ML20057D993
| ML20057D993 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1993 |
| From: | Grimes B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20057D992 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9310070043 | |
| Download: ML20057D993 (7) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the matter of
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PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,
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(Trojan Nuclear Plant)
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EXEMPTION I.
The Portland General Electric Company (PGE or the licensee) is the holder of Possession Only License No. NPF-1, which authorizes possession and maintenance of the Trojan Nuclear Plant (TNP or the plant). The license provides, among other things, that the plant is subject to all rules, regulations, and Orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect.
The facility is a permanently shut down pressurized water reactor and is located at the licensee site in Columbia County, Oregon.
II.
On January 27, 1993, the licensee submitted a letter notifying the NRC that PGE decideti to permanently cease power operations at TNP. On February 2, 1993, the licensee also submitted a letter to the NRC informing the staff that as of January 27, 1993, all reactor fuel had been moved to the spent fuel pool.
In a letcer of February 17, 1993, the licensee committed to not move new or spent fuel into the reactor building without prior NRC approval. On March 24, 1993, the NRC issued an order confirming the licensee commitment not 9310070043 930930 PDR ADOCK 05000344 l
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' to move new or spent fuel into the reactor building without prior NRC approval. On May 5, 1993, the Commission issued Amendment No. 190 for Facility Operating License No. NPF-1, converting the license to a possession only status.
By letter dated March 9, 1993, PGE submitted a request for exemption from certain sections of 10 CFR 50.47, " Emergency Plans," and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV, " Content of Emergency Plans." The requested exemption addressed two areas:
(1) the discontinuance of the need for offsite planning, and (2) the reduced onsite planning needs of the Trojan Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan. On September 8, 1993, the staff and PGE held a telephone conversation to discuss this exemption request. As a result of this conversation the licensee, by letter dated September 14, 1993, modified the March 9, 1993 exemption request by returning certain requirements to Sections 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV, originally requested for exemption that were still considered applicable to TNP.
III.
The justification presented by the licensee for the exemption request is that the reactor has been defueled and the fuel removed from the containment building to the spent fuel pool and the reactor would not be rehrned to operation because of the February 17, 1993, letter from PGE certifying that fuel would not be moved back into the containment building withcut prior NRC approval. The licensee indicated that the potential risk to the public was significantly reduced and the range of credible accidents and accident consequences for TNP were limited for the currently configured shutdown and
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. 1 defueled condition. The licensee determined that the most limiting accident for this facility in its permanently shutdown defueled state is a fuel handling accident.
The NRC staff has independently calculated the offsite doses resulting from such a fuel handling accident. The staff analysis shows that the doses at the exclusion area boundary are a small fraction of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Protective Action Guides (PAGs). The doses calculated by the licensee at the exclusion area boundary for the whole body, the thyroid, and the skin were also a small fraction of the EPA PAGs. Under the general guidelines defining emergency classifications in NUREG-0654/
FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Procedures in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," dated November 1980, for an accident of this nature, the level of severity would not reach a point where offsite protective actions would be warranted.
The NRC staff has reviewed the planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b), the requirements of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, the guidance criteria of NUREG-0654, and NUMARC/NESP-007, " Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels," taking into consideration the current plant status and inherent low risk posed by the TNP. The staff also reviewed the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(d) for a license authorizing only fuel loading and low power testing; these requirements address the decreased risk associated with low power operation and are generally appropriate for reviewing the offsite needs for emergency plans at TNP in its current status.
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, The NRC staff, in a letter dated May 18, 1993, requested that the licensee examine a hypothetical accident sequence involving the complete or partial loss of water from the TNP spent fuel pool as a result of a major seismic event near the plant.
This beyond design basis postulated accident sequence, described in NUREG-1353, could result in a zirconium fuel cladding fire in some of the recently irradiated spent reactor fuel stored in the pool that could then propagate through the spent fuel pool and result in a significant radioactive release, with possibly significant offsite consequences. The licensee responded to the staff request for additional analysis by letter dated June 17, 1993.
The staff conducted a review of the licensee submittal and determined the TNP spent fuel pool will maintain, with an adequate margin, its structural integrity even for an earthquake with'a resulting ground acceleration value of 0.5g.
