ML20135B357

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Discusses 960222 Visit W/Listed Individuals to Discuss Issues Re Salem & Hope Creek Generating Stations
ML20135B357
Person / Time
Site: Salem, Hope Creek  PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 02/27/1996
From: Taylor J
NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:
NRC
Shared Package
ML20135A581 List:
References
FOIA-96-351 NUDOCS 9612040286
Download: ML20135B357 (5)


Text

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. February 27, 1996 MEMORANDUM FOR: Record FROM: James M. Taylor Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

DROP-IN VISIT - PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY On February 22, 1996, Mr. Leon Eliason, President - Nuclear Business Unit and Chief Nuclear Officer, and Mr. Louis Storz, Senior Vice President - Nuclear Operations, both of Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G) met with Messrs. J. Taylor, W. Russell, L. Chandler and Mrs. C. Carpenter to discuss issues concerning the Salem and Hope Creek Generating Stations.

Mr. Eliason began the discussion with a description of steam generator (SG) tube cracking problems that have been found on the Salem Unit 1 SG. He described the locations a..i descriptions of the indications found to date, indicating that about 70% of the SG tubes on Unit I have been inspected to date. Approximately 17% show deep indications, and another 30% are showing shallow indications. PSE&G did 100% steam generator tube inspections on the Unit 2 SG, and found the tubes on the Unit 2 SG did not have the cracking problems found on Unit 1. Salem Unit I began service in 1977, and is the Unit with the longest service life. The utility is currently reviewing ptions to determine how to characterize and resolve the steam generator issucs. Mr.

Storz indicated that the work on the Salem steam generators was being performed by B&W.

Due to the cracking issues on the Salem Unit 1 SGs, Messrs. Eliason and Storz indicated that they plan to announce their intentions to de-focus licensee efforts on Salem Unit I by stopping major work on that unit, and focus licensee efforts on Salem Unit 2. They indicated that they anticipate restart of Salem Unit 2 in the fall of 1996, and anticipate, based on work identified on Unit 1, about 20,000 to 25,000 work tasks on Unit 2, with 5000 already completed.

Mr. Storz described the new management team in place at the Salem Station, but recognized that the real test of their efforts will be the operation of the plants. He indicated that the management team has superior organizational skills that was lacking prior to the new management team. Mr. Storz also recognizes that PSE&G will continue to find issues needing resolution, even during restart, and that this was part of the process. Mr. Russell indicated that the more important test was how the licensee handles problems when they arise.

Mr. Taylor questioned Mr. Storz on the status of operator training, since the Salem Units have been shutdown for an extended period of time. Mr. Storz indicated that he had just returned from a meeting with INP0 on February 21, l 1996, where he discussed the status and his philosophy of hiring and training of plant operators. Mr. Storz described his overall philosophy with respect '

to operator training and knowledge levels, the meaning of a passing score on the written exams, and how he intends to ensure appropriate knowledge and ownership by the operators. He indicated that PSE&G intended to raise the A

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passing grade for operator training to 80%, up from the previous passing score of 70%. Mr. Storz also indicated that to ensure the plant was ready for restart,'four crews have been selected for retraining; they will also validate procedures and will receive an extremely tough requalification exam. ,

Mr. Storz also described their plans for the shift technical advisor (STA).

The STA will function as a shift manager, with the duties of controlling the work processes, maintenance, tagging and procedures. This will reduce the administrative burden of the senior nuclear shift operator, allowing the senior nuclear shift operator to focus solely on plant operations. The STA, however, will not be the supervisor of the senior nuclear shift operator.

With respect to Hope Creek, Mr. Eliason indicated that they are moving towards restart of Hope Creek. Mr. Storz indicated that he feels the operations team at Hope Creek is stronger than the operators at Salem, and have improved their operating philosophy.

Mr. Eliason questioned Mr. Taylor and Mr. Russell on the trending letter process. Specifically, they were surprised to receive a trending letter, since they felt they were on the correct track for improvement and were receiving good feedback from the NRC. Mr. Taylor discussed briefly the senior management meeting process, including the philosophy behind the tre... ding letter. Mr. Taylor acknow. edged that the focus of the NRC's effort: have been on Salem, and that the slippage of Hope Creek caused the NRC some concern, resulting in the issuance of the trending letter. Mr. Russell indicated '. hat some of the major concerns at Salem were processes, work control and procedures, and that the staff did net see sufficient differences between Salem and Hope Creek in the areas of work control and procedures, and that the' shutdown cooling event at Hope Creek troubled the NRC.

