ML20062E712
| ML20062E712 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/13/1978 |
| From: | Ostrander F, Sandvik R OREGON, STATE OF |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7812110321 | |
| Download: ML20062E712 (11) | |
Text
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g5 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 4
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2 iS NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION D"
3 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD Oh n
4 Docket No. 56 5 In the Matter of PORTLAND
)
(Proposed Amendment to Facility GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,
)
Operating License NPF-1 to Permit 6 et al (Trojan Nuclear Plant).
)
Storage Pool Modification 7
EXCEPTIONS OF INTERVENOR STATE OF OREGON 8
TO THE INITIAL DECISION (Amendment to Operating License) 9 10 EXCEPTION 1:
(Water Chemistry)
The ASLB was incorrect when it 11 found that there was no advantage in imposing technical 12 specifications on spent fuel pool water chemistry:
13 Exception las The ASLB erred when it found that Oregon implied 14 that water chemistry controls should be imposed as technical 15 specifications.
(Page 7, Finding 4).
16 Exceotion Ib:
The ASLB erred when it found that testimony
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17 arguing against water chemistry control technical 18 specifications was not controverted..
(Page 8, Finding 7).
19 Exceotion le:
The ASLB erred when it found that water l
l 20 chemistry could be adequately monitored through 10 CFR 50.59 21and state surveillance of records.
(Page 9, Finding 8).
22 Exceotion Id:
The ASLB erred when it found that components of 23 the SFP or fuel assemblies stored therein will not be subject 24 to adverse cotrosion.
(Page 14, Finding 16).
25Exceptien le:
In the absence of water chemistry control Page 1 - EXCEPTIONS OF INTERVENOR 781211032/
y
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I 1 technical specifications, the ASLB erred when it found that 2 stress corrosion cracking in weld heat affected zones would be 3 precluded by proper water chemistry control.
(Page 15, Fir. ding 4 17).
5 Exception If:
In the absence of water chemistry control t
6 technical specifications, the ASLB erred when it found that the 7 SFP liner would not leak due to corrosion.
(Page 20, Finding 8 31).
9 Exception 19:
In the absence of water chemistry control 10 technical specifications, the ASLB erred when it found that 11 corrosion would not result in significant off-site radiation 12 releases and occupational exposures due to the modifications.
13 (Page 45, Finding 73).
14 Exception lh:
The ASLB erred in its finding of similarity 15 between fuel stored for 18 years and 14 years and Trojan spent 16 fuel.
(Page 12, Finding 12).
17 EXCEPTION 2:
(Corrosion Coupons)
The ASLB was incorrect when 18 it found that a technical specification requiring a corrosion 19 coupon program was not necessary:
20 Exception 2a:
The ASLB erred by finding that the evidence does 21 not indicate the necessity for requiring a corrosion coupon i
n program.
(Page 9, Finding 9).
23 Exceotion 2b:
The ASLB erred in its interpretation of Oregon's 24 witness' position on use of coupons.
(Page 9, Finding 10).
3 Exceotion 2c:
In the absence of requiring a method to evaluate Page 2 - EXCEPTIONS OF INTERVENOR
4 i
1 abnormal water ch mistry ccnditions, the ASLB erred in finding 2
that. SFP components 'or fuel assemblies would not be subject to 3
adverse corrosion.
(Page 14, Finding 16).
4 EXCEPTION 3:
(Alternate Storage Cavaties)
The ASLB was 5
incorrect when it found that a technical specification was not 6
required to prohibit spacir.g of freshly discharged fuel no 7
closer than every other cell in the new racks:
8 Exception 3a:
The ASLB erred because it misinterpreted g
Oregon's witness as Mr. Godard in fact relied upon alternate 1
to storage cavaties in his analysis.
(Page 30, Finding 45).
11 Exception 36:
The ASLB erred in finding that requiring use of 12 alternate storage cavaties would be an unjustifiably rigid 13 requirement.
(Page 31, Finding 46, Footnote 8).
14 Exception 3c:
In the absence of impbsing a technical 15 specification requiring the use of alternative storage 16 cavaties, the ASLB erred when it found that the potential 17 consequences of projectile impacts are acceptable from the 18 standpoint of public health and safety.
(Page 31, Finding 47).
19 EXCEPTION 4:
(Water Temperature)
The ASLB was incorrect when 20 it found that a technical specification was not required to 21 ensure that the spent fuel pool water would not exceed a n temperature of 140 degrees F:
23 Exception 4&;
In the absence of imposing a technical 24 specification, the ASLB erred when it found that little s corrosion will cccur at the temperature of the SFP water page 3 - EXCEPTIONS OF INTERVINOR
r 1
because no enforce',ble temperature limit has been set.
(Page 2
12, Finding 13).
3 Exception 4b:
In the absence of imposing a technical 4
specification limiting water temperature, the ASLB erred in 5
finding that SFP components or fuel assemblies will not be 6
subject to adverse corrosion.
(Page 14, Finding 16).
7 Exception 4c:
In the absence of imposing a technical 8
specification limiting water temperature, the ASLB erred in' 9
finding that the weld heat affected zone would not be subject 10 to corrosion.
