ML20137L141

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Rev 0 to JPN-PSL-SENP-95-108, Engineering Evaluation, Assessment of Auxiliary High Pressure Header Piping for In-House Event Summary 95-058
ML20137L141
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 09/08/1995
From:
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20137K821 List:
References
FOIA-96-485 JPN-PSL-SENP-95, JPN-PSL-SENP-95-108, NUDOCS 9704070161
Download: ML20137L141 (7)
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1 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.

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' l j ENGINEERING EVALUATION l

l As8EssMENT OF RUEILIARY EIGE PRESSURE 1

EEADER FITING FOR IN-BOUSE EVENT

SUMMARY

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ENGINEERING EVALUATION l

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A38E88 MENT OF AUZILIARY NIGE PRES 8URE j .

READER PIPING FOR IN-ROUSE EVENT SIDO(ARY 95-058 i

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ST LUCIE NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1

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a JPN-PSL-SENP-95-108 REVISION O PAGE 2 OF 7 REVIEW AND APPROVAL RECORD PLANT ST. LUCIE UNITS I l

i TITLE ASSES $NENT OF THE AUXILIARY ~ HIGH PRES $URE HEADER PIPING FOR IN-HOUSE EVENT l

SUMMARY

95-058 l

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l l ENGINEERING ORGANIZATION PRODUCTION ENGINEERING GROUP l

l REVIEW / APPROVAL:

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INTERFACE TYPE '

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K'yh[&;N;tf ?f _ REVISION C PAGE 3 OF 7

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i i SECTION TITLE P.AftE

-- Cover 1

-- Review and Approval Record 2 l

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-- Table of contestts 3 j

i j 1.0 Purpose and Description 4 i 4

! 2.0 Background 3.0 Design Bases 4 4.0 Analyses of the Event 5 5.0 Conclusions 6 i '

Verification Summary 6 6.0 References 7 1, 7.0

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JPN-FS'-5ENP-95-102 REVISICN O PAGE 4 CF 7 1.0 PURPCSE AND DESCRIPTICE The purpose of this evaluation is to assess the impact on plant operation and safety associated with pressurizing the auxiliary j high pressure header piping (from the 1A HPSI pump to HCV-3617, 3627, 3637, and 3647) to HPSI pump shutoff head, with RCS l temperature below 236 *F. The plant Technical Specifications restrict HPSI pump operation when RCS temperature is below 236 F. Technical Specification 3.5.3 requires that all high j pressura rsfety injection pumps be disabled and their associated header stop valves closed prior to RCS temperature decreasing r

below this value (References 3 and 2), except as allowed by l l

Specifications 3.1.2.1 ana 3.1.2.3.

2.0 sacIGROUND on September 2, 1995, it was determined that Technical Specification 3.5.3 had been violated when the header stop valve was used to fill and vent the auxiliary high pressure header, and when the 1A HPSI pump was used to perform an in-service leak test of safety relief ~ valve V-3417. The relief valve was being leak i tested to satisfy post-modification testing associated with l relief valve replacement. (Reference 1)

The 1A HPSI pump was started and run with the header stop valve  ;

open to perform an in-service leak test. The four injection valves (HCV-3617, 3627, 3637, and 3647) remained closed during_

the event. The pressurizer was controlling RCS pressure with a steam bubbit assurizer liquid ' eval was approximately 50%,

both PORVs war. available for RCS overpressure protection in the l LTOP mode. RCS pressure was 250 psia, and RCS temperature was l

I approximately 120 *F.

Technical Specification 3.5.3.c requires that both HPSI pumps be disabled, and their associated stop valves closed, to provide additional administrative assurance against exceeding the RCS pressure / temperature limits during a mass addition transient (Reference 2, mitigated by a single PORV, when below 236 *F.

Section 3/4.5.3 and Bases)

This engineering evaluation involves an engineered safeguards system and is therefore classified as safety related.

3.0 DESIGN BASE 3 RETIEW Auviliary Hieh h =mure Header Pinine and valves The auxiliary high pressure header must passively maintain the integrity of the HPSI system pressure boundary (Reference 3).

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This fur.ction is acensplished by selecting a design pressure

! rating that is consistent with the maximum, sustained, service conditions expected .Nring normal and post-acciaent operation.