Mr. Taylor discussed the 50.54(f) letter sent to Northeast Utilities, and that

.there may be repercussions from this for the rest of the utilities. PSE&G had not~seen a copy of the 50.54(f) letter; the letter is in the PDR, and a copy was provided to Mr. Eliason and Mr. Storz at.the meeting. A copy of the 50.54(f) letter is also attached to these minutes. The meeting concluded with a discussion by Mr. Russell of the need to ask the "what if" question of themselves. Specifically, licensees should ask the question of maintenance activities, if the activity fails, have you put yourself in a worse condition than if you had not done it at all? What would you do if does not go well?

Mr. Storz concluded by inviting Mr. Taylor and Mr. Russell to the site.

The meeting adjourned at approximately 4:20 p.m. No regulatory decisions were requested or made.

Attachment:

As stated '

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20606 4 001 o%*****/ .

December 13, 1995 .

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Mr. Robert E. Busch President - Energy Resources Group Northeast Utilities Service Company c/o Mr. Richard M. Kacich .

P.O. Box 128 Waterford, CT 06385

Dear Mr. Busch:

On August 21, 1995, as supplemented August 28, 1995, the NRC received a petition under 10 CFR 2.206 which requested NRC shutdown Millstone Unit I and i take enforcement action based upon alleged violations of licensed activities i related to operation of spent fuel p7ol cooling systems and refueling practices. At a public meeting on December 5, 1995, in New London, Connecticut, the NRC Acting Inspector General (lus stated that certain of your activities may have beei conducted in violation of license requirements and 4

that refueling activities may not have been conducted consistent with the 4

Millstone Unit 1 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR-). The staff will O, review the IG investigation report, when issued, in order to determine what enforcement action, if any, is appropriate. As you are aware, NRC's Office of

Investigations is also conducting an investigation of these matters.

The 15tC's approval of Amendment No. 89 to the Millstone Unit 1 operating license to authorize full-core offload to the spent fuel pool as a normal end-of-cycle event was based upon design changes, procedure revisions and enhanced administrative controls which did not exist during prior refueling activities.

While we have not yet completed our investigations' and reviews related to past refueling activities, the NRC requires that additional information be j submitted under oath or affirmation, pursuant to Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and 10 CFR 50.54(f), no later than seven (7) days prior to Millstone Unit I restart from its current refueling outage

(i.e., not later than 7 days prior to reactor criticality). This information will be used to decide whether or not the license of Millstone Unit 1 should be suspended, modified or revoked, or other enforcement action taken.

Specifically, you should describe what actions you have taken to ensure that future operation of Millstone Unit I will be conducted in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Millstone Unit 1 operating license, the 4

Commission's regulations, including 10 CFR 50.59, and the Millstone Unit I

UFSAR.

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This requirement affects nine or fewer respondents and, therefore, is not i

subject to the Office of Management and Budget review under P.L.95-511.

j Sincerely,

! William T. Russell, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation f.

Docket No. 50-245 t

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i mitei 5tates benate WA$HINGTON. DC 20510-0802 February 29,1996 l

The Honorable Charles A. B'rowsher l Comptroller General General Accounting Office 441 G Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Browsher:

Since its inception in 1974, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has been charged with licensing and regulating civilian use of nuclear power. As you are likely aware, the cornerstone of this mission is the protection of public health and safety and the environment, a l responsibmty which provides little room for error.

I am deeply disturbed by continued reports of regulatory complacency, on the part of l NRC, and am troubled by what appears to be a decidedly pro-industry tilt to this most troubled government agency. This abdication of regulatory oversight is apparent than at the' Salem ' nuclear facility, a twin, reactor complex located in Lower Alloways Creek _ Township,on_the Delaware l River in Salem County, New Jersey. Accordingly, I request a thorough review of NRC's recent oversight of the Salem nuclear power plant.

It is my concern that NRC's reliance upon individual nuclear power plants for self- -

regulation may be inherently, and perhaps fatally, flawed. Ironically, the agency that may he-partly to blame for an accident is charged with finding the cause; a conflict ofinterest which cannot be ignored. In the recent past, it appears to be frighteningly apparent that the economic ,

i imperatives behind a functioning nucIcar power plant moved NRC to put a plant - even a plant as troubled as Salem -- back online, prior to the satisfactory resolution of outstanding safety l issues. Despite repeated self-assessments, credible, tough oversight has not developed. It is my  !

fear that this cannot be expected as long as the NRC continues to investigate itself.

