ML20141E314

Recommends Issuance of Low Power Ol.Ol Review Rept Encl

ML20141E314
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	04/11/1986
From:	Murley T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:	Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8604210295
Download: ML20141E314 (69)

Text

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t 1 11 APR 1986 f

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l l- Docket'No. 50-354 l

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l MEMORANDUM FOR: Harold R. Denton, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor '

l -Regulation  ;

i FROM: Thomas E. Murley, Regional Administrator

SUBJECT:

HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1 LOW POWER LICENSE RECOMMENDATION l

t l I and the Region I staff recommend the issuance of a low Power Operating Li--

l cense for Hope Creek Generating Station, Unit 1. This recommendation is based l upon the Region I evaluation documented in the attached Initial Operating ,

License Review Report', and especially upon the following- <

1. We have concluded that Public Service Electric and Gas Company is l essentially ready to load fuel at Hope Creek Unit 1 and is capable of l operating the plant safely at low power.  ;

i l 2. The construction and preoperational testing inspection programs have  !

l shown that the Hope Creek plant has been constructed substantially in l conformance to the construct. ion permit and the application, as amend-  !

l ed, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the  !

Commission, as required by 10 CFR 50.57(a)(1) and (2).

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3. Each Region I professional was requested by memoranda dated September >

23, 1985 and March 21, 1986 to identify any unaddressed safety con-cerns which he or she might l ave concerning Hope Creek. No concerns i were identified.

Other significant elements of this recommendation include:

The evaluation is based upon over 12,000 NRC field inspection hours As-built inspections have found good conformance between the facility, the Technical Specifications, the FSAR, and the SER.

Region I independent NDE examinations in 1982 and 1985 have demon-strated acceptable welding and welding control. ,

The appitcant's QA program for Hope Creek has assured a high quality l of construction.

l About 14 allegations have been received concerning Hope Creek. No i safety inadequacies have bacn identified.  !

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PDR ADOCK 05000354  !

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I Harold R. Denton 2 11 APR 1986 The following is planned to evaluate the licensce's performance during operations:

As part of routine inspection, conformance to Technical Specification requirements for operational staffing (including advisors) will be reviewed upon lictnse issuance and frequently thereafter.

The effectiveness of licensee conduct' of power operations will be evaluated during a special team inspection late in the power ascension program or early in the period of subsequent power operation.

In conclusion, I find that Hope Creek has been constructed substantially in ac-cordance with Construction Permit CPPR-120, the FSAR, and NRC requirements.

Original signed by ThemasI. E rley Thomas E. Murley Regional Administrator

Attachment:

Initial Operating License Review Report i

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O Harold R. Denton 3 cc (w/ attachment):

V. Stello, EDO J. Sniezek, DEDR0GR J. Taylor, IE J. Davis, NMSS R. Bernero, NRR E. Adensam, NRR D. Wagner, NRR R. Starostecki, RI S. Ebneter, RI T. Martin, RI H. Kister, RI J. Strosnider, RI W. Borchardt, RI ,

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d INITIAL OPERATING LICENSE REVIEW REPORT

O TABLE OF CONTENTS Page

1.0 INTRODUCTION

. ............ ..... ....... 1 2.0 FACILITY CONSTRUCTION 2.1 Overview and Construction Status .......... ... 2 2.2 Inspection Frogram History and Findings .......... 2 2.3 Third Party Audits and Evaluations ......... ... 9 2.4 Quality Assurance for Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.5 Facility Construction Summary and Conclusions . . . . . . 12 3.0 FACILITY PREOPERATIONAL TESTING 3.1 Overview and Testing Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3.2 Inspection Program History and Findings . . . . . . . . . 14 3.3 Third Party Audits and Evaluations. . . . . . . . .. . . 15 3.4 Quality Assurance for Testing . ... . . . . . . . . . 16 3.5 Facility Preoperational Testing Summary and Conclusions . . . 16 4.0 FACILITY PREPARATIONS FOR OPERATIONS 4.1 Overview and Progran Status . . ..... . ...... . 16 4.2 Inspection Program History and Findings . . . . . . . . . . 17 4.2.1 Facility Operations - Staffing and Programs. . 17 4.2.2 Quality Assurance for Operation- ...... 18 .

4.2.3 Emergency Preparedness Facilities and Programs 19 -

4.2.4 Radiological Controls Facilities and Programs 20 '

4.2.5 Security Facilities and Programs . . ... 20 -

4.2.6 Fire Protection Facilities and Prograns . . 21 4.2.7 Technical Specifications . . . . . . . . . . 21 4.3 Startup Test Program ............... . . . 21 4.4 Facility Preparations Summary and Conclusions . . . . . . . 22 5.0 ALLEGATIONS ..................,.... . . . 22 6.0 SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE .........23 7.0 REGION I FUTURE ACTIONS . ...................26 8.0

SUMMARY

AND CONCLUSION . ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

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List of Enclosures

1. Special Assessment of the Quality of Construction at the Hope Creek Generating Station - Unit 1

2. SALP Evaluation Summary l 3. Inspection Program Annual Breakdown i

4. Inspection Report Characterization l

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1.0 Introduction Hope Creek Generating Station is the third nuclear plant to be built by Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G) on the 740-acre Artificial Island site on the Delaware River in New Jersey. The plant is jointly owned by PSE&G (95%) ar.d Atlantic City Electric Company (5%).

The Constrection Permit for the Hope Creek Generating Station was issued on November 4, 1974. Bechtel Power Corporation is the architect / engineer and constructor. PSE&G currently operates the Salem Generating Station, consisting of two Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactors, adjacent to the Hope Creek site.

Hope Creek is similar to the Peach Bottom and Brown's Ferry units in that it is a Coiling Water Reactor (BWR)-4 using a Mark I containment. Except for the containment, it is also similar to the Limerick and Susquehanna units, BWR's also constructed by Bechtel. Many of the lessons learned during the constructicn of the Limerick and Susquehanna units and other projects have been applied to Hope Creek. Examples include-design modifications to the Condensate Demineralizer System, Redundcr.t Reactivity Control System and the Recirculation System discharge valves. : ope Creek has also reviewed the startup operating experiences of recently licensed plants in an effort to make a smooth transition from construction to operations. These reviews have enabled Hope Creek to preset many equipment controllers and to perform operator / technician training to minimize personnel errors.

Public Service Electric and Gas Company corporate management, engineering, QA, and licensing personnel are knowledgeable of the requirements as<cci-ated with the design, construction and operation of a nuclear f:sility.

This knowledge coupled with the applicant's nuclear experice,ce has con-tributed positively to a high quality construction effort at Iope Creek.

NRC Region I began performing inspections at Hope Creek in 1973 and has completed about 200 inspections totalling c<er 12,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> since that time. These inspections involved observation of work in progress, exami-nation of completed work, examination of work control documents, indepen-dent measurements and calculations, and the examination of quality records.

This report presents the basis for NRC Region I determination that the Hope Creek Generating Station has been constructed substantially in accord with Construction Permit CPPR-120, with the FSAR, and with NRC regulations, and that Public Service Electric and Gas Company is ready to assume safe operation of the facility.

This report describes the process used by the applicant to monitor and control quality of construction and preoperational testing, discusses the results of independent evaluations of the applicant's performance, and addresses both the inspection program and the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) program conducted by NRC Region I. The report also discusses facility preparations for operation. Regional staf f has gained suf ficient information to assess the performance of i

2 PSE&G and its major contractors and subcontractors at Hope Creek. The staff conclusion is that overall, licensee performance and compliance with NRC requirements and safety objectives have been acceptable.

This report was prepared by the Regica I staff. Those statistics supplied by the utility are so noted in the text.

2.0 Facility Construction 2.1 Overview and Construction Status Construction of the Hope Creek Generating Station (HCGS) is essen-tially complete. Systems not totally completed and for which deferral requests have been submitted include the area radiation monitori,1g, solid radioactive waste, process radiation monitoring, traversing in-core probe, and gaseous radioactive waste. NRR has reviewed and ao-proved these deferral requests, and acceptable schedules for comple-tion of these systems have been established. These systems are not needed during fuel load and their completion should not interfere with fuel load.

Senior PSE&G management has been involved at Hope Creek since its inception. This has led to PSE&G managers maintair.ing close contact with the conditions at the site and closely maritoring the contrac6o s and subcontractors working at the site. PSC&G management has not

, hesitated to take corrective action w h en problems have been identified.

This action has included dismissing one subcontractor for poor performance.

2.2 Inspection Program History and Findi33s 2.2.1 Region I Inspection Progran and History Region I inspections of construction activities at Hope Creek have been conducted in accordance with the program established by the Office ot~ Inspection and Enforcement. The objective of these ".afety inspections is to obtain sufficient information through direct obser-vation in the field, personnel interviews, and review of procedures and records to determine whether construction and installation of safety-related components, structures, and* systems meet applicable requirements. A significant portion of the inspection effort is directed toward inspection of the applicant's Quality Assuranco Program and its implementation in both the Preliminary and Final Safety Analysis Reports. This program has been reviewed by the NRC and accepted as documented in the appropriate Safety Evaluation Reports.

3 The NRC inspection program is currently performed by both resident and region-based inspectors. This program has been developed over a period of years to place emphasis on potentially generic deficiencies and on areas experience ha shown to have problems.

From February 1980 to September 1985, a Senior Construction Resident Inspector was assigned to Hope Creek. In early November 1984, a Senior Operations Resident Inspector with prior resident inspector experience at an operating BWR facility was assigned to the site to specifically follow the preoperational testing program and monitor L plant readiness for operations. There are currently 2 operations resident inspectors and an entry level engineer assigned to Hope Creek. The direct observation, independent verification, and daily

[ presence of resident inspectors at the facility provide a measure of f assurance that the quality of construction and testing is maintained.

l Initial inspection of the applicant's QA program, performed by

Region I in 1973 when the facility was originally planned for Newbold I Island, identified numerous deficiencies. Followup inspections were then performed to verify implementation of the necessary changes, resulting in an acceptable QA program. NRC inspections were conducted at a frequency consistent with the pace of construction activities as work at the Hope Creek site progressed.

On February 5, 1981 a management meeting between PSE&G and NRC Region I management was conducted in the Region I office. The l

purpose of this meeting was to discuss ongoing performance problems l of a piping subcontractor and the applicant's response to these l problems. Results of the conference included additional, more I aggressive applicant corrective action, and more comprehensive j responses to items of noncompliance.

Region I inspection monitored activities including soils and found-ations, concrete work, safety-related structures, piping, welding, electrical activities, safety-related mechanical components, instru-mentation, and related areas. Enclosure 2 identifies the inspections J performed, the areas inspected, and significant inspection findings.

At present, about 200 inspection reports have been issued or are pending for the Hope Creek facility. A comparison of inspection hours expended at BWR facilities at a simifar stage of construction (90*o construction complete) is shown oelow:

Hope Creek Shoreham Suse.uehanna_1 Limerick 7600 Hours 6500 Hours 7100 Hours 8100 Hours 2.2.2 M LSp_ecial Inspectiom_

Several special team inspections have been conducted along with the normally prescribed inspecticn program to provide assurance of construction quality. These inspections are discussed below.

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Regional Construction Team Inspection An in-depth assessment, to gain further insight as to construction quality, was made by the Regional Construction Team Inspection (RCTI) during September 19-30, 1983. The inspection purpose was to determine the applicant's management effectiveness in directing the construction of Hope Creek. This was accomplished through in-depth examination of construction management, quality assurance and controls, engineering and design controls, construction, procurement and training.

Electrical, welding and piping, and mechanical aspects were considered within the area of construction. The team (eight region-based inspectors, the senior resident inspector and a section chief) had expertise in a variety of technical disciplines. The inspection involved 707 hours0.00818 days <br />0.196 hours <br />0.00117 weeks <br />2.690135e-4 months <br /> of direct inspection effort at the Hope Creek site and at the offsite fabricatien shop.

Construction Management - The inspection indicated that both Public Service Electric and Gas Company and Bechtel were exerting effective control of work through an adequately experienced onsite staff. PSE&G and Bechtel counterparts appeared to work well together and the decision-making managers were cuncentrated onsite. For example, the PSE&G Vice-President for Engineering cnd Construction, the Bechtel Construction Manager and representatives of the Bechtel Engineering and Design groups were all located on site and in close contact with one another. These shortened lines of communication were supplemented by a computerized management information system. The construction management organization and the high general level of performance of that organization were cited as particular strengths by the regional construction team.

Quality Assurance and Control - The program was found to be effective and to be based upon adequate policies and procedures. The PSE&G QA staff were judged to be well qualified by education and experience.

Quality Assurance surveillance and audits were well-scheduled and effectively conducted. Reports of QA activities addressed programmatic concerns and provided recommendations for corrective actions. The regional construction team cited the assignment of Bechtel Supplier QA representatives directly to the site and the Bechtel QA Tracking System as particular strengths in the area of Quality Assurance. One area of concern wat lack of direct QC involvement in contractor welder qualification.

