earthquake energy release in the Portland area: Cregon Dept. Geology and Min. Ind. Ore 31n, vol. 30, no. 10, p. 155-190.
Couch, R.W. , and Lowell, R.P. ,1971, Earthquakes and seismic energy release in Oregon: Cregon Dept. Geology and Min. Ind. Ore Bin, vol. 33, no. 4, I
- p. 61-83 Couch. R.W., Victor, L., and Kelling, K., 1974, Cgastal agd offshore earth-
, quages of thg Pacific Northwest between 39 and 49 10' N. Latitude and 123 and 131 W. Longitude: Oregon State Univ. Dept. Oceanography and Oregon Dept. Geology and Min. Ind.
Dehlinger, ?. , Couch, R.W., and Gesperle, M.,1968, Continental and oceanic structure from the Oregon coast westward across the Juan de Fuca Ridge:
Canadian Jour. of Earth Scienses 5, 1079 (1968), p. 1079-1090.
Dehlinger, P. , Couch, R.W. , McManus , D. A. , and Genperle , M. ,1971, 4. Northeast Pacific structures g The Sea, vol. 4, part II, ed. by Maxwell, pub. by John Wiley and Scus, p. 133-189 F' -'us-' c 1w -i --r-ygi.---v,, . , - - - a,- -
g -+,w.--.w,-p- , r-- , . - - * -. g ,.y_, y , ,, .,,f,_m..,. .- ,,- . , _ _ _ . , _ . . , . , _ . . , . , . _
P Hammond , P.E. , Benson, G.T . , Cash, D.J . , Palmer, L. A. , Donovan, J . , and
. Gannon, B., 1974, A preliminary geologic investigation of the ground effects of earthquakes in the Portland metropolitan area, Oregon:
unpub. rept. to U.S. Geol. Survey.
Heider, Douglas, March 7,1972, Statement before the Nuclear and Thermal Energy 1 Council.
Hook, John W.,1976, Perruginous bauxitos of the Pacific Northwest: Oregon Dept. Geology and Min. Ind. Open Pile Report 0-76-3, 26 p.
Libbey, P.W., et al,1945, Perruginous bauxitos in northwest Oregon: Oregon Dept. Geology and Min. Ind. Bull. 29, 97 p.
Livingston, 7.3., Jr., 1966, Geology and mineral resources of the Kelso-Cathlames area, Cowlitz and Wahkiakum Counties, Washington: Wash. Div.
Mines and Geology Bull. No. 54.
Nuclear Plant Siting Task Porce, July 2,1970, In the matter of site applica-tion for Trojan Nuclear Plant by Portland General Electric Company; Esarings officer: C.E. Leierer - includes written testimony.
Oregonthermal I apartment of plants power Energy,(1976, Site certificate application rules for draft, revised).
Peterson, R.A. , White, J.E. , and Dodds, R.K. , Aug.1972, Geophysical Survey report of Trojan Nuclear Power Plant site.
Beiche, P.,1950, A suney of weathering processes and products: Univ. New ,
Mexico Pubs. in Geol. no. 3, rev. ed., 95 p. !
Shannon & Wilson, 1972, Seismic regionalization studies, Benneville Power Admhistration service area, Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and western Montana: report to Agbabian and Assoc., El Segundo, California, l
Sims, John D., Determining earthquake recurrence intervals from d ifor.sational !
features in young lacustrine sedi:nents.
1 Thiruvathukal, J.Y., Berg, J.W., Jr., and Heinrichs, D.P., 1970, Regional l gravity of Oregs : Geol. Soc. America Bull, vol. 61, p. 725-736.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cornission, 1975, Standard format and content of safety analysis reports for nuclear power plants: NUEEG-75/094, Hegu-latory Guide 1.70, Revisien 2.
l l
l l
l 1
I Rockwell International, Febraary 14-16, 1978, Tectonics and seismicity of the Columbia Plateau vance, J.A., The pre-Ymirima basement of the Washington Cascades; Swanson, D.A., and Wright, T.L. , Some important facts and inferences concerning the Columbia River Basalt Group; Waitt, R.B., Jr., Post-Miocene stratigraphy and tectonism of parts of the Great Columbia Plain and adjacent Cascades, Washington; Malone, S.D., A review of eastem Washington seismicity; Beck, M.E., Jr., Summary of tectonic models for the origin of the ColumF a River Plateaus Keinle, C.P., Jr., and others, Western Columbia Plateau tectonic l structures and their age of defo mation.
Washington Public Power Supply System,1977, Preliminary safety analysis report; Volume 2A Subappendix 2rC, Davis, G.A.,1977, Tectonic evolution of the Pacific Northwest pre-Cambrian to present.
Shannon & Wilson, March 6, 1978, Columbia River Gorge slide studies, Oregon and Washington Rept. to Portland General Electric Company, 23 p.
Palmer, L.,1977, Large landslides of the Columbia River Gorge, Oregon and i Washington: Geol. Soc. America Reviews in Engineering Geology, vol. III, {
- p. 69-83. l 1
l I
l l
9
RECEmg ML
~
Department of Energy ;
Room 111, Labor & Industries Building, k - '
f , **".'.1f"" 52K)CQUAGE(E20ET)hf,EX, SALEM. OREGON 97310 PHONE 3784123 January 18, 1978 Mr. Don Hull State Geologist Department of Geology and ttineral Industries 1069 State Office Building Per land, Oregon 97201 Cear Don, A we discussed yesterday, there is considerable renewed public interest ii. the seismic character of the Trojan Nuclear Plant site. And, as you kr.cw, the Board has rejected an intervenor's contention relating to geological issues at the current Nuclear Regulatory Comission hearing.
The issues that have been raised relate to (1) whether the record is clear on the development of the state's conclusions regarding the suit-ability of the site in the early 1970s, and (2) the substantive issue of geological considerations relating to the safe operation of the plant and on-site storage of s::ent fuel.
I want the Cepartment of Energy and the Energy Facility Siting Council to have ne benefit of your expert analysis. I would apareciate your coment on the available studies and your review of any new infcmaticn related to tne geology of the site. I am interested in deternining wnether there are any new facts wnich reflect on :ne safety of spent fuel '
storage or plant operation or which incicate that acditional research is recuired. A presentation of your finoings to tne Council in either late Feoruary or at the regular Council meeting on Maren 14, 1978 would be '
approoriate.
Sincerely, Nd Fred D. Miller Director FCM:bj cc: Bud Kramer Janet McLennan Bill Young Charlie Davis .
EFSC Members -
l 7~~~ '
% Department of Geology and Mineral Industries ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
"'"' af ' 1C69 STATE OFFICE ELOG.. PORTLAND, OREGON 97201 PHONE (503) 229-5580 1
January 26, 1978 1
Dr. Fred D. Miller, Director State Department of Energy 111 Labor & Industries Bldg.
Salem,' Oregon 97310
Dear Fred:
Thank you for your letter of January 18, 1978, requesting a review of the geology of the Trojan nuclear plant site near Rainier in Columbia County.
I brougnt your request to the attention of the Governing Board of the Department of Geology and Mineral Industries at its regular quarterly meet-ing on January 19, and the Board agrees that we should undertake such a review.
We have begun a ccmpilation of existing data and would appreciate ycur help in securing copies of all relevant materials. In this regard, would you please send us cocies of all the maps and reports in your files which cor.tain pertinent information. We will also be requesting similar assistance from the ocerator.
2., additien to the existing data, we will review any geologic facts which have beccme available since tne latest reports were written. After integrat-ing all of the infor ation, we will report our findings to you in late Fe::ruary or early March 1978.
Perhaps we can meet with you and your staff in the near future to answer the 4
follcwing questions: (1) what geologic hazards are to be evaluated, and (2) wnat standards are to be used in evaluating the geologic acecuacy of tne plant vis-a-vis on-site storage of spent fuel and plant operation. The issue of the adequacy of present data in addressing geologic ha:ards is not easily resolved and may be answered only with clear definitions of the intended use and the standards against which available information is to be measured.
In order to clarify the record on development of the State's conclusions in the early 1970's regarding the suitability of the site prior to the existence of the Energy Facilities Siting Council and prior to vesting of review authority for geological matters in the Decartment of Geology and Mineral Industries, we have enclosed a chronological tabulation of corresocncence in 1970 anc 1972. These letters and memoranda summarized concerns of
Dr. Fred D. Miller Page 2 January 26, 1978 Mr. R. E. Corcoran, State Geologist, regarding the adequacy of site investi-gation.
We look forward to working with you and your staff and the Council to insure that a comprehensive and unbiased review of the geology of the site is com-pleted in a timely manner.
Sincerely yours, Donald A. Hull DAH:jr State Geologist Encl.
cc Janet M-Lennan cc Governing Board Members 1
. CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD
. OF CORRESPONDENCE RE TROJAN GEOLOGY March 3, 1970 - Letter from R.E. Corcoran to Governor McCall regarding the need to consider earthquake risk in siting Trojan.
May 21, 1970 - Letter from R.E. Corcoran to Governing Board commenting on linears near the site and also to possibility of
- 1andsliding as a hazard for consideration.
July 21,1970 - Letter from R.E. Corcoran to L. Williams commenting on a concurrent study of earthquake potential being con-ducted by the consultants of the operator.
July 27,1970 - Letter from R.E. Corcoran to General Itschner commenting on linears near the site and requesting that a micro-seismic study be conducted.
October 14, 1970 - Narrative by R.E. Corcoran summarizing the regional geology of the Northwest and speculating on possible earthquake risk for the Trojan site. Includes cover letter to L. Wilkinson dated October 14, stating that the Governing Board had not reviewed the document.
October 16, 1970 - Press release stating Department of Geology and Mineral Industries accepts conclusions of U.S. Geological Survey regarding adequacy of Trojan site owing to limited staff and facilities.
October 27, 1972 - Concurrence with NTEC memo authored by Kelly Woods and stating that R.E. Corcoran has no reservations on the safety of the site, although a microsaismic study had not been conducted.
- e 1
i
- - - - - . . - - - - - . - . , - . , . _ . . - , - , , . . _ - . . - - . - . . . . ~ .. . , ,-. - . . -. . . - . - . . . . , - , , , . - , , - ,
Q Department of Geology and MineralIndustries ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
, 'c ""
- 5," '"
,, 1069 STATE OFFICE BLDG., PORTLAND, OREGON 97201 PHONE (503) 229 5580 January 30, 1978 At :he request of the Oregon Department of Energy, the Department of Geology and Mineral Industries is conducting a review of avail-able geologic information on the Trojan Nuclear Power Plant Site as it relates to the safe operation of the site and the storage of spent fuel at the site.
We would appreciate your help in obtaining factual data for this review. Please send to us, in writing, all geologic facts which you feel are pertinent. In addition, wculd you please bring this
. request to the attention of your associates who may also desire to provide data.
Effective completion of this task requires that we assemble and technically review all available geologic infor~ation in a ecmcre-hensive manner. In order to proceed in a timely manner, we ask that the material be sent to us on or before February 10, 1978.
Sincerely yours,
. ?' -Yd Donald A. Hull 0,AH:j r State Geologist
~h+3 SH STATE OF OREGON 37 - INTEROFRCE MEMO To: Staff cATE- Februarf 23, 1973 ,
- ' FROM- Con Hull !
suener Trojan site study The Depart.ent is currently reviewing all available data en the i
geology of the Trojan nuclear plant site near Rainier in Colu=ia ,
County.
The purpose of this memo is to remind individual staff c:e=ers to submit any data pertinent to the review.
CAH:j r i
1 I
....u.on
-ev---w -e v 1. e nr - .c- -v-r- w - . - - - - --4v-- , - r -- .-v 4. . -we r=w - ,,-r- -- 4.- * ,wnwe---- +-es w w<r----w- ..eme--=--. +. -r-- - .
I I
)
l l
l
.- RECIPIENTS OF LETTER DATED JANUARY 30, 1978 -
Rauno Perttu James E. Sexson, Director 903 Cunningham Lane S. State Water Resources Dept.
Salem, Oregon 97302 555 - 13th Street, N.E.
Salem, Oregon 97310 Ronald L. Jackson Shannon &. Wilson, Inc. Prof. Sam Boggs, Chairman 1105 N. 38th Street Department of Geology Seattle, Washington 98103 University of Oregon Eugene, Oregon 97403 Raymond E. Corcoran Special Assistant for Dr. Lloyd W. Staples Environmental Assessment Department of Geology U.S. Sureau of Mines University of Oregon 2401 " " St., NW (Rm. 1004) Eugene, Oregon 97403 Washington, D.C. 20241 William S. Cox, Director J. Edward White Division of State Lands P.O. Box 581 1445 State Street Pinecliffe, Colorado 80471 Salem, Oregon 97310 Prof. Robert Lawrence Wes Kvarsten, Director Department of Geology Land Conservation & Develoo. Ceot.
Oregon State University 1175 Court Street, N.E.
Corvallis, Oregon 97331 Salem, Oregon 97310 L. F. Williams Harvey Latham Oregon Environmental Council Executive Department 1238 N.W. Glisan Street Division of Emergency Services Portland, Oregon 97209 8 State Capitol Bldg.
Salem, Oregon 97310 David B. McCoy 348 Mussey Lane Prof. Robert Yeats, Chairman Grants Pass, Oregon 97526 Department of Geology Oregon State University Dr. Raymond A. Peterson Corea111s, Oregon 97331 1946 Midlothian Drive Altadena, California 91001 Donald Godard Energy Systems Program Susan M. Garrett State Department of Energy 7325 S.E. Steele Street 528 Cottage Street N.E.
Portland, Oregon 97206 Salem, Oregon 97310 Lawrence E. Wilkinson R. Kenneth Dodds 6582 Ganon S.E. 520 S.W. Sixth Avenue Salem, Oregon 97301 Portland, Oregon 97204
_ _ _ _ _ , __ _,. . - _ . . . _ _ . , . - . . - , . _ - _ _ - . _ . . - ~ , _ _ _ . - . - . . _ _
Prof. Leonard Palmer William H. Young, Director Dept. of Earth Sciences Dept. of Environmental Quality
. Portland State University P.O. Box 1760
,. P.O. Box 751 Portland, Oregon 97207 Portland, Oregon 97207 Sharon S. McKeel Prof. Tom Benson P.O. Box 8786 Dept. of Earth Sciences Portland, Oregon 97208 Portland State University P.O. Box 751 Ralph S. Mason ,
Portland, Oregon 97207 3932 S.W. Idaho Terrace Portland, Oregon 97221 ,
Prof. Paul Hammond Dept. of Earth Sciences Richard G. Bowen '
Portland State University 852 N.W. Albemarle Terrace P.O. Box 751 Portland, Oregon 97210 ,
Portland, Oregon 97207 Herbert G. Schlicker Prof. Marvin Beeson State Department of Geology & i Dept. of Earth Sciences & Mineral Industries Portland State University Department of Geology !
P.O. Box 751 Oregon State University Portland, Oregon 97207 Corvallis, Oregon 97331 l
Prof. Ansel Johnson Dept. of Earth Sciences Portland State University j P.O. Box 751 Portland, Oregon 97207 Colonel Paul Triem Portland District Engineer ,
Corps of Engineers ,
l P.O. Box 2946 Portland, Oregon 97208 i
Dr. Richard Couch !
Dept. of Oceanography j Oregon State University Corvallis, Oregon 97331 ,
.. Dr. Howard A. Coombs Dept. of Geology University of Washington Seattle, Washington 98105 Mr. Willingham Dept. of Environmental Quality l
P.O. Box 1760 !
Portland, Oregon 97207
, . . , . ...---.,...-~,,..--,-.-...--------~,,..--_.e... --- ---..-, ....,n,, -. .- , --, . , -
40 -
, RESPONDENTS TO LETTER DATED JANUARY 30, 1978 J. E. White Ansel G. Johnson 330 West Fair Avenue Earth Sciences Dept. ;
Littleton, Colorado 80120 Portland State University P.O. Box 751 Lloyd W. Staples Portland, Oregon 97207 P.O. Box 3133 -
Eugene, Oregon 97403 Leonard Palmer Earth Sciences Dept.
Paul E. Hammond Portland State University Earth Sciences Department P.O. Box 1751 :
Portland State University Portland, Oregon 97207 .
P.O. Box 751 !
Portland, Oregon 97207 Rauno K. Perttu 903 Cunningham Lane S. i' Lawrence I. Wilkinson Salem, Oregon 97302 520 S.N. 6th Avenue (Rm. 815) ,
Portland, Oregon 97204 '
Howard A. Coombs l Dept. of Geological Sciences i University of Washington l Seattle, Washington 98195 L. J. Sten, Chief Engineering Division Portland District U.S. Corps of Engineers P.O. Box 2946 Portland, Oregon 97208 James E. Sexson, Director State Water Resources Dept.
555 - 13th Street N.E.
Salem, Oregon 97310 Marvin H. Beeson, Chairman l e Earth Sciences Dept.
. Portland State University P.O. Box 751 Portland, Oregon 97207 R. Kenneth Dodds, President ,
Foundation Sciences, Inc.
Cascade Building Portland, Oregon 97204 '
February 21, 1978
-ar---ewu--.*-w+ m ww w e,e. , ,-- ,---s-ea-=- e~e w e w ,ww w ...-wr-v=w-.-=--- ,-w--->- -ww-,,-+ ---v-y.-~,-,-,-r www, . . - - - < - w,v.-tv , y -e , sr w+ + y -. -f e v , y,,,,-pit-s, e ,v,,
__ . . _.- -- - - - - - .. _ - . - . ~ _ .. . . - _.- - -_- .- .. ~ . -
41 -
RESPONDENTS TO LETTER DATED JANUARY 30, 1978 Sandy Ekstrom, Deputy Administrator Executive Department Emergency Services Division .
43 Capitol Building 1 Salem, Oregon 97310 Richard M. Sandvik Assistant Attorney General State Department of Justice 500 Pacific Building 520 S.W. Yamhill Street Portland, Oregon 97204 Rick Hillaan .
KINK - FM Portland, Oregon
! Gilbert T. Benson Dept. of Earth Sciences Portland State University Portland, Oregen 97207 Raymond A. Peterson (verbal)
.' 1946 Midlothian Drive
! Altadena, California 91001 Richard W. Couch Associate Professor
' School of Oceanography i Oregon State University ,
Cerva111s, Oregon 97331 1
Stanley Hamilton
" - Waterway Manager Division of State Lands
. . , 1445 State Street Salem, Oregon 97310 February 21 - March 1,1978
- 4 ee-ey-we,-- g-- + - - , , - wy, y-,- w e we ,ge-'=rwe=---i*ce--te-+-----r-m- - miww - e--**s-e--ea w-w.- ew w e- w r7r-e tw 9'ee-=+w--eowr--ep.,-P ga eesw-,me-gw e +**+w.aw- y-e=-w--,--e- v-
i i RESPONDENTS TO LETTER DATED JANUARY 30, 1978 Susan Garrett 7325 S.E. Steele Portland, Oregon 97206
?
i RESPONDENTS TO MEMO DATED FEBRUARY 23, 1978 l
herbert G. Schlicker .
Jepartment of Geology & Mineral Industries f
Jerry Gray i Department of Geology & Mineral Industries i
l l
l l
l
. . l c I l
1 l
March 1 to March 3,1978 i l
l I
/
, FAT sif24
. 105 uw 21 caevAtup,clZ. g . -- . . . .
- m 50.-3*4 sP
/
k kestfous. 5dauHed fd Ha- tJacleov aMDr
[ Anni %io?s$ta riw & card on k En.sV
.[ k C ahe{ de~ .~t A . 'raf 4. P.v *q u kt-PIud-Q ,_
~
\
8' Oct.I,cv 14* gg g l~
'n# \
's NOV 131979 3 1
~
&kl% : g W w..1 W #)
$W & l'[M' s SD n.
~
W1l *f l) $W Y Y kla$~'af PG& fe lt a.lIcu< )
i.1 kris c ou 4. +eckm b 66(3 kl. (vaftou depeu.k (kcuT b b M dcAf A t d// IM cLire cev% cse L sse le~th fu paa2kJ l % nt%ul
( Apprix/ MAS.d I 6P* sh klud lad- />
/tiune'a. Iscs, de & p(shu, f(hf61egenk.A.in Can.ttLNL A shtLA { or [Ule ,as h tu t k)derrl4l+sAf b YstAY detI s . l 1[u., ha& i<tkyn f5 ait ufies &d k sevn) b 6 'r enh Ha }u coahutik . ' th.
Mroo (u d flu- sif c f tiu.fL tut, f y ible-).
][ CAM- nt9du. WW. hhs SMnH- $ts El%c w i nut utttri fb f eopk Er~
wlw u n ac Q inndx4.
,& SfraLlutt U . A N lA-
& NnrlL wMhwficsof 4 if m / pat.
- ) #fld5 Inw h AAArtsCLd. lo fladlf M Khta h Y g&utuad W ,
4 F,u.T Y to A k M +M.-
4c I g ck y?M 5twue#.
fhbq<4 W doetouAez, %gp. +wys, JJ'-
A mw31 a #<u.ceweg una Ha.y.:>tcasac w(4 srgcu9 .
l 1
l
\
il 4 u a rj u d L & u k ., g a a p , ta y 1 4 qL wI r* aht Hus sse . b 4 A wf g Ad 9 Wy s- Ru. sk & s y of Hu.(c<in{4 4+ . .
E u l m % k +tu. ryad ktn Ac .hf $VgeukwiQNa$.
wi & n 1 alou d W w u m'c htxpraw9ni.sRyesd k Mc 6(f uths ;ari M pHL sbu'tu b k Qlld & T u ate prork sdaldd?
bf
/ ht , Md , ' s e a u.c h 4 1 x 7G cN deww y & qua//ou y na wap ./ A prun}uapurl%E (e d nas -u zu w pin decisim n Hu. setsucc upLu'y G flu- Tq',p twb f466iktuw k a fHan flu. u+ AN 4 auu / e&
<'s usaAA
.Eibf64
.la pssibil 4 y ,' k W. @ ilw W uxM a.
m 44 ay a aratata wi+ Le tw9 ,
l auA&&dc)wattheA.
J A6 g * , p M a ru , f p q f>tt l W r Aua~_
(
Aufutq' g-s d
fluur vant k .4 eiuier w use 4n . r ac m P %6 O w.!n a % . tiu. y tu nGet& ,]ua.we luaarin' Io(LeJ{c !
6%ph4. rh kuu]efu_ Pc6/SeMrl. Tn[w CAME kk lumais LeMith ^^(fpaLk Lkdsare-.
- j ,
, . 1 e . . 11l i
- 4 f
1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA f i
2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY CC!' MISSION I ,
i 3 Before the Atomic Safety & Licensing Soard j 4 IN THE !%TTER OF )
) N0. 50.344 -
5 Pon* LAND GENERAL ELEC*RIC CO. et al ) (Control Buildine) l I
(Trojan Muclear Power Plant) ) LIMITED APPEAPANCE e l l
7 The owners and coerators of the Trojan nuclear power j f I plant are applying for an interin permit allowing the plant to l .
I cperate while necessary repairs are beine made to the centrol
- i 10 room to enable it to withstand eartheuakes as per federal i i
11 standards and while other repairs are made bringing the plant : i i
12 to safety standards. !
1 13 No enviren= ental 1= pact statement has been prepared i 14 in conjunction with this application for interim operation. That 15 the proposed present operation of Trojan is labelled " interim" 16 pending repair of its f acilities does not eliminate the ;
_s h 17 necessity of an environmental impact statement. Louisiana l '
j d3F 55 N ;;; 10 Power & Licht Co. v. F.P.C., 557 F 2d 1102 (5 th Cir. 19 7 7) .
e2v e 3-3,%*) . ; II
~~ %
10 C.F.R. 50.36 provides that each applicant fer
& -;?
j_ i ~ E a license autherising operatien of a utili::ation facility
- 21 (defined as any nuclear reactor other than ene designed er used
! 1 22 primarily for the for=ation of plutonium or U-233) shall prepose 1
23 in its applicatien certain " technical specifications". " Tech- !
I 24 nical specifications" include the following:
25 50. 36 (c) (1) (i) (A) Safety limits for nuclear reacters , ,
are limits upcn 1=portant precess variables which !
E are found to be necessary to reasonably protect the l
I integrity of certain of the physical barriers which 27 guard against the uncentrolled release of radicactiv- ,
j lty. If anv safety 11rit is exceeded, the reaeter { l 28 shall be shut cewn. . %peratien shall net te resu=ed , ;
1 - limited appearance 1
, . _ . , ~ _ . _ - . _ - , _ _ - , , _ _ . . , . _ . . _ .~ _. . _ __ .___. _ __... _. .. _ ... _ - -, _ _ ~.. _ ____-. _ . _ _ .
1 1 until authorized by the Commission.
2 (2) Limiting conditions for operation are the lowest functional capability or performance levels of 3j equipment required for safe operation of the facility.
When a limitina condition for oeeration of a nuclear 4 reactor is not met, the licensee shall shut down the reactor or follow any remedial action permitted by the 5 technical specification until the condition can be met.
(emphasis added)
The original operating license of the Trojan facility 7
set certain technical specifications which were found to conform with these definitions of safety limits and limiting conditions 9
for operation. The above-cited regulations make clear that the 10
<t 11 ,
technical seecifications as set bv the license must be met or 1
the clant shut down; they make no provision for interim operation 12 while a plant is being repaired to meet its technical specifications.
. Therefore, P.G.E. apparently now is asking for an amendment to 14 I i
its operating license, to change its technical specifications 15 :)
i and redefine certain tafety limits and limiting conditions for 16 ,
cperation.
i The federal regulations confirm that an environmental gg l 1mpact statement is appropriate in this case. Technical gg j specifications may be amended as per 50.36 (d) (3) :
20 At the initiative of the Commission or the 21 licensee, any license may be amended to include gh technical specificatiens of the scope and sEm s 22 content which would be recuired if a new license S$2 2 were beine issued. (emphasis added) e: a~5~
95,13 r w 4
[hgy24 An application for new license for a nuclear reactor
.: =-
25 l must be accempanied by an environmental impact statement. 10 if ,
2B t C. F. R. 50. 30 (f) ; 51.5 et sec. Any original environmental imoact l 27 i statement must have considered the technical specificatiens i 2B 1 ! proposed for the original license, and not the current cenditien j 2 - limited appearance 7 i
i I
1 4
~
l I
I I of the plant in which it new proposes to operate. If Trojan were l 2
allowed to operate now in its current condition in violatien '
3 of the standards of its own license, this would constitute 4
a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality 5i of the environment, so that an environmental impact statement 6
is required. A revision in a project, as well as the 7
initiation of the project, will require an environmental impact 8
statement where the revision significantly affects the quality of Il the environment. Scientists' Institute for Public Informatien, 10 1 Inc., v. Atomic Enerev Commission, 481 F. 2d 1079 (C.C.A. 1973) 11 (at p. 10 88 and footnote 33) .
12 i Dated: october 25, 1978.
13
] submitted by:
14 I ,
15 , I
.b ._ / 8 ! ,
Doreen L. Nepom 16l, Attorney at Law 1935 S.E. Washington g "11waukle, OR. 97222 80 i
, 7 ' ; 18
=2 =s c
E3 19 '
- o y?,,$$.20'
- s =z-
~3 21 1 22 23 24! '
I e i
25 '
! 1 26 l !
I I
27 i 1
28 :
l i
3 - limited appearance j 1
- i
.. -,,,--.--,-- - . - . - - - - - , . - - - - , - , , , , . - , - . - , - - - - - - , - - - , - , - - , , - , - - - . - - - - - , - - - - - . - . - - - - . - - - - - - - - - , , . - - , + - - . . - - . . . . ~ - , - - ,
1995 Hanilton Lane Grants Pass, Cryon 97524 9
30 Cetober 197*
O us c- Q... .
6- ~4
.itorie 3 afety and licensing Board ; NOy 2 >, Jg7gA -["3
- iuclear ?.egulatory Commission
'Jashington, 0.0. g Q& a.,48 %
i
. . 9
Dear Board Members:
b j I made a limited appearance on 27 Cctober in Portland, but wish to supplerent it with this written statement. I appreciate the 3 card's allowin; all particiP ants to express themselves fully during the appearances. As was frequently mentioned, the scheialing of the Limited Appearances precluded the attendance of persons with daytime responsibilities and those from other areas, so I hope consideration sill be civen to scheduling appearances at other times and places to afford further opportunities for such people to speak. ! realize that you are encoura;ing written statements and that thy will be considered, but the people who were unable to get off verk to cane to Fortland are 2e least likely to have ; ice to write such statements, and I believe their testimony would have a unique value.
The heaJings so far have revealed something about de difficulties which f ace the public in obtaining infor~ation necessary to the understanding of specific situations at Trojan, to interpret what infor~ation is availa.,j:le, and to .tske their voices heard. A report in one of the Portland papers headlined "W3cien-tist urges Trojan start-up" illustrates this. ~he first colunn of this article features the testimony of several proponents of nuclear power. I attended toth days of the appearances and counted about 5 statements favoring interin operation and about h0 opposing it (these were mentioned at the end of the article). Se words of the proponente were not convincing or reassuring (to have even the'n say that tistakes are nade ever-/ day is actually quite alarning), but te p: int here is that the scientist quoted in the headline said he wculd like tc see hojan back in operation "but not unless it is safe." 3 1s is quite different fro 2e idea conveyed by te headline and it is probable tat a number of people read the headline and not the article and that few of 2cse readin; the article had en;'
way of knowing the actual quantity or quality of te testinonies. 3 1s a;" eem trivial, but it is so typical of the relationship of nedia cov+rsge to actual situatisna and of equal importance is silence (either from 2e agency or te nedia) on incortant occurrences. Se record shows that there have been resi problens in the operation of dojan but these have had little or no exposure.
- herefore, how can the general public hold informed opinions or be nativatec to contribute input into processes of decision .noking? Zven though eritten stata-nents are accepted, there is an added dimension to in-person presentations which
- 1. Troves communication and understanding, so I feel that every effort should be nade to facilitate this kind of participation.
Admittedly, reny issues technically beyond the limited scope of the hearings are brought up in dese types of presentations, but (as soneone testified) noting can truly be exmined or understood ia isolation and I don't ';elieve it ia ;ou-ible to consider any action vith such potentiall/ far-reachlag effect: as 2is one without studying the causes, possible results, ano the economic philoscphy involved. heref:re, I hare the Board eill carefully ersmine Trojan's racord (centinued)
2 (including the occurrence file) and its "etergency response plan", which I under-stand has been criticized by the U.S. Coast Guerd. I feel that in s11 these :n-cidents and deficiencies, ?GE and 3echtel have blatantly demonstra ted tad faith, and calling them " factors" rather than errors doesn't help. Also, to existence or non-existence of an " energy shortage" is directly pertinent to de recessity or non-necessity of plant operation. It is my opinion that Governor 3 treub would have served the public interest better by encouragind energ conserma.on tnsn by pres-string President Ca.rter to influence the re-opening of *rojan, It has been demon-
.;trated that c:aervation is much more cost-effective thar the creation of enery, but nore important, it is essential to us and future generaJicns that we r etueny begin serious efforts to institute it. "'he American hysical Scelety has esti.ma ted that up to 705 of energy produced is wasted; elimination of such waste should receive top priority, aleng with other conservation methods. nso, right here in Gregon, se have other more reasonable sources of energy, some of which are now only creating ponution and.being absolutely wasted as an energy or asterials source (such as logging slash and residues). One of our congressional representatives is now proto-tiag a bill to research and demonstrate utili:stion of this resource; our federal and state forest agencies, which should have instituted such projects long ago, will apparently have to be forced to do so by an act of Con3 ress. Se public has been urging and demanding this for some tire but has not been heard. Other ns tions, such as India have been producing energy from wastes for .many years, dest Cernens deriveioftheirelectricityfromburningtrash. 'de have fr.r core trash Osn tPey do, plus enormous quantities of wood and brush, which under present fores t"ranage-rent"are being poisoned and burned (at great expense both econor:icall/ and ecolo-gically). Technologies to convert such materials to energy are certainly not
" exotic", nor are other alternatives or appropriate technologies. nmos t uy of dese are more labor-intensive than the nuclear industry, which is capital-intensive.
On that basis alone, surelf the unemployment situation here warrants the minimiza-tion of capital-intensive industries. PGE, by the very nature cf its incorporation, mst drive for short-term gain and stimulate the use of energr; these sims ard pur-cuits verk against the imperatives of today's ecological and social condition.
"arindar Singh, in Zeoncnics and the Crista of Ecolgr, stat s, "2e crisis of eco-lo;y, then, is due prir.arily to a fundamental malstructuring of what tha gen tel aculd prefer to call tan's systen of production 4hich cannot ers : =xis t witheat demand sticula tion. ... Cur planet ... can ill-cfford the luxury of artificial de .a ud-
- timulation." (p. b) "...Eut high consumption has its own linitations and ha:ards and the economic system which is obli;ed ii to precote it m be taken to be irra ti:nal in the extrue. .. 2ere must be sonething 01ndamenta11/ irrational ebout a sys t*n which, in order to cater to the dysfunctional vants of de (Jrld's few has cf ne-cessity to deny to increasing .illions a rere chance to live es M.sns." (r. 5)
- t is depressing to pass by the shops in y town or elsewhere in C.is country and see entire displ?y windows filled with ite+s which have no necessity or functien Aatever; contemplating the energy, resources, and labor t'.lat go into their pro-duction is to realice the validity of Er. Singh's prenise. "aen l w er-niddle elses living standards and habits here have a tremendously exploitative quality ad in-fluence on the world at large. The 28 Cetsber Cregonian contained an article titled
"" alt ur;;ed to rising U.3. energy use" which reported the Zuropean Corren Mrket's s ta tement that ri sing energy consumption *ust be storped to protect the sorld ag3i...st cot lner price rise by oil-freducing :stions. ^ur traditional objective of a const-nt1/ -
expendir econony, seeking an ever-hi;her standard of living, wic the gs; ' e . ween O.e
- u@ end "have-nots" steadily videning, is both unfessible ac.d i:rpossible; mr:e, it is disastrously ir.noral. As Singh states in his book cited eteve, "...intm::1fying inequalities ... characteri:e conte porary world econo y." (p. 7)
(continued)
3 2e arragance and inhumanit/ of these attitudes and actions ar- being 1,;nored or denied by too e.any people, especie.117 those in power. Instead of trying to re-orient aurselves to a e mserva tion-based econony, we go on end en tith our con-sumptive, westeful, and polluting endeavors and sven influecce oder countrW ta do 11%ew h e. In q oral staten.ent, I atemd wit we of the other spchrs in Ge opinion that the world wvuld be better off if nure "eeple could cry about this situation, but I did not nean (and I am sure he did nat) !.hnt "erationalisn" as generally interpreted (to nean an unreasoning display of enution) ves desirable or would solve a .ything. Rather, the ecciogical and nral crises 4hich nist are the
. tost inportant facts of life facing us and I do not believe it is possible t) realize their full inplications (and thus be able to deal wig them) without f eling some emotion. 3ese hard realities demand that we resct Nith sone humn feeling; I do not believe we can respond constructively te correct unacceptable conditions o therwise. Enotion has a necessary role in perceptien and notive, but the issues themselves are not based on emotion. It seens we all try so hard to be super-objective and unemotional that we are in danger of losing our hunanity.
':he people who are raising their velees against the re-opening of Trojan are not doing se in a hysterical or unreasoning way. It is ry cbservation that 'be majority of then are not only concerned about present construction deficiencies, but about the basic issues 7.entioned above and that they are the ones who have already sheen aw m gness n to nodify their life-style so that it vill be nininally consumptive of natural resources and as non-polluting as possible. Eone of Se remarks directed at those picketing and leafleting at the MI office in August concerned how sorry we r d be if our aims were realized and our electricity would have to be shut off; we were not given the opportunity to answer these " comments" but the truth is that many of the proponents of alternative sources of energy are already foregoing the use of electricity and if there were an absolute choice between no electricity or only nuclear-generated electricity, these people would opt for the for .er. Per-sonally, I have lived without electricity and could do so again; I definitely con-sider that a preferable alternative to nuclear proliferation, which the operation of any nuclear plant effects.
Among the natters yeu are considering is the risk imposed on the public, not only from possible catastrophe, but fron routine operation or even shutdcwn condition of the plant. Since E approval was granted for expanded and extended spent fuel storage on-site (a violatien of FGE promises) in te face of articulate ;ublic opposition, we feel it necessary to be repetitive about ie evi9 nce which should prevent tb oparation of Trojan in its presently known substanderd condition. Se extrenely questiocable benefits to We public cannct justify the ;cesible conse-
- nences, ahich
- .ast be acknowledged to be greater than te risks ccynted in te Easnussen Report (which is itself questionable and did not even 0:nsider catsstro-phes such as sabotage or acts of war and risks of transportation or waste storage or disposal). Even our relatively short period (cenpared to te life of the hazard created) of experience v12 this industry under supposedly strict reg".la-tion and safeguards has been fraught with accidents and unexpected occurrences.
6 Lowering present criteria is not the direction we should be taking.
Iven if reacter risks are assured to be less than ' hose of oder societal risks, such as hurricanes, lightning, or air or land vehicle travel, te Operacion v.d existence af a nuclear reactor is an 1.rposed and not -smentitl risk and i: not conparable with either uncontrollable natural events or activities in which Nre is a choice cf wheter or not to participate. Se term " chemical trespass" is conitz into use in regard to air, land, and water pollution with ;esticides and o&er nan-made chemicals; this concept is also applicable to " radiation trespasa".
(ccatinued)
l l
k 5ur-17 types of action such as spent fuel pool storage and request to o.cera te while contral building nodifications are .'ade constitute "-ajer ec-ions significantly affecting te quality cf de hur.an envirernent" and 'hus necessite te an Inviron-ental :..p.ct 2t terer.t. ~12 pidelines (Fedeni ?.e;ister, L1. 3 3, ::o. Ih7,
..uj. 1, 1973, ?a rt : ) 1500. 5 ( a ) (2 ) s ta te 26 t "se tions" inchde nu and eminui f projects ard program activities. l!CC.o (a } s ta tes " . ..if 0.ere is ; o tent 2.ai v.a is environrant nay be significan 1/ sffected, te sta tenent io to be ;aprei."
(eghasis rine) " Proposed najor actior.s, the enviror.nental i; pset of which 1.5 likely to be hig;hly centroversial, should be cevered in all cases." (p. 2:551) (t) cf t is section states that ':IFA (Sect.11 (b)) also indicates cat adverse significant -f-fects include those which serve short-tern goals, nier San 2cse tenefiting me environnent in te long-tern. 1500.13 reads, ' Agencies have en oblizs tion to re-assess ongoind projects and prograns in order to avoid or rinirize adverse environ-nental effects. ...it is essential tat de environnental in; sets of proceeding are l reassessed pursuant to de J.ct's pelicies and precedures and, if de project or ro- l Jrs.: is conti:raed, dat furter inerenental najor actions be shaped se es to e.2ance j snd restore environnental quality as well as to avoid er rinini:e adverse environ- i cental consequences. It is also inpertant in furter action tet account be ta. ken j cf enviroer. ental censequences not fully evaluated at de outse . of de project or ;
protr2=." (p. 2:555) :.lculd 213 no , apply to seisric siting? .ny is it sre-ines l j
necessary fcr the public to bring federal a;ercies to 0:urt to ist een to cerply l
<ic T?A? 2.e indus tries irttoivec count on our no t being able to 'can,r te finan-cial expense involved in legal action. Furter, not only ust se asure unwanied risks from ce nuclear indus try, but our tax dellars are subsidi:ing it, and .:e can be sur- tat ecst overruns .till te passed on to us ;re iay cr another. ,
I anaiderin; te docanented 'eccurrences" caused by eccipnent snreliability 2nd hu:2.n crror at kojan and o2er reactors, the i.mplicit notivation of ?E and Iechtel and the denonstrated unreliability of their stated clains and ia.tentions and te building and safety equipnent defects which
- hey admit (wie possibly an even greater varia- l tisn between te nodel on paper and the real ting), please do not allow interin i operations prior to the necessary nodifications and ple.se require a more i partial !
and conplete analysis of plant saf ety. Iince strict regulation se-ns to be ei2er l an impossibility or a . yth, : telieve te revnce tion cf 2,jan's o; era ing license i sculd be most preferable and ap.crot. riate. '
l Tours traly, l m n
. # t , ,
A. . f (W w h
- s. c-G % 'f c . ..% .- s . . ,
,--.,-...-...,,r.- . . . - . - . - - - - , -
1 1
a
- s. l
\;
g NOV1 l' ' P > -}
~
i 4 l s
WIT 33 I wish to protest against allowing ors spent fuel to be ce;-
pacted and stored at the Zion Nuclear Generatin: Station.
I feel that this would materially increase the hazards already j there of leakage of radioactive materials into the envirensent with consequent dangers to the h.alth cf the pcpulation.
fhe Zicn plant already has core vic1ations of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's regulations than any other plant. With more spent fuel stored there, the pessibilities of human error causing an accident and allowing radicactive material to escape are just that =uch greater.