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JPN-FSL-CEWi-95-108

  • REVIS!CN O PAGE 5 OT 7 HPST 1A Header Isolation Valves HCV-3617 3627 3637 and ?647 ,

The HPSI 1A header isolation valves must perform the following functions in addition to maintaining pressure boundary integrity l

(Reference 3): ,

1. Shall automatically open on a safety injection actuation to '

l admit HPSI purp flow to the associated RCS loop. _

2. Shall control HPSI flow to the' associated RCS loop. Changes to the valve positions necessary to control the HPSI flows are performed manually, fr om the control room.
3. Shall remain closed during normal plant operation to provide a redundant containment isolation barrier for penetration numbers 36, 37, 38, and 39.
4. Shall close remote-manually to provide a redundant containment isolation barrier for penetration numbers 36, 37, 38, and 39, in the event of a passive failure or malfunction in the safety injection system.
5. Shall manually open to allow filling the safety injection tanks using the HPSI pumps or the charging pumps.

RCS Low Temoerature Overoressure Protection (LTOP)

Overpressure protection of the reactor coolant system during low temperature condirians is provided' by power operated relief valves (PORVs) N- and V-1404 connec.ed to the pressurizer steam space.

The LTOP setpoints are estSblished to ensure 'ihat RCS overpressurization will not occur from mass or energy addition events. The current LTOP analysis is described in Reference 4.

4.0 ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT The 1A HPSI pump pressurized the auxiliary high pressure header to HPSI pump shutoff head during the leak tes*. The design shutoff head of the Unit 1 HPSI pumps is approximately 1250 psig (Reference 3). The following discussions form the bases for assessment of safety associated with operating the NPSI pump for in-service leak testing, with RCS temperature below 236 F.

Intearity of the Auxiliarv Hiah Pressure Header The piping and valves in this portion of the RPSI system are designed to accommodate charging pump flow through the auxiliary high pressure header for SIT outlet checPAs valve testing, and to such, the piping provide an alternate charging flow path.

system is rated for 2485 sig; consistent with the RCS pressure boundary (Reference 3). This design pressure rating is much higher than the HPSI pump ahutoff head. This piping is not

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.: rN- P S L-S r.' P - 9 5 - 1 C S REVISION C PAGE 6 OF 7 subject to neutron embrittlement, thermal stratification, er other pressurized thermal shock (PTS) concerns. Thus, code allowable stress limits were not exceeded during the in-service test.

HCV-3617. 3627. 3637. 3647 Oeerability These globe valves are oriented such thrat the normal injection flow path results in flow under the valve seat (Reference 3, Sections 7.9.2c and 7.8.2c) . High upstream pressures will not drive, or wedge, the valve disc into the valve seat, or challenge the stem packing. As a rescit, valve operability is not affected by the pump shutoff head.

RCS Low Temnerature Overeressure Protection Valves HCV-3617, 3627, 3637, and 3647 remained closed during the In addition, the fill and vent procedure and the leak test.

automatic SIAS function was bypassed and in the blocked mode.

Under these conditions, an inadvertent SIAS event is not considered credible. There was no adverse impact on RCS temperature / pressure limits. The header isolation valves performed their isolation function and there was no mass or energy addition to the RCS as a result of the alignment.

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5.0 CONCLUSION

S This evaluation mmonstrates that the piping, fittings, and I a j

valves in th6 iary high pressura header _were not affected by i

the alignment, and that code allowable stress limits were not exceeded in the leak test boundary. In addition, there was no l challenge to the RCS 1cs temperature overp essure protection function. Therefert, this event did not adversely impact plant

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1 l 6.0 VERTFTc1 TION StnOOLRY f

The scope of this verification was to review the inputs to dataraine if the results were reasonable. The method used for i this verification consisted of ensuring that the applicable i

references, codes, and regulatory requ:xements were identified and addressed. The inputs are correctly selected and applied.

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The conclusions provided are reasonable with respect to the inputs and discussions. The verifier concurs with the Nuclear safety Related classification of this Engineering Evaluation. The

,' rationale in assigning the safety classification was verified The against the requirements of JPN Quality Instructions.

verifier concurs with the conclusions outlined above.

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IT.* : C I C . . O PACE 7 CF 7 l 7.0 R!??RENCES i

1. STA In-House Event Summary (IHE) Number 95-058, dated 9/3/95 j (Preliminary)

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i 2. St. Lucie Unit 1 Technical Specifications, Amendment No. 138 St. Lucie Unit 1 Design Basis Document No. DBD-HPSI-1, High )

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Pressure Safety Injection System, Revision 0

! FPL Letter to the NRC L-89-408 dated December 5, 1989, Proposed 4.

j License Amendment P-T Lirits'and LTOP Analysis ,

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