ML20055G433
| ML20055G433 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem, Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 06/28/1990 |
| From: | Randy Erickson Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Bellamy R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18095A358 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9007230171 | |
| Download: ML20055G433 (3) | |
Text
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l MEMORANDUM FOR: Ronald R. Bellanty, Chief ga ' , ' Facilities Radiological Safety and Safeguards Branch Division of Radiation Safety A and Safeguards Region I FROM: Robert A. Erickson, Chief Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Radiation Protection I and Emergency Preparedness Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
FEMA EXERCISE REPORT FOR THE ARTIFICIAL ISLAND POWER PLANT Enclosed is a letter from Dennis Kwiatkowski of the Federal 2.mergency Management i Agency (FEMA) dated June 13, 1990, transmitting the FEMA Region I report for the November 29 - December 1, 1988 full participation exercise at Artificial-Island Power Plant. An evaluation of the December 2,1988 medical drill is also included in the report. No deficiencies were identified in this exercise. However, forty-five Areas Requiring Corrective Action were identified as a result of this exercise. We recommend that you transmit the enclosed FEMA letter and exercise report to the licensee with the request that the licensee in toordination with offsite authorities ensure that the areas requiring corrective action identified by FEMA have been addressed. Robert A. Erickson, Chief Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency Preparedness Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
FEMA ltr. dtd. 6/13/90
.w/ enclosure Distribution w/o enclosure to FEMA ltr.: Distribution w/ enclosure:
FJCongel, NRR RHasselberg, NRR RAErickson, NRR WLazarus, RI RJBarrett,-NRR LJCunningham, NRR FKantor, NRR CYShiraki, NRR 9007230171 900710 JCStone, NRh PDR ADOCK 05000272 F PDC MTaylor, EDO EPB R/F Central Files PEPQ- P . RHasskiberg PEM F1teh~ tor PE RE son C#90 4 /?[/90 (, /Wl/90 h / /90
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JUN ? 81990 L ! MEMORANDUM FOR:. [iisitNM$k' M IM~ 37 $afety
. Facilities Ridiolog'ic'@T a
and Safeguards Branch Division of Radiation Safety q.
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, Regian I 's FROM: Robert A..Erickson, Chief f ,
Emergency Preparedness Branch
-Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency Preparedness Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 7'S'C'#- Dq
SUBJECT:
-FEMA EXERCISE REPORT FOR THE E NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 4
, Enclosed is a' letter from Dennis Kwiatkowski of the Federal Energency Management Agency (FEMA)datedJune 13 -1990, transmitting.the FEMA Region-I report for:
the November 29 - December 1,1988 full participation exercise at Artificial Island Power Plant. An e,aluation of the December 2,1988 nedical drill-is
'also included in the report.
No deficiencies were identified-in this exercise. However, forty-five Areas c Requiring; Corrective Action were identified'as a result of this exercise. Wa. recommend'that you transmit the enclosed FEMA letter and exercise report to - the licensee with_the request that the licensee in: coordination with offsite
~
- Lauthorities ensure that the areas requiring corrective action-identified-by
/a '
-FEMA have been addressed.
i i vt Rob rt A. Erickson, Chief Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of-Radiation Protection and Emergency Preparedness Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ; i t
, Enclosurs
' FEMA'ltr. dtd. 6/13/90
-w/ enclosure 2
~~~~
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~
Washington, D.C. 20472
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JJ: 3 1933 Mr) Frank J. Cargel Director Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency Prepared ess
. office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory h i== ion Washington, DC 20555 Dear Mr. Congelt Enclosed is a copy of the exercise report for the Nch.M 29 - Mr 1, 1988,: full-participation exercise of the New Jersey State and local offsite radiological emergency response plans, site-specific to the Artificial Island Nuclear Power Plant. This report includes an evaluation of the Mr 2,1988 medical drill which testad.the capabilities of ambularce service and hospital facilities for this site. 'Ihe swi. was prepared by Region II of the Federal Emergency Marspmeit Agency (FDR).
No deficiencies were identified during this exercise. However, forty-five Areas Requiring Ccuddve Acticm were identified as a result of this exercise, naw on wr&,tive actions already taken, FDR considers that offsite radiological energency preparedness is adequate to provide reasonable assurance that 6ppviate measures can be taken offsite to protect the health arrl safety of the public living in the vicinity of the site, in the event of a radiological' emergency. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact craig Wingo, Technological Hazards Divisica Chief, an 646-3026. Sincerely s & Dennis H. Rwiatkowski V Assistant Associate Diret, tor
- Office of Natural and Technological Hazards
- - ml 4{o O1. An m o
ENCLOSURE n wee swam wns +-+.e,,,,e m e 4-oo m 4m n-m m s,,,,. m .s
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.1 i
POST EXERCISE ASSESSMENT
. November 29-December 1,1988, Exercise of the Radiological Emergency Response Plans of the State of New Jersey, Salem and Cumberland Counties, and Eight Localities -
In Those Counties for Public Service Electric and Gas Company's Artiftelal Island Site, Salem - Unit 2 Nuclear Generating Station, Hancocks Bridge, Salem County, New Jersey
, 4 ..
December 15,1989 h Federal Emergency Management Agency Region !! v 4 b a6t1o n M f g. h._
h CONTENTS 1 1 v . P ARTICIP ATION OF GOVER N M ENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi L A BB R EVI ATIO N S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L 1
SUMMARY
3-
~1 I N T R O D U C TI O N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1 1.1 Ex e rcise Ba c kgroun d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4 le 1.2 Fe deral Evalua t o rs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 L 1. 3 Ev alu a t io n C ri t e ri a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 [. 1. 4 ' Ex e rc is e O bj e c tiv e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . New Jersey Emergency. Operations Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8' l 1.4.1 Bureau of Nuclear Engineering Headquarters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.4.2 9 1.4.3 Emergency Operations Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ 1.4.4 E m e rg e n cy N e w s C e nt e r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 . l i New Jersey State Police - Forward Command Post . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 l i- 1.4.5 9 1.4.6 Radiological Field Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4.7 St a t e Field Ac tivities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 j 1.4.8 Salem County Emergency Operations Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - 10 1 l 1.4.9 Sale m County Field Ac tivities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 11 l 1.4.10 Sale m County Municipalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4.11 Salem County Municipal Field' Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . .' . . . . . . . . . . 12 L 12-f, 1.4.12 Cumberland County Emergency Operations Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . j 1.4.13 ~ Cumberland County Field Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 ; 1.4.14 Cumberland County Municipalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
~
14 1.4.15 Cumberland County Municipal Field Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 -j ( 15 - 1'- 1.5 Exercise Scenario Overvie w . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . :
- 1. 5.1 ~ Ini t i al C o ndi t io ns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
15 ] N arrativ e Su m m ary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 1.5.2 Emergency Classification and Event Timeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Table 1 a Table 2 Protective Action Timeh - Plume Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 l- Table 3 Protective Action Timein -Ingestion and Recove ry/ Re e ntry P hase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 J t L 2 EXE R C ISE EV A L U ATIO N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 ] 1 1 22 L 2.1 N e w J e rs e y S t a t e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . State Emergency Operation Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 L 2.1.1 Radiological Field Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 j l, 2.1.2 31 1 22.1.3 Field A c t iv i t i e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l l- Emergency Worker Exposure Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 ) 2.1.4 33 J 2.1.5 Ingestion Pathway Sampling Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 2.2 ' E mergency Operations Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 j
- 2. 3 E m e rg e nc y N e w s C e n t e r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
41 g p 2 . 4 Sale m C o unt y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Salem County Emergency Operations Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 l 2.4.1 ' Radiological Field Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 p 2.4.2 47 I 2.4.3 F i e ld Ac tiviti es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Emergency Worker Exposure Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 i 2.4.4 Salem County Municipal Response Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 l p' 2.4.5 57 2.4.6 Sc hool In t e rvi e w s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. jl .r k O .
111 l i
CONTENTS (Cont'd)
- 2. 5 C u m be rl a nd C o un t y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 2.5.1 Cumberland County Emergency Operations Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 2.5.2 Radiological Field Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 2.5.3 F i e ld A c t i vi t i e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 2.3.4 Emergency Worker Exposure Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 2.5.5 Cumberland County Municipal Response Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 2.5.6 Sc hoo l In t e rvi e w s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 2.5.7 M e d i c al D r ill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 3 REMOVAL OF CORRECTED ARC As FROY ?REVIOUS EXERCISES . . . . . . . . . . . 78 4 SUMM ARY OF AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 TABLES 1 Emergency Classification and Event Timeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2 Protective Ac tion Timeline - Plu m e Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 3 Protective Action Timeline - Ingestion and Recovery / Reentry Phase . . . . .'. . . . . . 21 4 Re moval of Corrected ARC As from Previous Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 4.1 Salem Nuclear Generating Station -
Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action N e w J e rs e y S t a t e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 4.2 Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action Em ergency Operations Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 4.3. Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action E m e rg e n c y N e w s C e n t e r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 4.4 Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action Sa l e m C o u n t y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 4.5 Salem Nuclear Generating Station - . Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action Sale m County M unicipali ties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 4.6 Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action , C u m be rlan d C o u n t y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3 4.7 Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action Cumberland County Municipalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 iv
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m s PARTICIPATION OF GOVERNMENTS i 1 1 Participating Governments . The State of New Jersey Salem County Elsinboro
' Lower Alloways Creek Manningtoa Pennsville Quinton
- Salem City Cumberland County i', Greenwich Stow Creek -!
=. . j o, The State of Delaware 'y (see pages 1 and'7) j R; Nonparticipating Governments '
None- . f l-i , a q. _s
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h ig - '[ i hh , ' 3 . W:; ABBREVIATION 8 ' -aa w
'AlPEA ArtificialIsland Post Exercise Assessment ,
ANL Argonne National Laboratory I ARC American Red Cross ' i AMS Aerial Monitor System i BNE Bureau of Nuclear Engineering (New Jersey) ~ CCFA Cumberland County Field Activities c CCEOC Cumberland County Emergency Operations Center F' CCM Cumberland County Municipalities !" CCMFA Cumberland County Municipal Field Activities j C PCS-1 Common Program Control Station DOC U.S. Departm'ent of Commerce j',- ' DOE DOH U.S. Department of Energy Department of Health 5 A DOI U.S. Department of the Interior DOT U.S. Department of Transportation s o EAL Emergency Action Level
's, EBS Emergency Broadcast System ? ECL Emergency Classification Level ,
EIS Emergency Information System EMC Emergency Management Coordinator j
*3' EMRAD Emergency Management Radio (a New Jersey State Police 1, emergency radio system) ,,
EMS Emergency Medical Service ENC Emergency News Center d EOC Emergency Operations Center
'i EOF Emergency Operations Facility (lleensee, near site) 1 EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
- g EPZ Emergency Planning Zone i FCP Forward Command Post FDA U.S. Food and Drug Administration FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FM Field Monitoring FNARS Federal National Radio System FNATS Federal National Teletype System C-M. ~ Geiger-Mueller i HQ Headquarters
- HHS U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ~
INEL Idaho National Engineering Laboratory K! Potassium lodide 4 VL
t T
.l ABBREVIATIONS (Cont'd) ,
l LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident ; NAWAS National Warning System i, Nuclear Emergency Telephone Systems -l NETS Nuclear Generating Station NGS - NJDOH New Jersey Department of Health
+
NJSP New Jersey State Police < NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ' NUE . Notification of Unusual Event NUREG-0654 Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Prepardness in Support of Nuclear . r Power Plants (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1) ., OEM Office of Emergency Management (New Jersey State Police) OSC Operations Support Center PAG Protective Action Guide PAR Protective Action Recommendation PIO Public Information Officer PSE&G Public Service Electric and Gas Company RAC- Regional Assistance Committee
-RACES' Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service
'RADECO Brand name of radiological sampling equipment RADEF Radiological Defense RAP Radiological Assistance Plan RERP ' Radiological Emergency Response Plan SCEOC Salem County Emergency Operations Center SCFA Salem County Field Activities .
SC M - . Salem County Municipality SCMFA Salem County Municipal Field Activities SEOC . State Emergency Operations Center (New Jersey) .i SFA State Field Activities SNGS Salem Nuclear Generating Station SOP Standard Operating Procedure SRAO State Radiological Assessment Officer
TAC Technical Assistance Center TACT Tactical (message form) '
TCP Traffic Control Point TLD Thermoluminescent Dosimeter TSC - Technical Support Center (Salem Nuclear Generating Station) USCG U.S. Coast Guard USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture vii
a
.- 1
SUMMARY
I On November 29-December 1,1988, a team of 31 Federal evaluators monitored an exercise of the radiological emergency response plans and the levels of State, county, and municipal preparedness for the Artificial Island Site in Salem County, New Jersey. FEMA Region !!! has issued a separate post exercise assessment for Delaware. The full-participation exercise was conducted by Public Service Electric and Gas Company and included ingestion pathway activities. Following the exercise, a preliminary Evaluation was made by the Federal evaluation team, and a briefing for exercise participants was held at the Penns Grove Holiday Inn on- December 2,1988, at_1000 hours. Detailed evaluations were prepared and are ine'.uded in this report. A public critique was held on December 6,1988, at the Salem Cou'ity Fire Training Center. During a full-participation exercise, the Federal Emergency Management Agency requires that most components of the State and local emergency response organizations participate. The following operations and activities were specified for demonstration for the Federal evaluators to observe and evaluate during this exercises e State Emergency Operations Center;
- Bureau of Nuclear. Engineering Headquarters;
- New Jersey State Police -- Forward Command Post;
..
- Emergency Operations Facility;
* ' Emergency News Center;
- Salem County Emergency Operations Center;
- Cumberland County Emergency Operations Center;
- Municipal Emergency Operati_ons Centers;
- Evacuation of general population;
- Evacuation of school children;
- Evacuation of mobility-impaired persons;
- Traffic control;
- Siren activation (simulated) and Emergency Broadcast System messages;
- Radiological field monitoring (plume and ingestion);
i 3: -3 , 7j, e Reception and congregate care; Decontamination 1=
~ e' ,, e Medical drill; and
- c e School interviews.
s k 6 e0 e 4
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' t 1 INTRODUCTION t
'1.1 EXERCISE BACEGROUND
~ On? December 7, 1979, the Pet.Jent directed the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assume lead responsibility for all off-site nuclear planning and response. FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency plannin7 for i
fixed nuclear facilltles include the following
^
*. Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning ahd in the review and evaluation of radiological emergency response plans (RERPs'
' developed by State and local governments. ,
- Determining whether such plans can be implemented on the baals of:
observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans conducted by l' state and local governments, and
- f. *' Coordinating the activities of federal agencies ~with responsibilities
~
j-in the radiological emergency planning process:
-U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC)
-U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
-U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
- -U.S. Department of Energy (DOE).
-U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)'
-U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)
'*' -U.S.' Department of Agriculture (USDA) l .
-U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
~
-U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI)
The RERPs for the Artificial Island Site (Salem and Hope Creek- Nuclear : Generating . Stations (NGSs]) were formally submitted to the Regional Assistance Committee:(RAC) by New Jersey and Delaware. -Formal submission;was followed by a critique and ongoing evaluation. A public meeting was held to acquaint citizens with the contents of the plans, to answer their questions, and to receive suggestions for changes in 3 ' " the plans. The following exercises have been conducted by FEMA Region 11 to assess the L , . " ' capabilities of State and local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their RERPs 'and procedures to protect the public in a radiological emergency involving the' Artificial Island Nuclear Generating Station (AINGS). (' i S
- 4 ,
Date of .. Headquarters -
. Exercise . Exercise Publication Transmittal to-
' Number' Date Date' NRC 1 4/8/81 4/24/81 2 -10/13/82 1/10/83 7/8/83 3 10/26/83 2/06/84 4/27/84
- 4 10/23/84 2/19/85= 2/26/85 Remedial (4/23/85 6/19/85 7/31/85 Exercise ~ D ,
5 11/12/86 5/12/87 6/17/87 6 11/29-12/1/88 12/15/89 The sixth full-participation exercise, the subject of this report, was conducted on November 29-December 1,1988. As part of this exercise, a medical drill was conducted on. December 2,1988, to test the capabilities of ambulance service and ~ hospital facilities. A Federal evaluation team comprised of personnel from FEMA Region 11, RAC, and FEMA's contractors evaluated the exercise. Thirty-one evaluators; were
-assigned to monitor the emergency response activities of state and local' jurisdictions.
These evaluators .were broken down into 3 teams. Team leaders coordinated team operations. Following the exercise, Federal evaluators met to compile their evaluations. ,3 Evaluators presented observations specific to their assignments. The teams of evaluato'es developed preliminary . assessments - for each jurisdiction, and team leaders . then - consolidated the evaluations of Individual team members. The' findings presented in this report are based on the evaluations' of the Federal
-evaluators,l with final determinations by the FEMA Region II RAC Chairman. FEMA requests that State and local jurisdictions submit a schedule of remedial actions because the FEMA'-Regional. Director is responsible for certifying to 'the FEMA Associate Director _ :of State andlLocal Programs and Support, -Washington, D.C., that all deficiencies and ARCA's evaluated during the exercise have been or will be corrected and that such corrections are being incorporated into the State and local plans, as appropriate.
- 6 ,
1.2 FEDERAL EVALUATORS Thirty-one Federal evaluators valuated off-site response functions. The names of these individuals, their affiliations, ano '. heir exercise assignments are given below. .
' Evaluator Entity Exercise Location and/or Function (s)
I. Husar FEMA RAC Chairman, State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) Operations
. 5 P. Weberg FEKA Oversight evaluation Oversight evaluation R. Acerno FEKA S. Nelson ANL SEOCl Team Leader S. Singer FEKA SEOCi Communications J. Keller INEL Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and New Jersey Bureau of Nuclear Engineering (BNE); Recovery and Reentry P. Kier AhL Salem County Emergency Operations Center (SCEOC); Team Leader H. Fish DOE SCEOC; Communications and Operations T. Baldwin ANL Cumberland County Emergency Operations Center (CCEOC);
Team Leader M. Madore ANL CCEOC; Communications and Operations A. Hall ANL Elsinboro Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and Lower Alloways Creek EOC J. Mitrani AN'L Mannington EOC and Pennsville EOC J. Moore ANL Quinton EOC and Salem City EOC L. Zander ANL Greenwich EOC and Stow Creek EOC F. Herrera FEMA Simulated Siren Failure; Route Alerting and Access Control B. Conley USDA Simulated Siren Failure; Route Alerting, Ingestion Sampling Team, and Decision-making J. Sutch ANL Emergency News Center (ENC) L. Testa FEMA Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) Cateway Station (WBSS); School Interviews and School Bus Evacuation M. Farrell FEHA New Jersey State Police -- Forward Command Post (FCP); Traffic Control, School Interviews, and School Bus Evacuation E. Fox NRC Radiological Field Monitoring, State Vanguard Team A, and Ingestion Sampling Team B. Salmonson INEL Salem County Radiological Field Monitoring: Ingestion Sampling Team B. Serrano INEL Cumberland County Radiological Field Monitoring; Ingestion Sampling Team l
6 S. Gray FEMA Ceneral Population Bus Evacuation T. Matthews Mass. General Population Bus Evacuationi Ingestion Sampling , DOH Team M. Pensak EPA Emergency Worker Decontamination, General Population ' Monitoring and Decontamination (Salem County), Ingestion Pathway Emergency Lab.J" wy Facility -- Protective Action Recommendation (PAR), and Congregate Care Center (Salem County) D. Duncan ANL Emergency Worker Decontamination, General Population Monitoring and Decontamination (Cumberland County), BNE, and Congregate Care Center (Cumberland County) J. Staroba ANL Access Control and Traffic Control Individuals; R. Bernacki FDA Noninstitutionalized Mobility-Impaired Medical Drill M. Santiago FEMA Support R. Neal FEMA Observer M. Marley FDA Observer 1.3 EVALUATION CRITERIA The exercise evaluations presented in Section 2 are based on applicable planning ' standards and evaluation criteria set forth in Sec.11 of NUREG-0654-FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1 (Nov.1980). For the purpose of exercise assessment, FEMA utilized the Exercise Evaluation Methodology (EEM) dated May 25, 1988, for interim use. FEMA classifies exercise inadequacies as deficiencies or Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARC As). Deficiencies are demonstrated and observed inadequacies in the performance of state and local governments that would cause a finding that off-s!te emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures could be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power facility in the event of a radiological emergency. Because of the potential adverse impact of deficiencies on emergency preparedness, they are required to be promptly corrected through appropriate remedial actions, including remedial exercises, drills, or other actions. ARCAs are also demonstrated and observed inadequacies in the performance of State and local governments, and although their correction is required
*during the next scheduled biennial exercise, they are not considered, by themselves, to adversely impact public health and safety. An ARCA that is not corrected in future exercises may be reclassified as a deficiency. FEMA also identifies Areas Recommended for Improvement (ARFis), which are areas observed during an exercise that are not considered to adversely impact public health and safety. Although not required, -
correction of these areas would enhance an organization's level of emergency preparedness.
t 1.4 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES The licensee (Public Service Electric and Gas Company [PSE&Gl), FEMA, NRC, and the States of New Jersey and Delaware planned a " full-participation" exercise of their respective RERPs for both the on-site and off-site support agencies. The exercise involved activation and participation of the staff and response facilities of the AINGS as well as the emergency organizations and emergency facilities of the States of New Jersey and Delaware and the local municipalities. As noted previously, FEMA Region !!! has issued a separate post exercise assessment for Delaware. The exercise tested the emergency response in both the 10-mile plume pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) and the 50-mile ingestion pathway EPZ, including recovery and reentry activities. The exercise was intended to demonatrate many, but not necessarily all, of the licensee's, States', and local governments' abilities to respond to an accident at a commercial nuclear power plant. The scenario was designed to activate the various levels of the AINGS < RERPs and PSE&G corporate RERP. Although the scenario accurately simulated operating events, it was never intended to assess all of the operator's diagnostic capabilities. Rather, it was designed to provide sequences that would ultimately demonstrate the operator's ability to respond to events resulting in the exercise of both on-site and off-site emergency procedures. The exercise demonstrated a number of primary emergency preparedness functions. At no time was the exercise permitted to interfere with the safe operation of the AINGS. The plant management, at its discretion, could have suspended the exercise for any length of time to ensure this goal. Before the exercise, it was agreed between FEMA Region !! and the State of New Jersey, that the actual sounding of the strens would occur at the Site Area Emergency
. ECL This pre-designated sounding (in conjunction with an EBS test message broadcast),
was due to the large elderly population residing in the 10-mile EPZ. Any sounding of the strens later than the Site Area Emergency ECL would unnecessarily alarm them, and create a public relations problem.
' During the exercise, Federal agencies were notified according to existing '
emergency response procedures. Personnel from FEMA Region !! with radiological emergency preparedness responsibility activated the local Federal response. Federal representatives also acted as exercise evaluators (Sec.1.2.) To properly drive the exercise in terms of off-site doses and areas affected, exercise meteorology was used. Actual meteorology might have led to projected radiological doses below established protective action guides (PAGs) within the areas of
- Interest.
The objectives listed in Sees. 1.4.1-1.4.15 were developed for this exercise and are referenced in the narrative of the exercise evaluation (Sec. 2). - E
8 . w w e 1.4.1 - New Jersey Emergency Operations Center (SEOC)' x '
, .SEOC-1 Demonstrate. the ability to monitor, understand, and use emergency .
classification levels (ECLs) through appropriate implementation of emergency . functions and activities corresponding to the ECLs, as required by the
- scenario.
0 SEOC-2 Demonstrate the ability. to fully alert, mobilize, and activate pmannel for ~
' both facility- and field-based emergency functions.
SEOC-3 Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency activities. - SEOC-4 Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel. SEOC-5 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, - displays, and other materials to support emergency operations. SEOC-6 Demonstrate the ability to make appropriate protective action decisions, based on projected 'or actual dosage, EPA PAGs, availability of adequate shelter, evacuation time estimates, and other relevant factors. SEOC-7 Demonstrate the ability to initially alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an instructional message within'15 minutes of a decision by an appropriate state official (s). SEOC-8 Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of accurate information and instructions to the pubiic in a timely fashion af ter the initial alert and notification has occurred. SEOC-9 Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated and timely fashion.
~
SEOC-10 Demonstrate the ability to make the decision to recommend the'use of potassium lodide (Kl) to emergency workers and institutionalized persons, ~ based on predetermined criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it once the decision is made, if necessitated by radiolodine releases. SEOC-11 Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for the impacted permanent and transient plume EPZ population (including transit-dependent persons, special needs population, handicapped persons and institutionalized person).
. SEOC-12 Demonstrate the ability to implement appropriate measures for controlled reentry and recovery.
1.4.2 Bureau of Nuclear Engineering Headquarters (BNE-HQ)' , BNE-HQ-1 Demonstrate the ability to project dosage to the public for ingestion pathway exposure and determine appropriate protective measures, based on field data, FDA PAGs, and other relevant factors. a
i t
- 9 ,
BNE-HQ-2 Demonstrate the ability to estimate total population exposure. BNE-HQ-3 Demonstrate the ability to determine appropriate measures for controlled j reentry and recovery, based on the maximum exposure to an Individual, , available EPA PAGs, and other relevant factors. 1.4.3 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) L EOF-1 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, d! splays, and other materials to support emergency operations. I EOF-2 - Demonstrate the ability, within the plume exposure pathway, to preject dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant and field data. EOF-3 Demonstrate the ability to make the decision to recommend the use of K! to emergency workers and institutionalized persons, based on predetermined criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it once the decision is made,- if necessitated by radiolodine releases. EOF-4 Demonstrate the ability to identify the need for and call upon federal and other outside support agenciev assistance. . 1.4.4 Emergency News Center (ENC) ENC-1 Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize, and activate personnel for facility functions. , ENC-2 Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in an accurate, coordinated, and timely manner. ENC Demonstrate the ability to initially alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an instructional message within 15 minutes. l 1.4.5 New Jersey State Police - Forward Command Post (FCP) FCP-l' Demonstrate the ability - to monitor, understand, and 'use emergency classification levels (ECL) through the appropriate implementation of l emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECLs as required by the l scenario. FCP-2 Demonstrate the - adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays, and other *
. materials to support emergency operations. l 1.4.6 Radiological Field Monitoring (FM)
FM-1 Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations,
, organizations, and field personnel.
l FM-2 Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and procedures for determining field l radiation measurements. l l l
10 FM-3 Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and pro for measuring airborne radiolodine concentrations as low as 10'pedures microcurie per cuble centimeter in the presence of noble gases. , FM-4 Demonstrate the abillty to obtain samples of particulate activity in the airborne plume and promptly perform laboratory analyses. FM-5 Demonstrate the appropriate laboratory operations and procedures for measuring and analyzing samples of vegetation, food crops, milk, water, and soil (indigenous to the area and stored). [ Emergency Lab Facility] FM-6 Demonstrate the appropriate use of equipment and procedures for collecting samples of vegetation, food crops, milk, water; and animal feed (indigenous to the area and stored). 1.4.7 State Field Activities (SFA) SFA-1 Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure. SF A-2 Demonstrate the ability to supply and administer K1 once the decision has been made to do so. SFA-3 Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas. 1.4.8 Salem County Emergency Operations Center (SCEOC) SCEOC-1 Demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand, and use ECLs through appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECLs, as required by the scenario. SCEOC-2 Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize, and activate personnel for both f acility- and field-based emergency functions. SCEOC-3 Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate, and control e mergency activities. SCEOC-4 Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel. SCEOC-5 Demonstrate the adequacy of f acilities, equipment, displays, and other materials to support emergency operations. SCEOC-6 Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control e m ergency worker exposure. SCEOC-7 Demonstrate the ability to initially alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an instructional message within 15 minutes of a decision by an appropriate state and/or local official (s).