Engineering and Design Control - The Bechtel San Francisco Home Office (SFHO) Project Engineering group was heavily involved in safety-related design activities. SFHO Project Engineering was represented onsite by a Resident Project Engineering Group which had the same authority as SFHO onsite but whose actions and decisions were reviewed by the SFHO. The regional construction team found that the engineering and design control program at Hope Creek was being effectively implemented.

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5 Construction - This area received very close scrutiny by the team.

The inspection results included one violation involving a failure to identify non-conformance of cable raceways to specifications. This was deemed not to be indicative of a programmatic breakdown in construction verification. A weakness was identified in the control of rework activities af ter initial QC inspection.

Procurement - While the procurement of major components was performed by Bechtel SFHO, Bechtel Field Procurement purchased bulk items, piping, valves, and other related items. Additionally, Field Procurement held responsibility for receiving, storing, and controlling material obtained from the SFHO The inspection team found the Field Procurement staff to te well qualified for their positions and knowledgeable of the interfaces between Field Procurement and QC, QA, Field Engineering, and Supplier QA.

Training - Considerable RCTI effort was devoted to evaluating Quality Assurance training of personnel involved in the PSE&G and Bechtel quality programs. Personnel interviews and document reviews led to the conclusion that training programs met NRC- requirements and adequately served site needs.

Conclusion - The overall conclusion was that the construction management performance at Hope Creek was adequate to the task at hand, with particular strengths in construction management controls, the Bechtel offsite fabrication shop activities, and supplier quality assurance. Overall weaknesses included unauthorized rework, and lack of QC involvement in contractor welder qualification, and unusual complexity in the drawings used for electrical raceway installation.

The applicant corrected these weaknesses subsequent to the inspection.

Independent Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) Inspection An independent Non-Destructive Evaluation (NDE) verification by NRC Region I was conducted during Fall 1982 using the Region's mobile NDE laboratory. The inspection involved 598 inspection hours.

The purpose of the inspection was to verify the adequacy of the H applicant's quality control program for NDE through independent testing. This was accomplished by performlng the same tests that the applicant had performed, and then comparing Region I results to-those of the applicant. The program also performed pipe wall thickness measurements and radiographic film comparison.

The inspection sample selection was made by the regional inspectors and was designed to provide a representative sample of piping systems, components, pipe sizes, materials, and shop and field welds including ASME III Class 1, 2 and 3 welds.

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6 j The Region I examinations were performed using detailed procedures specifically written for compliance with the licensee's PSAR commitments to the ASME III Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. The intent was to duplicate, to the extent practicable, the techniques and methods of the original examinations. The results of these independent examinations were as follows:

Radiograph (RT) - Twenty-two welds were examined by radiography using an Iridium-192 source. The weld sample included _ASME III Class 1, 2 and 3 carbon and stainless steels. All welds were found acceptable.

Liquid Penetrant (PT) - Three welds and the adjacent base metal were examined by liquid penetrant. All areas examined were found acceptable.

k Magnetic Particle Examination (MT) - Two ASME III Class 2 pipe welds and four American Welding Society ( AWS) structural welds were examined using magnetic particle techniques. All areas examined were-acceptable.

Visual Examination (VT) - Twenty-six weldments and adjacent base-material were visually inspected for weld reinforcement, overall workmanship, and surface condition. All areas inspected were acceptable.

Thickness Measurement - Four weld, and adjacent pipe material were examined using an ultrasonic thic\ ness gauge. Minimum wall thicknesses were determined from A3TM standard pipe size and nominal thickness charts. All areas examined were within tolerance requirements.

The Region I independent NDE verification showed very good agreement with the applicant's determinations.

On April 8 through May 3, 1985, an additional NRC Independent l- Measurements Inspection was conducted. As in the initial inspection, l the purpose of this examination was to verify the adequacy of the

licensee's welding and nondestructive examination quality control l programs. This was accomplished by duplicating those examinations

! required of the applicant and evaluating the results. In addition to the required examinations, several other confirmatory examinations

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designed to verify conformance with material specifications were performed and compared to quality assurance records. No discrepancies were identified.

I l 2.2.3 Construction Team Inspection l-An "As-Built" team inspection was conducted December 2-13, 1985. The team was composed of Region I personnel. The Technical Specification, FSAR, SER and corresponding design drawings were compared. Portions of safety systems were physically verified during walkdown inspections to compare the installed hardware to the design. Preoperational tests l

7 and surveillance test procedures were reviewed to verify that testing has been, and will be, conducted to fulfill FSAR requirements, and prove. system functionality. No significant concerns were identified.

Typical examples of concerns that were identified are: 1) spacing of rigid pipe supports and velocity-limiting non-rigid supports (so-called mechanical " snubbers"), 2) minor discrepancies in elevations for anchor bolts and floor slabs on drawings, and 3) identification tags on vent valves had been inadvertently exchanged between valves to the North and South (a condition previously identified and docu-mented by the licensee test group).

Enforcement History The inspection program uses enforcement measures to promote adherence to regulatory seguirements, reduce repeated nonconformances, and encourage self-identification and correction of nonconformances. NRC enforcement measures, that is, Notices of Violations, have been issued when necessary. The applicant has been required to respond to these Notices of Violation and provide the proposed actions to correct the nonconforming conditions and to prevent recurrence of similar violations. NRC inspectors and management have reviewed and evaluated these responses for acceptability. The inspection staff confirms, during subsegunt inspections, that corrective actions are properly completed. The following table gives a comparison of the Hope Creek enforcement statistics with those of three other plants at a similar point in construction. Early enforcement actions were classified as

" violations," " infractions," and " deficiencies" (in descending order of severity) while the more recent reports contain violations categorized into severity levels ranging frcm I to VI (again, in descending order). Below is an enforcement comparison through 90%

construction completion:

FACILITY CppR VIOL INF DEF I II III IV V VI TOTAL Limerick 6/19/74 0 45 20 0 0 0 11 19 5 100 Shoreham 4/14/73 0 38 6 0 0 0 17 13 1 77 Susquehanna 1 11/2/74 0 47 15 0 0 0 18 19 3 103 Hope Creek 11/2/74 0 19 5 0 0 0 19 13 2 58 In evaluating the NRC inspection enforceme6t history for Hope Creek, Region I has not identified any significant programmatic weaknesses in the quality of the construction of the facility since those identified during the initial program review in 1973. The ccmparatively low number of violations issued to Hope Creek is indicative of an overall well managed and high ,1uality construction effort, and management responsiveness to concerns identified by the NRC.

8 2.2.4 Review of Construction Deficiencies Significant deficiencies in design and construction, as defined in 10 CFR 50.55(e), are required to be reported to the NRC. The respon-siveness of the applicant to this requirement, and the applicant's management attention to this reporting activity, shows a commitment to quality and an ability to identify abnormal conditions.

Continuing review by Region I indicates that the applicant's program  !

of significant deficiency reporting is effective. This program involves a multiple sequential review of identified nonconformances and deficiencies. Reports of nonconformances, and deficiencies per 10 CFR Part 21 , are initially reviewed and analyzed by the appropriate Bechtel field engineering discipline. Final screening for reportability of significant deficiencies, and corrective action in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e), is conducted by PSE&G Quality Assurance - Engineering and Construction. This process provides reasonable assurance that the requirements of the regulations are met.

The process also provides an appropriate level of evaluation and followup to assure that the geslity of construction is maintained.

To date, the applicant has evaluated 112 potentially reportable construction deficiencies. Twenty eight were determined to not be '

reportable. Eighty four deficiencies were reported under 10 CFR 50.55(e). Of these, 24 were subsequently withdrawn af ter further evaluation.

The reportable significant deficiencies cover a wide range of topics.

Of the deficiencies reported the most significant involve components supplied by Bailey Control for use in the Hope Creek control room L design. -These problems have received extensive review by NRC Region I and NRR.

The Bailey Model 862 Logic Modules have experienced a number of problems: 1) Susceptibility to Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) with induced voltages in the input circuits causing or preventing actuations at random. This problem was resolved by changing the input impedance and adding a filter circuit on the input. 2) Susceptibility to Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) with electromagnetic fields directed at the' logic cards affecting actuhtion. This problem is to

be resolved by administrative controls on the use of radios, welding machines, and other sources of radio frequency emissions.

, 3) Corrosion of jumper clips on the front panel reset pushbutton

, switches prevented the logic memories from assuming the correct status.

l This problem was resolved by doing away with the jumper clips and i

hard-wiring the switch circuits. 4) High humidity (>60%) could cause the logic memories to assume improper states and fail to i respond to set or reset signals. This problem was resolved by l- increasing the gap between the printed circuit pads and very carefully cleaning the surface of the cards.

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l-l- 2.3 Third Party Aud'its and Evaluations i

f 'In addition to evaluations.and audits routinely conducted by quality assurance and project management, the applicant has participated in several independent reviews. These reviews, with regard to ,

l- construction, were conducted by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), the Joint Utility Management Audit program (JUMA),

Theodore Barry & Associates ar.d an independent design verification program (IDVP) by Sargeant and Lundy.

INPO Evaluations A team of INPO personnel evaluated activities at Hope Creek during June and July 1984 The evaluation addressed design control pro- .

cesses, interfaces, and verification; control of construction

t. processes; the quality of workmanship, quality control and assurance; and test planning, performance, and documentation. A formal report of the evaluation was prepared and presented to PSE&G in November 1984. PSE&G has reviewed the findings and recommendations and has initiated appropriate actions in response. In summary, INPO stated that the systems in place to control the quality of design and con-

. struction are being implemented effectively. NRC Region I staff have '

reviewed the final report and found no need to pursue additional action.

Theodore Barry & Associates - Hope Creek Generating Station Management i Review Public Service and the New Jersey Public Advocate (NJPA), in early l 1985, reached an agreement on resolving contentions which the NJPA had raised before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB). This resolution was formalized as the Joint Agreement and Settlement, and was accepted by the ASLB. The study of project management conducted by Theodore Barry & Associates addresses certain requirements of the Joint Agreement and Settlement.

The study examined several areas including Project Management, Construction Management and Quality Assurance. The study consisted of two phases; an initial review resulting in 26 recommendations for improving management, and an update evaluating ongoing management performance and response to the initial recommendations. The overall conclusion of the review was that the Hope Creek project has been, and l . continues to be, a well managed project, comparing favorably with other i nuclear projects. Management was responsive to the review findings, taking action on all 26 of the presented recommendations. Project and construction management were found to be involved and effective. A summary of study results regarding the preoperational test program is included in paragraph 3.3. of this report. ,

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10 Independent Design Verification Program The. independent Design Verification Program was conducted by Sargent &

Lundy (S&L) at the Hope Creek Generating Station (HCGS) for Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G). The purpose of the IDVP was to provide additional independent assurance that the design of HCGS met licensing requirements thrcugh a review of the technical adequacy of the design of representative HCGS systems and structures and the design process utilized on HCGS.

The IDVP was a comprehensive design review conducted in accordance with an NRC-approved Program Plan, which included an internal S&L Quality Assurance Program, and a formal Protocol governing S&L's communications with PSE&G and Bechtel Power Corporation (BPC). The '

review was performed by a dedicated project team comprised of qualified S&L personnel experienced in the design of nuclear power plants. Over a 6 month period, 120 engineers from every major design discipline participated in the project. The IDVP team reviewed more than 4,000 design documents,'and held 31 technical meetings and 700 telephone conversations with personnel from the NRC, PSE&G, BPC, and other HCGS contractors.

The completed design work reviewed during the IDVP was found to be technically adequate. In general, the concerns identified were resolved by additional calculations and analyses or by the ,

verification of engineering judgment used in the design. In no case was a design or hardware change required to resolve an issue raised.

This constitutes evidence of the adequacy of the design of HCGS.

However, the IDVP team identified a need for additional attention to detail, accuracy, and completeness of documentation, particularly in the areas of ha:ards analysis, environmental qualification of equipment, and instrument setpoint, piping, and civil / structural calculations.

The conclusion from the IDVP was that completed design work reviewed during the IDVP was technically adequate and conformed to applicable licensing requirements and that ongoing programs were adequate to ensure satisfactory resolution of weaknesses that were identified. '

The results of the IOVP and BPC's and PSE&G's ongoing design activities provide reasonable assurcice that the design process is adequate to control the HCGS design and that the overall design of the HCGS will be technically adequate and conform to the applicable ,

licensing requirements.

Joint Utility Management Audits

! The Joint Utility Management Audit (JUMA) program provides independent audits, by utility senior management, of an applicant's QA activities.

This type of audit can be helpful in assuring that quality is

maintained at a high level. The audits evaluate an applicant's

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11 performance and make recommendations for improvements as deemed appropriate. Audit teams evaluated the PSE&G Quality Assurance Program performance at the Newark, New Jersey corporate offices and at the Hope Creek site. There have been six such audits. Past. audits have led to improvements in such areas as: (1) nonconformance control, (2) as-built drawing development, and (3) QA audit documentation. At Hope Creek, this has resulted in a better defined approach to QA/QC ,

coverage of the preoperational and start-up activities.