No known substance has yet been found to contain nuclear wastes safely over a period of years. These wastes are dangercus for hundreds and even thousands of years.
fhe first known leakage in I111ncis ccourred at Sheffield where tanks were designed to last thirty years. Several months azo the Sun Times reported that waterborne radioactive tritium was es-caping frca a burial trench at Sheffield and spreading underground at the rate of 25 feet per year, instead of the 1 root per year that was predicted. Cther leaks have occurred in Kentucky (Maxey Flats),
Georgia (savannah River), Colorado (Rocky Flatsl, New York (West Valley),
Idaho (Idaho Falls), and Washington (Rictland-Hanford) . In Idaho Falls 400,000 gallons escaped and at Richland-Hanford a total of 515,000 gallons on two different occasions, plus abcut 1E cther leaks have occurred, per: eating the ground with radicactivity.
Besides leakares, there is the possibility cf a nuclear explosier at a waste site. Newly released CIA documents shew that two major ex-plosiens at a top secret Scviet nuclear facility in the Scuth Ural ountains in the 1950s resulted in any huniteds of casualites and left a large tract of land lifeless, barren and centaminated for perhaps hundreds of years.
Oleser te he=e, an IRDA document states that a waste tren0h at Hanford, Washington accuculated sc much atcmic bomb caterial that it almost created its cwn runaway chain reaction. Alarmed engineers averted a pctentially sericus nuclear accident by pumping into the trench large volu=es of Oadrium metal to absorb the neutrens.
I believe that nuclear waste should not be stored near to the nuclear facility or so near to a heavily populated area.
Dorothea 4. Ramland ~
Ncv. 20,197E q g e MW' g g, " , 'e w , , - . -. - - - ,, ,
l o ,
TROJAN DECOMMISSIONINCr ALLIA.NCE l Shut Down Times . WE SAY NO TO NUCLEAR POWER 25C May197 TM,-jh Vol.1 No. 4 l .
. *I.
4 l
hfE f.5 -
e k y Fla f,, (og ,,
a V[;~ - < & & % '; s .,. ' -
- \=~ ?y.:;,: .sf. uga
~.,.
6 ..
- x. . _
- m..tw .x . -
, u, -e. o m- :. W, guj,,
.}Y
. -Trojan Occupation, August 6-9 Inside: Letters Blame PGE for Trojan Accident r-5 % PAye3 , .
I s by .
a.J FF w' T Ww' 'V* fr T TgrW' emet Nr t-w p"9 WN'WySD -ecrt h-e-4 9p p -www-e-erw' ='T-v -W=-w w er'-ee a
, e AGE ,, - PAGE 2
, SM DOWN TIMES 4
1 Hot Shorts ~.
s s
4 g } Radiation Limits are Too High 4 v cw e .. ;, 9(
4 q
Dr. Edwad Radford, chair of the Nat- :q?! .y " ;};,
Mt
, ' .~
q ional Acadecy of Sciences cocnittee on the -
II' ta 4, Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation g
j (the "3EIR Cocnission"), has testified at **$.,#
z f'17.j[
q a Congressional hearing that current fed- . h. , , d % gh eral radiation standads for nuclear workers are at least ten times too high.
y.
if+,
< In addition, Dr. Radford says the controv- * '
y ersial Mancuso study, showing much higher
, cancer rates among Hanford workers, was '-
the product of sound methodo, logy and is -
scientifically valid.. '
r ~
9 '
) D Waste Burial Plans Questioned' ( -
i
) ,
o Af ter 3 days of hearings in New Mexico, 889* j. .
Deputy Inergy Secreta:y John C8 Leary said 'm i d of the plan to bury nuclear waste in New ,
4 4m Mexico dalt beds: "we have a diff hult
'q job in find hg enough to satisfy me and D Has Your Life Changed? 4 the other technical memcers of this pa. -
"" Fewer medical I-rays could prevent tacu-nel that we can safely proceed with the 25 project." (CregonStatesman4/lS/76) sands of cases c.f cancer and nlated dis-g *
' , . orders, a General Accounting Cffice offi-g cial told a House OcVerment Operations A coenittee of the NationalI Academy' cf. '
suo-con:mittee hearkg. An Inviremental 7 Sciences (NAS) in a 269-page study of.Han* . Protection Agency aide said guidelines g ferd has concluded that despite some mis
- were under preparation.
- takss. nuclear waste has been safely and e efficiently st.cred for three decades at tne Ashington , State site en the Columbia. > Si kwood Inquest 4I, 9
5 3.iV er.
j e,
The report esthates that converting existbg solid and liquid wastes to a Two Federal District Ocurt judges have removed themselves from the Karen Silk-3 glasslike solid form could cost $20 bil , pod case now in prognss in Oklancr.a.
~
lien. "he report also says that makeshift s a groundbreaking cove, tse ;ir:uit storage methocs used over the years have cu~. of Appeals appointed an cu -of-sta*e made the final disposal probleur more dif. judge +4 the-case *a avoid *.ne sta*ewide p litical in. uence of the Kerrhee ficult. (Source: Christian Science Corp., a defendant in the suit. (Silk.
Monitor 4/11/79.) -
wood was a las analyst and union leader at the cc=pany wno was killed in a :ar
) Not ey along Shot (, -
erash in 17M wnile enreute' to give a NY Times reporter documents snowing inat Speaking before the pro-melear Atomic gerr-ge3e,,was falsifying qua11:7 23 7:1
.n dustrial Fora =. Dr. David Bodde,.a fede-ral Departnent of Energy official, reper, records in the produc* ion of plater),um ted that public resist.ance to further de. rods for r.aclsar reacters. he dceu=ents velop.ent of nuclear power gene' ration ap- she carried have disappeared. "he new pears to be lessening. (Oregon Statesman judge has granted a reques,:y Silkweed's,
. family that key .ttnesses be ~, pelled to
'*/19/70 respond to questionbg.
aseme 1
e 9
s ao s 1, , _ _ _ . _ _ , , _ _ , - . _ _ . - _,_ ,__. _._ _. _ _.. _ _ . _ , _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
~
PAGE 3 May i
Dr. Ernest Sternslass, the ;tysicist st,o
) Moratorium Recommended (- has warned against the dangers of low-eve radiat on, @wes this e te de Gannett News Service reports that "a *** ** "
- *8 *
- I confidential report prepared by the staff enaur Gary Hart, Sternglass saids of a House subcomittee calls for a morat- e gnatest increases b cancer nortal-crita on the construction of new nuclear ity rates (1972-1975) have occured in ,
power plants in the United States." 6 se si.x states with the largest nuclear The news service adds: "The report is facilities - Hanford in Washington, Oak harshly critical of the nation's nuclear ge in ennessee, and S avannah River 6 energy industry and originally remenended "* "#' 1** 3 # "I*h ""#1* ** "*C"#8 moratoritas on both new construction and '
that have released large amounts of rad-the operation of existing plants. The idea a a densely populated anas ne of closing the plants already in operation * #""* 8 ""E*# #**C"# D'*****
was vetoed by Rep. Leo Ryan, D-Calif., Connecticut and Rhode Island and the chait: man of the Envire nment and Energy ys er reacur in New Jersey, also subocanittee of'the Government Operations-
- of the boiling water type. These siz 4 . , ,
ce,,ggm,,, - ; states acorded the highest increases:
Washington, plus S.9 percent; Tennessee,
) Power Company Sues over Nuke Defects ( plus s.1 percent; abode Island, plus 3 percent;'New Jersey, plus 5.7 percent; and South Carolina, plus 5.4 percent.
Florida ?cwer Corp, filed a damage This compares with a U.S. national aver-suit against Babcock & Wilcox Co. and. . age increase of 3.4 percent for the sa:e Gilbert Associates Inc. for alleged con-struction defects in the utility's $400 .
period. On the other hand, cancer cor-nillion nuclear power plant at Crystal tality rates declined most sharply from 1971-75 in the four states having no nu -
River, Fla. _
- clear tower facilities at alls Alaska, The year-old plant was- closed March ~
3 for repairs that the company expects minus 10 6 percener Montana, minus 4.4 ^
will keep the facility out of operation percent; New Hampshire, minus 2.0 per-
"until some time during the summer" or cents and Hawaii, zinus 1.5 percent."
even longer. -
The suit " seeks riEwmf for several 't construction defects in the pisnt incitsi- '
' ing.. .the delaminatica of the dome of the containment vessel and the failure ,
of two reactor coolant pasps." - ', .
Florida ?ower. said in March that' the plant was forced out of service.be- * .
\T g, \
T cause loose saterial from a fuel assen- .-
g bly in the reactor core damage 1 one of-the steam generators.
In Reading, Pa. , a spokesperson for > #-
t Gilert Associates said, "We certainly f'
~
are going to defend against the action F
- 2 and we decy that we're liable.* -
(ften Wall Street Jon--ul 4/21 /78.) g
_ 4 ;
} NucleatPlants Cause Cancer T 1 i 1
. The Elecents nasatine responded to a .
reader's question "Is it true that _ _
, It cancer ttes are highest 12 those states vith large nuclear power plants?" - this Sternglass at Roc!qr Flats Actics ways 9 g
- o - , ,
- * * * - ~- - - __
l - -
1 Act - ,
~
SHUT OCWN TWES f/ PAGE 4 i
- Knock Nuke Week '
People are encouraged to get sponsors who will donate money for each mile you travel or just a flat donation. Bese 1 .
starting on Jun 19th, CA will be funds win be used in each con:= unity as sponsoring a " Knock Nuke Week." There are several events planned and your par. they see fit. If you are planniM a ticipation in one or all is invited and rcute. be sure to anew for rest areas and places to sleep.
encouraged. bird, June 23 people win ;neet at First, starting on June 19th, people Marion Park in Salem between 12 p.m.
win be engaging in local community.ac. '
tiens to spread the word about the dan. ' and 2 p.m. At 2:30 we wi n gather to.
gether and go directly to the Capitol.
- ers of melear P*wer anithe' safe alter.
- A message win be taken to Governor Straub natives. If you want to do this check and DCE director Fred y*11er asking them the appropriate box and write in where to close the plant so we don't have to oc.
and wnat you will be doing. Also let us.- cupy jan star % August . Mng know if you'll be picking up material or .his time there will be leafleting of win meed it mailed state workers until 4:33. .
Second, Walk. Bike or drive to Salem. ~ Afte- tha't we win go % Jason W People win be going from' thelp local com- Church for supper, relaxation, etc. Then,
= unities: walking-biking, or driving, and starting at 9 p.m. we win march by candle.
. light back to the Capitol. Upon arrivir4 j '
taking the message to State Goverment j that we don't want m elear power. The at the Capitol there win be a few speak.
g time you leave win depend.on where you ers and music until n p.m. wnen we will um 'are leaving from, you should plan to ar. leave and rest for tne next day's activi.
j rive in Salem between la p.m. and 2' p.m. ties.- -
June 23. Groups will be leaving from Tourth, June 24th, starting at 10 a.m. l I
Portland, Ihgene, Sheridan ani Trojan . , ws: will gather on the capitol for work. '
- g. '
C - shops until'3 p.m. If the Governor or Nucir.ar Power Plant. . ,
l g acutes from these places are available. Fred Yd.ner have not acted we will turn i People are encouraged to join along the our backs on the state goverment and g ,
head toward Trojan to arrive there start. l g way or make your own route. If you make your own. route let us know so we, can pass ir4 August 6, to close the plant ourselves. '
) . .
P. Bnning tojoin us ? l t .
~
1
~
. Let us know:
I will be _yal$:ing _ bicycling _ Driving ,
l to Salem
- I' will attend _ June 23 candlelight march, k, ,,,, June 24 events
-Rooactue aisposer s.tw nave o en '"
I cannot participate in any of the above use trom tour to maze then 30 years. nt it es -
events but will support walkers and bi-not snown -nar rna or nyorogeosos,c ,
enaractenstics ano eng,neenne leatures cyclers with a donation of SS S10 offer the greatest asscrrance tMal factoactiv~ $15 $20 $ 2S-sty. Once Duned erll trot mugrate to creater e QC$sible puChC henith naterd and .4Quere ext soremary eno costry ettores to correet- I will coordinate in =7 local area peoort to the congress av tr.e comorroner Generei of the Unsteo States. .lanuary.1976.
4 g 8
k e
y . g..-,, , . . . . _ , . , . - . - , . , . , , __ , - . -
. = . -. - - ,.
May PAGE5 LiveWithout Tridmt. . .
May 21
- Lega~. Demonstration
~
May 22 l l
. l CIVL Diso aec2ence '
m-Opening tae Base 1
1 l
w l
V '
Trident -Deterrent to Peace br Jahre 3*ran*ki <
Measuring longer than 2 footban fields Trident is the Navy's contribution to and about as high as PGE's new Winamette the Pentagon-designed " Strategic Triad"--
Centar building in downtown Portland, one composed of land-based intercontinental i Tridant submarine will cost about banistic missiles (ICEMs), lo'ng-range '
32 billion. ' aircraft (3-52 and F-In bombers), and
% at's enough to sustain the entire sea-based ballistic missiles carried on ~ ,
operating budget of Seattle's public submarines (SL3Ms). l schools for the next 17 years," say In a pamphlet can ed % M dant %
Quesn City opponents of tho' nuclear sub. Life,-Pacific Life Community reports that
=arine and missile system.
~
Truent win supplement tue existing sea. l The Live Without Trident. campaign says based Polaris / Poseidon weapons system. '
that the Navy wants to build 16 Trident Right exsw. Polaris / Poseidon is compriseci vass=1s, each armed with.408 deliverable of forty-one submarines, each carrying 16 -
nuclear warheads. "at a total cost of more missiles with a striking distance ranging
. than $50 binion" when funds for the base . fue 1,200 to 2,500 miles. Each missile presently under construction at Sangor. is a Multiple Independently targeted Re.
Washington, are included. .
entry Vehicle (MIRV). sThat is to say, But the price tag is nothing compared the multiple war-headed missiles can hit i to ths cost Trident will exact if anowed one target from different. directions at to be deployed. That's because it's "t, slightly different times.
ulti= ate first-strike weapon," says Robert What the Trident system win do is in-Aldridge (an aerospace engineer who quit crease the striking distance to 6,000 working on the project) and, as such, the - miles and, when fitted with new Maneuver.
incarnation of that Apocalyptic horseman.e ing Re-enty Vehicles (MARVs), consider -
War. s ably improve the accuracy of current SLEMs.
t 9
i
- w-- .
l
W
] FAGE 6 SHUT DOWN TIMES Pacific Life points out that "unlike the less accurate MIRVS, MARVs can pin- ,
N ,! -(
l i
point enemy missiles in their underground silos," thus depriving an attacked nation g\,,t {}gY ,,- g /
l of its IC3M force. 'xp" ' ',. ,di F
! "MI*,V warfare meant not hitting some . xnt. ,,bE,3 D h {Uj '
enemy launchers, therefore inviting retali.- .
g _,,,yy ;, rd '
ation and mutual destructier. But now the D ' i%
U.S., the only nation presently developing
, j ,. M,,
r V* <
- g. '
' MAdVed mis ~ciles, is approaching the cap. - ; "
74 !
ability for an unanswerable first and , 1 final blow in nuclear war." '
In addition,' each Trident submarine ' , , ,
/
will carry. 24 missiles, each armed with- , j- -
17 warheads that will have a destructive 1 force 3 times that of the bomb. dropped DO '
[')~
on Hiroshina. , -
W%d y ,
$3ME$b'f.~
Together with its other advantages *'
of quieter operation (to escape detec.
y .
I [ n,p tion) a superior sonar device (for self. .# MM .D defense), and a dcubled cruising speed of
- 40 the Trident and MPH,/?cseidon, submarine anything willthe.
bea*i Russians
, T@h O A
- j, i H,,
Polaris can come up with, hands down.
gytf ':M %;f J
-2,
'J{ % j-I Trident opponents maintain that the i shif t from XIRVed to MARVed warheads, ~f."- .
. which are specifically " designed for first- . M i
j strike accuracy," has shattered "the. tra-ditional argument of nuclear deterrence,"
- M Wd --
r even amopg proponents of nuclear weaport. --
l
- Says Pacific Li.fe, " Trident is not only TDA mutant !
3 the most destructive weapons system ever s E made,. but perhaps the most. provocative."
i Cpposition to Trident in the Pacific-
- Northwest began soon af ter the Navy an-5 nounced it had chosen the Sanger site (on 3 the Hood Canal 1.n Puget Sound) for the- Cn August 14, 1977, Pacific Life's efforts Trident, base (February, 1973),
i culminated in a 2,000 participant mass.
j According, to Pacific Life, groups like ' rany at the main gate to the Trident base.
the Seattic centered Action Committee l
In the heat of wnat mary were then Against Trident and Concerned About Tri- calling, "Seabrook Fever," the mass rally
' dent (which included lardowners from the was responsible for giving birth to the '
county where Sanger is located) "were Live Without Trident campaign, and later concerned about tne envirorraent, about the May 22nd Coalition whien is sponsoring I wnat 200 ' hot.' =issiles and $18 b4114on another mass rally and civil discoedience would do to rural Kitsap. County." action at the base scheduled on the 21st They filed suit. against the Navy in and 22nd of this month.
19'75 for anedgedly violating envirornen- Here in Portland . members of TDA, the tal standards. set by the National. F.nviron- Mobilisation for Survival.. and the Catholic mental Protection Act. But U.S. District Worker Community recently organised an Ocurt Judge George L. Hart, Jr. ruled in ad hee arm of Live .'dithout Trident. The the Navy's favor. purpose of the group is to educate ?crt-That same year, Pacific Life Community, f landers 'about the Trident issue, ard "a group of Canadians arvi icericans,"' through nonviolence training workshops, began a,
- Transnational campaign against prepare any wno plan to participate in
- Trident" througn nonviolent direct action. the May 3.2nd action.
q e a 4
& s a e 1
4 - , .
- m,-,r-.. - - - - - - , -.e ,--
p, w---.----- . -,, ,-.n, e---,-,,,-<--w-_n ,--,--
. - . . - - _ . . -. . _ . = = - . .- . -
.. - c-. . = . : = . x= =., n , ,.7 May ,
PAGE 7 To date, the Portland group has held, ,
Wim the stage thus set, it's worth sevcral planning meetings, nonviolent pointing cut unat Sidney Lens (author of training sessions, and a Trident Education .me ray Before Doomsday, Doubleday, lW7) -
Night at the Multnomah County Librazy. has witten: ?It is not too early to end It also is making educational handouts- the oms race. It may be too late. "
t.n " Action Handbook" for Xay 22ns, and a slide show on Trident available. -
AEFEENCES Nor: violence Training Sessions are con- ."One Trident Sub Could Educate Every Kid ducted every Saturday in the parlor at in Scattle," a flyer produced by tha Live Contanar/ nilbur Church from 12:30 to Wittwut Trident campaign, Seattle /Bening.
5:00, says conny Barbhart, a contact per- ham. 1977 son for the group. "One affinity group -
has already begun forming and a mass mail. " h Ultimate First-Strike Weapon," by ing on the action has gone- out to members .%srt C. Aldridge in The Nation, Feb.
ofi CA and the Portland American Friends ruary 4,1978, pp.111114.
Service Committee," she said.
Along with Barnhart, who can be reached Free Trident to Life, a pamphlet issued at 236-8331 Terry Sorene, a staff person '57 racua.c Luo community,1975 for the American Friends, is also acting De' National Catholic Reporter, special as a Trident contact person. Soren e's..
phone is 235 8954 insus on the arms race, April 8,1977 Reclaim Satsop-June 25- ,
M ~
Friday. April 1 Glenna Hayes and I -
vEn.
- c g ,
Mr traveled to Centralia, Washington to at-tsnd a two-day workshop on training' lead.
ers for non-violence direct action work-sA
.\
shsps (training for trainers).. De three the Satsop & en preparath W W-folks who were passing their skins on to fif teen student trainers were charles Gray . , gun- for building twin nuclear power re-actorsi ce camp w from Eugene, laura Wiskie-McCan from , la d w m be occup M untn an cons m e.
Seattle; and Charlie, Anderson from Centrs. tion a.t the plant site is stopped .
U"
- The day- before the reclaimation, June mis workshop was one of the highest 24 . win be a day for teach ins, exhibits,.
times for me since the start of my in.- and non-violence training,near the site volvement with the anti-nuke movement. Crabshell and the Satsop Task Force are An the people present were extremely sen" encouraghg anu-nuke fdks from Oregon sitive to the need to express feelings,. '
so we continued to think clearly and enjoy to come to Elma on the 24th and 25th to participate in the demonstration and boing together as humans throughout the occupa hon. S6ce the Sauop site is ody wa9kend. mis awareness was experienced in thy expert . ways the trainers had incor- needmiles 130 north of'?crtland I feel that we to help take action to prevent being porated the techniques of co-counseling. down wind of two aceittonal reactors. As into the training session. , The workshop we know from our fight against Monster was fined with light and lives, sorgs, Trodan, the best strategy is to prevent feeling breaks, active listeninge,a1d the power plants- from being built in the role plays. -
.. first place
- We came together to share skilln that . :
w2 might use for training occupiers for Bree Shtse Nu-vidence Training the itsop reclamation on June 4 Og 'iorkshops are now planned, for Portland.
2:e first session is
' Sunday June 4, the this day a large celebration will happen. second is Sunday h e n , and the third is in naa, Washington, 30 miles west of .
Clympia, with speakers ar.d a send-off for Saturday June 17 An training win be parsons doing civil disobedience. Re. f.~om 1 to 6 p.m. at 215 S.I. 9th and wh
- claimers will engage in referestation of. include food and c.
~
- s. ,
)
o
, p _
,g _ _ - ^---^-'-'~ -
.,. _ . _._ _ _ _ .~ _ -._ .. _ _ . ~ ~ ,_ _ _ ., _ ,_- _ _, _ - . _ . . . _ _ . , . _ . _ . . - _ - _ . , _ . _ , . -
~
~- ~ ' ' ' ' ~ ~ ~
, PJ PAGE 8 SHUT DOWN TIMES 4
f Letters Blame PGE for Trojan Accident ~
4 DOE Blames PGE .
1 4 Two radiation protection technicians contamina' ions. The inportance of this j philosophy was demonstrated in February, received the anowable radiation doseexposure at the Trojan several times ~ 1977, when personnel contaminations pro-thiclear
( Plant on April 5th. On April 13th, some vided early warning of a liquid holdup
(
eight days later, Fred Miner, Director tank failure. POE failed to identify the I
of the Department of Energy (DOE), sent underlying cause of the contamination in-4 a letter to Portland General Electric cidents and as result the tank leaked for (PSE) concerning the incident. This let- several days before the problem was ter provides the first somewhat complete identified
.nsight into why and what happened on btM to ff incidents at ntTrujan.@M has ...
con-Addi-that ay and PGE s ability to operate - '
ad e te p e g m asures
"*# not taken once the radiation protec-A sentence in the first paragraph of the letter gives a good pummary of what tion technicians went, in search of an un-fonows: "This incident raises questions .known and potentially high radiation about safety of plant operations an:1, in source. . ..the investigation took place
(
conjunction with other similar incidents, with minimal involvement of the Trojan about P3E's management o$ Trojan." perations department. The holdup tank 4
( Wnat fonows are excerpts from. the re. lustrates failure discussed in the above also il-l
$ mainder of the letter: problems in coordination between
- 1. Trojan Operational Performance--DOE '"#ious gra ps at Trojan. '
- believes that tne nign radiation dose to - .
similarly, two previous incidents were l Trojan personnel on April 5,1978' resul- caused, in part, by inadequate planning.n ted from some of the same factors that DOE is particularly concerned with the haves contributed to previous incidents. apparent failure to use an effective sys- l M t the plant. ,
. temati'c approach to identify the cause of i
- a. ...At least, threalindicationsF of unusual radiation levels.... Likewise, inacequate fuel transfer tube shielding safety related equi; ment at Trojan may
- k' existed W oe to the radiation exposure. show intemittent anomalies wnich will 4
, First, additional shielding has been re-l quirer! on the fuel building end of the j transfer tube; however, no one apparently j.<'
- thought to investigate the possibility of .
j inadequate shtalding on the other end of 4 the tube. Second, on the first' day of re- * '
fueling Trojan workers were aware of ab.
rer=al radiation levels in the contain-ment building as well as the fact that a portion of the transfer tube was unshield-ed. Third, on April. 3,1978, a radiation survey identified, unusual radiation levels in the area of tha transfer tube. If any one of these early indicatisms had been * ' -
effectively pursued the personnel expo-sures very probably would not have occurred.
c' DCI has previously discussed with j P3E the i=portance of thorough corrective
{ action for even small problems before .
,; larger problems develop. In September, 1 1976. DOE. expressed its concern about 8m \ PGE's apparent lack of aggressive action (to identify the root cause of personn=L s
b i e s
t e,--~------, .-,,-w-~,---.- -r--,--o,----e .,w.wa-,-weee-w,--w-_ --e,-- w a ame,m e-o e.--,,am- a,---o--+,s---
_ 1 May PAGE 9 not bo found and corrected unless the in- (285' milli rem); however, corrective vntigation is systematic and recognizes ] action changing plant conditions.
was not timely.
Also, if the workers' hand held ra-
- c. ...Throughout the sequence of event. diation detector had operated properly leadhg to aM following the personnel ex- on April 5, it is possible snat their posure, PGE management fail,ed to . recognize radiation dose would have been less and '
tha importance of the incident.... the seriousness of the incident would l Fcilure of Trojan personnel to infom have been more readily' apparent. However, t higher levels of plant sanagement an:1 despite past problems with this type. of l othat plant departments of abnormal ra- instament oorrective action had not been diation levels in the contaiment is also i=plemented. ,3 indicative that PGE management has' appar- Trojan has experienced chronic OSA ently not. emphasized the importance of sequencer failures. On September 16, 1977, -
1 radiological controls and fcAlow up of DOE expressed its concern that PGE's cor- I '
scrly indications of plant problems. , rective action was not successful in re.
Additionally, PGE management failed solving this problem. Despite PGE's to make the required notifications to DCE- assurance on October 1% 1977 that no (
in a timely manner. DCE did not receive. further design evaluation was necessary ) ,
another DBA sequencer failure occurred on a verbal ieport until 18' hours after the incident and the required written descrip. January JO, 197ti.... f
/' I j
tion of the 1.ncident was not made until ...It seems unreasonable that plant requssted by DOE. personnel who are intimately involved Finally, Trojan management did not as- . in preparation for a maintenance / refuel-sign any one person the responsibility for Jing snutdown aM day-to-day operations, hysstigating the incident. Much of the should also be expected to have a reflec-.
infernation relating to'the incident was, tive perspective that would allow for iden-not identified 'until the USNRD and. DOE tification of more basic problems....
performed their investigations.l .
x- ... Plant personnel generally do not
- d. ... DOE believes that' the incident _N have the detailed. knowledge of equi; ment -
on April 5,1978 was preventable...if ae6 design that is. necessay to determine tion had been taken by PGEp the incident.. ; whether a proposed operating method.is prooably could have been avoided. . ~<, consistent with.the equipment design or ,
l the system. of which it is a part. Also, ;
2 FGE Mana ement creanization-DOE is [ procedures written by plant personnel may !
concarned that the problems discussed reflect; a tendency to sacrifice proper above may be indicative of a larger pro. - operation from an equipment standpoint blem that might be resolved by a review for operator ease.
of PGE's management structure.... i l' . Procedures-Trojan personnel vers ,
l rssponsible for identifying the need for % '-
and designing an. adequate radiation sur- -
vey. If an adequate survey-had been per- , f* ~
formsd thp April 5, incident wculd pro - E J.
1 - }, 4Q T[
btbly not'have occurred. Similarly, in. t l November,1977, all four contaiment prassure detectors were .found to be capped g .
2
.)
,.* # My'., 9 q#M i 2-.. M . 'E. p (for six months). _The cause of this pro- : - -
blem was also inadequate procedures . .
' Pluto showed he was ready for prime time i
- 2. Follow up of Problems-If. the .two.. . . when..he made a 45 second appearance on workers on April 5. had beerr wearins .
the cBS Nightly News. The occasion was I alarming dosimeters it is likely that Pluto greeting President Carter as he, tusir radiation dose would have been less. ' Carter, was leaving the all-American ,
"hs need for alarming desi=eters had been home in Portland. Pluto said ics '
idsntified in Septa =ber,'1977, when another important that people are made aware worksr received an unexpectedly high dose . of the dangers of nuclear power.
88
?
s -
qup g+' glb og us.- .-e- *- m. - - - - - - - - - - -
_ gp _ _ gp ggp _,,,M
. . . ~ - . -. _ _ _ . _
c -_= _ _ _ _ - . __
Pi PAGE 10 SHUT DOWN TIMES q
4 Both statements are falso and misleading. ,
The average whole-body dose a patient gets l l
1llP
$YMYD.
tre me twoRN AD-from upper and lower gastrointestinal x-rays is tbout i ren or about 1/15th as l l @t $ s mcny/
. auch as these two workers received.
We asked Dr. John Bailar, Editor of the 4
~
Journal of the National Cancer Institute 4 ,
and an expert on the adverse effects of radiation, to comment on the PGE health.
"'1 id' Nader Group Blames PGE .
5' 'i ***** *****"*"** "'
a'diation dos.s that bracked the t
range of 14-17 roms quite clearly 4
Trojan is guilty of "a near total cause cancer of the breast and cancer 4
- breakdown in its quality assurance program af the thyroid gland in human beings. ,
s and operations;that border on the irrespon- It is very likely that such doses cause sible," according to two national scientif- cancer of many other organs as well.
ic organizations. The assessments came in Further why a it is difficult to understand responsible official would attempt a letter to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission from Dr. Sidney Wolfe, director to equate whole body radiation exposure ,
a such as these workers received to radia- 1 j
of Health Research Group, and Richard Pollock, director af Critical Mass Energy tion doses largely confined to a few abdominal organs."
4 i Project - two groups affiliated with Ralph The April 5 accident is the ' latest af. a g a Nader. series of system-wide accidents that have t Here are the anjar portions of the 1stters . taken place at the Trojan plant. As such,
",, it raises profound questions about the i We have learned that.on April $. two
- radiation technicians'at the Trojan Nuclear 3 Operations( adequacy and procedures, of Portland its training General Ele Power Plant in Columbia County- in Northwest and monitoring program and the quality of
, Cregon,were seriously over-exposed to pene. its spent fuel operations... .
.trating, hi h6energy gamma radiation. A review of the operation of the Trojan !
l Their exposure - according to an NBC: offi- facility reveals that this type af accident l cial we spoke to -- is the largest ever re- fite a recurring pattern that is emerging ceived by an atomic power plant workar. at the plant. NRC reporting documents from The accident, which occured in the reactor the period of the last twelve months dis-refueling cavity in the spent fuel contain, close that the Trojan plant has' experienced ment buildin6 exposed the two employees to' at least 30 mishaps. Several of these acts somewhere between 14 and 17 reas 4.6 to of non-compliance with federal safety zw-
.5.6 times the quarterly allowable worker quirements appear to have been caused by )
exposure limit set, by the federal govern- , systemic procedural error or defective non-mont. According to NRC afficials in Walnut itering procedures. In addition, a number Creek, California, the preH=twY readings of these mishaps and violations are direct-any be unduly low. Neither individual was ly now tied to the spent fuel system, which PGE wishes to expand....
hospitalized by Portland General Electric, In the recent April 5 accident, federal the licensee. ,
In a statement issued on April 6th, Ron , and utility officials were not even certain Kathren,, a. Portland General Electric (PGE) of the maximum doses the two contaminated ;
technicians had received. Only on April 14 health physicist, attempted to trivialize were utility executives prepared to conduct the significance of the exposure by stating
,that "The expocure these men received is a. simulated test of tne accident to deter-about the same as a persen could expect to Rine the maximum contamination of the men.
get from an upper and lower gastrointesti- It is clear that PGE interest to obtain nal tract (x-ray) annination and...it is accurate exposure rates and to enact speedy below the level where biological effecta procedures to determine precise readings can be detected." leaves auch to be desirmi.
l 1
$6 i, ,
d
. . . . - - . . - ~ . _ . . .. - =- - -
May PAGE 11 Most important, however, is the fact that blies when their permit clearly said that ]
this latest accident is the third mishap in "the spent fuel storage pool...shall.be about six months 'that indicated a breakdown maintained with a storage capacity limited in plant-wide communications. In September to no more than 280 fuel assemblies."
t 1 F7, in January and in April of this year, Trojan's mismana6enent of an operation as the licensee operators committee repeated simple as this underscores a near total mistakes even when projects were set up in breakdown in its quality assurance program 4
advance. In one instance, communications and operations that bonier on the irrespon-breakdown between operation staff.and. sible.
maintenance testin6 staff resulted in a The very fact that the April 5 accident ronitoring system being disabled. In occured in the spent fuel operations rein-another instance Trojan staff placed more forces this view.
storage racks' than the NRC permit allowed.' Finally, despite repeated citations of And in the April 5 instance a spent fuel infractions and violations of federal rod was shipped throu6h a room knowin617 safety and operational requirements by the being tested by radiation technicians. Commission, these continuing mishaps in-In.each instance, an error was committed dicate that stronger enforcement anasures despite the fact that there was plenty of are required. Past NRC activity has advance notice about how to proceed.~The clearly not served as an adequate deterrent mishaps disclose. that there is a funda
- with respect to the operation of the Trojan uental systems-wide ecamunication problem facility.
between different divisions within Trojan. In li ht6 of these considerations, we urge The series disturbingly su6 gests that one the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissions hand really doesn't know what the other is
- To impose stiff sanctions against Port-
- land General Electric, the licensee. l doin6+
In fact, in January of'this year Trojan Such measures.should include the maximum operators redesigned their spent fuel / fines permitted under the law and should ctorage capacity to hold 283 fuel assen- / , be accompanied by a provision that the penalty cannot. be passed on to ratepay-i ers. The Commission should also consider'
~
the imposition of fines on Mr. Frank K. l Warren, P2's Chief Executive ani Chair-man of the Board and on Robert H. Short,
/9 President of PCE.' Such fines should be related solely to the April 5' accidental jM
, corf anhation of the two technicians and~
\ of the procedural violations which were I associated with the overexposures.
g
- To forbid PGE ter assign the two recently
..h exposed technicians to " hot
- areas of k k. ,h ,d, Trojan for at least the next several
' ~
years. The employees not only exceeded
.'===" " [ quarterly limits, but surpassed their
' ~
g, annual limit by apprcximately 'a factor -
- h. I s z u. < . of three. Given new findin6s on the
[
% 4 incidence of cancer among workers exposed
- to low Invel ionizin6 radiation for b] .
atomic workers, restrictions on further exposure of the contaminated technicians Q,,,
is pruient and reasonable. -
'That's a good question that demands some real e 'To maintain the Trojan Nuclear Plant in
"*"' a cold, shutdown status until all pro-cedural, training ani monitoring oper-
. I 1
l
. 1 g
.w; ;. , , . .
- . - ......,...s_ _ .
,_3 ; ;, _ . .
l
== 1
-~~~~~'""~'" ~~~
,.g 2__ .2. _. ..__ _.u- -
~
, SHUT DOWN TIMES PAGE 12 stions have been corrected to the satis-a ct uo e she Commas an. The addit an-
~ al cost, if any, to PGE for extended FBI... CIA...PGE?
shutdown should not be passed on to rate- The Salem Capital-Journal revealed in payers, but should be borne by company April that the Oregon Department of Energy mana6ement and private investors. has been added to the list'of " criminal
- To deny the PGE application for expansion justice agencies" with access to computer-of spent fuel capacity pending affirant- ized criminal records.
ive evidence submitted by the licensee PGE had initially requested such that future mishaps or accidents will not direct access itself, but wa n't quite able occur with regaris to spent fuel mana8*- to muscle its way into that one. The state ment. The Commission should conduct a Criminal Records Council "didn't think it thorou6h inspection at the spent fuel was quite right to give a private firm like PGE access to criminal records," according
, procedures and release its findings to to council chairpetson Bob Oliver. ' "So the general public for comment prior to issuance of such application < seendment they gave the privilege to the Department on storage capacity. of Energy for the limited purpose of pro-i e .
viding RGE with infomation about job
- To conduct a thorough review of the per ' applicants."
i sonnel trainin6 pro 6 ram to determine if The arrangement is awaiting approval i from the governor's office and there are manm60.aent and staff can properly carry " difficulties in working out the specifics
- out a radiation monitoring and record ;
4 ~
of the order," according to the governor's
, keeping pro 6 ras.
{ ,
' legal counsel Jim Brown, who added: "The
-
- To conduct an immediate inspection of tricky part is to write this order so that
' Trojan's internar communications ' system it will stick with the FBI. Oregon State
- ' ,ter determine what corrective -=ms ar*. Police only have state records, and PGE neededito ensure that all operations'ar* needs more than that." . . ,
carried out safely and in accordance with., ' Brown added that "we're anxious to the. law. .,,,
wire this thing so tightly that it can only be used for security information on the specific people it is intended to be
- e. .
- To furnian us with a tabulation of all used for. It is certainly the intent of
. .worksrs in NRC-licensed facilities who the council and the governor that this is haves been. exposed to more than 5 reas per year ce 3 roms per quarter, not .to be used against anti-Trojan people."
,- t djto instruct'NRC licensee employees not to tasks irresponsible statements such as the' ,
'ons mentioned above about the lack of - g ,*
" biological' effects" of whola' body rad-1ation doses of 14-17 roms. ~
It is clear that therr are serious defic-ioncies at the Trojan PWit of which the major April 5 accident only appears to be ,
small part., Vs urge you to take immediate '
corrective measures'to ensure that the J
! health.and safety of the public and the employees at this facility are well pro-tect .. .
g g Sidney M. Wolfe, M.D. .
Director, Health Research Group.
Richard P. Pollock Director, Critical Mass Energy Project j
i
- r l' ~ ~
..m -
,- , ,--.-,...-._,,---.,_,e.,,,.-,,,,--, ,, . _ . - . ..,.,,,,,m.,. _-%_m_m _.,_%,, %w.cy,,,._c.,.,,-,,,._,.,,y,,,,,--,-_,r,
May PAGE 13 Why PGE PR is Doing Overtime Consider the consternation-in the ** Publicity that one of the plaintiffs in always-busy ?GE public relations depart- that federal suit against Trojan lives ment. In the past few weeks it has had to within a half-mile of the plant. The myth do its best to cope _with news items such that everyone who lives in Columbia County ass loves Trojan has bit the dust for other Disclosure that the Trojan control reas ns as well, including the fact that building - designed as the electronic \ all but one person in the town of Prescott,
- omputer " brain" of the entire plant - adjoining Trojan property, signed a petit-
'does not meet federal earthquake stand- i n against expansion of the spent fuel ards. '
pool for nuclear waste storage at Trojan.
, , And, the Columbia Environmental Council -
- made up of county residents, announced at Irradiation of two workers at Trojan,-
at higher levels than ati any other comm- a May 6 press conference that the group is ercial nuclear power plant in the U.S. , .
" seeking to halt Trojan and other nuclear according to the federal Nuclear Regulat- industry in the. area."
ory Commission.
Testimony by former Oregon DOE direct-or Lon Topaz that refusal of PGEs request ~
for increased nuclear'vaste storage on-site "would not result in any substantial harm to the public interest" even if the '
result was a Trojan shutdown.
Testimony proded out of PGE licensing Af@ .f ,
manager John Frewing that - as the Oregon. .
~ ,
l 1
Journal put it,- PGE "may need t;o further ;
expand the amount of radioactive waste- X %
~
fuel stored at 'the Trojan nuclear power '
plant even if its' application to more than
, ; 'op 4 double the present storage capacity is .: g granted."
j q
- Release of a state DOE study showing '
PGE has significantly overestimatged need for power in its service area for the future.
, j
- Release of a state DOE report April 28 that nuclear power plants are more expen-Why is this nuclear Deanut smiling?
sive than coal-fired generators in' meeting future demand for electricity - and that, according to the state DOS, there is ,
reason to seriously doubt that electricity from the proposed pair of Pebble Springs
- PGE is Sinkina Fast nuclear plants (current estinfated price- Meanwhile, one Portland stockbroker, tags $2.6 billion, and. rising fast) would asked about the advisability of purchasing PGE stock, leaned across his desk and be needed before 1995.
quietly said: "?GE is a lousy investment.
flow of ratepayers.
Y f
o 1
l SHUT DOWN TIMES ,
PAGE 14 5000 Rally at Rocky Flats '
participation in the anti-nuclear /
disarmament struggle. She asked for More than 5000 people gathered out- support in legislative efforts, in- I side the west gate of the Rocky nats I cluding the Transfer Ammendment, which Bomb plant on April 29th to demand its would shift tax dollars away from conversion to peacerui.uses. Many had g g g traveled thousands of miles, some from
"^
Britain and Japan, to participate in A r presentative from the British this action. More than thirty people aerospace trade union, Phil Axworth came from Oregon and Washington. Of spoke on concrete efforts at changing course, there were also many local priorities which have been made in the people, because Rocky R ats is indeed ,
^
UK. Workers at Lucas Aircraft, a a " local hazard and a global threat." British military contractor have writ-It produces plutonium triggers for ten a 1200 page conversion plan. The nuclear weapons that threaten the se- plan gives specific designs and proces-curity of the wrld,. while it leaks see whereby the company's production i massive amounts of radioactivity int can be shifted from weapons to domes-the local enviroment* tic needs, such as mass transit vehicles !