-~ _ __
11 .
' SCEOC Demonstrate the ability to make the decision to recommend the _use of K1 to
- emergency. workers and institutionalized persons, based on predetermined .
critertai as well as to distribute and administer it once the decision is made, If necessitated by radiolodine releases. SCEOC Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for the impacted permanent and transient plume EPZ 1
~
population (including transit-dependent persons, - special needs population,
- handicapped persons and institutionalized persons).
1A.9 Salem County Field Activities (SCFA)' SCFA-1 Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary_ to in.plement appropriate
-protective actions for the impacted permanent and transient plume EPZ population (including transit-dependent persons, special-needs- populations, y handicapped persons, and institutionalized persons).
L SCFA-2 Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for school children within the plume EPZ. SCFA-3 Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, facilities, equipment, and personnel -' for the registration, radiological monitoring, and decontamination of evacuees. SC FA-4 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, - equipment, and personnel for congregate care evacuees. 4 SC F A-5 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, supplies, procedures, and personnel for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment, and vehicles and for waste disposal. SC FA-6 Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and procedures for determining field radiation measurements. SCFA-7 Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and propedures for ' measuring - airborne radiolodine concentrations as low as- 10 microcurie per cubic centimeter in the presence of noble gases. - SC F A-8 Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure. SCFA-9 Demonstrate the ability to make the decision _to recommend the use of K1 to emergency workers and institutionalized persons, based on predetermined
'. criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it once the decision is made, if necessitated by radiolodine releases.
1.4.10 Salem County Municipalities (SCM) SC M-1 Demcnstrate the ability to monitor, understand, and use ECLs through appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corres:?onding to ECLs, as required by the scenario.
^
13l . , [ . SC M-2 . . Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize, and activate personnel for both f acility- and field-based emergency functions.
- SC M-3 Demonstrate the ability to direct, coor Jinate, and control - emergency activities.
SC M-4 Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations. organizations, and field personnel. SCM-5 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays, and other materials to support emergency operations. 1.4.11 Salem County Municipal Field Activities (SCMFA) SCMFA-1 Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control amergency worker exposure. SCMFA-2 Demonstrate the ability to initially alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an instructional message within 15 minutes of a
- decision by an appropriate state and/or local official (s).
SCMFA-3 Demonstrate the ability to make the decision to recommend the use of K1 to emergency workers and institutionalized persons, based on predetermined criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it once the decision is made, if necessitated by radiolodine releases. SC MFA-4 Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas. . 1.4.12 Cumberland County Emergency Operations Center (CCEOC) CCEOC-1 Demonstrate the ability to . monitor, understand, and use ECLs through appropriate implementation of- emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECLs, as required by the scenario. CCEOC-2 Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize, and activate personnel for both facility- and field-based emergency functions. CCEOC-3 Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency
. activities.
CCEOC-4 Demonstrate tne ability to communicate with all appropriate locaticas, organizations, and field personnel. CCEOC-5 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays, and other materials to support emergency operations.
~
CCEOC-6 Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
.,,.i...,__
i 13
- n. ,
CCEOC-7 Demonstrate the ability to make the decision to recommend the use of K1 to emergency workers and-' institutionalized persons, based on predetermined-criteria, as well as to distribute and administer,it once the decision is made, if necessitated by radiolodine releases. CCEOC-8 2 Demonstrate the ability to initially alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an instructional message within 15 minutes of a deelslon by an appropriate state official (s). CCEOC-9 Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for the impacted permanent and transient plume EPZ population (including transit-dependent persons, special needs population, handicapped persons and institutionalized persons). 1.4.13 Cumberland County Field Activities (CCFA)
'CCFA-1 Demonstrate the approptiate equipment and procedures for determining field radiation measuraments.
C C F A-2 Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and pro for measuring airborne radiolodine concentrations as low' as 10'pedures microcurle per cubic centimeter, in the presence of noble gases. CC F A-3 Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for the impacted permanent and transient plume EPZ - population (including transit-dependent persons, special needs populations.
- handicapped persons and institutionalized persons).
CCFA-4 Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropria,te-w protective actions for school children within the plume EPZ.- C C F A-5 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, supplies, procedures, and persorinel for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment, and vehicles and for waste disposal. CCFA-6 Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, facilities, equipment, and personnel for the registration, radiological monitoring, and decontamination of evacuees. CCFA-7 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, and personnel for congregate care evacuees. C C FA-8 Demonstrate the resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and control access to evacuated and sheltered areas.z
* 'C C F A-9 Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
C C FA-10 Demonstrate the ability to make the decision to recommend the use of K! to emergency workea and institutionalized persons based on predetermined criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it once the decision is made, if necessitated by radiolodine releases. {E
14 . C C FA-11 Demonstrate the adequacy of vehicles, equipment, procedures, and personnel for transporting contaminated, injured, or exposed individuals. C C F A-12 Demonstrate the adequacy of medical facit! ties equipment, procedures, and personnel for handling contaminated, injured, or exposed individuals. 1.4.14 Cumberland County Municipalities (CCM) O C M-1 Demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand, and use ECLs through appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECLs, as required by the scenario. C C M-2 Demonstrate the ability of fully alert, mobilize, and activate personnel for both f acility- and field-based emergency functions. C C M-3 Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency activities. C C M-4 Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, an i field personnel. CC M-5 Demonstrate the adequacy of f acilities, equipment, displays, and other materials to support emergency operations. 1.4.15 Cumberland County Municipal Field Activities (CCMFA) CCMFA-1 Demonstrate the abillo; so continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure. . CCMFA-2 Demonstrate che ability to initially alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an instructional message within 15 minutes of a decision by an appropriate state and/or local official (s). CCMFA-3 Demonstrate the ability to make the decision to recommend the use of K1 to emergency workers and institutionalized persons, based on predetermined criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it once the decision is made, if necessitated by radioiodine releases. CCMFA-4 Demonstrate the ability to identify the need for and call upon other support agencies' assistance. 9
. 15 1.5 EXERCISE SCENARIO OVERVIEW 1.5.1 initial Conditions Hope Creek - Currently at $5% power repa!rs in progress on "A" main feed pump.
Salem Unit 1 - Refueling outage has just been completed. The plant is currently in mode 3 (hot standby), and preparations are un(.erway for startup, which la scheduled for December 3,1988. Salem Unit 2 - Currently at 100% power; acar end of !!fe (400 FTPD). All power generation and engineered sMety features equipment are operable, with the following exceptions:
- a. Circulator #23A is out of servlee for screen replacement.
- b. Service water pump #26 is out of service for pump replacement.
- c. Charging pump #23 is out of service for piston leakage repair.
- d. BAT (Boric Acid Tank) pump #21 is out of service for seal repairs.
- e. RHR (Residual Heat Removal) pump #22 is out of service because of high vibration problems discovered during a .
surveillance run the day before. The inboard motor
- bearing is being replaced, and the pump should be returned to service in 72 hours.
- f. Containment spray pump #21 is disenembled for pump replacement. The new pump is expected in the next morning.
RCS (Reactor Coolant System) activity exceeded for LCO (Limiting Conditions Operation) for specific activity at 1535 hours on November 27, 1988. Increased fuel leakage is suspected, and letdown has been maximized in a effort to clean up the RCS. The last sample analysis showed RCS activity at 1.1 uCl/g-DEI (Dose Equivalent lodine). Operations is making pieparations to shut down in accordance with Tech Spec Action Statement 3.4.9.b. Shutdown will be initiated if the next sample results (due back at 1530 hours) are not lower than the tech spec value (LCO = <1.0 uCl/g del-131) An equipment operator is inside uni, 2 cer.it.'r.mant pert'orming a surveillance of containment isolation valves.
16 , 7"- . 1.5.2 Narrative Summary j The exercise commences at 1530 hours when the control room receives the latest sample results, which Indicate RCS activity has not improved (1.20 uC1/g-DEI). In accordance with the technical speelfications, a unit shutdown is required. As a result, an , Unusual Event is declared. 1.5.2.1 Unusual Event - Shutdown to Comply with Tech 8 pees, ECG (Emergenew Classification Gulde) Sections 4A,14A, or 18A Shortly thereaf ter, reactor coolant pump #23 experiences high vibrations and seizes. This event results in a reactor trip on low flow. Unknown to the operators, increased fuel damage occurs due to the RCP (Reactor Coolant Pump) seizure and due to a few skewed control rods that cause mechanical damage as the rods drop into the core. This increased fuel damage causes various RMS (Radiological Monitoring System) monitors to go into alarm. The operators request an activity sample of the RCS. These events result in declaration of an Alert. 1.5.2.2 Alert - RCP Selzure with Fuel Damage, ECG Section 4B Af ter the reactor trip, the operator inside the containment exits, and the outer hatch jams with the door open about six inches. While attempting to free up the jammed containment door, the operator slams his hand in the door. The fire brigade is called upon to provide first aid. . At this point, the reactor is in a stable hot standby condition, and the operators _are making preparations to go to cold shutdown. During attempts to borate the RCS, *he
' operators encounter problems with a boric acid flow control valve and with a leak on the BAT pump. These equipment problems require the OSC to dispatch repair teams that correct the problems and allow boration to recommence at about 1800 hours.
At 1750 hours, a news helicopter -- dispatched from Philadelphia -- experiences engine' failure and crashes in the vicinity of the unit 2 RAP (Refueling Auxillary and Primary Feed Water) tanks. Within minutes, the fire brigade is on the scene and provides the control room with an intilal damage report and proyldes first aid to the two occupants of the helicopter. The damage assessment report informs the control room OSC that there are no
. flames (i.e., wreckage is only smoldering) and that two persons are being treated for injuries. The report also informs the control room that the RAP tanks were pelted with helicopter blade fragments and that the unit 2 RWST (Reactor Water Storage Tank) is leaking and appears to have a section of blade lodged in the side toward the bottom of the tank. As a result of an aircraf t 9 rash on site affecting plant structures, a Site Area -
Emergency is declared. i
- 17 j * .
1.5.2.3 Site Area Emergency - On-Bite Alteraf t Crash Affecting A Plant Structure or Mlastle Causing Damage to A Plant Structure, ECG Sections 11C cc 110 Over the next two hours, the plant experiences various equipment problems that will exercise the OSC teams. These events include making #24 CFCU (Containment Fan Coll Units) ready for service, facing problems with service water, responding to a fire alarm, and losing charging pump #21. At 1852 hours, the control room commences RCS s!@wn after chemistry reports that the RCS boron concentration is >1600 ppm. Cooldown b allowed to commence at 40 degrees per hour. While the control room staff is proceeding with cooldown, the plant experiences a large break LOCA. Safety injection and containment spray initiates, and operators follow the appropriate EOPs (Emergency Operating Procedures) to combat the LOCA. As a result of a LOC A with preexisting fuel damage, the emergency coordinator declares a General Emergency. 1.5.2.4 General Emergency - Loss of Two of Three Flaston Product Barriers, ECG 8ection 5A and 5B
- With initiation of containment spray, #22 spray pump starts and immediately - trips, resulting in no containment spray capabilities. All available ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling System) pumps are operating, and the RWST (Reactor Water Storage Tank) is quickly drained and cold-leg recirculation established. As a result of the LOCA and
- the resulting shock to the RCS, fuel damage increases, but all fission products are being held within the containment.
Shortly af ter cold-leg recirculation is established, the operating RHR pump trips, leaving the plant with no water sources to cool the core. EOPs direct the operators to line up safety injection and charging pumps to the RWST: however, ..le RWST is now about empty because of the large amount of water used before establishing cold-leg recirculation and the water lost because of the leak from the helicopter crash. As attempts are made to fix the RHR pump, the reactor vessel level drops, as water is bolled off as a result of decay heat. As the level drops, the fuel is uncovered, which increases fuel cladding damage. Some fuel melts. At this time, the containment is still intact, and the containment pressure is slowly being reduced by the fan coil units. Because of the increasing fuel damage, the'
+ radiation levels and hydrogen levels in the containment are increasing.
At 2143 hours, the containment experiences a hydrogen detonation that causes a momentary pressure surge from about 25 psig to well above the design pressure of 47 psig. The force of this pressure surge is felt in the containment spray ring headers (empty at this time) and results in a weld crack in the spray piping outside the containment. This f ailure of the sprey piping outside the containment results in a loh of
- _ containment integrity, and high-level releases commence. At this point, the containment spray piping is acting as a vent duct, venting the containment atmosphere to the auxillary building.
I
18 . j Within 20 minutes of the start of the release, the RHR pump is repaired and returned to service. Core cooling is quickly reestablished, and no further core damage
- oecurs. i The release into the environment is now a function of the difference in pressure f between the containment and the auxillary building. With no containment spray l l l car "v. the containment pressure slowly decreases from the energy ost through the c' s.t ainm- ' breach and the work of the fan coil units to cool down the containment. By e cut M , hours, the containment and auxillary building pressure are equalited, and the re, 4 /ates decrease accordingly. ,
The exercise is terminated (day 1 - plume pathway exercise) when the controllers are satisfied that the participants have had an opportunity to demonstrate their ability to l meet the objectives. The plant remained stable, with no further release of radioactivity l for the remainder of the exercise, l l l t t i i-
+
i P 4 t
19 TAlti,E 1 Eanergemey Classification and Event Tieneline (hours)(11/29/88) Media Municipalities State EOC Salem Cumberland Emergency County' Center Received West Trenton County Classification Utility Received Received (average time) Declared Received Received Notification N/A 1550 N/A 1538 1538 1554 Unusual Event 1614 1602 1620 1602 1607 1615 Alert 1646 1702 1745 N/A 1650 1715
, P ity Declared Operational
-1819 1806 1824 1806 1812 1816 Site Area Emergency 2021 2014 2037 2013 2021 2035 Ceneral Emergency 2140 2131 2155 2131 2138 2150 Release Started Release 0019 Terminated (11/30/88)
N/A = Not Applicable
. .O d
4
.
- 8
. ..a ,-
20 G TABLE 2 Protective Action Timeline - Plume Phase TAOL4 3
... s. , ex 2 .e...i... e...., tec
.e, sesie tel i.i en e...
t Oeci.i 0. i.i.. 36,.. o.. t i.a sta acii..ii.. a... ee..ie.. A.it .ii.. ... i .. .i si. . Coc 0.i. h.... s..i.e. in....) seei.e. (n....) <>..,> se. ... in.. .i i 84,.a 11/29/04 1819 1830 + 18tf lit $ 1832 Atti'.ii.a ( Aet. 4 ) et la t e A,s.
- Im.,gency 9,.teltive ll/t9/84 1013 14 0+l ett 1034 El 0 l mig tool 20)6 (I 0*) ett 20'6 atta.a #1 St )*40 ei si 1 60 mil ( S ie.l a t .d l
- lt 1*t0 mit (E.St 85t. (t.St.88t. (t.St.85t.
Elt.t>tl tit.thti tit tut) e Et t. emerg.ney it61 El t. one,seney n/A 1956 ft is ene,sency N/A 9,.t.tti.e 18/29/84 206) v.,ter. t Agin.n 88 .e,6e,s v.,he,o te;t.stisa ll /19 t 8a - 1868 4: $*it ei st)6 to S.40 mi !!)6 Ille t 5 10 eis 2291 etti.m f) (R.84. tit. (t,tt. lit. (lie.leted) (t.lt.$$8. Ett.thti tElt.EktI (SE.ENEl e
+
t o ... .. .. s ineit.e. ma e mai .ept ic a6t e . a. ma . u.i se,.es.4 > s a 9
.j i-(
l l: i l
. 31 TABLE 3 - Protective Action Timeline - Ingestion and Recovery / Reentry Phase PA Decision Decision Number Date Made Area Affected 94 12/1/88 0011 Animals to 50 mi on stored feed in ENE, EST., E
#5
^
12/1/88 1100 condemned milk and produce in Lower A110 ways Creek and isolated meat and water.
#6 12/1/88 1105 Isolated produce in DeerfieId, Pittsgrove, Buena, Buena Vista, .and Hamilton.
#7 12/1/88 1110 Isolated milk in Upper Deerfield.
#8 12/1/88 1124 Isolated produce in Vineland.
#9 12/1/88 1150 condemned produce in Hopewell and Stowereek.
#10 12/1/88 1421 Allowed return to evacuated areas.
#11 12/1/88 1445 Established restricted zone *.
D'
- Restricted Zone - An Area with controlled access from which the population-has been relocated. .
e
. 88 .
h 1 EXERCISE EVALUATION 2.1 NEW JERSEY STATE 1.1.1 State Emergency Operations Center The SEOC had it objectives to demonstrate du'Lig this exercise. Seven objectives were met; five were partially met. SEOC-1. The objective to demonstrate the f.bility to monitor, understand, and use ECLs through appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to the ECLs, as required by the scenario was met. Th'e SEOC used the ECLs in accordance with its plan. Thus, the Notification of Unusual Event (NUE) was used to place the SEOC staff on notice, the Alert to call staff members in, and the Site Area Emergency to inform the public. The current ECL status was displayed prominently at several places, including the monitors for the new Emergency Information System (EIS). Notification of the ECLs was received via the dedicated telephone line from Salem Unit 2. The ECL was always vertfled by calling back the operator at the utility. The changed status was not posted or , acted upon untti verification was received. 8EOC-2. The objective to demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize, and activate personnel for both f acility- and field-based emergency functions was met. Many staff members were contacted upon receipt of the NUE notificationi some were asked to report to the SEOC and the rest were asked to be prepared in case the incident escalated. Upon receipt and verification of the Alert at 1607 inours, a call chain for activating the SEOC was begun. The calling was completed by 1625 hours. Sufficient staff arrived by 1650 hours to declare the facility fully operational. All required agency personnel arrived by 1750 hours. SEOC-3. The objective to demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency activities was partially met, in accordance with the plan, the key . State deelslon-makers were co-located in the operations room. Information was
- received, analyzed, and discussed before deelstons were made as to appropriate recommendations. All but one recommendation was appropriate for exercise conditions. Once an action had been agreed upon, the P!O generated a press release that was reviewed, approved, and released to the ENC, with simulated transmission to EBS.
- The Director of the State's Office of Emergency Management was clearly in command and control. During the plume phase of the exercise, SEOC staff were updated by use of the EIS and occasionally over the public address system. Decision-making invariably III IIIH
23 Involved several key staff. Key deelstons were occasionally initiated by the Director's subordinates, but were given to him for final approval. This arrangement was efficient , and effective because long-term training and association has allowed the participants to ,
- anticipate both needs and decisions. Most of the internal messages were recorded on the EIS, however, not all of the critical messages or questions which were originated outside the EOC were recorded on this system. The EIS provided a mechanism of producing hard l copy of any information in the system if needed.
On one occasion, in the Ingdstion Pathway Phase of the exercise, the OEM , Director did not coordinate prior to release, one public notification (see evaluation of ; objective BNE-HQ 1, p.41-42). SEOC-4. The objective to demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel was met. A varlety of communications systems were used to communicate with emergency management staff, the utility, the EOF, the county EOCs, the State of Delaware, the EBS radio station, the Emergency News Center (ENC), and FEMA Region !!. , The primary communications systems were three hardawired telephone systems: (1) the central office lines to NJ Bell, (2) the NJ State Centrex System, and (3) the NJ State Pollee (Dimension) System. Other wire systems available included dedicated lines to the utility, the FCP, the two counties, and the ENC. These systems all had conference capability. Three facsimile machines - located in the SEOC rumor control area, the public ' information officer (PIO) area, and the SEOC proper - provided hard-copy capability to other locations. Pagers were assigned to most State emergency management staff and were used extensively for calldown and notification. The State automated this function by having computer-assir.ed dialing with message transmission. Another principal communication system was the emergency information system's computer local area net within the SEOC for communicating status and other l Information to participants. i Other installed communications were wire-based and ' radio-based systems, including National Warning System (NAWAS), NETS, EBS-remote, Federal National Teletype System (FNATS), Emergency Management Radio (EMRAD), Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES), HF(high-frequency)-Secure, and Federal National Radio System (FNARS). All were available, except FNARS, and were demonstrated and found to work satisfactorily. FNARS was tested recently, but was not used for this L exercise. Telephone control was effected by having a limited number of published tele-phone numbers for incoming calls from the public, six " tactical" lines that were essentially unpublished lines for senior officials, and five "800" numbers for rumor control.
24 ,
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Responding State agency and U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) liaison staff were located In the support room of the SEOC. Each could communicate with his or her main office . , by telephone and in some cases by radio. All systems functioned satisfactorily. SEOC-5. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment,
' displays, and other materials to support emergency operations was partially met at the SEOC. The facility is modern, well maintained, and quite adequate for its purpose.
Noteworthy was the deelslon not to use traditional status boards, but to display the Information using a computer-based EIS. The theory behind the system was to store in a computer the reference material and plans that form the data base and standard operating procedures (SOPS). This planning information is then merged with current Information to yleid a timely integrated display for deelslon-making as well as for ' information-sharing. The system has the potential for making an emergency response to an incident more efficient and effective, however, the failure to log all Incoming For example, if all - messages or questions limited the usefulness of the system. l Information is logged on the system, one of the advantages is reducing the need for ' runners to carry hard copies of messages between various desks in the EOC. This would reduce the noise level in the EOC, and contribute to a less congested operation. , However, not all executive coordination times with the State of Delaware were logged in the EIS. The EIS displayed the status, the ECL, weather data, the plume, evacuation routes, relocation centers, traffic control points (TCPs), radiological monitoring points, and maps in Integrated computer displays. These displays were available throughout the SEOC on Individual monitors and wall-sized projections of monitor images. Displays were also available to !!alson staff via a monitor connected to the local area net.
- Changes in the situation were entered into the E!S and displayed throughout the SEOC.
The system provided Information to multiple locations, while eliminating the noise and confusion of runners. Traditional status boards were available should the CIS fall. However, the local l area net ran two file servers in " mirror-image" mode so that if one were to fall, the ! other could take over instantly without any degradation in service. SEOC-6. The objective to demonstrate the ability to make appropriate protective action decisions, based on actual dosage, EPA PAGs, availability of adequate shelter, evacuation time estimates, and other relevant factors was met. Each time a utility PAR was made, it was carefully considered by the executive staff. Information
,from BNE and any other relevant organization, as well as appropriate information on such things as evacuation routes, was considered.
SEOC-7. The objective to demonstrate the ability to initially alert the public , within the 10-mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an instructional message within 15 minutes of a deelslon by an appropriate State official (s) was partla!!y met. The SEOC received the notification of the Site Area Emergency ECL at 1812. A deelston was made 4
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25
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to activs.te the Public Notification System at 1819. The Public Alert and Notification .
System tras activated at 1827 with an EBS message to be alred at 1832 and again a!
- The message informed the EPA residents and transients about the Site Area Emergnecy l und informed the public to stay tuned to the EBS station. Instead of alting the exercise message, the EBS station actually alred the standard test message to inform the pub; ,
the reason the strens were sounded. Staff members had anticipated the necessity for the preparation of an EBS message and were preparing the message by amending a prescripted message, when the Site Area Emergency notification was received from the , utility. They were therefore able to act promptly. During the stren sounding, one stren actually failed to sound and for scenarlo purposes, eight additional strens were simulated to have f ailed to sm""!, O.: FOC was made aware of actual stren failure by 1900 hours. Although the radio station egulpment for this new Common Program Control ' Station (CPCS-1), WBSS-FM-97.3, functioned properly and the radio broadcaster was , acquainted with his responsibilities, the receiver radio stations on the EBS network (WNNN-FM 101.7, WSNJ-FM 107.7, WJIC-AM 1510, WGJ-AM 1240, WWBZ-AM 1360 i WREY-AM 1440) still had their radio frequency crystals set for the former CPCS-1 radio station WDEL. Radio station WDEL is now the EBS station for Delaware only. Had there been a real emergency at ArtificialIsland, the New Jersey receiver radio stations servicing the - l i New Jersey portion of the EPZ would transmit Delaware EBS messages. : BEOC-8. The objective to demonstrate the ab!!!ty to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of securate Information and instructions to the public in a timely
- The staff. had ,
fashion after the initial alert and notification was partially . met.
- prescripted messages available to send to the public once the decisions were made.
These prescripted messages were used as a starting point. , In EBS message #2, the optionalInformation for the sectors to be sheltered was ' omitted at the beginning of the message. However, the correct sectors were included in the body of EBS menage #2. In addition, the EIS contained another version of the ; L sectors to be sheltered and NJ State Police News Release #4 omitted any mention of the sheltering recommendation. Staff should receive additional training to ensure accuracy and consistency of news releases. Staff were informed of decisions via the public address - I l system and EIS monitors. Information interchange with the ENC was by telephone and ' facsimile machine. Further, the Deputy Director of OEM was informed by the State of' Delaware at approximately 1830 that Delaware has decided to recommend sheltering for special population including pregnant women and small ch!!dren out to 5 miles In all Delaware areas. The EBS message containing this information was broadcast (simulated) at 1840. Although there was no release of activity at the time, the wind direction at the time was out of the WW, i.e., blowing toward New Jersey, and was projected to continue to New Jersey officles chose not to notify the impact New Jersey and not Delaware. public in the New Jersey portion of the EPZ why a protection active was not required a this time. The potential confusion in public perception of the credibility of the response officials would have been heightened due to the New Jersey radio station inappropriately
~- _ - . ,- - __,m __ s__ _ . _ _ _ . . . . - - . -.s__ , . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _
26 ! e rebroadcasting the Delaware EBS messages (discussion under SEOC -7). Under these
- l circumstances, New Jersey was obligated to explain its position to the public via a press release. .,
One press release used the wording of a warning / recommendation for those within.50 miles of the plant without making clear that the warning / recommendation + applied only to New Jersey. Press releases should be speelfic as to applicable geographic areal if appropriate, State boundarles should be given. ! The following is a planning lasue and will be addressed during the next plan reviews the State must revise its Plan to reflect the required use of natural and/or man-made landmarks to more specifically delineate geographic areas for which PARS are Intended for the general public. A previous ARCA (N.J. State 42) from the Al PEA dated May 12,1987 remains uncorrected. 8EOC-9. The objective to demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor , control in a coordinated and timely fashion was met. The rumor control function was operated by a New Jersey State Police (NJSP) staff of four in a room adjacent to the SEOC 11alson staff operations room. Rumor control information was obtained primarily from public address system announcements and the hard copies of those announcements that followed, usually within five minutes. The P!O was contacted directly if , clarification was required. A facsimile machine was available. Calls came in on five published "800" lines. Four additional lines were available for returning calls or for verifying Information. All rumor calls were promptly and courteously answered and 5 logged, and the correct answers were provided. Several calls required additional staffing , and research; they were quickly returned once the answer was clear. SEOC-10. The objective to demonstrate the ability to make the decision to recommend the use of El to emergency workers and institutionalized persons, based on predetermined criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it once the deelslon is made, if necessitated by radiolodine releases, was partially met. The decision to recommend use of K1 was made by the Commissioner of Health at 2045 hours. The original El recommendation to the Commissioner was from the BNE and was based on l plant status and not on projected dose, as is called for in the plan. Therefore, an ARCA ' was identifled at the EOF (Sec. 2.2). The BNE liaison in the SEOC Immediately informed < the BNE-EOF staff of this deelslon. The BNE-EOF staff, in turn, Informed the BNE-FCP, who then informed the field monitoring teams. There was a break-down in the
- communication between the BNE-FCP and the Salem County monitoring teams, which is l discussed under SCEOC-8. There was also a breakdown in communicating this decision
! from the SEOC to the two county EOCs. Because of this second breakdown the l remaining emergency workers (other than field monitoring teams) were not informed of , j the KI deelslon until after the 2148 State OEM deelslon on expanded protective actions. The message to simulate use of E! was transmitted to all relevant personnel, including the New Jersey Transit Bus representative. I
27 12,1987, was
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- A previous ARCA (New Jersey State 40) from Al PEA dated May corrected.