2.4 Quality Assurance for Construction The applicant's construction quality assurance program is described in the PSAR and FSAR. This program was implemented through the i Engineering and Construction Quality Assurance Manual. With the implementation of the uope Creek Transition Plan, as described in '

paragraph'4.1, responsibilities were shifted from the Engineering and Construction Department to the Nuclear Department. The Nuclear Operations QA program is described in the Nuclear Quality As wrance Department Manual. In order to facilitate completion of construction QA activities under the operations QA program certain sections of the construction QA Manual were incorporated into the Nuclear QA Manual.

This ensured continuity in the QA program as the project focus shifted ,

toward operations.

Region I inspections indicate the applicant is: (1) responsive to facility construction needs and providing aggressive management at-tention to NRC concerns, (2) improving QA/QC programs and increasing QA/QC manpower, and (3) recognizing the necessity of continuous man- -

agement attention to assure quality performance. Adequate management  :

review is evident, w.th both site and corporate management aggres- '

sively involved with decision-making; this has been noted both in

. Region I inspections and in other independent assessments.

Region I has developed a high degree'of confidence in the Hope Creek nor. destructive examination (NDE) program, as a result of the independent verification of the applicant's examination, using the NRC Region I Mobile Laboratory (NDE Van) as discussed in Section 2.2.2.

SALP reports have generally indicated a strong involvement by PSE&G management in their overview of constructi6n. Management has initiated many new and innovative programs to improve communications and jobsite morale. Examples of such initiatives undertaken by the i

applicant have included: '

A transition plan to coordinate orderly transfer of the Hope Creek project from the construction phase to operations.

-- A documentation 'and record turnover (DART) team, established to identify all records and schedule their turnover, format, and L location (storage).

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12 The PRIDE Program, to upgrade work force morale and improve communications, including a suggestion program, newsletter and surveys of attitude and morale was initiated in 1980.

-- Bechtel QA review of all past 10 CFR Part 21 repo-ts, for applicability to Hope Creek, using printout from the Public Document Room.

The Response Coordination Team (RCT) to coordinate closure of NRC Bulletins, Circulars, and Information Notices. The RCT has also undertaken to investigate and resolve NRC Generic Letters, GE SIL's and TIL's, and INPO identified items.

-- Applicant QA verification that corrective actions taken to correct past violations are still in effect.

An independent program to receive and evaluate safety concerns of any site employee (past or present) was established in October 1984. ,

The program, known as SAFETEAM, is intended to surface and resolve safety concerns at an early date.

-- Field engineering responsibility for inspection of completed safety-related items, prior to turnover to QC for inspection,  ;

resulting in low QC reject rates.

L As a result, the applicant's strong commitment to QA has been reflected by a quality project.

l Overall, Region I finds the construction program quality at Hope Creek to be acceptable. This review adds confidence that PSE&G, Bechtel, and the various subcontractors are committed to, and capable of, building a quality nuclear plant. In addition, the preoperational and startup testing programs are designed with a strong in-line QA/QC involvement, t

2.5 Facility Construction Summary and Conclusions In summary, Region I has expended over 7600 hours0.088 days <br />2.111 hours <br />0.0126 weeks <br />0.00289 months <br /> of inspection effort evaluating the quality of construction at Hope Creek. This effort has included several special team inspections dtilizing inspectors with a broad range of expertise. The findings from these inspections have indicated a well managed, quality construction program. In addition to the NRC inspection program, several third party audits and evaluations i have been conducted. The results of these activities were consistent l with the NRC inspection results. The results of the NRC inspection program including review of PSE&G quality assurance program, and the i findings of third party audits provide adequate assurance that the l Hope Creek facility has been constructed with an acceptable level of quality and in substantial accordance with NRC requirements.

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ll 13 3.0 Facility preoperational Testing 3.1 .0verview and Testing Status Preoperational testing conducted prior to system turnover to Hope Creek operations consists of two phases. Phase I testing is the construction test program and is conducted by Public Service o Engineering and Construction Department. Phase II is the preoperational test program conducted by the Public Service Startup Group.

The phase II testing consists of numerous component level tests and 151 integrated system preoperational tests (PTP). To date 130 of these 151 tests have been completed and results approved. Hope Creek operations has accepted for turnover 130 of these results approved tests. The balance of the PTPs are in progress, in_the results review process or will be deferred until after license issuance. Those in progress or in review tests will be complete prior to issuance of a low power license. Those systems / tests which will be deferred are discussed below.

The applicant has requested deferral of construction completion, preoperational testing and post-test review of the following systems until after fuel load:

Solid Radwaste System Radiation Monitoring System, Area / Process l

Traversing In-Core Probe Monitoring Gaseous Radwaste l

Completion of the deferred work is keyed to post fuel load milestones.

Detailed technical descriptions of the requested deferrals have been submitted to both NRR and Region I for review. The results of the Station Operation Review Committee and the Offsite Safety Review Group safety evaluations of the deferrals have been submitted to and reviewed by NRC. Acceptance of the applicant's deferral request is based upon the fact that all Technical Specification requirements will be satisfied and where necessary temporary systems will be installed and operable. All required area radiation monitors will be operable at fuel load, but the deferral is necessary since the entire preoperational test may not be formally approved.

PSE&G had projected a fuel load date of December 1, 1985. This date was revised to February 15, 1986 due to construction and testing delays. The FeL uary date has slipped due, in large measure, to difficulties encountered during the preoperational test program.

Many systems were released for testing prior to full completion.

l This led to large numbers of test exceptions, since the test pro-cedures had been based upon complete and fully operational systems.

Tracking and resolving these exceptions has required expenditure of many man-hours. A related problem has been system rework and design L

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14 changes after testing. In some cases this has resulted in test invalidation, and the need for test procedure revisions and retesting.

Based upon the large number of test exceptions and the range of the identified discrepancies, Region I management determined that credit for the' Mode 5 Surveillances could not be taken based upon the preop test results, as originally requested by PSE&G. The utility committed to conduct Mode 5 surveillances prior to loading fuel. The resident inspectors have been closely monitoring the surveillance testing program and reviewing the test results, with assistance from region-bssed specialist inspectors.

3 i,sInspection Program History and Findings The preoperational test inspection program began October, 1984. The program was conducted by both resident and region-based specialist inspectors. Inspections conducted to verify management controls and procedures, including quality assurance prcycams, have not idcatified any significant programmatic weaknesses. Inspection of test 4 procedures, test performance and test results has progressed consistent with the applicant's scheduled activities.

1 NRC preoperational test procedure review and test observation are essentially complete at this time. NRC results evaluation is also complete.

NRC review of selected test procedures indicates an acceptable level of technical adequacy. The applicant's test group is well staffed

, with qualified personnel. NRC observation of testing in progress showed that involvement of quality assurance was considerable. Review of test results by NRC indicates that while results appear generally adequate, the large number of in process test changes, test I exceptions, and post-test design changes creates the potential for test invalidation / inadequacies. The applicant has committed to

. performing the required surveillance testing without reliance on preoperational test results. This commitment, in conjunction with

examination of preoperational test results provides assurance that 2 systems will function as designed and as required by Technical Specifications.

• Based on review of inspection report 766 forms, the following hours have been expended on preop test inspections at Hope Creek:

. over 410 inspector hours for procedure review, 455 inspector hours fcr test witnessing, and 208 inspector hours for test results evalua-

. tion. These numbers do not include hours devoted to programmatic inspections related to preop testing, such as QA training, etc.

Observations have been conducted for portions of those preop tests

- where witnessing is either considered mandatory by the IE program or where the inspectors have considered that specific additional obser-vation is warranted. In fact, the region has exceeded the IE manual requirements for witnessing preop tests inspection.

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C 1F 3.3 Third Party Audits and Evaluations The applicant's Nuclear Quality Assurance group and the Engineering i

and Construction Quality Assurance group have performed several audits of the preoperation test program. These audits focused on program development and implementation with respect to system turn-over and test performance. In addition to the internal QA audits, the applicant has undergone two independent reviews. These reviews were conducted by the Cooperative Management Audit Program and Theodore Barry & Associates.

Cooperative Management Audit Programs (CMAP)

CMAP is an organization composed of several utilities involved in the generation of nuclear power. During the period of October 14-25, 1985 a CMAP team consisting of representatives from three utilities, audited selected activities at the Salem and Hope Creek units. For Hope Creek this included review of QA involvement in the system turnover process and test program. Audit results indicated that QA involvement was evident and generally effective.

-Hope Creek Generating Station Management Review This review was conducted by Theodore Barry and Associates at the direction of PSE&G as part of an understanding between PSE&G and the

'New Jersey Board of Public Utilities. The background and scope of this review are discussed in more detail in paragraph 2.3 of this report. Objectives of the study as it relates to the preoperational test program included 1) construction / operation department interaction during the turnover process: 2) startup Quality Assurance program implements.jon; 3) the SAFETEAM program.

Results of the evaluation ' indicate that the turnover process was well coordinated and managed. Problems identified during turnover were '

well documented and effectively tracked to resolution. The Startup Quality Assurance Program was found to function effectively.

Management was found to be committed to ensure quality work, and aggressively sought new methods of attaining this goal. The SAFETEAM process was evaluated and results indicated that the process was generally well organized and conducted. Orie concern identified was the SAFETEAM staffing levels and close out rates. A recommendation that near-term management attention be placed on improving these areas was made.

. 3.4 Quality Assurance for Testing The Startup Quality Assurance program applies to "Q" designated components, systems and facilities during phase I and II testing.

Startup Quality Assurance and Quality Control perform monitoring and t

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D 16 auditing functions in those areas applicable to the preoperational test program. The presence of Startup QA/QC throughout the preoperational test procedure review, test performance, and test results review process has been evident.

I 3.5 Facility Preoperational Testing Summary and Conclusions Region I's inspections of the Hope Creek preoperational test program included programmatic reviews, test procedure reviews, test witnessing and test results evaluations. . Although it appears.that the somewhat premature turnover from construction to startup resulted in a large number of test changes and test exceptions, the end result appears to i satisfy all. regulatory requirements. In addition, the applicant's commitment to perform all mode 5 surveillance tests, with the exception of a limited number of static tests, without taking credit

< for preoperational tests gives an added degree of assurance that safety related systems will function as designed.

l 4.0 Facility Preparations for Operations  ;

4.1 Overview and Program Status 1

The applicant's activities in preparation for initial fuel load were closely monitored by Region I. Facility staffing, personnel qualifications and training, procedure development and implementation, and establishment of operational organization interfaces have been i reviewed. The areas reviewed and inspection findings to date are summarized in Enclosure 2. New fuel receipt commenced on September 3, 1985 and was ccmpleted on November 1, 1985. This activity was performed in a well-controlled, safe manner. ,

The corporate and on-site organizations for the support of Hope Creek operations were reviewed in the Safety Evaluation Report issued in

<- October 1984. The organization proposed and reviewed at that time was found acceptable pending assignment of individuals to key managerial positions. Subsequent to the above described review both corporate and on-site management reorganized. .The staff thoroughly reviewed the final organization and has indicated that it is acceptable.

The applicant's effort to prepare for the licensing and subsequent operation of Hope Creek has been guided by, and focused through, two major documents. The Hope Creek Operational Readiness Plan identifies all major tasks required prior to fuel load, assigns applicable portions of each task to the responsible deoartment/ individual, and

establishes a schedule for their completion. Tho Hope Creek J

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17 Transition Plan addresses the transfer of functions, people, and records necessary for the orderly transition of the Hope Creek project from its construction phase to its operations phase. Together, these two documents provide an outline of the applicant's preparation for operations.

4.2 Inspection Program History and Findings 4.2.1 Facility Operations - Staffing and Programs Plant Operations, under the operations manager, is responsible for safe and efficient plant operation. The operations manager is responsible for managing, directing, and controlling the department activities. The operations manager ensures that plant operation complies with the facility operating license, Technical Specifications, and all government and company regulations. He ensures that a properly trained, licensed and non-licensed staff is available to provide safe and efficient operation.

Hope Creek Operations will be a separate organization frcm that at the neighboring Salem station. The two sites will share physical security and fire-fighting organizations, but the operations staffs will be separate organizations reporting to a common corporate Vice-President.

The applicant plans to operate Hope Creek with five shift crews. Each shift crew will be under the direction of a senior nuclear shift supervisor. Reporting to the senior nuclear shift supervisor will be a nuclear shift supervisor. Reporting to the nuclear shift supervisor will be two nuclear control operators and at least two equipment operators. The senior nuclear shift supervisor and the nuclear shift supervisor will hold senior reactor operator (SRO) licenses and the nuclear control operators will hold reactor operator licenses. In addition, the applicant intends to have an electrician, instrument and control technician, radiation protection technician, chemistry technician, and additional equipment operators and utility operators on each shift.