In the morning a rally i.n downtown . They would use the same workers, the Denver raised the slogans, " Fund Human same factories, the same tax money, ,
Needs, Change National Priorities." Then only the product is different. I ai motorcade to the much larger after- Another link between nuclear ]
noon rally at the plant site which energy and' nuclear arma is the ever-demanded " Convert. Rocky Flats, End present health danger of radiation. I Nuclear Hazards." Toward the end . Dr. Ernest Sternglass of the Univer- I of the Rally, a group of about 120 sity of Pittsburgh and Dr. Rosalie people carried banners to begin a '
civil disobedience action, blocking ~
- + -
the railroad tracka leading into the- ' q g plant. .
s %# '
People came to Rocky nats for a' ;'
, j variety of reasons.' Many were new ,
activists, recently involved in the
-MEMPMS-WICHITA-DENVER struggle to stop the spread of Nuclear-Power Plants. There was also a strong g g N MI presence of older people who have been ] ' r {9.Ci - vyy marching for peac'e and disarmament for
~
L I I
many years. In a message sent to the -- --
demonstration, Barry Commoner pointed --
out, "our movement becomes strong as h g wa linic our enee separate issues." .
That spirit of linkage was one of the' ,3 common themes of the weekend'.. "1 3
Ll1 We G Another conunon thene was the neces-
- sity of commitment to maintain and ,
create' jobs without nuclear power or - # (* ;
nuclear weapons. Sid Lens, a long 4 ..
time labor activist raised the demand b .L../ .
that we must " shut down Rocky Flats and Daniel Ellsberg speaks from the give every worker union wages until the Plutonium Path Caravan. The Caravan they find another job." Pat Schroeder, travelled from the Savanah River
- a U.S. Representative from Colorado Plutonium Production Facility, across pointed out that the jobs issue was the country to Rocky Flats, to dramatize the dangers of Plutonium transport.
critical in building broad popular l
. . 1
~
)
. , = . . . . -
,. - , , , , - - r . . . - - - ~ , - , n , ,---. - - - - - - ~ ----,-.c .wn.--.v,
May PAGE 10 .
g TDWMSD ppg: j - y..
-the Neutron' Bomb. "The Neutron Bomb must never be built," he said, pointing RM MM M out th** *** 'ff activ* u=* 18 not to
_bE n- defend, Europe from Russian tanks, as C* ' * ' '
! has been stated, but rather to put down '
popular insurgencies in Third World countries. It would not be appropri-ate for the tank attack icenario since
- tihe radiation effects 'cause death only C after .6 to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, but oauld be used ..
i.n African or Latin American countries to put down111beration movements against US supported Military Regimes. He ;
called the Neutron Bomb "a movable Holocaust" and said "we must resist it" "Our power is the critical mass of humans who will not. go into.the death ,
Berto11 of the Boswell Park Manorial, camp" he told the crowd "we must use 7
Cancer Institute both addressed the all methods from electoral activity health effects'of ' nuclear facilities, to demonstrations to civil disobe-
. Sternglass told the crowd that his dience." "If you're willing to go to -
study of Colorado Public Health data - jail and ri'sk your job," he said, had presented stron evidence of the "you will discover options you never danger of the Rocky Flats Plant . He imagined." --
explained that deaths from. lung cancer Ellsberg then joined with the in the county up-wind from the plant. 8 ta ty gr ups taking a stand weta si'gnifigantly lower than.in the ,
county which is down-wind. ~ . ~ , . , -
n e railroad tracks. : Most of the , ;;
Dr. Berte11 pointed out'that 'can .'_
120 CDers left.on. Sunday morning.to- --
=
cers are not the only effects from - ,
, j in with, hundreds-of others in a ,
radiation exposures. She warned. that. . day of workshops and sharing. A .-
'88811er'gr up decided to continue .,
even the samalleet iadiodetive dose "
tra f r-as long as can contribute to disease and pre- ;
mature aging. She accused the governi . pos @ e. De 26 nmaining occu- J ment of "suppressingi research infor . ' ' ..,
e ere arms a . n. g ,- ay 5.- y l
^' ~
mation, already accepted in the medi-cal community,"'and exorted the audiend ' .
audience saying,"."its time: our, voices.
were heard." ' ' [j h.i . . . Uh.
J..
kb. .
. t - 'p u. <'
- h. .. [s . h h .-
u
. . ('
E. ./
Stokely Carmichaer, s. vetran. of many struggles also spoke to the need
?
- i s -'?M"N -
y .. Q: M --
.i'?A '*' ' .
~
for public outcry. He recalled his own .,j 'Q,-[ZI .hOl' ! ;. .
l involvement in " Ban the' Bomb". . activities V" s
~
of the 1950s. notin8 that the " struggle ,. '# ~
- i I O .
j must now intensify". " A few'peopie can.
not use the labor of the people, the
' hU, ';3 M ~ I
- "L .
.) ,
~
.Q \ - f, ,'
~
retources of the people, for greedy X ..
capitalist society," he said., conclu- - s. a / .
' ' ~
7 '
s ,'
ding, " people must take control".. sur w .;~ : a ' :
The crowds reaction was appreciative w way v S '"
"! c a g,. ' [ .. .Q'ig 4 and sustained. ' l' -
Pentagen Refugee Dantel Ellsberg "
S 3I Y , - ~# 7
- told of his recent visit to Ansterdam, where 50,000 people gathered to oppose . Stokely Carmichael. addresses the Rally . }-
G
, ... . ~ . . . , . . .
,I, .
- . . )
.y%.,pg e ,gyn=g M
- a.f' ! #'
e.d'*'p*% 'e N@ '
M E '
- _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ , _ ~ . _ . _ . _ _ . . . ., _ _ . . - . . . _ . ~ . . - . . _ _ . _ . , . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
. , 3 s .
- ;
- ,Y' ^ .% \'
4 PAGE 16 - bf 4 ' '~ -~
SHUT DOWN TNES l
.; - 1
'n s Pote r..sts . "..
,N e w L a..w:Threate.
by severs stein l Consequences of doing '
l or even planning direct . action , .
activities like' civil disob- 8 Some examples of the respres-edience will be considerably 'sive aspects of the bill and.their more severe if House Bill 6869,
~ ramifications for our work to '
stop nuclear power' are desc'ribed'
~
the new Seriate' Bill 1, is passed by Congress. The f -
here:- y <.: a ? t. - .p i Senate version,.S. 1437,,.has -
,, : Section 1002(Criminal .. .. -
already passed', ' House ' f Conseiraev) would make a person passage of HB 6869 is the only -
7, guilty.:of criminal conspiracy ,
thing standing in the way '
if s/be'rpakticipated in a.' meet 4 '
of the enactment of legislati_on ing where a. decision was made >
.. ' ' , to takp an. action which is which will seriously infringe on our rights to protest agaliit-lfedera1 s law. ' Therefore, -
government action. Aspects of if interference, with :a nuclear.
HB 6869 could have direct effects power plant was made a federal i on the current tactics of the crime,.any person present at anti-nuclear' movement. Certain '~ - - a TDA meeting-which consensed' l activities-will immediately to do civil disobedience would -
f all withid thelwide ' sweep of ' ' -
be guilty of criminal conspiracy I the legislation.others would f all, even if s/he ultimately did not into the law's constraints.if - -
participate in the action.
interference with nuclear plants Section 1302(Obstructina j becomes a* federal crime. ' This. '
- -~ a Government Function bv. .. .
is not an . altogether . improbable - ~ Physical Interference) proposes. ~.
a.new crimetsaking-possibility f ederal .overnment' (as we and. see.state the .n l -,j,', .- Q' ,. . f ntierforaes, i ..like ,.any' physical.
4.demonstrationf.
governmentai dea ~ wing;.juris-7,-- M;~T Twith' gp,.y,, .federafffunction under y C ..
~
dictional battle 11nes 'for ,,gy,, circumstances a-ground for, .
ragulation of the highly' - *a prison sentence. This suggests I dang,erous nuclear industry. , .that a demonstration 11Ye , ,
The possibility of'.legis- interrupting NRC, spent fuel.
[ hearings would.be a federal crime.
lative escalation as a response .
to /our tactics is demonstrated 'i '
Section 1003 (Crim'inal l by the. remarks.of Oregon State, S,oJ ici tation ) also creates a new l Representative. Dick Magruder ' federal crime which makes it -
after TDAfa August' occupation .
illegal *to try to-induceEor'
at Troj an.1 'Magrud,er said he' .; persuade another person to fio .
believed,that> trespass on ..m X,1 an' action whichmonatitutes
~
nuclear plant grounds should ' a federal crime.- Under'this- -
be a felony not a misdemeanor section', i.f: obstructing a _
as a deterrent to the activities nuclear:. plant was & federal '
of groups like TDA'. crime, writing 'or agreeing to _.
HB 6869 is a somewhat ^ write-a leafle't encouraging toned 'down version of Ns.xon's * ,' people'to do civil disobedience
'SB-1 however, much of the ,
at'a nuclear. plant would be' Nixon philosophy directed at . a criminal activity.
crushing political opposition Section 1323(Tamperinci with is still apparent in the bill. a Witness ) not only makes threats Its attempt to organize federal and intimidation of a witness criminal laws into one law results illegal, it also sweeps into its in over-generalizations which grasp any other act which inter-turn methods of political protest feres with the administration of into federal crimes. .any law or the -exercise of the s I 4
.~, #)
.. .[he*****E
. E $ ,, .p . , , , " ' * . , , *
, , ,, , , , . .7.*..*,,.*p*Q *f 9
_ - _ _ _ _ _ ._ .~ _ _' _'_ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ . ~ _ . _ _ "
4., -
. . - . _ _ _ - . - . . _ , _ . _"_""*[. - . . _ __
. May PAGE 17 legislative power on inquiry. 'the Secretary of the Treasury i Thus participating in a demonstra- the authority to cordon off i tion t.o protest a NRC hearing grounds where the president could be illegal. is temporarily visiting away Section 1328(Demonstratinc from the White House. If a I l
to Influence a Judicial Proceedine) Person enters this area with th prohibits picketing, parading, , intent to act in a disorderly or displaying a sign, using a sound disruptive way s/he can be amplifying device,.or otherwise charged with an offense which -
demonstrating within 100 feet of would draw six months in prison ..
a federal courthouse in which and/or a $100,000 fine.
any judicial proceeding is in This punishment could be -
progress. The implication of given for entering only :.
this aspect of " government - with an " intent" to do protection by barricade" should somathing and the size of be obvious.. the area which can be .
Section 1831(Leadica a Riot). sectioned off from protest extends federal power inter loc al is not limited. The application affairs by extending federal of this section to the protest I authority over any " riot"(defined vigil during Jimmy Carter's ]
as a public di sturbance involving recent visit to Portland are ten or more persons) which .c lear involves the movement.of a person People committed to direct over statelines. Therefore the action in the anti-nuclear participation of a person from movement and anyone who is Vancouver, Washington in a TDA concerned about exercise of '
i demonstration involving more democratic rights of protest than ten people would. subject should challenge this blue- ; i us-to federal law. This section print for repressive govern-- *=
would make it a federal offense ment. If HB 6869 is passed to urge a person to participate some of our. limited resources -
in a " riot"-therefore a TDA may have to be diverted from ...
person urging people to ' join the direct action and education demonstration would be committing against nuclear power to an illegal act. keeping our people out.from -.
. Another part of the bill, under the thumb of the law. 1 added to S. 1437.in the final At this point, with time minutes before it cassed, gives. so short, it is vitally important a to write to your congressperson = i urging opposition to HB 6869.
'k& " . < s I
That's all you need to say but
~l . .* do it today. If you live - '
- ~ ' '
~
j ' ". , " ' '
in Portland ea'st of the
... $~ Willamette River write. Robert .
4.f .- -
Duncan. Those west of the river i
in Portland should write to
- ~ - [J - ,,
g Les Aucoin. The address for -
f-7r . y .' both is House Office Building, '
% f*g
. Washington, D.C.
M/
' g- -
More information on this
~-
- M~ ~
- r. g j gn . legislation
" can be obtained from the National Committee
- 3"A ,
7 . Against Repressive Legislation
.h .,. -
- 'J % " '
f (NCARL), 1250 Wilshire Blvd., i
~
e M "3 h ;s'$ '
7~ ~ , -
'. Suite 501, Los Angeles, Calif.
6 90017.
l
- -N==ar=== =, <=..p= ^%. .- .. e_ _- ., . , . , - .-._e. . ,. _ , , ,
,m.e,. e,mv~~--. --- . - - , ,--w.,---n- - - -m-.e -- - ~-- - - w.- ->-------.------v-----a
l SHUT DOWN TIMES PAGE 16 .
Unions Sell Out to Nukes " 2 -
M"tw
"" " ' "" '"" ""i <
3y a WALLSTREET JCCRNAL Staff ?.eporter *d '[ T WASHI.T,TCN--The nation's major construc- -
tion unions and four big construction con- d g tractors took what they hope vill be a j giant step toward cutting the time it ,g takes to build a nuclear power plant. . 3 The unions and the contractors signed : l a nationwide agreement aimed at M eing i i labor-management strife at r:1cis y plant :
sites and thereoy cuttirg construction }
~
tims. Amon6 other provisions, the agree-msnt stipulates hat there won't be ar;r strikes or lockouts at nuclear plant sites How to sen the "noke certer and senleeinger put tt sr needs tooether covered by the agreement.
Carter Praises Accord The agreement was announced at the strikes or lockouts, the contract pro- 1 White House. President Carter can ed it vides for flexibility in manning construe. I "a supero example of hcw business and tion projects as required by local labor lacer can cooperate to the mutual ad- conditions. Under some conditions, for vantage of both sides of the bargabi.ng example, members of one union wocid be table and at the same time be of great. anowed to do work normally done by mem-
.aensfit to our country." bers of arether.
Mr. Carter said the agreement would The contract also provides for a com-mean a "significant saving" in the cost .mittee made up of international union and .
of building a r:1 clear plant, lower utilit7 ocntractor representatives to set pay aM bills, better profits for contractors and benefits under some conditions and to iron botter working conditions and pay for out other details. Additional constm c. _
union laborers. -
. x. tion contractors will be invited to sign Although the agreement' binds local .the agreement and serve on the cocittee.
unions, the international unions may have to do some selling to get the locals to e= brace.it enthusiasticany. In publici- Deinocrats Vote No Nukes ,
skg the agreement, the international On April 1, wnile TDA marched in the I unions went out of their way to stress that it was " announced by President Carter s m ets of Ingene, the M gon Democra u e and to otherwise " drape ourselveMn the Party platforn convention voted to shut flag,
- as one union source put it. down Trojan.
Robert Georghe, president of the build- IWo. delegates to the cenvention--John ing and construct 1.on trades department. Bartels of Lane County and Imily Ashworth .
estimated that the agreement could slice of Coos County and a' caMunts for gover- !
as much as a year off the current three- nor -spoke at TDA's rally. So*.h are strong- l l to-fi.ve-year construction time for build- strongly opposed to nuclear power. l ing a nuclear generator. But environ- Bartels helped write the party 5 s energy l mental and regulatory delays add another platform, and Ashworth said that if elec. l five to seven years to the process,. and ted she wm name Licyd Martet s+. ate di. -
the agreement doesn't address those delays. ' rector er energy.
Mr. Georg he observed. He called on the' . Generally progresstve platforms were l Carter administration to " play its part" also passed in such fields as health and by "taking an appropriate action to re- welfare, ecucation, taxation, housing, duce and remove the uncerta hties causing land use, human rights and foreign policy. )
unnecessa:y delays in sitbg and licensing The question remai.ns, of course, as to !
cf nuclear power plants." how much this platform will guide Cregon's In addition to the. clause barrins elected officials. In the governor's race, l l
6
>f 3
~ - ..-..
May i PAGE 19 the front runners are an uninspiring incum. Court battle fought with PGE to release bent and a so-called enviromentalist who this petition from their tactics of delay.
huffily talks of " trade.cffs" as if we If you have any questions concern ,
could balance today's phony prosperity ing this petition, the issue of nuclear with an acceptable number of future deaths. power or would desire to set up a meet-There are other carxiidates who will ing with yourself and others concerning stand by this platform. A vote for Emily ways in which to gather signatures, @
Ash.sorth is one way, of being counted. please feel free to contact Forelaws.
John Bartels is worth supporting in Lane. We do not have much time left to gain amms County. And in Portland there are some the signatures we need but it can be ;
good candidates for various' offices. ' done. It is important that anyone who amm Stephen Kafoury is opposed to nuclear wishes-to pass this petition be given l powsc, and a victory for him could pre. the opportunity. If you wish to give ,
vant Frank Ivancie from ever becoming petitions to others to circulate and l mayor of Pertland. And Rep. Sandy ?.ich- ign this is perfectly acceptable.
porefawstelephone;inPortland l
ards worked hard. at the convention to ensuro a strong anti-mke, vote. Let your ' ' 637-3549,- in-Bend 389-8381.
conscience be your guide Ban Nuke Petition , .
- =
i . by Lloyd K. Marbet . . e - ,
l To put a Constitutional amendment y L P. ' '
on the ballot for the to vote on in the.
November 7,1978 general election, it d8 81 1-k m M 1
i is necessary to ebtain 60,000 valid , -
,4 '1 h 0 )?
signaturas of registered voters, in? , .
- Yib3 ,
Oregorr, by July 2,1978. This means -
that. to ensure that we have enough valid
. R SQN signatures and to ensure they' are in the- -,y I Secretary of State's office by' July- 2,< # .
we will need at least 80,000 signatures
~
,/C by June 25. ,
- h. )
We now have the potential to stop :5 nuclear powen 14 Oregon. All it. requires j N;C .
t is you.
For years now we have worked to both-
"g enlighten the people of Oregon to the very real threat of our reliance on nuc-lear power and to- provide the necessary- e as tools by which we might enact change. ;
The Nuclear Ban Initiative Petition spon ' ~ - 1 1-sored in part by Forelaws on Boarti is just that change.
As of April 1978, no one. in Oregon l has seen or signed this petition. It is unlike any petition which has been , g attempted on this issue. It: is simple.
i #
- t and straight forward. It says;we will not have any nuclear plants operated in l Oregon and we,will not have any radioact- ..*f f
) ive eastes or fuels stored or transport- / ,
g-c' I ed in Oregon. It once and for all gives the people of Oregon the right ta choose. .'
A right denied them by the utilities '
clear up to the recent State Supreme .x
. e 1 ! .
3E 20 SHUT DOWN TNES rojan Occupation, August 6-9 2
2 After several nonths of narches, workshops in local cociunities - is Lics, vigils, testinony at hearings scheduled to take place at the Portland court suits - all ained at preventing TDA office, 215 SE 9th Avenue. (Partici-
- inued operation of the T:ojan nuclear pants are urged to gather for a potiuck er plant - TDA affinity g:oups all at 7 p.n. Friday, June 2, to be followed '
- Or:gon have nade a consensus decision that evening by a discussion, agenda re-spontor renewed civil disobedience at view for the ne,:t day's session, and a '
jan in August. . , ,
filn and/or videotape. The :: ore "fornal" "Wa invite everyone to join us in the part of the training for trainers workshop ,
tcetion of our futures," TDA said in begins 9 a.n. S aturday, June 3, and is ex- [
ouncing the occupation, which will _pected to run until 8:30 p.m.) s in with people arriving at the Trojan A schedule of non-violence training -
e on four consecutive days, August 6 workshops for people planning to do civil ough August 9. The first day of the '
disobedience at T:ojan is being developed,
- I upr.tica will take place on the 33rd. ter take place throughout the Pacific ~
iversary of the first use of nuclear- Northwest. starting in June. r hnology -- the dropping of an atomic As was the case at both previous *
[
b on Hiroshina, Japan. Trojan occupations, TDA policy - confim- [
Tha Alliance statenent noted that ed by the April 23r1 TDA regional neeting ;
e costs and risks of Trojan are nany. - is that non-violence training is re- g they are all i.ntolerable. The in- quired for all those who will be doing y ion of governnent agencies, officials. civil disobedience at Tmjan in August. i courts in failing to put an end to .
Affinity groups - nade up of between f1 a 4-ninent danger leaves us no re- five and fifteen people - are central to
.rsa but non-vinient direct action." - TDA organization and decision-.anHng. A Participation in the occupation ~ - . spokes" f:om each affinity gMup takes 1 taka the form of support work as - part in local _ and iegional TDA neetings.
.1 as civil disobedience. Anyone in . -In addition, affinity groupa neet regular- i ested in helping create this occupation. ,17, providing a basis for personal support, j tha third one at Tmjan and undoubtedly cohesion, coordination and decision-caking. H
- tined to be its largest - is invited- People are being urged to join existing contact their local TDA office.- affinity groups or forn new ones, sending "We cannot afford the life-threaten- - a spokes to local and regional TDA neet- ]
- continuation of nuclear technology, ings.
.ch today casts the most grave shadoir. The first day of the August occupat-ir known in the history of hunankind," .
' ion at Tm jan . rill' take place sinultan-
! TDA announcecent said. Pledging it- ecus to an occupation at the Diablo Canyon I
.f to continue its policy of total nuclear plant site near San Luis Obispo, 1-violence th:ough the upcoming occu- California. .. ,
- ion at Trojan, TDA said that "it is our .
Announcement of the next Trojan occu- I msition to violence - including the pation comes at a cine when more problems ! I istrous violence enbodied in a nuclear with the plant are being disclosed virt- }"
ter reactor - that causes us to occupy" ually every week. Most recent was the '
t T:ojan plant as part of the ongoing April 29 news that Trojan's control build- }
1paign to shut down T:ojan." - ing does not neet federal earthquake .
Non-violence training vill be central, standa:::is, as_ questionable as they are. )
pr:paration for the occupation. A The continual litany of nalfunctions. l emi *g for trainers" non-violence work- poor planning, gross distortions and cu:,u- l 2p - intended to provide training for lative nisleading statements on the part i
- ple who vill be leading non-violence of the Trojan plant operators - ?GE - l 1
i
. .-. . ~ ~ .-
1 ,
- PAGE 21 .
May 1
Y } _ g. )
, ~ , .-
l '
t%. -'. . : -
Ja m h j.
p.
b
, Z S' - k ..
2
'f
. , p ,,
- [s. . l-. ,
f ..
(? V 3l.1 -
- g. **~
_j & ~
i
,3 -* .') .. x' Par, * ' .. .<. ~ -~ ,
'Y 'g
"
- JA %
f . % ' ' ( Wse
{
)
't 9
g
.- , ys
. l <% t Q~ .* r %.
' 'aS*- y.
s - .
s ,
,k
~ - \ ,
- . ~T l y
,[ F -
i strengthens the case for permanent shut- M The non-violence training committee- '
- down of a nuclear reactor.that under.'the . met in. Portland ort May 2nd t6 discuss best of management would be an unaccept- training foir, the upcoming August occupa-able menace to ourselvesC the earth's.C
~
tion ~ Qur primary focus was planning life-support systems, and future generat-- The for .a training'for trainers session.
1 session has been set for the evening ions. . .
"We are taking action in self-defense, (7:00 p.m.) of Friday,. June 2nd and all in defense of.the people. of' the Pacific- . da7 Saturday, June 3rd (9:00 a.m. ,to Northwest, and. for* ehildren and grand- ~~ ' 8s00 p.m.).
l children who already are burdened by the As. agreed upon tr/ the last state- .
wide meeting, this first training for nuclear wastes being generated by Trojan.,
trainers workshop will lay the' ground- .
and other nuclear reactors. In all con. - work for regional continuity in training. ,
science we cannot allow the' continued . .
We are looking-forward to people from operation of Trojan, whose radioactive -
out of Portland and need' to know how poisons are bringug aty. rut an ongoing many to expect. We decided to limit destruction of life.n this session to.50 people so we're ask -
Further information on the upcoming ing that people RSVP. -
3 Trojan occupation is available from local The committee will be meeting everr
! TDA officess Fortland, 231-00141 Eugene, ot!'er Tuesday starting on May 9th. at -6130 687-2557 Salem, 390-1686; Sheridan, p.m. tt the Centenary Wilbur Church 'in. .
843-2304; Chehalis-Centralia, 748-3009 or Portland.
736-3605.
~
~
t t 7 j i 1 . _
. es a.
O O O
. o w 3 sm..my, ,--ee----m--m -+-e-----ws- --,,.ws-9ra.m srw-v-+m -, r %w ww we e-imi rha ev w3e a wt as.ne-a - ws m e.eh.+re rim
PAGE 22 SHUT DOWN TIMES
)
l Refueling TDA i Johnry 3aranski ,
Now that IDA has reached consensus on mass civil disobedience action at the Tri- l further civil disobedience at the Trojan dent Baso in Sangor, Washington, they an- I l
plant this August, it should be taking ;nasized that training acecmplishes four ;
coasures to place nonviolence training, things: it allows activists to meet and high in priority on its agenda. support one another, familiarizes then But why the need for training? ,
with the complexities of nonviolence.
.11 chard Gregg offers some poignant equips them with the tools to make a par-ansrers to the question in his widely re- ticular campaign aM action successful garded classic primorf the ' Power of Non- (which is to say, nonviolent), and helps violence (Shocken Books,19eo), them decide at unich level they will par. '
For one thing, "All of us are crea;. ticipate. ,
tures of habit," he writes. and, as such. .Among the techniques they aro using must subject ourselves to aJprocess of are exercises in quick' decision saking, learning, "of habit femation " which will hassle lines (to prepare activists for produce the kind of behavior we desirei- the tactic of negotiation), and role-plays.
For another, there are a few of'us who can In a handout on role. plays they have instantly think of the right thing to do developed frcm the' Movement for a New So-in most conflict situations. ciety"s Resouree Manual rer a ttytre ne.
. Gregg, who has spent considerable time volution (1977), rasx Force tra:.ners stress studying no siolence in India, including that the exercise is of prime importance seven months with Gandhi at his ashram in - in training for di ect action.
Sabamati, has learned that nostolent re- 'The purpose of role plays is to help sistance is effective only when it is in examining.real problems on the level '
habitual. . '
.. .of theory, emotional responses, and phy-- ;
"At the instant when action ded of us, we do not have time to thg*n.' lyzeis d a ' sical social change; to try out and ana-througn the whole situation. and so we-situations, theories, and tactics; cet according to our assumptions, our son- to understand people and their roles; to
" he says., Xence.
- develop insights on the thcughts and feel-tim:nts if we prefer and our habits,5cind of action, it ' inEL of ppenses! . te an M pate new si-a certain tuations; to reveal fears, anxieties and is wise to prepare in advance the senti- ,
m:nts ahd habits that will automatically other fee 6.gs people have yut an adm to gain more infomation, an. to develop
]
i produce that kind of action.,
Gregg calls this process of learning' Ereup morale and individual and group com-petence and confidence."
or hacit formation . " discipline," and com-.
pares it to the kinds of descipline~ re- .
quired by any- vocation, even warfare.
3 "De Discipline for nowtolence is like _
l
. military discipline, an intangible tool. M. .M'" __ : _.
.' I i It maxes. the idea effeetive." But unlike W M N b_ ,- O ' - ~
l military discipline, he says that the M W/.L*P ~ 1'M'*'M !
" steady use of this tool will make, a vast #Ty g _~' .g '_ T- '
no ride.S $ mI9.[.r.7 M, .-
- improvement in human relationshipe.' .
- Nowielence training, as members of m ,;;.- a. % _ 1 _ f -- l
- the Nonviolanee Training Task Force for - ^ _ . - - e J % .5 ;% !
the May 22nd Goalition describe it, is "a laboratory where we take our thinking ETCi T~-l W 5'P '
- Xf l f;,
32T
~
j i
about nonviolence and test it, where we Q i
a develop skills and praetice thest in pre- ,
-fg:K/J,4 ~
-@. . . ;- --i' k f. - ? ,y ~
paration for real life situations." -- .4*g%: ~~ C; .
a At a weekend workshop held in Febru-arr to train trainers for this monthss i
c%g %" {p@s;+. Q ,e w. " '.W .
.. JJ. -
)
- .a . w % . e n % *
- C'Xi;?M:,$vC2.~r
. - :' : l
\
I a.M- ^
l l
May PAGE 23 In another handout they also stress the continue to use the same amount of elec-importance of a relatively new training trical energy from PGE7 How are house-concern.-feelings. hold needs (hot water, heat, lights, "From the experience of those who par- cooking, etc.) met? - 8 ticipated in the Trojan and Seabrook ac. 3) Have you been planning to make ary '
tions came a very clear lesson--pay at- changes in your ways of consuming energy?
tcution to feelings." If so, what are they?
Bei Task Force reminds us of the ten- 4) Would you like to receive infomation N sion that surfaced, especially after ar- on ways in which to live independently rast, for people in both occupations. from PGE7 Through such tools as Feelings Breaks. '4 Constructive Confrontation. what they call ) TrialUpdat'e (
the "I'm in charge" approach, and Role Ap-
- prcciation, they illustrate liev partici- Judge Robert Gilliland, in a pants in future actions can adequately letter dated April 27, 1978, denied -
prepare to deal with the fears and frus- TDA's final motion to dismiss current trations that interrupted the coherence ' ' cases on the grounds that November /
and effectiveness of the Seabrook and ccupiers had been acquitted in our n ;
Trojan occupiers. previous trial.
The Task Force has compiled and detailed ,
The judge granted District thsse techniques in a training manual re. Att rney Martin Sells' motion to have .
cantly issued for the upcoming Trident ac- an omnibus hearing to determine whether TDA can present a choice :
tion. Along. with a complimentary four hour " sample Session " it may serve.TDA f evils defense at the trial. No -
date for the hearing or the trial.
as an excellent model for one of its ' wne o has been sec yet. e J Sut whatever resources the Alliance'de-. .
cidzs to use, now is the time to set in motion a more comprehensive nonviolence training program than it has in the past. ' '
- Mail this Back .
Cthorwise, the human frailties and over. -
~
.~ '
sights of its brief, impressive history N' will surely return to hauist it.
graphie............... ,
typing.. 4............
Announcenients : . '**ias - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~. -
photography...........
leafletting...........
On its way to Trident, a Japanese anti- non-violence training.
nuclear delegation, including survivors printing..............
of Hiroshima and children who have the research..............
imprint of the bomb in their genes. will office................
stop in Portland to s on Thursday, May 13 (pend time with hu4 M w repair.......
potluck)., and TDA Fri-phoningkromhome)....
day, May 19 (press conference). For more other information, contact Portland EA at '
231-0014 or Genny Barnhart at'236-8331. Are you in an affinity group?
Do you want to be in an affinity Casey Burns is ' currently evaluating the
~
3"PI potential of Appropriate Technology as a .
tool .or social change, through a. research I do not want to receive SEUT DCWN 73,,,
project in the Center for F.nergy Research, '
I do want to continue to receive 3'W S.r. Ash (232-9124. Either write or SEUT DOWN Times a!
call Casey at 07a or at 771-8468. '
- 1) To wnat degree are you involved in . ,
dere is my contribution of $
the anti-nuclear movementf
- 2) ishat enanges have you personally made p with the ecsts of pr nting and
- in your ways of consuming energy? Do you ,
f
....-.w. - , .~ ~ w w: ma.~mv ' ' ~ 2.=._:.:.a. L- --
.m,. , _ . . _ . _ - - , _ , _ _ , _ . - . - - . , - - . - _ _ _ _ _ _ - , - . ~ . - - . . - _ _ . . _ - _ _ - . _ . - - - . - . - - . _ _ - - - - - - - . _ _ . , _ - - . . _ - - _ - ~ - -
.--_c. ._
i PAGE 24
, SHUT DOWN TIMES l
--..-_n_ j 1
1 (d
Calendar: !
I 4- A May 11 :
UQ Eugene TDA general meeting 7:00p.m.
l Eugene City Council Chambers.
y
{
l t
/ h
- 13 Eugene Trident NV Training at Wesley Center 123C Kincaid.
12 Eugene TDA bakesa1e at U.0. Bookstore.
Eugene Trident N7I at Wesley Center.
)
l
, h} @
June 6 Portland,
'17 Eugene Trident NYT at Wesley Center.
20 Portland TDA general meeting at 10 a.=. at 21s S.E. 9th.
l
~
A
' ' h' rident Legal Demonstration.
O t . 22 Trident Civil Disobedience 33 s NTDA NVI Conunittee meets at 6 30p.m.
l E8 at 215 S.E. 9th. -
gb!
3 ~
E 25 '
c7 T I5P$ Portland TDA Ed Committee meets at
%2 $$~ g 7 p.m.
- y,
'e .
5 3
l8 2
j 3
June 3 Port 1and TDA general meeting.
$ Training for Trainers Workshop.
j
- 5 4 NVT Workshop for Satsop.
' E 6 E Jesse Colin Young Benefit Concert in Portland.
7
, Jesse Colin Young Benefit Concert in Eugene.
7e Fs 11 , .
h3 NVT Workshop for Satsop.
n f.s @m
" N P 195 Knock Nuke Week begins
@@ m I
. . . ._ ~ . . _ -.._ - . . _ - _ _ _ . . . _ . - -- -
/
,. ^
. s /
.t.. I2
- J
- ,/ l ..' t
- ,, ~
3 ~. .,
A2 I3 1 i ) *
. r a /
e J - .
2
\ .3. 1.s ,' .' . 1 -
.~ ;rf 3 :a
.. * ', j
- s. . a 4 .- 3 /
%m f,%.;,/
,) j 1
- s. ~-d m n :7j A 7., rs e3 k 2Us.3.%;:.-l .
]*".m %A;-)rr=v.l?.a,1 u..a .v:
'L-f, a } Q 'g : :
4
... : Q ) -( . ,
". .}
Sy STEVIN C.* "tTE'i ettn etc; 2' m art o: wheda the :ew tr.:is c: 03 to 'r.- .
A gicap opposed to nuc!:lt power s* C: d sad one on wheder r re n-
- accused the Por:!a:d Ge:gra! E:ectric tv:'ed fuel fror1 Tre'".G rea::or e ,;4 Co. Frida.v of heh:g d!shocest with re.a-b .' .". i~s..' ' c ". . .~. ...
ulatory officials and the rantlic in t.n .s..., . v o.. . e u. . q . ". tv c . . .. ..o,.
, [.
e s. u- . . '
'* effort tC Sp#ed eXp..sion of nuc!eir .. .
. ".. d s 1 ". .. a.~ e. i 7 . . - -". w'. . is b
,. ., . , /
.r ~i,) ..
% was:e ston ,e iscili:les at the Troht la tra TQd :.3 PM. .fOr *
- 4
- . ' CUC!ttr u*:w i'r *'!L1t. t'. s t ".. e , . .." .vas r. a. t
^/ a .w. . . ". . -". - ~. .uW. . .
The Tro9n Dece nmissioning A!. s3.6 a..e r .n. ..
c- a..- -.: :
t a.c .c. s..r..h.o.v.-)
- . e. .* A- .
. Y..
- s. . . , ' . liance 5.!d at 1r 'ress cer.ference that > .s '.. ,a
..e
. su..d .. s e ,.. . .s. . . e .+. r.a e . .v . . . .*. s .*
PGE had t'"- .h :,3 l0f * ' O s
- af -!!!d in :.1 w ': 3 .p-e,-
.w... .. .r.g n.
t'. . '.- . x ..' t', f ". . .' .'. r' . . . . '
s AlIk:h".* I: '*;*~. -d '.:stf*!ra a. 1. ,. .
-v Cr - - ? . - ' it . .tC .c ..'<. t-f - . . -1 t'
- r the ;!f Hat I:
- I.s , r? T**,,- I!y .s
...t.-. -
01* e... [. . . .t . , centimin:'-d -
- ru'!;t.:' ve m:t -tal,
. ,a, 7. . ~ .3 y eg-l ~gy d, t . ' r ., r,3 Contrary to whit he uuhty renttd ce two.73..'d tar!!er. a A hnrists ThurMiy :.r.d G... . u... . h. a. .. .
. . .:.es .o ..,v.Co...v.ine.4 gn v...
0.. . , . s . . e. . .. 3 PCE confirmed tht :here v.tr ' w- -. A 6 , y,. s a. .. . . c. a t..s v-. ISVel Colt **.!r.::!oc 6n 2J tr.cI.s '.01 d
...t s. ?..r. c t.v <.e. la
. n
. r...
5.dd it re're'e**ed Do h:2ird. a S i u. . e , f . %- N
.s
.-{3 .. 6.t
*Lh3 It?Whg. Of PGE's Utr'! Eg v .a.'e. t '. - A. . , ,a .L..6..
. .. . , .- *.b.1 e . ..
4 dW.S:on. $ lid the C0t*L:-i .11: 03 W t.s 1.;e.* DsE. er b7: * '"3 :T:523 (MD 4. s .
- v. .o. .sw. a. .- e.6...
due to te.:pwsry stor:ge (c July M6 3 m n ,r;; .;,,v
. . e..t. .c e t. - .e .
of I.M. id ra f::"cr. weI:e fec:a 2e ,-:. int ,. . or c: 5 2,t.e,g g g co.
. . . : , . . s . $ .o.. t.
w hile it wu. Shut d:wn f r r.r.ttte- . .
-'er e..,$...se ..... .,. tt.... ..
o r.ssce. Dat he 5::d the rt:P.t:,n te::g .
. .. a .a emi::ed - o .e :: nth mi.:: ram pr hout c:.e spat f;e!. tut PG'E hers : 3 c..:.
- was so 10w that an em; bye wc :d phie ;;. np: r:ca tefre turned f:e!
- have to work in the at:: 50,C hours a is (ge out of the r:3;;3r A 379 3 ,
, year before c::ceeding fMeta'st.r.f uds .. .s .c. n . , .a. s.. . . .+.... g t,s.. . .,. . .t. %.,.-
.. a. .
cm expeme. point w;tt c:;t eght ti .es ?s m;;b ::.d
?GE Ued to the p 51:c. the (s.r : pres:nt a gren:r radiz:fon risk to Escrgy R:ility) 5 Sg Coun: t. u.d the wylars, federal 'hc1:r.- Re,v.:!r.torv Ccm %.n.
- w. 3:e T d<.....~. .- . <. O. n. . cots, - tir g c3;rcit u =.
when it implied in its orii;inal 2;ptn- . .. .. .c m.'. . e., a.s . >. c .. n . tien that this s:sn5 e .v1 was emect- .cits c - 2::s .i..-. ,rv te .y. Ms n et a ': tar 'o d e tr. nit:sted." an 3:" nee st:te: e ,t s:id. .
.- . . .. .a.
. n .N. '. . . . ...- .a-The d!schrute has a!so Irked cme eOg1 f*.3 b c - h t'!e <.x cr crW* til, l'.e <! !e .e.~.<....,.c..
r.U*.htr$ GI the s!!!r.5 - .... ..
.s..~.. . c. e c. .
s 2 DC.Y th5* : .'"*!*Lis Tre 3*.. Yh*., % re , .w. c .r..
- a. g v
- 4. . . -? .*$. .6 -.
*s-
. . , . . . . ~
r,at 7.w1*0 Of the c:rt. *J r.?h*, ;"t!} &
. 3.
r*.Mti .* TUtt,'."Y. .
.e. 3 .w s.-..--il 4
.. ..a..' s V".^ ..
tv-~.., %. s a.. .a. t a. r. . ' .. d e A L e m.. m...
"I d:n't thMk that PCE has t es: ;y-.ed of ".e comp!:te!y h:::est w!!h us." :.'d Dr. c: ~y r.: in::4 a ta
- .<s r ura... . . s. . .ee..
Jcho Therre, a ecur.c!1 membcr fir:n . m , . - . .....g.. e r '"/ . tt er Tordand. s.;,t t, . , I Tha i t:*M ht ".2 .0 3 cy: .cil r.~ . .: . , ". %. . c . . e . . " , n.s.
. .. . i 3
. . so 3 i. y. , v v, .t ... ' -
.c.., - -
h-d :(CO m'n #7d to 'h'! *: r * . ;ry 3 7, j S t ^, e c , - .. . y 'e . - .. . .,- , . '. 3 l CV..-"T.Cn *h21 Nr' k? ti . : :.r;:t' t;3, w j
...5. 2 *. '. . . 4. . "o . e he:.f.rn .s on e.r .nd:d f;.cl era;<t. :33 4
. .m,.,
'. 4 u. t .? .
2 ;h9..,o. . ,'~ -..:.. . e.. , o C.. .."s &,, .04
. ,a t
.s-q. 6. .. .