The 0.5g value was found to be appropriate for the geographic location of TNP and could be used to evaluate plant vulnerabilities significantly beyond the design basis. Therefore, the staff concluded that there is an extremely low likelihood of a complete or partial loss of water from the TNP spent fuel pool.
Furthermore, the staff has also determined that in view of the low likelihood of the event and the time elapsed since shut down of the facilty, and the configuration of the fuel in the spent fuel pool, there would be. sufficient time after a postulated loss of water and before the initiation of a cladding fire for the licensee to implement actions to preclude the gradual heating up of the spent fuel.
The licensee has implemented procedures that provide this additional level of protection using a variety of cooling water sources. The length of time
available also provides confidence that additional offsite measures could be r
taken without pre-planning, if required.
Thus, the staff concludes that offsite emergency planning is not now warranted at the Trojan plant.
The licensee has also requested a revision to their physical security plan for the plant. The staff has reviewed the proposed changes to the physical security plan and has determined that the revised plan provides an acceptable level of security to protect the spent fuel pool against a design basis sabotage threat.
Considering the permanently shutdown and defueled status of the facility, the configuration of the stored fuel and the length of time since power operation, the staff concludes that the TNP can discontinue offsite emergency planning. Therefore, an exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(q), which incorporates by reference the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, which pertains to operating plants, would allow TNP to discontinue offsite planning activities and reduce the scope of its onsite response by eliminating those onsite activities previously needed to support offsite planning activities. The licensee will identify the actions that they will take to implement the still applicable portions of the planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and requirements of Appendix E in their Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan (PDEP).
The Commission will not consider granting an exemption unless special I
circumstances are present.
In the PGE letter of March 9,1993, these special circumstances were addressed as follows:
l 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) states, " Application of the regulation in the i
particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule;..."
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4 i I The degree of emergency planning and preparedness necessary to provide adequate protection of the public health and safety in a permanently shutdown and defueled condition is significantly less than provided for in the existing Radiological Emergency Response Plan that was prepared to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47.
PGE has conducted a hazards analysis in support of the Trojan Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan and has concluded that there are no design basis or other credible events that would result in doses beyond the exclusion area boundary that would exceed the Environmental Protection Agency Protective Action Guides.
Therefore, requiring PGE to comply with the full range of emergency preparedness requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. These regulations were established for power operation conditions, as such conditions could result in the potential for an accident with offsite ractiological dose consequences.
The permanently shutdown and defueled condition of the Trojan facility renders the possibility of such accidents no longer credible.
Therefore, the elimination of offsite emergency response capabilities, planning activities, and a reduction in the scope of onsite responses is warranted.
In view of the fact that power operations at Trojan have permanently ceased, and thus the potential risk associated with activities at Trojan has been significantly reduced, maintenance of offsite emergency response capabilities (e.g., facilities, public notification system), offsite planning activities and the current level of onsite responsa would represent a misallocation of human and monetary resources.
Such resources would be better allocated to maintaining the Trojan Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan and training the appropriate emergency response personnel on the defueled plan.
IV.
The staff, based on its independent evaluation, concludes that sufficient bases have been presented for approval of the exemption request. The staff finds that full application of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR 50.at TNP is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the regulations, that is, to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protection can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. Therefore, special
,r 4 circumstances are present that satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR l
50.12(a)(2)(ii) given that application of the fall regulation is not necessary I
to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule.
V.
Based on our Safety Evaluation, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a)(1), this exemption is authorized by law, will not r
present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common defense and security.
Accordingly, the Commission hereby grants an exemption to the portions of 10 CFR 50.54(q) that apply to operating plants and the sections of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E stated in the licensee exemption request as revised. The exemption will become effective when the TNP implements an NRC-approved PDEP.
" Implementation" is defined as completion of all needed procedures and training of personnel.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commistion has determined that the granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect on the quality of the j
human environment (58 FR 51117).
This exemption will become effect'ive when the Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan is implemented, as discussed above.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATO COMMISSION
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Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Dated at Rockville, Maryland i
this 30th day of September 1993 i