SEOC-11. The objective to demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for the impacted permanent and transie plume EPZ population (including transit dependent personnel, special needs p handicapped persons, and institutionalized persons) was met. The Federal evaluator Inserted the message at the SEOC to activate the general population evacuation bus runs (Route 4D in Salem County, and Route 8 in Cum County). The State Controller conferred with the Operations Chief, who then met wit New Jersey State Police and New' Jersey Transit staff. New Jersey Transit dispatche the buses, and a patrol car escorted each bus. The N.J. State Police troopers were in control of the General Population Evacuation bus runs. The bus drivers and the troopers had 20 R and 200 mR dostmeters, TLD badges, dose cards and simulated K! tablets. They displayed a good knowledge of their procedures and of dostmetry. The troopers the buses in a timely manner through the assigned routes, stopping to read their dos! meters at 20-minute intervals. They were famillar with the bus routes, and knew the Previous location of the Congregate Care Centers and the Decontamination Centers. were corrected ARCA's (New Jersey State 4 & 36) from the Al PEA dated May 12,1987 through changes in the plan. ' SEOC-12. The objective to demonstrate the ability to implement appropriate
. The SEOC staff prepared for ,
measures for controlled reentry and recovery was met. return by discussing needs and capabilities prior to any return advisory. Upon rece
- from BNE the advisory permitting restricted reentry and unrestricted return, all major As the two-mile zone around the plant.was to be entered by issues 'were reexamined.
plant personnel only, a discussion on access control took place. Upon resolut Prior to reentry, steps were authorized to establish 4 problem, reentry was authorized. disaster information centers, to perform persons, and to provide access control. g DEFICIENCIES ' No Deficiencies were observed at the SEOC during this exercise. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECT!YE ACTION h
Description:
All coordination times documenting telephonic 1. L conversations between State of New Jersey and Delaware officials were not entered into the EIS. Since the EIS is now the SEOC's primary means for logging, tracking and displaying information, the logging of the Interstate PAR coordination is essential (NUREG-0654, !!, F.1.b).
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( Recommendation: Since the EIS is' now the SEOC's primary means l for logginge reporting, tracking and displaying emergency management information, the logging of Interstate PAR . l coordination into the EIS database is essential. Therefore, l appropriate individuals should be tralned to log Interstate ; coordination calls into the EIS.
- 2.
Description:
New Jersey decision-makers took no action to advise the public in the New Jersey portion of the EPZ af ter being advised by the State of Delaware of its decision to shelter special ! I populations, including pregnant women and small children, out to 5' miles, at 1840 hours (NUREG-0654, !!, F.1.b). Recommendation: To minimize confusion, suspicion, and/or anxiety of the public, ~deelslon-makers should be brlefed on the importance of advising the public on the rationale why PARS are not being implemented .for New Jersey when they have been implemented in Delaware. 3.-
Description:
The receiver radio stations in the EBS network j (WNNN-FM 101.7, WSNJ-FM 107.7, WJ1C-AM 1510, WSNJ-AM 1 1240, WWBZ-AM 1360, WREY-AM 1440) that are supposed to be i activated.by the new CPCS-1 EBS station for.the Artificial Island NPS, radio station WBSS, do not have their radio' frequency crystals set for WBSS (NUREG-0654, !!, E.5). Recommendation: Insure that the affected EBS stitions on the . [ network obtain, install, and test the operability of the required , t frequency crystals.
- 4.
Description:
Emergency workers (other than field monitoring ; teams) were not informed of the El deelston (made at 2045) until l after the 2148 State OEM deelslon on expanded protective actions , t (NUREG-0654, !!, J.10.e). L Recommendation: Appropriate SEOC staff should be tralned to I inform the county EOCs promptly after the dectslon by the Commissioner of Health for emergency workers to take Kl.
- 5.
Description:
The SEOC staff had prescripted messages available , to- send to the public once the decisions were made. These prescripted messages were used as a starting point. in the EBS message, #2, the optional Information for the sectors to be sheltered was omitted at the beginning of the message. The , correct sectors were included in the body of EBS message #2 (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.c) l t
29 Recotemendation: SEOC staff should receive additional training in modifying prescripted messages. I
- 6. Descriptiom There were errors and inconsistencies in sectors to be sheltered in N.J. State Police News Release #4 (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.c).
Recommendation: SEOC staff should receive additional training in ensuring accuracy and consistency of news releases. 7
Description:
One press release used the wording of a warning / recommendation for those within 50 miles of the plant, without making clear that the warning / recommendation applied only to New Jersey. (NUREG-0654,11,E.7) Recommendation: Press releases should be specific as to the applicable geographic area. If appropriate, State boundaries should be given.
- 8.
Description:
Failure to log all incoming messages or questions limited the usefulness of the EIS. (NUREG-0654,II,F) Recommendation: Appropriate SEOC personnel should be instructed to log all in-coming messages or questions on the EIS. AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT No areas recommended for improvement were observed at the SEOC during this exercise. 2.1.2 Radiological Field Monitoring The four objectives to be demonstrated during this exercise by the radiol >gical field monitoring team during the plume phase were met. FM-1. The objective to demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel was met. No radio problems occurred that could not be corrected by moving to a new location. If team members had experienced radio problems, they knew that local telephones were available. They had obtained telephone numbers for the FCP before departing. The team demonstrated very good radio practice and procedures. The FCP acted as a net control station, effectively handling radio traffic. Proper radio control and use were observed throughout the exercise. Particularly noteworthy was the effective way data for traversing the plume were transmitted by clustering the numbers on a grouping when the numbers were the same.
30 . FM-2. The objective to ' demonstrate adequate knowledge of appropriate equipment and procedures by the field monitoring team for determining field radiation ! measurements was met. The radiation monito ing team was issued sufficient equipment - { to perform field radiation measurements (CDV 700, CDV 715, Ludlum 19). Equipment ; spares were available. Battery and source checks were performed. AllInstruments were l found to be properly calibrated. Proper calibration for the alt sampler was provided. ; Readings were made at waist and ground level with the window both closed and open. , Survey instruments and probes were enclosed in plastic to preclude contamination. The ! readings made were logged appropriately. The team went to its initial position and all subsequent positions in a prompt and effielent manner. Team members displayed adequate training and knowledge In the use of the$ equipment and in the procedures for its use. Three previous ARCAs (New Jersey State 1, 2 and 28) from Al PEA dated May 12,1987 were corrected. . 1 FM-3. The objective to demonstrate the appropriate eg for measuring airborne radiolodine concentrations asmicrocurles low as 10'ylpment per cubic and pro q centimeter in the presence of noble gases was met. After being directed to take an air i sample, the team proceeded to the location specified by the FCP. Once it reached the l correct location, the team followed proper procedures in setting up the air sampler. A power converter was used. To preclude talnting the sample with vehicle emissions, a 25-foot extension cord was used. Extreme care was taken to ensure proper placement and l orientation of both the cartridge and the filter in drawing the sample. After the sample I was taken, the team exercised proper technique in handling the cartridge and filter.
. Proper procedures were also followed to prevent the spread of contamination. .
!~ A previous ARCA (New Jersey State 6) from Al PEA dated May 12,1987 was corrected. - 1 The team moved to another site to count the sample. The counter used had prev!ously been checked against a known source. Before going into the field, the team J l had noticed that its counter was missing a label that displayed its range. Accordir. gly, ) i the team took another counter with the proper label. L Once the release started, thi team was told to traverse its territory and take ) readings using the survey meters every 0.2 mile. Once readings above background levels ) were found, the team was directed to take an air sample and then position itself outside the plume for counting. Team members were then to proceed to the BNE FCP and drop off the sample. The team was located outside of the plume while awaiting Instructions. A previous ARCA (New Jersey State 7) from Al PEA dated May 12,1987 was corrected. FM-4. The objective to demonstrate the ability to obtain samples of particulate activity in the altborne plume and promptly perform laboratory analyses was met. Once . team members had obtained a sample, they proceeded promptly to the mobile
31
., i laboratory. They transferred the sample to the laboratory, following good health physics r procedures.~ At the laboratory, the sample was double-bagged to further preclude the !
spread of contamination. At the laboratory, established procedures were followed in - analyzing the sample. The results were transmitted to the FCP within a matter of . minutes af ter the rough result from the first sample was obtained. DEFICIENCIES No Deficiencies were observed in field monitoring during 'his exercise. t i AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION No Areas Requiring Corrective Action were observed in field nonitoring during this exercise. I AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT , No Areas Recommended for Improvement were observed in field monitoring during this exercise. ,
. 2.1.3 Field Activities The three State field objectives to be demonstrated during this exercise were
- met. i NJSP-PCP-1. The objective to demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand, and use ECLs through appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to the ECLs, as required by the scenario, was met. A wall-sized status
' board was Installed in the NJSP-FCP. The ECLs were posted on this board as they were received. ,
A previous ARCA (EOF 6) from Al PEA dated May 12,1987 was corrected. NJSP-FCP-2. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays, and other materials to support emergency operations was met. The >
- facility was state of the art. Space, lighting, restrooms, and supporting office equipment were more than adequate to perform all assigned tasks. There was a new status board to-track tin.e, ZCLs, and important messages. A keyboard and monitor connected to the emergency information system have also been installed. Sufficient radios are available. ,
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SFA-3. The objective to demonstrate organizational ability and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas was met. The NJSP trooper reported in a timely manner at the proper . location for the access control point. The trooper demonstrated that he had all the proper equipment, including protective clothing, dosimeters, and XI. He read and recorded dosimetry readings every 15 to 30 minutes. . He was aware of the evacuation j route and relocation centers. A previous ARCA (EOF 11) from Al PEA dated May 12,1987 was corrected. DEFICIENCIES - l No Deficiencies were observed in field activities during this exercise. l 1 j AREA 8 REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION No Areas Requiring Corrective Action were observed in field activities during
' this exercise.
J i AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT i No Areas Recommended for Improvement were observed in field activities during i this exercise. ] J l 2.1.4 Emergency Worker Exposure Control l There were two objectives for emergency worker exposure control to be l demonstrated during this exercise. One was met; one was partially met. f SFA-1. The objective to demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and i control emergency worker exposure was met. Before proceeding into the field, each ( member of the field team possessed two direct-reading dosimeters and a thermo-I luminescent dostmeter (TLD). At the BNE FCP, all the dosimeters were charged, and-Initial readings were recorded on the radiation worker exposure card. Instructions on
- using and reading the dosimeters were provided during the initial briefing.
A previous ARCA (New Jersey State 6) from Al PEA dated May 12,1987 was corrected. SFA-2. The objective to demonstrate the ability to supply and administer K! once the deelslon was made to do so was partially met. The team was not instructed to ' take K!' until 2234 hours (over the radio). Appropriate staff should have informed the
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- team promptly after the deelslon by the Commissioner of Health at 2045 for emergency workers to take Kl. The team had a bottle of K1 that was still current, and each member simulated injestion of one tablet. This action was recorded. ,
DEFICIENCIES No Deficiencies were observed in emergency worker exposure control during this ; exercise. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION ,
- 1.
Description:
The State Vanguard Team A was not informed of the K1 decision (made at 2045) until 2234 (NUREG 0654,11, J.10.e). Recommendattom Appropriate BNE-FCP staff should be trained to inform the State Vanguard Team A promptly after the deelslon by the Comm!ssioner of Health for emergency workers to take Kl. AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT No Aree.s Recommended for Improvement were observed in emergency worker exposure control during this exerelse. 2.1.5 Ingestion Pathway Sampling Teams The Ingestion pathway sampling teams had five objectives to demonstrate during '
- this exercise. Two objectives were mett three were partially met.
t FM-5. The objective to demonstrate appropriate laboratory operatioits and procedures for measuring and analyzing samples of vegetation, food crops, milk, water, e and soll was met. Triple-bagged samples were transported to the laboratory in a state car. The car was checked for contamination with CDV-700 and Eberline E-140 instruments. After the car was determined to be uncontaminated, the samples were brought to an outside area to be checked for external contamination on the plastic bags. ' Eventually, a porch area will be built onto the eme'rgency lab facility to handle these types of samples. L The samples were then taken into the emergency laboratory facility for analysis. Again, they were signed over in accordance with SOPS. Priorities were set, l based on the importance of the samples to humans. Milk, water, and other samples [ important for human consumption were therefore analyzed first and in accordance with correct laboratory procedures. All the staff members were knowledgeable and , l l understood laboratory analytical techniques and procedures. Laboratory procedures were performed in a timely and efficient manner.
34 . l F M-4. The objective to demonstrate the appropriate use of equipment and I procedures for collecting samples of vegetation, food crops, milk, water, and soll . (Indigenous to the area and stored) was partially met. Five sampling teams were sent
- out. The well-equipped teams proceeded to their destinations promptly and without problems. BNE demonstrated excellent management and coordination of the teams from the FCP. Coordination was maintained throughout the sample collection period by effective and timely two-way radio contact.
Three of the teams did an excellent job of collecting samples and displaying monitoring techniques. One team had difficultles with proper contamination control, although its performance improved conalderably as the exercise proceeded. The fifth team had significant problems with sample collection and monitoring techniques: (1) the team failed to monitor while traveling between sampling points; (2) team members got out of their vehicle in a contaminated area before denning antleontamination clothings (3) team members failed to remove contaminated outer protective gloves wh!!e handling samples, direct-reading dosimeters, and personal items; (4) proper range settings on monitoring instruments were not usedi (5) poor technique was demonstrated for vegetation (grass) sampling when fallen tree leaves were first removed from the sample area; and (6) the outer protective wrapper instead of the inside wipe patch was used for wipe tests. Team members should receive additional " hands-on" tralning '.n sampling and monitoring. A previous ARCA (New Jersey State 45) from Al PEA dated May 12,1987 was . corrected. BNE-HQ-1. The objective to demonstrate the ability to project dosage to the
- public for ingestion pathway exposure and determine appropriate protective measures.
based on field data, FDA PAGs, and other relevant factors was partially met. On the
' basis of data on the radiolodine contents of various food samples, recommendations were made for each community on whether action was necessary to condemn or isolate produce, vegetation, milk, cattle, or water. All recommendations were based on scenario The data, appropelate PAQs speelfic to the food product, and dietary factors.
recommendations were transmitted to the SEOC in a timely manner. A decision was made not to send a message over EBS that animals in the 10-mile EPZ be placed on stored feed. This deelslon was made when staff members determined that such action had already been taken by the local agricultural agent who was at the CCEOC. Also, since the agent was in contact with.five dairy farmers, it was decided that it could cause confusion without serving any useful purpose. Although five dairy
, farms may be the total of dairy farms in Cumberland County, FEMA has no assurance that this number is the sum total of dairy farms in the 10-mile EPZ.
During the Ingestlor. and recovery phase of the exercise, certain data had not been logged on the EIS, and could not be effectively used. For example, the SEOC issued , a news release /EBS message to restrict the harvesting or movement of agricultural products within 50 miles of the site. This directive was inappropriate in that the restriction covered an extensive area which was not affected by the deposition pattern. Information which should have been available on the EIS which would have indicated the i
35
.. (a) the plume trajectory from Day 1, (b) inappropriateness of this restriction wast J
protective action #4 (see Table 3), and (c) the TAC Ingestion pathway restriction in
- speelfic townships (see Table 3].
BNE-HQ-2. The objective to demonstrate the ability to estimate total population exposure was met by the submission of a report dated January 30,1989. there are some concerns regarding the calculational assumptions used in the estimation of the total population dose, the calculational methodology demonstrates that the State The total population dose estimated was has the ability to make such an estimation. approximately 39,000 person-rems thyrold dose commitment, 3500 person-rems who The Ingestion body dose, and an additional 2500 person-tems from skin exposure. pathway commitment. dominated the thyrold exposure representing 81% of th 59% and 84% of their respective dose totals. BNE-HQ-3. The objective to demonstrate the ability to determine appropriate measures for controlled reentry and recovery, based on the maximum exposure The to an individual, available EPA PAGs, and other relevant factors was particially met. BNE-HQ staff, with input from New Jersey Department of Agriculture (NJDOA) and NJDOH staff, analyzed data on surface deposition from areas inside and outside the The staff used appropriate methods, including making several plume footprint. conservative assumptions, in calculating the annual dose to the most sensitive member of
'the general public. In addition, the annual dose due to inhalation of resuspended radlonuclides was calculated. .
These two doses - shine and resuspended - were added and then compared to
.the EPA PAG. During the technical recommendation development by the TAC personnel, little use was made of the population data contained in the State Plan. An area where Area analysis revealed that no permanent the PAG was exceeded was defined.The recommendation was therefore ma population resides in that zone. evacuated members of the general public to return to EPZ. It was also recommended that the adequacy of essential services should be assured before allowing return. The recommendation included provision for access control to the area where the FAO was projected to be exceeded.
During the calculation of projected annual dose, no areas were found where evacuation had not been ordered during the emergency phase and where the PAG had
' been exceeded. Relocation was therefore unnecessary. Protective action deelslons were posted on a status board.
Two previous ARCAs (EOF 2 and New Jersey State 54) from Al PEA dated May 12,1987 were corrected.
. . . I I O .s I l
36 [
.\
1 DEFICIENCIES *
- No defielencies were observed in ingestion pathway sampling during this , . ,
exercise. / AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION
- 1.
Description:
One of the field teams demonstrated . Improper sampling and monitoring techniques by (1) not using the vehicle-mounted Instrument for monitoring while traveling between sampling points, (2) getting out of the car in a contaminated area before donning anticontamination clothing, (3) falling to remove contaminated outer protective gloves when appropriate, (4) falling to use the proper range settings on monitoring instruments, (5) excluding fallen leaves from a grass sample, and (6) Improperly conducting wipe tests. (NUREG-0654, II,1.8) Recommendation: Team members should receive additional
" hands-on training in sampling and monitoring.
- 2.
Description:
Even though the agricultural agent notified 5 dairy farms to put animals on stored feed, FEMA has no assurance that these are the only dairy farms in the 10-mile EPZ (NUREG-0654,
!!, J.11).
Recommendation: As appropriate, EBS menages should instruc' that dairy animals within the 10-mile EPZ be placed on stored feed, even though agricultural agent may have made contacts.
- 3.
Description:
An inappropriate directive that restricted the harvesting or movement of agricultural products within 50 miles of the site was contained in a news release /EBS message because data that should have been on the EIS was not logged. (NUREG-0654,11, J.11). Recommendation: Staff should be tralned to log on all Information on the EIS and use this information in developing Ingestion pathway directives.
- 4.
Description:
During the technical recommendation development by the TAC personnel, little use was made of the population data contained in the State plan. (NUREG-0654,II,J.11) Recommendation: Greater use should be made of the data in the State plan, either through the use of large-scale maps or installation of an EIS terminal in the TAC.
- 37
' AREA 8 RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT No areas recommended for improvement were observed in ingestion pathway .
sampling. 2.2 EMEROENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY The EOF had four objectives to demonstrate during this exercise. Two were mett and two were partially met. EO F-1. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, The EOF is a displays, and other materials to support emergency operations was met. utility f acility whose adequacy is evaluated by NRC. The space and equipment provided . to BNE were adequate. Two previous ARCAs (EOF 1 and 3) from Al PEA dated May 12,1987 were correcti '. EOF-2. The objective to demonstrate the ability, within the plume exposure pathway, to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant and field ' data was partially met. The BNE-EOF. staff performed the dose assessment function well. Plant status and projected meteorological conditions were considered on an ongoing basis. The BNE staff had access to utility Information and made good use of this Information source.. The PARS were well founded and showed good anticipation. Dose
- projections were compared with the limited field data available. The FCP did not use the _ field teams effectively to define the plume boundary, and few radiolodine .
measurements were obtained. This is a repeat occurrence from a previous exercise (see N.J. State ARCA #21 from the May 12,1987 Al PEA). - EO F-3. The objective to demonstrate the ability to make the decision to recommend the use of K! to emergency workers and institutionalized persons, based on predetermined criteria, as well as to distrit. ate and administer it once the deelslon is made, if necessitated by radiolodine releases, was partially met. The BNE Assistant State Radiological Assessment Officer (SRAO) recommended use of K! for eme% My workers to the NJDOH at 2040 hours. A message was received from the SEOC ths ^ e i Health Commissioner had authorized the use of Ki for emergency workers M ' 15
- hours. The initial K1 recommendation was based on plant status, not on projected dose, as called for in the plan.
EOF-4. The objective to demonstrate the ability to identify the need for End call upon federal and other outside support agencies' assistance wu met. The Assistant SRAO recognized the effect of the release and called the Brookhaven area office. BNE staff discussed the situation with the Radiological Assistance Plan (RAP) team duty captain.
38 , On the basis of this discussion, BNE requested help in the form of RAP monitoring teams and AMS serial monitoring. The RAP captain did not request speelfic assistance from the State. . A previous ARCA (EOF) (10) from the May 12,1987 Al PEA has been corrected through a plan change (The NJSP-FCP has relocated to the Woodstown Station). , DEFICIENCIES No Defieleneles were observed at the EOF during this exercise. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION
- 1.
Description:
The plune was not defined by the field teams, and extremely limited radiolodine data were obtained. (NUREG-0654,
!!,1.8)
Recommendation: The FCP should provide proper direction to ensure that the field teams define the plume. if necessary, the EOF should inform the FCP as to which areas the teams should cover.
- 2.
Description:
The BNE K! recommendation was not based on a 25-REM projected dose, as required by the plan. (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.e) Recommendation: Additional training should be provided to ensure that participants are aware of the contents of the plan. AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT No Areas Recommended for improvement were observed at the EOF during this exercise. 2.3 EMERGENCY NEWS CENTER The ENC for the Artificial Island site was activated during the exercise. Two
. objectives were speelfled for demonstration at the ENC, and one to be demonstrated at the EBS gateway station (WBSS). ' At the ENC, one objective was met; and one was partially met. The objective for demonstration at WBSS was met.
ENC-1. The objective to demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize, and activate personnel for facility functions was met. Beginning at 1545 hours, commercial telephones and c pager system were used to notify personnel and activate the facility. i
' 39 The ENC was declared operational at 1702 hours. Staff members of all the organizations represented at the ENC Implemented their respective response functions in an outstanding and enthusiastic manner. ENC-2. The objective to demonstrate the ability to brief the media in an
- accurate, coordinated, and timely manner was partially met. During the plume exercise, the ENC provided a central location where media representatives from the utility, the affected states and counties. and others could collectively prepare and present Information concerning the emergency to the media. The facility was adequate in terms of space, equipment, supp!!es, and amenities. Work space and telephones were provided for n.edia representatives.
Nine press briefings were held during the exercise, and emergency information press kits were distributed to the media representatives present. In general, the press briefings were informative and the data accurately presented. During the sixth and seventh briefings, media personnel asked several questions that required detailed ' technical information on the physical effects of various levels of radiation exposure. The questions, which could not be answered by personnel present in the ENC, remained unanswered throughout the exercise. A health physicist should be available to the ENC utility staff to assist in providing answers to technical questions from the media. e ENC 3. The objective to demonstrate the ability to initially alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an Instructional message within 15 minutes was met. An evaluator went to the EBS gateway station WBSS to view and
- record the station's transmittal of the initial EBS message to the public.
1 Station WBSS received from the SEOC a facctmile copy of the message to be broadcast and the specified broadcast times. A follow-up telephone call from the SEOC directed WBSS to begin transmission of the message at 1832 hours. The station began its , transmission promptly at 1832 hours and repeated the message at 1835 hours. , A previous ARCA (JMC 7) from the Al PEA dated May 12, 1987 was correc'ted through certification. DEFICIENCIES No deficiencies were observed at the ENC during this exercise. AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION
- 1. Descriptiom During two of the briefings, media personnel asked questions that required detailed technical information about the physical effects of various levels of radiation exposure. The questions, which could not be answered by the ENC personnel
40 , present, remained unanswered throughout the exercise. (NU REG-0654, !!, 0.3.a) Recommendation: A health physicist, possibly from BNE, should . be available to the ENC utility staff to assist in providing technical answers to media Inquiries. AREA 8 RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT No Areas Recommended for Improvement were observed at the ENC during this exercise.
' \
4 i e b l l l i i l
41 e . . 2.4 8ALEM COUNTY t 2.4.1 Salem County Emergency Operations Center . The SCEOC had 9 objectives to meet; elght were met; one was partially met. Since demonstration of recovery and reentry capabilities was not an exercise objective for Salem County, the status of previous ARCA (SC 55) from the Al PEA dated May 12, 1987 remains unchanged. SCEOC-1. The objective to demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand, and use ECLs through appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECLs, as required by the scenarlo was met. The SCEOC staff was kept ' informed of the ECL. The ECL was promptly posted in a window between the operations room and the command room, and any change in ECL was broadcast throughout the - SCEOC. The Emergency Management Coordinator (EMC) initiated emergency functions
- and activities appropriate to the current ECL. To some extent, the EMC was aided in this by ECL-specific checklist displays hung in the command room.