*1
Safety at Trojan By MARTIN ROSENBERG plant challenge 4 ! Capital Journal Reporter Inadequate safety planning and failure "1bs is tne first nuclear power in. Miller also faulted PGE for what he to respond to "early mdications" of dan. stallation PGE has been involved in and called ineffective plannmg. ger at Portland General Electnc Co.'s they can't treat it like another power (PG E) Trojan nuclear power plant led to plant," Kramer said. " Lack of an adequate radiation survey the recent exposure of two Trojan tech- The exposure of the two PGE workers (test) at the first Trojan spent fuel move- ' nicians to radiation levels five times the earlier this month was the only instance ment is a prime example of how insuffi- l federal limit, according to a state energy of workers at Trojan receivmg more cient planning has contributed to inci- ; official, than federally set limits, Godard said. dents at Trojan," Miller wrote. "Because The Apn! 5 accident at Trojan " raises The NRC limits exposure to 3 rems over this was the first refuelmg at Trojan, questions about safety of plant opera- three months, and 5 rems pc r year. (Rem DOE expected increased precautions to cons and, m conjunction with other simi- is a measure of radioactivity.) be taken by PG E." tar mcidents, about PGE's management According to radiation monitenng de. Two other incidents at Trojan were of Trojan," accordmg to a letter sent vices the two technicians wore, they re. caused by inadequate planning by PGE, Thursday to PGE by Fred Miller, direc- ceived 14 and 17 rems of exposure. Miller wrote. i tor of the state Department of Energy Tests will be conducted to determine if Maintenance workers, not provided j (DOE). they received more radiation than regis. with wet suits, were sprayed by conta- l Miller called the accident " prevent. tered by their badges. Godard said he ex. minated water. A second incident that I able" and recommended that the state pect3 Parts of their bodies received more was a result of inadequate planning oc-Energy Facility Siting Council fine PGE radiation than the amount registered on curred in September IS77, when a worker for the accident. their badges. unknowingly entered a high radiation area, Miller wrote. The federal Nuclear Regulatory Com. PGE and DOE have not released the PGE managment failed to recognize mission (NRC) also is conudenng levy, names of the two workers. the importance of the Apnl 5 accident, mg a (me agamst the utility. The workers were exposed when they the director wrote. The accident this month could have came close to an unshielded portion of a The movement of spent fuel past the been "much more severe" if it was not transfer tube. A spent nuclear fuel as* unshielded portion of the tube contmued "comctdentally" discovered, the letter sembly was moving through the tube, for more than 12 hours following the ex- , sta ted. On Apnl 3, two days before the acci* posure of the two workers, Miller wrote.
" DOE ts particularly concerned with dent, "a radiation survey identified un- -. -- -.
the apparent failure to use an effective usual radiation levels m the area of the PGE management delayed reporting < systematic approach to identify the transfer tube," Miller wrote. the accident to DOE for 18 hours. ; cause of unusual radiation leveis" at In addition, additional shielding was "We feel they should have told us im- { Trojan, Miller wrote. placed on part of the tube but "no one mediately," Godard said.
"PGE ought to do somethmg different apparently thought to investigate the up there before they get m big trouble," possibility of inadequate shielding on the " Trojan managment did not assign l Donald W. Godard, DOE sitmg and re;;u. other end of the tube," he wrote. any om person the responsibility for in.
vestigatmg the mcident, Miller wrote, i lation supervisor, said. fle also wrote that on the first day of Richard Pollock, spokesman of Cnti. refueling Trojan workers were aware and as a result, details of the accident cal Mass, a Wasnington, D.C., group op. that a portion of the tube was unshielded were not identified until DOE and the l i posed to nuclear power, said after talk. and that radiation levels in the building federal NRC performed their investiga. l were hign. tions. mg to PGE officiais about the accidet, that "there are several questions about "If any one of these early indications Miller concluded that the problems at j the attitude of PGE officials to the safety had been effectively pursued, the person. Trojan may be the result of problems in and health of its workers." The accident nei exposures very probably would not PGE management organization. j , "strongly mdicates there are defective have occurred," Miller wrote. worxmg procedures at the Trojan plant." . PGE should consider ruakmg some of ! Pollock said. " DOE has previously discussed with its "off-site" engmeers workmg out of its PGE acknowledged receipt of Ihe PGE the importar.ce of thorougn correc. downtown corporate headquarters "re- , DOE letter this mornmg but officials had tive action for even small problems be- sponsible for prepanng and maintaming l
.. comment. fore larger problems develop," Miller Trojan operating procedures" Miller Mi!!er, in his 6tter, directed PGE to wrote. For example Miller wrote,in Fe- wrote. l identify by Apnl ?.8 corrective action it buary 1971, worker contammation pro-vided early warning of a leak of some This "could increase corporate man-will Me to prevent future accidents at mvolvement m plant opera-g, radioactive coolant from a tank.
., he wrote, and it would " help m.
Loren Kramer, executive assistant to "PGE failed to idenufy the underlying sure that equipment is operated proper. Gov. Bob Straub, said the " strong" letter cause of the contammation mcidents ly," Miller wrote. was " absolutely warranted." and, as a result, the tank leaked for sev-eral days before the problem was identi-fled," Miller wrote. l
TROJAN DECOMMISSIONING ALLIANCE 2: 5 S E 9
- Avenue, Portland, Oregon 9 71 t phone: Joj - 2 3 s - oo' t
__ . . . e TO an raClatlOn COSO ligles: ever THE OREGONIAN, FRIDAY, APRIL 21,1978 By BfLL KELLER "Several of these acts of non-com*
- The nuclear critics quoted Dr. John W The onesaten ewt pliance with federal safety require- !
Ballar, editor of the Journal of the Na-WASHINGTON - A spokesman for ments appear to have been caused by tional Cancer Institute as saying radia-tho Nuclear Regulatory Commission systematic procedural error or defective tion doses of 14 to 17 rems "quite clear-said Thursday that ooe of tne two men monitoring procedures," they said. "In ly cause cancer of the breast and cancer who were exposed to radiation earlier addltion, a number of these mishaps and of the thyroid gland in human beings. It this month at the Trojan nuclear plant violations (lacluding_the April _S case) is very likely that such doses cause can. may have received a hlgher dose than are directly tied to the spent fuel sys- cer of many other organs as well." was reported at the time. tem, which PGE now wishes to ex-Kathren defended his original com-In addition, the spokesman, James pand. Hanchett of the NRC's Walnut Creek, PGE Assistant Vice President Chuck ood M ea **NE .peets is vanishingly s Collf., office, said the April 5 ace! dent Goodwin said the ocetarences compiled HowN, abren modded an ear. was the largest known radiation expo- by the critics were insignificant events sure of a worker in a commercial nu- that the company is obilged to report ass
- Ap d s clear plant. regardlessof theirimportance.
t2 E' Hanchett's comments came after Pollack, in an interview, conceded "Pect,a.An_a series of diagno_stfc two top aides of consumer activist that the individual occurrences were rays of the gastrointestinal tract. Chal-Ralph Nader asked the Nuclear Regula- minor, but he said they point to a per. lenged by Wolfe and Pollack, Kathren tory Commission Thursday to forbid the sistent problem with radiation monitor. said Thursday that 14 to 17 rems would restarting of the Trojan nuclear plant ing and plantwide communication. be a relatively high dose from an X ray end punish Portland General Electric "It's not the magnitude of the prob. exam - with one to three rems more Co. for a " recurring pattern" of mis- lems, bdt the type of problems that con. likely, haps at the Rainier area generator. cerns us," he said. " Cumulatively we The April 5 accident occurred when The letter to the regulatory agency have a very serious problem of a utility a spent fuel rod was sent through a was prompted by the accident in which being plagued by the same kind of mis. refueling room while two technicians two technicians were exposed to radia- take." were carrying out a pre planned ex. tion that was five times the safety level Pollack and Wolfe asked that Trojan amination of the room. set by the federal government. be kept shut down "until all procedural. The two men, not identified, have Hanchett told The Oregonian that training and monitoring operations returned to the plant. Under federal the exposure of one of the men may have been corrected to the satisfaction law, they must be kept out of radiation have been even higher than the 14 rems of the commission." Trojan is shut areas until the next calendar quarter. reported at the time. The second man down for refueling and maintenance Pollack and Wolfe asked the NRC to until at least May. require that the exposed workers be received a dostof 17 rems. The two nuclear critics also urged kept out of " hot" areas for "at least the He said the agency suspects the that PGE be heavily fined for the acci. next several years" because of the large dent and that the company be denied a doses of radiation they received, thir te o nt is o cause the measuring device may have pumit to expand storage of spent fuel been shielded by the worker's body, at Tr dence,ojanthat nopending affirmative future mishaps evi-will oc-Hanchett said the worker with the cut.
!ower reading was actually closer to the NRC spokesman Hanchett'said the radiation source. The federal limit for agency stillis investigating the accident exposure is 3 rems in any three month and expects to have a report by late P'TI0d- May recommending whether or not PGE officials said Thursday that PGE should be disciplined.
within a day or so they will have more " Civil penalty is a very live possildl- ) ap3 , definite dose results, based on a simula- lty," Hanchett said, "but I would not tion of the accident conducted last expect a shutdown."
^*
weakend. In their letter, Wolfe and Pollack In their letter to the NRC, Dr. Sid. also sharply criticized PGE herith phy. sicist Ron Kathren for a statement to ney M. Wolfe, director of Nader's Healm Research Group, and Richard P. reporters that the exposure in the Tro-Pollack, director of the anti nuclear jan accident was "below the level Crttical Mass Energy Projects, said the where biological effect can be detect-April 5 accident came on top of 30 other ed " safety irregularities at Tro}an within the past year.
h e
~
FOR DmEDI ATE RELEASE
* '[ PUR FURTHER INF0HMATION CONTACT:
illCHARD FOLLOCK, (202) 54c-4790 l , j SIDNEY WOLFE, (202) 872-0320 J l lilZeri l:)llfl[! April 20, 1978 fu (~ im 1n
\.
Chairman Joseph Hendrie - T" , , , U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission * ;- ,, , Washington, D. C. 20555 '4_,
Dear Chairman Hendrie:
We have learned that on Ap,ril 5, two radiation technicians at the Trojan Nuclear Power Plant in Columbia County in Ncrth-west Oregon were seriously over-exposed to penetrating, high energy gamma radiatigp. -- Their is the exposure -- according to an NRC largest ever received by an official we spoke to-atomic power plant worker. The accident, which occurred in the reactor refueling cavity in the spent fuel containment building exposed the two employees to somewhere between 14 and 17 rems - 4.6 to 5.d times the quarterly allowable worker According to exposure limit set by the federal government. NRC officials in Walnut Creek, Californiai/, the preliminary readings may be unduly low. Neither individual was hospitalized by Portland General Electric, the licensee. ' In a statement issued on April 6th, Ron Kathren,a Portland General Electric (?GE) health physicist, attempted to trivialize the significance of the exposure by stating that "The exposure these men received is about the same as a person could expec: to get from an upper and lower gastrointestinal tract (x-ray) examination and . . . it is below the level where biological effects can be detected." Both statements are false and misleading. The average whole-body dose a patient gets from upper and lower gastro-intestinal x-rays is about 1 rem or about 1/15th as much as these two workers received. We asked Dr. John Bailar, Editor of the Journal of the National Cancer Institute and an expert on the adverse effects of radiation, to comment on the PGE health physicist's state-ment. Dr. Bailar said,
" Radiation doses that bracket the range cf 14-17 i rems quite clearly cause cancer of the breast and cancer of the thyroid gland in human beings. 1:
is very likely that such doses cause cancer of . I i 1/ James Hanchart, NRC, Walnut Creek, California HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP e 2000 P STREET. N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 . G02) 572-03:0
Chairman Hendrie - 3- April 20, 1978 to enact speedy procedures to determine precise readings leaves much to be desired. Most important, however, is the fact that this latest accident is the third mishap in about six months that indi-cated a breakdown in plant-wide communications. In Septem-ber, 1977, in January and in April of this year, the licensee operators committee repeated mistakes even when projects were set up in advance. In one instance communications breakdown between operation staff and maintenance testing staff resulted in a monitoring system being disabled. In another instance Trojan staff placed more storage racks than the NRC permit allowed. And in the April 5 instance a spent fuel rod was shipped through a room knowingly being tested by radiation technicians.
- In each ' instance, an error was committed despite the fact that there was plenty of advance notice about how to proceed. The mishaps disclose that there is,a fundamental systems-wide communication problem between different divisions within Trojan. The series disturbingly suggests that one hand really doesn't know what the other is doing.
In fact, in January of this year Trojan operators rede-signed their spent fuel storage capacity to hold 283 fuel assemblies when their permit clearly said that "the spent fuel storage pool. . . shall be maintained with a storage capacity limited to no more than 280 fuel assemblies." Troj an's mismanagement of an operation as simple as this underscores a near total breakdown in its quality assurance program and operations that border on the irresponsible. . The very fact that the April 5 accident occurred in the spent fuel operations reinforces this view. Finally, despite repeated citations of infractions and violations of federal safety and operational requirements by the Commission, these continuing mishaps indicate that stronger enforcement measures are required. Past NRC activity has clearly not served as an adequate det'errent with respect to the operation of the Trojan facility. In light of these considerations, we urge the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission: (1) To impose stiff sanctions against Portland General , Electric, the licensee. Such measures shculd include the maximum fines permitted under the law and should be accompanied by a provision that the _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ - - . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . ~ - . . . _ _ _ _ . . . . _ _ . - . _ _ _
s Chairman Hendrie - 5- April 20, 1978
; c e,'5 88 "
(8) To instruct NRCa; employees not to make irresponsible statements such as the one mentioned above about the lack of " biological effects" of whole body radiation doses of 14-17 rems. , It is clear that there are serious deficiencies at the Troj an plant of' which the majoi April 5 accident only appears
'to be small part. We urge you to take immediate corrective measures to ensure that the health and safety of the public and the employees at this facility are well protected.
Sincerely,
- k. % .O -
Sidney M. dolfe, M.D. Director, Health Research Group d Richard P. Pollock Director, Critical Mass Energy Project cc: Portland General Electric SMW/RPP:gh 1 l 1 i I _, .,.,-,_,,.,m,..-~,,m,,-, .. ...,,,.
**J y
*e* s
'N *
", 'o * ' ' "'
m CERTIFIED MAIL G34530ft - #'
,j s' Return Pcceint Recuested 3 ,, Y- kzul 4
x,
'b 5 L;f .
g( .*/ -' y (
@l 5333 6 i
~ March 16, 1977 /
l.- - '
, 1.t i
v_
~
Mr. Fred Miller, Director & .A'. . !- Orogen Copartment of Energy
$2s cottava stroot !ct
[ Q' .. e to Salem, Crogon 97310 *
- gjg
, Res P2 - PC::/TroJrn -
, , Colud21e County Dear l'r. E111ert I trant to thank you for tha cppert.:sity to asot and diset:ss with yes our resp':ctivo concens rosa::dir.g Wojen liccica: M. Ant cporatienc 6:d Port 0.rnd Ceneral ::1cetric'a rc ent roquest of the Nccicar R:9elatcry C 3 mission (i;;'.C) to exN:d the opent fuel stor==
age pool (fJP). In folic:m to yone request thst c :: Cepert::ent cen idor the coversi c. pacts eclated to the G77 we tsou24 liko to c=: ment ca the follr.Aring ers us '
~
- 1. Ctxuctural intcyrity of ele = nata involved i
- 2. Asse:1sted increnso ir. thar=al it.:;nct
- 3. Question of de facto ps m:nont storage Incle.ded trith ccch will bo items which seem to-us to be unciser or which require recolution.
Ita recogni:o that Department revicw cf parts of this prcblas is not direct.ly mndated by Orsgen statutest heirever, es tre discuscett, . it is neithe.r po:ciblo nor prudent to consider one acrect of such an f industry cs wholJy diverced frca anothar. j
\
l
)
Includod in the imC notification of this proposed chango rore l the nc=ec of the centra. tual torn imolvod. At this tico va have no ; first-h:nd knwledge of any of there fir:s hecsvor, es dstalled in ' the Decm:ber 12, 1975 icsua of t?illamtre Nkl , sirdla ucch for ncacho Caco hc.s been unt.artskon by local c:occa fires. ,In that e.se it vca dotcmined that a subetantini nu::bar of structural walds in l i
. .._.y. ,
Mr. Fred Miller . Page 3 1 i March 16, 1977 l n 1 It in our understarMing that, prior to Troje's going criti-cal, the reactor veneel was subjected to a 600% overproscurination as a result of operator error and eouipment malfunction". Comrannte made by Carl 3. MorganS su7 gent that this cortination of low tamp-erature/high pressure conditions may be the worrt matallurgical case to which a reactor vessel can be subjected 6 . Further state-7 ments by Ronald M. riceryga , while calling for ehnt-down of similar ' PNR's. until radificatione can be modo, fa.il to clarify whether acy of the classical nee-dectructive structural tacts vere performed en the recotor, or their rasults (if any). Without purening !!orgen's statesentaE that " cay failure so serious should not' bo handled by Mr.inintretivo precedures" and that "rancter design abould ha cuf-ficient to prevent cuch events", we vould liha to resolre why crent fuel weeld be stered in euch close proximity to a veesol whose upper limit integrity (failing tests to the contrary) may have hosn com . prcelsed. _
~~
, curton and Moleon in Sta:D 7f-5:r,00 state that ramearch being done rolative to tha possibility of a eteen uxplosien taking tilacs in cresas of containr.emnt espe.bilitics cay be presently conducted on a seslo too croll to test the dynamic coif-cizing brysthosis cet forth by colgats10 Significantly, if the Colgats hypothesia is cc."coct, then the Rassmuar.on predictica l l that cctly 10 of cera ncit ec:idents will bs of a serious naturo is not valid. In evoxy ct.se, then, there tr'.11 exict the potentici for a inrge scalo steam erpicsion, the ugn.(tudo of which say be likely to breach the containeaant. What Orther research has bean dono regarding thic pcssi- ' bility? ,, Is there any indicat on that a building cit:d next to an explosion of this kind and loaded with radioactive fuel would be able to withstand such a tremor? -
':2 tha car.c end, wo would like to knotf trhat donign mcdificSticas (other then fuel rack reconfiguration) have been = ado to dec1 with
- the attendant incrosso in criticality, Kgg.
IMvs domign changes been nado that veuld prevent the ro-l occu resco of n fuel transfer car jc= ict in the trzasfar tuba? Or ju:rpin7 off the conveyor tr'ick'il2
~+
't> Y y ==
g e w'c:i--w1==- -e-'+- g- -yPM-- w-_' w-r-- y e-+i - wwew-ex-
... y l
' .n a. . ,
Mr. Fred Miller . Page 5 March 16, 1977 t Wy was there no provision made for the heat associated with this fuel storage in the original design application? Why the discrepancy between the abovs figures? What level of confidence can be placed in these latest figures? a Has the otorgon stato Departs:ent of Fich and Wildlife been ccntacted regarding possible additional thermal impact on biota? , There are a fev otner areas of confusion in the FTAR that ' have not been cicarod up in the PCE 1013 reports - Wy in the statement nade on pp. 9.1-2 that "this [SFP]
. pool ic not required for any plant enfaty related fune- l tion" followed on pp. 9.2-1 by "C2crgency water cupplies j for the follor. ting safety-related systans cnd equip = ants...e) l spent fusi pool"?
j Again, in section 9 1.2.2 the ntatanent is anda that " borated water ic used to fill the spent fuci storage pool at a boric acid concentratica of approximately 12,000 pps boren." tut in section 9.1.3.2.2 t.ho FSAR continues: "Ecric ncid concentratica in the cpent fuel poc1 water is maintained at approximately 2000 pga been."
! tJthough PG31013 replaces oms parts of thic ccctica of the FELR, '
, . , . . it leaves this unclear by repeating the use of 2000 ppe boren on I pp. 3-15.
Could you piense clarify this? 1 i Althee;h this proposed expansicn would not violata CTcgon law . , l i es it prencatly oxfsts, it_. stands in_ conflict with tastimony.re- ; ponte_d_1Y_offore@ PCE before state, Sonstq Cc cittoo _that 1*ual j storage would be confined to the chortest time necessary_to_prepara , 6e fuel accerbTlas,[cr sh_l@t off-siti. Asa,~doeNtatheAttorney
'l l
canoral's finding that, legally, this preposal does not constitata / radiocctive waste disposal,' practically it placon Crogon in a resi= !
! . tion of being a do facto permanant we.ste depot for nucioar materials.
3 At no point in the propo a1 do wo see arrf contincency plcnning rela-tivo to the likelihood that slippages in any federal ti. stable for waste dispenal e.ny puch tho "off-load" dato beyond 1908. . 1 ter do va eso n realistic appreciation of tho fact that there i are oosa 70 other reactors around the country in much the at:r.s l .-- f I b~
, , , 3 s
= .
.A e
Mr. Fred Miller Page 7 . March 16, 1977 FOOTNCTTES: A Willamette Week, 12/12/72; page 1. 1 Nuclear Power Experience, Vol. PWR-2; page 9. 3 Nuclear Power Experience, Vol. PWR-2; page 9.
- 4 Nuclear News, 11/76; pages 29-30. .
5 Professor, Nuclear Engineering, Georgia Technical School of Nuclear Engineering; telephone conversation; 3/10/77. 6 Nuclear News, op. cit.: page 30 7 Reactor engineer, Reactor Systems Branch, Division of Systems Safety, NRC; ibid., page 29. 8 See footnota (5) above. 9 Cormentary on "An Explosive Reactor Poss2.bility - Blowing the lid off the Teapot", SANDIA PIPORT #76-5260, Lawrence Buxton, Lloyd S. Nelson. 10 Colgate, S.A. and Sigurgeirsson, " Dynamic Mixing of Water and Lava", Nature, Vol. 244, 8/31/73; pages 552-555. 11 U.S. Atemic Energy Cc= mission, " Reactor Safety Study, An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Power Plants", Appendix .VIII, Draf t WASH-1400, 8/74. l l l la Nuclear Power Experience, Vol. PWR-2, 4/73; page 4. . l 13 Nuclear Power Exeerience, Vol. PWR-2, 3/73; page 3. 1"
- Nuclear Power Exnerience, Vo'i. PM.-2,12/76; page 14. .
15 Nuclear Pcuer Exceirience , Vol. IWR-2,12/76; page 14. 16 Nuclear Power Experience, Vol. PWR-2,1/74; page 2. 17 Nuclear Power Exeerience , Vol. PWR-2,10/72; page 1.
, , .,w --,-y - - , . , , -, . ,- ,, -.-- .. ,c -y-y..--.v.--,,--..,,- . , . ,,-.,y--,--,-....#v -,%.,.-. _ ,,, , ...- , ,. . . . , - ,_.-,....,v
.. .,_ - .. . _ _ _ .- . _ -.= . _ . _ _ _ _ .
, 1 gh.f.~., C' Je l~ .$U
((-~~. A%L La. . 1 ..,, } ((
. . J W **
L ibrtland General W. toc Trojan ::ucicar r1ane e <'#p a.^' 621 S W. Aldei F: i et P. O. Box 439 -( /.,/ i Fbriland. Oregon -37205 Rainier, Oregen 97043 , c' h,[
- Septe :bcr 19, 1977 " f* * . f
,,. ,. > ,poy.N; .7:, l ' ,, . P 1 yt -
.gr
&/ O'&, g@k k.a
'l -
l j 'p tir. R.11. Engelken liuclear Benulatory Cemmission, Ecglon V l{a G '//; ,g; ()' . 1990 North California li tvd . ls e r - Walnut Crock, Califor nia 94596 >>+~*
\*a s # r-C# r
Dear Sir:
'i*/ g ' ;
/
%416~ ;
in accordance with the Trojan Operating License, Appendir. A ,USNRC I 3 y Technical Specific:.:tions. attached la Licennee r. vent Perort No. 77-35 . ; which 5ysten.describes the Inilure of a circuit card in the Rod Centrol Sincer Jy '
%l
[ i' )ff .
/
b.D. Withers s k w Superintendent Trojan Nuclear Plant (X?i. , BDW/ R1'S :me Ac t.ac hmen t s c: J. L. Williumn C. Goodwin, Jr. D. J. Ilrochl - R. L. Sullivan S. L. Loy flucien t Operationq lbard l Trojan Operatina, :ammittee
- i Plant Review Pe.ird i L. V. Quinn D. F. Kielblock I
C. J. Fleming T Shife Supervisors F. D. ? tiller, riOE i Office of >!anar,ement Information and Pror. ram Control - Edison F.lectrJe institute - Patricia liigniric File 93.:No ' a .Y e 1 d 4 I
..~ * '
.- sm 5
- + =
me'-it-t e t-9 &-9 *-gmvW-e.e+yaSM-rm-vp------r'*'nveimvm --'v't,*y Wr*a-'-'-5 Y ev'N'*-'4--wd T-'w*'eevn-9-- -e- +a,-===g*w e 'e e iw c- w a ev +t.-+,w. -ee--F -ear.e ,=,-w--r & -.--u-wwwam aw
- - _ _ _ . . - . - - . . . - . ~
CONTOOL OLOCK;l l l l l l l (rt.1Act pntNT ALL REQUIRCO INF0HMATION) 1 G . LCfN$lt (cfNLt tyttaf LC[NOC NUM0(A t vi'i tyrt N A *.t( Lg lR lT!!!lPl1l l0l0l-l0l0l0 !O lti l-ln l o2bl {4l1 14 1b 2U l1 lt l1] ,, 30 l0lt( 31 32 00 tvtNT oaf t atpont cArg cattcony "7p[ t s$i$ ocentt NUunin { CON'T07l P lb00 l l1, l l 1, l l 0 l 5 l 0 l - l 0 l 1 l 4 l .'. l l0 l8 l? l1 l7 l7 l l7SO!9!1 l9l7l7l 00 08 bu 74 e b9 60 61 EVENT DESCfhPTION l
@ ll'0 77-D: A CIRCilIT Fall.llRF, cal! SED A LOUS OF Roh CO::TROI. WillCl! AFFECTED llAl.7 0F Tile 80 t U9 T1115 FA11.1TRE PitEVENTED l Q l('JNTR01, RODS I" CONTROL 1;A:NS B AND D A!!D SI:t'rDC'.0! I;ANK C. , 80 00 l
h l F.']VEMENT IN U OF TilF. P1. ANTS 53 COMTRol. RODS. , 80 , 09
- l.
8I 89 80 l bIDD po. ..f 80 r COW'.WLNI C"MfO #NT
- 1. f' Ti4 CAUSC SLsas'tsA MA*M AG1Un(H VO(A(O*4 r.not COCC COMr'04f Nf CDCt
@ll l li l l E l lCl0lN lR IO ID I 1"l lWl1 (2l0l47 l !d 43 17 43 ~44 .
D9 10 11 12 CAUSE DES n:PTION l
-@ [illE PARTI AI. LOSS OF RO3 CON t'ROL WAS CAUSED BY A FATI,URE Or A S11PERVISORY RUFFER 80Mr.M l 0 La TitF f (v:1c rAr,t s!rT To T9r PnMru r' r. n T Ni T _
hktARDW1tTC11TRANSMITSACONTR0f. SIC"AT.FROM LJ UU l E. WTHOD Of 80 4 ACIUTy DCCOvtnv CESCASTICN DTH(A STATUS CCCUvi ny Status % POW ( A l lEl. l1 l0 l0 l l NA l lAl l MA SO 0 10 12 13 44 4b 46 ; J AMCUNT OF ACTMfy LOCATCN CF AELE ASE I n E50 CF I nA
]O Izi Iz1ttf'. SE l sA 44 l
46 I 80 9 10 11 PtHSONNEL EXPOSURES f 4UVOF Q tvet CCSCAlpiON
- l
@lo\0]Ol
. U 11 Jl 12 13 NA 00 8
. PLnSONNCL IN.lV4tES
- NUMMI O Ot $09@1 ION NA l b h.,,,[0 l 0 l l .
80 U9 11 Sc 0'fSITE CONSEQUENCES P. A l h (, 00
,U0 Lt US On / WAGE TO FAC:UTY
- 1*:Y ots,;wt os .
i
\ fU9 l 10 ^
YA 60 PUOLICITY ' I
= NA
{} ' . OL A')DITIONAL TACTCAS FA
)D]UU
[ _
*G Ut.
1 0 l'
- a. . . . " . ,., , . .,. ( S O U 5%-171 'l EXT. 2 M
K hPUR f A". pa;r nua.:.L r, t .s 1 l ,
- 1. Repott Number: 77-35. I f,7
- 2. a. Report. Dat c: Sept ember 19, 1977.
- b. Occurrence Date: August 21. 1977.
- 3. Facility: Trojen Nuclear Plant, P. O. Box 439, Rainier, Oregon 97048.
l 4. Identification of Occurrence: s A circuit failure caused a loss of rod control which af f ected half , of the control tods in control banks D and D and shutdown bank C. Titis f ailure prevented movement in J ? of the plants 53 control rods.
- 5. Conditions Prior to occurrence:
I ; The plant was operating'in Mode 1 at 1007. of rated power. I
- 6. Description of Occurrence: ,
j- Whlic attempting. to change the position of control red group D using manual rod control, the group failed to respend properly to an inward motlou signal. The group inserted three steps and then stopped although the insertion uinnal was still nrenent . A rod control urgent f ailure alarm was receive I at this time. An investip,atlon f.iund that the alarm was caused by a phase C regu-g lation fallore m powr cablott 2BD. Thin poner cabinet converts w from three phaso AC to DC power and supplies it to the control rod j mechanism coils for h11f of the control rods in enntrol rod banks I i Il and D nnd shutdovn bank C. Upon attenptinn to reset the power cabinet the alarm shifted from cabinet 2P,D te cabinet 2AC. Attempts , vare made to locate the cauce of the failurr: however, shortly af ter ,! the power cabinet wes opened the f ailure disappeare<l and sub- 1 l sequent actinns could not reproduce it. Personnel concluded thac the f ailure van cauced by hinh temperat ures in the closed cabinet which decreased when the cabinet was opened. On this basis, the 4
% Rod Control System was declared operational and was returned to r.c rv i c e .
Approximately two hours later another rod control urgent f ailure alarm was rcccived while attempting to move group D control rods. Troubleshooting of the system was recommenced to isolate the source of the problem. The f ailure was eventually traced to supervisory buffer memory circuit card wliich transmits a control signal from the log]c cabinet to the power cabinet. A>. a retult et the failure. ~ the power cabinets were receivine unanswerabt" 4"t ruc t ions. 1 k 7. Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: This event war,couned by the failure of a circuit card in the rod cont rol logic circuitty. ; I' i I t . s
i .
, l' AGE Ta'0 s ,, .
f
- 8. Analysis of Occurrenec:
This event had no etfeet on either plant or public safety. Alternate tr.ethods of reactivity control were availabic if required. In addirjon. thir, failure did not affect tFc ability to insert all control rods with a reactor trip.
- 9. Corrective Action:
The def ective circuit card was repaired. t O e l l
,/3 (( f3 - '
)o'g[/J.W Li MkW E ;les;
~
j . W ,. J*9 jp*' G Tbriland General 'ik ctric Trojan Nucicar Plant 8 ' 621 S.W. Akiet Si mt P 0 Box 439 -(/*.f'j Fbriland, Oregon N205 Roinicr, Oregen 97048 ,
' hc.[
- Serrember 19, 1977 F, ,. . t .
.+-
$,,f,, 4W4Chf 'u.g 7
' l ' ' t . '"
,d Q O h'Y'h Mr. R.11. Engelken y} @h f. M '3 -
Huclear Rentilatory Ccmminston, Region V (9' a y '.pf (O! . 1990 North California 111vd. d c Walnut Creek, Califoinia 94596 D E' # Qbf $* !*- G
Dear Sir:
b [6~ p In accordance with the Trojan Operating Liconne, Appendix A ,USNRC Technical Specifications, attached la 1.lcennec Event Report No. 77-35 . which describes the Iallure of a circuit card in the Rod Control
, System.
Sincer Jy i- \, )
+ !) ,
f b!.D. Withers y Superintendent Trojan Nucicar Plant T& BDW/RPS:mm 1 Attachments - c: J. L. Williumn ! C. Goodwin, Jr. D. J. Brochi l R. L. Sullivan S. L. Loy . l Nucienr Operations P.ca rd Tro jan Opera t J in', Gmmit tee ' Plant Revfav lloard L. W. Quinn
- D. F. Kiciblock C. J. Fleming )
Shift Supervisors F. D. Miller, POE Office of Manar,eminr Infor.mation and Program Control Edison Electric Institute - Patricia liignins File 93.24a W y W --w-+ - - , , - - - pm, ,-. , - - - e . , , , , m.-.. .y,,-- . . . - , m , , - , . .,,-m.,- ,.., , --cm.-.m.--, , - . , -- y-- , , - -.,-c ,m.*
' ' '
- CONTD0l. OLOCK:l l l l l l l (PU.AGC PntNT ALL A0001000 INF0HMATION) 1 G
tcrN;g tytNT LCtNS(C ifer typg wavt (Ctf45C NUM0(n L j' llt lT lM lP l114l l 0 l 0 l -l 0l nl0 !O l0 l-ln l 02bf {204 l t ll ll [1] l0l1f 32 1b 00 31 C0 gytNg carg ngpont o&fs Cattcony "7p"t t 5$bb 00 Cutt Nuuntn l 1, l l 0 l 9 l O l - l 0 l 1 l 4 l ',j lnlR l? ji l7 l7 l l p! fy l 1 l o l 7 l 3 l
]CO*rT l57P l 0]
1 l1. l 74 75 00 bu b9 60 61 08 UU 0 EY9NT DESCn6PTION A CTRCt!IT F.\ll.littF. CAUSED A 1,033 0F R00 CO::TROI. WillC:1 AFFECTED llAl.F OF Tile l g l1~0 77 "33: 80 09 T111S FAIT,l!RE Fl!EVENTED -l
@ Q0NTR01 RODS IM CONTROL 1;A545 B A"D D AMD SI'tirl10'.O! I'.ANK C. 80 09 l h lMVEMENT IN 13 0F Tile Pl iMTS 53 COMTRol. RODS. _
80 09 - l. 8i80 80 l hIDD po , 80 CDMD)N1.NT C9MINF NI
$ f *",T f M CAUSC SWEV.4 MA*M E17(4
- VV(ATON Cf10( *COCC COMf'MT Nf CPC( '
lC]OIS lR l 0 l I) l lNl lWl1 ( /. l 0 l l 'd .
@ 0D 10 k}Bl l El 11 12 17 43 '44 47 49 ,
CAUSE DESCn:PTICN l
@ [',IlE PARTI A!, LOSS OF C03 COSl'ROL WAS cal? SED BY A FATI.URE ni' A StiPERVISORY RUFFER 80 M I O9 c a. n t strT h l( ARD W11T Cl! TRANSMITS A (sWTR01. SIC"A1. Fun" 11tF f (v:in ('Al',t "r? Tn Ttir Potwet LJ UU I E.t) U Mff HOD Cr 80 F ACIUTY fifM(n ST ATUS CCOuvi ny Oscovtnv CCSCA@TICN STATUS % ACW(A l
@ lEl. l1 l0 l0 l l NA l 44
@ab 46 l NA SO J G 10 12 13 ActUvit y CO*4 f TNT LOCATCN CF AEL( ASE I AlltASCO CF AttFASE AMCONT cr A01Mtv 1 NA k7l l 7. l KA 44 4b , 80 0 9 10 11 PtHSONNEL EXPOSUAES fJUMDfn tvet CCSCAtp10N'
} ,
@lH\0\0\ [ ,.] l NA GO j
.U 11 1C 13
- J
, PtnSONNCL INJUAIES ,
4 muuns n etscastos l
@ [0j0l0l l NA 80 U9 11 12 .
O *rSITE CONSEGUENCES h4
!I
[ (, 00
.U9 Lt US On ' WAGC TO FAC:UTY
- tuY ot;;Acios
*j l i EUDLJ l 10 E^ *'
PODUC1TY v^
\l\
1 D\ , 00 A:lOITIONAL. f ACTCAS I i i MA
]n]UU
[ ut t Ut 1 1 0P i
- . ".. - f u**. . ( Son 5 %-1713 [.XT. 2 3 5
)
la.00 R i i ". W. chin a.:.ta; t y t. l ,
- 1. Repore Number: 77-35. ! f, /
. O 2. a. Report l'at c : Sept ember 19, 1977.
l
- b. Occurrence Date: August 21, 1977.
- 3. Facility: Troje:n Nuclear Plant, P. O. liox 439. Rainier , Oregon 97048.
4. Identification cf Occurrence: I A circuit failure caused a loss of rod control which affected half of the control t ods in. control banks 11 and D and shutdown bank C. This failure prevented movement in 13 of the plants 53 control rods.
! 5. Conditions Prior to occurrence:
[ The plant was operating'in Mode 1 at 100% of rated power.
- 6. Description of occurrence: -
j 'Jh11c attemption to change the position of control red group D using manual roit control, the group f ailed to respond properly to an inward motion signal. The group innerted three steps and then stopped although the insertion uinnal was still prenent. A rod control urgent failure alarm was receive I at this time. An investicatlon f.iund that the alarm was caused by a phase C regu-g, lation fallore an power cabinet 2 tlD . This powr cabinet converts W from three phaso AC to DC power and supplies it to the centrol rod j mechanism co t t s l'or half of the control rods in contral rod banks t B and D nnd nhutdovn hank C. Upon attemption to reset the power
. cabinet the alarm nhifted from cabinet 2bn te cabinet 2AC. Attempts vere made to locate the cau::c of the failuro; however , shortly af ter the power cabinet was opened the f ailure disappeared and sub- ,
l sequent actions could not reproduce it. Personnel concluded that the failure van cauced by hinh Lcmperatures in the c1p_ sed cabijlgt l which decreased when the cabinet was opened. On this basis, the i
'- Rod Control System was declared operational and was returned to service.
Approximately two huurs later another rod control urgent f ailure alarm was received while attempting to move group D control rods. I Treubleshoot ing of the nystem was recommenced to isolate the source , of the problem. The f ailure was eventually traced to supervisory ] buf f er memory circuit card wliich transmits a control signal f rom the I logic cabinet to the power cabinet. As a result of the failure, _ the power cabinctn were receivine unanuwerab1"
**w *"c* ions.
l t l 7. Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: i
. This event was canned by the f ailure of a circuit card in the red cont rol logic circuitry. l t
I 4
, PAGE TWO
[ ',
- 8. Analysis of Occurrenec:
This event had no effeet on either plant or public safety. Alternato inethods of reactivity control were avesilabic if required. In addirlon, thin failure did not affect the ability to insert all control rods with a reactor trip.
- 9. Corrective Action:
The def ective circuit card was repaired. 1 1 O e l t l 0 N m- a a a
~ ~ '
EXHIBZT A A-1 DOE Report on Trojan investigation August 2-3, 1976 . During the months of April and May the Trojan Power Plant operated in possible violation of their NPDES Pemit and NRC operating license. The major violations involve the instrumentation for measuring the thermal emissions, the failure to report and take immediate action to alleviate the situation, and possibly exceeding thermal limits. Information developed Energy (DOE)during and Federala joint investigation Nuclear by the Oregon Regulatory Commission NRC) atDep(artment Trojan of is summarized in the following outline. Relevant correspondence w ' ... we have received on this matter are presented as a separate appe ~ t i ID't-I I. Thermal Pollution , l[ i A. Quantification of Thermal Discharge Gl
- 1. The meter required by the Technical Specificatio be S in the control room giving BTU /hr. was non-functio e for all of May and apparently for most of the time th
- plant was in operation.
- 2. The effluent temperature sensors were located after a pump which draws water from the effluent stream to be measured for chlorine content. The sensors are on small pipes in an instrument panel. It is highly likely that these will measure temperatures in excess of the real effluent water temperature. Due to their location the sensors were not reading the efflueng temperature accu- ,
rately; they were off by more than 1 F. I 1
- 3. The effluent flow as measured by a triangular weir does not have the confidence of the plant staff. At some points it was reading inaccurately because of an instru-ment zero shift and water in one of the tubes of the differential pressure cell which measures the height of fluid in the weir. The date and data involved in the correction of this was not recorded. The engineers involved felt that the weir needs to be calibrated; that the measured height may not currently be accurately related to flow.
- 4. In light of the problems in the instrumentation of the thermal output, grab samples were taken at the influent and effluent structures and measured for temperature.
Before May this was done periodically. Starting May 3rd it was conducted almost daily. The grab sample program was not a formal program and measurements were made at most once a day. On some days in May samples were not taken. (There is no provision for this method in the Technical Specifications and it was not okayed by either NRC or DEQ.) l
- 5. A secondary flow calculation was made at PGE by taking l the service water input minus the cooling tower make-up.
This is not accurate because the make-up flow can only be estimated. I l
, A-3 B. The understanding of the plant personnel was that the amount <
in question was the external sodium added by the plant. ' Support for this interpretatio'n comes from the requirement for zinc, chromates or phosphates which are not required to be : monitored because none are added by the plant. Furthermore, the NRC technical specifications specifically state that the limit refers to only the external sodium added by the plant. On August 4th, this interpretation was checked with Kent Ashbaker, Supervisor of Water Pollution Control at DEQ. He felt that ' this interpretation was consistent with the-intent of the NPDES. PGE's reported values include sodium concentrated out i of the river water in the cooling tower. The input by the ' plant in the domineralizer and during dechlorinization are i estimated to be well below the required limits. PGE is in the t process of trying to develop data to document that they were ! within specifications. ! C. If the plant was in violation of its sodium limit it should l have reported it to the NRC and 00E and taken prompt action to ' meet limits. III. Boron i A. The NRC Technical Specifications require that the Boron. Lithium, Volatile Amines be sampled continuously. The existing > method of sampling takes a composite sample continuously for i 24 hours each week. This latter method is in compliance with ' the NPDES permit. t B. The reported levels are not in excess of the required levels.