The applicant plans to have each shif t technical advisor (STA) obtain an SRO license. In cases where the STAS are senior licensed and have a bachelor's degree in a scientific or engineering discipline, the applicant plans to use them in a dual role as a shift supervisor-engineer. If they do not meet these qualifications, there will be an i STA on that shift.

The applicant plans to have on each shift a senior shift supervisor or I shif t supervisor who will have at least 6 months of onshif t hot participation experience, including startup and shutdown experience on a boiling-water reactor. This experience has been obtained at the Susquahanna Steam Electric Station for individuais not having previous hot participation experience. Therefore, the applicant does not plan to use shift advisors, i

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18 The 'first set of operator and senior operator license examinations  ;

were conducted July 8 through July 17, 1985 with.the following results:

--J 11 SR0 Candidates - 8 passed 8 R0 Candidates - 8 passed 1 Inst. Cert. Candidate - 1 passed e

!ne three SRO candidates who were unsuccessful, failed the simulator partion of the examination only. Generic strengths were recognized by all examiners in 'the candidates' familiarization of control panels and inplent components. This overall strength was also noted during the grading of the R0/SRO written examination. All candidates were generally familiar with plant operating procedures and operating surveillance ~ test requirements.

The second set of license examinations was conducted during the week of October 14, 1985, with the following results:

13 SR0 Candidates - 11 passed 8 R0 Candidates - 6 passed  ;

1 inst. Cert. Candidate - 1 passed The third set of license examinations was conducted during the week of February 24, 1986, with the following results:

12 SR0 candidates - 10 passed  ;

7 R0 candidates - 5 passed 1 R0 candidate is still being evaluated 1 !.nst. Cert. candidate - 1 passed These results are abcve average for cold license examinations, and indicate an effective licensed operator training program. 1 The Hope Creek training program benefiteri greatly from the existence-of the Salem training program. Although each reactor site has its own unit specific simulator, the simulators and the training staffs are located in a combined training facility located in Salem, N. J. The Salem training program is fully accredited by INPO and accreditation is scheduled for Hope Creek in 1987. '

o L Based on the examinations conducted to date, the availability of a l' plant specific simulator and the strength of the licensed and non- '

Itcensed operator training programs the performance of personnel examined is not expected to be a concern.

4.2.2 Quality Assurance For Operations r

The quality assurance program for operations, as described in the HCGS FSAR, was reviewed in the SER and the staff concludes the QA program is in compliance with applicable NRC regulations and is acceptable for l

19

! the operations phase of the HCGS. The operational quality assurance program was implemented, in accordance with the HCGS Transition Plan, on July 28, 1985.

The NRC staff has conducted a series of inspections to assess the adequacy of the applicant's operations QA program as implemented at Hope Creek. Programs reviewed include design change and modification, surveillance, calibration, measuring and test equipment, independent review groups, equipment control, plant staff training and qualifications, procurement and maintenance. No areas of concern were identified.

4.2.3 Emergency Preparedness Facilities and program The HCGS SER, issued in October 1984, provided the staff's review of the Hope Creek Emergency Plan through Revision 4. In response to open and confirmatory items cited in the SER, Revisions 5 through 7 to the plan were issued. The staff review of the emergency plan through Revision 7 identified a number of additional items requiring action by PSE&G. These items are being addressed by the applicc a :nd will be confirmed by the staff in a future supplement to the SER. Based on the review of the plan and the applicant's commitment to correct the identified deficiencies, the staff has concluded that the emergency plan is adequate.

The Hope Creek and Salem Generating Stations are located in close proximity. At present it is the applicants intentfon to maintain separate emergency plans for the two facilities until after issuance of the Hope Creek operating license. In the longer term the two facilities will be combined under one site emergency plan.

A preliminary Region I Emergency Preparedness appraisal was conducted in August 1985. It was determined, due to the incomplete state of the applicants emergency facilities and the numerous emergency plan changes in process, that an additional appraisal would be necessary at a later date. The additional appraisal was conducted during November 1985 and it was determined that the physical facilities and procedures were adequate to support plant operation.

The Hope Creek Generating Station has been* incorporated into the Artificial Island Generating Station Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan. This plan was exercised by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on October 29, 1985. There was 1 identified deficiency during the exercise which resulted from failure to complete public alerting and notification within 15 minutes of the initial evacuation decision. Officials of the State of Delaware promptly addressed and resolved this deficiency during a remedial exercise conducted on November 15, 1985. Based on the results of this exercise I and the remedial exercise, FEMA considers that offsite radiological emergency preparedness is adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite to protect the health

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20 and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the site in the event of a radiological emergency.

4.2.4 Radiological Controls Facilities and Programs Region based inspections have assessed the applicant's chemistry, environmental monitoring, health physics, radiation monitoring and radioactive waste management programs and facilities. As discussed in section 3.1 of this report the applicant's radiation monitoring and radioactive waste processing systems are considerably behind schedule.

Construction and/or startup testing of these systems will be incomplete at the time of OL issuance. The impact of these deferrals on the safe operation of the unit, and the radiological safety of persons both on and offsite, has been carefully examined by region based specialists, resident inspectors, and NRR. Sufficient portions of the deferred systems will be operabic to allow safe conduct of fuel load activities and all Technical Specification requirements will be satisfied.

4.2.5 Security Facilities and Programs The staff has reviewed the physical security and safeguards contingency plans. Preoperational inspection of the equipment and security facilities at Hope Creek has been conducted. As part of the new fuel receipt inspection team, region based' specialists examined the applicant's i plementation of the security plan for new fuel l receipt. . Resident inspectors have verified, on a sampling basis, actual implementation of this plan during fuel receipt and movement.

No discrepancies have been identified.

Presently Hope Creek and Salem Generating Stations are treated as separate sites under their respective security plans. Access to each '

site is through a common security center, with passage from site to site only through the security center. Public Service has indicated that future plans are to combine the sites into one for security purposes. However, this action will not be completed by PSE&G until ,

af ter OL issuance.

The security force at Hope Creek will be provided by the same contractor currently utilized for Salem.

The security program plans for Hope Creek were approved by NRC and the readiness review indicated no impediments to adeonate implementa-tion. Portions of the security plan were implemented on February 16, 1986, to allow the security staff to exercise the program prior to plant operations. Full security program implementation will occur ,

just prior to receipt of an operating license.

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L 4.'2.6 Fire Protection Facilities and Programs  !

t On May 20-24, 1985 an audit team composed of Region I and NRR -

representatives, and consultants conducted a joint NRR fire protection / Region I Appendix R-type audit. Fourteen items, including

• nine licensirg related items, remained unresolved at.the end of the inspection. Region I conducted a followup inspection to close the above open items and to verify proper implementation of the fire i protection. program. No open significant items or concerns remained at the completion of the inspection, j l

4.2.7 Technical Specifications (TS) ,

l The " proof and review" copy of the Hope Creek Technical Specifications was distributed for comment in October 1985. A general review of the proof and review copy was conducted by region-based and resident in-

! spectors. Region I comments were submitted to NRR on November 1, 1985. A technical specification team irispection composed of.contrac-l tor personnel was conducted during December. System configuration,

l. technical specifications and surveillan:e tests were cczpared to as- t sess correctness and consistency. Both the program and procedures l' appear to be adequate. The final draft of the Technical Specifica-  !

tions was reviewed by the Region and found acceptable.  !

4.3 Startup Test Program .

j. Review of the startup test program is progressing. The applicant has

. undertaken a program to compress the power ascension test program, p

The philosophy and justification for the compression have been discussed with NRR and Region I personnel. Changes to the program l fall into 5 general categories:

i l 1. replacing some testing with Technical Specification surveillance l l 2. deleting non-essential testing

3. simplifying some tests l

! 4. replacing tests with data from other tests i 5. deleting certain Regulatory Guide 1.68 testing A schedule for submittals justifying the above described ch.nges was submitted to NRR/ Region I in September 1985. The applicant has, in accordance with the schedule, submitted a number of detailed technical

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. analyses for the proposed changes. These analyses, as well as the

' final test procedures, have received thorough review by both NRR and Region I.

r The applicant has, in cooperation with Bechtel and General Electric, begun a program designed to identify and resolve possible problem areas which could impact the power ascension test schedule. This effort inv)1ves drawing on the General Electric /Bechtel experience base accumulated during testing at numerous other BWRs. Des *gn, procedural and scheduling problems experienced at other sites are assessed to determine their validity for the Hope Creek design.

Detailed system walkdowns are conducted by teams of PSE&G, GE, and Bechtel personnel. Through this program the applicant hopes to minimize unscheduled outage time during the test program.

Power ascension test procedures will be test run on the Hope Creek .

site specific simulator. These simulated test runs should aid in l identifying any technical precedure inadequacies or logistics ,

l problems. The dry runs will also serve as valuabic training for the l operations staff and should aid in reducing the number of unplanned scrams due to operator' error.

4.4 Facility preparation for Operation Summary and Conclusions Region I has performed readiness for operations inspections in l

accordance with the IE inspection program and generally found the applicant's programs to be well organized and in accordance with

, regulatory requirements. The areas inspected included operational L l staffing, training, procedures, quality assurance, fire protection, emergency preparedness, water chemistry control, radiological controls and security. The transition of project responsibility from

l. engineering and construction to operations on December 2, 1984 promoted the development of an " operating" attitude among the applicant's staff. Because of previous licensed experience or l

experience gained at_Susquehanna Steam Electric Station the use of shift advisors in the control room will not be required during the power ascension program. Based upon our programmatic reviews ar.d l

observation of activities, Region I feels that the Hope Creek facility l

and staff will be ready to conduct low power operations upon completion of the preoperational test program and applicable L surveillance testing.

L l~ 5.0 Allegations PSE&G initiated a program early in plant construction to handle employee  ;

concerns. The program was initially operated by 0A Engineering and Construction Department. In October of 1984, early in the final phase of construction, the program was replaced by the SAFETEAM program. This was intended to reduce possible delays at the end of construction and improve overall plant quality. The SAFETEAM is responsible to the Senior Vice President, Nuclear Engineering. The manager is the only SAFETEAM

23 employee that works directly for PSE&G . All oth e s work for consultants under Syndeco (a subsidiary of Detroit Edison Company). The interviewers are employed by Management Decision Systems, and the investigators by National Inspection Consultants. PSE&G believes that this type of independent organization increases employee confidence in the anonymity l of the SAFETEAM process.

A special insp'ection of the Hope Creek employee concern program, SAFETEAM, was conducted during the week of February 3, 1986. The inspection involved 73 hours8.449074e-4 days <br />0.0203 hours <br />1.207011e-4 weeks <br />2.77765e-5 months <br /> of onsite inspection by a Region I Section Chief and two inspectors. The SAFETEAM program was reviewed from a programmatic point of view and a sampling of specific concerns was inspected. It was con-cluded that the SAFETEAM process has done a generally satisfactory job of identifying and resolving employee concerns and that it has had a positive effect on overall plant quality and safety.

To date, 14 allegations have been received and investigated by Region I.

One allegation related to seismic supports in the radwaste area was substantiated. Several other allegations were substantiated, but found to be without merit, due to a lack of nuclear safety significance. There are currently 3 allegations open at Hope Creek. Two of these are related to employee concerns previously reported to SAFETEAM and the third is related to interpretation of administrative controls which had been brought to corporate management attention. These issues remain open pending responses from the licensee.

There are no open safety concerns at this time.

6.0 Systematic Assessment of Licensee performance (SALP)

The SALP Program was established by the NRC staff to improve the NRC regulatory program, by evaluating applicant performance in a number of functional areas and communicating those findings to the applicant via a '

SALP report. The SALP process serves to permit sound decisions regarding NRC resource allocation, as well as to better understand the reasons for the performance level of each applicant. This program involves an integrated subjective assessment of applicant / licensee by NRC management using inputs from Region I inspectors, NRR and NMSS project managers, and AE00. Following the formal assessment, senior NRC regional managers meet with senior utility managers to discuss the findings of the assessment.

For facilities under construction, the discussions at the management n'eetings are oriented toward the quality of construct'on practices.

Potential problems identified by the SALP process arr also presented and discussed by the NRC staff at these meetings, and niterated in a formal report issued after the meeting.

Since the inception of the SALP program in late 1979, the performance of the applicant at Hope Creek has been assessed six times. SALP Boards convened on January 19, 1981; October 20, 1981; November 8, 1982; August 29, 1983; December 21, 1984; and January 16, 1986.

24 The first SALP addressed performance during the period from November 1, 1979 to October 31, 1980. The SALP found performance to be average in 11 of 12 functional areas evaluated. Increased inspection activity was prescribed in one area, Piping and Hangers. This was based on the number and nature of noncompliances associated with piping and hangers (all of which involved a single subcontractor), and on the finding that the applicant htJ not implemented effective corrective action to control that subcontractor. A management meeting was held with the applicant on April 30, 1981 to discuss NRC concerns in this regard. The applicant eventually replaced Schneider Inc., the subcontractor for containment piping erection.