4 SCEOC-2. The objective to demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize, and activate personnel for both facility- and field-based emergency functions *was met. The Alert ECL was received at 1615 hours, that is, during normal working hours for the EMC
+ and Office of Emergency Management (OEM) staff. The SCEOC staff was promptly notified by means of pagers and telephone calls. Telephone notification was complete by 1634 hours, and the SCEOC was declared operational at 1715 hours. The SCEOC became - fully staffed, with representatives from allinvolved agencies present. The sign-in sheets indicated that the EOC was staffed with 68 persons. The six elected freeholders present throughout the exercise were kept informed and involved.
SCEOC-3. The objective to demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate, and ;
' control emergency activities was partially met. The EMC provided strong, effective direction to Salem County's emergency response. Briefings were held periodically, usually when the ECL changed and when protective action decisions were received. Most
- staff members were knowledgeable and totally inv,olved in the exercise. Message logs ;
~
were kept, and message handling was excellent. Several Civil Aviation Patrol volunteers
- acted as runners, which facilitated rapid distribution of messages.
There was excellent coordination of protective actions, especially with the State
'of New Jersey. The hotline telephone (for communication between the SCEOC and SEOC) and the NETS conferencing telephone on the EMC's desk were staffed by the State Liaison. Monitoring NETS provided information on licensee PARS and allowed the '
SCEOC to prepare for protective action decisions officially received over the hotline. The Salem County EMC and the RADEF officer did not recognize the concept of operations with regard to the communications between the BNE-PCP and the county field monitoring team. As discussed under Objective SCFA-6, the county must act as a
43 , relay point for communleattors between the field monitoring team and the BNE-FCP apparently because of the lack of compatible radio frequencies. The RADEF officer intercepted the message from the BNE-FCP to the field teams for simulated Ingestion of . K!, referred it to the EMC, and did not relay it promptly to the field team, not following the concept of operations. As discussed under Objective SEOC-8, the New Jersey Commissioner of Health authorized K! for emergency workers at 2045. It was reasonable for the EMC to seek verification of this order from the SEOC, however, the only record of such a verification appears at 2145, over an hour later. The county EOC must not act as a filter between the BNE-FCP and the field team. All Information and directions must be expedittously relayed in order to assure the effective and safe use of the county field monitoring team in an overall coordinated response. The EMC ccrrectly sought verification from the SEOC when a message concerning the evacuation of the Salem Memorial Hospital was received at the hospital and relayed to the Salem County Medical Coordinator. The Assistant Director of OEM, acting as the Governor's representative,is the only one authorized to issue an evacuation recommention. SCEOC-4. The objective to demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel was met. Given its extensive communications networks, the SCEOC can respond to emergencies at the Artificial Island site. The systems used during the exercise included dedicated land lines, commercial telephones, and various radio networks (i.e., EMRAD, RACES, and Fire and - Rescue). The NETS dedicated land line provided conferencirig capability with the licensee, SEOC, and Cumberland County. The hotline -- a secure, direct land line between the SEOC and SCEOC -- was constantly monitored. All communications systems operated effectively during exercise play. Each message communicated was identified by a message form number, which was verified to ensure accuracy of message sequence. Furthermore, message content was verified to ensure proper transcribing. A previous ARCA (SC 1) from Al PEA dated May 12, 1987 was corrected. SCEOC-5. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays, and other materials to support emergency operations was met. Sevent rooms in the basement of the Fire Training Center on Cemetery Road in tuannington are dedicated for use as the SCEOC. More than adequate space, equipment, supplies, and amenities are available for extended emergency operations. The building was equipped with backup power. Status boards and maps were prominently displayed and were updated regularly. The security staff maintained adequate access control. The command room was situated between the operations room and the message center, where the telephones for communicating with the municipal EOCs were located. There were message doors connecting the command room with these rooms. througn which the EMC handed out and , received messages. This layout facilitated rapid message handling.
j 4 3 -- w . SCEOC-6. The objective to demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and
- control emergency worker exposure was met. Because the SCEOC is not located witt.'n the 10-mile EPZ, its staff members did not wear dosimetry. However, dosimetry kits and
.Kl were stored at the SCEOC and were observed. During the eurcise, a message was received that additional dosimetry was needed by Salem City. The dispatching of -
speelfled dosimetry was simulated. A previous ARCA (SC 57) from Al PEA dated May 12,1987 was corrected. SCEOC-7 The objective to demonstrate the ability to initially alert the pubtle within the 10-mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an instructional message.within 15 minutes of a decision by appropriate officials was met. The SCECC is responsible for the. activation of the system of fixed strens used in the public-alerting process. The sirens are activated electronically from the-dispatch room of the Fire and Disaster Center, which is on the floor above the SCEOC. At 181u hours, an instruction was received from the SEOC to actually sc,und the strens at 1827 hours. This message was promptly conveyed to the dispatch room and the sirens were activated at the specified time. The electronic system used to activate the stren has the capability to display promptly on a video monitor _ the identification of any stren which failed to sound properly. During the exercise, one stren actually failed to sound. This excellent system (which corrects a previous ARCA (SCM 23) from_ the Al PEA dated May 12, 1987) permits the timely dispatch of redundant backup route aleeting vehicles from the municipalities where sirens 1 failed to sound. The scenario called for the simulated failure of one siren in each of the l municipalities in' the two- risk counties, eight sirens in -total. The SCEOC promptly-
; notified Cumberland County of the two siren failures in its jurisdiction and' notified the -
six municloalities in Salem munty of the simulated stren f ailures. f t When SEOC issued N .ective Action Decisions for the remainder of- the exercise, the activation of the siren' systems was simulated. This occurred on two occasions; at 2041 and 2156 hours. A previous ARCA (SC 70) from the Al PEA dated May 12, 1987 was corrected through receipt of certification from N.J. State. SC EOC-8. The objective to demonstrate the ability to make the deelslon to recommend the use of K1 to emergency workers and institutionalized persons, as well as to distribute and administer it once the decision is made, if necessitated by radiolodine releases was met. The decision times and circumstances concerning this decision have been discussed previously (see SEOC-8 and SCEOC-3). Because the county is not a decision-maker and apparently the SEOC- did not communicate the KI decision more promptly, the county is credited with meeting this objective since it transmitted the decision as soon as possible after receiving it formally from the SEOC. At 2154 hours. - the SCEOC received a lengthly message from the SEOC that included evacuation instructions and a repitition of the instruction that K,1 be administered to emergency workers. This instruction was relayed via telephone from the message center to the municipal EOCs at 2204 hours and from the RADEF Officer to the field monitoring n ,
N . 44 ,
- teams at 2206 hours. The interval between receipt and transmission of the K1 Instruction to the municipal EOCs was longer than usual because the telephone dispatchers in the message cen t er were transmitting the evacuation protective action instruction that was .
received with the K! message. SCEOC-9. The objective to demonstrate the ability and rescurces necessary to
- Implement appropriate protective actions for the impacted permanent and transient plume EPZ was met. At 1700 hours, a free-play message was injected at the SCEOC that called for evacuation of the _noninstitutionalized, mobility-impaired resident - on Waterworks Road in Quinton, N.J. The EMC promptly instructed a radio dispatcher to contact Williams Transportation. - An appropriate vehicle -- a bus with a wheelchair lif t
- arrived approximately 15 minutes af ter injection of the message at the specified '
rendezvous point with the field evaluator.
~ A free-play message to have the SCEOC provide the bus driver with the exact address:of the_ Waterworks Road resident was misinterpreted by an evaluator at the-SCEOC, which' precluded the SCEOC from promptly providing the exact address. When the SCEOC evaluator was informed of the problem by the field evaluator nearly an hour later, the EMC was able to provide the address of the Waterworks Road resident.
A previous ARCA (SC 6) from Al PEA dated May 12, 1987 remains uncorrected. in addition to' arranging for the evacuation of the special needs individual, the SCEOC cocedinated the opening of a general .public ' reception and congregate care center, an emergency worker decontamination center, a general public evacuation bus, and establishing traffic control points as required by the plan. A previous" ARCA (SC 15) from Al PEA dated May 12, 1987, was corrected. DEFICIENCIES No Deficiencies were observed in the activities of the SCEOC during this exercise. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION
- 1.
Description:
The RADEF officer intercepted the message from
- the BNE-FCP to the field teams, and did not relay it promptly to
- the field team. (NUREG 0654,II,F.1.d)
Recommendation: The county EOC must not act as a filter between the BNE-FCP ahd the field team. All information and directions 'should be expeditiously relayed to the field monitoring
- tet.A.
~- . .
y -.. 45-1 Jo -.. E ,C AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT No areas recommended for in'provement were observed in the activities'of the ' SCEOC during this exercise. t 2.4.2 Radiological Field Monitoring One radiologle:', fle!d monitoring team was activated by Salem County. The two radiological field r.ionitoring objectives demonstrated during this exercise were partially m e t. - SC FA-6. The objective to demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for determining field radiation measurements was partially met. The team members were well trained, had appropriate instrumentation, and followed'the correct procedures for ambient radiation monitoring. They completed a very thorough equipment checklist and. an Instrument operability check procedure. They noted that there were several weak batteries in the equipment kits and that the CDV-700 instrument had no calibration sticker. The State of New Jersey is responsible for providing appropriately calibrated
,and documented equipment to' the counties and should do so.
, Tpm members were very familiar with the local roads and had no difficility in
- , locating the original monitoring locations. Communications from the field were via radio
~
to the SCEOC. Communicating'was awkward: because the. field team receives its r direction from the FCP, and all communications had to be relayed through the SCEOC.
~
?- .This process appeared to cause delays. For example, after the plume was detected and reported to the FCP through the SCEOC, the field' team had to wait 30 minutes in a
. radiation field in excess of 450 mR/h before being directed to .take an air sample and' move' from the area. As discussed under SCEOC-3, there was at least one case where messages intended for the field team were delayed from the SCEOC. It is not absolutely clear where the break down occurred, the SCEOC or the BNE-FCP. In any event, having the field team remain in an area of elevated radiation readings while awalting instruction has occurred previously at this site (see NJ State ARCA #7 from the May 12,1987 PEA).
The following is a planning issue and will be addressed during the next plan review: The current procedure (SOP Sn?) rgquires the county field- monitoring . team to move - only as directed by ine Manager of Radicion . Monitoring at the FCP. This
.a procedure should be revised to permit the team to indep-ndently dafbe the plume (i.e.,
traverse the plume) and take a centerline air sample, once the plume 14 encountered. An alternative would' be for field monitoring teams to be provided with direct radio communications with the FCP. - SC F A-7. The objective to demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for measuring airborne radiolodine concentrations as low as 10~ microcuries per cuble
46
.centimeter in the presence of noble gases' was partially met. The' team . adequately l demonstrated alt sample collections however, there were a number of problems that , l precluded accurate analysis of the radiolodine concentration in the air sample. ,
The first problem concerned calibration of instruments and equipment provided by the State of New Jersey. The RADECO air sampler was outside the annual calibration , a requirement.- The Ludlum 2218 counting instrument had been calibrated with Cs-137, s !. 4 which is not an appropriate calibration sowce for detecting 1-131. No range of source _ l counts was provided for the simulated rL.!alodine source. Therefore, even though the field monitoring team performed the appropriate source check, it could not be assured f l that the instrument was operating properly.1 The second problem resulted from the confusion and distraction that occurred'
~
during the air filter co'mtin7 process when the . vehicle stalled and a dead battery - prevented the vehicle from being started. The team member doing the sample counting l switched the I.udlum 2218 .to internal batteries; however, during the confusion, he l Inadvertently counted the particulate filter instead of the'sByer zeolite filter. This < counting error was not detected by the team leader or the other team member, as they were preoccupied with trying to restart the vehicle and with loading sampling equipment into the vehicle. The State controller did not observe the sample counting process. Upon (' '- request, the controller provided data for the silver zeollte filter count. Field monitoring team members should receive additional training, and the team leader should provide L> quality assurance of the sample collection and counting processes. 1 The~ third - problem involved completing the thyroid dose calculation. Using s [ controller data, a team member attempted to comphte the thyroid dose calculation form (ATT302-4), out was unable to do so because the team did not receive the reactor - shutdown time 'information that they had requested from~ the FCP. As a consequence,
.the thyroid dose ' calculation was not completed and transmitted to the FCP prior to
! termination of the exercise on November 29. 'This problem may be related to the awkward communication between the FCP and field monitoring teams that was discussed earlier; however, the FCP should be more responsive to requests from field teams for L necessary information for completing the thyroid dose calculations. M DEFICIENCIES L -
~ No deficiencies were observed in the activities of the Salem Coenty radiological field monitoring team during this exercise.
R , y.-
- AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION t .
!! ' 1. '
Description:
Several redlological monitoring instruments and equipment that were provided by the State of New Jersey had ' I problems with calibration or documentation of calibration. The RADECO air sampler calibration sticker was outside the annual calibration requirement. The Ludlum 2218 counting instrument L t
+
,e w, - i *- -47'
_o_. L" , was calibrated with Cs-137, an inappropriate source for detecting [
^ l-131. No range of source counts was provided with the simulated radiolodine source; consequently there was no way of assuring that the instrument was operating properly. (NUREG-0654, !!,1.8)
-Recommendation = The State of, New Jersey should calibrate
; properly, and document such calibration, the radiological- ,
monitoring equipment provided to county fleid monitoring teams.
- 2. Descriptions During the confusion caused by a dead car battery, a team member was distracted and counted.the particulate filter-
'Instead of the silver zeollte filter (and would have completed the thyroid dose assessment using this erroneous information). This ,
error was not detected by the team leader'. (NUREG-0654,11,1.9) Recommendation: Radiological monitoring teair.: should receive-additional training, and the team leader s'iould assure _ the quality - of sample collecting and counting procedures, regardless - of - circumstances.
- 3.
Description:
The FCP was not responsive to requests from the Salem County.fleid monitoring teams for information regarding reactor shutdown, which was requ! red to complete the thyroid dose assessment. (NUREG-0654, !!,1.9) _ Recommendation: The FCP should be more responsive to requests 5 [from field monitoring teams for necessary information. This
= problem could be related to'the need- to relay communications
.- between the FCP and field tronitoring teams through the SCEOC.
- AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT No Areat Recommended for improvement were observed in the activities of the Salem County radiological field monitoring team during this exercise.
+ 2.4.3 Field Activities Of the five field activity objectives demonstrated in Salem County, three were.
Emet; two were partially met.
, SC FA-1. The objective to demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for the Impacted permanent and transient plum'e EPZ population- was met. In response to a free-play message injected at the SCEOC at 1700 hours, the Office of Aging's Lakeview Complex received a call from the SCEOC at 1710 hours that a bus was on the way. At 1715 hours, a' specially equipped X
I
48 , Williams Transportation btis arrived at the Lakeview Complex. Because the free-play. i message was misinterpreted by the evaluators at the SCEOC (see SCEOC-9), the SCEOC directed the driver to go to the Quinton Fire. House to await further instructions. When , the driver arrived there, he was told that the field evaluator would direct him where to go. to evacuate the noninstitutionalized, mobility-impaired person; however, the field ; evaluator had only the name of the street, Waterworks Roed. When requested by the . ! field evaluator to proceed to Waterworks Road, the driver proe.ptly located the street and indicated that he would have been able to effect the evacuation !f he had had more-information. At 1810 hours, the driver received the full address of the Waterworks Road i resident from'the SCEOC. A general population evacuation bus run initiated at the bus mustering point at : the Mannington Voc-Tech Career Center was observed. The bus driver was met there by . y [ a NJSP trooper escort, who directed the running of the evacuation route. The escort was familiar with the evacuation route and it was properly run. In addition, the route to the
, . congregate care center was also run properly. After leaving the congregate care center, the trooper was aware that he and the bus driver should report to the decontamination i lA center. !
E A previous ARCA (SC 6) from the Al PEA dated May 12, 1987 remains uncorrected. SC FA-2. The objective to demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for school children within the plume EPZ was I met. This objective was tested out of sequence on November 30th. The bus driver departed from' the John Fenwick Elementary School in Salem . City at 1307 hours and arrived at the congregate care center at the Penns Grove High School in Carneys Point . at 1331 hours. The driver demonstrated good knowledge of the route to the congregate g , care center and traversed the route in a timcly manner. SCFA-3 'The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, facilities, equipment, and personnel for the registration, radiological monitoring, and o decontamination of evacuees was partially met. These activities were observed at the Penns Grove High School in Carneys Point. Evacuees were monitored for . radioactive contamination by three volunteers who showed adequate technique. " Clean" evacuees - were sent to the congregate-care center at the same school. Contaminated evacuees were sent to the shower and decontamination area, which was staffed by only two fire and police volunteers because of an actual fire call. Several problems were observed during the decontamination activities. Evacuees were completing their own registration forms. These forms were frequently filled out incorrectly. If an evacuee was contaminated, the form, which would then be taken into the congregate care center, might -be contaminated. Decontamination workers should ~ complete the paperwork, and receive additional training in cross-contamination procedures. Although the High School has 24 showers (12 each for boys and girls), only one shower area was set up, and it contained only soap. The procedures call for other
4 . 49 detergents being used as well. The decontamination area should be provided with the supplies specified in the procedures. Decontamination workers were unaware of what instrument readings indicated that an evacuee was contaminated (see SCFA-7) and should receive additional training in this area. Previous ARCA's (SC 7 and SC 67) for this location, from Al PEA dated May 12, 1987 were not corrected. SC FA-4. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, and personnel for congregate care of evacuees was met. A congregate care center was set up at the Penns Grove High School in Carneys Point. This facility was effectively managed by the Shelter Director and the American Red Cross (ARC) Director. Operations by the ARC volunteers were excellent. The shelter's disaster plan, which explains procedures in readily understandable terms, was available and used by the f acility's staf f. Volunteers carefully checked the paperwork of the evacuees from the decontamination center. If this paperwork had been completed incorrectly, the evacuees were to be sent back to be remonitored. The facility had sufficient accommodations, and food supplies were available from the school cafeteria (one week's supply) and from nearby fast-food restaurants and a grocer through agreements. There were radios and a land line available for communications with the SCEOC. SC F A-5. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, supplies, procedures, and personnel for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment, and vehicles, and for waste disposal, was partially met. An emergency worker decontamination facility in the Quinton fire station was observed. The fire house is an adequate facility for emergency worker decontamination, but currently does not have a shower. N.J. State OEM has a bid being processed in the Purchase Bureau of New Jersey for a trailer, designed for personnel decontamination, which contains 3 showers. FEMA was aware of this before the exercise. The State plans to purchase 4 additional units, for a total of 5 trailers. As cars arrived, passengers were instructed to put on booties and proceed to the monitoring station. The driver remained in the car while it was being monitored. Contaminated cars were instructed to proceed through to the car wash area for decontamination. Separate parking areas were available for clean cars, decontaminated cars, and contaminated cars. Two previous ARCAs (SC 53 and SC 3) from Al PEA dated May 12,1987 were corrected. The plan calls for use of radiation detection instruments that read in counts per minute and use 50 counts per minute (cpm) above background as the criterion for contamination. However, the workers used instruments that read in mR/h (Ludlum Model 17) or .R/h (Ludlum Model 19). Being familiar with the number "50" as the contamination level, the workers improperly recorded the contamination level as 50 mR/h or 50 uR/h to correspond to the units on the instruments being used.
~-
k l 50 . . l-Emergency workers should receive additional training on the contamination
- criterion appropriate for the instruments used, instrumentation is supplied by the ,
NJSP. The State Police Radiation- Coordinator indicated that they do not own instruments that read in counts per minuto The following is a planning issue and will be
- addressed during the next plan review: There appears to be a prot,lem - in that decontamination workers cannot be provided with the instruments called for in the plan. .
Elther tlm plan should be modified to correspond to the instruments provided (with appropriate contamination levels given), or the instruments called for in the plan should be acquired. The radiation detection Instruments used were not reading properly. For example, one Instrument was reading 50 vR/h and then 100'uR/h at the same location. Additionally, decontamination workers did not appear to understand the' different scales. The instruments should be maintained properly, and the monitors should compare background readings. Slippery garbage bags were used for walkways Instead of the _ recommended blotter paper. After workers were decontaminated, it was unclear exactly where they should go next. No surveys of the facility were made. Previous ARCAs'(SC 2 and SC 4) from Al PEA dated May 12, 1987 were not corrected. DEFICIENCIES No Deficiencies were observed in the Salem County field activities during this exercise. . AREAS REQUIRING' CORRECTIVE ACTION
- 1.
Description:
Evacuees at the decontamination facility at the Penns Grove High School were completing thelt- own registration forms. These forms were frequently filled out incorrectly. If an evacuee was contaminated, the form, which would then be taken into the congregate care center, might be contaminated. (NUREG-0654, !!, J.12) Recommendation: Decontamination workers should complete the paperwork and should receive additional training in cross-contamination procedures.
- 2. Descriptiom Workers at the Penns Grove High School evacuee decontamination facility were unaware of what instrument readings indicate? that an evacuee was contaminated. (NUREG-0654, !!, J.12)
~
Recommendatiom Decontamination workers should receive additional training and should review their standard operating procedures.
I
+; '
o 51 3..
Description:
The plan calls for the use of radiation' detection instruments l I that read in counts per minute and uses 50 epm above background 'as the ! criterlon for contamination. However, the decontamination workers at' the-1 emergency worker decontamination facility in Quinton were provided with instruments that raad in mR/h or.uR/hr. The decontamination workers were familiar with the number - "50" as the contamination - level, - and they ; improperly recorded the contamination level as 50 mR/h, or 50 uR/h to j correspond to the units on the instruments used. (NUREG-0654, II, K.S.a. l K.5.b) >
-1 6 Recommendation: Decontamination workers should receive additional-training on the importance of the units an instrument is read in.
.4.
Description:
The procedures for decontamination of evacuees call for several detergents to be available for use in the shower area. During the .j exercise, only soap was available. (NUREG-0654, II, K.S.b) ( Recommendation: Proper detergents for decontamination should be
. available, or the procedures should be revised accordingly.
AP.2A RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT
, 1. -
Description:
Radiation detection instruments were not reading properly at the . emergency worker decontamination facility. For example.. one instrument was reading 50 uR/h and then 100 uR/h at the same location. R Additionally, decontamination workers did not appear to understand the l 9 different scales. I Recommendation: Instruments should be properly maintained, and monitors. should compare background readings to detect malfunctiotilng equipment.
~
- 2.
Description:
No surve'ys of the decontamination facility were made.
' Recommendation: Staff should p_erform a survey of the facility being i utilized for decontamination.
2.4.4. Emergency Worker Exposure Control J
' Four emergency worker exposure control objectives were evaluated in Salem L County. Two objectives were met; two objectives were partially met.
SCFA-8. The objective of demonstrating the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure was partially met. The Salem County field workers I that were observed had the proper dosimetry: low-range (0-200 mR) and high-range (0-20 R) direct-reading dosimeters, a TLD, and a record card. The 0-200 mR direct-reading
53 . Tdosimeter provided to the bus driver for school evacuation was completely discharged, i.e.,'not zeroed before going into the field. . The 0-20 R direct-reading dosimeter carried
- by' - the 'special vehicle driver for Williams Transportation for evacuating a .
noninstitutionalized, mobility-impaired resident was also not zeroed before going into tM field. Procedures should be developed to ensure that field workers are equipped with properly charged direct-reading dosimeters.- . 1 The bus driver for general population evacuation was escorted _ by a NJSP trooper. The trooper was equipped with a charger and dostmetry for himself and the bus driver. He had the driver stop the bus every 20 minutes so that he could take dosimetry readings. The escort also briefed the driver on exposure control. All observed emergency workers knew how to use the dosimetry and who could - authorize excess exposure, except for the driver of the special vehicle for evacuation of the noninstitutionalized, mobility-impaired individual. However, all % and special- V vehicle drivers should receive training in how to use dosimetry PLc who can authorize excess exposure. The route alerting team members dispatched from the Quinton fire house zeroed
'their dosimeters before leaving and read their dosimetere once they were 18 minutes into the routes. However, they did not read their dosimeters atring the remaining 45 minutes of the route.
Previous ARCAs (SC 9, SC 40, SC 57, SC 59, SCM 2, SCM 3, SCM 5, NJ 8, NJ 9, NJ 47, and NJ 57) from Al PEA dated May 12, 1987 were corrected. Previous ARCA (SC .
- 7) from the Al PEA dated May 12, 1987 was corrected regarding Quinton, but remains uncorrected regarding the school bus driver. Previous ARCA's (SC 8 and SC 49) from the Al PEA' cated May 12,1987 remain uncorrected. . :
SC F A-9. The objective- to demonstrate the ability to make the decision to recommend the use of K! to emergency workers and institutionalized persons, based on predetermined criteria, as_ well as to distribute and administer it once the decision is- l made, if necessitated by radiolodine releases, was partially met. The bus drivers for 4 school evacuation and general population evacuation, the' members of the Quinton route ! alerting team, and the police officer from Salem City who manned the TCP were all familiar with the terms K1 and potassium lodide, as well as with the procedures for administering them. The driver of the special vehicle for evacuating the noninstitutionalized, mobility-impaired resident, although in possession of a simulated KI tablet, was totally unfamiliar with its use and when to take it. He should receive additional training. Three previous ARCAs (SC 10, SCM 4, and NJ 10) from: AI PEA dated May 12, 1987 were corrected. A previous ARCA (NJ 40) from Al PEA dated May 12,,1987 was not corrected. - j
-+ o 1 _53 SC M F A-1. The objective of' demonstrating the ability to continuously monitor -
and control emergency worker exposure was met. At each of the municipal EOCs in Salem _ County, 0-200-mR and 0-20-R direct-reading dosimeters, permanent-record-dosimeters, record cards, and an instruction sheet were given to all emergency workers.
Also, there were sufficient dosimeter chargers. _ . Emergency workers at several of the municipal EOCs had recently received additional training in exposure control. The responsible officials knew.the exposure: threshold for recalling field workers. Previous ARCAs (SCM 6, SCM 9, SCM 10, SCM 20. SCM 21, SCM 22) from Al
~ PEA dated May 12,198'? were corrected. However, previous ARCA's (SCM 7 & SCM 8)
'.from the- Al PEA dated May 12,1987 remain uncorrected.
SC MFA-3. The objective of' demonstrating the ability to make the decision to recommend the use of K1 to emergency workers and institutionalized persons, based on predetermined criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it once the dectslon is
.made, if necessitated by radiolodine releases, was met. Because municipal evaluators had
'two assignments,' activities relevant to this objective could not be observed at all vmunicipal EOCs. At approximately 2205 hours, the instruction was received from the
'SCEOC to take one K1 tablet. The emergency workers were so instructed. Although the LKI tablet was simulated,' actual K1 was available at the municipal EOCs.
A previous ARCA (SCM 11) from the Al PEA dated. May 12, 1987. remains uncorrected. [ DEFICIENCIES No Deficiencies were observed in emergency worker exposure control activities in Salem County during this exercise. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION
- 1.