~
. IV. Actions as a result of the NRC visit f A. Voluntary agreement was obtained from Mr. Goodwin that the l plant would not be re-started until the temperature instru-mentation and systems identified in limiting conditions for operation are operating properly in compliance with the re-- ;
quirements of Appendix B of the technical specifications. An ' action letter to this effect was sent by the NRC to Porter i with copies to Goodwin and F.C. Gaidoes at PGE on August 4,1976. V. Personal Opinion on general feeling at Trojan The general feeling at Trojan is that the thermal limits are so far below levels having any detrimental effect on the environment that , meeting them has not been of very high priority. By " default" the Chemical and Radiation Protection Supervisor was given responsibility for measuring and recording the-thermal and sodium emissions. When an overrun on the thermal output was detected they stated they notified operations who theoretically would respond. by reducing ! cooling tower blowdown. However, there 's no record of th's response l or of formal instructions to the operators for handling such an 4 er w- s r e- it -=---c.i.w+, w-w e e i, 3- rr.-,r-en-ea,ee.r-. v*=mw=*w-----zem+%-r -a*-r-iw--st--*--re mvv e-r e-me+ 'r -r r e yv w wr < < firt" -tm r*v m n t- v --try ww-t' Wivv e - vT'-* *m'v^ ets--v* y- - + - ~
A-5 PG 2A1 Appendix 2A - The Environmental and Effluent Monitoring Program Guide - The pertinent quality assurance requirements of OAR 345-2-6, Rule 26-060 and Appendix 1 apply to all applicable activities affecting the performance of the below-listed Environmental and Effluent Monitoring Programs and associated services, systems, structures, and components. These Programs are all established by the requirements of the ETS. The Meteorological Program is not included as it is subject to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. ThefollowingProgramsan{ajssociatedservices, systems, structures and components are those specified in the ETS to which this Quality Assurance Program applies. (1) Thermal Effluents - As specified in ETS Section 2.1, this effluent monitoring applies to heat added and temperature and rate of water discharge to the Columbia River. This monitoring is done under the compliance of the plant staff. C. 26-160 - (1) failure to notify the Council of violation of the NPDES permit. D. 26-165 - failure to submit performance tests of equipment and procedures and controlling pollution emissions and discharges to the Council within 180 days of the initial start-up of the plant. E. 26-170(2)- failure to notify the Council within 24 hours of having exceeded a " Limiting Condition for Operation" of the Environmental Technical Specifications. VII. Recommendations of the DOE A. That the questions of variances be left to the DEQ with the Department of Energy staff providing any assistance that is requested. B. That the Director of the DOE serve notice to PGE under ORS 469.540 curtailing operations at Trojan until monitoring equipment is functioning properly and a quality assurance procram has been implemented. C. That the Council seek civil penalties under ORS 469.992 for the following causes of action:
- 1. failure to adequately monitor
- 2. failure to observe and implement the actions required by the QA program
- 3. failure to report
IXHIBIT B ' B-1 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
- REGION V AUG u SulTE 202. W ALNUT CREEK PLAZA ,
1990 N. CALIFORNIA sOULEVARD W ALNUT CREEK. CAL 6PORNI A 94S96 AUG4 mg Portland General Electric Company , Docket No. 50-344 621 S. W. Alder Street Portland, Oregon 97205 Attention: Mr. A. J. Porter Senior Vice President Gentlemen: This refers to the inspection currently being conducted by this office of activities authorized by NRC License No. NPF-1. The inspection includes a review of thermal discharges in excess of technical i specification limits reported to this office by telephone on July 26, i 1976. The inspection revealed that systems and instrumentation l required by Appendix B of the technical specifications and designed to l measure temperatures and compute thermal discharges were not operating i properly. These ; natters were discussed by Messrs. R. F. Fish and R. T. Dodds with Mr. C. Goodwin, Jr. and other members of your staff , on August 3, 1976. , l With regard to the matters discussed by Messrs. Fish and Dodds, it is ! our understanding that you will not resume operation of the plant < until all instrumentation and systems identified in limiting conditions I for operation are operating properly and you are in full compliance with the requirements of Appendix B of the technical specifications. If our understanding as stated above is not correct, we should be informed promptly in writing. Our inspection is still in progress and enforcement actions by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regarding this inspection will be ; addressed in future correspondence. ! Sincerely. l i.kG,,.C(..' - C. Goodwin, Jr., PSE 9 " cc: F. C. Gaidos, PGE hr tor l [W'. Kell ~~ 1 Xcods, Energy Facility Siting Council I
@acWDo+ 4
+
5 4m Y % l
#776 GN
, - -- _ , _ ..,__.y., - , . - .-.,
F DI
- a @ar L@m@rl Rif u l l C I by winiam Boly -
? h e;Y q .
Photos by Clyde Keller l 1 Q>s # ~ THE ATOMIC ENERGY Commission's pro 4
- mi S uled to be "on line"in September 1974.PCE now of cheap, clean and reliable energy from nucl r plants is turning out to be just another technoc.
wer c(./ sa = '/gers crossed, that the plant will produce electricity , l fu. jf fall of 1975. Meanwhile, Trojan construction costs : j ' Across the nation, unwitting consumers are subsim g j ,~. s.have climbed with vertiginous speed-from an original 5226 I through increased rates a spectacular,if underpubliciza, million price tag to the current " final cost" of $375 million. ] failure in nuclear performance. Nuc! ear power plants are PCE puts the best face possible on the overruns. Accord. I several times more expensive to put up than onginally con- ing to Don Broehl, Manager of Nuclear Projects,if Trojan templated, don't get built wellin any event, are conse. meets the fall deadline," construction time will compare quently inefficient when they are operating, and once they very favorably with any plant of similar size, both in time break down, are extremely expensive to repair. and investment per kilowatt." The statement is as much a Oregonians are being initiated into the unlovely realities commentary on the ineptitude of the nuclear construction . of nuclear power by Portland General Electric,whose 1130 industry as it is an apology for Trojan. Where the AEC once i megawatt behemoth, the Trojan Nuclear Power Plant,is promised that nuclear power facilities would be built for an ! Oregon's first and one of the largest in the nation. Reality investment of $125 per kilowatt of generating capacity and i No One is the electric bill; there have been four rate in- less, utilities now budget $800 and more. ! creases since construction began and others will follow. l j Intiated rates have helped float a project that is already [ Inefficiency in America?] three months past its ongmal completion date and nearly twice as expensive as onginally forecast. Just how bad has the nuclear power plant performance g < .p. m = = a = , . f . _ e vv
- cma--
Q Q Q G b,e W* ' g t ~. i i mb gfc%s..e.s.s. m g%? ;hte.S$j'g-, k a,_@I
- "88 g l N?.M;.il
. m .: w m$..inF.BM.YES.BWYIEM%f'p.
'~
ums . . :ere "
~
..., m. . .
. ..'+m 3 ag *3 - - l j
"%G!?.
p., S,,
.? Y e,. *.
" 6 y),y@;.
~
i . n, fd!h] pid[1 ,
* $f .. l i
j -
~~
,l a. The compute i:ed control center of Trojan: this panorama of spacenige instrumentation gives some indication of the techno-logical complexity of the nuclear plant. l i Reprinted with permession from the January 19*5 issue of the Oregon Times. This article was written by % illiam Boly with photos by Clyde l Keller. Subscription information for the Oregon Timer is included on page 8 of this reprint. l l i b *l
.,\
i . jl
- / /
a a j -
, ,3
,~. . .e l
or .
- l
l
..w.....~ Any separation ut use tauca ut scunonne depciiu.iumty wot,ld be' expected to provide an average of 800 megawatts and safety is purely artificial. As with fossil plants, nuclear on a day in, day out basis PGE says that Trojan will run at planta out of operation represent idle capital and financial 85% of capacity.
loss. But further, nuclear plant stoppages are usually asso- i But according to the AEC's own data, nuclear power l ciated with an unsafe situation which,if untended,would has not done even remotely so well. The average output l pose a health hazard. From the large number of outages in for commercially operated nuclear power plants above 100 i nuclear plants,one may argue that the utilities scrupulously megawatts in size has been 54% of ideal capacity, j monitor the plants and that allis well;or one can argue To the utilities, this 54% capacity in lieu of 80% means that there is a lot to shut down about, and that the plants l thet nuclear power plants are not furnishing the amount of are not safe, electricity that the companies thought they needed.To the A grim cycle may be set in motion. A malfunctioning benks and lending institutions,54% capacity means that I nuclear plant may lead to financial difficulties for a utility, financing nuclear power is nskier than anticipated. To the and that in turn may affect safety maintenance. A hard. l consumer,54% capacity means that electricity from nuclear I pressed utility will certainly be more tempted to cut cor. power will be much more expensive, ners than a well= heeled one. But it is preenely those Even 54% capacity may be a charitable figure to apply ! utilities, owners of the sourest lemons, that are likely to ' in the case of Trojan. A direct correlation exists between become hardest pressed. Consolidated Edison of New York size of a nuclear plant and its performance. So far, the has gotten into financial trouble through ownership of two bigger they are, the harder they have fallen. The 10 largest unreliable plants, tndian Point 1 & 11. Con Ed's trouble has led the AEC to initiate an investigation into the company's finances to find out if Con Ed has sufficient money to run the plants safely. As usual,the consumer gets news of the nuclear prob. lems on his monthly bill: Con Ed is asking for a whopping Detroit haS been building and 25% rate increase. Why has atomic power proven unreliable? For one thing, marketing automotive lemons nuclear power plants are not nearly so well made as popu. larly supposed.The plants require a critical precision of for years, but what is the nu-
- design and execution in the primary system.Such precision as an abstract propesition m ght ee attainaeie. Bui ii is clear equivalent to driving your questionable whether the technological excellence required for nuclear development can be achieved or even approxi.
Car out o[the ShoW room and mated in the real context of an irrational economy, a dis- , integratins society and a culture dominated not by the watching the bumper fall off? motive of craftsmanship but by the motive of profit, i (Building Nuclear Lemons! Quality assurance has been imposed by law,but has never l been internalized as a primary goal by either contractors or j t power plants, all with a rated capacity of 800 MW or more, the work force. The corporate monolith is responsive main. had an average 43% attainment through the first half of ly to the imperatives of profit;the workers are disgruntled ( 1974,or just over half of what utilities were counting on. and alienated from the job. Detroit has been butiding and The inferior attainment in large plants suggests that techno. marketing automotive lemons for years on this basis. But logical complexities and vulnerability to failure increase what is the nuclear equivalent to dnving your car out of geometncally with plant size. If this is the case, PGE the show room and watching the bumper fall off' management's hubris at building the largest nuclear power Statistical graphing of nuclear power plant performance plant in the U.S. may turn to mourning at future stock. holders' meetings. [The High Cost of Crud] When Trojan breaks down, rate. payers will learn another Reprinted by EARS fact oflife: nuclear power plants are extraordinarily expen- Environmental Action Reprint Service stve to repair. Radioactive " crud" inevitably circulates 2239 E. Colfax Ave. throughout the primary system of the reactor where heat Denver, Colorado 80206 and stress are greatest and senous problems most likely to (303) 320-6537 occur. When working in a radioactive zone, a worker can l receive his maximum exposure in a matter of seconds, rendering him unusable on the job for three months. In l w ! ( = h :l
~ .y. .,
. n l
- ' or - .*
~
' - .% i
ff.fTj;QOM ! -e?pser ,n. : t .a -
> '~
.M - .T . ,
%Wh$/y i'.! ' ,(e- 1. aJ p '
.c .
~',,.3 f,
' "5
- 2;V;t:..:. ,n.;.g* v :; ;. . '
'y , .
- h *L-Q' ;.':1s N. k' W ~.yfli3& d'3.
'.M}.'G:: & . :. y
.g K';Vh;e[QlUr}[ L R$W .t h5 $ :- MW .
r*,,
* , g" qgn%, hkfM@%, _%"0?. _ %*Q j a u r
' ' Wnf 3C$f ,
l 1 s I
! e c e
^ -"
[ jh ,_ A p,
$ N i-
"g g' 3 WW The cooling tower of the Trojan Nuclear Power Plant looms eerdy out of the Columbia fog. PGE has promoted th 500 foot cement anomaly in the sylvan lower Columbia Gorge, as the project's symbol.
reveals that the plants go throug:t a fairly predictable "!ife cycle" on their way to an early .md expensive senescence. [Bechtel's Bungles} ' The initial phase is ordinanly sper.t in working out kinks and idiosyncracies in a particular plant. This period is Criticism centers around Bechtel Corporation, hired by PGE as Architect Engineer for Trojan. Bechtel has a " cost. marked by a gradual improvement m capacity, which peaks plus" contract with PGE; that is, a proSt is guaranteed on in the 70% region after three or four years. According to top of whatever its costs to put up the plant. As for quality, D. D. Comey's testimony at the Chicago Project Indepen-whatever passes PGE's muster is good enough for Bechtei. dence hearings, the irutial problems are "largely due to a Bechtel Corp. is a giant in the field, with dozens of carryover of construction related quality assurance prob. nuclear contracts running concurrently and many more lems and insufficient development of operanon proce. dures." After the peak, plant performance declines- signed. Critics of Bechtei's performance at Trojan say that the company is over extended and arrogant, that it is a irreversibly this ame. According to Comey's analysis, prodigal spender of PGE's money but parstmonious with
" Corrosion problems set in. Ieak:ng fuel becomes a prob- its own.
'em, and system components break down due to fatigue and other wear related problems." " Cost is simply not a factor out there " said a field mspector. "We needed a small drainage ditch to catch Comey's observattons combmed with the construction surface water coming off a hill next to the fuel and history of Trojan yield a dismal prognosis for the PGE plant's economic future: storage building. They put in a canal with cement rem.
For good reasons, PGE has limited confidence in its foremg." An expensive concrete and brick plaza for the Architect Eng:neer, administration building was no sooner completed than it was torn up to run some pipe over to the de chlorauzation
. A Westinghouse. supplied fuel system is untested in building.
commercial use. The work force, when not out on a wild cat, has been On the other hand, Bechtel field inspectors are among unproductive and intractable. the worst paid workers on the job. "You see Bechtel ads all over the country. You wouldn't see so many ads if they The Times mterviewed severalindividuals who have paid a decent wage." Low wages mean margmal persennel, worked at Trojan in vanous capacities. What emerges :s a One wefder said,"The inspectors won't make the contro-uniform expression of no confidence m the plant, based vers:al dec:sion. They follow the plan,long after it is on entiques of every aspect ofits building. Since the obvious that :t won't work. When everything is hung nuclear construction trade is a tight fam'ly, with a history of black.hstmg peop!e who make waves, the T:mes has
*rceg and everyone can see it won't work,:t goes eack up through the chain of command unal it reaches seme.
agreed to withhold the :dentity of its mformants. one who wdl do somedung aoout it." 3 l t
- i .. ,'
<. , . A
'~ -J
%.,- ..- . 1 .
- 7. p. .
}g!t . , ,A 4 j v 1 4 ., .
- o--
- . .. , pa .
- j l, s }Ib- ' '
\ L ; ; -.h, 1
.; - % .s f y . , , . .
...y 3 . . ~ ; - n .. . . l.. ,. . . ._ 9 t
.;;y y . .
Q.jp; [J. .~ i:,,
;y ; _ 's. 3 m' 4,
i- '- iQ%Q
- )$% D ,
eYy; To [% yy.-4::Yi 3 ' ' < . . c '. . ' -
'~ ~
-[ Q _l l Eg . [T' v.
.smqj. .,. .- m ;
~ - g a
. . . . . .e~ cf . g~
;p%.;y
' ~ gp
< ~ - . ~~ I 7 *~ . 84 KV e' ~ -V e ' .
I -! f' { k,E . E 'f.' . b
- G
.T
.d [M% u
;Q J..
p-
< *][T,lt p
, 't; L . w g; a ,. g we % ,a y' Nt
. ,. h ,g34 d :~
ow ' $ cEsgb4te
.,N.3gltn%.
_, =vw.4. .-
.T y... f! / (p ec
- r. [
a l' l- s. J.gP [,/Oj,, R T *'.
- M
- g.. ; o. v? f f 1 k1 !' g .gr>%,.. .
; The reactor core: nuclear fuel rods slip into these berths. Westinghouse hopes that this I7 x 17 core arrangement, in its first 1 commercial operation at Troian. wull avoid fuel densification problems that have plagued previous Wesunghouse core designs.
Absence of competent field inspectors is doubly signi. pressure at the core of a reactor, Westinghouse fuel rods ficant as Bechtel's designs have been riddled with flaws. An have a history of warping. Poorly understood phenomena engineer from a sub. contracting unit said,"! can't count have caused compaction of the nuclear fuelinside the rods, the number of detail errors on working plans I've found." Fuel shrinkage creates an empty space, reducing support He cited work he had just completed on repositioning a for the cylinder casing with resultant distortions. This " fuel i denstlication" problem, initially detected in Switzerland, I transfer tube used in moving fuelin and out of the reactor, I The tube had been placed in accordance with designs, but has been encountered in several Westinghouse. built systems its collar would not marry with previously installed racks, in the U.S. Problems of fuel denstfication have been met by opera. It was three mches off. A surveyor said,"Some of the equipment isn't even ting nuclear power plants at restricted capacity. The stra. I referenced according to the grid system. There's no way tegy may not be economical, but it is prudent. to properly site it because it has no specified position on At Trojan. Westinghouse is auditionmg an entirely l the plans." unproven fuel contiguration, an " advanced fuel core if Trojan flops,it will not be Bechtel's first fiasco, system." The new core is actually .in attempt to solve According to the Wall Street Journal of October 8, Con. the densification problem. l sumer Power Co.of Michigan is sumg Bechtel n the princi. No one knows for sure whether the new system will work any better than its predecessors. The !? x !~ core :s pal deiendant in a 7,300 million suit for damages resulting from alleged faulty work at its Palisades Nuc! ear Power completely untested in commermai operanen. In fact, the Plant. This plant, designed to produce 821 MW has opera. AEC has decreed a longer than usual tnal pened at .'imited ted at 35% capacity since going commercialin December capacities to see how the system fares. Oregon rate payers j of 1971. may wish Westmghouse betie luck this time. L [ A Gutsy Experiment] ( Alienated Labor l Second only to the Architect. Engineer in importance is T-the Nuclear Steam System Supplier, the builder of the ' Ltbor trouble has further contnbue 4 to cost overruns. radioactive guts of a plant. At Trojan, Westinghouse has Wildcat stnkes have been a regular feature, wnh safety the the contract and it too has a troubled track record, most frequently cited reason for walkouts. Satd one old Westinghouse's problem is that its fuel core design has hand,"You hear the constant call of the wobble bird out turned out to be defective. Under the tremendous heat and there. Pipe-fitters in particular are fairly militant." i l I s
$ 5 .e
- s
. .rp i
. ,t . e C
sumuuang ,,uvut u.s extent ut uku auenanun.
.h 3, a : .,
- ] 4 ,. 1 - /
[ Price No Object] Mh. yy . [ .
-..' q
'd.,1. ,. If workers are in it for the money, so is the management.
WW *. ,; n . vg.,7 W , <;,,,; r 1' g[g ,t. ..e. PGE hasn't done much to combat price overruns,but then i A .,
< again,it hasn't much incentive to do so. In fact, the rules
% .j :;1,'t . . f(3 Q -.Z'lkCh.. -
of the Public Utility Commission encourage over spending.
%g9"gm .~ Two vanables determine the cr>st of electricity: (1) the rate e .-
d.. -
.. 7- of return set by the PUC and (2) the total investment of the w ?.}'kP'
^
company,both debt and equity.The more Trojan costs, the
~
. .V' i -
- 4. greater will be the investment, and hence, the more money N,)/ .U Iff.,g' 9.u yhy j PGE will be entitled to charge for electricity.
[t a.,. -
. .. f # ..
W,_
.9 . . Trojan will not become part of the rate base untilit is
?g ~
f .; ' , , ,. . t u
. . ,, j- ,
producing electricity for commercial use. At that time,
" ~ . : PGE's two thirds share of the plant's cost, about $300
,, # i c ~- 1 '- .7 W: y ,. g, million,will be added to its present capitalization of about l
~- # '
5 5600 million. Unless the PUC. controlled rate of return is l An assembly of pump, valves, and criticalstainless steel scaled down, PGE customers wtll see a dramatic rise in their pipe typical of Trojan. WorAers say that malcontents have electric bills. But PCE has already said that it will ask for welded obstructions at random in the miles of such pipe. rate increases of about 10% on an annual basis for the next Workers have also discovered a way to jam the intercom several years. One wonders how Oregonians would have system (not shown here). When this happens, each phone reacted to PGE's intent to build Trojan if the company had has to be rechecAed individually, announced that it would, for starters, result in a 30% in. crease in consumer charges, provided that it operates The largest portion of the work force comes from the Dawlessly, electrical and pipe.0tting umons. Independent sources , report that both unions took adversary positions from the [We Are Paying Now} beginning. According to PGE's manager of nuclear con. struction, Mr. Starner,the unions obliged them to hire Consumers are alaady paying for Trojan. Since the start the " dregs" before sending out " reliable, worthwhile, of construction. PUC chief Richard Sabin has granted PGE energetic workers." Starner says the union forced PGE to hire not only unproductive workers from the immediate g-g ]y.g:..[ gn
$.'m 1..
.,e..
'A area, but also " imported rejects and picked.up travellers
.f . A yl (c. y .- -
that nobody else wanted." Consequently, Starner says, the ; ~ , c .4. . g. ;; .. . . ;' G Trojan project has been " noticeably worse" for labor pro- x q r= 1 b.5 ' ductivity in companson to any other We::t Coast job he has seen. g;,S. g, . K.,[* '1, g . . . . ' -~ , . .
. l Massive featherbedding has had an interesting side-effect iO,- L/r ' . '< '
H1
~~
~
- ~~1 -
at Trojan: the development of a new art form among the - workers. For pipe fitters and welders, hand crafted stainless V ~ steel jewelry is all the rage. Workers do incredibly intricate k2 .- '[Nk6'-l a ' <J s and finely wrought pieces-belt buckles, medallions, brace. -
'?F '#
,j .
~
1:g'.T' N lets-and compare results among friends. Evidently, Trojan . welders are not too different from Saturday Market crafts. 4[ V, ,,,.T.i$ -
' " . - .B.-
c-( men-except that they are paid 512 an hour, and not to E. ' 'l make buckles. ' I '.% .
- - ' 'e .
Worker disenchantment is reflected in small things. ' Y ei Walls inside the plant are spiced with grafitti, most ofit unpnntable but directed at possible liaisons between PGE f]'S
'c' I .
7 executives and goats. With little esprtt de corps, quality of - ' . /* ~ craftsmanship inevitably suffers. Outright vandalism has 1- '~, 1 ) been a problem. In one case, an intricate web of hand. - shaped copper tubes, representing months of work, was destroyed dunng the night shift by someone wielding a A fuel transfer tube big enough for a man to crawl through sledgehammer, will be used for moving nuclear materialfrom the storage One sub3 ect of frequent speculation concerns the pres. area to the reactor core. This tube was not properly situated sute teststances Bechtel will discover when they flush the on Bechtel designs and had to be redesigned and rehung. d*
.. l t y i
l
<<. n . . .a ,
__.___________ _._ _ __ .____ ____ __ ___ ___ ____.. _ _ -.-. _ . _ ._. _ _ _ . ._. _ ._. ...-._)
... ....... . . . , . ..... w. .. ...a j pu* u = uun uis prumas (nat, txcause of economics of scale, the l bigger the plant, the cheaper will be the electricity it generates. PCE seems to have taken the maxim to he MWe is the biggest commercizi nuclear plant yet built.
But operating statistics from the 10 largest nuclear plants "on line" in the U.S. tell another story-nuclear giganti economic dead-end (see table below). Plant capacity is a measure, expressed as a percent, of the total electrical energy produced by a lod, compared to the energy it would have produced if it had operated at its licensed design pow . Net Design Powr Date Commercial Unit Name Plant Capacity Factors in Mezawatts of Electricity Opention Started from start to June 30,1974 Dresden 11 800 June 9,1972 49.3% Dresden 111 800 Nov.I1,1971 ' 52.6% Indian Point 11 873 Aug.1,19731 16.8% , Oconee 1 886 July 15,1973 56.0% Palisades 821 Dec.31,1971 35.1% ! Quad Cities I 809 Feb.18,1973 46.2% Quad Cities 11 809 Mar.10,1973 52.3% Surry I 823 Dec.22,1972 48.7% Surry 11 823 May 1,1973 57.0% Zion i 1050 Oct. 2,1973 21.0% < Average 43.5% While all nuclear plants are providing only 54% of the power they were designed to generate (the AEC promised 80%), t biggest are doing even worse-operating at 43.5% capacity. In terms of Trojan, this means that half of the capital inves have no electricity to show for iuelf, thereby imposing a hidden, automatic cost over run of about 5:00 million on consumers.
.'~ ^ ~ . ..:
~ ~ ^ .
;- -- b h g G , _ . _
w ir:r-w '
-- . g .,
# .' g .- q
-~-
-' ~
. - % ,4 ,
;.. g;,
' % .t,
/ " ~ ,
~
, ?q f
.h ;-q, -
f % MQ
,l -
. i;*
', b ;* ), 7 k
- ff .. 'T .
. h.g.;
. ~
p
.y ,t f
f? ay i 1 1 Looking up inside the dome of the reactor containment building. In certain places the containment wa!!s warer up to one foot out of tolerance. Falling matenal, in one case a ten foot long section ofsix inch diameter pipe, has prompted workers to wildcat sinke because of the lack of safety netnnt. 1 e e i
.- s j ,,. .t . . . , ,
,gt 1
- y u-n-t, uu ~~vy apa demands. company has already expended l
PGE doesn't like to admit that consumer dollars are financing Trojan. After all,if the public is paying for it, $10 million on Pebble Springs I, shouldn't the public have a say over whether the plant should be built in the first place? Ed Wildfong,PGE vice near soardman, and has bud-president, contends that Trojan has been financed through the sale of company stock and through bond offerings; geled $2.8 milllOn [Or rebble ' that all money has been internally generated. But the argu. ment is a phantom, since the company would have long Springs Hin 1975. since passed its legal bonding limit (when company profits and earnings are no longer in excess of outstanding interest) for pnvate profit-raises the whole question of public par. if rate increases had not generated more supporting cash. Furthermore, the intensive capitalization required for ticipation in the decision to build more generating capacity. Trojan has made clear that each additional unit built by the Trojan would certainly have resulted in decreased earnings, utilities is going to ratse the average cost of electricity, were it not for the rate increases. And with decreased earn. Given these facts, the residential consumer might well pre-Ings, what would happen to the stock sales with which PCE fer a period of slow growth in utilities. But as things stand, claims to be financing Trojan? the consumer has no way to say "no" to growth onented PCE so much as admttled the link between rate increases private utilities. end nuclear plant financing at the Boardman fjearings. Expansion may be exciting for the utility executive, Where were they gomg to find the money (some 5943 who can supervise the transformation of a mode.st fiefdom million) for another nuclear power plant? PGE's Mr. Phil. into an energy empire, and justify increased salaries and lips testified that granted " adequate rate relief . . . we can perquisites besides. PGE's present horoscope includes: raise unlimited amounts of money." (1) the building of two 1,200 MW nuclear plants at Pebble lNo Way to Say Nol SPnngsd2) 20% ownership of 700 MW coal fired generat-l ing units at Colstrip, Montana,(3) a 500 MW coal fired tndeed, PGE's dependence on consumer money to subsi. ! generating unit at Carty, Oregon,(4) 10% of a 1300 MW dize its grandiose projects-nothing less than public dollars l nuclear plant at Montesano, Washington, and (5) 25% of a proposed hydro dam (1640 MW) across the Snake River. tu But PGE has no proof that there is a market for all this
,v f ..Mq pyp ca.*$ new energy. PGE's sales have actually dedined since 1972.
_eg Nationally, demand for electricity has been just about flat 7M.W$$f@.y$ in 1974. Utilities blame the recession, inflation and the
'..t. < .a m a 3.~h. NhhJ;{g 4 e nservati n ethic for this tapering off of the historic 7%
annual growth rate in electricity consumption. l l M I,..'S'floamono $ d Md Z, k'd%y,, V;D Another explanation is available: demand for electricity p efigg is price sensitive. As electricity goes up in pnce, people are
.fp [ -
)PT.45
.:D.F NJ.gg finding ways to consume less. Roy Hurlbut, former City p.R
- Energy Advisor, fired by Frank !vancie for defending the 4 @'
1 consumer's pocket book against further PGE raids, cited a National Science Foundation study in his rebuttal testi-Tf .. $ ._ l many before the PUC which showed that the most impor.
.hf# & '*.
7, ft,3-of consumers is price. The significance of this has been lost on PGE. Unless j the utility can find a way of providing cheap power,its
&S r: * *jI S,g 4~ "
j growth projections are completely awry Demand for ex. pensive nuclear power is not equivalent to demand for cheap hydro power. kQ;,W.J.MI? Doubtless for the utilities, Trojan places only the camel's
~w nose inside the tent. One scenario calls for 22 nuclear Detailof the controlpanel: these fuel rod controls would power plants along the Columbia by 1990. PGE has taken .
be home plate for any band of nuclear terrorists or extor. its role as atomic usher seriously, it is spending massive tionists. amounts of cash to acclimatize the public to the notion of going nuclear. 52.4 million has been expended on a 7 - l 4* e
/ t t
s, . ,t .a * . %
- --- - --...,.n - -- , - - . _ . , . , , - -,. .
-k- b k 5
g wisj gp y m.-
.' , a --7 W.
( f' S
#' . ..,,4 A . *
+s c.
y 2 - ,.~*m 3 y y 7 . ,,.,,..,/j
. . .p.
.j d a'E$ e Q 'm
{ ~ ,f Lh?$h ? (;g:G. _.,W q.
~
- p. ,
a.GM'Q! [ .
/ .
\ lN?%WW g a fje;-4
;g r, . .-C g
"K.2-;.p _
epff.n s I - I Trojan's turbines; rated to generate iI30 megawatts (31We). If Trojan performs at the same average capacity as other nuclear power plants in its class (13.Mo* of design), the turbines willprovide an uneconomical 492 StWe on a day in, day out basis. Visitors Information Center at Trojan. Operatmg budget struction permit is the responsibility of the utility, not the for the Center is $500,000 a year. Granted " adequate rate rate-payer. If Oregon's Nuclear and Thermal Energy Coun-rehef" they might be expected to spend even more. etl handed down a similar ruling, our pnvate utilities might not be so eager with their cash. - Meanwhile, the work drags on at Trojan, as the C.olum. ! [The End of Illusion) bia tiews by, full of its winter burden. Lookang over ' h*e' t Unfortunately for the utilities, the honeymoon with nu. maze of unconnected wire and stamless pipe dnpping in clear power may be neanng its end. Of 191 nuclear plants the rain,one worker scratched his head and shrugged,"I under construction or in the plannmg stages, there have don't thmk this thing will ever start up." An older man, a been eight cancellations and $6 deferrals nationwide. Ac. " pipe springer" as the pipe.ntters have come to ca!! them-cording to Wall Street financier Jerome Katztn, there has selves, looked up. "The problem is, what if it does?" O been a 20"o reduction in overall construction of power generators,but a 4 lc5 cutback in nuclear construction. , i l In Eugene, the publicly owned Water and Electnc Board ' (EWEB) asked voters in 1970 for their approval of a plan A STRAIGHT OFFER I to budJ a nuclear plant. The voters rejected it. EWEB , pulled an end run on the ballot verdict and bought a 30, FROM THE - I piece of the Trojan action for 569 million. By 1974, that share had cost them 5113 million and was still c!imbmg. OREGONTams ! But EWEB, unhke NE,l earned from its mistake. The II'" "* U I board voted unanimously in late November to abandon plans to build their own nuclear power plant north of No g!mmicks. No fnlls. just hard. hitting, reveahng journalism on the ! F!arence. state of oregon. Standing *aten on sa:em politics, investigating ore , , fon '5 'nEY Pro *"" M8'4 'nt m' econom'c '"5's: The oregon ; , [ Pebbles in the Skyl Times b Je$catec to tnoughtful, in decth researcn on tne crucial l
'ssues facing tne state, now and in tne future.
In Portland, however, PGE is qmetly commitung the pub-lie to further nuclear de..:lopment. The company has al. If keeping up with oregon and making it a octter place to live ,s par: ready expended 510 milhon on bbble Spnng I near Board- of your ?,cai, you won't want to miss the Times. Subsenbe now and man, and has budgeted 52.3 milhon for Peboie Spnng 11 m get tne next 11 asues cetivered to your nome.
!974. These espital outlays generaie tremendous inertia ...... .. .......................................,... ,.
towards acceptance at permit heanngs.The nuclear plant ; Oregon Times j ) is regarded as a hit accompli by those who are supposed l1000 S.W. Third Ave. I to weigh its impact, in this regard, a recent decision by j Portland, Oregon 97004 ! Wisconstn's atomic siting cody, the Public Senvce Cam. : ; l C 1 year / 57 C 2 years l $12 C 3 vears / $16 : mission. Jeserves mention. The PSC handed down a rer. manent ruhng m Octooer that any Gnanc:a!!oss mcurred l l Sy a uuhty w hich be;tms butiding without a nu;! ear con- lName l
! l l Aodress ;
s lCitv __
,,,, _ _S g _ _ _ Zio _j l t y SP I # I 8F =d ,
I _ _-.- .....--.,.--.. - - -. _
7 I
- twing psoposed and thnehrte the 'c hair anx.uuss to 6 us prteret of im ume up to t a ,. 9,. , ,,,,,,, ,,g,,y g,,,g og g g y,ygg g, g, A< .
. ],'1 e
will cast a siegative vote on reposting schedtho to alw to 613 percent la
~ $' ; out this 1411." Ullman sa6d.
er .
! 6 1979 D0 to a maalnium notary of
* .' In last Thursday's vote tfilman bebke $22.900 le 1979 and $25.900ln 194tl en..
a g), go a mit the desiding vote in favor of lhe earlier coenmittee vele woidd e .. p ., * - ..._...5.* -~-..5., ., ,e ..~..%. -i' . Se tommk bnause he ssW b felt a W rM h tan pH ha h M N saools sofeey rot.of d.rd L. d roel a.nd a s.l.ool cr_ ,u r a. ,he ll_, ai.d ll.e s.m.u.r comog W.4m43y Anu.g e day deAcored to sonm , [ "y,[("g "
; .s .. s
.I so ,,otrolment.rs. stor, on ,,e 2 s.y , [,",g[,"ht of tic at
,to,et,,e e
= ,wo ,,a,s. to 8 and o -
.y ,Q,,e,,,,,, ,,r,e ,n ,,e , ,, o, ,o . , ,o,e a,A,n, ,d,n ,, do .
Cancer search begins in Oi kgon or ex-SE workers By i RfC GOR ANSud *
- tisa o Bay area shleyarde.
Jennal Staff Waher many as il adition Americans may e at Osbed's Rose Msnor Hestau-Many are t.clieved to have moved to have tres empowd to a bestos hazards a> fle noted that medh at authorities also died of ancer end that their daughter, tiregon and Wa,hington. ' la shipyards during WalJ War II. Dr. Polakott noted that the pro- are concerned about the famthes of now 35. has contrarted meanthchoma, a Islifornia needet al authorites will lhe aim is to determine thdr health ) fanded by the federat gosernmrat. shipyard weekers stare they can be- rare form of cancer affectitig the lung In Puttland and Vancouvn. Wash, tr nrb a roasculde seasah nemt Thure- conditbn and chee k out many of thera about 75.000 people are estimated to c. a
;malohs and smne "concer ned" come esposed to the deadly ashestos hntngs ce stabminst ravity.
for as many as 400.000 men and to detet mine whether they have cancer. fipanics. is not atmed at only people fibers from the clothleg worn tiy the T he fleckeley do(tot also cited the have worked la shipyssds dusing Weste
- 4 Worked om hellHng and trpatring workers.
noen who hace waked le See f ran- f actal!s of the pro)ert were spelled War II. ' shfa but any one who worked in ship- danter of shipysed office werhere heing out Wednesday la Portland by lar, l'hll- Speaking to labor Icaders at a tum h- ) .iits. Induding metretaines Dr. pulakoff repsted one enw where esposed to asbestos fibers frma ten-Mp Polakoff of Westers lastitute for both parents worked in a shipyard and tilating aepoa s'us'pua at Orcopathmet m me ., F_avironmenta_lSdem,ng es '.s'
. a
. - 1 Oiki i,k 1 !ni,,h; ,:.= =.m Worker, lu.cky m. radiation mishap The yrojec t, the fisat of its kind om
;8 By not i A 3 ( Rlt K '"* '< ' *' 'E Jontest staff Watter
.t
*' JyJAMf.5I.ONG m' ria and t'wo co. workers were unaware PGE in rennwtlos with the lurident.
j sh a Journal 5taff Waleet the'an esposed antson of pipe in an fannedout through the Interior of Tro-P""Pl e la P-e enen free on bait from a Starch 19, Ids have e much higher potential fo" $heer kh - and only tak - pes- sri !le wbkh they were looking foe a enposure One te baktse received a sadlahn Jan to'cheth for any enusual radiation vented a tethakles from receivfog a rart htloe cf 27.3 rema Another re- duridt the first refueling of the mem-go of kidnap and rape la the first. contracting canter because of their en- leak was a spent nuclear fuel seshma and conceivably fatal dose of tra' er tube. cetved 17 t and the third verthed a ee appeared in Prineville Justke', posure to ambestos and esbestoe fibers- nadiation during an tathlent last month negligible amount. accerding to I%F. mp musicar resctor .c w .# - / M t Wednesday on charsea of kutnap- t it imesends semilar efforts .in the I pdJftion. pGE sdmitted. the tec hni-PGE has refused te ldentify the terb- "I '" D' 'I""IIII'
- rydng end murdering a 16 year,. NmAwest ane etwwkre la ne nanom et the Trojen nudear power plant. clai less was equipped with a faulty * " *
- atey setter Munday ' ; if it prows antessful It also is a fol- Detalls of the bitarte imident' are rad contained la a new report filed by Port- we I them adequately of the NUn danger.Itlos
- d'er NRC regulations., the man-.
detecthmMstilfr - - devlte t'tirt Idthat a deepfailed pool of water to /nktens ) stop partas, 22. appeared before}' Joseph30**p Califano,to an if S.ennuuncement secretary of landletieneral April by Dettric Co with the Ore' he regional sistf of the federal No. , lment,alkwaMe uposere for e notlear fuel aswmbly - an 8 byg Inth paskege tmtdde the containment chamtne. Fat h It ostineed on rege 2)a heshb. edmation and welfare, that as gun I epartment of l ecrgy. clei ' Regulatory Comminton already plaht storher is 3 reme per quarter or 5 shout 12 feet long, contatutag 264 rods Actordlag to the reprt, the techal- has 'ecommended a $25.000 fine for rems per year. The NRC estimates that - makes part of the burney on a con-j p a whole-body done of 450 rems would veyor cart traversteg the length of a
, I
. ,3 j be fatal within two months to 50 per . tube from the tescoor to the post *
.. tent of Individuals esposed, whlust L
In ' g g 3 4 medical treatment. 1be tube, filled with esser,is imbed-g' , ,
, g h gesam . Accarding to PGE's report. a simula- ping ded in 3 to S feet of geaims ray-stop-cantrete encept for a 2 font occ '
,1 * , 4 tion test recreating the laddent pro
- thoa containing an espansion hint that left at least two fire' fighters .
- , . % deced readings as high as 350 rems at WIS IllilSIS ,1+1ed a c*mwa cas of -
s , , iI the pipe's surface duitng transfer of a snust be accessible for maintenance. The spe .udent f i assemhey.
, g, Ohio Inc. spokesmaa described .. nposed get to al,,se,t,tlee is located iikea,em n,a,aelacu,ved a hard to-
} ,,pg,,,g,a a,, ,,, og , eest =sts of the containment building
']lk lOl))(*$ E w 0 s
in a f.* , , unidentified Inhnicleas leaned over the , Nobody, apparently, thought to tell
, ) low,vpressuree r p r pipeline e s s usystern.
r i n g.., ,,,- 30lmh pipe at one point sad later + Se Inhnklaas aboum ' jg gjQ * -i h* .t // . f
- i. t
- g h' b, placed his est egainst it to listes for a As refueling got under way on Arett a n 't ...U' I. solne. Fortuastely, according to the re. 3. Ge inHlat feports to Trojen's radia- ,t A series of fises and enplo- l
- M port, these activttles miswd - by sec- tion protectlee engineer were routine b- l' ons in fLlansfield, Ohio, op. , aIO UMklUU,o. I e 'I !. , ,
ends or mistules -- the Passage of rsolo- ~ no enusual radiation llut later la the attive feet =} J day a quality assurente Inspector told j treally triggef ed by 100 p 'ti i 9 .
