ML20137L162

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Rev 1 to JPN-PSL-SENS-95-021, 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation for Fuel Handling Equipment FSAR Changes
ML20137L162
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/10/1995
From:
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20137K821 List:
References
FOIA-96-485 JPN-PSL-SENS-95, JPN-PSL-SENS-95-021, JPN-PSL-SENS-95-21, NUDOCS 9704070165
Download: ML20137L162 (26)
v • d • e


Text

- _ _ . _ . . _ _ . . - _ - - . ... .. . .. - . _ . . . .-. .-_ - . . . .. . . . - . .

4 1

..,,s  : e .? . "Y' e

e 1

FAGE 1 C7 13 l

ll b

I' 10CFR50.59 SAFETY EVALUATION FOR '

l

l l FUEL HANDLING EQUIPMENT FSAR CHANGES 4

i j

j ST LUCIE NUCLEAR PLANT i

I UNIT 2 i

i 1

1 i JPM-PSL-5 ENS-95-021 REVISION 1 1

1 1

4 l 1 1 l

l l 1 l

FLORIDA POWER & LIGET COMPANY  !

3 i NUCLEAR IMGINEEF.ING DEPARTNENT l I

4 1

3 l e

i 1

i QUALITY REL&P2D l

\

^

l

'3 b

< (p 8

9704070165 970402 PDR FOIA BINDER 96-40" PDR

h i .': . . ' N 1 T/.GE :' .. ;)

ttvite w AWAt 11CDC is tl 2 MAsf it ttrtr P='"'

t;TLE incitso 59 tarttY rvA2 L.tt!'m f an 9 tat maant iac t =.;t er_st s tAh t LEAD D18CIPLim E at geSIMERitt M GAst2Afim stir smeterratac amam MVIEWAPPROWAL:

INTreFAct TYPE m3F PREPAAfD WEAIFl# APPG0WED FPL APP 30 6

  • i tuPUT Rfv!EW m/A Mmmm66mN GECW X ELECT I rets f6C I CIVit I __ ,

FA Y Y a As n  : n'~

Lic" -

, j r ~.. a,, , ,

I. LO tWL 1

.  ! CTMER l 1

  • For Centrator Evets As Deteraired Sy Projects a geview Interf ace As A min m ALL 10CFtSO.$9 twels aral PLAs FPL PEMCTS APPEDWAL:

- MTE: /O I V

otw a IntsatActs P

JPu pers 36, ase, g e t l

1

... . j nu: . .:

l l

l 10CFR50.59 SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FUEL EANDLING EQUIPMENT FSAR CHANGES 1.0 METRACT FPL Quality As.aurance Department Audit No. QSL-OPS-94-24 identified sovel'sl minor discrepancies between existing plant procedures and various parts of the St. Lucie Unit 1 FSAR. The discrepancies noted in the -QA audit all pertained to fuel handling equipment. As a result, safety evaluation JPN-PSL-SENS-94_Q25 was issued to provide the corrections for the git 1 SSAR.

SulitTquently, the Unit 2 FSAR was reviewed for~ 'siYtlar inconsistencies. This evaluation justifies and provides the Unit 2 FSAR changes identified as a result of the Unit 2 FSAR, review.

This safety evaluation demonstrates that the FSAR changes provided in the attached FSAR Change Package (Attachment 1) do not adversely affect plant safety, security or operation. It has also been shown. by this safety evaluation that this activity neither constitutes an unreviewed safety question nor requires changes to the Technical Specifications. Therefore, prior NRC approval for implementation of these changes. is not required.

sion 1 is issued .o clarify that the use of an actual fuel assembly fer refueling machine functional checks is limited to hoist setp ut verificatiens (note: hoist is load tested with a

test weight prior to lif ting an octual assembly) . This revision also clarifies wording regarding the f ailure modes of the CEA handling tool. The conclusions of the original safety evaluation have not changed.

2.0 DESCRIPTION

AMD FIMPOSE i

i A review of the Unit 2 FSM identified several discrepancies '

between the FSAR and various plant proceduros with respect to fuel handling operations. This evaluation justifies and provides the necessary changes to the FSAR. The changes addressed in this evaluation pertain to: (1) use of the new fuel crane; (2) use of the CEA change mechanism; (3) use of a dummy fuel =====hly for preoperational (4) dry sippingtesting of the refueling of irradiated machine fuels (5) xhoist use setpoints;theof gripper l operating tool; and (6) miscellaneous editorial changes. An FSAR Change Package is attached (Attachment 1).

l l

i l

l

l ,'

4 l

].