Description:
The 0-20 R direct-reading dosimeter provided to the special vehicle driver for evacuation of a noninstitutionalized, mobility-impaired resident in Quinton was completely discharged,
.l.e., not zeroed bef6ce going into the field. (NUREG-0654, II,
. K.3.a)
Recommendation: Procedures should be developed to ensure that vehicle drivers are provided with properly charged dosimeters.
Description:
The 0-200 mR direct-reading dosimeter provided the 2. bus driver for the Fenwick School evacuation was completely discharged, i.e., not zerced before going into the field. (NUREG-0654, !!, K.3.a) 1
54' * , j
. , o
. 's Recommendations Procedures should be developed to ensure that vehicle drivers are provided with properly charged dosimeters, h
- 3. Descriptions The special vehicle driver for the evacuation = of a noninstitutionalized, mobility-impaired resident from Quinton did not know how to.use- dosimetry and who could authorize excess .
l L exposure. (NUREG-0654, !!, K.4) L Recommendation: All emergency ' vehicle drivers should receive , additional training in exposure control.
- 4. '
Description:
The special vehicle driver for the evacuation of a noninstitutionalized, mobility-impaired resident from Quinton was , totally unfamiliar- with the use of Kl and when to take it. (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.e) Recommendation: All emergency vehicle drivers should receive additional training in exposure control. 1 AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT , No Areas Recommended for improvement were observed in emergency worker ' exposure control activities in Salem County during this exercise, ,
' 2.4.5fSalem County Municipal Response Activities .
o Lm Activities at the following municipal EOCs were evaluated during the exercises Salem City, Pennsville, Elsinboro, Mannington, Quinton,. as.:1 Lower Alloways Creek. ' l-These municipalities had seven objectives to be demonstrated; all seven objectives were ] . met. ; SCM-1. The objective to demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand, and use ECLs = - through , appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to' ECLs, as required by the scenario was met. At each municipal EOC, ! [ the emergency response was consistent with the current ECL. The ECLs were posted u prominently, and the status boards were updated as each.EOC was informed by- the SCEOC of an escalation in ECL. The EMCs kept their staffs aware of events. p it m ' SC M-2. The objective to demonstrate the ability to fully-alert, mobilize, and activate ' personnel for both facility- and *fleld-based emergency functions was met. Because each evaluator had two municipal assignments, activation was observed at only three municipal' EOCs (i.e., Mannington, Quinton, and Elsinboro). At these EOCs, the staff was act'vated in a timely manner. Examination of sign-in sheets indicated that the [ other municipal EOCs were also activated in a timely manner. l l-i k
y , a 7 ' e 4; 55 Each EOC ' was fully staffed, and there was excellent attendance by elected l
' officials. At the Mannington EOC, there was a high level of participation and active ,
involvement of the mayor and his deputy. At the Lower Alloways Creek EOC, the active ; participation of: the mayor and four freeholders in the decision-making process was ^ l Impressive. . , Two previous ARCAs (SCM 1 amd SCM 14) from Al PEA dated May 12, 1987 were corrected. , SC M-3. The objective tu demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate, and-control emergency' activities was met. At each EOC, the EMC effectively managed the emergency response. The EOC staffs, which w :re well trained, knew their assignments. Staff members were consulted in decision-mixing by the EMCs, as appropriate. _At Pennsville, the EMC responded appropriately to a simulated accident at the DuPont plant at Deepwater that also required evacuation and alerting. The briefings were generally timely. However, at the Salem City EOC, the briefings were infrequent during the time i the evaluator was present. At Salem City, the EMC should give more frequent briefings, l and the briefings should include status updates from the staff.- ; 1
~
. l t SC M-4. The objective to demonstrate the ability to communicate with all l appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel was met. Communications ,
i j q, fequipment and the personnel staffing them provided adequate communications for the municipal EOCs. The communications systems available included commercial
' telephones, the NETS conferencing telephone, RACES, EMRAD, and . fire- or police ,
- . radio. No delays in communications or equipment malfunctions were observed, j q
~
SC M-5. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of their facilities, equipment, displays, and other materials to support emergency operations was met. Although generally small, the municipal EOCs had adequate facilities with the requisite b . maps and displays, and adequate security. The Lower.Alloways Creek EOC is a fairly new facility. The well-planned space, lighting, ventilation, and equipment provided an
~
excellent atmosphere for the EOC staff as it performs lts emergency functions. The new EOC being built for Elsinboro will be completed in about 90 days. The facility used t during the exercise is an interim facility and quite marginal, with limited equipment. e SC M FA-2. The objective to demonstrate the ability to initially alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an instructional message within 15 minutes of a decision by appropriate officials was met. The public alerting i responsibilities of municipalities are limited to redundant back-up route alerting in the vicinity of f ailed strens and alerting of hearing-impaired persons. At the three municipal EOCs observed, route alerting for mobility-impaired persons (i.e., to instruct them to I turn to an EBS station) began promptly after receipt of the Site Area Emergency ECL at approximately 1824' hours. About 20 minutes later, each municipal EOC was informed by the SCEOC that one siren within its jurisdiction had failed. Before being dispatched, the 1 n; : r
~
=56 ,
i ' I route alerting teams were' provided 'with maps, instructions, and the message to be broadcasted. A Federal evaluator observed the routt alerting team. dispatched from the
- Quinton EOC as it ran its route. As the vehicle passed the first residence, the team actually sounded the stren on the police vehicle used and read the message over the '
public-address system, stating that an emergency had occurred at the Artiflefal Island site and that residents' should tune in to the EBS station for information and instructions. For subsequent residences, activation of the stren and pubilo-address system was simulated. The route alerting team ran the entire route in approximately 50 minutes. Quinton's police-fire personnel were on another assignment during the, exercise. Therefore, route alerting personnel were requested and received from Alloways Township, an example of Intergovernmental cooperation. A previous ARCA (SC 5) from Al PEA dated May 12,1987 remains uncorrec ted. . SCMFA-4. -The objective to demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and sheltered ' areas was met. . At 1800 hours on November 29th, a free-play message was-injected at the SCEOC that a TCP should be established at the Intersection of Chestnut and Grieves Parkway in Salem City. This message was immediately given to the police- , fire representative at the SCEOC, who promptly informed the Salem City EOC. , inexplicably, the Federal evaluator and the police officer did not locate each other that evening.' However, the required demonstration took place the next' day. The police officer demonstrated good traffic control procedures and was knowledgeable about all .
' aspects of the emergency plans and procedures.
Previous ARCA's (SCM 2 and SCM 3) from Al PEA dated May 12,1987 were corrected. DEFICIENCIES No Deficiencies were observed in Salem County municipal activities during this exercise.
. AREAS REQUIP %J CORRECTIVE ACTION No Areas Requiring Corrective Action were observed in Salem County municipal activities during this exercise.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT
- 1. Deeription: During the time the evaluator was present at the Salem City EOC, briefings were infrequently held.
g 1 Recommendations- The EMC should give more frequent briefings,
.* - and should include status updates from the staff. al.
, 2.4.8 ' School Interviews SCFA-2.. The objective to demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for school children within the plume EPZ was Principals of the following six schools were interUlewed: Salem Middle School, Salem High School, John Fenwick Elementary School Quinton Elementary School, Lower Allo' ways Creek Elementary School, and St. Mary's School. Each principal stated that, at the start of each school year, parents are mailed a letter on schoolletterhead that gives the location of relocation centers and the destination of students during radiological .
emergencies.- included in the malling is a school f act sheet that gives the required public responses, if any, for each ECL and the callletters and frequencies of EBS stations. Each principal knew the number of buses required to evacuate his or her sc'hool. The principals also indicated that copies of the RERP were available at each school. Salem High School had an evacuation procedure sheet, and Fenwick Elementary School had a teachers handbook. Each principal was famillar with cvacuation procedures and . knew the estimated, evacuation times to the appropriate relocation centers. 2.5 CUMBERLAND COUNTY 12.5.1- Cumberland County Emergency Operations Center Nine . objectives were to be demonstrated by the CCEOC during this exercise. Five objectives were met; four objectives were partially met. CCEOC-1. The objective to demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand, and use ECLs through appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECLs, as required by the scenario was met. When changes,in ECL were
; received, the "significant events" boards in both the communications and operations Large, color-coded ECL signs - were also >
areas were updated .in a timely manner. prominently posted in both areas. CCEOC staff members were aware of the current ECL, and instituted ECL-
-initiated activities by working from checklists. All relevant functions -and activities were implemented in a manner consistent with the County's emergency plan and procedures.
- _ t
58 , CCEOC-2.' The objective to demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize, and activate personnel for both' facility and field-based emergency functions was partially
- . met. Following notification of the Alert ECL from the NJ OEM, key CCEOC staff were ..
contacted and advised to report for duty. The remaining staff members were then
# contacted and placed on standby for later mobilization in the event of an upgrade in ECL. ,
When the Site Area Emergency ECL was received by the CCEOC, at 1819. hours, the remaining personnel on standby were mobilized. The CCEOC was declared activated at_1646 hours and was fully staffed by 1950-hours, following the arrival of the ARC representative.' State personnel (two from the DOH and one from the OEM) and six ; communications personnel were already in position at the ; start of the exercise. Responding personnel should be called to the CCEOC by on-duty staff instead of being prepositioned. , The primary means of notification was by pager for key staff, and b'y telephone for other personnel and organizations. The notification process was completed in a timely manner and in accordance with the County plan. The notificatio'n was accomplished by experienced, well-trained communications personnel, who were able to
' handle a number of real emergency situations simultaneously.
The CCEOC was set-up following notification of the Alert ECL, that is,' : telephones were installed, furniture was positioned, and displays were set up. The-Deputy EMC served as the operations officer, and the Road Department supervisor also performed as the County engineer and the Traffic Safety Coordinator. These unstaffed' . positions should be staffed as called for in the County plan, or consolidated into staffed positions. If they are consolidated, the County plan should be revised accordingly. 4 A previous ARCA (CC 1) from Al PEA dated May 12,1987 was corrected. \ CC EOC-3. The objective to demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate, and
- ) control emergency activities was partially met. The EMC, assisted by the Deputy EMC-l and the Communications Center Coordinator directed ' and controlled emergency l
operations. The EMC periodically held briefings to review the emergency status with the operations staff. ' Overall direction and control was generally adequate to support the County's emergency response, with two significant exceptions. !- First, the completeness and accuracy of the information received from the SEOC (, was called into question by the EMC and the Communications Coordinator, but it was not !- clear -- either from observations or message documentation -- whether these concerns were being directly relayed to the appropriate personnel at the SEOC. The incoming
~ message log indicated that no formal messages were received from the SEOC during the >
f entire exercise. Many tactical (TACT) message forms were received from the SEOC. However, as required by the County's procedures, these TACT forms were neither , numbered nor logged by communications personnel at the.CCEOC. Therefore, it was - difficult to determine whethe appropriate replies were received or appropriate actions taken. l. (; L l
> 59-Second, questions were raised about the system for handling messages within the
*= CCEOC. All incoming messages were reviewed by the EMC or the Communications -
Coordinator ~ to determine their content and quality.- In a number- of cases, unclear
. messagesf were clarlfled before any action was taken. However, in. several cases, messages containing vital information were unclear. If clarification was attempted or obtained, such action was not documented.
j Two previous ARCAs (CC 3 and CC 20) from Al PEA dated May 12,1987 were i not' corrected.
)
C C EOC-4, . The objective to demonstrate the ability to communicate-with all'
- appropriate locations, , organizations, and field personnel was partially met. Radio communications were handled in an efficient and professional manner by a well-trained staff. Communications equipment at the CCEOC was exceptional, consisting of four fully. functional communications consoles capable of monitoring and transmitting on 16 l frequencies. Preprogrammed individual and group paging capabilities were demonstrated l during the exercise. With minimal disruption of exercise-related . activities, 1 communications personnel handled numerous real emergencies, including two structure l fires, a head-on automobile accident, several health-related emergencies, and a leak in H the coffer dam'at Union Lake. (
A problem was observed in the communications capability of the CCEOC that
-relates to inadequate space (see following objective). Conferences - between the Communications Coordinator and operations personnel often had to take place in.the l hallway outside the communications center or in the- operations._ area. The_ ;
Communications Coordinator's absence resulted in . failure to answer the ring-down l I
' telephone lines from SCEOC on' at least two occasions, and from the-SEOC on one occasion. .The results of these failures were not clear, but .the Federal evaluators- i believed. that the failures delayed implementation of response -activities following -l declaration of the Site Area and General Emergency ECLs. The State EIS was not fully operational in the CCEOC, and the Communications Coordinator and EMC expressed '
. concern about having received no formal messages from the SEOC.
A previous ARCA (CC 4) from' Al PEA dated May 12, 1987 was corrected. L! C C EOC-5. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, l displays, and other materials to support emergency operations was partially met. The CCEOC is located on Bridgeton Road in Deerfield, New Jersey, in two temporary ;
. buildings of modular design that normally house the County communications center. Its i furnishings and. equipment were generally adequate to support' emergency operations.
l However, space was limited, which made response activities difficult. Movement to and through the communications area was especially difficult. l 1 The boards and maps available to support operations included a plume EPZ map. l with planning areas, a map of siren locations, a map of radiological monitoring points, a j i . status board, a significant events board, and a meteorological data board. As events dictated, the boards were updateA in a timely fashion. l 1
60 , Two previous ARCAs (CC 2 and CC 21[from Al PEA dated May 12,1987 were not corrected. A previous ARCA (CC 19) from Al PEA dated May 12,1987 was corrected.- CCEOC-6. The objective to demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure was met. All emergency workers'deploye'd te the field from the CCEOC were equipped with two direct-reading dosimeters (0-200 mR and 0-20 R) and a TLD. The' direct-reading dosimeters were zeroed by the County RADEF Officer before being issued to the field monitoring personnel in prepackaged exposure
- control kits. Each kit contained the appropriate dosimetry, as well as a K! (simulated) tablet, instructions for use of the equipment, an exposure record card, a penell for recording readings, and a plastic necklace for carrying the direct-reading dosimeters.
The. County RADEF Officer has developed an emergency exposure data base for > entering exposure data on a personal computer at the CCEOC. Data obtained from each emergency worker's exposure record card are to be entered into this data base in order to track exposure according to his or her social security number. CC EOC-7. The objective to demonstrate the ability to make the decision to recommend the use of K! to emergency workers and institutionalized persons, based on l predetermined criteria,' as well as to distribute and administer it once the decision is > made, if necessitated by radiolodine releases was met. The CCEOC received information - at approximately 2056 hours through the State DOH Liaison that the State Health Director had decided .at 2045 hours that emergency workers within the plume EPZ should ingest KI. The recommendation was broadcast to field personnel at 2100 hours by the . Communications Coordinator, who had not consulted with the EMC. The EMC was not informed of this situation until approximately 2117 hours, when he received a request from the field monitoring teams who were seeking clarification of th,e instructions from the County Health D!rm: tor about .taking KI. To obtain clarification, the State OEM Liaison contacted the SEOC at 2121 hours. The SEOC responded to the request'at 2200 hours, reiterating that all emergency workers were to take KI. CC EOC-8. The objective to demonstrate the ability to initially alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an instructional message within 15 minutes of a decision by appropriate State officials is not the direct responsibility of-theJ CCEOC and is handled .st the SCEOC. Therefore, this objective was met by implementing redundant backup route alerting for failed sirens. On the basis of notification from the Salem County officials responsible for activating the Artificial Island off-site stren system, the CCEOC notified the Greenwich and Stow Creek EOCs to initiate route alerting for areas covered by siren numbers 116 ~ and 125. The message initiating this activity was transmitted to the municipal EOCs at approximately '1845 hours. Alerting teams were dispatched in accordance with the protocol in the County plan, and notification that the areas had been alerted was ,
l l 61 [ 1 received at the CCEOC at approximately 2040 hours. Field demonstration of redundant- I t backup route alerting for siren number 116 was interrupted by an actual f' ire emergency that required the presence of the Greenwich volunteers. A previous ARCA (CC 23) from the Al PEA dated May 12, 1987 was corrected through certification by New Jersey State. l I CCEOC-9. The objective to demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to l implement appropriate protective actions for the impacted permanent and transient 'j plume EPZ population was met. The protective actions recommended by the SEOC were implemented in a timely manner. The CCEOC directed local and County traffic and access control personnel to their posts at approximately 1900 hours so that they would be prepared to implement an evacuation, if needed. Evacuation was'actually implemented I at approximately 2131 hours. l The message handling and message flow problems discussed above under objective CCEOC-3 caused confusion regarding the meaning and interpretation of the , PARS issued by the SEOC. Of particular concern was the PAR for administering K1 to emergency workers and the PAR issued later recommending evacuation of sectors ENE, E, ESE; SE, and SSE at S-10 miles in Cumberland County. The discussions observed during the time these messages were being reviewed by the EMC, Communications Coordinator, County Health Officer, and the RADEF Officer indicated that CCEOC staff were prudent in interpreting the messages conservatively. Rather than risk the safety of the public, the staff chose to implement the PARS as they understood them.
. DEFICIENCIES L- '
No' Deficiencies were observed at the CCEOC during this exercise. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION
- 1.
Description:
Two State DOH, one State OEM Liaison, and .six CCEOC communications personnel were prepositioned at the CCEOC at the start of the exercise. (NUREG-0654, II, E.2)
, Recommendation: Responding personnel should be called to the CCEOC by on-duty staff instead of being prepositioned at the
. facility.
- 2.
Description:
Procedures for handling, comple .ng, and docu-menting messages were not consistently adhered to. Spaces on message forms were lef t blank, including the time the' messages were written and the message' originator. Confusion also existed as to whether messages were formal or tactical. (NUREG-0654, II. A.2.a)
63 ' 1 Recommendations Before the next , exercise, communications personnel should receive additional' training in filling out message forms, and clear instructions on how to distinguish between formal - and tactical messages.
- 3.
Description:
Ring-down telephone lines' from other EOCs were allowed to ring repeatedly and were not answered on three occasions when the Communications Coordinator was out of the communications center. l(NUREG-0654, !!, F.1.b, d)
- Recommendation: Communications personnel should receive additional training regarding proper ring-down telephone protocol, including procedures _ to follow when _the Communications -
Coordinator is out of the communications center, j AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT l 1
-1.
Description:
The Road Department supervisor and the Deputy -l EMC performed more than one functional role. The Road Department supervisor also functioned as the County Engineer and , the Traffic Safety Coordinator. The Deputy EMC doubled as the
. Operations Officer. _j Recommendation: Staff members should be assigned to only,one ' _;
staff position. if more than one role'Is_to be routinely filled by a 4 single person, the plan should be revised so that the multiple roles , are consolidated into a single staff position.- 4
- 2.
Description:
Space at the EOC was limited, which made response i activities difficult. Movement to and through the communications. _; areas was especially difficult.- ! i Recommendation: The county should investigate the possibility of j providing additional space for the EOC. 2.5.2 Radiological Field Monitoring . One radiological. field monitoring team was dispatched from the CCEOC. Two objectives were to be demonstas ed; both objectives were partially met. . A !
- h. CCFA-1. The objective to demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for determining ambient field radiation measurements. was partially met by the -
Cumberland County field monitoring team. The three-member team, composed of personnel from the County Health Department, arrived at the CCEOC within 45 minutes of notification :of the Alert ECL. The team was instructed to report to the BNE FCP after taking inventory of the team's equipment and completing all instrument checks.
-63 p,g; At the. FCP, the team- was' deployed to the field for the purpose of collecting
-' ! samples. The _ team was sufficiently knowledgeable about the technique used to obtain open- and closed-window readings at both ground and waist levels, and the reason for.
doing so. The problems observed during the exercise were related to equipment calibration and inventory lists:
- 1. = The CDV-700 meter did not have a current calibration sticker.
- 2. The equipment inventory was checked against a list that was not :
the list identified in Attachment .18 of the plan.
- 3. The' following items are identified in the Attachment 18 inventory list but-were not included in the kits used by the teams
- a. CDV-742 dosimettr (0-200 R);
1
- b. Two CDV-771-1 kits (only one was available)
- e. One MSA Model 260 oxygen combustion meter; and
- d. One bottle of Radiac wash spray.
A previous ARCA (CC 5) from Al PEA dated May 12,1987 was corrected. CCFA-2. The objective to demonstrate appropriate eq
'for measuring: airborne radklodine concentrations as low microcurles per as cubicifjlpment and pro centimeter in the presence of noble gases was partially met. The RADECO air-samp!!ng pump did not have a current calibration sticker, and insufficient data were available to calibrate the dual-channel analyzer (i.e., the efficiency values were not known)..
When the Federal evaluator requested that team members demonstrate the collection of an alt sample, they performed the task adequately. However, the sample
- was not counted adequately, which Indicates the need for additional training. In addition, severalcissues associated with the equipment were identified, including an inadequate number of particulate filters in the field kits and outdated procedures.
A previous ARCA (CC 6) from Al PEA dated May 12,1987 was not corrected. DEFICIENCIES
- No Deficiencies were observed in . C.umberland County radiological fleid monitoring team activities during this exercise.
I
- . . . = =
e 64- , AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION -
- 1.
Description:
The CDV-700 meter and the RADECO air- 4 sampling pump.used by the field monitoring team did not have current calibration stickers. (NUREG-0654,11,1.8)'
. Recommendation: Equipment used by _ the field monitoring teams should be calibrated at least annually.
- 2. -
Description:
The field monitoring team's- equipment was - checked against an inventory list that was not the same as the list identified in Attachment 18 of the plan. (NUREG-0654,11,-
< !.8)
Recommendation: Equipment . lists used by the field g - - monitoring teams should be consistent'with those in the plan.
- 3.
Description:
- Several items that were specified to be in the equipment kits of the radiological field monitoring team were not present, or were not present in sufficient quantity.
- (NU REG-0654, II, I.8) ,
Recommendation: The equipment supp!!ed to the field < monitoring team should include all items specified on the , S equipment list in the plan in sufficient quantity. i
- 4.
Description:
The field monitoring team did not demonstrate , j sufficient knowledge about ' operating the Ludlum-2218 analyzer. Additionally, this meter could not be properly 1 4 calibrated in the field because the efficiency values required by the plan were lacking. (NUREG-0654, !!,1.8) , J
' - Recommendations = Team - members should- receive ~ additional j training on operating and calibrating air-sampling equipment.
-l AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT. :
' No Areas Recommended for improvement were observed in Cumberland County fleid monitoring team activities during this exercise.
4 2.5.3 Field Activities Six field activity objectives'were to be demonstrated by Cumberland County. Five objectives were met; one objective was partially met. C
k h
. 65 CCFA-3. The objective to demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to
-: Irrplement appropelate protective actions for the impacted permanent and transient p'ume EPZ population was met. In demonstrating this objective, the CCEOC deployed a e bus on a general population . evacuation route and evacuated a noninstitutionalized, mobility-impaired person.
The bus route began at the bus mustering point located in the Maralngton Voc- , Tech Career Center on Bridgeton Road in Deerfield, New Jersey. The bus dispates he was - g the first to arrive at the mustering point at approximately 1645 hours. After the buses arrived, NJSP personnel inventoried the exposure control kits for the bus drivers. The kits were issued to the drivers before the dosimetry briefing. The bus drivers were then instructed to begin driving their ' designated routes, accompanied by their NJSP escort unit. In the course of running his route, the bus driver evaluated during the exercise checked his dosimetry frequently and recorded the readings. The bus route was successfully completed when evacuees were simulated to be discharged at the congregate-care center. The-County demonstrated that there:were adequate resources for effecting an ; orderly vm-tice of mobility-impaired individuals within, the 10-mile EPZ. An ambulance from the Shiloh Fire and Rescue Squad successfully simulated the evacuation
-of a mobili ty- i mpai red resident of Stow Creek within a reasonable time-frame. A list of
= mobility-impaired residents in Salem and Cumberland counties is maintained. .l Previous ARCAs (CC 7, NJS 3, NJS S, NJS 38) from Al PEA dated May 12, 1987 l
'were corrected.
CC FA-4. The object've to demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate prctrouve actions for school children within the plume EPZ was met. School evacuation was simulated for children at Morris Goodwin~ School in
- Greenwich Township. The driver was knowledgeable about her assignment and followed ,'
the bus route appropriately. In accordance with school procedures, a roll call was taken before the children boarded the bus. The vehicle then proceeded to the Cumberland Regional High School reception center, arriving at its destination within approximately 30 minutes. The driver logged her dosimeter readings before the children were discharged at the congregate care facility. The driver was knowledgeable about radiological control measures, s Principals of the Stow Creek Township Elementary School and the Morris Goodwin Elementary School were interv:ewed. Both principals stated that parents are mailed a' letter on school letterhead that gives the location of relocation centers and the destination of students during radiological emergencies. They also knew the number of buses required to evacuate their schools. Copies of the RERP were available at both schools, and both principals were familiar with evacuation procedures and the estimated
. evacuation times to the appropriate relocation centers.
CC FA-5. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, supplies, procedures, and personnel for decontamination of emergency workers,
, 66- ,
equipment, and vehicles and for waste. disposal was partially met. Personnel assigned to Lthe Shiloh emergency worker and vehicle decontamination center did an excellent job of
; demonstrating the adequacy of f acilities, equipment, supplies, and procedures. Use of ,
the Shiloh fire ' hall facility,- Including- the surrounding- streets, _ was prearranged. Diagrams of the layout were prominently posted so that personnel could quickly set-up traffic flow to the facility. Posted layouts were also used for setting up the operational area inside the building. These outside and inside layout diagrams resulted in the set-up of a very effective emergency worker and emergency vehicle decontamination facility. The staff responsible for preplanning and f acility Ikyout are to be commended. Staff members assigned to the decontamination facil!ty used adequate personnel monitoring _ techniques. Fire equipment was available and demonstrated for , vehicle decontamination. Showers were available for personnel decontamination. Additional training is ' required for emergency workers performing decontamination to address two problem areas identified during the. exercise. In both cases, staff members were unfamiliar with monitoring instruments and procedures:
- 1. None of the CDV-700 instruments had any visible proof of calibration. These recently exchanged instruments had been supplied to the decontamination center for use during the exercise. They should have been calibrated and the appropriate calibration information attached. ,
An emergency worker at the checkpoint for monitoring 2. emergency vehicles used a CDV-700 without prope.cly protecting the instrument's probe from contamination. - CCFA-6. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of ["ocedures, f acilities,
- equipment, and personnel for the registration, radiological monitoring, and
( decontamination of evacuees was met. The procedures, facilities, and equipment used
- for the registration, personnel monitoring, and decontamination of evacuees were l adequately . demonstrated by the staff at Vineland High School.- Entry routes to the reception center were established and maintained. Vehicles were monitored and directed to either the " hot" or " clean" area. Trigger limits previously established for the different monitoring ' instruments were appropriately used to determine contamination. Vehicle occupants were-monitored and then directed to the proper entrance of the building. Fire equipment and personnel .were properly set up to decontaminate vehicles as necessary, and procedures were followed to minimize groundwater contamination.