,, I 1 PGE says t*s hij the englater he recched se onespected 1 ut e,ve h pressure
. . . . in . a.. natural. gas d s -contest, - Itavbl Itegel-
, e,..% ,or n im~.- ~ s . -
,st dyshows Trojan d e .
i NRC issue?
- :weakerthanl thought ,
! y29,999 q;,,
)' ""
~
blad said data in a new " preliminary" By BILL KELLER saidy by Bechtal Power Corp. indicates t j h . . m the toierance of the control building ; LV A,U ,
. _, o. o-e=== awWASHINGTON - The control may be about
.z.#~' N buildmg at Trojan nuclear power plant py 20l percent lower than .
M- la even weaker than previounty be previounty bebeved. However, PGE and consultants from f ~ ! WALNUT CREEK Calif ((g
%g .
[ , beved. Portland General Electric Co. the Unive'stry of CalIforms and Massa. "-- Office of inspecuan and Enforcemen
' revealed Monday. diusetts insutute of Tecnnology said it
~ ,
4 But PGE told Nuclear Regulatory wocM still be safe to operate the ek
- nas propied a gm civu p
; retn- agamst Poruand General Electnc Corri
; Comnussion officials at NRC's Betnee whue ti.c *ontrol buildine 9 Wa Qany for aheged noncomphance wit:
da. Md., headquarters Monday that new %.eceral regulauons stemmmg from a l 1~ forced. r-evidence of structural deficJencies "This doesn't change out overal! - Apnl 5 raciauun overexposure mcider at the Trojan nuclear power plant nea
.: should not prevent restarung of the rect mmendauon, but it is a setback plantnear Raimer. aimer, Ore.
to if However, the company and the res-terms of our schedule."Undotad would r said. s j *t.,;* undblad esumated that thsitto repair 4, - ..The office said an mvesuganon r-A ulatory officiais agreed that the new vealed that apparent noncomphanc
< pumanussa ,.flatfJagt.pronably will l weelts of addluonal delay in putting
. maan tas controi bu8 ding., several ptaka trom four A U.S. Atonuc Safety and ucensing sammu5 win feceral to regulanons sts mon"contnbutr sagnificantly" to the cause and sevent Tropin back into operauon. Board bearing on the tasus, originaDy : of radianon overexposures to two er Trojan. which had been shut down scheduled Sept. 6-8. has been canceled - ne ployees who were working mside it (
for maintanance and refueling earlier. wblie the NRC staff digests the new "!$1 reactor contamment buildmg dunt l
, b was ordered to remain closed in Aprl!
*' I informatiotu 00 plant refwenng operstaana. ~
after a study disclosed that the plant's PGE agreed Monday to send thei l i
' * - -s control building does not meet nand- agency a forma! report on tbe Bechtel,n,gg ares for withstanding eartbatuake study by Sept.11. after which the NRC
{@,f bodyThe exposures twoWworkers approximatelyreceived h whc REM NRA regulations hmst ext'
. , , stress. staff will decide what position to take , y y'sure to radtauon workers to three RE PGE Vice President Wulism J. Und- when bearings are rescheduled. .
per calender quarter. (An REM is The NRC staff had cather sided ed bWtandard measure of exposure to rad. j
- a '
e --e. open without the repalts, but tlist rec. "acq kD['Ernst Volgenau, director I $I O-" II ommendation could change with tne i I -}- *[f
- f. 3,g813Ey!E{a
':a
- new information. I' NRC's Ofhce of Inspection and Enfor; biasment at Bethesda. Md,. said in a lett PGE bas estimated that every day
):i .h g l }t e 7kg J* d Iy. }
" to PGE the agency mtends to tmpo d
~~
i*
g I
'A i ." gl j pFE 52 ek Trojan is shut down it costs about l $130,000 to buy power from other!
l 2nMhe g20.500 civil penalty.
- I M
h
- h j .Egr i- sourcea. The company had asked OrN gon Public Utility Commissioner,.,
nuo ,aThe company has 20 days follown
'%ificauon of the proposed acuon eitner pay the penalty or formally p
$ k_{p,g e ".> P 3
,h
?
- 2 Charles Davis for an emergency rate;M its impositeor.
( *+
E p .E,L g
.E e M.f
- j i- 1 surcharge to pay for the electncity but Drbolgenau said. "The' circt,
.g E l delayed its request last week at the .. urg-
, y conces associated with this mcident j ,f.E g 'I tag of Gov. Bob Straub. ,
4hcate a need for significantumpre 3 3 tr g n I
*rpent in radiation protection practi
.E.y. ma $
j,=IyT ! L hat tne Trojan nuclear power p; ant.
,N g N8p j g"2 11 as a need for improved mier.
h 62 M g }. [, y a, gj g i, a rtmeritalcommumcaions." '
y[ ,g
- Idgg [ also nusi o
.1*.!jgaj ~
.He said the company corrective steps that have or wil?
- T'd 7af a f
haken to prevent recurrence of the ir
}=fa4kj7$wj d; 5 3re 3f sfy,g#'Qj d
.g ag } g c4 dent.
The NRC mvestigauan identd
.W five items of apparent noncompha l radsauon e'
,q with regulations. (1) h a
,edIEE$!j l
[' sures greater than three REMS I calender quarter; (2) tailure to rr
['E.""d5 f3i Tl g r- ;;JgJg $ g g kJk e- /
( g necessary surveys and evaluanons h d' Raim 7E prevent radiation overexposures.
A 2.b 'f " !. g$[ij [f.,
Q ! I J.E E 3L 5 2aj. yu W!,EiL8-gy ej ,w6yEyg. ,;1al & 5E; j 1 <Hq;ymuste -.p2acc=
failure to7 immediately regional office of the exposures; (4'
=tre a mgu noufy*ine P T.{ ! p E,l g ,i yy
anon area of the contamment buw u - .4 q4 pC.g '
and (5) the fanure of radianon prr
- p -eg ,e }y} ? L ,gI Ig i2 g %g =li1 hph.C,!*t*k f1l ,t- s e r f.sE 8
bgggy1)y"E%,3I$
P noe to promptiy notify
?
' * ?"4 c
{!j*
y*i,3E* Fg$ p
- tam control room ope *ator concerning u.
pected ingh radianon levets.
g 4 i, y g g , 3 <d ,i i U? -l7
~
e t" j ,y2 .
* ,- 9 24' 5%~E5 l 1a d,c !
p 15.
s
;? Qg*c.8 l2x*ke$4 % .w ickmI [.= y- 2I :p 5
=r" .I
's " E' St eo , c l .$1 =Jzi u E I 6 7- l= 5 j b ['i f .5i s %y* L 1
b[if$ifL g 'Y 12E z-tvEj{t E
EE t-f:f,"3CIYyi i'ts m I~pIb g rn 11.s n 3$ .
*5 g g
3a - E, z.jg -: =
,C
; [x!].g .ii 2.biE !
- E4f M d*$
4Ealz E5t k'IE H1 E*t1 h"[4 &[]
e fIEI $ $ Ce E
a GEps Er* md egncs! g .y-m q =.c o @tfr ,p r -iEi'; r u;E h" E %md&
Y i EE U , ! g &r
~ h f $ E %f -- b," .
@f.p!;U!m Ec85 gr
-9:IE& o&m MO ~3
@ ~. =m , Pr F M,w &
n s ~C .
F s F e :: p "E .*m e =U I fb a. i D ':"" n~T" j Co
. E F e 7 9 :- y!I .F23 E
y
= Hearing supplants trial e MM
[ ' Q..'"
~ ' '
- v -'T f.-
Ju aa welc hs ru inc on -'ro'an By JIM HLL WNr . ene w %
of the spen 9fue! s:orage poo: to had 10 case had cess het The tna. no ma US. Mag:s ra:e Gecrge E. Jus sag years' waste ra:ser than fw because wouw be a separa:e procescng had Wednesday that be hopes te maae a no spent fue; reprocessing or storage a lazer uma, put Joa agreed to the p'
. ruhng by next wees on a reques: by centers are avakasse as ong:nah7 an. after lawyers on botn sides indicat a
f ederal authort!y to expand the capadty as if the actual tna. On the met:s of t J
r two Oregon cr::zens tha: Portaand Gen. Oc:pa:et my dd not intend to offer any s.
I
' era; E eetne Co. De engned imm refs.
. PGE went ahead wt:1 the fer. refs. s:anual adotuocal endeoca.
- eung tas Trojan aucaear power P6 ant e3ng of Troju on Man:t 31 after Juba Jua couad decce to g u: a per:r
, , waten it ope a:es near katnaar. dented tne pl4:ntffs' mocon for a n- nen: taluncton aga:ns: refuaang per i 1 t. The ptaisuffs - Susan Garrett of s:ta:ning order tc baoca the refuel:n3 tag preparatoc of an environmen:
g i L- Pod.and and De'be : Burnham, wno The frm proceedet bowever, w1:t the impac: r.atement, as wouM have De .
;, hves nea tne Trojan pian: - han undernanding tha: new fuel cos.14 De requested a: tna. As as alternamn l assed the court to pron;ntt refue:!ng removed from the reactor and tae spen: coud requ:re preparanon of the su
..,,,;n. untu an environmental impact state. fuel re:u ned from the spent fue. pool to ment but a3ow tM plant to oper: l
.O ~ T. N man: la p epared assessing the effects the reactor if the coun g uted an in- wtue it is be:ng preparet j
I of long te m storage of spen nuclear Junctos earty in May. Raacuvauon of fuel at the plant site. Tney contend tse the plant fobowing refueling and He also has taaen unde adnsem< i i
U.S. Nuclear Regula:ory Commimon matntenance wars is set for May 19 defense a gumenu taa: m suit she
, con.ome 13e effecu of ony oon. The paruo in the cue agreed be d== f-inch of mruccoon l k . term st3 rage wten it g-anted Trojan an Wednesday at the conclusion of a two- IAE3 d M*
k
- ope stag bcense in 19*!,. day bearing to have Juba Coosade* the Whatever JuDa decides. his ruh i' PGL war.1 wt:B the NRCis named evidence wnich had been presented dur. wg: be subjec: to renew ask posa,- i l [ _
. . - ] a defendant In the case, has apphed for Ing the prelnatwy inp.nccan reques' modificaton or reverna: by one of C l
_ gon's four Us oinnes Court sudgu. .
the !! 4 eds t
, , _ ednesday, August 2N978 15O 8 l '"equiru u Md.c"ona! un*onme:h'*'*"*****7' n s r
.V*g -J N ss i
$ impact t.atement when circumnan:
not contemp.ated in ene or:stna: na 1ra e
j '
l i ment, suct u expansaan of the sp f fuel pooi at Trogn. are paannet 1 '
r He contended that the puche c d se ves the benefit of an impac: su T' A*
r;- '
t
?c. 5 I
~ . . . ..
' " 7~. * ^M ~ 'r I
C* 16
'3 ment anaessing long tenn effect of s:
- age of "high risa extra hazardo matena;L even though the prosa:
rtas of leasage or accaent may be re tve;y now.
Leo slagg* rep esenons tM NT e . . - a t- mm o ne fedm: a=
V' " l being taten wtich would require
' ~ '* "
i I impact catement onder the endt P * .
j l menta! pobey act. He as:d tae p. ant
[' f' i eIpanBon of the spent fuel pooi has IO W = Cov. Bob Straub Tues. whne p l - s:gnificant effect on the balance '
'"aI, fem Carte to try to pc. i,7,,,,ubW ,,,,( bea.inguo ruoan u, m,F ; q tween env:ronmenta: tmpact and be P a c ea h . s e as a C mmas; en tM g im sta amen
- i. I la a W:te to Carter. St[aan said. "Fau- Ene gy have said the eund.n sa I
, . m by your adm;n:stra::oc to respond dante. Sane sa4 y f ; A ope *anns hcense in W l .
, $$1' {tgajepaye-s semeee pcr Mo"ar'e 4d 83aed Puc he UtAr.s Com. Rotand L baan an attomy .
r
. IS?g-
~ mm meten na"r;= frpensate for extra casu c
a rmsteinming ano ! I ;' PGt. con:enaed am ha ban on g dence at tae bearing of potenti ha
** Ene Nat- to the p.a:Lu!!s or otters ouuide i m% ,,
Portland {an pian:General Eiectric for annuai maintCo , teo sau$ra t, permayy
[Q'g]" to $ Tro;an piant He asad tt would taat
% .. - 'showed to Degia o #8 # P#dC havgs oealzng wnf t y un mum W u mon.as to p epa o Apn I"
- nenmutaMmpact naument.
p ; gg,a findings ,,g taa: u con:roi cauding Straan "wro'te to Carten8 *f88
- L3e con% 20i paq cueng'- sultng in cons of ml!11ons of douars j eartneuaae reaistence i ,i,,g S:rne said additaonal costs to th se PGE if Trotan were ann: down in :
Bua asaed (nat tae pian: be reopened .
*Nd H gh pe
[m"ated stoma. page si m atn. $ . t inte-tm. A sau:down he sast a so co'
. ' Intan h!gher rates to cunomers, a I p2as!b!y power shortages or tempor:
L- . . _ . ..
~
j cacaures of someindustna;cuname s es V~m..gn. sq.... , . . s r;*s C ,
i p
V -
C $: $- i $ [k [! , sc g !r.=
Lii
$ [(j E5 HIE II=Eii'l 17}-* jay j i s i s "Ist+ig= .ts k
e%e '.e*c =i:!41-g r
o ~.2,3 :! ;ar.aa=.s m r,- 2
.- e ; g e
=r&.1:I=;* -
! ts -, e!c ,su ne x.. 3p .g g ,., i.d
=3*b f. ! 5 fIS} 2bE$*$f5;'
I I E , be W f' 5 .5, e !gs-21 I.),
0 - : 1e- ! $.
!g h 1
>=e $. ' a 2a, 8 = *a a-Es. p g a-* y e 1 ,
i y
, m.
6 a *.E.- c)s
, -
- 5 g s
. *c j .g - s
- 1 ~
- 3
"[* .b-l.ga_w yw e. 51,= -a 5g I 6
g
,cE %m /- E kI E E i
*4 3;i-leg E{! ef'QI :j;b 8 "Ed e !
1:g !I!b.insE
- r ~ j Ef $ ! s )d~5h6 7 E
[ " M <c .Ellsf,sI{g
!r M__ U M i3j M m$w, d .ial f t aEl. l.d; ' .ud pi.N 1 9_ .'I d, . Mt [! h M.je.1
- i C2 3 c d 5573? 1$ Q..=.
t D k !p; di!!I in* w' E gh L
c c o d :,i a1 I: eI:n; Q
!ris 3ai8 E!!!
El t
=e--- " -- _ %.
r.g :RIM! ;. n ;.; E3hiW{jj;:;:I g; gf lTe gg D @ g_
J
,, n
~. .
w ee"~'i"* Siting council takes 'a jab atsr6}%n 1
; security breach - .
..y- .,
. I<
at Trojan facility Surprise move on, storing nuclear wastes catches PGEh// AnarilJ hmW H r
h W WW d W Hiaf energy The atthey had fieen able to defend
< =. ra ,
isn't ewn the federat gowrnmenrs ll PORTIAND (UPI ~ ltreaches in D *H n' Pknt eget an onins -. at regula semetry at the Trnt n auricar power
""" h 8* M fault." he said "But it be a prnblem
" * " ' D d""' hue t nn a r ed und we tak a plant near Rainier are being investigst -
ed tiy the U 5. Mrlear Regulatory Corm Pt#Rit AND - The Trojan Nuclear armnpM" ed %nis, "wasn1 an- nd kP E M Power Plant hit ete canvas Tuesday. [t mnsiem. the Atomtr Safety and tirens' I
takmg a binw fre m the state Fnergy 8I*""E '"' ""P*"I" C"""" .
I""A*y. hn*PWr. the siung ement il incle ha twen s freqqcat reitir e,f ing Daard was told lhursday. Fadhry $sHng foi 'er tl in Oregon's enn- The Trnjan plant omt PCF and i,, made Hs maw onewpet tedly at the end federal waste marmgement inart6an timoing multi ml um dollar nuricar partness - the f ugene Waler & Fler- af a Hring, day hmg meeting 6e whkh a F,ety last for he persuaded the siung N9C attegney Jeeph R Grey told g ritiren rhallenge en Tre.jan's refuelmg
- muwd te naud e=haustive hearings en the twined wherb is rumsidering whether schedule was unammnEMy defested ruh he propewd W M mndem 4 7 the rad 6 earth,e waste stcrage rapartry i in a hwally eczys ted nwwe the 3 k ur y dat s e d Pt nl N r a s na e ill \ !analyb b s 00 Ennnber inn Emllagdl . federS$ gnternment develnps a naste mrwd to me witans stand and drapped Ptageam.
linked to the subject of the hearing, tmt and to ludd tv-aeings in May en a pre j pmed rule lhat wnuld snnefy tim 6B mhst he latn raHed his '1emnbsheHs " IInwever, when the time rame to lie felt the twurd stwmtd be informed . %
waste steirage at the plant In an impassinned speerh. t amt pre vore mi his own preensats - s6mHar in tric Ihmed and Pacific Power g iight the vbAntbms were spotted during a Co - Finn mdhn m budd h criinuine's posed that the reunrtl ask a federal effnt to the mneams passed Tuesday -
twit,ne inspertmn mw. 28 tice. Il just The rmmr rs pmirinn rould force gg _p, g , , hreensing hnerd to deny PGF's request Im% herked off killing the pmpnsed three diys after some 100 anti nutlear Trnjan_s rhnure by 51R2. arenrding to to npand Tmjan's waste sewage pont. mW ms sW fase starHed and an pmn denumstrators were arrested en angui hed affu bh of Pnrtland General empemes Mare than a 'capies avest 3 pierd the plant ahen symbs hres PGF's' and that the teard ludd hessings on a gned nudear pnen cr6tks trespawng charges after they attempt- Fim test (o . the plant s viperator and . unwa'vericg commitment to marlear role to 16mit the emptmt af waste star-ed to hhm k gates leading to the plant rhtef cwrie r. ,p ,, , 'That mekes this any different MMRY- from last year?" I trh et hard a repart-A snamth earlier two farmer Trojan "this is an estremely serkms deri- Trojan's rinsure enuto drive PGF. tmch said his recpisals were er's questim. "lhis year I had the guards empreswd ranterns en Oregon sum that will have a tremenches impart cut of business and would result in in pronyted by the federal gmerament's vrwes I didn't have the votes last year I on the pengde af Oregon," tiong fle6.ter, creewd whidesale power rates inr those inability to develop a waste manage- always rount my votes "
mwlear agemtes that see artty at the ,
plant was nnt adequate. a PGI- vice president said after Tues- Northwest elettric emtics teed to Tro '"""'P*E'"
day's munrd mming "The Trajan Nu- jan thrnugh Bonneville Ptimer Admims- "This is not PGE e fault This is not
^
An NRC spAesman in ratiforma **"
clear Power Itmt supphes a signihrant tratmn " net billing" (power purt hase) the faull of the siting mencil. the state said the vmdaikms found during the in pnrtson cf the eter tekity owd tiy Orego ,, ,ements of oregan er the penple of Oregim it a
sparthm were suit serhus, but were um ,
Neaw tem' te Page N drr review at NRC headquarters In ,
Washmghm. I10 lie said penattlw for "- # Q f e ,
nnn sere.ms wiedatums range from "an '\ O angry letter" to 81*ies-I' g n:- . = w . --
- .; ,e ., , .
. . .. . - . . . ... _,. , w .,.
988 E ?!si EEI$5 EE. b o DO E ~!$ pj M c
"kiE n [gE! "
,@ C3 o .a a@ hi)P E135 e 3.,e iD!E 7"$EEM P "% "um&!*. d!! HE]I! fard35Ejj'!!gTg-c.fsij! ihO.a - ,0 m,
p o amE g.g:su~s m
.s a .e . --== =. . a s . se m. , esew = ev.n 7==- u- 2. b=.E= "gs g e
.g .em %wC 8
. 2 8n sy5 g" Iu -
4s,fB82. - -
e j#i o - o 7 U
. w.
o . _c m
@ N, ~NRE E._he 0lh.s::d3!
en e" s 8 gj*s sus e e EN . SviI mf8
%sgu. c*s e =
e 5
et o
oco "ee c id =aa.i,i,s g.r {sggz 3r g= ,g
.s.. J s
=
Lfelii4 a- (cJji.".g
.m 3ggai
.s ..
. a bb a *og m!E l E5h o m s., h5b e #38.h$ a! N z]a! NE
- N i t j E*! " I 4
.y +, scghisj o o o _g 4.s a- -
Ashei -
ssee . se~ m, r. g n.w. . ey a . ~ nm aw.
e m.. q-gg. e..%. 4 "=d. w,e" d ~~ b m
m -o m-8 u.8a sg e M_ ,E ,
k
- _ _ . __ \
T k -;{
4 Oregee Joernal, AprE 13. 1978 (t) s .*
opnnnon x
!Lacko credibility malces adclearpower doubte k .
Supporters of the nudear industry and the notion on requests to slow down certain plant constructions catastrwhe on the American population and because The incident necurred the same da) that audear power pt.ints are a mahr way toward or operations. we need the electric power the plants produce. reporters and photrgraphers was pr o energy salvation grumble a good deal about the Earlier, a federal magistrate in Portland saw no Then akmg comes pGE,in the opening hours of shown 1rojan's refueling by pGE. Nt L stumbhng blocks in their path. need to order an immediate halt to Trojan refueling refuelling Trojan (or the first time. Three workers formed of the actident until the neat day l PGE of fklats the other day complained about the, operathms because he said it is unfair to assume the were exposed to radiation ennecessarity. a state These assumptkms about safe oper
- need for several hundred employees required to ful-federal government will mit provide safe storage for offidal has concluded, bnause of sloppy procedures. nuclear industry cannot be given t<un mt fitt the demands of regulatory and environmental radhiartive wastes and spent fuel. Detractors of 1he three men bere searching for a radiathni ty if these attitudes are the goverain
. agencies' paperwork plaintiffs who are trying to obtain court interventkm leak with inadequate detecthe equipment and inade- Trojan and in the imtustry nathmwide.
The LI.S. Supreme Court inst week made the in the refueling operation consider the effert tan- quate protection from radioactivity. The stumbling blocks nudear suptw
. remarkable dnree that since Congress and the fed- tamount to halting inesitable progress. Their esposure, under standards some critics feel it is apparent, are of the industry and g
,eral government have d>ases to live with nudear We are asked to believe in safe operations of are too louse, was considered suffklent to remove own making, and lack of credibihay is t
- power, the courts should be limited in their rulings nuclear plants because none has inflicted a major two men from the kb. j barrier.
_ _ _ .._~ '* A- .=,:- ai, r- ----: -
E
, ; . m. - a. g, mi '.
m . ..., s'i 5
I$gia?!! s
$2w ajaa ase.
Eb an!5
$$hh!
m[g32f. kh
,;5,aEEgg!IY 0
5Eg 31 3E%
F hhh fa
_0$
gij f gj,1,3, s N
to 4
':-.. - -o , s g .ggg
- -33:eiga eie. s a p gs. ssaeae u"gms
.- g a!,=asb a a= ama n esa- ae
,u,!I s=aa a22-O g a
i N 3 i IE* ""
!.!=la 16 rir, a;E!! tEsa s" i a! i=:= n:*s am 8 err;:!! asai ;an % ;$ m 3:**r fing its: = o
, vsgra a = . a -a e n= = a es 13 " a: ra ase!
sig: s e
es aan, q
C g g' 2"a? Urgg [!Eisia ** a l"21 UR F trier pig C a Kg s !',,I5*Nf a!wa ,i,2!s!ggflast ip 2 -
O
,iEEN E
= asss s ga, N hh!$! 4$!aNb$
t' R g a: ,-gan 8 .
a $ ,"ls
-i g,N n.=_,,is; ei=a=
g a u . =-
a=
na.e i a s e
-ae8
=gya s, s * = s e
D.
3 t =s h5E =n=u :R-S$N e
= Qs hg 3 b.3:.=i a v a s:sk= s
. . I !!!!Ii!!!150d!%!!Hi!NijiEGj!!!!!N ! E o-a s . ;
! !"!!! !!!a!!!!
" h.!.a:g , , = b3; u =Eais : ig! eiS?"
pa "E
8;r, eD!;:iiiM a;v s, r;ama g a,
! g!ia i"g, . C# e- d u -ga :r= ., y a t en .. g a ., -. e.- ,
?
.t mae,q.gf; side from glowing spent fuel was a tuy- i Try 16rsibke Trojan lic5d, bYdils #
J, er of water 30 feet deep - more thaa ,3 l, ,l. By htONTE ENBYsK storage of spent nudcar fuel at the enough, nuclear technologists have a ,
, . JournalCorsespondent require Trojan to apply for a separate ' matter the last two years.
. plant vblates a law passed by the 1977
'k
- found, to keep sadioactivity from escap- license for radioactive maste disposat.. t G Sandvik said the hearing is eIthan the Ing late the air above.
3 FtlGFNE - A petiHun filed by two t egislature banning permanent storage The coundt she voted 5-I to set a ' stung councils discretion. The coun(il
. state senators to revoke the Trojan ne_ of radioactive waste la the state.
tinder the left end of the crane. la a clear power plant"a site certifkate was -
hearing on about June 20 on a Pactitc can ludd a hearing first and decide rejected la a 5-1 vote by the Oregon Power & ilght Co. proposal to build a w hether to latervene later. he said iner3y FadHIy Siting Counct! here Sandvik Assistant Attorney General Richard 500,000-kilovett t.ansmission llae . In a unanimous 6 0 vote, the coun B f R idiait*oni
- i liits Tuesday. ' recommended that the council through Southern Oregen Indkating that the Rkhard Bs(b PP&L attorney, bro- active voted to hold a hearing to define *:adie ne ,c,1,le ,lled b, sta,e sens red reject waste sto, the agepetition.,atended is totested be eni, purp the .iting coundra intervention Ing w, at material'*
radtnact for,vedea, n.oses of decid-was,es F
listhnk and Jan Wyers, both Portland temporary. lie also noted that the in the power line proposat, p4ating out come withis its jurisdk tion IO) Ivmocrats. sotrght to revoke Trojan's state's attorney general has issued am that Oregon's public atihty commhston-state license on grounds that long-term oplelon that the siting council cannot er has beca holding hearings on the (Itelated story on Page 9) tr.ari edfrempage:)
. ,ua bundie was being iransierrea io nr E,nergy [ bdNM I hh _
y
- {-- >
conned. member n.r hed m ,T,c, pent fu,n ad pel
, be,.d .,tne ~, s,over i
gone
-id i,a-. b.ti b-n..
R4 y n ,4 and as the fuet went through the tube
[ 1 e , e e
="r"Th:,7-"t 2'"a"
, Pow,.er firm cited for . Trojan a{ foul su,p p fast as they could."
lie said the expsuure time was about j f
.. t 6 e .-
.p3. 3 ,g,] y, g , 9., ,i 3a, - - * *
, ; ,. ~ s a 15 seconds ~. By J RV tiltRHAntMER
- low
.a. A. -
i a second failure'of the same enachines whkh snaffutu tha l,t ut, the gretted the mhinterpretatiin er:
Brochi said the Ettee were "cl05'T than the should have been while dalog
.. k **8' em, that "the plard operating statt ...J
- SCORY s -[IU"tand 1 Genera' c calized 8 ***thatM by Mnot ifwrtlng the plahl ;performatnce. an4 competenrf ef5the . and agreed that the technical sen afka-b t the should have been doing." Eleriric" down withf(one hier of the failure en personnel respansible for handling Ihms tatted for a shutdown within one arthe surveys of the area will be permitti$g was nianyactosed humanMeday o.f. Sunday. they violated their operating (fuse
" foul-crs breakdown prelems correctly. hour. ' l g,36 , (, ](,
,4 -
,t d nd additional barriers will be to continue at he Tropn uurlear power nsatcunns, according to Degt of En-w 9cI as a result of the incident, Broehl plant, which has been plagued whb ngy Dirutor tjenel Tupar hmNwg
- Purter said PGE will revie$e"what g start up tribles Inch said. "the issue is ehether the happeed and devekip proirdares to lhe Trojas plant superintendent, person who is responsible did the right Prevent any reotwrences. .b Brocht said be believes the Incident "Sonumne from PGE has to go cut Mes Gomfein Jr, told the council thing under the gun. That person had "
the first of excessive radiation re- a
' nd shake up smne people at that mening hne that a "nnsinteples- better show a pattern of doing the sight .
ed b lant worker since Trojan . plant." said Iptl l uch. a memtier of the .The enunrli voted unanimemsty to ac-Hon" of de opesateng restrictums was thing, because sormer or later there is rept the statt's rerommendathm that begon pr clo3 p wer la Decefnber - Energy Fattpties Siting Council, the respmstble for the dniske not to shut going to be a danger to the put> tic PGE he required to provide a writece state agency whkh regulates energy emn the plant immediately health and safety, e knew people should not go explanaHon of the incidents, why they
. fat ilfth s 1he systems involve 1 show the pt>
enus red and how 'ticy can be prevent-be and those barriers" he said. "They 1.ach's tre was raised here at a coun- sluons of the enntnd emis, which are N "And it's obvious to me," I urh run- j ed it " til eneding by a report on the latest la a used to canol de twat gwrsuom Hwd. Mat anne d de pvainnet ym '
hl said the Inca had asked the series of malfunction incidents whkb within the muricar reattor. PGE has have at Trojas don't have that pattern. 1 Meanwhi*e, sitmg comrti snember
" aut to release their names. lle have caused shutdowns at the PGEg- sakt h failure of the red peltion sys- You've got too many foul ups ** John fire,on of Portisnd annourred his
** highly trained gad eI- ersted niKleur plant barated 49 miles tm s USP by overheanng d Hae Dann, $MMve May 1 Brykm. a north of Portland on the Octumbia Riv- gggeg p,,p .yg.s a matter of safety Wenced la Mlattua technology. . 'I"$"IC8-' *
' ' ' ' '!-'s . first. If something Is going bayatre, la vyet is leadng to bemne full Hme 1 er near Rainter. (The Eugene Water &
I # " " shut it (the plant) down. tit's get into a maltman d the State Watnyneurces Flectric Board owns 30 per cent of the stung cou'nctl, said the failure of the pattern of entreme conservatism " muoi Bard in Mornia Tnstan ) i system did not threaterb the public , Gnmtwta repfled that PGE had al-5 PGE violated its operating restric- heattb er safety but did show some "ad. teady established "a patters of entreme It was also annormied that the sitmg r._. -. __ , , "J tourts on Sunday, April 4. eben et falled ministrative weaknesses" that need to cumservatism" when it shut damn the to shut down Trojan - then aperating be curretted.
etninett is haing a veteran statt mem-ber, enetranmental se clailst Bell ver-et appeusemately 2 per cent power - -- ' plant for four weeks folkswing the fait sneere, who is leaving May I to herome tmut two and a half hours after eme of are of analitary feedwater pumps in radiathm safety effuvr at the tiniveesi-But 1.uch, who was sharpest in his late February.
two separate systems involving centtrol criticism, saki a "latger issue" than ' . . ty of Oregan Mrds af Schoid in Port.
reufs failed The plant s techntral speci- the numher of *seportable im-idents" g, pg pg.s senkw vice land Vermeere was one 6f the originaf ficathms enn for a shutdown within an whtrh have artwrred is a
- pattern" president for power prmim tkm, told the staff members of the old No(lear and h hemr in such a case- whh h he seen developmp rusmil the operating restrie Ekm tre thermal Fm try Co w H. rrented liv
I
__ _j _ .a tuisehw***d DisapsialemW : W .1 n , cr w. ,
e 3
e
?'
Page 12 A REGtSTER_ GUARD. Eugene, N_ . Wednesday. May 10.1978 Federal fine againstbTrojan said adequate t
. ' A smunmendal 325.0 tut feders, tane fdCs mese rmst offise is recommend frwn htadpam, Idaho, to Mnifmd The the issue la she hands nf the state l'ub- tificate shnuld be rew.ked herause 5%E agatast Purtland General Elratr6r (c~ eng the penalty so its headquartets. j hne is swupused by Padfic Power & he Utility ranmisshmer. is attempatng to e=pand as waste sene l<st espmmg two wwkees to utmsually fugh sadbtum levels last numth terne-ths tait Haynte. nne of the depart U8I
- However, the Sierra Oub petitumed age fae-Hun wsHumt shnusg an mttu's irojan plant numitors, told the PP&l. edfittats have argued the hne the coutuit, ratteng for a ruhng from ame sh mMicm and turauw sents an adequate tesgense, state enes-gy department Director f eed Mdhr romud the inddent and a department is exempt fetun sitmg toumil jurisdic- the omnril en Its authneity to stle the the incread sawy .in Me an letus cand W PGE prem has h inam W Mieguem plxed kne in hght of sigmfvant changes in O8'm hw puMunng pantan:W said luesday in F ugene. **#""*8" "'
,gg ,, ,,g,gg,c,,,. ,.hanges in the 4"
y PP&t 's pnym! ruute If the fme is appened by the Ntx te-er Hegulainty Commishut in Washing utshty's usuker tratamg and radiathe ,q
'. Tuesday's dwishm enty means enun Hmver, t=um a mnnMs agud numikwmg programs. p; til neemtwys have agreed to tudJ a with the state attorney grectal that an t
tun. D ( Miller saed bc edl nul reemn rnend a sue ime it.synie termni some of the thanges
- U hearing to take evideme from h*ah """"I'##"""" "#"
i . " impressive ~ and said IME offu sets -
h
- sides an the councirs authorney regulate and that - 6w the nume ns at b ast -
1hg expusure imident etTurscJ dus- mere renewing department rerummen-
- I* ** *
.# 't the inne.
' ** # "Eg 6ng a curirar re fuchng operathm at d.stums ttut tropn plant offu tats re- .
t PGE's Tropa Nsnlear Power I'lant main in rhm.cr tienmuneratum enh stil .lt*~ $' the reunre also desm 6ssed a gw titkm I"'I"" l'I*"' #** '
Miller made has renmw nes at a meeting My engwats headquarlesed in Porttatal. '
fenen state Sens Jan Wyers. D Hund the rouncil also agsmf to huld hear
., of the state inergy f ardity 5tting 45 nules west if the plant. ;
- s i. River. and Ted Itatha 6. D rnettand. to ings an yrnpced rvies that wo.sA de-k '"" , . .. In other tmseness the remnril voted . ),t *4 remike the Trojan planrs site muft ime redumuve wage for the pur pne us y4 Elem Cnidard, the cetenrtl's state De- to tudd a hearmg June 20 em whether J& s' ate.
regulating waste handhng fas statars a t partment of Energy staff advaser, said the cuenrd has jurisdwesun ever a 506 /: j g Dan O'fcary, a Portfand attorney .,'
.the department has twee nutthed the kehnmit pieer hne shat would extend
- i rep;esenting the senators, said the cer- pelased sleey. Page 7B C . . g. ,
.. ,e -
% .;?,ks t m - -
s.; .- .
M -
'E 9.
j' e
e h P g"
*a
- r ps==r==ai!se*a.zg{m:f.d.ua* M u83 -- rae-s a *-*-
~
4w s-f ' E ' r
- PIs"lig i
~ esae 89j?m-f kBIE*uhR ~
].e En I,hEris-N S =a . r,' m,**-3, EE$84 i dWe+ M?
OQ a l
*!! ?ES % *-E" @ ! a *E*32
,8 EI sSI sadqy=.E'h( m*!ui 1d 'I9 W t.t.. A m s,;lf=iPia.cla,b7yl3 m,.p ange u~ <gara ~ eg! sa3l S
me "Oio' w cf z r~si = rg -;
tra*gges m m-
.. o Jeins!a.rc.!!!..pm s .mg_ sam- w a ne n-Rbe
,b y=r-a %.
[=h e!;
L %ia ~a nag e $3
- ng aele" -ea=s=
g f( s 8 -pans e- g o :iL=ggg8 n 2 -a >* -
~sggs
= ., ? Re5s r f =
, , '(lg ' i . . < t r ;t 5 '@' Rs E afs:n'go o,
h{g b 0.}' . qm wi . _ _ _ -
, h- d vN 2 [,) II '
.. _ l l l l
~ ~ ^
I
* .. j f
%e -r---9 g
- r .eo- _
-+ "h h e edhp t t nma
,9 y{e _ga" .p*?E gg=
ed nofo pI s
e e n
t.Otf,th Ef i
sh oead e
cat e
o y ine 4.m muh e
tmg a
h or *e t
hdtst gt rht Pet r e ft r
la
.EE 81Eg oe t aib rupr g ," g nd mtadut os nh d tri e s t a
l
_l i7g f op divo r e a1 et hCA i
g 5 *8 j aa ar f sth r ot egen
,d fopw s f 3 " Bi h,p ,t x t co
# wage o nd nc n l y
f,g E SE th - f 3 rlrat u re ef r pnm6s - ws e n e ei ma es esinos o
ilirtCl t ert i
_ 5@E g gf r e
' t
- cd e e se oit i, g t r r o tafa t n rby n S 't pp g a .Esj [ a Pd r stin a eon h s
irUe n b$ .
t nao gnash no r timT e a
h rC l
r
.@, wrj 9Zg .6
- IK g - ]h5g
$ ooyt n s e
. I.
ba n.pi insi estss enb o 9 g g g"eh g"a *t3 sl e e
Kt c
Mem oiOm.r d
o ta mnew a cgIIkikm oot no vdt e i el ta apa
.Th1 h
ehS t tu he lst 1
;5g EE[u-- ed - . inoeh . - euw.
R .H{E8 352 - n ynemt
.Smgg ,5ggEeE' l g tl a ei gsr t
taipss o tr.
o e i . n r o h
gH 9,
$O A{"6 g= t@ GEE ,g 6 t r
o y
eene a ne l ahy
- c. w e l , ,f sf oPeaduTsswoan pst s hhtql t rb es ah t ut g
e e v ;t tmn o
oggg "gg *j -Q!8 o "O 8 a Ra s i e l
o r h sb e av s tab e o gE0E"E ee tnk ah p e, sg ao n lct te n*f et Kad s t
ain o
,S g gE _3" c r n nh g tsi uhdt i *
*gMw3E3'b2 o ta e n ea r
Nge at T f s s ih e ut m*
?Eyje=DEE nor eeu i
=!
g> ,S y Ej 95" MS^ Ei wMGIit ndth o yeubt ao nq r
e h C v n n l. nr d ad m t rt ei htenmrow r ol n ot seio sifh S
Sc r ea f el
{
uep oht
.y 45t a = g=a , : dMepl nd tn c eytl s
retn o,wn .r tte i i y
y p gg g g j- < cEh3 g.
hEO $ "38 Mi p3 e-[ g'gg S *$t_ = q, E* $5E 8 Ag Nt aiiehloua teiht rrd v
a eof e lT r t sfan gl ogeiignt . ywlu ,, dettu k rl a
a m ,, dm,nv g!u3* E j~
i gfW . dyea op I oe 5 n m' E an n ogh ut r C g,o,ph g 0f-jWag=lCSy E Ga e tl1 qae nk I st
;5E- ,2~g c: 5 E
& S {,g gg$
g a-5ges E"- y g Es v$ ds te. s y yd tnm ebbiaao e
m ahi,t,r a 'r j
d l l 'f g_ $ gg Gl s e r a t
- ( B[ ,,5"E' g g,a. o ts ut h ha n mf tag g
fd2xy^f, r
- u m gi> SE gtg8 )a .* .i otf e lsuidi ne s d o h iE= eos g j la l
l wh gsoo pd et s h c w e
eai a s
& Og jW6I g (" QH ofla degteea Tesh r aOws ts o s ti nlaeietRhu r at ro r emas gn es ce r t wn i i
g <
t c
e r v pet n xt
. i v
n e
M@ aJ aled . ea T
c e t d
- ed r a whehl n sg ehen e g'
T Si a a e s e t t u eiyt ta holci u gau non r s r
s" o aa r
dt e fat s o ht h W
~ a~ "
Q O M h g#b R tsw,f nib gslagcotwnek . r t ad o
da ah eGawl aron s
t oeye t
n v
e na pe "t k mfo et emna lolan hh t mt a l
ck t
n s imM oo toatGtht ye"p ., vet O
r i nt rl r al eEo e I
r laPAtb" wfla ' *^ $, rl l
- t sPsl
- l' .,' i .
%
- i emi t -i nt e N
glk y vr dit e gt.n nke e cfh. i e (rarWhr uoSolaytf t e t e eapet nri a rh e d h
~ j
~
dltydte l ut n htfbtpAnn.B e i g o eu t.b. K.rsm h rh c ert oet ut mehofW ethl a
stle n s wr h d
e c a igmr eit a, n ei s
'4 hiBmf elukhiidfa th ear -
a O dlsrbloopohis eih n
.i e r eksih sh st no h.
r a t e e sot e
wehWf gr inec w S hi.