PAGE : : '

1 W 1_2U; t*1/ I ',17 T. S

' i 252ical specifications 7

' .no technical specifications were reviewed, including those of

^ action 3/4.9, Refueling Operations. There are no technical i specifications that pere =.in to this evaluation.

J .M New Fuel crane FSAR section 9.1.1.3 provides the *sys; am evaluation
  • f or new f uel storage. With respect to compliance with regulatory f>sition 3  ;

of Regulatory Guide 1.13 the FSAR states: , l Regulatory posit an 3 of Regulatory Guide 1.13,

  • Spent ruel Storage Facility Design Bases
  • December, 1975 (R1) requires that

" Interlocks should be provided to prevent cranes f rom passing over i stored fuel ... when fuel handling is not in progress.* The only i device capable of placing loads over the nea fuel tacks is the )

five ton capacity fuel handling crane. This crane is used exclusively for new fuel handling, and is locked in position when l fuel handling CEA chande Mechanism FSAR section 9.1.4.2.1 provides a general description of :he fuel handling system and notes the follcwing with respect to the CEA j 1

change machanism:

Major etsupenents of the system are the refueling machine, the cza

  • hange mechanism, the fuel transfer equipment, the epont fuel sndling machine, the new f uel elevator, the new fuel crane, contairmaant polar crane, and the cask handling crane. The refueling .aachine moves fuel assemblies into and out of the core and between the core and the transfer equipment. The CEA change mechanime is used to move CEAs 4rce one f we1 aesembly to another.

The fuel transfer equipment moves the fuel between the containment and the Fuel handling Building through the transfer tube.

l FSAR section 9.1.4.2.1.4 describes the interlocks associated with the CEA Change Mechanism.

FSAR section 9.1.4.2.2.3 describes the operation of the CEA change mechanism as follows:

The CIA change mechanies is shown on Figure 9.1-9. The machine, l j

which inserts CIAs into and removes CEAs from feel aseeablime is -

mounted on rails adjacent to the containment side opender and consists of a structural frame, a translation drive, and a grapple l hoist.

The w kt== has indes capability to leeste to either of two operating positions and a third parking positism, which permits access of the ref.aling nachine to the operating positions. At the bottom of the hoist section an alignment device contere the fuel assembly to the grapple centerline and a finger guide maintains '

the pattern of the five control rod fingers when the cza is withd-wn. A rotary grapple engages thr. control element assembly for ..fting. The grapple rides an a vertical channel sectron so that ! Sadvertent release of the cEA te not possible. Crapple lead is monitored and posttten readout $s provided for both hcasting

.~ , ~ . ._.- .--.~.._.n_ . ~ _ ~ , . - _ . . . _ . . - , _ - - = - . . . . . ~ . - _ _ _ - - ~ _ - . - - _ - - _ . - - - . .

i l

  • j i .

k e . .a :

  • w: Es i

j .4 . ':L d : . W .. T ", et tf. cr'a C : *. t t . * * . t ; C P. ;e N.: -

  • j . L L, c.s et t n,e ru N 1;N r<.< ; - n . r ., *.' c W r A r. . c ru :an ..
venitored. Interlocas are provicwd to ensure that translation co.e
not occur duri.ng hototing, and etco versa. The equipment,

! . including all soving parte, oay be lifted off its rail for maintenance or repair.

I

! D qv Fuel Asse *1v ,

j TSAR section 9.1.2.4 *accribes the use of a dummy fur =1 bundle as

, follows:

! The welded steel opent fuel and new fuel storage racks are laguld I penetrant tested for structura. adequacy and alignment to j periodi. ally checked prior to handling fuel assa Mie by operatica et all systems using a duammy fuel bundle which has the

sans weight, conter of gravity, exterior size and end geometry es ,

j a fuel assensly. . 1 i

j Dry sinnina Eauinment l

ySAR section 9.1.4.2.2.10 describes the use of dry sipping I equipment as follows
)

l A dry eipping system, as shown on Figure 9.1-17, tests irradiated .

I fuel assemblies for cladding defects. This systema consists of both perunanently sounted componente on the refueling machine and a l portable control console that is set onto the refueling machine l trolley when a dry sipping test is to be performed. The refueling machine fuel hoist box containe hosee so that pressurised nitrogen gas can replace the cooling water within the hoist boa. This gas can than be vented t wcmgh a scintillation counter af ter the soak period has been completed. Temperature detectors are also installed to indicate the temperature of the gas surrounding the suspect fuel assembly. The gas is vented to the waste gas collection header.