Evacuees with detectable contamination in excess of the prescribed limits were directed to either the boys or girls locker room of the high school. After decontamination, " temporary" clothing was provided, a green " clean" card was issued. and admission to the congregate care center was allowed for registration. Proper , monitoring and decontamination techniques were demonstrated. Any contaminated item was placed 'n a refuse containes uneu with a plastic bag and held for future disposition.
2 .
'q.
'E 67
( x Personal itema and clothing that were determined to be contaminated were not Individually bagged and labeled ( e.g., billfolds, purses, and watches). They; were simply placed into a drum for storage or disposal. Personal items and clothing determined to be - contaminated should _be individually bagged and labeled. Laundering also needs to be-considered. A previous ARCA (CC 8) from Al PEA dated May 12,1987 was corrected. CCFA-7. ine objective to demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, and personnel for congregate care of evacuees was met. The congregate care center was activated and made operational at the Vineland High School. The shelter manager was ~ notified at 1846 hours .by the County Emergency Communication Center. He was t informed that the exercise had started at 1602 hours and that he was'to activate the congregate care center. The manager then notifled two additional shelter managers, who in turn notified approximately 15 additional staff. The Federal evaluator arrived at the center at approximately 1920 hours; ARC personnel had _ arrived approximately
-15 minutes earlier.
The center was located in the gymnasium of Vineland High School Building 11/12 in Vineland, New Jersey. In addition to the 11/12 building, there is a 9/10 building which can be used to shelter an additional 300 evacuees if additional shelter is needed.~ The total student capacity is 3000. Preplanning and facility surveys performed by the ARC , and other agencies indicated that the facility could accommodate 375+ evacuees. This y number was based on ARC standards of 40 square feet per person, or 60 square feet per family unit. At 2030 hours,- a message from the County EMC indicated that 380 evacuees
'would arrive at Vineland High School. Other shelters were available as planned in the County.
1The center was operated by the ARC, which implemented previously planned procedures. The shelter had sleeping accommodations; including cots, pillows, and blankets, available' for the anticipated population. Prior arrangements for feeding had if these arrangements proved been: ulscussed with fast-food establishments, unsatisfactory, the facility's cafeteria had a two weeks' food supply on the premises, and arrangements had been made through a letter of agreement to.have school district kitchen personnel available.
- The center's staff consisted of a shelter manager and two assistant managers. In
, addition, specific personnel were in charge of registration, billeting, feeding, crisis ~
counseling, and medical assistance. A physician was on call, and fire and emergency
' medical personnel were available to transport injured people to local hospitals.
The ARC shelter registration ard was completed for each individual or family unit. Only individuals that had been provided a card Indicating that they were not contaminated were allowed inside the facility. Movement of any individual inside or outside of the f acility was recorded. The staff demonstrated superior capabilities in setting-up and managing a congregate care facility. A previous ARC A (CC 9) from Al PEA dated May 12,1987 was corrected.
, r 4. !
' .68J ,
_q e O
' C C F A-8.' The objective to'~ demonstrate- the resources : necessary to control..
traffic z flow.- and control access to : evacuated and sheltered areas. was met. The-
,, ~.
l responding NJSP ' officer in his' fully, equipped mobile unit, 'at TCP 158 in Cumberland : r
' County, had received radiological exposure training. - He had proper dosimetry and traffic control equipment and was very knowledgeable about emergency worker exposure control 4
and traffic control. l-DEFICIENCIES , 1 No' Deficiencies-were observed in the Cumberland County field activities during this exercise. - ' AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTWE ACTION
Description:
None of the CDV-700 instruments in use 'at the ; 1. emergency workers decontamination center had visible proof - of calibration. (NUREG-0654, !!, K.5.) J Recommendation: Each instrument' assigned for use in , monitoring emergency workers should have the required calibration performed, and the appropriate calibration !! Information attached to the instrument. ' \ f h 2.
Description:
An emergency worker at the checkpoint for monitoring emergency vehicles used a CDV-700 instrument ' without properly' protecting its probe from contamination. -r l ' (NUREG-0654, II, K.S.b)
' Additional training on equipment i L Recommendation:
L procedures' should be provided to emergency _ workers performing radiological ~ monitoring.
- 3. '
Description:
At the reception center .(Vineland), personal items and clothing that were determined to be contaminated were - not individually bagged and labeled (e.g., billfolds, purses, and watches). Items were simply placed in a drum for storage or disposal. Provisions for laundering contaminated ' items have not been developed. (This statement is a planning
' . Inadequacy and will be incorporated in the RAC comments for the plan).
Recommendation: Personal items and clothing determined to be contaminated should be individually bagged ano labeled. Also, provisions for laundering contaminated items should be developed. . a
l ! g s i AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT No Areas Recommended for improvement were observed in the Cumberland q 1
~ County field activities during this exercise.
1 1 2.5.4 Emergency Worker Exposure Control i Two objectives concerned with emergency worker exposure control were to be l l demonstrated during the exercise; both objectives were partially met. 1 C C F A-9. The objective to demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and
~
I control. emergency worker exposure was partially met.. Emergency workers with field x assignments for Cumberland County were issued dosimetry kits that contained the i required equipment and supplies. Included in these kits were two direct-reading J dosimeters, a TLD, simulated K1 tablets, written instructions, an exposure record card, a pencil, and a plastic necklace for carrying the dosimeters. Fire personnel assisting with decontamination at the reception center did not record their dosimeter readings every 30 minutes as required by the plan. Thus, additional training should be provided to familiarize personnel with this requirement. ' One individual was. supposed to obtain the readings from each emergency worker.
. According to workers who were interviewed, this procedure was not followed.
The driver of the bus for evacuation of school children logged her dosimeter l readings before tha children were discharged at the congregate care facility. The driver was knowledgeable about radiological control measures.
- $ The NJSP officer arriving at the TCP had received radiological exposure
'l training. He had the p oper dosimetry and was very knowledgeable about emergency l
worker exposure control. All three emergency workers who responded for the evacuation of the mobility-Impaired had proper dosimetry and record forms and were familiar with their use. . Previous ARC As (CCM 2, CCM 3, CCM 4, and NJS 8, NJS 9, NJS 10, NSJ 47 and - NJS 57) from Al PEA dated.May 12,1987 were corrected. CCFA-10. The objective to demonstrate the ability to distribute and administer
- K! to emergency workers once the decision has been made to do so was partially met.
The emergency workers in Cumberland County assigned to activities in the field were provided with dosimetry kits, most of which contained KI tablets (simulated). The three emergency workers who responded to the evacuation of the mobility-impaired were not provided with K! in their dosimetry kits. They were, however, knowledgeable about K!
. procedures. Other emergency workers evaluated were also f amiliar with the KI process.
A previous ARCA (NJS 40 from Al PEA dated May 12, 1987) was correm
i O -70 , DEFICIENCIES No Deficiencies were ; observed ' in Ct. nberland County emergency ' worker .- Lexposure control. AREAS REQUIRINO' CORRECTIVE ACTION 1..
Description:
' Fire personnel assisting with decontamination at the reception center did not record their dosimeter readings every 30. minutes as required by the plan. (NUREG-0654, II, K.3.b)
' Recommendation: Additional tralning should.be provided to f amiliarize personnel with this requirement and to ensure that the readings are taken and recorded.
. 2.
Description:
' The three emergency workers who responded to the evacuation of mobility-impaired persons were not provided with Kl (simulated) in their dosimetry kits. (NUREG-0654,11, i- J.10.f) Recommendation: All emergency workers with field-assignments should be provided with Kl. AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT , No Areas Recommended for Improvement were observed in Cumberland-County f emergency worker exposure control. s
. 2.5.5 Cumberland County Munleipal Response Activities Municipal EOCs were activated and field activities demonstrated at Stow Creek -
and Greenwich in Cumberland County, New Jersey. Stow Creek had nine objectives'to be
. 6emonstrated at the EOC and in the field; six objectives were met,-two objectives were partially met, and one objective was not observed. Greenwich had nine objectives to be demonstrated at the EOC and in the field; eight objectives were met and one objective
~ was partially met. 2.5.5.1 Cumberland County Municipal Emergency Operations Centers CCM-1. The objective to demonstrate the ability to monitor; understand, and use ECLs through appropriate implementation of emergency fwietions and activities
- corresponding to ECLs, as required by the scenario was met. Upon this notification, municipal EOC' staffs displayed the current ECL on status boards and tock action 4- ~ .._s
P 1 71 1 i appropriate for the current ECL. The CCEOC notified each municipal EOC of changes in
.. ECL.
1 CC M-2. The objective to demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize, and activate personnel for both facility- and field-based emergency functions was met. Each i EMC received the initial ECL notification and subsequengly contacted EOC staff and field personnel. Written call lists were used in notifying personnel by telephone and pager system. The pager system used to notify Greenwich fire personnel is activated from the CCEOC. The Greenwich EMC should meet with the County counterpart to ; reach a mutually agreeable solution to the question of whether the Greenwich EOC ' should be able to directly activate the pager system. , J C C M-3. The objective to demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency activities was met. Each EMC was effectively in charge of his response operation. Periodic briefings were held to update EOC staff and to sollelt staff input. A copy of the plan was available at each location. Messages were logged-in and written down on standardized multicopy forms before being appropriately distributed. At l both EOCs, message forms were occasionally incomplete. More specifically, times or J message numbers were missing, as was origin or destination information. Improvements should be made in message-handling procedures to enhance the accuracy of information. l C C M-4. The objective to demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel was partially met. Both locations had numerous communications systems: commercial telephone lines, high- and low-band radio systems, EMRAD, hand-held radios, a RACES operator, and a dedicated ring-down telephone to the CCEOC. However, the dedicated ring-down telephones to the CCEOC were Inoperable. Greenwich could not call out or receive calist Stow Creek could receive calls but could not call out. At each location, commercial telephone lines ' were used in addition to the EMRAD radio. No undue delays were observed at either . l EOC. CC M-5. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of faellities, equipment, ! displays, and other materials to ;upport emergency operations was met at the Greenwich j' .EOC and partially met at the Stow Creek EOC. The Greenwich EOC was small but ' i adequate. The high noise level sometimes made it difficult for the communications operator to hear telephone conversations and radio transmissions. Because of !!mited r
- space, dostmetry was issued from the running-boards of the fire trucks. If the fire trucks were parked on the driveway, the parking bay area could be used for emergency operations. Maps were displayed and status boards used. Access to the fecility was effectively controlled.
The Stow Creek EOC was recently renovated. A large conference roorn and and three private cfflees were added. The communications room was not set-up yet, and messages had to be delivered to the EMC by a runner. When completed, this facility is expected to be qu(te adequate. Access to the facility was effectively controlled.
I I.I-4 .. 72 , Stms boards were used at the Stow Creek EOC, but the information was not I always complete and consistent. For example, the reporting times for staff members varied from " time received" 6.nd " time declered," which resulted in confusion. EC Ls, , , weather data, and route alerting times were posted, but protective actions were not. The Stow Creek EOC should take steps to improve the accuracy of the status boards. One map showing EPZ sectors and evacuation routes was displayed. The EMC ' commented that the maps provided by the State depleted valuable information (e.g.,- relocation centers) but local roadways were not included. 2.5.5.2 Cumberland County Municipal Field Activities CCMFA-1. The objective to demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure was met. At both locations, emerirency workers were issued a prepackaged exposure control kit that included two direct-reading dosimeters (0-20 R and 0-200 mR), a TLP. record forms, instructions for using the equipment, and a K1 tablet (simulated). A pencil for recording readings and a plastic necklace for hanging the TLD and dosimeters around the neck were also included. Chargers were available for zeroir.g dostmeters before departure. Stow Creek
. emergency workers radioed the EOC with their dosimetry readings. This Information was recorded and given to the EMC. The emergency workers were knowledgeable about authorized exposures and radiological control procedures.
CCMFA-2. The objective to demonstrate the ability to initially alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an instructional message within 45
- minutes of a deelslon by an appropriate state and/or local official (s) was met. At 1846 hours, the Stow Creek EOC Implemented redundant backup route alerting procedures af ter it was advised of a stren failure. Route alerting began at 1858 hours and was completed at 1958 hours. The informational packets provided to he emergency workers included route maps, instructions, and prese?lpted messages.
At 1830 hours, the Greenwich EOC was notified by the CCI OC of a stren f ailure and was requested to implement redundect backup route alerting. A~t 1836 hours, the Greenwich EOC asked the CCEOC to activate the peger system to JMlfy Creanwich fire personnel to report to the Greenwich fire station. Four route alerting teams were mobilized and dispatched at 1906 hours frors the Greenwich ECC All four teams were provided with prescripted messages. naps, extra copies cf public instructicns, and an emergency worker exposure control kit. Route alerting wM interrupted by the need to respond to a simulated fire. All Greenwich fire !mits responded to this simulated emergency at 1940 hours. Af ter responding to the simulatert f(ce, route alerting units were redeployed for notification of the General Emergency ECL. Route alerting recom.menced at 2055 hours , and was completed at 2110 hours. Route alerting was accomplished by the Greenwich EOC in a professional, timely, and efficient manner with appropriate and operational equipment. , 1
4 73 CC M FA-3. The objective to demonstrate the ability to make the deelslon to ed persons, based on recommend the use of K1 to emergency workers and instituttor. predetrmined criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it once the deelslon is made, if necessitated by radiolodine releases, was met. At 2140 hours, the Stow Creek EOC received a message advising of changes in At 2200 hours, meteorological conditions and Instructing the field teams to take KI. Stow Creek received a message from the CCEOC Instructing EOC staff to simulate taking K!. The Greenwich EOC received message number 21 at 2122 hourst it advised of a change in meteorol6gical conditions, an anticipated telease, and a need for field teams to take Kl. Message forms state that this message originated at the 'CCEOC. The Greenwich EOC received message number 29 from the CCEOC at 2200 hourst the message stated stated that all emergency workers were to simulate taking Kl. A previous ARCA (CCM 5) from the Al PEA dated May 12,1987 was corrected. CCMFA-4. The objective to demonstrate the ability to identify the need for and The call upon other support agencies' assistance was met at the Greenwich EOC. oojective to demonstrate the ability to identify the need for and call upon other support agencies' assistance was not observed at the Stow Creek EOC. Recognl:Ing early in the response operation that additional resources would be netded from the County, the Greenwich EMC properly requested them. .or traffic control support, the EMC requested activation of the pager system to fert fire department personnel and extra manpower and traffic barricades. Additionally, an ambulance for evacuating noninstitutionalized, mobility-impaired persons was requested through ' ae CCEOC. A previous ARCA (CCM 1) from the Al PEA dated May 12,1967 was corrected. DEFICIENCIES No Deficiencies were observed in Cumberland County municipal activities during this exercise.
" AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION
. '1. Descriptiom The dedicated ring-down telephone at the Greenwich EOC used for communicating with the CCEOC was inoperable. The EOC could not call out or receive calls.
(NUREG-0654,11 F.1.b) Recommendation: The dedicated ring-down telephone system at the Greenwich EOC should be repaired.
- 2.
Description:
The dedicated ring-down telephone at the 4 tow Creek EOC used for communicating with the CCEOC was
N .
.l Inoperable. The EOC could receive calls, but could not call ;
- out. (NUREG-0654, !!, F.1.b) f Recommendation: The dedicated ring-down telephone system !
at the Stow Creek EOC should be repaired. ; t
- 3.
Description:
At the Stow Creek EOC, status boards were used but the Information was incomplete and inconsistent. For ' example, reporting times for staff members varied from " time ' received" and " time declared." which resulted in confusion. ' The ECLs, weather data, and route alerting times .were posted, but protective actions were not. Also, maps, provided by the state did r.ot include local roadways. (NUREG-0654, !!, , H.3) Recommendation: The Stow Creek EOC should take steps to . Improve the accuracy and completeness of the status boards. i The EMC should request maps from the state that depict local roadways. AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT i
- 1.
Description:
The Gr2enwich pager system is activated by the ' CCEOC. , Recommendation: The Greenwich EMC should meet with the , County counterpart to reach a mutually agreeable solution to , the question of whether the Greenwich EOC should be able to directly activate the pager system. , I
- 2.
Description:
- Message-handling forms were incorapletely filled out at both the Greenwich and Stow Creek EOCs. Recommendation: Improvement should be made in the message-handling procedures to ensure accuracy and completeness. l
- 3.
Description:
The high noise level at the Greenwich EOC l occasionally made it difficult' for the communications % .. operator to hear telephone conv?rsations and radio j transmissions. ]
)
Recommendation: The parking bay area of the fire station could be used as part of the EOC, thereby reducing the -l number of people in the communications room. l
,.--.-w-.-- ,w__
,.e,-
. 75 ,
^
l
' 2.5.4 SchoolInterviews l l
CCFA-4. The objective to demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to l Implement appropriate protective actions for school children within the plume EPZ was ! I met. 1 Interviews were conducted at two schools in Cumberland County to evaluate ) 1 their degrees of preparedness. At each school, the Federal evaluator Interviewed the principal, asking a preselected series of questions. Information regarding the number of buses required for each school and the bus dispatch point is available in the Cumberland County plan. Parents of school-age children are sent letters annually concerning the school evacuation plans. The dest! nation of the students is included in those letters. i The principal at each schoolIndicated that the time required to transfer students from the school to a reception center is approximately 30 minutes. Students from both schools are to be bused to the reception center located at Schlick High School.
- t. 2.5.7 Medical Drill 1
The two medical drill objectives demonstrated for Cumberland County were : I partially met. i C CFA-11. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of vehicles, equipment, procedures, and personnel for transporting contaminated, injured, or exposed Individuals l was partially _ met. The medical drill began out of sequence on December 2nd at approximately 1000 hours. The Shiloh fire house was notified of an accident on State ,
; - Route 49 that involved a truck containing radioactive material. An ambulance with l three emergency medical service (EMS) personnel responded. The driver of the vehicle that collided with the truck was unconscious. He had a deep laceration on his forehead and a fractured lef t arm. In addition, his lef t hand and clothing were contaminated.
When the rescue team arrived, they properly assessed vital signs and injuries. l . They surveyed the area with a G-M survey meter and cordoned off the affected area. The victim was surveyed with a high-range survey meters in fact, the contamination level (5-10 mR/h) would have been difficult to detect with that ir.strument. EMS personnel should receive additional training on the use of survey instruments, y Proper medical treatment was initiated and, at 1040 hours, Salem County Memorial Hospital was it' formed by radio that the ambulance was on its way. Proper radio protocol was oleserved. The ambulance crew used adequate contamination procedures at all times. When the ambulance arrived at the hospital, the ambulance crew and vehicle were monitored with calibrated survey meters by Artificial Island site
- radiological physics technicians. Also, the ambulance crew was equipped with proper dosimetry.
e
76 j Previous ARCA SC 64 from Al PEA dated May 12,1987 was corrected. Previous . - ARCA SC 7 from Al PEA dated May 12,1987 was corrected for the medical drill. i l CCFA-12. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of equipment, procedures. and personnel at medical facilities for handling contaminated, injured, or exposed individuals was partially met. Upon arrival of the ambulance bearing the injured, I contaminated Individual at Salem _ County Memorial Hospital, the medical team began assessing the patient's condition. A radiological physics technician, who joined hospital personnel in the radiological emergency area, interpreted the patient's radiological status. ] Shortly after the first patient arrived, a second injured, contaminated individual J arrived from the Art!ficial Island site. Medical personnel performed triage, and treated the most significant inlurles first. Appropriate medical treatment was initiated radiological surveys were performedt and samples were collected. A!! surveys were .1 i documented correctly, and the samples were labeled properly. Appropriate techniques were used to cleanse wounds and intact skin. Proper contamination controls were used. ; Af ter decontamination, good contamination control was used in transferring the patients from the radiological emergency area. A second radiological physics technician located in the buffer zone performed exit surveys of the patients and the gurneys. The ' radiological physics technicians then assisted hospital personnel in demonstrating proper i exit procedures. At this point, the direct-reading dos! meters were collected for documentation. One was completely discharged, i.e., not zeroed before being carried into , the field, and one other read 10 mR. The dosimetry records indicated that all dosimeters had initially read zero. Whole-body and finger badges were available for backups however, personnel should be trained to record actual readings, and to charge the . dosimeters or to discard the inoperable ones. , b DEFICIENCIES , No Deficiencies were observed in medical drill activities in Cumberland County ' during this exercise. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION
- 1.
Description:
The victim was surveyed by the ambulance crew with a high-range survey meters therefore, the contamination i level (5-10 mR/h) would have been difficult to observe with that instrument. (NUREG-0654, II. L.1) Recommendation: EMS personnel should receive additional , training on the use of survey instruments. 9
l 77 j j 2.
Description:
One direct-reading dosimeter used by hospital personnel was completely discharged, i.e., not zerced before ! l being carried into the field, another read 10 mR. The l dosimetry records Indicated that all dostmeters initially had read zero. (NUREG-0654, !!, K.3.a) Mooommendation EMS personnel should be trained to record l actual dosimetry readings, and to charge dosimeters or to j discard inoperable ones. AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT I ( No Areas Recommended For improvement were observed in medical drill i l activities in Cumberland County during this exercise. l l ~ l l-1 l l-4 5 V l .
78 -
. 1 3 REMOVAL OF CORRECTED ARCA FROM PREVIOUS PEA The following list suminarizes those ARCAs identified in the Post Exercise assessment Artifletal Island Site Hope Creek Nuclear Generating Station dated, May 12, 1987, which have Naen corrected and vertfled in previous exercises and have been ,
removed from the c.=rt provided in Section 4: l New Jersey State: 11-27, 29-35, 37, 39, 41, 43, 44, 46,48-53, 55, 56 i EOF: 4, 5, 7-9, 12 ENC: 1-6 Salem County: 11-14, 16-39, 41-48, 50-52, 54-56, 58, 60-63, 65, 66, 68, 69 Salem County Municipalities: 12, 13, 15-19, 24-30, 32-37 Cumberland County: 10-18, 22, 24-29 Cumberland County Municipalities: 6-18 The only ARCAs which will appear in Section 4 are those preilous ARCAs which remain incomplete, or have been corrected as a result of the November 29- , December 1,1988 exercise, or are new ARC As.
. r i
i 79 i 4 8UMMARY OF AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION l l Section 4 of this report provides a listing of Areas Requiring Corrective Action I noted during the 1988 exercise. Tables 4.1 through 4.7 summarizes recommendations to correct those Areas Requiring Corrective Action evaluated during the exercise. These tables also include , ARCAs ident! fled in the previous exercises which remain unresolved or have been rectified during this exercise. . FEMA requests that the State, Counties, and
. Municipalltles submit a schedule of actions they have taken or intend to take to correct these inadequacies.
k 4 4 4 9 h _ ~ . . - ~
80 l O !
*i TAgl.E 4.1 Salem Unit 2 Wuclear Cenerating Station -
Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action ! Worember 29 - December 1,1988 I Wew Jersey Statt . . Page 1 of 8 , WUREC-0654 Exercise Date FEMA kEP-1 Rev. 1, FEK4 11/29 - Previous Present ! No. Area Requiring Corrective Action Reference
- Objective D 12/1/88 Esercises Status
- 1 l
- 1. All coordination times documenting F.1.b 5 I I e telephonic conversations between State of New Jersey and Delaware officials were not entered into the EIS. Slece I the EIS is now the SEOC's primary means s for logging, tracking and displaying :
information, the logging of the Inter- l state PAR coordination is essential. Therefore, appropriate individuals should be trained -to log Interstate coordination calls into the CIS.
- 2. New Jersey decision-makeas took no F.1.b 18 X ! I action to advise the public in '
the New Jersey portion 4 the EPZ after being advised by the State of Delaware their decision to shelter i special populations, including pregnant women and small children, out. to 5 ) miles at 1840 hours. To minimise confusion, suspicion, and/or analety of ' the public, dettelon-makers should be { briefed on the impor ance of advising l the public on the rationale why PARS l are not being implemented for New I Jersey when they have been implemented in Delaware. j
- 3. The receiver radio stations in the LBS E.5 12 x !
network (WNhN-FM 101.7, WSNJ-FM 107.7, l WJIC-AM 1510 WSNJ AM 1240, WWBZ AM 1360, WREY-AM 1440) that are supposed to be activated by the new CPCS-1 EBS station for the Artificial Island WPS, radio station. WPSS, do not have their radio frequency crystals set for WBSS.- Insure that the affected EBS stations on the network obtain, install,'and test the operability of the required frequency crystals. l 4 Emergency workers (other than fleid J.10.e 16 X 1 monitoring teams) were not informed of the K! decision (made at 2045) until after the 2148 State OEM decision on espanded protective ac. ions. Appropriate SEOC staff should be trained to inform the county E0Cs promptly after decision by the Connissioner of Health for emergency workers to take K!.
- I S
l I t
i Ts.BLE 4.1 Sales Unit 2 wuclear Cererating stetten - l
. Summary of Arcas nettirles Corrective Action i
*
- November 29 - December 1,1966 ;
New Jersey State (Cont'd)
- Page 2 of 8 tierrise Date l
' yVREC 0654 !
FEMA-3,EP-1 Rev. 1, FEMA 11/29
- Previous Present l Reference s Objective b 12/1/88 Esercises status' l No. Area Requiring Corrective Action The SEOC staff hasl prescripted messages J.10.c 13 I I )
S. available to send to the public once the decisions were made. These prescripted messages were used as a starting point. In Els message $2, the optional information for the* sectors to be sheltered was onltted at the beginning of the message. The correct sectors were included in the body of EBS message d2. SEOC staff should receive addittonal training in modifying prescripted messages. J.10.c 13 I I l
- 6. There were errors and inconsistencies '
in sectors to be sheltered in W.J. State Police News telease $4 SEOC staff should receive additional training in ensuring accuracy and consistency of news releases. 13 I I E.7
.7. One press release used the wording of a warning / recommendation for those within ,
50 alles of the , plant, without making clear that the warning / recommendation applied only to New Jersey. Press
- releases should be specific as to the applicable geographic area. If ' ;
appropriate, State boundaries should be t given.
% I I '
- 8. Fallure to los all incoming messages or F questions limited the usefulness of the Elst Appropriate st0C personnel should be instructed to los all in-coming a messages or questions on the EIS.
I I
-9. The State Vanguard Tese A was not J.10.e 16 informed of the K! decision (made at -
2045) until 2234. Appropriate SNE-FCP I staf f should be trained to inform the state Venea%. Team A promptly af ter Gs sec1slon by the Commissioner of Wealth for emergency workers to take KI. I 4 k
s . s *
- g3 TAglE 6.1 Salem Unit 2 huclear Centrating $ ation
- Suanary of Areas Requiring Corrective Act.cn November 29 - December 1. 1933 Eew Jersey State (Cont'd) .