The second SALP addressed performance during the period from July 1, 1980 to May 30, 1981. The SALP found performance to be " Category 1" in seven of nine functional areas, including the area of Piping and Hangers which had been rated "below average" during the preceding cycle. The areas of Safety Related Structures, Safety Related Components, Electrical, and Training which had been rated " average" during the preceding cycle were also rated " Category 1". A management meeting was held with the applicant on November 21 1981 to discuss the SALP report results.

The third SALP addressed performance during the period from September 1, 1981 to August 31, 1982. The applicant's performance was assessed as Category 1 in two of five functional areas, including Soils and Foundation, and Piping Systems and Supports. Category 2 performance was observed in the remaining three areas, indicating a decline in the areas of Containment and Structures, and Safety Related Components. No basis for assessment was found in three assessment areas.

The fourth SALP addressed performance from August 1, 1932 to July 31, 1983. Assessments were made in seven functional areas. Performance in all seven areas was judged to be either " Category 1" or " Category 2".

The applicant's performance was considered to be satisfactory overall, with no major construction problems found. Performance improvements, through more thorough planning and oversight of construction activities, were suggested in the SALP report.

The fifth SALP addressed performance from August 1, 1983 to 0-tober 31, 1984. The applicant's performance was satisfactory. Initiatives to improve site communications were effective and improvements in craf t and supervisor training were apparent. There were no major construction problems and corrective actions were generally prcmpt and effective. The CTI identified both strengths and weaknesses in the project's activities and the applicant aggressively pursued resolution of the weaknesses.

Construction management by both the applicant and Bechtel provided effective control of the work. Corrective action was generally complete, thorough, and adequate to prevent recurrence of problems. In some cases management was insufficiently active in identificattra of generic problems although the improved NCR trending and field engineering accountability programs improved this condition.

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The construction project remained on schedule and close to budget due in '

large part to good communications within and between the applicant and Bechtel. Bechtel also transferred many people with experience from recently completed nuclear projects to Hope Creek to build a solid experience base. Performance throughout this SALP period generally improved with the addition of more experienced personnel to the Bechtel site organization.

The sixth SALP period addressed performance from October 31, 1984 to October 31, 1985, with a Region I SALP Beard convening on January 16, 1986.

The applicant's performance was satisfactory in all areas. Project personnel displayed a quality-conscientious attitude and good safety perspective relative to completing construction, performing testing,~and preparing the facility for operation. There was good ranagement involvement in all areas, and areas requiring improvement were generally aggressively pursued.

Construction management maintained a positive attitudo, was appropriately involved in resolving issues, and used a variety of approaches to maintaining quality awareness among workers. Areas needing improvement include (1) housekeeping, which has generally lagged other areas of progress, and (2) communications and interfaces among various groups having responsibilities for electrical and I&C activities.

The preoperational testing function is well-staffed with experienced personnel. Nonetheless, sore problems have been noted in procedure scope and review. Procedural adherence and test control have been generally good, but have varied depending on personnel involved.

NRC inspection of the applicant's performance of preoperational tests and preparations for plant operation were not conducted during this assessment period. However, as previously indicated in section 3.2, weaknesses have been noted in the preoperational test program. As a result, credit was not given toward satisfying surveillance test requirements and Mode 5 sur-veillance tests will be required prior to fuel load.

SALP evaluations performed to date have found the applicant's performance to be acceptable, providing reasonable assurance that satisfactory quality is being maintained during construction of Hope Creek. The SALP currently in progress, and the subsequent assessment period will focus on preoperational testing and readiness for operation. A summary of SALP functional areas and ratings is included as Enclosure 2.

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7.0 Region I Future Actions l Region I resident and specialist inspections will continue throughout the i

startup test program. Results evaluation will be closely monitored.

l A Readiness Asser.sment Team inspection is currently planned for near the l l end of the Power Ascension Test Program and prior to commercial ,

l- operation.  !

I 8.0 Summary and Conclusions Region I has expended over 12,000 inspection hours at the Hope Creek fa- l cility and has determined that the project has been well managed with a ,

! clear focus on quality. Adequate management attention to all facets of i l the project and a commitment to QA/QC have been evident during the twelve years since the issuance of construction permit CPPR-120. A Regional

Construction Team Inspection conducted during September 1983 concluded that construction management was adequate with particular strengths in l~

construction management control, fabrication shcp activities and supplier l quality assurance. The weaknesses noted during this inspection were  ;

promptly corrected. An "As-Built" team inspection conducted during December 1985 compared the FSAR, SER, design drawings, and the proposed -

Technical Specifications with the as-built plant. No significant concerns i, were identified. Region I has not identified any significant program-( matic weaknesses in the quality of construction since construction '

l activities commenced. ,

i A high degree of confidence in the applicant's non-destructive l examination (NDE) program was established as a result of two NRC Independent Measurement inspections conducteo during November 1982 and l April 1985.

l Region I has found the construction and preoperational testing program quality to be acceptable. Although problems have been identified with respect to the' preoperational test program, the applicant has taken

strong actions to provide added assurance of safety related system l operability. The Region I staff has determined that PSE&G has adequately demonstrated a commitment and capability to build a quality nuclear plant. .

We therefore conclude that Hope Creek Generating Station has been constructed substantially in accordance with Construction Permit CPPR-120, the FSAR and NRC requirements. We further conclude that the i applicant has taken all necessary actions to permit initial license issuance.

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27 Enclosures

1. Special Assessment of the Quality of Construction at Hope Creek Generating Station Unit 1.

2. SALP Evaluation (Tabulation of previous SALP functional area ratings)

3. Inspection Program Annual Breakdown (Breakdown by calendar year showing reports issued and hours of inspectian per program (2512, 2513, 2514, 2515))

4. Inspection Report Characterization (P eakdown by inspection report including general subject, and violations identified.

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ENCLOSURE 1 SPECIAL ASSESSMENT OF THE QUALITY OF CONSTRUCTION OF H0pE CREEK GENERATING STATION

1. Region I has expended over 12000 manhours of direct inspection time at Hope Creek during the construction and preoperational test phases. These

inspections have covered the applicable inspection programs and have addressed the 'equired areas involved in facility construction. The number of inspections conducted is as follows

Year Number of Inspections 1973 1 1974 1 1975 2 1976 7 1977 14 1978 14 1979 10 1980 22 1981 18 1932 16 1983 18 1984 29 1985 66 (through 1986 20 3/18/86)

2. Special inspections conducted by the Region included:

Regional Construction Team Inspection (1983) - Inspection of overall construction management, QA and design control. One violation for failure to perform adequate QC inspection. Several general strengths and weaknesses were noted.

NDE Van (1982) - Verification of applicant's QC through independent testing. No findings were identified. Independent testing showed good agreement with the applicant's results.

NDE Van (1985) - Verification of applicant's QC through independent testing. Again no discrepancies were identified.

Fire Protection Audit (1985) - Joint NRR/ Region I audit to determine the I

state of applicant compliance with fire protection commitments. Fourteen

items were identified. These items were generally administrative in nature, and were subsequently resolved.  ;

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Enclosure 1 2 l~

As-Built Team Inspection (1985) - Comparison of as-built plant to i the FSAR, SER, Technical Specifications and design bases. Five j findings were identified. None of the items required modifications.

3. Region I inspectors have generally received adequate response to concerns l from the applicant. Corrective actions to identified problems have been I generally timely and effective.

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4. The quality assurance and quality control organizations have adequately l controlled the quality of work at Hope Creek. Public Service Electric & ,

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Gas retained review and approval rights for all contractor's inspections and work procedures. These quality assurance reviews provided the necessary measures resulting in good quality controls over safety-related l structures, systems, components and materials. Early in the work process the applicant identified problems with several subcontractor QA practices.

Two subcontractors were removed from the project while the QC function of a third was transferred to Bechtel.

5. PSE&G established a three phase approach to obtain required quality in materials, equipment, installation, and construction. This approach results in multiple reviews of QA/QC activity during procurement,  !

fabrication, handling, shipment, storage, cleaning, construction, >

installation, inspection and test of safety-related items, systems and structures.  :

Phase A is the Quality Control Inspection function performed by principal contractors and their subcontractors engaged in manufacture and/or construction. Both the principal contractors and their subcontractors are required to have Quality Control and Inspection Programs appropriate to the product which they fabricate or construct. They are responsible for their  ;

work and for testing, inspection, and quality control programs needed to verify and document that their completed product has the specified degree of qualsty.

Phase B consists of the Quality Control Surveillance function, which is performed by the principal contractors (i.e. the NSSS contractor and the architect-engineer). They are responsible for surveillance activities over their QA/QC and inspection functions and those of their subcontractors.

t These principal contractors have quality groups' responsible for this quality effort. Their quality groups include personnel with technical  !

backgrounds in materials, special processes (such as welding and '

non-destructive testing), and in mechanical, electrical, structural, instrumentation and controls disciplines.

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c , 11 Enclosure 1- 3 .

Phase C is the Quality Assurance Auditiog function which is performed by each of the principal contractors over their own QA program ,and those of

-their subcontractors. In addition, PSE&G audits both its i.1.ernal operations and those of its principal contractnrs in order to verify conformance to applicable Quality Assurance Programs in each case. To accomplish this the documented Quality Control programs of the' principal '

contractors are subject to PSE&G QA review and approval.

4 The Quality Assurance organization is staffed with wel; qualified personnel. The staff consists of graduate engineers with several years of engineering or nuclear industry experience, technologists with several 1 years of nuclear industry experience, and non-degreed technicians with I several years of nuclear experience. Several of the key individuals additionally possess graduate degrees, professional engineering licenses and other industry certifications. This quality organization is_ d functionally and administratively independent of the Hope Creek project organization. 3 To date, PSE&G's quality assurance personnel have, on a planned and periodic basis appropriate to the status of the design and construction ,

activities, conducted over 140 audits and 879 surveillances. These aud'ts have confirmed the first two levels of the quality program are working

, effectively to assure that the Hope Creek Generating Station will be a safe i and reliable plant. (This data provided by PSE&G)

Public Service has initiated a number of additional programs designed to -

c enhance the quality of construction and aid.in the transition from construction to operations. These initiatives include:

Development of a formal transition plar to ensure a smooth transition from construction to operations.

A review by Bechtel QA of all past 10 CFR 21 reports to dec6rmine if any s were applicable to Hope Creek.

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PSE&G QA established a program to ensure that corrective actions taken to correct past violations are still in effect.

PSE&G established an independent program to receive and evaluate safety concerns of any site employee - either past or present. (SAFETEAM)

A documentation and records turnover (DART) team was assembled to identify all records and schedule their format, turnover and storage location. The team contacted other utilities tc> learn from their experience and factored this information inte their plans.

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A pride program was implemented to upgrade the morale of the Hope-Creek work force. It featured attitude surve;,s, a suggestion program, quality awareness, work study and problem solving teams, employee recognition and improved communications.

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Enclosure 1 4 The quality assurance program at Hope Creek has also been subject to review by several outside organizations:

The American Society of Meenanical Engineers (ASME)

Bechtel Construction Inc. has received and maintained its ASME certification to install nuclear pressure retaining components.

ASME teams audit every three years with welding being one of the ]

major areas covered.

Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company >

Hartford maintains a staff of Authorized Nuclear Inspector's (ANI) on site as required by the ASME Code. These inspectors monitor ASME related activities and have the authority to assign hold points on construction activities past which construction cannot proceed until their inspection is satisfactorily completed. In addition, Hartford supervision performs semi-annual audits of applicable Bechtel activities associated with ASME Code welding.

Joint Utility Management Audits (JUMA)

PSE&G is a participating member in a Joint Utility Management Audit Group (JUMA). This group periodically audits the PSE&G quality assurance organization's activities. The JUMA audits are conducted by senior supervisory quality assurance personnel from other utilities.

Institute of N.uclear Power Operations (INPO) - Construction Project Evaluation (CPE)

The INp0 Construction Project Evaluation was developed as a standard method of evaluating utilities' nuclear construction programs. PSE&G supports INP0 CPE and has actively participated in the development and l trial of the Phase I evaluation.