The portable control console contains the sequencing mechanism, which first surrounds the fuel assembly with nitroryen and then porte the gas to 'the integral scintillation counter. Strip chart recorders are provided to record the dose rate and also the temperature of the nitrogen surrounding the fuel assembly, and a pressure gage displays the depth of the water interface in the hotet box. A tank with water detectors and solenoid valves prevente flow of contaminated water through the console and a high temperature alare automatically initiates venting, which replaces the gas surrounding the fuel assembly with cooling water. Venting can also be independently accomplished by slightly lowering the grapple.

Crinnar Oneratina Tool FSAR section 9.1.4.2.2.13 describes the use of the gripper operating tool as follows:

l This teel is approclastely eight feet Long and besically - ame.

of tuo someostric tehes trith a femmel at the louer and to. ,

1 facilitate engegament erith the ma esteenlee shafts. & three-sidad support stand holde the tool vertically and incorporates a gear hos used to rates and lower the concestric tubes relative to tba satension shafts, when the tool is connected to an estension short, pine attached to the inner tube and separate pine attached to the outer tube engage *J-elote* on the estension shaf t. Lifting

  • .e inner tube of the tool allows the extension shaf t gripper to release, thus separating the entension shaft from the control i e l saent s e c esr.b l y .

t l

F .. ..s...  ;

)

PAGE 6 OF 12 l Editorial ch ecer FSAR section 9.1.1.3 and table 9.1-2 note that the new fuel storage racks are analy::ed f or a fuel enrichment ct 3.7 w/c. Per Technilal Specification section 5.6.1.b, the correct value is 4.5 w/o.

FSAR section 9.1.2.5, Instrumentation Applications. sta .

'Means are provided to control entry of personnel *and to accou.it for the flow of tools in and out of the area. This statement has nothing to do with instrumentation applications and is being deletod.

< FSAR section 9.1.3.2.3 notes a second fuel pool heat exchanger i will be added by .he first refueling. The second heat exchanger I was added via PC/M 139-283 (Fall '84) and is reflected in FSAR l

! section 9.1.3.2.1, figure 9.1-6 and tables 9.1-6 & 9.1-9. The f

wording will be revised to reflect the installation. l l FSAR section'9.1.4.2.3 provides a procedural overview of new fuel

. transfer, spent fuel transfer and refueling operations. There

are several minor corrections being mada to this sectior,. l

, J i

4 XRC Bafety RValuation Report (SER) j The Unit 2 SER (including supplements) was reviewed for any 4 discussion pertaining to the subject fuel handling equipment. {

section 9.1, resi Storage Facility, provides a general  !

..cription of the facility; however, the description is not to

the level of detail as to be considered applicable to this
evaluation.

Regulatory cuide 1.70 4

! Per FSAR table 1.8, the FSAR was developed "to the extent practicable" in accordance with revision 3 of RG 1.70, Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants; IMR Edition. This Reg. Guide establishes format and content criteria acceptacle to the ilRC for the development of .

SARs and was thus the bssis for what information was included in the Unit 2 FSAR.

Seculon 9.1.1 of RG 1.70 describes the requirements for new fuel l storage. Unlike the spent fuel section identified below, this l section does not reference RG'1.13.

Section 9.1.2 of RG 1.70 describes the requirements for spent fuel storage. RG 1.13 is referenced as providing acceptable design guidance.

O F AGE ' Cl .3 Section 9.1.4 of RC 1.10 descrices the requirements fer the fuel handling syste=. This section requires the SAR to include an outline of procedures used for fuel receipt & storage, refueling operations and spent fuel storage & shipment. Periodic inspection and testing requiresents are also to be identified in this section.

Regulatory Guide 1.13 Per FSAR table 1.8 and section 9.1, revision 1 of RG 1.13, Spent Fuel Storage Facility Design Basis, was used in '. ~.c des 1gn of Unit 2.

4.e numLYsIs OF EFFECTS OM shPFrY safety classification FSAR section 9.1.4.3.3 states that fuel handling equipment is not <

creditedinthepreventionormitigationofpostulatedaccidents;G however,thisevaluationisc.lassifiedasquality-Ralatedsincef the fuel handling systes is required to funct166~~prope~rly in . -

order to prevent damage to irradiated fuel assemblies. i i

Impact on Regulatory Requirements

, Fuel crana i koAR section 9.1.1. 3 references regulatory position 3 of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.~13 in discussing the new fuel handling crane.

The FSAR notes that the crane will be used " exclusively

  • for new i fuel handling. The intent of regulatory posit'lon 3 is to protect

! spent fuel from being impacted by a dropped load from a crane.