- Page 3 of g buREC-06H Fierrise Date .
FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1 FEMA 11/29 - Previous Present No. Area Requiring Corrective Action Reference
- Objecti,e b 12/1/83 Esercises Status'
. 2
- 10. One of the !! eld teams demonstrated 1.3 21 I. 1 improper sampling and monitorleg techniques' by (1) not uslag the .
vehicle-mounted . lastrument for
- monitoring while traveling .between c samplir.g points, (2) getting out'of the * * .: * *
- car in a contaminate 4 area before .
donning anticontamination cit _ ales. (3) falling to remove contaminated outer . protective gloves when appropriate. (6) . falling' to use the proper range settings on monitoring instruments. (5) escluding fallen leaves from a grass sample, and (6) Improperly conducting wipe tests. Team members , should ,'w receive additional ha n g- on training *- in sampling and monitoring.
- 11. Even though the agricultural agent -J.11 29 X 1 nott!!ad 5 dairy farms to put animals on storsd feed. FEMA has no assurance that these are the only dalry farms in the IC< mile EP2. As appropriate. Eg5 messages should- instruct that dairy animals within the 10-mile EP2 be
- placed on stored feed. even though .
, agricultural agents ray have made contacts.
- 12. An inappropriate directive that J.11 29 1 1 restricted the ha rve sting or revement of agricultural prsducts within 50 miles of the site +as contained in a news release /Ess me sage because data that should have bee.i logged on the EIS was not lossed. Staff should be .
tralned to use information logged on Els in developing ingestion pathway directives.
- 13. During the technical recommendation J.11 32 x 1 development by the TAC pe r sonnel .
little use was made of the population , dats contained in the State plan. Creater use should be made of the data
. In the State plan, either through the , use of large-scale maps or installation of an Els terminal in the TAC.
S
p r t 1. 83 o . 1AbLE 4.1 Salem Unit 2 Nuclear Generating Statiun . Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action November 29 - December 1.1988 New Jersey State (Cont'd) Page 4 of 8 WUREC-0654 Esereise Date ~ FCMA* REP-! No. Area Requiring Corrective Action Rev. 1,a FEMA 11/29 - Previous Present Reference Objective b 12/1/88 Esercises Status' l Vanguard Team Alpha (#1), .did not 4 1,4 1.8 K C U demonstrata not sieulate the taking of 1.11 readings in the field. When required to provide a reading, the team asked V" the controller for the numeric value ; rather than implementing appropelate field - procedures. Field teams should actively demonstrate the use of all required equipment while using the controller to provide readira aftet using field equipment.
- 15. A previously identitled losue regarding H.10 K C the lack of current calibration of sit I.8 samplets was not ob s e rve d .' Air samplers should be properly calibrated.
.This should be coserved at a future esercise.
- 16. Some problems were observed in com- J.9 K C pleting the transit-dependent general J.10.g ,
population bus evacuation routes. This was because the bus drivers and police escorts were unf amiliar with the area
- and the roadways and intersections were poorly marked. This caused some delays in completion of the bus routes. The evacuation routes should be be t t e r
,. marked with
- 17. One of the general population bus J.9 1 r
' evacuation routes required the bus to J.10.g C 30 over a bridge which carries a maximum load limit below the combined weight of the bus and passengers. The evacuation route should be alteted to avoid the restricted bridge. 't
- 18. One of the general population J.9 i K C evacuation buses was directed to go J.10.g ;
directly to the decontamination center i before going to the congregate care center. This is in conflict with the written plan. The plan and procedure should be revised. to insure .nat i evacuation buses will be directed to a monitoring / decontamination center in , the event of an emergency that could a requite evacuation during or after a f
, release front the plant.
1 i e l 4 i j
'h u 84 c 7 TABl.E 4.1 Saless Unit 2 W clear Generating Station - j Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action hovember 29 - December l, 1968 Wew Jersey State (Cont'd) . . Page 5 of 4 NUREC-0654 Esercise Date FEMA-rep-l
- Rev. 1 FEMA 11/29 - Previous Present No. Area Requiring Corrective Action Reference
- Ob,}ective b 12/1/64 Esercises Status' If, one member of or.e of the radiological K.3.a b X C field monitoring teams was not initially issued a mid-range dosimeter.
After this individual arrived at the first survey point, dosimeters were delivered. Field monitoring teams should be given all . required dosimetry prior to deployment into the field.
- 20. While waiting in the field for another K.3.a b X C assignment from the FCP, the State radiological field monitoring team had to stay in an elevated radiation field, thereby increasing their ' accumulated esposure unnecessarily. The team did request permission to be relocated but the FCP instructed them to remain at the location as new instructions were fortncoming. It is recommended that the field teams move out of elevated radiation levels while avaiting further instructions.
- 21. The, supervisor at the bus dispatch K.).a.b X C point a r.d the bus desvers were untrained and not familiar with .
cmergency worker exposure control procedures. Specifically, they were unfamiliar with the use of DRDs and T1.Ds , the operation of the equipment was not known.*f and the frequency for taking readings was unclear. Drivers did not take readings as required in their precedures. All the required dosimeters (200 mR) were not distributed to the bus drivers. 61though they were in ample supply. The personnel used for the general population bus routes should receive training in exposure control procedurse.
- 22. The emergency workers responding for K.4.a X C
[ the State's field activities (general l population bus routes, water I notification, and access control) were i not aware of the maximum allowable dose j' without. authorisation. Emergency workers. should receive training in l procedures for the authorisation to receive exposures in excess of the
- general population PACS.
l
i
'. 85 l g
C * .
}
TABLE 4.1 Salem Unit 2 Nuclear Centrating Station - I
*~ Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action ;
November 29 - December 1,1988 - New Jersey State (Cont'd) i Page 6 of 8
- NUREC-0654 teereise Date i FEMA-REP-1 '
Rev. 1 FEMA !!/29 - Previeue Present I
. No. Area Requiring Corrective Action Referencea Objective b 12/1/88
' Exercises Status' I t
2 3. ' All the bus drivers f$r the general J.10.e. X C population routes were upplied with K! I but only some were aware that they should take .it when instructed to do so ,
?
by their supervisor. The .pollce I dispatched as bus escorts and the personnel responsible for marine i notification were not supplied with KI. " Emergency workers should be provided with supplies of K! and should be aware . of. how they would . receive. the I recommendation to ingest it. , I 24 .The air sampler of the Vanguard A field H.10 X- C-team was not properly calibrated. The 1.8 alt', sampler should be properly Calibrated. , l
- 25. New Jersey uses compass sectors to J.10.a X define protection action areas, whereas C PSE&C designates Emergency Planning a Areas- (EPAs). State and utility
. ' representatives should agree on a single method for areas where pro-
- l
*. tective actions may be impleasated. I This deficiency regarding the - desig* .
I nation of areas to be evacuated has f been operationally addressed during the 1984 exercise. The use of EPAs . has been replaced at the State EOC by, the i use of compass sectors which are then . converted to narrative descriptions of
'the af f ected' areas for EBS messages.
Although this sys tem - works well, the ' ;
. use of EPAs is still' referenced in the -h New Jersey Radiological Emergency ;
Response Plan (RERP). Practice is not consistent. with the plan. _ The New Jersey RERP should be revised to remove the EPA concept, and replace it with the procedure presently in use based on ' compass sectors.
-i e
#.s 9
b
+
. 66 TABLE 4.1 $41em Unit 2 Nuclear Centrating Sta'.un - 7 Summary.cf Areas Requiring Corrective a.61on November 29
- December 1. 19's New Jersey State (Cont'd) .
g, Page 7 of 8 ; NUREC-0654 tiercise Date FEMA
- REP-1 Rev. 1 FCKA 11/29
- Previous- Presen:
No. Area Requiring Corrective Action Reference s Objective D 12/1/88 Exercises Status 8
- 26. Some problems were observed in follova J.10.a. X C ing the proper evacuation routes. . This J.10.g was because the bus drivers and state 0.1 police escorts were unfamiliar with the area, roadways were poorly marked, and route maps were segmented. Considera-tion should be given to installing additional road name signs and/or route nuaber markers, and providing better maps and written descriptions of the routes. Esisting small ma ps could be improved by placing an "a" or a match line at the point where the previous map ends. A larger ma p showing the entire evacuation route should also be included for reference in each bus driver's packet of maps.
- 27. The message to simulate the use of K! J.10.e X C in NJ CC was not received by one of the bus J.10.f I in SC drivers involved in the general population bus evacuation' Communica-tions should be improved to ensure that messages concernir.g radiation exposure protective measures are received by all
- bus drivers.
- 28. Although evacuation procedures were J.10.g X 1 generally clearly stated in the CBS messages, there were no instructions given for. the evacuation of school children. CBS evacuation messages should make it clear whether school j children are to be evacuated or not.
- 29. gRP should better coordinate the J.ll X C responsible agencies ingestion pathway sampling and measurements.
l- 30. The bus drivers' knowledge of ra - 4 tion K.3.a .X C l protection and dosimetry varied greatly l between the two drivers involved in the l general population bus evacuation. l Additional trainind shuuld be provided
- l. . to ensure that all bus drivers are I knowledgeable about appropriate radia-l- tion protection including the use of dosimeters, allowaole dose limits, and prvceoutes tot oving authorised to ,
receive additional expusure. The training schedule should be submitted to FEMA. h
?N P k_- .ii. ,, k,
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i 37' '
- h. A ;
, l TAgLE 4.1 Salem Unit 2 Nuclear Generating Station = l Svamary of, Areas Requiring Corrective Action :
o, November 29 - December 1,1946 1
, 'r New Jersey State (Cont'd) !
Page 8 of 8 *
.t
- y NUREC-06$4 Esercise Date- I FEMA-REP-1 '
. . Rev. 1, FEMA 11/29 - Previeve> Present. :
- No.. Area Requiring Corrective Action Referencea Objectiveb .12/1/88 Exercises' $tatus*4 ",
i
- 31. _No messages were posted in the accident J. ll' X C. t
,. assessment ares . .or the State EDC to- * )
garding protective actions implemented ' *' s f p -for the ingestion. pathway. Protective, .i lj actions .'implenented . should be clearly ;{ hh -posted on the status boards and maps.-
- 1. ;t h ^ {
The . bus ' drivers hadi noi training.'in. H.10 X C- -' 32.. -( radiation - record keeping or knowledge . 0. 4 . i '
'of ,esposure . control ' procedures.. No ,')
dosimeter- chargers. were available at-the mustering point.- The bus drivers
' t should receive further.. training in !
-radiological-esposure control. .
l
.i
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l t I.< e + L i t C. . D 4 {.^ I s , 4 l: s b - l l: a L 4 t ie
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- g. ,
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([ d Fs . D 4 . TABLE 4.2 Salem Unit 2 Nuclear Centrating Station
- h Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action.
November 29 a December 1, 1988 i- f.mergency Cperations facility -* Page 1 of 2
-i i' NUREC-004 Enereise Date ~
,, 1
" FEMA REP-1
'Rev..), . FEMA !!/29 - Previou's 'Present Reference 8 Objective b 12/1/8s Esercises status 8 so. 1 Area Requiring Cottective Action 10 X !.
- 1. The plume was not defined- by- the fie'id - 1.8 teams, and estremely. limited radio-
' lodine data were obtained. The TCP *
;- should provide proper . direction -to
. ensure that the field teams define the
' !! necessary. the EOF should-plume..
inform the - FC" as to which areas the teams should cover.' 1
- j. The BNE KI recommendation was not based J.10.e 16 X on a 2$* tem projected dose, as tequired
' by the . Plan. . Additional training y ;, should: be provided to' ensure .that participants are aware of the contents "
,of the plan.-
H.2 X C 3.L The space provided for the State $NE operation at the E0F is insufficient. Additional room .should be provided for the $NE'$ staff.. X C
.4. lA previously identified ARCA that there J.ll had not been proper posting of messages in the a cident assessment area tsgarding protective actions implemented for the ingestion . pathway - ' remains outstanding- because ingestion.
pathway escision-masing was- not an ' objective for this esercise. _This ARCA was previously- identified 'at the accident assessment area ' of the EOC ' which has r.ow been-. relocated to o the EOF. . At the nest ingsstion pathway f exercise,' messages regarding protective
..' actions - implemented for the ingestion
. pathway should be clearly posted on the status boards and maps.
I' l Y. t 4 r 1 t i i 5'
- v ,
, so TABLE 4.2 Salem Unit 2 Nuclear Generatirig Station
- Summary of Areas Itequiring Correctiv. Action November 29 - December 1, 1988 Emergency Operations Facility (Cont'd)
Page 2 of 2 WUREC-06$4 Enereise Date FEMA-REP-1 Rs v. 1 FEMA !!/29 - Previous Present No. Area Requiring Corrective Action Reference
- Objective b 12/1/88 Esercises States *
- 5. With the dose assessment functions of A.1.b. X C the -BRP treisferred to the EOF, the H.2 allocated space in the EOF was insufficient tor the additional staff and equipment, and the arrangement of allocated space hindered interaction between dose assessment and management personnel for the BRP and those of the utility. If it is decided to transfer the dose assessment functions of the BRP to the EOF permanently, the BRP should negotiate with the utility and obtain additional space as well as
.'e a r r a ng eme nt of space throughout the .1 EOF to allow grouping of dose assessa ment personnel in one area and key utility and BRP/0EM management representatives in another. '
- 6. A status board was not present in the D.) X C NJSP*FCP and there was no posting of the emergency classification level. A status board displaying the emergency classification level should be displayed and maintained in the NJSP-FCP.
7, The NJSP-FCP room was not shielded like J.9 X C the nearby EOF toom in the same J.10.m builving. Wnen the FCP personnel were advised to move to the sealed EOF room for radiation esposure protection they could not do so since there were no communications hookups available in the E0F toom. It is recommended that the FCP toom in the Nuclear Training-Facility building he protected similar to that in the EOF toom, or that the FCP be relocated to the NJSP Woodstown station.
- 8. The NJSP reported to < slightly J.10.a X C dilletent location for one of the two J !G.j access control points demonstetted dur-
, ing the exercise. This became apparent when the NJSP attempted to relieve the Lower Alloways Creek police at the indicated post. It is recommended that
- j. coordination between the NJSP and local police be implemented in order to ob-tain agreement on the precise location of the traffic control / access control points. In particular, the exact location of post MA needs to be confirmed.
90
' 4 TABLE 4.3 Salem Unit 2 Nuclser Centrating Station
- Summary of Areas Requiring Correttive Action November 29 - December 1, 1988 Emergency News Center . ,
Page 1 of 1 NUREC-0654 Esercise Date FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1. FEMA 11/29 - Previous Present No. Area Requiring Corrective Action Reference
- Objective b 12/1/88 Esercises status'
- l. ..During two of the briefings, media C.3.a 16 X 1 perseneel asked questions that required detailed technical infore.ation about
. the physical ef fects of various levels of radiation esposure. The questions, which could not be answered by the ENC personnel present, remained unanswered throughout the esercise. A health physicist, possibly from BNE, should be available to the ENC utility staff to assist in providing technical answers to media inquiries.
- 2. Public information meterials have been C.) X C developed indicating evacuation routes C.2 and the location of congregate care centers. These materials have not been distributed by PSE&C due to printing problems. Distribution of public information informing residents of 4 protective actions should be continued.
- In aesition, information should be disseminated to those locations where transients might bel e.g., $alem Colf and Country Club, and the Salem Motor Lodge. Although the results of the formal survey conducted by the State and utility regarding public awareness are not yet avellable, a spot check of EPZ residents during the 1964 esercise indicated that, even though PSE&C has mailed information concerning emergency planning to EP2 residents, public awarenoss of protective actions was somewhat weak. This is a continuing deficiency that was observed at previous esercises. The public educe-tion program must be intensified so the residents of Salem and Cumberland counties ' be more aware of protective actions to be taken during a radio-logical emergency.
e t c
-- - ------~_m._. _m .2 m ._ .
-e - . 91 I.
TABLE 4.4 Salem Unit 2 Nucleat Centrating Station -
-. Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action hovember 29 - December 1, 1988 Salem County Page 1 of 8 NUREC*06$4 tiertise Date FEMA-REP-1 Rev. le FEMA 11/29 - Previous Present No. Area Requiring Corrective Action Referente a Objective b 12/1/88 Esertists Status"
- 1. The AADtr of ficer intercepted the mes* F.1.d 3 X 1 sage fro 9 the BNE-FCP to the field teams, and did not relay it promptly to the field team. The county LOC must not ett as a filter between the SNE-FCP and the field . team. All . Inf oteetion and directions should be espeditiously relayed to the field monitoring team.
- 2. Several redlological monitoring instru- 1.8 7 X 1 ment s and equipment that were provided by the State of New Jersey had problems with talibration or documentation of calibration. The RADCCD alt sampler calibration sticket was outside the annual calibration requltement. the Ludlum 2218 tounting instrument was calibrated with Cs*l)1, an inapproa priate source for detectlng 1*131. No .
range of source counts was provided
, with the simulated radiolodine sourcel consequently there was no hay of assoring that the instrument was operating properly. The State of New Jersey should callbtsts properly, and document such callbtation, the tsdica logical monitoring equipment provided to county field monitoring teams.
- 3. During the conf usion caused - d*ed !.9 8 X 'l car battery, a team memb- .
distracted and counted the partiew filter instead of the allver aeol, Illter (and would have completed the thytold dose assessment using this erroneous information). This error was not detected by the team leader. Radiological monitoring teams should retelve additional training, and the team leader should assure the quality of sample collecting and counting pro-cedures, regardless of circumstances.
- 4. The FCP was not responsive to requests 1.9 7 X l
. f rom the Salem County field monitoring teams for information.regarding reactor shutdown, which was required to complete the thyroid dore assessment.
The FCP should be more responsive to requests tros tield monitoring teams for ~ necessary information. This problem could be related to the need to relay communications- between the 'CP and field monitoring teams through the SCEOC.
, c- .
5
- A; 92 TABLE 4.4 Salem Unit 2 Nuclear Centrating Station * .
Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action November 29 - December 1, 1988 Salem County (Cont 'J) Page 2 of 8
- g]
NURECa0654 Esercise Date FEMA
- REP-1 Rev. 1,s FEMA !!/29 - Previous Present "
Reference Objective b 12/1/88 Esercises Status
- No. Area Requiring Corrective Action r decontamination J.12 25 x J
- 5. Evacuees at -the .
facility at the Penna Crowe High School
* ' were completing their own registration
- forms. These forms were frequently filled out incorrectly. If an evacute ,
was contaminated the form, which would then be taken into the congtegate care center, algt.s be contaminated. Decon- , l' tamination ve rkers should complete the paperwork 44 should receive additional t r/ som,'t in cross
- contamination, precedurg . , r J.12 25 X !
- 6. Wo hers at the Penns Crowe High School evacues decontamination' facility were unaware of what instrument readings '
' indicated that an evacuet was contamin.
- ated. Decontamination workers should receive additional . training and should review their standard operating l procedures.
K.5.a. 25 X !
- 7. The plan calls for the use of' radiation detection ihstruments that read in K.5.b counts per minute and uses 50 cpm above background as the criterion for contam*
laation. However, the decontamination werkers at the emergency worker decon* tamination facility in Qulaton were + provided with instruments that read in mR/h or uR/hr. The decontamination workers were familiar with the number ,
"50" as the contamination level, and t they improperly recordeo the contamina*
tion level as 50 mR/h, or 50 ,R/h to correspond to the units on the instru-ments wied. Decontamination workers should receive additional training en the importance of the units an instru*
. ment is read in.
K.S.b 25 x !
- 8. The procedures for decontamination of evacuees cell for several detergents to ,
be available for use in the shower area. During the exercise, only soap
, was . available. Proper detergents for ,
decontamination should be available, or the procedures should be revised accordingly. 9
-a 1
'?- 93 '
- . e- -
TABLE 4.4 Sales Unit 2 Nuclear Convratina Station
- Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action
'4 November 29
- December 1,1988 ,i Salem County (Cont'd) !
Page 3 of 8 1 WUREC-06$4 Emereise Date > FLMA REPal ) Rev. l. FCKA Present
- Wo . . Area Requiring Corrective Action Referencea .Objectivab .12/1/88 11/29 * - Caercises' Previous Status' I
- 9. The ~ 0 20 R direct-reading dosimeter K.3.a 6 X 1 provided to the . special vehicle driver '
for evacuation of a noninstitution-alised, mobility-impaired resident in ' Quinton' was completely. discharged, i.e. , not seroed before going into the , ; field. . Procedures should be developed ~ [ to ensure that vehicle drivers .are provided with pro pe rly . charged dosimet e rs. r
- 10. The 0-200 mR direct-reading dostmeter K.3.a 6' X 'l- I provided the bus driver for the Fenwick l
School. evacuation was completely ;c discharged, i.e., not .seroed before going Into the field. Procedures should - be developed to ensure that. i i
< vehicle ; delvers' are , provided with i c properly charged dosimeters. ,
(
- 11. The special vehicle driver for the K.4., 6 4 1 evacuation of a noninstitutionalised, mobility-impaired resident from Quinton 'l
( did not know how to uso dovimetry. and who could authorise escess e s po s u r e .
'* All-emergency vehicle drivers should receive adequate training in esposure
,. control.
121=The special. vehicle driver for the J.10.e 16 X l ' J evacuation of a.noninstitutionellaed, mobility-tapaired resident from Quinton 1 was totally unf aellier with the use of 't ? ' K1 and when to take it. All emergency , vehicle drivers should receive adequate ;} training in esposure control. i I
-13. The driver for the mobility is.pai red J.10.d X 1 '
? evacuation' was not provided with a , specific house number for one location. ' Although the driver correctly requested g the . information from her . of fice, the ' of fice was unable to provide it. It i
- wa s observed however, that this
, information is acallable at the Quinton
- C0C.
The county should have more specific information on the locations of noninstitutionalised . mob t a i t y ' impaired individuals which is probably available from all ot the local EOCs, as it is from the Quinton EOC. .
. i h
i
! 9' o < o E e I TABLE 4.4 Salem Unit 2 Nuclear Cenerating Station - , Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action November 29 - December 1.1988 Salem County (Cont'd) . y NUREC-0654 tiercise Date 1 r FEMA-RCP-1 11/29 - Previous present j Rev. l.- FEMA Area Requiring Corrective Action Reference 8 Objectiveb *l2/1/88 Caercises Status' No. s X 1
~ 14 Workers at the eeergency worker K.$.a only K.S.8 0; decontamination center were. .
generally f amiliar with the procedures l for and the requirements of decontamination. They lack hands-on training with survey instruments and decontamination ' methods and ' they were unfamiliar with what levels are considered contaminated ~ and at what levels decontamination efforts should ; be stopped. Monitoring personnel at ; the Salem County decontamination center should receive additional hands-on training' to improve knostedge and use of survey instruments. personnel at the $alem County decontamination center should be given-additional training in contamination levels and , decontamination procedures, i X 1
- 15. -The potential- f or spread of contamina- K.S.b ,
tion within the emergency worker decon* tamination center has not been con-sidered in detail., No provisions were in place to physically separate areas
- f or contaminated workers f rom ateas f or I noncontaminated wotsers. It is recom- 'l mended that methods be established to prevent the spread of contamination within the facility. These could include the use of blotter paper on walkways and step off points, cordons l to separate areas and indicate walk- t ways, the elimination of crossover points. and periodic surveys of the facility alter contaminated persons )
have been admitted. X C
- 16. The route alerting team only completed E.6 a . portion of the route during the exercise, explaining that the remaining I part of the route was not in their jurisoittion. This does not agree with ,I the plan which indicates that Quinton ,
- is responsible for the entire route. ..
* 'The plan and the toute assignments '
should be reviewed and changed. !!
.necessary, to clarify jurisdictional areas of responsibility. Route alert-ing team members should be given proper ,
instructiors and training on the areas to be covered by route alerting. s w
% t F.
c- .' .
95 ,. .l 4 .
r TABLE 4.4 Salem Unit 2 Nuclear Cenerating Station - r s > Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action !
- November 29 - Decembut le 1988- l
..' Salem County (Cont'd) .. 't
-Page 5 of 8 *}
WURtC-0654 tiercise Date i FEMA
- REP 1 .
Rev. 1,8 FEMA 11/29 - Previews Present Objective b No. Area Requiring Corrective Action ' Reference 12/1/38 Caercises Status' i i
'17.- The bus driver f or' school evacuation K.3.a X ! i did not have a dosimeteel the ambulance =!
crew for the medical drill only had one 0 200 NR dosimeter between them and it had been completely discharged and was
.off*scatel emergency workers at the decontamination center .w ore only one dosimeter eeth (either : a high or . low range)J t a t t.e r than both.; It is ,
recommenced that all energency workers i have high and low range direct reading ., dostmeters and TLDs.
- 18. .The route alerting team personnel did K. 3. 'b X- I t not' ' read - their - dosimeters at 15-30' +
minute intervals. It is recommended that the toute alerting team personnel
. receive ' additional' training to read .;
their- dosimeters and- record the
' exposures at 15 30 minute intervals as {
specified in the plan.. j
.19. . In . t he 1984 esertise. the bus driver K.3.a X 1 i
for the school evacuation in Salem ;
... County did not have . a dosimeter. - In s
.the 1985 = remedial esercise.' the bus '
driver had a self* reading dosimeter but ' f no permanent record dosimeter. Apprope(ate dosimetry- should be provided . to all delvers involved .in i evacuation busing.- The listing of dostmetry should be provided to FENA. j
. 20.1 Emergency f workers at the Salem County K.5.s X ! :
congregate . care shelter (Centerton Fire
- 5tation) did not know the contamination level > for determining the need for
. decontamination. Emergency workers should -receive additional training on
, the contamination level for determining !
the need for decontamination. ,
- q I
l
)
r i e I t ..l'%<_ 4 U* ~---. , , . . . _ ._ _ . ,. ,
f 96 s TABLE 4.4 Salem Unit 2 Nuclear Cencrettng 5tstion
- Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action November 2)
- December 1. 1988-Salem County icont 'd)
- Page 6 of 6 l NUREC-0654 treceise Date FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1 FEMA 11/29 - Previous Present Area Requiring Corrective Action Reference
- Objective b 12/1/88 Esercises Status' No.
F.1.b X C
- 21. In some cases, inf ormation transmitted from tho' Salem County EOC was not correctly transcribed at the Quinton '
C0C. Apparently this was because the form used at the Salem County EOC (from which the message was to be relayed to the local EOC for- transcription) differs from the one ' used to record ! messages at the Quinton EOC. Although the County requested verification f rom the local EOC that the nessage had been received, the content . of the message was not verified for accuracy in transcription. Transmission of messages f rom the Salem County ESC to all local toca should follow the forms available at the local COCs and local communications officers should be trained in the use of these forms to insure that- information is recorded , correctly. For important messages, the information should be verified for accuracy to insure that it has been transcribed properly.