Independent Design Verification Program PSE&G contracted Sargent and Lundy to conduct the independent design verification program at Hope Creek. The IDVP was conducted in accordance with an NRC-approved plan. *

!!oye Creek Generating Station Management Review - Theodore Barry &

l Associates l As part of an agreement with the New Jersey Public Advocate, PSE&G contracted Theodore Barry & Associates to assess the effectiveness of the project construction management.

t l The above organization's evaluations, auditing and verifications of the Hope Creek project have all been positive. The ASME audits have resulted i in the extension of Bechtel's ASME Certificate of Authorization. The L

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Enclosure 1 1 5 on-sita AuthorizedNucija'~InspecturhasverifiGthatASME.hort a done in acccrdance'wi-th th; tode requirement.s. The semi-annual audits W. Hartford have~revet. identified a majc prw..lem, and all JUMA audits ani lNPO.

evaluFtions have concluded thac'the Hope Creek Station quality. assurance progrJfiiseffectiveandisbeidreffectivelyimplemented. ,

The INPO evaluations and JUMA audits go beyond verifving conformance with the established programs. INPO and JUMA also evaluP.e t t programs and 's recommend irepro @ ypts. PSE&G has evaluated the INP0'asd JUMA recommendations a*:0 has adopted many of the recommendat$ons. "The results of these outside agencies' evaluations and audits have been beneficial to PSE&G. They have reported to the Company's management on the effectiveness of the program from a dif ferent perspectise ana this has further 10 creased the confidence the Company has in its quality assurance program which, in turn, leads to a higher degree of confidence in the quality.

6. The Public Service Gas & Clectric'Conany. Quality Assurance organization

,- M s the authority to stop work independent of the Construction organization ind has not shoc i reluctance to do so whc' s nditicn. warrant this l action. T,e fetirsing sumpyizes stop work' actions initiated by the l Quality AffuranC4 Organization.

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-v ear "' Descript'pn -

Remarks l

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( , M79 Lack of doc 9etited Proper procedures were l procedures for dry- developed wito review and well knuckle in- concurrenck by PSE&G and stallation by PDM Bechtel 1979 Installation of Qualification 'da a l - unqualified cable received. A chang? to electrical constrW tion specifications requiring applicabir- testing was issued.

1980 - Lack of procedures Analysis of the effe5.t'on for installation of piping and supports was SRV lines resulted in- conducted. Use of " cold alignment by " cold springiryg" without prior springing" engineering approval 13 i disallowed.

1980 Improper alignment Alignment procedures re-techniques d sed and arplicable QC hold points added to ensure proper alignment prac.tice.

1981 Concrete pour causes , Analysis of concrete used, (Unit #2) bulge in damage to liner cord :cted.

drywell liner Repairs were made ami e~ valuated.

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Enclosure 1 6 Year Description Remarks 1981 Concrete pour causes Similar analysis / repair.

(Unit #2) bulge in Additional procedures / precautions drywell liner implemented to preclude placement overpressurization.

1982 Elimination of welding Review of drawings controls for electri- conducted to preclude cal equipment misapplication of specifications.

1982 Improper modification Training / procedure modifi-of ASME component cations implemented to ensure proper QC involvement and weld history records are maintained.

1985 Inadequate protection Proper protective measures of class 1E electri- established. Additional cal equipment training and protective mea;ures checklists implemented.

ENCLOSURE 2 Summary of SALP Evaluations Functional. Area Rating (for period ending) 10/80 6/81 8/82 7/83 10/84 10/85

1. Soils and Foundation Avg. ---

1 1

2. Piping Systems and Below 1 2 2 Supports Avg.

3. Safety Related Comoonents Avg. 1 2 1 1

4. Support Systems (Including --- ---

2 2 1 HVAC & Fire Protection)

5. Electrical Power Supply Avg. 1 2

and Distribution

6. Instrument and Controls --- --- ---

2 2

7. Licensing Activities --- --- ---

2 2 2

8. Containment Structures Avg. 2 2 2 1

9. Safety Related Structures Avg. 1

10. Preoperational Testing --- --- --- ---

2 2

11. Quality Assurance / Control Avg. 2 --- ---

1 1

12. Reporting Avg. 1 i

13. Design and Design Changes ---

1 1

14. Training Avg. 1

15. Environmental Avg. --- --- --- ---

16. Management Avg. --- --- --- --- ---

17. Concrete Avg. --- --- --- --- ---

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18. Construction Activities --- --- --- --- ---

1**

19. Electrical and I&C --- --- --- --- ---

2** Il Construction

20. Operational Readiness 1

21. Maintenance 2

22. Radiological Controls 2

23. Security and Safeguards 1 24 Emerger.cy Preparedness 2 Notes: "-- " indicates that this functional a*rea was not evaluated or there was no basis for assessment during the subject period.

1 Functional area 9 was combined with functional area 8 for  ;

evaluation purposes during these assessment period. l l

Functional areas 18 and 19 are combinations of areas which were previously reported separately. l l

ENCLOSURE 3 HOPE CREEK UNIT 1 INSPECTION PROGRAM ANNUAL BRFAK00WN (Hours)

Year Reports Construction Preops. Startup Operations Total 1973 1 1974 1 No record of hrs. -- -- --

1975 2 40 -- -- --

40 1976 7 99 -- -- --

99 1977 14 207 -- -- --

207 1978 14 293 -- -- --

293 1979 10 292 -- -- --

292 1980 22 937 -- -- --

987 1981 18 901 -- -- --

901 1982 16 1922 -- -- --

1922 1983 18 1728 -- -- --

1728 1984 29 526. 623 --

42 1191 1985 66 1647 2374 61 78 4160 TOTALS 218 8642 2997 61 120 11820

ENCLOSURE 4 INSPECTION

SUMMARY

FOR HOPE CREEK Inspection Date/No. of No. Inspectors Areas Findings-73-05 11/27-20/73 Meeting to outline NRC inspec- Several 1 tion functions and review of storage de-storage procedures and their ficiencies implementation. were identi-fled both with records and equipments.

74-02 6/19/74 QA program implementation 1

75-01 2/4-6/75 Long term storage. Sterage Vio-2 lations of:

10 CFR 50, i Appendix Criterion XVI Criterion XVIII.

l 75-02 8/12-14/75 Long term storage and site QA 2 activities. .

75-03 11/25-26-75 Determination of status of site None 1 construction and staffing and resolution of open items.

76-01 1/15-16 Review of receipt inspection and None 1/22/76 handling procedures for reactor 2 pressure vessel.

76-02 2/24-25/76 Environmental. None E

76-03 3/5/76 Reactor vessel handling and None l 1 related procedures.

76-04 8/19-20/76 Dewatering, excavation, ground None 2 water control, and foundation requirements.

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B Enclosure 4 2 76-05 9/22-24/76 QA manuals reviewed to determine None 2 the basic requirements of the QA program and consistency with PSAR commitments.

76-06 11/18-19/76 Reactor vessel handling activi- None 1 ties.

76-07 12/8-10/76 Dewatering, excavation, speci- None 12/13/76 fications for concrete batch I plant and test lab.

77-01 2/8-9/77 Document control and groundwater None 1 control procedures and site preparation work activities and quality records.

77-02 2/22-25/77 Inspection of the quality aspects None i 3/7/77 of the excavation and dewatering 1 work, work activities as related to foundations, concrete batch plant activities, and civil /

structural lab activities.

77-03 3/15-16/77 Environmental monitoring. None 1

77-04 4/20-22/77 Dewatering, foundations, soils None 1 testing, backfill records, batch plant and solid test lab.certi-fications, concrete specs, and civil QC inspection plans.

77-05 5/5-6/77 Implementation of contractor's None 2 and subcontractor's QA manuals.

77-06 7/33-15/77 Reactor vessel storage and None 1 related records, implementation of concrete QA pro edures.

77-07 7/27-29/77 Onsite and offsite equipment None 1 <ta 2ge, Bechtel and PSE&G QA audits.

77-08 8/2-5/77 Installation of rebar and cad- None 1 weld splices for reactor basemat, review of cadwelder qualifications and cadweld inspection requirements, backfill records.

Enclosure 4 3 77-09 8/9-11/77 QA program for primary containment None 1

77-10 9/6-7/77 Concrete placement of basemat 1 Violation 9/12-14/77 section of power block. Failure to 1 follow proce-dures during concrete placement 77-11 9/27-28/77 Bulletin and Circular Review. None 3

77-12 10/19-21/77 Storage and maintenance procedure None 3 reviews, installation of structural steel, storage of steel and equip-ment, applicant's audit program.

77-13 11/7-10/77 Concrete placement, cadwelding, None 11/14/77 removal of defective concrete, 2 review of concrete records 77-14 12/14/77 Status review of construction None 1 and schedule.

78-01 1/31/78 Concrete activities, rebar None 2/1-1/78 installation, ground water control I records, batch plant audits.

75-02 2/15/78 In process work and records review None -

2 of containment erection, storage, receiving.

78-03 3/8-10/78 Environmental 1 Violation 1 Discharging motor oil to the river l 78-04 3/15 17/78 M&TE program, QC and audit Improper 2 personnel qualifi' cation tocords, issuance of QC subcontractor surveillance, material supports. instruction 78-05 3/21-23/78 Concrete activities, concrete / None 1 soils test 78-06 4/11-14/78 QC program for reactor vessel None i

2 storage, 10 CFR 21 program, vendor documentation for l structural embedments, sub-contractors' QA/QC proce6sres.

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Enclosure 4 4 78-07 5/2-4/78 Containment erection, concrete None 2 placement, backfill.

78-08 5/24-25/78 Applicant's audit program, None Bulletin and Circular review, Dames & Moore QA program, and 10 CFR 21 conformance program.

78-09 6/6-9/78 QC program for concrete place- None 2 ment, cement storage, equipment storage, structural steel documentation, CDR reporting 78-10 7/11-14/78 QC program for mechanical None 1 equipment, spacer material for structural joints.

78-11 7/31-8/3/78 Concrete placement activities, None 1 qualification and training of QC personnel, inspection of honeycomb voids in concrete partition wall.

78-12 8/21-23/78 QC program for concrete place- None 3 ment, storage and maintenance of reactor vessel and reactor internals.

78-13 10/16-18/78 Fabrication and installation None 1 of torus.

78-14 11/18-30/78 QC programs for piping and None 4 structural steel, weld material control, examination of radio-graphs, soils, concrete lab QA program and its implementation.

79-01 1/30-2/1/79 QC program for structural steel None 1

79-02 2/27-3/1/79 QC program for installation of None 2 pipe hangers and supports, containment fabrication and erection.

79-03 4/16-19/79 QC program for fabrication and 1 Viol.

2 installation of containment Inadequate penetrations, structural steel storage of equipment supports, conta'inment penetra-welding. tion pipes

O Enclosure 4 5 79-04 9/12-14/79 Receipt, installation, and 1 Viol.

I welding of safety-related piping. Failure to perform required surface examina-tion 79-05 6/18-21/79 QC program for structural welding; None 4 pipe welding; receipt and storage of equipment.

79-06 7/31-8/2/79 QC program for installation and None 2 welding of piping 79-07 8/25-27/79 Bulletin and Circular review, 1 Viol.

2 review of ASME Certificates of Inade-Authorization, quate Corr 0C-tive actions in response to non-confor-mances 79-08 10/30-11/2/79 Structural integrity test None 1

79-09 11/26-30/79 Concrete placements and records, 1 Viol.

2 subcontractor QA program, Inadequate storage and storage records of concrete repair /-

poor records reactor vessel and internals.

79-10 12/19/79 Inspection of onsite facilities None 1 for Resident Inspector's Office.

Enclosure 4 6 80-01 1/14-17/80 Concrete placements, hanger and 1 Viol.

2 small bore pipe fabrication shop, Inadequate subcontractor QA program, documen-dewatering settlement studies, tation of condi-tions adverse to quality 80-02 2/4-29/80 Concrete related activities, 1 Viol.

I reactor pressure vessel cleaning Improper activities, sandblasting and storage painting inside the drywell, of storage and maintenance, welding, materials rebar fabrication, pipe joint fitup, hanger installations, storage of radioactive sources.

80-03 3/3-28/80 Weld rod control, equipment Nora 1 maintenance and construction, structural steel welding and bolting, reactor vessel nozzle modification, pipe welding, status i of electrical work.

80-04 3/31-4/30/80 Reactor vessel nozzle modifica- 1 Viol.

1 tion, pipe welding, equipment Failure supports, hanger and restrains, of QC bolting, torus vent line bellows program i repairs, maintenance of installed execution equipment, concrete activities for cadwelding, pipe specs, PQR's, preventing allegation investigation involving segregation painting. of raecrete 80-05 4/21-25/80 Reactor vessel nozzle safe end None 1 replacement, safety-related pipe welding.

80-06 4/23-25/80 Nonconformance control, trend None 4/29/80 analysis, and control of field 1 change requests.

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Enclosure 4 7 80-07 5/5-30/80 RPV nozzle modifications, vent 3 Viol.

I line bellows repairs, equipment Welds made maintenance, structural steel without a welding, piping erection and procedure storage, backfill, ce'ic.l>M, bioshield welding, NDE records, Failure to containment penetrations, meet storage painting. allegation. requirements for RHR and core spray pumps Failure to identify weld defects and missing records for bioshield 80-08 5/12-16/80 Weld material control, RPV safe None 1 end welding, pipe welding.

80-09 6/2-27/80 RPV nozzle mods, vent line None 1 bellows repair, backfill and compaction, in place storage and maintenance, installation of to as piping, structural steel instalia-tion, containment welding.