The new fuel handling crane is used to handle new fuel assemblies (

and is physically incapable of operating and moving loads over l stored spent fuel. Additionally, RG 1.70 does not call for the j use of RG 1.13 in the design of new fuel storage facilities. Use i of the crane is controlled by Operating Procedure 2-1630023, New j Tual Randling Crane Operation, which provides sufficient controls for the safe operation of the crane. Therefore, there is no '

basis for restricting the use of the crane exclusively to new I fuel handling. j The FSAR will be revised to eliminate language restricting the use of the new fuel handling crane " exclusively" to new fuel (

handling. {

cn chanam Machenium FSAR section 9.1.4.2 describes the design and use of the CEA i change mechanism. This device is no lonone used; instead a CEA handli,g tool is used to shuffle CEAs fros one fuel assembly to anothe.. me CEA handling tool was designed and provided by ABB-CE. GP* ration of the tool is controlled vis plant procedure (refarence 13).

I D

Use of the CEA handling tool in lied ::,r the CEA change mechanism is acceptable because the tool was designed for St. Lucie Plant oy ABB-CE for the specific purpose of conducting CEA shuffles (references 14 & 15).

An FSAR change hill be made to delete discussic" of a CEA ,

change echanism. g /'

f Dpartv Fuel Assemb1v FSAR sect'on o.1.2.4, Testang and Ins f,O on, dercribes the seVi of a dummy fusal oundle for the perJodic checking of fuel handling (

equipment prior to its use.