- 32. Only one shower is available for decon- K.S.b X C taminating emergency workers, repeating i
an area requiring corrective action ' identified at a previous.exercist. It i is recommended that additional shower facilities be available at the decontamination center. i E.6 X C
- 23. The bus driver for school evatuation and the director of the decontamination center were. unsure of who could authorise sucess esposure. It is recommended that' the school bus driver and the director of the decontamination center receive addittoaal training on eme rgenc y worker procedures for authorising excess exposure.
-24 The route alerting team and - the bus J.10.e X C e driver f or school evacuation were unf a-
-millar with the terms K1 and potassium iodide. This was a remedial action for the school evacuation bus driver an.d is incomplete. It is recommended that the -
route alerting team and the bus driver for - school evacuation receive additional training in the use of Kl. F e
\ .,
+ s
. ,, {,
4 TABl.E 4.4 Salve Unit 2 Nuclear Cenerating Stat tun + ! Sunpary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action hovember 29
- December 1. 1988 i Salem County (Cont'd) .
P63e 7 of 8' .-l [ 1 a, NURCC.MS4 FEMA +ktP+1 [mercise Date Rev. 1, FEMA 11/29 - Previous Present' !
! No. Area' Requiring Corrective. Action References . Objective b 12/1/88 taercises' Status' l
. i, s = 25. The ~ 1982 Post Esercise Assessment J.10.j X 'C i a- stated " Salem County mu.. demonstrate
. the capability . to implement protettive ,
I measures. The tpunty shout d demon * ! ti , .. strate its capability to participate in ! l' relocating tho' populace,~ evacuate ;
< ' residents from the LPZ, and caetrol access." At the 1983 eserci se ," t he
- county demonstrated the ability to ,
t evacuate residents f rom the EP2.' Access L, control was not en objective ' for' the county f or this exercise and should be demonstrated in a future esercise.
- 26. The bus driver for ' the school evacua- J.10.e X~- C-tion in Salem County was not trained in K.).b the.'use of - dosimeters or K!. All
- eme rgency workers, _ locluding : bus driverb, should- be fully trained in radiolog(cal esposure' control including *
- 1. - the use of dosimeters and Kl. The
_ training schedule ior .all emergency , workers should be furnished to FEMA.
,,', -27.1 At .the Salem County decontamination K.S.b X C' s center, the- forms available for
. recording emergency worker's esposures
, - do not includeLa place for recording the, location of body - contamination f or E monitored' workers. Emergency worker espesure record forms should be revised
- to . include a place for recording the location.of. body contamination. ,
(- - 28.' Radiological' esposure control- dosi. K.3.a X C s metets were not . issued - by the County-for the bus driver involved in the evacuation of -transient de pendent i individuals.- Moreover t he =- driver l< appeared to have had no training in thw use -ofi dosimeters. Raa ' olog'it al esposure ; cont rol dosimeter d traina ing' in their use .is .requirs J for per* sonnel< involved in evacuation busing. f l29 1 Resider.ts et- Cumberland- and Salem C.) X C 1 : Counties- must be. made aware of C.2 protective actions to'be taken during a-radioloeital emergency. l3'
-?1 y =e d;
i , .
e~n, . , , * -- 0 ; 1 , ,
?L' s
es: t ut 4i i' l TABLE 4.6 : Salem Unit 2 Nuclear Cenerating Strtion
- qe l
' fummary o! Areas Requiring Cerrective Action- i
.Wovember 29 - December 1, 1988 Salem County (Cont'd)
~*-
g,I Page 8 of 8 1
.?
' 1 fuereise Date j NUREC*0654 FEMA *REPal
>< Rev. 1, FCMA !!/29 - - _ Previous. .Present- l No '. - [AreaRequiringCorrectiveAction Referenes s ogj,,ggy,6'12/1/88' Esercises Status' g h 6s
'l
- 30. At t ha .- $A- traf!!c control point, X - C -- .t b
dosimet ry equipment was not ~ observed. K . J . s' l l Police offitets assigned 'to traffle ,! t- - control points should be equipped with l
! personal dosimetet s and; should. be '
trained in their use. I at. X C J 731..During the September 27,4 1984 moeical F.2 W.2.c 6[
> Ldrill. .the ambulance crew member who
.talled in to $ sloe County,M4*orial ,
i Hospital over : the ; radio neglected to
'i say- "This is~ a drill."- All' radio #
' transmissions made as part . of future '"
drills' should
' ' be clearly medical , t
' identified as such.
. V
^
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1 if
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6
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, N b T
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. . -. - _ . . - . . _ ,, _- .~. _ . - - - -- .
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. TABl.E 4.$ ' Salem Unit 2 Nuclear Genef ating Station -
- e. Summary of Areas Requiring.Currective Action November 29.- December 1, 1988 Salem County Municipalities Page 1 of 4 NUREC-0654 Esercise Date ~
. . .E' FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1, FEMA- !!/29 - Previous Present Objective b Referencc a Exercises' Status C
.No,' Area Requiring Corrective Action 12/1/88 1
'l. Several emergency workers at the Salem -K.3.b X. 1
..' -City E0C were not . f amiliar with the F* 4 procedutes for proper use of dosimetry and stated that the County's. scheduling
~ of training classes does not meet'their l- tie e d s . They request that the County.
- schedule .tralning- at . Salem City's~
torstioni a remedial action remains-y : Incomplete. -It c is ruommended that Salem . City , and - Salem ' -County work together to ' develop a training program and schedule. focusing on dosimetry for emergency workers in Salem City.-
'2, in the=Quinton EOC,'.there were 0-200 MR K.3.a X !
and 0-20 R dosimeters but supplies were insulfleient : for all- worke rs. It is recomrnended that additional dosimeters provided for the emergency workers at and dispatched from the,Quinton EOC.
- 3. ,At'- the . Salem City EOC, several staff J.10.e X' I
. members were not familiar ~ with the M -. procedures L f or the use . and authoriza-
,'< 'tlon of Kl.- 'The remedial action for training-; emergency workers in Salem City in the-use'and authorisation of Kl.- ,
' is incotaplete. It is-recommended that ,.
,s emergency workers in Salem City receive
'i' additional training -in procedures . f or the use and 'authorisation of KI.
1_., 4'. L The participation of local staf f at the A.2.a X C Mannington EOC .was limited to the EMC, EMC assistance and the fire department representative.~ . There were tso repre-a -- sentatives of elected offlaialst there--
"a fore a remedial action identified 'at a previous. exercise was not demonstra 1 ted.. It is - recommended that elected offi-tals be , represented in the Man-
-nington E0C.
s
.$. Thej r,bjective to demonstrate that J.10.) X C
'* traffic control points can be established in a timely manner was-not
' ' demonstrated or observed. It is recommended that at A future exercise, )
traffic control points be established and that . the officers remain at the
.TCPs until they are evaluated.
4.- o-
E 100 --
~
=4
.a
~ ,
' TABLE .$ $'alem Unit 2 Huclear Cenerating Station -
,N " Sunenary of Areas kequirlng Corrective Action-November 29 - December.1, 1968-Salem Coenty Municipalities (Cont'd) .
. Page 2 of 4 - .
g h NUREC-0654- Exercise Date
>g FEMA-REP-1 ;
Rev.' 1,. FEMA 11/29 - Previous .Presentc
" Status Area Requiring Corrective Action Reference e Objective b 12/1/88 Esercises j + : N 6 ,-
- l X 'C - aj
- K.4' '
- 6. ;; Tbe ' objective- to ~ demonstrate the
' decision . chain that has been
- established to authorise - esposure - for
'd .
emergency workers in .escess of ' the . d general public PACS was not demon-strated Dr ODueved for the officers at th? T~). .It is C* commended that at a future exercise,, traffic control points be established and that the officers remain at- tne TCPs. until -they are evaluated regarding - their knowledge j'
.about the decision chain established to-
'E ,# authorise exposure .for, emergency ' workers in excess of'the general public
.l PACS."
m -C-X objwctive, to' demonstrate the J.10.e. !
~~J.. <The g",
ability to. supply and' administer K!. once the decision:is made to do so was y not demonstrated or' observed for the ; of ficers a the TCP.T tt-is recommended .
-that at' a. future exercise, traffic .;
conc tol points be established and that
.]
the of ficers - remain at the TCPs until j i they are- evaluated regarding their , b knowledge about K!. X C 8..Since traffic control points were not K.3.4 ,
- established. or observed. the remedial
'~
.rction was not evaluated that municipal and fire police manning traffic control I points. will. be issued dosimeters. The 1
;-remedial action that municipal and fire !
police manning TCPs will he issued !
- dosimeters should be implemented and ,
evaluated at a: future exercise. C -I X At the Elsinboro and Lower Alloways K.3.a
- 9. s Creek EOCs, there were - only 0-200 mR cj dosimeters, which are - too low. It is i
- recessnended that mid-range and / or high-
~
. range dosimeters be- provided to the l
- Elsinboro ' and Lower. Alloways Creek EOCs.
t I 1
, 101 TABLE 4.5 Salem Unit 2 Nuclear Generating Station -
Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action e November 29 - December 1, 1988 Salem County Municipalities (Cont'd) Page 3 of 4 NUREC-0654 Esercise Date FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1, FEMA 11/29 - Previous Present No. Area Requiring Corrective Action Reference
- Objective b 12/1/88 Exercises Status'
- 10. The EMCs at the Elsinboro and Lower K.4 X C ,
Alloways Creek EOCs'were unaware of the decisicn chain that has been established to authorize exposure for emergency workers in excess of the general public PACS. It is recommended that the Elsinboro and Lower Alloways Creek EMCs receive training in emergency worker radiological exposure control including the decision chain for authorizing exposure in excess of the general puolic PACS.
- 11. An emergency management official at the V.4 X C Lower Alloways Creek EOC was unsure of the exposure threshold for recalling field staff, repeating an area requiring a remedial action identified at a previous exercise. It is recommended that emergency management officials at the cawer Alloways Creen EOC receive additional training in emergency worker radiological exposure control including maximum allowable dose for field staff.
- 12. Although a letter was sent to all A.4 X C Mayors and Boards of Ch6sen Freeholders as a r'sult e of the 1981 exercise, the level of participation of emergency personnel in the exercise was disappointing. Every effort should be made by the Mayors and Board of Freeholders to educate their emergency personnel of the impertance of the exercise expertence. On the basis of the 1954 exercise, this rematns incomplete for the Elsinboro and Mannington EOCs. The Elsinboro and Mannington EOCs need to improve their participating levels. The interaction and coordination of their statf could not be tully evaluated. A system should be implemented to inc-ease the
. participe,icn levels of volunteer staff at the Elsinboro ard Mannington EOCs.
The timing of the exercise should be given greater consideration in the scenario development. 1
-, , , , , , , ,,,,,,,,,,.,...,--,,o-___ -w.rm
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-TABLE 4.5 Salem Unit'2' Nuclear Cenerating Station -
4
. Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action
- November. 29 - December 1,1988
- Salem County Manicipalities (Cont'd) y 4 , Page 4 cf 4 -
WUREC-06, Exereise Date
- b-FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1, FEMA 11/29 - Previous ~. Present Area Requiring Corrective Action Reference
- Objectiveb.12/1/88 Exercises. Status' l'- - W).
e
-[
> '13.1 Most smergency' workers responding to an
- X C t (spediment to evacuation left/ their K.3.a -
e, dosimeters; in ~their vehicles.' All K.3.b (( ' 4 q;
=
- emergency' workers should be instructed' '
to carry dosimetersg with- them at all s
-g: . times in the -.'ield.
X C The ' radiological officer at the Lower K.4
' 14. .
. Alloways Creek E0C was not aware of the
- exposure threshold . f or recalling field staff. ' Emergency staff should be (trained to- be knowledgeable -in- the semimum allowable' dose for field staff.
F.1.b 'X~ C
- 15. Persornel of the Lower Alloways: Creek
- rescue squad had no dosimeters. t E.5 X C-
' 16. ' EOCs shoul d check 'for coordination of sirens and' EBS and notif y the county if:
- there is a problem with either sirens -r
- of EgS.
,+
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J 1 4
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-103 -
-;a; p A p i-.--
, TABLE 4.6 Salem Unit 2 Nuclear Generating Station -
, Summary of~ Areas Requiring Corrective Action Let = November 29 - December'.1,1968 Cumberland County
, Page 1 of 6 .
NUREC-0654 'Esercise Date-FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1, Previous' Present No. Area Requiring Corrective Action Reference a FEMA. b 12/1/88 Objective !!/29 - Exercises Status"
- 1. Two State DOH, one State OEM 1.iaison, E.2 1 X 1 and sin CCEOC communications personnel were prepositioned at ~the CCEOC at the start of ~the exercise. Responding personnel should be called to the CCEOC by on-duty staff instead of being prepositioned at the facility.
- 2. Procedures for handling, c omplet ing , A.2.a 3 X l and- documenting. messages were not.
consistently adhered; to. . Spaces on message forms were lef t ' blank includ-ing the time the messages were writtan and the message originator. Confusion also existed as to' whether messages were formal or tactical. Before the next exercise,-communications personnel should receive add i t iorral training in nat'ing out message forms, and clear instructions .on how to distinguish between formal and tactical messages.
- 3. Ring-down ~ telephone lines from other F.1.b, '
4 X 1 EOCs were allowed to ' ring repeatedly F.1.d and were not answered on three occa-sions when the . Communications Coordia nator was out of the communications center. Communications p.e r sonnel should receive additional training regarding proper ring-down telephone protocol, including procedures to
' follow when the Communicat i'ons Coordi-nator is or of the-communications center.
4 The' CDV-700 meter and the RADECO air- I.S 8 X ! sampling . pump used by the field moni-
' toring team did not have current cali-bration stickers. Equipment used by the field' monitoring teams should be calibrated at least annually.
6 i
f: . b: (e ' 104 ,
' *)
n . - ! TABLE 4.6.-Salem Unit'2 Nuclear Cenerating Station - l Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action. t November 29 - December 1, 1988-Cumberland County (Cont'd) e. g
-e
~
Page 2 of 6 , s NUREC-0654 Emereise Date i FEMA-REP Rev. 1,' FEMA' 11/29 - Previous Present' N;. ' Area Requiring Corrective Action. Reference 8
- Objective b 12/1/88 Exercises -Status 8
?
$ . ' - The' field monitoring , team's equipment I.B 7 X 'I was checked against en inventory list
-f '
h-[0 3 that 'was. not- the- same as the list.
' li' identified in- Attachment 18 of the Lr plan. 'EqLipment lists 'used by' the L -flold monitoring . teams- should- be consistent with the one in the plan.
- 6. Several items that were specified to be !.8 7 1
.In the equipment kits of the radio-
. logical field monitoring teams were not
", 'present, ' or L were not .present- in sufficient- quantity.. The~ equipment supplied = to the field monitoring team should' include all items specified on the equipment-list in the --plan, in t sufficlent' quantity. .
-7.. The ' field. monitoring- team did not 1.8 8 X I
. demonstrate sufficient knowledge ' about ,
operating the .1.udlum-2218 analyser.
- Additionally. this meter could not be
. properly- calibrated -in the field because the ef ficiency values required by the plan were lacking. Team members -
should receive additional training ,on operating , and calibrating air-sampling equipment. t
- 8. None - of = the CDV-700 instruments in use - K.5.b '25 X 1:
at .the emergency workers decontamina* tion. Center -- had visible proof s of l calibration.f .Each instrument assigned
- for use in monitoring-emergency workers ,
should have i the required Calibration
- pe r f ormed., and the appropriate calibration information attached to the 1
-instrument.
- 9. ' An . emergency worker at the checkpoint K.5.b 25 X !
' for . monitoring' emergency vehicles -used
-a CDV-700 l ins t rument without prope r t y '.
protecting._ its probe- from .!
=
contamination. Additional training on
- -equipmer.t procedures should be provided
'to emergency 1 workers- performing radiological monitoring.
t
Q vw ' D K4 105 r
- opa L
,%, TA61.E 4.6 Salem Unit 2 Nuclear Cenerating Station -
Susr.aary of' Areas Requiring Corrective Action >
' of -November 29 - December 1, 1988 ;
E ' Cumberland County (Cont'd) page.3 of 6 NUREC-0654 Exercise'Date FEMA REP-1 -l
*; Rev. 1, FEMA Present. ;
Area Requiring Corrective Action, objective b !!/29 *. Pre vious . No, Reference' 12/1/88 . Exercises Status C -t
,)
Il0. J AL'- the: reception center ,(Vineland),. L21 ! 0 pu sonal items and clothing that were J.l. X If detesmined to - be contaminated were not - s 4 individually bagged and labeled , (e.g. , billfolds, purses, and watches). Items
'E .
were ' simply . placed :in s' drum for Provision for storage or disposal.
-laundering contaminated items have not been developed. a Personal items 'and '
clothing determined to be contaminated should : be -individually bagged and labeled. . Also provision for laundering contaminated items 'should be considered.
- 11. Fire personnel as sisting - with K.3.b 6 x i decontamination'at'the neception center 1
~
i did not record their dosaeter readings i i every 30 minutes. as reqd red by the
. plan. Additional ' training should be
, 'pecvided to f amiliarize per ioneel with
;this requirement and to enstre that the treadings'are taken and recorded.
s ,
.12 . . The' three emergency workers who J.10.f 16 .X l [
. responded tol the evacuation of 1
, -mobility-impaired .1 persons were not
' = provided-. withu KI- (simulated) in their dosimetry kits. All emergency workers ~l
.with. !! eld . assignmente should- De provided with K!. ,
~
G
;13. ,The' victim was surveyed by the L.) 2J X !
ambulance -crew-with a high-range survey metert therefore, the contamination 3' level '.(5-10 mR/h)' would have been difficult to observe with that 1 instrument. EMS personnel .hould receive additional training on the use of survey instruments.
- 14.~ Onei direct-reading:-dosimeter used by K.3.a 6 X ! '
hospital' personnel' was completely discharged, i.e., not eeroed be' ore
.- 'being carried into the fieldt another read 10 mA. The; dosimeters initially . '
had read sero. EMS personnel should be trained to ' record actual dosimetry readings, and to charge dosimeters or ; to discard inoperable ones. i)
h 1
-106' ,
- p. ,s TABLL 4.6 ' Salem Unit 2 Nuclear Generating Station -
^
, Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action-November 29
- December 1. 1968'
- l. Cumberland County (Cont'd) . .
Page 4 of 6' q i NUREC-0654 Exercise Date 1 b FEMA-REP-1 [s Rev. 1. L . FEMA 11/29 - Previous Present No. Area' Requiring Corrective Action _ Reference s . Objective b 12/1/88- Exercises Status' y _. . s GS,'The facilities at the Cumberland County H.3 X X' I-f EOC were marginal to support emergency A.4 operations.: Space. and furniture were 3 I limited.-- The County should investigate ' s, the possibility of providing additional space and furniture for the EOC.* 16 . ' Message' icss were not well maintained F X -X 1 p throughout the. esercise at the . Cumberland County EOC. . Several-lJ messages were- not recorded in the 7 log.~ Staff at the Cumberland County EOC . should . be i trained to keep logs -- of I all messages that are' transmitted or - received by their agencies. l
- 17. . The 1.udlum.Hodel 2218-survey instrument 1.9 X I
' issued'to the -field monitoring team ;
failed to calibrate properly due to an appar,ent ' electronic..malf unct ion - withia the instrument. -Instrumentation , supplied should =be operations'.or a backup unit cade available.
- 18. ' -SomeL minor. preblems with me s sa ge -- A.2.4 X ! j
- i i~
handling and . accumentation- were observed- at the -CCEOC,- . including ; o incorrectly identifying the source of a message, not including the times that
- some of the messages were recunved, and i not knowing- with certainty how to identify - messages =to .the state as exercise messages. Additional. training: 7 of ' communications personnel should be ensure l conducted to accurate vocumentation of messages.' !
i
'This
- ARCA was evaluated'at b'oth the 11/12/86 and 10/23/84 exercisest it reflects the combination-of ARCAs Cumberland County 2 and 21 from Al PEA dated May 12, 1987. '1 O
i
.) ,
- )'
x . i. 5
? , e J
~
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=- t: 107
-a,,
- 6 6
- S T ABl.E 4.6 SalEmUnit 2 Nuclear Generatibg'L'stion *
,p : Suavnary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action 3 November 29 - December 1,' 1968
"' Cumberland County (Cont'd)
',ijn Page $ of 6 NUREC-0654 Exercise Date FEMA-kEP-1 Rev. 1 FEMA. '11/29 - Previous Present No. Area Requiring Corrective Action Reference s Objective b 12/1/88 Exercises, Status t
# j 19.'. Activation and set up 'of the Cumberland - E.2 X C ig County EOC was not actually demonstra-ted. The facility was set up prior to the ~ Alert notificatica Jwith equipment and supplies'prepositioned. The EOC staff should demonstrate .at ' a future exercise setting up and preparation of s Ji f ;the facility for emergency functions in real time without any- prepositioning...
following receipt of .the ' Alert ECL notification. I _20. The three ' part TACT message form used F 4 X C at the Cumberland Countyi EOC does not have " space- provided to. indicate the point of origin of the message. .The TACT message forms should 'be revised to include a place to enter thel message's
~
point of origin.
. 21. :- The Cumberland Count y,' radiological 1.8' X C field monitoring ream -was directed to a sampling location'outside their antici-pated . range, .into._-Salem- -County.
, Distrapancies' in labeling of . sampling
~ points for the -two Counties caused confusion ~in-- the directingof the M Cumberland' team. The State and Counties! should ' review and revise the procedures and the system used for directingand- controlling the fielu monitoring' teams.
- 22. - A time change in the scheduling of the J.10.d X C
-mobility. impaired demonstration was not-given to L the Federal' evaluation team.
Therefore, this demonstration could not be evaluated. Federal . evalustors should be -provided with schedule changes before the exercise day, so that arrangements can be made to-l accommodate the observation- of all exercise activities. 'The objective
. will.be tested.'at a future' exercise.
L f 108' ,_ j s, !
' e
~ TABLE 4.6 Salem Unit 2 Nuclear Cdocrating Station -
s Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action ' November 29 - December 1 1988 - .:
-Cumberland County (Cont'd) _
*; I Page 6 of 6
- r. .
NUREC-0654 Esercise Date FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1 FEMA 11/29 - Previous--~ 'Preser.t Area Requiring Corrsctive' Action Reference
- Objective b 12/1/88 Exercises' Status' No.
'8 X -C l
- 23. yThe survey , instrument's provided~ to the J.12 monitoring teams checking. vehicles for contamination - at the . congregate care ,
center were not ~ -~ sensitive - enough. Also, some of the ' instruments did not '
- display calibration dates. , Nonitoring-teams ~st the congregate care center should be provided . with . properly call- ..
brated instruments ' that - are sensitive enough to accomplish the surveys for
~w hich they~are responsible.
J.12 X C 1
- 24. The staff at the- decontamination
- j center, ' used for evacuees, ' was not i aware of the predicted number 'of j individuals which 'might be processed Anticipated l through the facility.
-{
' numbers -of evacuees should be known by ,
the decontamination center scaff. Cumberland. County .EOC- A.2.a X. C
* ')
J25. -The (CCEOC) occasionally' became- overcrowded taj H.3 i noisy- because of the- presence of. nonessential' personnel who w. not identi'ied -in the count y' .- RERP , staffing ' list. _A means st- .d be developed to ' limit -the number of , For example. ) personnel in the CCEOC. only those individuals with a pre- l established- EOC Jor field : assignment ,
- should be allowed. access into- the EOC j without-specific permission of the EMC. tj C.1 X C I
~ 26. Residents of Cumberland and Salem
' Counties must- be made aware of C.2 protective actions to be taken during a 'f radiological emergency.'
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-TABLE 4.7 Salem Unit.2 Nwclear Centrating Station -
'6 Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action November 29 - December 1. 1988 Cumberland County Municipalities Page 1 of 2' NUREC-0654 Exercise Date FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1 FEMA- 11/29 - Previous Present- I No. Area Requiring Corrective Action References Objective b 12/1/88 ' Exercises Status' l.- The- dedicated ring-down telephone at F.1.b 4- X !
the- Creenwich EOC 'used for
,- communicating with! the CCEOC was -j inoperable. The EOC could not call out or receive calls. ~ The dedicated ring- {
down telephone system at the Creenwich' E0C should be repaired. { I
- 2. The; dedicated ring-down telephone at F.1.b 4 X ! .i the . Stow Creek EOC used for communi-cating with the CCEOC was inoperable.
The EOC could receive calls, but could not call out. The dedicated ring-down ' telephone system at the Stowe Creek EOC should be repaired. i
- 3. At the Stow Creek EOC. status boards H.3 5 X ! -
~ were used but the information was incomplete and. Inconsistent. For example, reporting times for staff
' members varied from " time received" and
" time . declared," which resulted .in '
[ confusion. The Ect.s, weather data, and 1
' route alerting -times were posted, but I
. protective' actions were not. -Also, maps provided- by ~the State.. did not -)
include local roadways, 'The EMC should i
' request maps from the State that depict .]
local raodways. The Stow Creek EOC should taka steps to improve the j
. accuracy of-Leo status boards.' '
4.; The ability of the designated of ficial A.24 'X C to determine. the need for and the ability to obtain county assistance was not observed at the Creenwich EOC. The ability of -the designated official to determine the 'nefd for and the ability ; to obtain county assistance at the
.Creenwich EOC should be observed at a i future exercise.
i 5 .~ The police of ficer who responded to the K.3.a X C
*~
traffic ~ control point in Stow Creek was K.3.b not> familiar with dosimetry j i p*ocedures. Emergency workers should be trained in proper exposure control l precedures. d e i
110 , e s TARLE 4.7 Salem Unit 2 Nuclear Cenerating Station - Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action November 29 - December 1, 1988 Cumberland County Municipalitics (Cont'd) Page 2 of 2 NUREC-0654 Emercise Date FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1, FEMA 11/29 - Previous Present No. Area Requiring Corrective Action Reference' Objective D 12/1/88 Esercises Status'
- 6. The officer responding to the traffic K.4 X C control point was not aware of the maximum allowable dose without authorisation. Emergency workers responding to traffic control points should receive training on exposure control.
- 7. The police officer responding to the J.10.e X C traffic control point was unaware of what K! was and procedures for its use. Emergency workers responding to traffic control points should receive trainin$ on exposure control.
- 8. The emptration date on the vials of K1 J.10.e X C was not current, and the EOC management had not been informed that the date shown on the containers was not indicative of the quality of the KI.
When the expiration date has been - extenced beyond the date displayed on the viels, notitication should be transmitted to the appropriate persons so that the quality of the stores is accurately known. aNUREC-0654, FEMA, REP-1, Rev. 1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Part II. b Objective number is from CM EX-3 (dated February 26, 1988). C C: Remedial action complete. I: Remedial action incomplete. e
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