80-10 6/30-8/1/80 Backfill, pipe fitup, torus None 2 welding, NDE of bioshield, storage of materials and equip--

ment, vent line bellows repair, drywell penetrations, structural steel installation and welding, core boring, control rod drive housing restraint beam installa-tion, concrete repairs.

80-11 8/5/8J infccmation managhment meeting None 2

80-12 8/6-9/1/80 Backfill, storage, vent line None 1 repairs, concrete repairs, control rod drive housing support beam installation, containment spray header installation, pneumatic testing of drywell penetrations, cadwelding, repair nf defective bioshield welds, concrete placement.

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Enclosure 4. 8 80-13 8/26-29/80 Concrete placement for lower None 9/2,3,9/80 bioshield wall, heave / settlement 1 program, cadweld spliced rebar test program, and dewatering activities.

80-14 9/2-10/5/80 Vent line bellows repair, struc- 3 Violations 2 tural steel installation, back- Failure to fill operations, pipe welding, establish equipment storage, drywell code basis penetration testing, drawing for installa-drawino control, weld filler tion of CRDM material control, rebar housing sup-installation, and equipment port brackets lifting and handling.

Failure to establish controls over welding

. . .: . e t.

Failure to follow bolt tensioning procedures 1 Deficiency Failure to follow procedures for issuing weld filler material 80-15 9/9/80 Cable tray installation and QA None 80-16 10/6-11/2/80 Vent line bellows repair, struc- 3 Violations 1 tural steel installation, back- Failure to fill operations, pipe welding, correctly in-equipment storage, rebar stall SRV installation, biological shield piping installation, reactor vessel supports placement preparations, pipe support installation, NDE, and Failure to rebar splicing. cap pipe spools l

Failure to identify and correct i deficiencies l

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Enclosure 4 9 80-17 11/4-7/80 Structural steel erection and None I handling and installation of major components.

80-18 11/12-14/80 Receiving, storage, and mainten- None 1 ance of equipment, including asscriated QA records.

80-19 11/3-30/80 Valve internals inspection, 1 Violation structural steel welding inside Failure to containment, structural steel follow pro-erection, containment upper spray cedures when header pipe support welding, making bolted storage, of piping, hangers, and connections equipment; pipe installation including rigging and welcing, rebar installation including mechanical splicing, concrete pre-placement, placement and curing; '

load testing of reactor pressure vessel (RpV) lifting rig, upper bioshield welding and painting, and concrete test lab activities.

80-20 12/2-5/80 Concrete construction and inspec- 1 Violation 1 tor certification Improperly certified personnel 80-21 12/1/80 - Bioshield rework, bloshield and 1 Violation 1/4/81 reactor vessel placement, vent Failure to 1 line bellows repair weld testir.g, maintain structural steel welding inside internal containment upper spray header piping pipe support welding, storage of cleanliness piping, hangers, and equipment; pipe installation, and concrete batch plant activities.

80-22 12/4,13,22 QA and procedures' for transport- None

&31/80 ing, lifting and setting the 2 reactor vessel. -

81-01 1/5-2/1/81 Vent line bellows repair testing, None 1 pipe handling, fitup and welding, concrete placement, weld preheat l in cold weather, structural steel I erection, and equipment storage.

Enclosure 4 10 81-02 2/2-3/1/81 Structural steel erection, pipe None 1 installation and repair, equip-ment storage, mechanical splicing of rebar, concrete placement, and upper bioshield installation.

81-03 2/5/81 Enforcement conference piping 2 subcontractor performance and responses to notices of violations.

81-04 3/2-4/5/81 Reactor vessel internals instal- 2 Violations 3 lation, pipe hanger installation, Incorrect structural steel erection, pipe thickness installation and repair, equip- qualification ment storage and concrete placement.

Failure to radiograph in accordance with procedure 81-05 4/6-5/3/81 Reactor vessel internals instal- 1 Violation 3 lation, pipe hanger installation, Defects in structural steel erection and ACME Embed welding, pipe installation, material storage, concrete place-ment, and electrical installations.

81-06 4/30/81 SAlp NA 1

81-07 5/4-31/81 Supplier QA program, safety None 2 relief valve piping, uppt, bio-shield welding, pipe whip restraint installation, house-keeping, equipment maintenance, and pipe hanger installation.

81-08 5/26-29/81 Structural steel drection, None 1 installation and documentation.

81-09 6/1-7/5/81 Upper bioshield welding, struc- None 2 tural steel erection, concrete placement, Cadweld program, hanger installation, batch plant material storage, cable tray and conduit installation, and pipe installation.

O Enclosure 4 11 81-10 6/18,19,22- Structural steel installation, 1 Viol.

26/81 component maintenance and Failure to 2 storage, and reactor vessel document installation, maintenance inspections 81-11 7/6-8/2/81 Hydrostatic testing, piping None 2 installation, rebar installation, backfill activities, hanger installation, concrete placement, equipment storage, electrical installation, diesel generator design, and batch plant operations.

81-12 8/3-31/81 Concrete placement, reactor vessel 1 Viol.

1 hold-down bolt torquing, and Failure to pipe and hanger installation. adequately train pipefitters 81-13 8/14-21/81 Concrete placement and QA. None 1

81-14 9/1-10/4/81 Structural steel installation, 1 Viol.

1 pipe and hanger installation, Failure to material storage, reactor vessel add filler installation, HVAC duct installa- while welding tion, service water intake structure excavation, concrete placement.

81-15 10/5-11/1/81 Pipe and hanger installation, None 1 material storage, housekeeping, service water pipe backfill, reactor vessel internals installation, service water intake structure excavation, fluid head penetration installation, and contractor QA. .

81-16 11/2-30/81 Intake structure installation, None 2 rebar installation, equipment storage, housekeeping, testing of embedded piping, fire protec- '

tion, and radiography.

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Enclosure 4 12 81-17 11/12/81 SALP NA 81-18 12/1/81- Rebar splicing, structural steel 2 Viol.

1/3/82 installation, pipe and hanger Failure to 2 installation, welder qualifica- implement tions, cable tray installation, corrective concrete placement, reactor action internals installation, material storage, fire protection, house- Failure to keeping, and wall pour operations. translate design basis into drawings /spe-cifications 82-01 1/4-31/82 Intake structure foundation con- 1 Violation 2 struction and design, PSAR Failure to commitment implementation, pipe implement and hanger installation, reactor procedures vessel internals installation, for M&TE control rod drive pipe installation, control concrete placement, and response to NRC Bulletins.

82-02 1/18-22/82 QA performance for ongoing work None 2 in the following areas: reactor internals, reactor controls supports, HVAC, and concrete placement; QA audits and surveillance.

82-03 2/1-28/82 Intake structure foundation None 1 cleanup, equipment storage and maintenance, structural steel installation, rebar installation, and valve installation.

82-04 3/1-4/4/82 Intake structure underwater con- 1 Violation 2 crete placement, structural Failure to steel welding, reactor internal implement installation, eledtrical penetra- weld filler tion installation, pipe and hanger material con-installation, ductwork installa- trol proce-tion, dure

Enclosure 4 13 82-05 4/5-5/2/82 Upper bioshield placement pre- 2 Violations 1 parations, intake structure Failure to dewatering and concrete place- indicate in-ment, structural steel welding, spection HVAC duct installation, anchor status of ex-bolt installation, and electrical pansion penetration installation, anchor bolts i

Failure to initiate a -

design change l prior to modification 82-06 5/3-31/82 Cable tray supports, diesel None 2 generator installation, electrical l penetrations, weld qualifications, l and QC inspector qualifications.

82-07 6/1-7/5/82 Installation of reactor internals, 3 Violations 1 pipe ard hangers, electrical Failure to penetration, and HVAC ductwork, bend test anchor bolting, NDE, housekeeping, Nelson studs and QC inspector qualifications.

! Failure to obtain

• l excavation

. permit 82-08 7/6-8/1/82 Structural steel erection, con- None 1 crete placement, service water pipe trench excavation, cable l tray and support installation, i pipe whip restraints, and welding.

82-09 8/2-9/6/82 Bioshield installation, concrete None 1 placement, filler metal control, hanger and pipe installation, housekeeping, polar crane assembly, diesel generator installation and structural steel erection.

82-10 8/30-9/2/82 Electrical installation, instru- None 1 mentation, and field design control.

i 82-11 9/8-10/82 Welding on vessel internals and 1 Violation 2 reactor vessel cleanliness Failure to control. follow clean-liness cor:trols i

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l Enclosure 4 14 82-12 9/9-10/3/82 Polar crane rail installation, 2 Violations 2 concrete placement, pipe and Failure to QC support installation, HVAC duct to inspect installation, rebar installation, MCC's backfill and compaction Failure activities, welding and NDE. to control weld activities 82-13 10/4-31/82 Cable tray installation, HVAC None 1 ductwork installation, pipe fit-i up and welding, pipe support and i pipe whip restraint welding, l concrete curing, and structural

! steel welding.

82-14 10/25-12/1/82 Mobile Van (NDE) inspection None 2 involving independent measure-ments to verify adequacy of welding QC and NDE program.

l l 82-15 11/'-12/5/82 Piping and support installation, 1 Violation

! 3 concrete curing, polar crane and Failure of QC reactor building dome installation, to identify housekeeping, HVAC ductwork pipe support installation, and QA audits. deficiencies 82-16 12/6/82- Reactor internals installation, None 1/2/83 cold weather concreting, hydro-

! I static testing, measuring and i test equipment, and expansion anchor bolt testing.

83-01 1/3-31/83 Cable tray installation, HVAC None 1 duct and support installation, materials storage, housekeeping, concrete activities, welding, and structural steel installation.

83-02 2/1-28/83 Reactor internals' installation, 1 Violation 2 concrete curing, equipment Failure to l storage, pipe and hanger follow proce-l installation, and housekeeping. dures for concrete j curing l

83-03 2/14-18/83 Design, procurement, receipt and None 1 installation of electrical components.

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Enclosure 4 15

83-04 2/28-3/4/83 So11 compaction testing, equip- None 1 ment storage, and construction deficiency correction.

83-05 3/1-4/17/83 Electrical cable storage and 1 Vic,lation 1 installation, water-tight door Fa lure of QC installation, structural steel to iuetify weld inspection, HVAC ductwork HVAC do.twork installation, and housekeeping, i.iiciencies 83-06 3/14-18/83 Electrical component procurement, None 1 receipt inspection, qualification

! and installation.

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83-07 4/18-22/83 Installation of electrical race- None

I ways, cables, instruments, and l valves.

l 83-08 4/18-6/5/83 Structural steel bolting and 1 Violation l 1 weldteg, cable tray and conduit Failure of QC installation, reactor vessel to identify cleanliness, materials trace- weld and in-l ability, and pipe supports. sta11ation discrepancies I 83-09 5/31-6/3/83 Electrical component and system None l

1 installation and QA l 83-10 6/6-7/4/83 Backfill activities, structural None l 1 steel bolting and welding, housekeeping and concrete place-ment.

83-11 7/11-15,21/83 pipe, pipe supports, and anchor None 3 bolts, QA/QC, and documentation

! of construction deficiencies.

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! 83-12 7/5-31/83 pipe and hanger installation, None l 1 housekeeping, response to NRC Bulletins and Cirbulars, and training.

83-13 8/18-10/16/83 Battery charging, backfill None 1 activities, pipe and hanger installation, materials storage, j and housekeeping.

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Enclosure 4 16 83-14 9/19-30/83 Regional Construction Team 1 Violation 10 Inspection of construction Failure of QC management, QA, design control, to identify electrical construction, welding raceway non-and piping, mechanical equipment, conformances procurement, and training.

83-15 9/19-23/83 Preservice inspection (PSI) None 1 activities.

M-16 10/17-12/4/83 Torus modifications, installa- None I tion of instrument tubing, electrical cable trays and conduits, piping, pipe supports, HVAC ductwork, housekeeping, and Construction Deficiency Repoi uno.

83-17 12/20-23/83 Welding and QA/QC for primary None l 1 containment modifications.

i 83-18 12/4/83- HVAC ductwork and support 1 Violation 1/5/84 installation, rebar drawings, Failure of QC pipe and support installation, to identify torus modifications, and inadequate l

housekeeping. weld prep 84-01 1/10-13/84 Procurement, installation, 1 Violation 2 inspection, and maintenance of Failure to electrical components and energize systems. diesel alternator heaters 84-02 1/9-2/20/84 Pipe and support installation, None 1 NRC trending, torus mods, house-keeping, documentation reviews, CDR's, potentially generic issues.

84-03 1/20/84 Corrective action on discrepan- None 1 cies identified th the original seismic analysis of the auxiliary building.

84-04 2/21-4/1/84 Torus mods, pipe and hanger None 1 installation, implementation of snubber protection program, cable l

pulling, housekeeping, potentially

generic issues, Bulletin and Circular review.