These deficiencies are evident particularly with regard to the Salem facility. Since February 1983, at which time repeated failures of the automatic safety system and its backu,p nearly caused a catastrophe, accidents and various other events have brought near-constant scrutiny to this plant. In November 1991, for example, a devastating accident shut down operations for months, after three control valves failed, allowing the main turbine and generator to spin to its destruction. Just one year later, in December 1992, a computer glitch in the SaleIn

. control room knocked out dozens of waming lights and alarms, freezing indicator panels for more i than an hour and a half, without anyone noticing that something was wrong. More recently,

! April 1994, Salem I operators lost partial control of the reactor pressure and temperature for more '

than five hours. These and other mishaps resulted in more than 52.3 million in fin t

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e - Yet, despite this checkered past, NRC repeatedly avoided takiWaggressive action. Thus[I  !

am interested in determining the extent to which human health and safety were placed in jeopardy by NRC's inaction. Specifically, I request that the study examine whether:

! - NRC resident or regionalinspectors were or should have been aware of possible safety problems prior to events resulting in a shutdown of the facility;

  • NRC permitted the facility to restart after any shutdown without meeting the required safety criteria;-
  • NRC equipment standards are adequate to protect human health and safety; and, l

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  • If there is any need for an independent safety board, charged with the mission of investigating accidents, to replace NRC's investigatory functions.

l l For too long, the American public has been forced to accept a regulatory agency that fails to administer the highest standards of safety. That is not acceptable to me, nor is it acceptable to

. the millions of American families who live short distances from nuclear plants. As virtually all of the 110 operating nuclear reactors will continue operating for at leas + the next 15 years, it is

clear that adequate enforcement and oversight by NRC are of the utmost importance.
Thank you in advance for your cooperation. If you have any' questions, please feel free to contact Matthew Krusko at (202) 224-5042, or Tonya Baker at (302) 573-6345.

^

Sin' ' rely, b/

J seph R. Biden, Jr.

j nited States Senator i

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sk asummeuramuramr vr'amsE Executive Profile E. James Ferland .

d Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive Officer -

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Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated Yb i E. James Ferland became Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive Officer of Public Service Enterprise Group incorporated on July 1,1986. He has also been Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Enterprise's principal subsidiary, Public Service Electric and Gas Company, since that time and served as its President until September 17,1991, in addition, he became Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of

. Enterprise Diversified Holdings incorporated, parent of the corporation's diversified businesses, on July 1, 1989. Prior 'o joining Enterprise ir 1986, he had been President and Chief Operating Officer of Northeast Utilities.

Mr. Ferland was graduated from the University of Maine in 1964 with a B.S. degree in mechanical engineering.

.He earned an M.B.A. from the University of New Haven in 1976 and also completed the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration's Program for Management Development.

Mr. Ferland began his business career in 1964 as an engineer with the The Hartford Electric Light Company, a Northeast Utilities subsidiary in Connecticut. In 1967, he joined the initial operating staff of the Millstone Nuclear Power Station and became station superintendent in 1976. In 1978, he became Director Rate Regulatory Project at Northeast's corporate headquarters. He was named Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer in 1980 and President and Chief Operating Officer in 1983, He also served 'as a direc-for of Northeast subsidiary companies and was a director of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation, Yankee Atomic Electric Company and Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company.

Currently, Mr. Ferland is a board member of the Hartford Steam Boiler inspection and insurance Co., Foster Wheeler Corporation, and the Nuclear Energy Institute. He is a former board member of the Edison Electric i

institute, the Electric Power Research Institute, the American Gas Association, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations and the New Jersey Utilities Association. Active in numerous civic organizations, he is a former chairman of the New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce, of the Metro Newark Chamber of Commerce and i the Public Affairs Research Institute of New Jersey.

1 Maior subisdiaries: '

). Public Service Electric ond Gas Company  ;

Enterprise Diversified Holdings incorporcted g \ '[\ '

Energy Development Corporation Communin Energy Alternatives Incorporated a Public Service Resources Corporation .

/f Enterprise Group Development Corporation PSEG Capitol Corporation ~t l

Public Service Enterprise Group incorporated Enterprir,e Cepitol Funding Corporction a

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