1MQ( Watlb f e - y . a ts gr .
ye- at h njen a mIe m - ld ns -
r piPt d n
s r o e he ol n d nn e ,fof r g k a nda enlt nsilynkt oihd td R
h i e
- m h "e. tr a orkear-e hat enta r el e yo u o h u
o neh a, wg ht u t c, kae wehh r o a omits ye mr i n u tad w e e f tso eeb a
pt
>tsl t gh ue p o l
eEi p hl dt el ar gt e Tniyt ywa a a wdrdi n s yt el e t
m xt wc e pme v s
epobSed s
s ah s o nt s, e .h e Pee k
- a. rort crhaer o adeonf ot u ,re n vt le tfeer e r s dr T
h no e t t n ef y r
u dlat d w et I
y sf t or p nn gRf aol r omiabt d ml y r de ahl s o lbad ef boheuts e h at e nb a p at rr r iwy t s nns e n E u s h rucomnhWimw re r wca la e egm r ad n eet e nin e opm een e r ps cc ur o a a inna ela r t a
g e n lnr umd tentii waks El tfl c dd ah rogsh ns f lp mdcbrl tuua anC E
a ae i
t nds e r e a atla jo s, omr n oro e
l s t
e s te t
a Nos sSeid uttk
.ne eUel eyu s t
r st e
ep a remf a
,a niknkiamw ewqul a ei nDoegnl d
t s r0ehe elia ei t a
n a abn jos r nd o T io lud dt ot iar awuh w tat rpas et op se o
I n et r.linpl olla c n t n t gG weh rtpl
.dt et e n 's e obeh uE a atiion e eyws n eobP met ope c
r n
,d s
wo .h a i e wo el t r em s + m ss htah a, tns*
c eedth n c tciahb$d setue0bttave it et v to' e tl a re*a ra c s g sadiil rt s nidt to y eymeih te r lpat e ai s sns r ai ot e s
ms nmae no st t
itrh laoc ets e islh t
s n atsenuhtl eht st he ebt an no ddah iet pw abseidn o i r a rdkot .
er t
sr [o l t uo ilpn1 inr Wip t neer e i jR gr onu af i
r r
p sctec r r yt nt ec n pi s s ad aab a pla ulh e p
mri el ca g>sadl.
o coweghTs l
ehe ipo9 s
olu8 2
top ar c
s ne o ea r t rja Pr o Tmh s
e
.ev tT l dr epe6 tiaiapafie p6 i t r ts u fo oe t
eoti i ohht p s e at w1 ssW wspas e r nhtf thct h ut mCbt r d t onci ct u o o2,nwlhi n mhf im gs s49 or ic a hatgnd ts1 deh te nniioup s - - r r ge t - t ge d an ni e r mto E. ea eit nh e cn oa nh e o s ioue et e .at ti f yuf dewa te eI isbhirdir rd rf r
.i norfC f
la Ishit tc r po t o e hiP t tali sa oe lep s tloo t
luret i s tc ad an r
g d
jainir t r odi at cywpge g
rehdinhe o w e. et g nlinhd e
amot wtes c ra tef e s
's e sdfoIbh sd t,t nt .
a e tose o a w
s r o r opo ofuit reb
.ldee b as a g i i
nrttur nTb e ni a e yn ,gtlEd s.
allfihs a
t e n i
t t
s esf ne pt o d or ott. a u ed r
ne ays s a lih t s ti n
e n y 'e p siost av a er er v ui L i
t pItah s r e ceha e o ed t y n d pC g c k ta i yd e ni t nt m ie d
s o ac e o
h ,rtdh ap rt lp tnt a s p v ort eh nsge i a an c pt r psi ak u ag ep otddpa ypOeef as o aap. mso el ca s e eneatnn ea e eoiot nt ta nr ue rhcer eant ocr phiiiml t o oui e tst aft onk n ruth a abi le g1de foGt r eso at e mmn s pte re nt et aOaintlomutt s o a tbwa e t r r
n enh rw nv e
lat o aga et ool - - -et hwW'g.
s ei
.i ie rb t lgk pt a' al ts gB ci re aes e a aod t mc ua t
r deedit n ral ht e r. w ad e I gur o
e nmnd po s
a aksfm w tnna o r io epou egynt eht e e9 vnRc dkt s at npiol l a mwnwprdneiehe meauotengamblh n o pd w e r nt dt r t
ajanr mt el h lkt nyu etd awr l si c nht al d
e el r tsd aa J fapo a d p/
irtf s o oo s r ri i
aagr n7 oa n y'a tetieotd rl a c
ree aal la ew eshPtf s rokhhnm,i ml os s e e rpuaoheTelpe s t Asan ie ooawi nh at v a s o nl mwta mt por ninsdt u
th yrin ieflueo e a t ab e o spt s e te n e rf "ia r arh t s e
h l o eCye t r s ac itc n ea n
f leRn i raer n et r
t amaaS off e
icSh N.fe Rle Avit tl acaqca a shlda euuin a wsohl et ea t p nAet ts eseko ye et s ai p eld e afl strS t. r ot 1ict a cw t
t r
m" a2a i
rY O
,m t8 0 ayliid Oa3n ds res a yt pvt ete cc aitclaw yt otel rhl p
e Est oaptab a e nel amJ ta es r
Ah n efiod ph ona n t
,~ s
- C= a en awe r
s o o ee m nutdil e D R'*htdGcb Aa
- e i a mpefoo a ne et J u ppd r m nu on -f t nP I.
,l[
" ^
l } i'j s t; is , t< ir :D \ ^
l / 9 N:D POV ITYs TIME FCR A * . . . .
((*2' .
* / R2 CAP- TtMS TD SUMAWt-l
. /
f s j '?. ITE THE IMrVRTANT AD. l YES, ATEWIC RESFARot 15 l'freN& Att /'FEAS lIMIN-.arrra w narme wam__ ,,,,,, ;
'A '
f
/ Mc., /
/
VANTAGES OF NUCLEAR 6ENERATION Or ELEC-TRICITy/
OF OUR UvES, Pg AND rOR tW FUrUr0# RIMT I f40Yf SCENTtSTS ARE %ORKtN6ON.EVERYTHING j
[ Umt<S FOR SHomNG 175 UIE REAL IACI5 AOCUT At</EAf 66W.MTDY/ 'y*-
'/ rRom NuctEAR cowEnrP ARTirtCIAL HEARTS TO OrfE THfMG IS SURE-ITS COING TO
- -)v/
f ADVANCED TYPES ct 00wrR REACTURS.WE*VE PE. OREAT FDR AtLOF US!
EtITERED THE /VUCLEAR AAE THAT WILL MAKE CUR LtVINC EA6!ER AuD MOPV l'RODUCTIVE!
/
p @h jg l, AB;r~itish Nuclear i ; '
'p 9 i. $ t7 .
~ g; lt g V gj Report 5 E
.1
- h. .
g%elsts Doubt on
&& ==*E= .
lu~Q -
r p li i
9 - Cartoons from The Atom Electricity and You, a comic book n'hout the i
Trojan Nucleer fiant by Portland General Electric Co., Eugene Water e and Electric Board, and Pacific Power and Ught Co.
I e A team of British scientists sent to Oreoon to study site to switch from inefficient gas cooled reactors (the the conditions actually to be expected in the g
the Trojan nuclear plant has gone back to England with "model T of the nuclear industry) to pressurized water . reactor. .
doubts about the plant's safety, the Northnast I'sssage reactors (used in the U.S.), dwells more on safety and Victor Cook, physics professor at U.W., explained learned. less on profits. that uranium fuel rods are so long and narrow-they
' The team, w 8sich was evaluating the safety of pres- The wording of the critical passage of the report is 10 to 12 feet long, yet only "as big around as a penci sanired water reactors for possible use in Great Britain, , as follow - that they nuest be encased in an extremely strong. he l apparently became concerned that in a " loss of coolant" If coolant is lost... the behavior of the fuel in resistant rnetal. This metal casing is ontled the claddi accident, the fuel elements in the reactor could swell the interval between the loss of coolant and the Furthermore, the reactor core is packed with many I enough to block the re-entry of coolant from an emer re-establishment of emergency cooling is a crit- eods that must be extremely close together. In the h gancy cooling system. ical part of the reactor analysis. The study has buildup immediately following loss of coolant, swelli Ir The consequence of such sn inability to reestablish given rise to one area of doubt. The combina- of the cladding could block the reentry of water into the narrow spaces hetween the fuel rods. This, conct j
' {l
~.
cooling in the core of the reactor could be a meltdown of the reactor, considered to be the most ominous of tion of internal pressine in the fuel elements and increased temper atures results in some Cook, could lead to a meltdown.
' ~
I I possible nuclear reactor accidents. swell'ing of the fuel cladding. 'This swelling And Itolan is not alone, according to CooE Al
- A copy of a summary of the investigator *s report could interfere with the re-establishment of U.Ss reactors face this problam.even thorigh it thest i was obtained through a congressional office by Bill cooling under emergency conditions. Until re- sittance of fuel claddinql is much better than It used Van florn of Fourlaws, a citizen's group that has inter- cently, the experimehtal evidence has indicated be. It's just a messy business."
f
- vened in the Skagit and Pebble Sprir$gs nuclear reactor _ that such swelling would be localized and not Though the problem of swelling of the fuel claddi proposals. st
- Ificiently serious to cause prrhiems of this is not new to eritics of the Emergency Core Cooling j.
The report was originnfly sent.to the Portland Gen- kind, but some fir'ited n experimentst work in System, the British report is considered significant it 5
~
eral Electric Company from the Nuclear Installations this country has now sug< tested that there may "who"is saying it. Joan linbl, of the Washington Pu Inspectorate in London, along--ith a polite introduc s be conditions in which swelling might take place lic Interest nesearch Group (WashPIRG), notes that tory cover letter from J.J. Campbell, of the inspector- along an extended length of a fuel element and~ "I haven't heard anyone from the NRC [Nucicar Ret
/
latory Commission, the U.S. nucIcar watdidog agent
- ste, to the Chief Engineer at the Trolan plint. The let- be of sulficient mpgnitude to prevent the re es-ter ends: "I hope the availability of Trojan is high and _
tablishment of cooling. f urther experimental questioning whether the emergency cooling system work end a reexamination of the analysis of, , g would henction.", ..,,.*p.
i .i
.l ndding to the matgins of profit for your company ., . ..
"'" The NRC is known for its optimism about the pe-
- [h P;'- .
wa enjoyed your salmon...'* ,. .;. S w. , .h . I.' N , _
That the report, which was sparked by HeItaln's de-tvansients are needed to establish whether th's [
experimental constitions are representative of formance of the system.
{}, ___
r 6: ky % s, c.
Exnlanation of the 4tatement in our brochure ~
that says Trojan "acoroached a rel tc own . . . '
i The accident occurred on February 29, 1976 The r.lant was ooeratine at Mt no'ver for the first time. Something went wronit and the reactor automatically shut dcwn. To understan/ what happened next, one must understand basically how the Trnjan coolinc system works :
< N
_ M N Containment Structure Electne Tran on 6 b
',(,D'oas Reactor Vessel Steam Turbines asmam g- gg
[ [} ,
9;
- =
[p[V j;7; g ,,
j
( Steam Generators ( $3
%g
%gq g. -
SECONDARY Sectncal Generator D
$ : 2D 2 LOOP Condensers
) I i d Circulating ._ r ,
Cooling Tower 1
; I Pumos, 1 ' l '
l _ s s mm - 11 y i
- ~% y - __ _ _-=3 .
b F Condensate Pumos Warm Water ii ,
I PRIMARY LO "4eactor Pumes
[
Feoowater
~
TERTIARY LOOP Cool Water l
Pumps
- L' ;LJ Demineralizers HowtheTrojan Cooling SystemWorks ;
i There are three closed water loops at the Trojan Nuclear tem is the one hooked up with the cooling tower and its l Plant. They are called " closed" because water from one plume of warm water vapor.
loop never flows into another loop. However, the heat does Trojan's problems have been in the secondary closed j flow in a continuing stream from the reactor core to tne loop-the one responsible for preventing the core from outside-about a third in the form of electricity, melting from the accumulated effect of its owm fissioning. l The primary loop carries water at 617' l . and under There are two distinct sets of feedwater pumps which pressure in a circle that runs through the reactor vessr.: it-circulate water in the secondary closed loop: the main feed- I self (where the heat is constantly replenished by fissioaing water pumps and the auxiliary feedwater pumps.
in the core) and through the steam generator (where the During normal operations, the plant's main feedwater heat is depleted by ennduction to the secondary loop.) pumps send water to the steam generator. These main The secondary clowd loop is the worker in the plant. It- pumps are steam powered and cease to function (" kickoff")
translates the heat of the reactor into electricity and draws at the same time as the reactor in the event of a " scram."
off heat from the primary system. Electricity and cooling, or shutdown, safety and utility-it's one and the same function for the When the reactor is starting up or shutting down, two secondary loop. " auxiliary feedwater pumps" have the cooling responsibili- i l Here's how the secondary loop works: it provides water ty. During shutdown, they are not " auxiliary" at all but the - '
to the steam generator, where heat by conduction from the primary cooling mechanism and a critical safety component, !
primary loop turns the water to steam. The steam runs One of these auxiliary pumps is diesel powered. The , i through the turbines which drive the generators to make 1 electricity. other, called the " cherry" pump, is steam driven like the j main pumps, though smaller. I The steam exhausted by turning the turbines, is con- On February 29, when the reactor was " scrammed."
densed back into water, ready for another trip, by contact the main pumps shut off normally, but the diesel and with still a third system of circulating water. This third sys- cherry pumps failed to start up. j Acro 197'i CR ECON TIMES MAGADNE oVer e
i Thus , crucial cooling water was not being circulated, and there was no place for the surplus heat to go. After five minutes the diesel-driven auxilliary feedwater pump was started by hand.
If the pump h.td not been started, the water in the secondary loop woald have started to boil off and the plant would lose the ability to pull the heat out of the primary system. The pressure inside the primary system would increase and a release valve inside the reactor containment would open. This would let steam into the containment building. The steam would " steam cool" the reactor vessel (as well as thoroughly contaminate the containment building). In order for the " steam cooling" to work, enough water must be rushed into the core to make up for the steam that is being shunted away. There is a possibility that the charging pumps which perform this job would not be able to keep up with the release valve. In that case, the Emergency Core Cooling System would be called upon--and we have no way of knowing whether it would work or not since it has never been tested under these ;
conditions. l It is the auxilliary feedwater pumps that have failed to perform properly 14 times between December 1975 and May 1976. .
1 I
CNEGOMANS <
FOR NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS s h cm I
1
. . , . . ., - , . - - .,y. ,
.- . . - - - _ -., ---r ,-y..--
.- . . _ . _ . . -. - .- - . = _ _
. g* . ' CONTA0L BLOCC( l l l l l l
. (pLtf.nE PRWT QLL nEQUIRED INFORMATICW)
'I 1 6 '
LCI'Jsti Naus terNst Nuustn tctust tvtNt n ot 0 lI l Ll C !! !S l ? ! l15O!O l-l ol 0 ln b !^ f-! Aln 20 l l 6 ! 1 l 1 ! 1 !1 ! !O l }l tvot i 7 89 14 26 30 31 32 stPORT stpCat i catt cov typt 3UACE CC0 KEY NuvetA tvtNT cart At80G' Catt 01CCfril l l d60 l61 n l4 l ol-l Al tin I6 l l6 l 7l1 I? l?l7l l al 7 l :l c I" h f 7 8 57 58 59 68 69 74 75 80 EVENT CESCAlpTICN Q {yk41a n++o-w+4 c +n ,..#ar- +b. .. 4mA4 +.e6 er O.3,+ :
7 99 .. 4- l 60 h l1 ne4 e . .f4+b
- W m. n 4 6 4- ba+ e b. . + A a..
' A..... 1.-A . . , . . . 4 e+,91eA ,11 7 89 .
l h lmpee qw4_ woe levai m e m e e n t. 4 - e e a co c es.ce , wome+a r--1. + ina-30 7 89 # 1 - .. , _ l h l sea 7 89 e+mem come,s+an 1 ei,e1 4-c+ ..-ee+s+4- _
a. 4 e 1er* *uo , s * ,.
80 l
- Q { .1_
- b. en e a s i_ inAien+4me e# +baco asee-e+o 4 80 7 89 e nA ---m+eA sii / r* w - - ' A T l systtu CAur.:
av st 60
- ct casacumi cevemt c::t ceuocNENT ::ct susse mu%~usen hbb 7 89 10 11 12 lT b lC l"'I O!ff!
17 43 44 l C! C !O lCl vtx.ATN
[
47 41 CAUSE CESCAIPTICN .
Tbn e c t.c o m# *bo nt,em+ * .s e 'ba 4--
7 89 a-e m1sen-on* et A..=-.. e4-31e 4
@l lace 7 49 n' ar9 mate-e i--ar sa* +c al= -
+ -en+-a1 ~' b a 4-e--"--4--e 4a 80 l
80 h ltha C a 9 C
- 0 T* E"O t e c t ic'1 L orri c " a r i nedi a toe
- c m a r e -- i e e. *be -1mre-e=* ( e h,*,; '
7 89 f aC:Lf??
status % pcwan MtTWCC 07 etwta stArus c:se:vtav c;sc:vtav CasematcN 3
7 8 9 d !n}O l Ol 10 12 13 lha+ Sku+ A w 44 ) W l C-- * ~ 1 km,-A 21 m - l scnu cs 45 46 40 ?ivWV 80 CONit N T Aft!Ast3 AMOUNf CF AC*fvtTY 7 8 1R 9
b C# b' 10 MLF.All l M.A.
11 l l M.A.
LCCATCN CK 8tLIA31 l
44 45 PEDSCNNEL EXPCSUAES -
80 Nuueen tvet OficalpTCN .
@ b in in I L:J 7 89 l 5 I
11 12 13 80 PERSCNNEL INJUAIES wuveta ciscaricN h l 9lA }n l l 7 89
'J _ S l
11 12
/ 60 CFFSITE CCNSECUENCES 4
/
g 11" !M. A. M d' * "
7 89
'g r
v w- ,
y -- l gg LOSS CA CAMAGE TO FAC:LITY =
y, A 8/M
@ 00 10l 'E~"'
7 89 l W O 60 PUBUCITY g
@l 7 89
'I . a . 2 I
BC ACCITICNAL FACTCAS
@l 7 83
- f. -
1 ;
s0 1l3 l M. A.
7 8a f. ien. nef l C.K. a0 NAME. Ric ha r t* S C n NCNE: b # ~' " " b "". ?b7 po esi. .r.
_,, , , , _ _ , , . . _ . _ - - - - - . . - - - - - - - - - . . - + -~ ~ -- " - - - -
,.._ -. ,-- - , ,,-_ .. ,,.,, ,,,v-,,. .m .ym,-m-., ,,---m.-. ,-,,y.---e - , . . . , ..m.-.
. Laucription OL Lvent (Lon t ' d)
I <
automatic control functions associated with the instrumentation.
S' The dummy signal for pressuri:cr level, innta11cd at 1034 hours,
[ simulated a lovbl of 241 above the actual level at that time of i 22t. This caused the charging flow to back down, and the pressurizer
! level began to decreasc.
Soon afterwards, the unit operator noticed a reactor coolant pump labyrinth seal 4P alarm, caused by the decrease in changing -
i flow. He attempted to restore the proper 4P by adjusting the charging flow to seal injection ficw ratio. At 1055 two additional i reactor operators assigned to the logic test joined the unit operator
- to offer their assistance. At 1106 the unit operator requested that I
the dummy loads be removed from the steam generator level and pressurizer pressure instruments. All remaining dummy loads were
, removed at 1113-1114.
!< With the restoration of the actual indication, the pressurizer
, level showed zero. This signal immediately isolated letdown and .
; tripped the pressurizer heaters. An additional charcing pump was started, and the level becan to rise. At 1121 the level rese i above the =ero point on the control board instrumentation and t.he
, pressure returned to its pretransient value of 2250 psig. At i 1143 the pressuri:cr level returned to normal.
l Based on recorder charts, comouter outouts, and observations i"
by the operators, it was concluded that steam was never admitted to the reactor ecolant loops or the reactor vessel head. This j conclusion is substantiated by the following facts:
1 1. Pressuricer pressure indication was restored while level
; was still decreasing. At the low level point, pressurizer 0
pressure was approximately 2235 psig. At no time was there i a pressure drop indicative of steam being admitted to the I loops. (Saturation pressure at lo.op temperatures is 900 psig).
L
- 2. There was no evidence of reactor coclant pump cavitation.
, pump flows, seal leak-off flows, bearing temperatures, and motor currents remained constant throughout the event.
1
! This conclusion was subsequently confirmed by calculatic . The f inventory of water left in the pressuri:er at the icw lovel point was .
1 calculated by two dif f erent methods. In the first methed, a net ,, ,p h letdown rate was calculated frem the recorded increase in volume r j *i control tank level. This was then used to determine the net loss of water over the period of the level decrease. In the second method, o
the period after the restoration of the proper level signal was examined. A mass flow rate into the system was calculated from the recorded rate of pressuri:er level increase. By calculating the :
!, amount of water added to bring. 'the level back up to a known value, l I
the low level point was determined. The first method , with un- l
! certainties included, indicated that there were at least 17 ft. of water '
left in the pressuri:er. This was in addition to the 47 ft. cf water I left in the pressuri:er surge line. The second method indicatec J
that there were at least 40 ft, of water lef t in the pressurize:
surge line.
1 1
u 3
......c..... .. . . . . . - . . . ~
4
; . To evaluate any possible damage to the pressuriner heaters, the heating elements were mcggered and the currents measured. All i , indications were normal. Observatiens of other equipment during f the subsequent unit start-up revealed no abnormalities.
t
! During the event the reacter was suberitical and did not d
require the reactor prctection lecic sienals. However, the cniv .
., safety injection signals remaining were'these associated with a' steam line breaP. and the high centainment pressure signal. Two q indications that were valid, VCT level and RCP labyrinth 4P, did
( point to a prcblem with pressurizer level. However, no autematic i
I actions were available to =aintain the water inventory of the t reactor ccora'nt svstem. -
t.
f Cause Descri=tien (Cent'd) of du==y signals were misinterpreted. The dummy signals were to .
have been installed cnly as needed to simulate plan conditions q at hot shutdevn. Instead, all dummy signals were installed, when 4
in fact none were needed.
i The precedure has been changed te eliminate the need fer 8 **-
; d "_. ..v. .e .i:.
- . a .' s .4 .
. ..k. e .S. a. .=. . . -. P .- . . .a. - . 4 . . _ % .i . . a. s . .
C . .' . e .- e - - . . . . .ic.
g and safeguards periedic tests are being reviewed in crder te minimi:e g and further centrcl the use of de- y signals.
u 1
3 i
r.
)h
)4 g .
Q
%9 i F
.i i
I
.s o
e a
1 I
b
1 UCENSEE EV! NI El'Ulli f*'
COuTnot otOCr.:l l l l l l l vanac aniNr au ncouincO iuramariON) i u (CtNSE fvENT tctNttC LC[tJCC NUM0(n tys f TvPC
('
N A *.t g l 0 l 0 l -l 0} nl0 !O lo l-j n lo l (2U'i l 1 ll l1 ll] l0l1l32 lR lT l!! l P ! 1 l 2$ .;U 31 ju 1a 1y l
rtpont caf f occutt Nuunto EvtNT CAft 17p sE2$
cattC nv l1 l (d l0l5l0l-l0lt!4l>l l0 h 12 lI l7 !714l l75t'! 9 ! 1 l0l7l700l 1
1[CO rT57l P l bd 0l b9 60 61 La 09 u
EVENT DESCAIPTION l
g l10 77-D: A CTRC11IT Fall.l'IU. CAUSED A 1.085 0F Rnh CO::TROI. b'lllCli AFFECTED 11AIJ80OF Til 09 CONTROL 1;A::^ _
U.w PJ L U9 NA g h( u t, 235 uu 1
.. . . , . g,g.,g,7, ( ,0 T ) v r, 1711 U.T.., ... .
, l'ACC TWO
/
- 8. Analysis o f (k.t.ur cence :
' This event hail no effect. on cIther plant nr public safety.
Alternate c.ethodn of reacttvity control were available if required. In addition, this f ailure did not affect the ability to inscrc all control rods with a reactor trip. (
- 9. Corrective Action:
The def ce tive circuit card was repaired, i
I l
. \
1 1
e i
e 4
a
LEI'ORTA". F. OCCI!!MmMCp.
4
- 1. Report Number: 77-35. f O 2. a. Report Date: September 19, 1977.
- b. Occurrence Pate: Au,y,u s t 21, 1977.
j 3. Facility: Trojaa Nuclear plant , p. O. P.ox 439, Rainier, Oregon 97048.
- 4. Identification of Occurrence:
A circuit failure caused a loss of rod control which affected half of the control i ods in control banks 15 and D and shutdown bank C.
This failure prevented movement in 13 of the plants 53 control rods.
- 5. Conditions prior to Occurrence:
1 The plant was operating in Mode 1 at 100% of rated power.
- 6. Description of occurrence:
While attemptine, to chany,e the position of control red group D l using manual rod control, the group failed to respend properly to an inward motboi si r,na l . The croup incerted three steps and then stopped although t.he insertion sinnal was still present . A rod control urgent f ailure alarm was received at t h is t i:ne . An
] investip,ation f.iund that the alarm wan caused by a phase C regu- l
' lation f ailure in power cabinet 2BD. Th i:. po .er c ah i r.ct converts gN f rom three phaa.' AC to DC power and suppl ies it to the control' rod j mechanism coils for half of the control rods in control rod banks
) B and D and shutdovn bank C. Upon attenptinn to reset the power
, cabinet the alarm shifted from cabinet 200 to cabinet 2AC. Attempts i vare made to locate the cauce of the failue.: however, shortly after l the power cabinet was opened the f ailure disappeared and sub- l l
I sequent actions could not reproduce it. Personnel concluded that the f ailure wan cauced by high temperat urns in the c.losed cabinet j
which decreased when the cabinet was opened. On this basis, the
~
Rod Control Syntem was declared operational and was returned to j service.
1 Approximately two hours later another rod control urgent failure l alarm was received while attcmpting to move group D control rods.
' Troubleshooting of the system was recommenced to isolate the source I of the problem. The failure was eventually traced to supervisory I huf f er memory circuit card which transmits a control signal f rom the i
logic caninet to the power cabinct. As a resul t of the failure, the power cabincts were receiving unanswerable instructions.
j 7. Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:
This event was canned by the failure of a eireuit card in the rod control logic circuitty.
1
. (
i l
ill?? '
. --- 4 4
TROJAN BUGS THAT BUG ME MfEE 3!
- g goy 131B7gy -
- c, RCS OVERPRESSURIZTION. During the testing phase of plan construction 'oefore operations began, the Reactor Coolant
@e.Th-M ' g System (RCS) was overpressurised by as much as six times g e-the enount of pressure it was being tested at. The pressure y !
l was supposed to have been about 500 pounds per square inch (psi) but for about 16 minutes, the pressure increased to as l high as 3301 psi er 3326 psi, going cut of range on the i ecmputer calibration. The apparent cause of this occurance was the unauthorised closing of valve MO-8701 of the Residual Heat Removal System (RER) by an unidentified person from )
the local control panel. An engineer named Fluegge quit. the '
NRC last year and disclosed that 16 of the operating pressur-ised water reactors (PWRs) in America have experienced 29 incidents of overpressurisation since 1969. Troj an's high pressure-low temperature ~ (100 decrees F) incident was not a good start for the system that cools the reactor. :
ECCS. Five known Emergency Core Cooling System accuations nave occured to date.
#1 J anuary 8, 1976
#2 April 17, 1976
#3 O ctober 28, 1976.. 2 valves failed to operate properly
#4 & March 2,1977. . 4 components failed to operate
#5 properly NRC RI?0RTABLE CCCURANCES. 91 Reportable Occurances have been reported to Ine JRC from July*** 1975 to the end of June 1977.
C Ap ACITY FACTOR. The intial criticality of the Troj an plant took place on December 15, 1975. The testing period continued up to May 22, 1976 with power operations beginning September 1, 1976. The 1976 capacity factor for Trojan was 21%. For the power operations period of September 1, 1976 through June 30, 1977, the design electrical capacity (DEC) factor was 50.14%.
Of plant shutdowns from December 1975 through June 1977, 40 i were unplanned forced shutdowns while 22 were scheduled shutdowns.
EEEDWATER SYSTEM. The feedwater system consists of two main pumps oro anc two auxiliary pumps, all four having failed to operate ;
the history of the plant.
{ 1/perly throughout4) of the NRC reportable OccurancesAbout one havefourthdealt with this !
system, 25 out of 91. On February 29, 1976, 30TH auxiliary l
feedwater pumps failed to operate when called into service !
*** l i
RADICACTI7E WASTES. There are many ways in which Troj an wastes 1 us w1:n :ne racloactive waste that it generates. The three !
R's of nuclear power. . .the routine release of radiation into j our air and our water. . .
*** l
t 4
,i 1,
..* 3 !
have been
, FISH. Measurable amounts of StrontiumThis 90 (Sr90)cannot be i detected in the bones of fish analyzed. l compared with pre-operations data as these specific anaylses Were not made at that time. ***
LOW-LEVEL radioactive waste in the form of contaminated protective - >
clotning, tools and lab. equipment are compacted and stored in .
/ 55 gallon drums. Last The year PGE sent 120 55 gallon drums main component was Cozg.
from The Enviernmental Troj an to Hanford.
Impact Statement said that 200It55isgallon expected drumsthat would if be generated the plant and shipped off-site a year.
continues to operate, the number of drums will increase to quite a bit higher. ***
In 1976, 1,092 workers were exposed to PERSONNEL EXPOSUR2.
radiation at the Trojan plant. ***
95 TONS of partially spent fuel sits in Trojan's core inside aAbout 25% of this 9 containment vessel 43' 10" long.Troj an has a very unique core design so far been irritated. This unproven ,
completly untested in commercial operations. fuel configuration con 264 fuel rods. ***
REFUELING. When and if Troj an is The refueled, first refueling about 1/3 has of been the core '
will be removed, about 32 tons.
scheduled by PGE for April 1978. ***
When PGE got Troj an in here, they said they SPENT FUEL STORAGE.
would store the 32 tons of spent fuel from each refueling in th' spent fuel pool (SEP) near the reactor for about four months t'Then the allow it to cool and decay. >
the 3100 miles to 3arnwell, South Carolina toReprocessing the Allied-Genera. one Nuclear Services ( AGNS) reprocessing plant.
year of Trojan's waste would cost about $6.4 million in 1977 dollars.
But, this waste may not be So, reprocessed and AGNS is not in operation pGE has applied to the NRC to change to recieve spent fuel.
the Trojan operating license in order to increase the storageTheir near-capacity of the SEP.
associated with the rear-end of the nuclear fuel cycle is to remove the preuent storage racks from the SI? and rep 1~ ace them with new racks that could hold up to 31/3 core.. 317 tons.
In an ammendment to their application, PGE discusses '
(SFAs) or more.. 5 1/3 ccre..++* 507 tons...or more. How .
Who will pay? How much will it cost? '
DE At the end of the nlant life. . . hopefully soon. . .
willCOMMISSIONING.ceit cone?
the Troj an plant itslef will be a~piecerof ' radioactive waste.
No nuke plant the sise of Troj an has ever been decommissioned.the 3asically three plans exist, This the facility and burying the waste somewhere like Ranfo tinct- from curies must be dealt with, page 3 c.i
h4
~
+* Wpe LIQUID releases of radioactivity are made into the Columbia Elver. The *rojan Semi-Annual Effluent and Waste Disposal
- Og g,> g -
Report to the NRC for January 1,1976 through June 30, 1976 shows at least seven (7) types of radionuclides, plus @yo V ,,
unidentified, that were actual releases from the plant but c were not listed in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) as estimated annual releases in liquid effluents. One of those seven radionuclices was Sodium 24 (Nag ), the highest quantity of all liquid releases. The second mcEt common released y
radiois6to On May 19,pe was Cobalt 1976, the plant 58 (CoS8) .
liquid radioactive discharges exceeded limits by about 13% for five hours. The main cornponent was Iodine.
In the NRC reporting period of July 1,1976 through December 31, 1976, Trojan was releasing liquid rMioactivity 42% of ;,
the time. 253 " batches" were released into the Colnmbia L7.. .
River. ..this from a plant that operated some 59 days in the six. month reporting period, sometimes for only one hour a day! I
[ ' F. x GASEOUS releases are made into our air shed. The Trojan Semi- 9l f pd.q
- 6 Annual Effluent and Waste Report to the NRC for January 1,1976 ..
through June 30, 1976 shows that one radioactive gas, Krypton 83m (Kr plus dnidentified were actual releases but were not %~NJNi
~ "
lis$)in the FSAR as part of the estimated annual gaseous m releases under nonnal operations. , -1 For the NRC reporting period of July 1,1976 through December : M 31, 1976, Trojan was releasing radioactive gases into our air ,
10% of the time. 41 gaseous releases making up 107 curies. -
Not all releases are planned releases. Somewhere between 6 January 30, 1977 and February 8, 1977, a liquid waste tank partially collapsed and 62.5 curies of undecayed radioactive ~ x.:, .,_. .
gases fresh from the reactor were released into our environment.
Ucually gases are stored at the plant and allowed to decay down -.4 into other gases before they are released into our air. The ..
principal component of this release was Xenon 133 (Xe353). #r' Again on May 1,1977, the day of the last Troj an >
demonstration, undecayed gases fresh from the reactor were ;
accidentally released into our environment. The leak was three x >,
(3) times the amount first calculated and reported, mostly Xenon 133 and Xenon 135. PGE originally reported. 23.5 curies.
Later that week it was reported that actually 69 curies had been 7'
0%M_ ;
released.
r w -l 7 . . ::t \
COBALT 58 has a 72 day half-life. It is made in the reactor anc is actually CRUD or corrosion of the reactor internals i 9l '
I sluffing off into the cooling water. For the second year after 7 Trojan maintainance and discharging of cooling water into the ",
Columbia River, the State of Oregon Health Department, Radiological Monitoring eff.2,p; Cobalt 38 (Division Co z instrumentation concentrating in thehas detected moss downstream the radioisotope of the Troj an plan t.'g)he T amount contained in the June 1977 samples showed about 15 times higher than the AuEust 1976 samples. This amount I was 81.1 picoeuries per gram of Co almost 500 times higher I than " normal". . .or what the regulabr,y agencies would like te see. ' ;l i l page 2 . 'i
.:n
l mm Entombment, or removing the reactor internals and filling the plant up with concrete, would create a great number of sites with significant volumes and curies of radioactive waste throughout our land. This system would require a security force to guard the facility.
Mothballing, the least expensive method, is the one the Public Utility Commission for Oregon has identified as PGE's plan of action for Trojen. Security would be required...for a few centuries. PGB calculates the cost of decommissioning to be approximately 5% of their capital costs for the plant, $470 million. That would be about $23 million, much less than the about $60 million used to decommission the small experimental Elk River reactor in 1976. m WATER. Trojan's consumptive water use as evaporation out of
- ne cooling tower is listed in the EIS as a maximum of 14,600 gallons per minute (gpm), or 21,024,000 gallons per day (gpd) .
This amount is aboct one-fifth (1/5) of the consumptive water use for 30 water districts servicing more than a half million people in most of Multnomah and East Washington counties, which have an annual average consumption of 105,000,000 gallons per day.
A LOT of hot steam is being wasted into our atmosphere. Water should be uced for people and food production, not for cooling nuclear reactors nor the radioactive waste they produce. ,
_TRCJ AN is the biggest machine in America. It is only 20 megawatts smaller than the largest reactor on the planet located in Germany.
It is the first commercial nuclear plant in the Pacific Nor.thwest.
At $470 million, Trojan is one of the lowest cost nuke plants ?
of its size. . .and the fastest built. Another low bid construction job??? .
This information has been compiled for the Trojan Decommissioning Alliance occupation of the Trojan plant on August 6,1977 by S.S. McKee1. Data has been obtained from the Oregon Department of Energy, the Department of Environmental Quality, the Department of Health, the Public Utility Commission, the Nuclear Regulatory -
Commission and Allied General Nuclear Services. But then we must all realize that a11'information concerning the events at the Trojan plant originate with PGE, a private utility owned only about :
16.9% by Gregonians. '
e o
page 4
.O .'.. e a **f .T.T ., 7 0, T r.*,
. ,7 ,v se e
.=.: - - - . .. \ \$&
. , . . 2.-. . . . ..s. q e.*
. r. , .. ,. .. .. 2. g w..,.. .
;. e,m. una L
n n a. .n .s(, 3 .M p L w~ * .w ,2 U gqqgg p
emi W p NOV O N 1 -
ese,m tog es W s sn.** Y 5.f o. .w.
., b a .na,. O .4' ...b.a
(
A >. C =,=. . . 4m., s a.2a. b,,e, . ,1.,.J.
.. . , T .J ,e, g. ,.. . .u.e. 4 **C ,..w A in .aae: sion 2.
- c --A M. [ @. g r,s.+ . . . ,,a,
. . c..- e. ;-s n
.T.4 .n .e ,e
.'.3
. , . 4 -
,m .J e s . 7 .' ..9 4 ' k<g
.".3 e ss ,.n. 4. .. 3 < -
.. .. . us... 4 ,, e. e s. e 2 , ,.J .. J y. . . . . . e. . . . < ..o w .g.m. . . , ' . 1.a.i,, 2 g
. . e. n .J. .s } , =* "",#**" * * ***
,, 4. J.' -
, ~. '.'b.a e,' ,4.5. .a.
a, a a. -='*.
. *.'a
. . ****.*2.. . ,
_.4..,.,a.3 .
4
. - ..' .4 4., .
t,.
8'
., . 4. '., J. .' . 4 6,4, e,.". ....
1
. . . . ..4..,..... A.
w.
.,a... '. J. ..
J
-'.,.5a w
. ,. ,. . . 4 . .s s . e . e .4,. . , ... ., ,. . s a.
e 1. , ..% J ... .,....,. 4., ....m
.w .. . . ..
,,9 *
. . ,,. C aA.. .
. . Q ...... 4
.. .,. r ,:....,, . 3.,.,. . 1 ,,. e,. + 4 &, 4.,. . 44, .. , .. , , . . .. .. -
2.j . -
; .3. 4 . . .. .. *.. *,,.. ,,- 4 .
,.r.
,, g ,3 .. ;... .,4
.3 .. g
. w
. f .. ..
3,,
a e .p.,.=e.. .
g .
, . 4. e.., ...
.g
,o
.'..s , . g. '-.e- .* 4. ..2. . 2 .
1 2
- 1. , ,. , 2.t 4.
..s %. 2. 4,
.. .O, . . . ... . Lw o. . .o . . s. a-
,4. .e- i . ,4 - . . .2
*. 5 . . ' , ,. 4 ..,..;>. .
.,.. , 3 32 .,.: .. 2. 4 s..,...
. 2;.. a.. . s %. . a.. . . . . ..s . a .i . .. . .. . ..
4 . .s* ... . . . ..
2 , _a * . ..,.;..,v , , . . . . . . . . -
+ -
4 aa .. 4 . , ,..,. -
.....s
. . . . ... .. .t. . , .. .. . . . . ...
)
.~4.,
.c,.a. t. , - . ,< ...
., . mm ,-. . . 4. . u. .z. ,.... . . .. = . - . . ..e . ....s .. . . s. ,
.- :..a u. a. * :. u, J- ., -.. .,
b, . y . .&.. ..,. . 2 3,,..J...,
4 , 2, 4. . . k....,
. . , .,.3 .. . .. =,4 3 . .
. .g. 6.....
-=, .4
. -= . . . . ' .
. .~
. ... .r ... 0".*.%.'"..'..* #
d.;.'.'"*.'..*
. . ' ' " '.* ~.,#.'.'.., ' ' . ' ' ' . ~ ~ ~ .'
- a. ' #...,',.*' .'"
- , - :. . +- - .
4
. . .. . . v. .. ,C..,,., . ,
- 2 ..e . . . .A.. , . . . . . . .. . .. : . . .r.. . . 3.. . . . .,
6 a. wm.e..,,..*
..a
%..p ,.
a.
+ .
... . . . e. .a q . a . .. ..,
n 4 s. .*.;. - e.
. . n =. "a. a. ' 2.*. .u..-
.A..~.,.
..* '. *. J. .* .!. ., .7 e
. , . .3,....J..,. . . .o .. . . . . , . .
~
.T .3 ..,.s..-
.. .3
\
4&*..Q C L d'., .
~ ,
.2 .
- 3.* , Je . 't ".O .
- + - y w-y. y g- v -.w,, -
g- eye ,-- .mw.i.e, wg'ev g. w-*-y- w , - w w - - - - , - - . - ,
..._ .. . _ . . _- . _ _ m_. _ _ ~ . . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ -
s a
..2 * .
.3., . . .n
. . . . .. ~3 4. m, . . . .a f,....e. . .
. . . . , , 3.
,, .. 1 .. 3 . .
.g.., 3. ., . e. .3, . . ,. . ,
.,., s. . m., 7,.
J. ...' g. g .
. . . 3. ... N.. 3 . .J .w.,
- a. .... .. ' . .
.".'.'t.. . . C,.,J .. . 7....,.......? .. ...,,..J..J.,.. . . . . _ . . . . ., ..
* , , J .,.
- a 4
- 4. +. . ,, .. .. . . . ... ..4, .. . . , %.3 . . .
3.... , .s.,*3 . ,..2 4. ..