(Page 15, Finding 17).
11 Exception 4d:
In the absence of imposing a technical 12 specification limiting water temperature, the ASLB erred in 13 finding that no liner corrosion is to be expected.
(Page 20, 14 Finding 31).
15 Exce'ption 4e:
The ASLB erred when it found that no serious 16 consequences exist should water temperature exceed 140 degrees 17 F.
The ASLB erred in concluding that a 140 degree F limit 18 would be rigid.
Moreover, the ASLB erred by considering 19 " rigidity" as a test for imposition of a technical l
20 specification.
(Page 31, Finding 46, Footnote 8).
- 1 Exception 4f:
In the absence of imposing a technical u specification limiting increases in water temperature, the ASLB 23 erred in finding that a small increase in temperature is not 24 detrimental to SFP equipment.
(Page 37, Finding 61).
- S Exception 49:
In the absence of imposing a technical Page 4 - EXCEPTIONS OF INTERVENOR l
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1 specification limiting increases in water temperature, the ASLB 2 erred in finding that the SFP cooling equipment will not be 3 burdened.
(Page 31, Findi.ng 62).
4 Exception 4h:
In the absence of imposing a technical 5 specification limiting increases in water temperature, the ASLB 6 erred in finding that temperature would not affect off-site 7 releases of radioactivity and occupational exposures.
(Page 8 45, Finding 73).
9 EXCEPTION 5:
(2000 ppm Boron)
The ASLB was incorrect when it 10 found that a technical specification was not required to ensure 11 a continuous maintenance of 2,000 ppm of boron in the water in 12 the spent fuel pool:
13 Exception Sa:
The ASLB erred when it found that the likelihood 14 of a projectile causing criticality will not increase as a 15 result of the proposed modification.
Further, the ASLB erred is in relying on a " wedge mechanism" for causing criticality frem 17 projectile impacts.
The ASLB erred in finding that under 18 actual conditions, a substantial amount of refueling boron will 19 remain in the pool.
Moreover, the ASLB erred when it assumed 20 only spent fuel will be stored in the.SFP.
(Page 30, Finding 21 46).
22 Exception 5b:
The ASLB erred when it found that projectile IIimpacts on the spent fuel pool were acceptable from the 24 standpoint of public -health and safety.
(Page 31, Finding 47).
25 Exception Sc:
The ASLB erred when it failed to note that if Page 5 - EXCEPTIONS OF INTERVENOR l
l
1 2000 ppm boron was maintained in the SFP, criticality would be 2
precluded in all circumstances.
(Page 32, Finding 49).
3 Exception 5d:
In the absence of imposing a technical 4
specification requiring a 2000 ppm baron concentration, the 5
ASLB erred when it relied on a boron concentration in the pool 6
that may or may not actually exist. _(Page 33, Finding 50).
7 Exception Se:
The ASLB erred when it found the likelihood of a projectiles causing criticality was extremely improbable, 9 * (pace 33, Finding 51).
10 Exception Sf:
The ASLB erred in finding that a distinction 11 exists between the NRC staff proposal for 2000 ppm during 12 re-racking and Oregon's propocal for 2000 ppm at all times.
13 (Page 30, Finding 52).
14 Exception Sq:
The ASLB erred in finding that criticality will 15 not occur for credible but unlikely off-normal conditions.
16 (Page 35, Finding 55).
17 Exception Sh:
The ASLB erred in finding that the SFP will la remain subcritical in all likely circumstances.
(Page 35, 19 Finding 58).
20 Exception 51:
In the absence of a technical specification 21 precluding criticality by requiring 2000 ppm of baron, the ASLB tt erred when it found that releases of radioactivity and l
l 23 occupational exposures are insignificant.
(Page 45, Finding 24 73).
2 EXCEPTION 6:
(Full Core Reserve)
The ASLB was incorrect when Page 6 - EXCEPTIONS OF INTERVENOR
e 1 it found that a technical specification was not required to f
2 maintain a full core reserve:
3 Exception 6a:
The ASLB erred in finding that SFP liner leaks 4 can be repaired in the absence of a full core reserve.
(Page 5 15, Finding 18).
6 Exception 6b:
The ASLB erred when it found that the proposed 7 modification will facilitate potentially needed repairs in the 8 spent fuel pool or reactor.
(Page 23, Finding 34).
9 Exception 6c:
The ASLB erred when it did not find that 10 shipping cask availability is important in performing pool or 11 reactor repairs.
(Page 23, Finding 35).
12 Exception 6d:
The ASLB erred in finding that the conditions 13 before and af ter SFP modification are acceptable for performing 14 reactor and SFP repairs.
(Page 24, Finding 36).
15 Exception 6e:
The ASLB erred because it failed to find that a 16 50 percent chance exists that a full core reserve will be 17 needed during a three-year period.
(Page 23, Finding 34).
18 EXCEPTION 7:
(Utilization of SFP). The ASLB was incorrect when 19 it found that use of the spent fuel pool expanded capacity 20 beyond 1 and 1/3 cores was acceptable prior to completion of a 21 generic environmental impact statement on the subject of 22 handling of spent fuel:
II Exception 7a:
The ASLB ered when it found that Trojan may be 24 required to shut down in 1979 and that, therefore, substantial
=iharm to the public interest would result if restrictions were Page 7 - EXCEPTIONS OF INTERVENOR I
1 placed on the proposed modification.