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Enclosure 4 17 84-05 5/14-6/24/84 Torus mods, raceway and cable 1 Violation 1 installation, seismic II/I 4 Examples program, HVAC ductwork supports, Failure to instrumentation, housekeeping, maintain ty-NCR and SDR trending, hydrostatic wrap spacing testing, electrical terminations, pipe and hanger installation, Failure to Startup and Test program manual, ty-wrap CDR's. cables to tray

, Failure of QC to identify shim installation

! deficiencies Failure to follow rework control procedures l 84-06 4/30-5/4/84 Pipe and support installation and 2 Violations i 2 related QA/QC activities. QC acceptance l of l nonconforming ,

! snubber installation l F.11ure to l notify QC of j snubber removal 84-07 CANCELLED 84-08 6/5-8/84 Heave / settlement measurement pro- None 1 gram records and actions taken and records generated relating to the CDR of grout intrusion into the drywell air gap, i 84-09 6/11-15/84 Work observation and records None l 4 associated with electrical cables and terminations and HVAC.

l 84-10 6/25-8/5/84 Equipment maintenance, turnover None 1 packages, seismic !!/1 program, instrumentation, proposed drywell l mod to accommodate reactor water l level sensing lines, housekeeping, COR's, allegation investigation.

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l Enclosure 4 18 84-11 CANCELLED 84-12 8/6-9/16/84 Hydrostatic testing, pipe hanger 1 Violation, 1 installation, torus sand blasting, 3 Examples core boring, startup gror per- Failure of r sonnel qualifications, t over startup pro-packages, Bulletin and Circular gram to con-review. trol action items l Failure to assure test author attendance at PORC Failure to implement adequate PORC l review l

84-13 8/20-24/84 Safety-related equipment, vendor None

I documentation and QC records of piping and equipment, QA audit records.

84-14 CANCELLED 84-15 9/19-21/84 Piping system as-built turnover None 9/26-28/84 inspection, welding, PSI /151 3 program.

84-16 9/24-28/84 QA program for turnover including None 3 QA/QC overview and interfacing ,

activities.

84-17 10/1-4/84 Preoperational environmental None 2 surveillance program, radio- ,

logical environmental monitoring program, meteorological program, facilities and equipment, documentation, quality assurance, and contractor programs.

84-18 9/17-11/4/84 Mechanical and piping system None 1 walkdowns, instrumentation, potentially generic issues, falsification of records of soils test lab, QA audits of turnover packages, COR's, SAFETEAM, piping system walkdowns.

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e Enclosure 4 19 84-19 10/29-11/2/84 Preoperational QA including None 2 surveillances and audits.

84-20 10/30-11/1/84 This inspection opened the None 2 preop test program.

84-21 11/5-9/84 Work observation and quality 1 Violation, 4 record review of the installa- 2 Examples tion of cabling and instrumen- Unsupported tation systems and components cable in the areas of receipt inspec-tion routing, storage, termina- 8end radius tions, and maintenance, violation 84-22 10/22/84 This was a second corporate NA management meeting to discuss construction status and Region I activities during the preop and startup phases.

84-23 10/23-10/26/ Preop instrumentation, manage- None 84 ment action to address previously 1 identified problems in the instrumentation area, CDR's.

84-24 11/5/84-12/ Routine resident inspection of None 16/84 construction work in progress, 3 preoperational testing and preventative maintenance 84-25 11/14/84- Preservice Inspection Program None 11/29/84 activities, personnel qualifica-1 tion records and QA surveillance reports 84-26 SALP 84-27 12/10/84- System turnover process and Nont 12/14/84 procedures '

2 84-28 12/17/84- Preoperation test program and None 12/20/84 procedures 3

l l 84-29 12/17/84- Routine resident inspection of 1 Violation l 1/27/85 preoperational test programs Failure to 2 and ongoing construction follow test activities equipment Control procedures r

Enclosure 4 20 i

L 85-01 1/1/85- Preventive maintenance and 1 Violation

1/1)/85 preparations for reactor vessel Failure to l 4 hydrostatic test. maintain l storage conditions for a heat exchanger.

85-02 1/8/85- Preoperational radiation protec- None 1/10/85 tion, chemistry, and radioactive waste programs.

85-03 1/14/85- Installation of safety-related 1 Violation 1/18/85 instrument components and 2 Examples of I systems. failure to follow procedures.

85-04 Cancelled 85-05 1/28/85- Routine resident inspection i Violation 3/3/85 of preoperational test program Control of 2 and ongoing construction fluid and activities. pipe temperatures during piping system flushes, 85-06 2/12/85- Preoperational tests and con- None 2/15/85 struction work in progress.

4 85-07 2/11/85 & Management Meeting on system None 2/15/85 turnover and control room N/A design. ,,

85-08 4/8/85- Independent measurements of None 5/3/85 safety-related piping.

3 85-09 Cancelled

f Enclosure 4 21 85-10 3/4/85- Safety related electrical 1 Violation 3/8/85 equipment Failure to 1 maintain safety

'I related cables and trays in a '

safe and clean condition.

85-11 4/8/85- Quality Assurance Program for None 4/12/85 Preoperational and Startup 4 Testing.

85-12 3/1/85- Reactor Vessel and Related None 3/5/85 Piping Hydrostatic Test.

2 85-13 3/12/85- Preoperational test review and None i 3/15/85 verification.  !

2 85-14 3/14/85- Routine resident inspection of None 4/14/85 work in progress and pre-3 operational testing.

85-15 3/18/85- Piping systems and supports, PSI None 3/22/85 4

85-16 3/19/85- Preoperational radiation pro- None 3/25/85 tection program.

1 85-17 4/15/85- Safety related electrical 1 Violation 4/18/85 systems. Failure to 3 perform maintenanc e

in a timely manner.

85-18 4/16/85- Preoperational test procedure None 4/19/85 review and verification.

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Enclosure 4 22 85-19 4/15/85- Routine resident inspection of None 5/27/85 Preoperational testing, ongoing 5 construction work, and Emergency Planning program development.

85-20 4/22/85- Class 1 small pipe and pipe None 4/26/85 supports.

2 85-21 4/29/85- Maintenance, Surveillance, None 5/3/85 Document Control.

2 85-22 4/29/85- Reactor Pressure Vessel None 5/3/85 Internals Installation.

2 85-23 5/13/85- Preventive Maintenance Program r,;n a 5/17/85 and installation of safety-2 r. '. . . e .: . . . .. ! . .- pr.c n t 85-24 5/20/85- Emergency Lighting and safe None 5/24/85 shutdown capability in the event 5 of a fire 85-25 5/14/85- Preoperational Security Program None 5/17/85 Review 2

85-26 6/10/85- Preoperational Testing None 6/14/85 1

85-27 5/28/85- Routine resident inspection of 1 Violation

• 7/7/85 preoperational testing and work Failure to 4 in progress follow procedures for implementing preoperation-al tests,.

l 85-28 6/10/85- Pre-Service Inspection Program None 6/14/85 1 l i

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O Enclosure 4 23 85-29 7/8/85- RO & SRO Initial Cold License None 7/17/85 Examinations 8

85-30 6/24/85- Preoperational Test Program None 6/28/85 Imple.nentation 2

85-31 6/24/85- Soils and Foundations None 6/28/85 1

85-32 5/8/85- Review of Independent Design 5/10/85 & Verification Program 6/4/85-6/6/85 9

85-33 7/8/85-7/12/ Quality Assurance Program for None 85 & 7/15/85- Operations 7/18/85 4

85-34 7/8/85- Safety related electrical None 7/11/85 systems and equipment 1

85-35 7/18/85- Routine resident inspection 1 Violation 8/11/85 of Preoperational testing and 3 ongoing construction work 85-36 7/22/85- Preoperational Testing Program None 7/26/85 3

65-37 7/30/85- Preservice Inspection Program None 7/26/85 3

85-38 7/30/85- Operations Quality Assurance None 8/2/85 Program 2

85-39 8/5/85- Instrumentation and controls None 8/9/85 support systems 2

85-40 8/12/85- Er..ergency Preparedness Program None 8/16/85 Appraisal 7

o Enclosure 4 24 85-41 8/19/85- Readiness inspection for new l 8/30/85 fuel receipt ~

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l 85-42 8/12/85- Routine resident inspection of 1 Violation l 9/23/85 New Fuel Receipt Preoperational Inadequate i 3 Testing, and ongoing construction design l work control 85-43 8/1/85 Management Meeting on operator None N/A licensing examination results 85-44 9/10/85- Preoperational Radiation Pro- None 9/13/85 tection, Chemistry, and 3 Radioactive Waste Program 85-45 9/24/85- Routine resident inspection of 1 Violation 10/27/85 new fuel receipt, preoperational Excessive l 3 testing, and ongoing construc- cable tion work restraint spacing 85-46 9/23/l!5- Preservice Inspection Program None 9/30/85 I

85-47 9/25/85 and Preoperational Test Program None 10/1/85-l 10/11/85 3

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85-48 10/14/85- Operator Licensing Examinations None l 10/23/85 7

85-49 Cancelled 85-50 Cancelled 85-51 10/21/85- Instrumentation systems, com- 2 Violations 10/25/85 ponents, and control circuits Failure to 2 follow instructions, procedures, drawings; Inadequate design control 85-52 10/28/85- Preoperational Radiation Pro- None 11/15/85 tection and Radioactive Waste 1 programs

Enclosure 4 [bc 85-53 '0/28/85- Observation of annual emergency None 10/30/85 exercise 7

85-54 9/30/85- Independent Design Verification None 10/3/85 Program Final Report

'7 85-55 11/4/85- Preoperational Test Program and None l 11/15/85 Startup Test Program 1

2 85-56 10/28/85- Routine Resident Inspection of None-l 12/1/85 Preoperational testing and 5 ongoing construction work l .

t 85-57 '-

11/12/85- Preoperati,nai. Security Program t:cne l 11/15/85 Rev ow 2

As-BU.itTeamInspection

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85-58 12/2/85- None 12/13/85 10 ,

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85-59 11/1F/85- Chemical and Radiochemical None j 11'22/85 Measurements Programs 2

85-60 11/18/85- Preservice Inspection Program None 11/22/85 1

i e

O Enclosure 4 26 85-61 12/1/85- Routine Resident Inspection of 2 Violations 1/12/86 Preoperational Test Program and Quality 2 ongoing construction activities Control witness points bypassed and procedure changed without proper controls; final QC inspection failed to identi fy substandard bolt installed in flange in safety-relat-ed system 85-62 9/9/85- Preoperational Testing and Local None 9/18/85 Leak-Rate Testing 3 ,

85-63 12/16/85- Heave / Settlement Measurement None 12/19/85 and Program, HVAC Ductwork & Supports, 12/23/85 Pipe Support Designs 2

85-64 12/2/85- Technical Specification Review None 12/13/85 and As-built comparison 3

85-65 12/23/85- Integrated Leak-Rate Test 1 Violation 1/3/86 Review / witnessing Closure of 2 containment isolation valve by other than normal mode of motor l operation i

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Enclosure 4 27 85-66 12/30/85- ATWS Event Followup Items, QA None 1/3/86 Records and Measuring and Test 2 Equipment 86-01 1/7/86- Fire Detection ai.d Prevention None 1/24/86 Program 3

86-02 1/27/86- Administrative, Operations, and None 1/31/86 and Maintenance Procedures Review 2/3/86-2/7/

86 & 2/14/86 3

86-03 1/7/86- Preoperational Test Progr:m None 1/17/86 Revlew 3

86-04 1/7/86- Operations QA Program None 1/10/86 and 1/13/86-1/15/86 1

86-05 1/13/86- Water Chemistry Control Program None 1/24/86 Review 1

86-06 1/13/86- Routine Resident Inspection of 1 Violation 2/9/86 Preoperational Testing Activities Failure to 6 fully demonstrate system functionality 86-07 1/21/86- Health Physics

• 2/14/86 86-08 1/27/86- Preoperational Security Program None 1/30/86 Review

• I 86-09 2/3/86- Emergency Planning

• 2/7/86 86-10 1/27/86- Pre-operational Testing

• 2/7/86 86-11 1/27/86- Preservice Inspection Program None 1/31/86 Review 1

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Enclosure 4 28 86-12 2/10/86- Start-up Program 2/21/86 86-13 2/10/86- Open Item Closecut and Snubber None 2/14/86 Activity Review 2

l 86-14 2/3/86- Safeteam

• 2/7/86 86-15 2/10/86- Routine Resident

• 3/16/86 86-16 2/24/86- Operator Licensing

• 4/24/86 86-17 2/24/86- Start-up Program

• 2/28/86 86-18 3/3/86- Start-up Program

• 3/14/86 86-19 3/3/86- Bulletin /Open Items Closecut

• 3/6/86 86-20 3/17/86- Routine Resident

• 4/30/86 86-21 3/12/86- Surveillance Testing /

• 3/21/86 Start up Program

• Report Not Issued l

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