, 4
, . ...,,v.-
.. . .. s.
. . a. e. . , . , . , . . , ...
,n 3. .,. 3. . 4.
. ,. . 1.r e. .s , .. . u .s. . 4. . 4. 4.
. .,4. 4..~, ...
.a ..,A.
. . . . . .,i-,,.4...,
. .. . 3 ., ...g.. .c
...,...4...
. .. .. .g
- 3. .. _...,
%. , .,o. . , ._..
s... .. ,. , . , ,...
. , . . -. ...~.
...,,, m...,,m.., ,.. .,_,c_..,,,,...._.:_,
. 3 .. . W . . O *.*d..' d.0 .".3 #
""'/*.'.',**'.",'i.*.*'^.".,^~..".**.*..r'.'.4.r'.,.?.'..#*
..#^".
".-*. . " . ' '~ . " . . . .
* ..~' .. ... ', ..- _.". .,. ,... ... ... .
.."".1.,....,..
m.. ., . ~ . , . .. . _, ,, . . . , .,_4.
. . . . . . . . , n... ~..g . . . . . . , , , , . .. . . , .
. .* .._.. .. .4. .; 4 ,. n.. ., . , ,,.
. .. 3 . .
. . . . 4. .cJ. e.,.._. .! .. %. ,_ ,..,,3,...,.,4..,..3~
4
.....2......c
.. . . .N oa ...
. . . '. . .s . &. -..r...
. . . . s. ., . ..;.a....
. . . . . . . .e .sa . , .. : .
. .. ..,.....J.
..e , . 2s.
..m.. , . , _
- 3. . . . . . . . . .
J.
-....d_.*..n .3. . .
..J
.. .....,.3.
. J.*..4. ,3
-, .... 3. .-..J.
. , .1 . . . .
. s.. 3 a. ...j.,..J_**.,*3
.. 2..*. . .. .
.! .J. . . .,J,
..3
.. ...3..4
. _ . Q. . . . . .
........J.*.. ,, *;*.,,,..
. .3, *,. ., . . . ..
. .. ,.2
.a.,- .. . . ... . , ..,.: t 4 '
- q. .
i g g(s R 5' // ' M rA ak.
ud) ( 1 m ' -
i n.=W j W*,R, -
\ b
$4O!? C5 Atc u h r'..i - -
~[ w-- (
- / G. . /e tcc7 M l N /atL&k!'% ~
- o u m ,r
/, .--
h ?f r d ~ < ? = > L GA Ry h"'E R R - -)
mr *h 7 . m* s m'* r u. -
4 -
.*R '/,73; g._
. . <[,z
' (') ) yy N 3 '*] '
w
r a.
*/ -
w .-V,Gs. &v i i*
;_ ./ .- 7 ;
& ,$.. g .,Yf . . , .,.. /..
t .7 s'.,
' .+
.J.
.n . . . .,
~.'
j8.y,m .. a
,y. a. . ~. m - -
w, p ..r -
s -
v.".,... .
.*S * * * * * * . ,
gs,, ' y.
je "<*'.3 '. s
, o.9 s 9 ^*T-* .,ar s,s 'w n
\./ e.f > /*, f.o *
- g 4 "'
eu ' / af f- '4 _ . , . .- ~ :n <-
- a .4
. p
/_;; D: < '.', ,., :.< , /. l.
- G . *.m 4 :q , %
l,,, , ,,94,,
't,*= __ - ? a .'. ', L
..----. - - . . . . ..-.....m....- . , . . . . . - _ _ . _ _ - - . . _ , , - - - _ . , . . _ . . . , . . _ . _ . - . _ _ , - - - - - . , , , , _ .-
, .cp? ,
^
/, ,
',h .
I We, the undersigned electric enerrt users and rateoavers of Oregon, observe with concern the idling of the PcE Trojan reactor and the ,
centinuing delay in its operation. We believe orolonged inactivity of such an available power generaticn affects the individual and collective ecenemy of our communtry and could be a vital factor in a newer shortage period. We also believe evidence shews provisions have been made for conservative, safe coeration of ,the niant.
'le
. therefore ask the Atomic Safety f. Licensins; Ecard and the U.S. !!uclear Regulator / Ccmmissica that evert censideration be riven to ecutinued operation of Troian and that safety facters be met with-l cut delaying the coeratien if pessible. This does not enderse nuclear pcwer generaticn withcut preper saferuards, but it preposes to utilize pcwer producticn where new available and certain1v needed.
Signed, by the fc11cwin6 Pespensible Energy Users & Ratepayers Dated - Octcher 24, 1978
!! ace Address
/ +14 L -t 4 0l .$
~
hk h0mij Gnw ,w nz3 Ed Lb d4 ac O
7 4w L nvw < s 1 u.a e- j '
an Ae/ - - .
/ v4 ~lh </ M,, nc25/3'b ~ % q/l asO hh) //
bf/9 // E. / Wen $
l I
,- ,,, , . . , . ,--n., - . . ,
S e
< . _ , <^*
b * #'
, y y' w *W' e , W -
%b 4
e . 4, ,a s.s e' o Wp =
* / .g, ,
^ x
,y* (~ h 's ' a f, f ; .
- v }f}cf u ,,s I .o. ?/ y 2
, , . - j~ }
i, - .w e, v v v<- -~.w _
--1
- % ,+ . i
_. 2,f dp/A' Sc.y O*:'(& % - E L F 7 w w
., ./ . . . . - , .
,Y l
= ,,,, , 0,-* L y Y f G 'o i 5 W/
- . . n ., , . . - -
$ s. %%%E ** *, %
~
^
} %*w
/ ,, (;;hn - 6 ~ k, _ wt E -
y* /r~ s , l i. : ' ~ '
/ ) e
' % T'Z w ,* G .. +
, %., C U, 2 ? '
7 "' -"i . " * " ' ~ ~ "
w , .
Cs h h7A,M I SB%W C-e O
~
- P 225
.l
." ,y
" =' - ~ ,
m ,
, , , % ~ .n T
- 1 s ., -' -- e .. - .e... ~ --' ~~
- ._. ji '
.,-a- .
n .
I i
We, the undersicned electric enerev users and rateravers of Oregen, observe with concern the idling cf the Pct Treian reactor and the centinuing de'lav in its operatien. We believe crolenized inactivity cf such an available pcwer generatica affects the individual and collective ecenemy of our ccmmunit" and cculd be a vital facter in a ocwer shertace period. He also believe evidence shews revisiens have been made fer censervative, safe eneration of the 91 ant.
'la therefere ask the Atomic Safety & Licen=!ne Scard and the U.S. ::uclear Perulatcrv Ccenissien that ovary censideration be riven to centinued eneratien of Trc 4n and that safety facters be : ret with-cut dela' ring the ccaratten if nes;fble. This dees nct endersa nuclear pcwer generaticn withcut reper safecusrds, but it crepcses to utilize ccuer prcductica where new available and certainiv needed.
Sirned, by the fc110 wing Pespcnsible Enerry Users & Patepavers Dated - Octcher 24, 1978
- Tame ,. Addpgg3
, s' n ,
,J' J, y'
\
l{ $ ) a'}J ) t,)/' ,Y :? A l l .?0D ~ _
/
l A ,
$') $5 *
$ d E,, a.- t-i.s w A . a). L , w .
/
[s ,
W 4l, Lad 7rfu J&v~dqam
, c -
lba/u %to ?h u Wn2 F _wb
, . - 1
. , . , , _ _ _ .u J 1
_ . . . _ , - , _ _ _ , , . . _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ , , , _ , _ . . _ _ _ _ _ , _ - . _ _ , . _ _ , _ . ,,i
1 PETITION TO THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATCRY COSISSICN We agree witn the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmissien staff tha: the Trojan Nuclear Pcwer Plant should be allcwed to ccerate wnile cdifications to the plant centrol building take place.
We recceend that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission grant an interim operating license to the Trojan Nuclear Power Plant providec any necessary cperating restrictions are placed en tne Plant wnile modifications to the centrol building are in progress.
NAME . ADDRESS PROFESSION
$ / sf ?!41NINir.5S. ,G fu gr .i,,. % C.w $n . s - a r"
-~~ /s . -
-/' -
< ;L i. / w
. // :
h : .y ix . . e. .
/A~ c ,f . _ _ _
; e:
,; x . ., . n , .C f f PAe 3
/
/Q t t~' r A. // T t 90) Cij c e m m .. U. Fi. ' -. , t ' ;
'__.s l 2.,, / s ? ': '3 ,
(' % $3 \ .,!
~
<1 _
S.E $~ AL E 10 4 < w w 1 y s' ,$
, i'. n i ./ ' '
fb3b}icA)
"*'-):c. .
.. ~ .% t.1 f ', '... . x
. -l. - -
/ i . . y,
/ - -
I M -
bb c[A /0 & L/s 7 d I4 4 .3 M<5/c,b Md%m WDW- /&xbm3 (1-i/%at
/
eso dL D aA
.am
/7 s ~
Tw mb fl0' /s , ._ r .
Y N 4.Y
,/
YY \
wo y l 1
l
Q M g Nov13ggygja 1j PETITION TO THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION % ~~2w$ '"** (
(\. .
~
e We agree with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Coninission staff that tne Trojan Nuclear Power Plant should be allowed to operate while modifications to the plant control building take place.
We recomend that the U.,S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission grant an interim operating license to the Trojan Nuclear Power Plant provided any necessary operating restrictions are placed on the Plant while modifications to the control building are in progress.
NAME ADDRESS PROFESSION
' . . ' . e , , )? - : 2.p. f ) / ? *) yQ '/) J :/' Y f,,4. n.r .J
~- N-: . , . ... . i '-
4 .< , ir - ; . _., ./ .: A.
(-
b da . t , i).~ sr , /
' ~~ m ! <s L. , , :,,s././ './. m:? , ,
ft?A!d$~1 h<, * .B'i 3 C s' f )0 4017'?h4N'1 /~.! /Ll' fl.-)C J , [Cf?A!.LI& .3n'2% w 2
./
, f' . , . .
',k c r 7 h~/, / M ': r " % LV (~u,x (Y - t;". 9??32 5NJ k /$ua$-
i /I 1er ARO /7N CVku 972 2 n f i
~
!:t fy. $$
,'/f h . ,s.a, m, ~ 4de,ab
- t. sr I Lese. a a lll1 x ao>? m sh d'.w4-- -
a P f A A id k _t r a b el 4
- LAC e a t JALL t e Af 4 M 1 ,o 1 lu. Yet-M -,unboem, $0 fahAfHhPath, h , (.4 hew 6 d d, */'? ",,I3 L 3N hlW g
m mran uodt,,r e, n . s o y \ s es e tns i.itt s t* s n in i, L~. cI'L.2 m L .a i=L c hn . ~ awe =
# e L T A. , A
/:-
= m a % % m
@C < lCY,
( 9. - n. C ~ ; ;'
%Ae.p ,
~~"'O'J :- ?W X STT D .*2 @ & 'l t , <T .
O. ' . .~.'~ u Y' c' .-- p ., .--
.% v e P /k, ln,nks.r,e 1111 A/. td .tl,. rs f en a , ,*~ _ - >.va 11. r T4-valoa4" -
/Wo I.re &hr 0. ddk a } ff Wi SelfH Yu. fW W A L ). h wn- t7*Ak)10.CmdL %.nno
$h$duwbbe- //s.56WL<wtithns,.(t &:e w 5 d.
. i l[ ~ $v. i. 41
- c- ,! ' ' i' i
i.. ya i.,.
p' . 'L , ; /*<*/
WwllY ISST W L M /h- [$~ ]
Adld ' Ma hW &/n A n d '/ k
&dd s
/. . .
4~ .-g,
~. . - ..
, 7- ~
cLs C'. . i'[/ i C 3'i Lw 5 Y (VLC v e sM -
": d u: - IkcucL 0 Z
/4GC<I ,' 'M 6.
NOV l"i p.a. .s y N ei no 3.een,y 8=emhv a s w PETITION TO THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION amas , L ,
f f}
N, m We agree with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission staff that u,,
1 Trojan Nuclear Power Plant should be allowed to operate while modifications to the plant control building take place.
We recomend that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission grant an interim operating license to the Trojan Nuclear Rower Plant provided any necessary operating restrictions are placed on the Plant while modifications to t.he control building are in progress.
I NAME ADDRESS PROFESSION
' *^
'I ll '.-: ~. , ,
/ '
lu .r ,
. msw .. deums.-
~
-4
k ~s - 17." < ~*~ , < , c 6,i ! 4.%2' ,ro , ,, Oe "f "' f 5 .5 X s'_'
- .:n o .:~( >A M e c .r. _..s ns:p z' r 4 : n. , ._ /.. ? C r .: % , ,. no;,- i
,n .. i aji
<%a'U 1 bt/ J .
~
f 3 0 ' $ hN l% h .-, C x m !!'.~, c R Qus.%.><
b!IbY- ~
///2 I 52 s~2 "#M ku O2 & A~k LJit&W e m nisn wa - n -ir w u, xlA \
b u,A al D _Y $Y lf% / r ' ,. f l. *L L,, 104, . #aP
, I
. h AO l D$ _
WY_ Ak* 1A.54A*. f ,9 JM@cday su tx ;% %ss et ,\, u .
eg. b>
A . ..-
h I b.
de e, % c_ i., . I"I25 SE t.' nk O.d. b < . .D \. b D lC.
J y . ..J '
. w; u ' / / -
G ,
_ y. .
( .1 {,* _ , .
JNh2JQNe<~- " c. : 'i 1 . , S !; (; i : - u ni - ,<. , a e
~
<f'f,. N bl ? -S M / ./Y,x,4. j:', .
-- - - - - =
m f ,, -
;~
-l m%-:..'~. .-/ 7' m y x, ,. ,
, . r .: .. + -- n ....s ,, 1 !. -
.. .- a j
" ~
"l ..<-2 ,, if..,, , 7 '..A ., , .
"- . ,' g' _.._ .,
w%.p.
'LPsLive Rdl8 % M Cemil.t oR ' ..
%\ew %c - ,
(,i,: le . , /,e :..M' ?:t 2 csk. L n (/.:~,'C
/ j' ^
%i: U /L es G .: - - - 12, k. c cw 4
^ '
w--l.n?S-n. L .*. 1 .
s .: C =. e .] t.
l p
O , , ,
yL.f l 'e[ ; n lLj m,....
;.=1
_ & M* L-
.u- _
j I
l nu v i s m op -
% E T'"**j 9 Q+ f PETITION TO THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y J We agree with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission staff that the Trojan Nuclear Power Plant should be allowed to operate while modifications to the plant control building take place.
We recomend that the U S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission grant an interim operating license to the Trojan Nuclear Power Plant provided any necessary operating restrictions are placed on the Plant while modifications to the control building are in progress.
NAME ADDRESS PROFESSION hk -m 1740}fD $ w f Grv & J., W 2/~4 n & -v'--
, , i ). .
..,? .. . .
.r.
am k? f b'I'9'O Sidt h %/ $ /
CR. Ah Y D.
./
e
*'[.._.Y,/'
. l-~-L :. -.
, .m
'~
, , i.
/ . .. / (' ,,,,_
",~# .I *
,e ,
a a , ,
t s.__f$ ,i ,3 \ k' L !" 3 M :-i-C..e 'M ' A !, t.' '
'C .
*- -' 7 E -
m '
l,' , . I .>
,.,C .1,,. l -: 1. v. .i-,
?" - '
'~
.,t&. '~ !, G '/. T I'
. > , / (~lE N/ h Li n '
l '. 1 .c f "
j ,)
~
^ # ~j
- s. - b f0 b "S~ 2I :-;:4 .i'l (e < v ll. , c'~ *: ~? 7 ' : . 5 mic ..i G -
'I % _r.t a b. 1N ^
N'C 1 su n Am 6".t,. u'l CR 't7D ,n YAW % -. -> '
Q
=
3930 tW. bilMM el4L Dr* N/3i-o
. . //_ C 0ec/A L u e na 9*7330 hekoovim $$dd 1 do a. /> 't 9 3 to $A4s M L %U l an a, w%Mr,W'- -
a~m, &
hw . /. d.: .w~ s . 4; st" &: t-.r : s.., d,..,i4 ,.._ -
1 v
O J1,o $ h. Y. f* b j'lh h k'W 20$6 $4 OfECLA, C6All;l/uS .
f2fc T/MCS CA,Al &- - @ c. -
h,A (cQ M 7 3 2 8v acd L., c -a AL . i S LL./
'A L.! #6J nn and 6.g MT nif ,
c.L. 3. T J ewan c,-A a 9CmM h ey ,4,(4 'p g p ar- nw . c-.n
% d MA4 SY a sore p,tvgil.6 a ss du/
pg 9, i
54odent
nv<2, ~, --
O $
*****s w)WG PETITION TO THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y ,
We agree with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff that the ,
Trojan Nuclear Power Plant should be allowed to operate while modifications
+w the plant control building take place.
We recomend that the U,S. Nuclear Regulatory Connission grant an interim operating license to the Trojan Nuclear Power Plant provided any necessary operating restrictions are placed on the Plant while modifications to the control building are in progress.
NAME ADDRESS PROFESSION 174f.S~ WW/?tYS$t husk hs bYAY 6GaACd% r ,cro a n u w d w M /RAh 9 ) G~% '
%5 vu % c it v .us ca wet %.e .
4( L /AL me.stn/ $Auc a .
bn d Q L,
~ ., ..
f . bCdv 3 f ,&__ Cj- J ulm C :- ; ~ ,, ,/ o ', J '.,.,
x L'J, II ll. ELI t,
/ / m L -5 F li,s. . -
.s M,w aiv. I'.; ?,-s C; ,
-r. WD/. _
L . .- a
+ . . < . . , . > < .:.
. .. . - - ~ i . ~ ,.
. .:,- .c< - .; . '
N YU. W Mb M M, ,
U_ .- :
O f" ,
+d' a
lY /4 !' ^ W _ $ / $ $
D a &L1 0 $ fl5 % ss n S6 M h _, C a 9 wei fLA+*
&&b & s &< sen & 6% &, no s< &$ l Y.AY~ nro0 S/- hk M.-4:,Jr Prin W2 W8 4 58 2. 4m Er. S$ S 9 7W -
6*ainri m
gn M O(O 3 - m , ih4D MO W M m D OnA( J L OR 4736B '
Cu>. --A. !
Q /? e41-.
- i f/l!/ -r2to AnueJ st- 6mEl C/eaon a7no %"22J M 5 9 3'D S W M - dd D 7 701 bid W/ Wh] /ff3MWMA4L$Reas '
M 97 sos' un WC l' W ) .Y h,, 3730NUE) $k Nl}lD C=, A . c it
- 9. n V iO ^ ,
}\ LWi a.,Jl 2 G>2 m 9.lk iT, , .J , f i uw L.,. t ..
j$ t 9E-9 U!n.)$>he- 116 bI- t N- ~l d'Yhw%fchade, s6 MsUssella huhw ;
% % >Dnk isi;t,x e 6,.o, a '2.,~ n
< r /
/ g k D N Si ts:u e g
' N h NOV131978):3
., - .~.
f UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
.WQ8=== \' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION N O BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )
) Docket 50-344 PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY )
et a1 ) (Control Building Proceeding)
)
(Trojan Nuclear Plant) )
TESTIMONY OF JAY C. YOUNG My name is Jay C. Young. I reside at 1401 S. W. Midvale Road, Portland, Oregon. I am a scientist, having been schooled and trained in physics and nuc' ear engineering.
I appreciate this hearing process that permits airing such issues before those members of the public who may be impacted by the outcome.
I am pronuclear, as long as the plants are demonstrated to be beneficial,
~
cost effective, and present no undue risk to the health and safety of the public. Iherefore, while I desire to se2 the Trojan Nuclear Plant back on I line and generating the electricity for. which it was built, I also desire that its operation not be hazardous to the public.
At the time Trojan was approved for operation, it was concluded by the appropriate Federal and State regulatory agencies that the benefit to. be derived from its operation far outweighed any potential hazard to the public.
I hope that the only purpose of these hearings is to determine whether or not that risk has significantly increased as a result of the PGE-identified non-conformance of the Trojan Control Building shear walls with their overall design criteria as specified in the Safety Analysis Report. I would also hope that this determination be made solely on the technical aspects of the issue rather than emotional ones. If this determination shows that the risk to the public has not significantly increased, interim operation of the Plant should be permitted while the Control Building is modified to correct this none';. form-ance.
~ ),
TESTIMONY OF JAY C. YOUNG Page 2 Having studied the testimonies presented by persons skilled in structural engineering end seismic loading evaluations--namely, Professor Harold I. Laursen of Oregon State University; the Bechtel team of Anderson, Katonics, Johnson, and White; and Kenneth S. F.orring of the NRC--it is my conclusion, as it is the unanimous conclusion of these experts, that the Trojan Control Building can withstand the effects of an SSE, including the less severe OBE, in its present condition. Therefore, the risk to the public during the proposed interim operation of the Plant, while the Control Building is being modified, has not significantly changed from that upon which approval for initial operation was granted. ,
On this basis, I urge this Board to rule in favor of interim operation.
.,.f'* / }'
~
Y*
CTUtTIt'IID P.AII. 4 34% Y)Tt - 4 1 M %
Return Pcceir.t Recuestad
.gn
'l O ,*
.,\ -
O B99 Q4 $
. os* g i 5335 s .
N #
- March 16,1971 Nr. Prod flillcr, DL: actor '
. Orogen Copnrt=ont of Enorgy ~
528 cottava street N2 '
'.. , Salam, Creson 97310
- Rcs UQ - FC # Ire.ica .
Coluzbie County ,
, Doar l'.r. !*.illers
- I trent to then!c you for th: c;pe=t:. city te :asot cnd 4.ic:urs .
with yes our resp etivo conm:nz regt,rdir.g " Pro'jcn Finelce Pht cporations 6:d Fort 0. nd Camral 1:13: tris'c rc: ant rcsunet of the Nucicar negulatory C=nianion (ITQ to exp..r.d the opent fusi sto:; =
age pool (lJP) .
In folic.r-up to your requent thet cu: C ee.rt mt cen:id.Or tho coveral c: pact a ralsted to the G?P va ucuJd Lf.ho to cc::nnst ca *M fo11cAtin<; crssna
- 1. Ctruct nni int yrity of cic::csta 1svolved
- 2. Areo:1sted inczenso in tho=t.1 it;cet .
' 3. Glection of de facto pam:nont sterage -
IncleW. with ecch will bo ites: tehleb zer.m to-un to be uncles.r or which require recolution.
tre ree:vini:n thnt Depart .cnt review cf parts of this preble= is not directly t.andated by C: c., gen statuteer hzever, es tre diccusceA it is neither po::cible nor prudent to consider cas acrect of such m inductry es who13y diverced free another.
Incluhd in thu :-nc notification of thic p: pored c%ngo *reru tJin ner.co of the centractusi torn involved. At this ti o ve hr.vn no firet-h nd Infledpu of any of there ft cr heeaver, es datt.iled la the Decorbr:r 12, 1975 issuo of t 111.,.- s tre l'.v t 1, Nic.; u=h fo:-
hancho reco hc2 been undarte. hon by 100:1 C:oq:n firc:. [In tht.t e.ue it vca dorm /.ined that a substa.nt.iul nu::Lcr of structursi velds in
. l 1
y.(.,;
'7*- -
g,..t .
l j
Hr. Fred Itillar . 1 Pavo 2 '
Harch 16, 1977 I Cho CP wara of ctbstandard cua.lity and vers alleged to have ban '
co:metically applied to givo the copoart.nca of en intrmity not sctually p ccent. t.~ailo the nu.botandard perfc=mca of cretroc- , , - - !
tuel cbligations la not uniano to the cucica.r. power indust:7, we ' Q- '
. are anxietzt to knc>r ubet procedurno e.ro now in effect to acsura n 1 higbor degrao o ' ep.tality centzul for the fusi rccks at Troj?s. In l
the a.bovo ine a .near thern c;pesrs to bs cece cridanen that tputlity .-
, assurcaco checka varo olthe.: overicoked cr i wrly opr. roved. l 0;cn that bacim vill centrenes ha nrS that specified w22 for Trojen has bac.n carried cut? .
Throu;'hotit tho ope: r.tien ct Troj n, t'i ro hs.n bec t n' lingerino pecblen of cer==aic.n. ' c= present vwieremwling cf the n-i:!wtics ef _
l of corrosic::s of niciol-n11cy stecla ca?ce irradiatnd cenditions ic i t!w.t tho fli is c. riven off c: ce . W ie ic the c:=o radionuel.142 that has M00 found in CM3pS".- Edisco cercrci niles (. '.footre. cts frem Trojen. 1.".tiin tra recogni:;c t*.o practieni impot.cibility cf lu-tarpointing correcica re.te: e.ad nonrees f:e : ce.ch .1Jr.ited emirier.1 data, tra vauld like to knen if cref such c rc Lon studics haare boca crAartchen.
firecifloally, have fr31 c.-nai.511c.s b=n crr=ir.:S to
. . dstomino any pascibio c.:socint:d corre:ics probice.=?
In the opring of 1973, imestigatica ef cir.iler techtel fani71-tico et Tedmy Point 63 cnd f 4 t.aresled that cperr. tie .21 Cd1== cf' the fuel rcch cricr.!c restrainto ht 1 cccu. red. Ocno 25 of 70 (T7 03) and co_: 13 of 11G (U N) rectralur. ec-in7a fciled in a ct:c3s c?r- l region risIE. 'Iho W.rkey Point c=psnonto t oro c@rm'.ptir deter-
)
r.ined to have been installed ca dcaigand a.td cpecified".
l Are any testa condected er enderwer to eco if ths c :por-lance at Trojen in or will be similar? l that in ths i=plic.atien of long-ters irrndiation cf sini- I lar fusi assaably %,ets in the CP?
tosat porciblo less of cprir.g confficient ic jndged co-ceptchio in Tor.: cncipia of thecs cr=psr. ento dring a "desicJn basi.a cirthrp2axo* cr "cafo chutd:nrn carthqen?.e"? l C:n. tid cubetentici leen ef cai.-a.ie rest : int reenit in i any fool ascenblios falling into a criticci array?
l l
_ . . - . - ,, - ., - , _ . , - . , - _ . . _ , - , . . _ , - . ~ , . . . . - . - . . - _ - . , . . . - . . - - l
1
,s,1,, . . ., .
,. ! j l
.. ; * '- 1 Mr. Pred Itlller Page 3 '
March 16, 1077 e
It in ocr understanding that, prior to Projen's going criti-cal, the reactor veasel vae subjected to a 600t. overrroscurisation as a result of opera tor error and ec.uipront enifunction. Cam:nto tr. ado by Carl Z. Morgan $ stmact that this ecchination of icy toop-oratero/high preanuro conditions may bo the voret r.ot:31urgical case to which a reactor reecel cAn be cubje::tP. Purther st:te-7 -
ments by P.r.nsid M. riuc7efa , whild calling fer cbitt-dc*rn of eirillar .
FtW e until tendificatione ca.n bn F.edo, fail to clarify whether cay of the cicssical nee-dectructive otructural tests vare perferrnod es the recctor, or thnir ruults (if any). L'ithout purettiny thrgen's staten?ntoE ,
that " cay failure ce serious should not be hendled try adelnintretivo precedures" and that "rancter docf en chould be cuf- -
)
ficient to prevent cuch events", we voeld lihn to resolro why cMnt .
fust vecid be. ctered in ettch clece pro::inity to a veccol whoce UP72.r li:Ait integrity (fc.111ng' tests to the contrary) r.my have been con-promised.
1 Eu2: ten and Holcon in SN.") 7f-50C00 ctate that razoarch bein7 dern reintivo to the pcesibility of n eteen c=Plocica taking 12h00 a
in execc's of contrein . nt cc.pthilitics csy be precent17 conducted cn
- a Res10 too c??ll to test the dyna:2ic coif-c.ixing hypothocis cet forth by ColgatoIO. .
r.ignificantly, if tho l
Co.'.qt.to hypothtain is cevoet, than thet .
rancmututen predictica l that only 10 of cera r.elt ec:idents 'till be of a certows nctwo is not w. lid. Is enry cf.ac, then, thero trill exict the rotontini for a 1.ute scala stent e q1ccion, the ma7nituda of which say bo likoly to breach the containment.
What further resoarch has been donc regt.rding thic pcosi-bility? ,
Is thera any indicst on that a huilding cited next to on es:plocion of this hind te.nd loaded with radioactive fuel would be able to withstand auch a trcrace?
- To the ceco end, t a wuld 11ho to kne r uhat docign t':cdifiertions (other then fuel rack reconfiguretion) have been mado to doci trith the attendant incrosen in criticality, Kgg. -
IMrs domi7 n chcages bocn nodo that veuld prcrent the re-occurrenco of a fuel trcnsfer car je::in7 in the trassfer tubo? Or jt:71n7 off the convoyor trachY12 6
i ,..
l d ..
Mr. Prod Hillar
,' reva 4 '
, March 16, 1977 Have Pochtal designors incorporated the ree=cmondations .
neds by Yankco Down thrt *conercte l>2 hind liners bo groe' red auch that all the opcco bot::cs line.r e.sd ca-vity [bs] interconnected csd f
-1'ad to dzsin"? s.
'! hic w. tid make let$. Catecticn encier cnd my prevent t.ho re- '
occurrenco of the CD- gklien/nour 10.nh of radice.:tivo vasto crpez-
- ioncad at 1*,t;&ed. .
!!avo d sign criteric, codes cnd ste.ndards been :cdified
- sinco the four-ycer poried durin? trhich T;.rhrrf t'eint 03 1cehe pool waterl4 cyc:Wately 1500 calicas per d:7 of rMice=tive
, 7 '
At thnt tir., coincident lenb:go threr,h tM. etainicss stcol
~
liner r.sd f.ho reinfere:d cencrnta pcel et:teture " stas not ent!ci-patod":
h: sever, 'revic i of design criteric, codon and ntandards revealed that lecX tight css tica not a critcrics for the centrats atructuro" U.
thro c0ndit! cts ly2cs.ts cufficicntly undczotora and cSstveS cuch th:.t rJ.cro-cr7t.nium ren't c =o corra:f on pit: in '
- e etcinic a n'cci ucter ctorncts tanks chin to thoso at Prairio Icicnd 1 cnd 2107 .'
i P.ava eterogo ter.h icycl control's been prepar.iy codeciccM er,d reenlikrated to prevent the lo:=c of cs :onizately
- G000 gallena of red'icactiw teater from the refuelling vator stercge tank ca es:perienced at reint Eccch 02 Ut
.. With renpcet to the trasts*hent dit! charged f ~.4 this operation, vn havo nevercl quectionc. tic are uneblo to find in the Final r.n=
viron= ental Icpr.et senecent (8/73) eny rontf.on of thetual c:cd.ic .t caused by the nient fuel roolt hcvever, in the Finr.1 Safety J.nalysis R port (Ctt.n) (r.p 'A.1-G) it id ctate'd that the 'hcat loca en ths cooling cyct:m (reculting feca rem:1 oR 1/3 of the feel cic=te.ta frem the coro) will not encocd 13.0 :: 10" DW/heur. " Submitxmtly, herrrever, in PGZ 1013 it in etstod that gent lord undar the:e c==;s circu=stancea vill not e,:c ad 10.9 x 10 BTU / hour.
As you may hnev, tho PC". staff circ tf feel.s hin(sred tr/ ew "strai tn s 1: poned en vostn heat dicchcreed. ':t.cre dr.cirm critcris "
I (and pubneymantly tho ':'echnj. cal crecifice. tic-s) ucro, hcwcror, cz-actly the data r:rpplied to this Departunt by t h3 PC staff.
6
. - , . -..y pr- .---_--w.-. .,.-m.,e,e. _ , - , - , . . . , _ . ~ . , , - . . - - - - _ - . ,
'd .q . . '
ttr. F' red Miller -
,. Page 5
Harch 16, 1977
, - . +. l May was thors no previairm made for the heat es ociated with this fuel storage in the original design application?
Why the dicere.pancy hetveen tho abcyn fic..rcs? What level of confidenco can be pirecrsd in thno latest figures?
a Han the Cncon Stato Dopartment of Pich and Hildlifo . .
".' been ecntacted regarding poosibio additional thorr.a1 impact on biotn?
Thero are a few other arean of confusion in the FrAR that '
have not been cicarod up in the PCE 1013 reports ,
hhy 10 the statcment nr.de en pp. 9.1-2 that "thic [C'P]
pool ic. not requirnd for any plant cafety reinted fune-tion" followed on pp. 9.2-1 57: "rmorgency water cupplies for the follor
- cafety-related ryste a cnd equip = cats...e) spen t fual pec ' '
~
Again, in so tion 9 1.2.2 the ntntnment in cedo that " borated
;ter ic tried to fill the crent fuol storace pool ct a horic ceid concentration of tspyroximately 12,000 pps boron." Cut in eccti:n 9.1.3.2.2 t.ho TsAn continues: "E:ric neid conecatratien in this op:nt fuci rec 1 water is maintnined at approximately 2000 res iv.::een.' -
Although PGI 1013 repinces ec=o parts of this co': tion of the PEAR, it leaves this unclete by ropaating the uso of. 2000 pp:s bcron on '
pp. 3-15.
Could you please clarify thin?
Althot..7h this proposed nxpension vould not violato Oregon irw .
as it preneatly ex. fats, it stands in conflict with testi=c::7 re-P._3BteMy_,g,[feref,,by 2Cg_belqgo])its"Sonato Cemittooithat ftu:1 stort.go would be confinnd to the chortert tien nocc:aar/_to,preparo Ec f,uci~EcKijileI f6Csh,.ipE::'atToff-sith. And, 'doepito tbs Att:orney Conoral' c fir. ling that, icgally, *his prepossi does not constitato radioactivo vasto dioposal,'pra: tics 11y it pincou Crogen in a reci-
- t. ion of boing a c'n fach p:reannat wcato depot for nucioer estorials.
At no point in the propo:a1 c'o tra cao arty centMoney_p_1cnni.ne rois-tivo to tha likelihood that :lipr. '.gec in any federal ti etrJale for vaste dispenal e.e.: 7.tch tho "of f-load" dato beyond 1908.
idr do va eso a realistic appreciatien of the fact that thars are nos:o 70 other resctors e.round the country in cuch the onr.s eg
-,ag, w. ,,, ,--.,---,.,,-,n ..<,,.e--- e-a,, n . - , -+e,w r,- .- g r,-- , awr- ,,,--w..,r-,- --.v., , .-,.m
.e. . .k
}tr. Fred Miller
- Page G March 16,1977 .
ciretw.stancos that no matter how nuch it von't vsnt to, Trojan is gc.ing to havo to stand in lino with the othnrs. "his fset alcre may mean ve.stes generating rnv vould be on-site fer yee.rs af ter a theoretical " solution" to the pecbinra In closing, wo fool that these neveral are.is need to bo cleri- .
flod proposal.
or resolved hofore this Department can give canctico to this kapactf tilly ,
~
WILLIF.M H. Yoln:0 Director claf/mkw cc Energy Facilitica Siting Council .
Attention s l'.arien Franh
' l',nvironr.cntal cuality cc . .insion
, 1.ttention : Jec 3. T'ichards .
Meclear P.cquintery CT.:ttenion Attentiens Albert Schvonccor, Chief ~
Operating Roseter Uran:h 1 Divisien of operating Reactoro Charlos Tre: moll v.u~.m.: e m.; .~. s.v. us.v .
e
,.: w'.- '"c ' ~ m' ":V = "* ? * ' " *~~ i )i .
. -,.) *
' h A ;n . *o 2' 2 u
~l' '{ [ [vio '5t )
e es 0 j . g
*(: e
. -l i, h. . ,;.
C u
N ,, .. t. t. i .
d p.'. .,f'w, ppa I w'
- s u ;'u 3' 's ,h ; .
*5 f M, [ $ # $ (i# M U h
'6 TblbE *
~
C $ %,,,,,.*/, ) 1/ fk
* '" ' 3 .ad, t tr'. ; '.44
]
y g 7 ; i;g ,ds g%,f 9?
'd C n .
i,,,,y
' j 'i 3 3. j C ii 3.g "*gj $ 'S '41 j s. 8 'I e .* m2n ! U M a 's u C D US 5 -3 5 $ . .. N2h Ek ? . ) k O
- k. '
. =.,_c !: Eeu = e c..; !p ;ip i.ot '.aa * >. 7a >: a hg g 33 y 3*
E s s'.='.
3 g;.3 : yw c: O m .
O. ;;) ,;
!' - ] =o o Ve 3 ,, f3 0 *a A " , 01 .* g n
)
D = gC g .i sa O. tjt 4 ill e.:": N.! 3 e 53
)
N kb'*Yh58h IjI.g)JU'5 2 N O ? 5'b $
O 5
ih h.E 5: b g, *l ,
}
f* * '
t Yv - o f ta 3 v. m e 3 ;c t v. Soon r.' S C *E *U v t'$
.c v w* : c5 -
g J
r_ e, .. .
+ -
c c to - ;: - o ;J <' o S. .d
" ** 3
{x ]{ . 17 .'--. O
= $
- O' n'n" la *8 4 "t s:
s.,'
2 -
#y , ,,; #4 ::. =e vt V r , .$
A
. ........... . ,. . , -r e e n . isar ts asan r> w f ink Q MA;t .85 '
.y '
,,, ~ ~ ~. -
Mr. Fred Miller Pago 7 March 16, 1977 4 FOOTHOTES:
1 Willamette Week, 12/12/72; page 1.
1 Nuclear Pcwer Execrience, Vol. PWR-2; page 9.
3 Nucionr Power Experience, Vol. P57R-2; page 9.
- 4
, Nuclear News, 11/76; pages 29-30. .
5 Professor, Nuclear Engineering, Georgia Technical School of Nuclear Engineering; telephenc conversation; 3/10/77. '
6 Nuclear News, op. cit.; page 30 7
Reactor engineer, neactor Systems Branch, Division of Systems Safety, NRC; ibid , page 29 8
See footnote (5) above.
9' Corencnta / on "An Explosive Reactor Possibilit:y - Blewing the lid off the Teapot", SANDIA REPCRT #7(i-52GO, Lawrence
, Duxton, Llcyd S. Nelsen. -
10 Colgate, S. A. and Sigurgeirsson, "Dyncmic Mixing of 'Jater ~
and Lava", Nature, Vol. 244, B/31/73; pages 552-555.
11 U.S. Atemic Encrey Cc:-mission, " Reactor Safety Study, An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Cce:ncreial Pcwer Plants", Appendix VIII, Draft WASH-1400, 8/74.
11 Nuclear Power Exnorience, Vol. PWR-2, 4/73; page 4. .
13 Nucicar Power Exnerience, Vol. PWR-2, 3/73; page 3.
t 14
- Nuclear Power Cmorience, Vo'l. PWR-2,12/76; page 14. .
l i
15 Nucicar Power Execrience, Vol. PWR-2,12/76; page 14.
16 Nucicar Pceer ExPerlence, Vol. PWR-2, 1/74; page 2. '
17 N_uclear Pcwor Exco rience , Vol. FWR-2, 10/72; page 1.
y- -,-m, , .---,---e- ,= r * . , , - - ,--w m-,-- - , - , , - - --w, .,,.e.,..,- .. - . ._ _ , ,
.~ . _ __ _ _ - - _ - _
i
-s g FPI GN - ' k.'
. AFFIDAVU OF DR. JOHN W. GOFMAN
- ll- ./
w y / LW. .
STATE OF OREGON ) - '\J '
.h: ., !
-':.1 N g )f,' ,$
COLUMBIA COUNTY ) ***
Io f[/ 9m # 43..Ph, I
e l;%.
DR. JOHN W. G0FMAN, being dup sworn , deposes and says: k O Nll
)
I am professor emeritas of medical physics in the University of ,
l California, Berkeley. I became a full professor there in 1954, and retained' .
' ' , Q.' l that status until taking the emeritus status. I have served as Associate . t s i Director of the Lawrence Livermore (Radiation) Laborat.ory from 1963 through .l 1969. I organized the Biomedical Program and Department there, with the .'z mission of studying the effects on man and the remainder of the biosphere I
. i,,.
from all types of nuclear energy activities. I served as the Chairman of ;
that Department during its initial two years. .
o,e '. j I hold the Ph.D. degree in Nuclear Physical Che:mf ctry from the University of California at Serkeley, awarded for my dissertation on the discovery of U 232 ,U 233 , Pa 232 , and Pa 233 4 '*g '
, and for the discovery of the .#
fissionability of U 233 with slow and f ast neutrons. It is this last dis-covery that makes U 233 available for use in nuclear power plants and for 5 ,.
, use in nuclear weapons.
I also hold the M.D. degree from the University of California in '
San Francisco; California. I interned there in Internal Medicine. s I have taught in the field of biological effects of radiation and 3.
the application of artifical radioisotopes in medicine and biology, as .
well as having taught graduate courses in biological effects of radiation in cancer production as well as courses in the mechanism of cancer
;. , =
production. ,
~;
I served as physician to the Aerojet General Nucleonics Corporation, a company manufacturing nuclear reactors and fuel elements, a posit}}