(Page 56, Finding E6).
2 Exception 7b:
The ASLE erred when it found that the NRC staff 3 had adequately analyzed, weighed and balanced the five factors 4 in the NRC Policy Statement.
(Page 57, Finding 87).
5 Exception 7c:
The ASLB erred when it represented Oregon's 6 position.
Oregon does not object to rack installation of use 7 thereof up to 4/3 cores.
(Page 57, Finding 88).
8 Exception 7d:
The ASLB erred when it found that NRC staff had 9 successfully withstood cross-examination on cumulative 10 environmental impacts.
(Page 53, Finding 83).
11 Exception 7e:
The ASLB erred when it found that the NRC staff 12 did not necessarily testify that once racks are installed, 13 there will be a strong disincentive to do anything other than 14 use the racks until they are filled.
(Page 55, Finding 86).
15 Exception 7f:
The ASLB erred when it found that cumulative 16 environmental impacts had not been overlooked.
(Page 55, 17 Finding 86).
18 Exception 79:
The ASLB erred when it found that NEPA does not 19 require a GEIS.
(Page 58, Finding 90).
20 Exception 7h:
The ASLB erred when it found that a 21 consideration of need for the SFP modification, or alternatives 22 thereto, was not necessary.
(Page 65, Finding 98).
23 EXCEPTION H:
(Miscellaneous)
The ASLB erred when it found 24 that the test to be applied when adopting a technical 25 / / /
Page 8 - EXCEPTIONS OF INTERVENOR l
1 i
)
1 specification is whether it burdens the operator.
(Page 18, 2 Finding 25).
3 II.
4 EXCEPTIONS TO THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 5 EXCEPTION 1:
The ASLB's Conclusions of Law, pages 72 and 73, 6 Conclusions (1) through (4) are incorrect in that they are 7 based on the incorrect and invalid Finding of Fact excepted to 8 by Intervenor, State of Oregon, in Part I of these Exceptions
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g and that therefore there is no basis for the ASLB's Conclusions 10 of Law.
11 EXCEPTION 2:
The ASLB's Conclusions of Law relating to the 12 need for technical specifications violate NRC policies.
13 EXCEPTION 3:
In any event, the ASLB's Conclusions of Law (1),
14 (2), (3), and (4) are in*orrect.
15 Respectfully submitted, 16 17 Richard S. Sandvik f%c 18 Assistant Attorney General Of Attorneirs for Intervenor 19 State of Oregon 20
%~la. OAb 2
22 Frank W.~ Ostrander, Jd.
Assistant Attorney Gederal Z3 Of Attorneys for Intervenor State of Oregon 24 Department of Justice 3
500 Pacific Built 520 S.W.
Yamhill eet Page 9 - EXCEPTIONS OF INTERVENOR Portland, Oregon 204 l
November 13, 1978 l
1 1
1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 2
3 I hereby certify that on the 13th day of November, 1978, 4 copies of the foregoing Exceptions of Intervenor State of 5 Oregon to the Initial Decision were served upon the parties of 6 record listed below, by then depositing in the United States 7 Post Office at Salem, Oregon, full, true and correct copies a thereof, in sealed envelopes with postage prepaid, addressed to
(
9 the said parties of record listed below:
10 11 Sheldon J. Wolfe, Esq., Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 12 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 13 Dr. Frederick P. Ccwan, Member 14 Apt. B-125 6152 N. Verde Trail 15 Boca Raton, Florida 33433 16 Mr. Frederick J. Shon, Member Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 17 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 18 Joseph R. Gray, Esq.
19 Counsel for NRC Staff U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 20 Washington, D.C.
20555 21 Columbia County Courthouse Law Library, Circuit Courtroom 22 St. Helens, Oregon 97051 23 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 24 Washington, D.C.
20555 u///
Page 10 - EXCEPTIONS OF INTERVENOR
.o
- 1 Cocketing and Service Section Office of the Secretary 2
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 3
Susan M. Garrett 4
7325 S.E. Steele Street Portland, Oregon 97206 5
Mr. David B. McCoy 6
348 Hussey Lane Grants Pass, Oregon 97526 7
Sharon S. McKeel 8
P.O. Box 8786 Portland, Oregon 97208 9
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel 10 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 11 Mr. Warren Hastings 12 Attorney at Law Portland General Electric Company is 121 S.W. Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 97204 14 John J. Haugh 15 Attorney at Law 555 Benjamin Franklin Plaza 16 One S.W. Columbia Portland, Oregon 97258 17 Alan Rosenthal, Chairman 18 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeals Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 19 Washington, D.C.
20555 20 21 Richard S. Sandvik Fwo Assistant Attorney General 22 23
@ ba N
Frank'W. Ostrander\\ Jr.
24 Assistant Attorney General 3
Of Attorneys for Intervenor State of Oregon Pag,11 - EXCEPTIONS OF INTERVENOR