requiring tjla u== :of a are is no technical reason for y fuel assembly when conducting routine preoperathusal' ~ testing of fuel hi.ndling equipsent.

~~~ ~

Specificallyr-tt'is acceptab1'e to use an scrual fuel assembly for the refueling machine hoist setpoint verifications of the reference 10 plant procedure. The worse type of fuel handling accident postulated is a drop of a fuel assembly. FSAR section 15.7.4.1.2, Fuel Nandling Accident, addresses the consequences of this accident. The failure modes and consequences associated with the use of an actual fuel assembly during preoperational testing are no different than the failure modes associated with the normal movement of fuel.

As noted above, the limiting fuel handling accident results from the dropping of a spent fuel assembly. Per plant orocedures, the j lifting capability of the various fuel handling cranes, including i

.ie refueling mach ne, is verified via load testing with a test weight prior to the lifting of actual fuel (references 7, 3, 10

& 11). This requirement is not being changed. Thus, the ability of tha fuel handling cranes to safely lift fuel assemblies is verified prior to any actual fuel lifts.

The FSAR will be. revised to: (1) note the load testing of fuel handling cranes prior to the handling of spent fuel; and (2) to delete the dummy fuel bundle requirement.

nrv sinnino rouinment FSAR section 9.1.4.2.2.10 describes the use of dry sipping equipment for the testina of snant fueLassemblies _for_ cladding I!

~

dpfacte. Dry sipping wouldV used to ide E lfy failed fuel d whenever there has been an indication of a fuel defect as O '

identified by primary chemistry. Sinca the time of original plant design, fuel _ fabrication-bas improved __to ** paint.where fuel _ failures _ ara infr v t_ Thus, the need for dry sipping of fuel has disinished to where it is impractical to maintain equipment on site.

The dry sipping equipment described in the FSAR is a

  • tool
  • that I is not associated with plant operation, safe shutdown or accident mitic clon. There is no regulatory requirement to mai'ntain such equipment at the plant.

l

. _ _ _ _ . . _ _ ____ _ -. _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ - . . _ _ = . - _ _ __. _.__

I i

1 Fue' 58. r : c r:..a c.c a w .cr.i:. a . ..a :C.D n w w. ...e: . :r..- . . . .

Specification 3.4.3 provides ep a ting linits 'er R C.0 sc: i n t .

FPL Nuclear Policy NP-902, Nuclear Failed Fuel Action Policy, states FPL's goal of zero fuel defects and provides specific countermeasures to eliminate failed fuel. Interdepartmental Procedure IP-903, Failed fuel Action Plan, provides instructions ,

, to implement NP-900 IP-903 provides guidelines for fuel l l

performance monitoring and defines action levels : .W on the monitoring results. ,

1 The monitoring or fuel perforr.ance is not impacted with the

' de13 tion of the #y sipping equipment. Technica' specification ,

3.4.8, NP-902 and IP-903 provide the necessary procedural l guidance to ensure fuel performance is adequately monittred and

, appropriate a'tions are taken in the event of failed fuel.

! Should it become necessary to perform fuel inspections (e.g., dry l sipping) or reconstitution, services can be contracted out as I needed. Thus, it is not necessary to naintain dry sipping l l equipment on site.

The FSAR description of dry sipping equipment will be deleted.

crinner Oneratina Tool l FSAR section 9.1.4.2.2.13 describes the design and use of the gripper operating tool. JhisJesgn is nolonger usect; instead - ~

a newer version of the tool'is us'e ffor tfie removal of CEA extension shafts. Operation of the tool is controlled via plant procedure (reference 12).

use of the new gripper operating teal is acceptable because the l tool was designed for St. Lucie Plant by ABB-CE for the specific l purpose of removing CEA extension shafts (references 16 4 17). ,

I l An FSAR, change will be made to revise the description of the j

, gripper operating tool.

i l raitarini corrections .

The remainder of the changes to be made to the FSAR via this i evaluation are editorial in nature (i.e., they are not within the a'{

l scope of 10CFR50.59) and are provided via attachment 1 to this I evaluation as a matter of convenience. These changes include (

minor word changes in section 9.1.4.2.3 which describes operation of the fuel handling system, recognition of the second-fuel pool l cooling heat exchanger (backfit iten) in section 9.1.3.2.3a and correction of the fuel enrichment value used in the new fuel \{ 1 I

storage cack criticality analysis in section 9.1.1.3.

  • l l
s.o ru mna monna m ErrucTs n m is i

i cEA t'hanaa Mechanism

! The vorst-case failure associated with the use of the CEA

! - hand.ing tool is the dropping of a CEA (57 lbs wet weight per i reference 9) onto the top of the core. This failure is enveloped l t

i,

i I

I*  !

i J

i  !

l i I

e.  : .e  :'..

1 a me iw /c m .

- c: :LAh N: : : :. ., ;s.7.

W ev.aluates t r. e.: drcpping cf a.m entire :Uel assectly (1110 lbs veight per reference 9). Additi nally, the chapter 15 accident et ,

i j scenario and not the assumes failure the failure of any of fuelassemblies.

" target" rods of the dropped assembly

+

not contain spent Since a CEA does fuel products or fission gases, l radiological concaquences of a dropped CEA would be minimal. any/ /  !

l Rte y Puel Asse-bly 1

There actual are fuelno new failure assembly in lieu modes introduced with the use of an ofjLGtes machine hoist setpoint. checks. ~ The~rarlare s. > des of the fuel 'for the refueling handling system have been addressed in FSAR section 15.7.4.1.2. )

l crinner Oneestina Tool This tool is an upgraded version of the previous densign. The basic operating principles have not changed. This tool is used for the uncoupling of CEA extension shafts. Although the new tool itself may have new means of failure, with respect to refueling operations, no new failure modes have been introduced, 6.0 Pf1WT REATRTCTIONs i None 7.0 1 EFFECT ON TE N ICAL BPECIFICATIOMB There is no 1.mpact to any Technical Specification Li: siting Condition for Operation, Surveillance or Bases as a result of this evaluation. 1 s.e mutEnENED BAFETY QMtBTION DETERMIERTIDX In accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, the responses to the below listed questions serve to determine if the subject activity constitutes an unreviewed satety question:

8.1 Does the proposed activity increase the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR?

The probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR has not bean increased. The Fuel Handling Accident, FSAR section 15.7.4.1.2, is the only relevant analyzed accident.

The CEA r.andling tool and the gripper operating tool have been designed for their intended use by ABB-CE and equivalent to or better than the original tools used for these functions. Thus their use is not postulated to result in an increase in the probability of occurrence of a fuel handling accident. The new fuel crane and dry sipping equipment have no bearing on the fuel handlino accident since the new fuel crane is not used for the handling cf

> m m_ m . -. -_ .m.. . ~ - _ . . - - . ~ . . . . - _ _ _ . _ ~ _ . ~ . . _ _ . . - _ _ . . . - _ - . _ , _ . . . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _

I l

l J

1 l <

t l

., r .  :- . .

, Ie.' t. ;f y CpC 4* *.10 : ,. I'.* uSO Of ,h T. d C O 'a n 1 OLc! a.. V ".O1. .

lieu cf a cumy for the testing of the refueling macnine hoist setpointe vill not increase the probability of a fuel drop accident since the requirement for lead testing the refualing machine prior to the lifting of an actual fuel assembly is not changed by this evaluation.

8.2 Ms :he proposed activity increase the conseq2ences of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR?

The c nsequences of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR have not been increased. The design and operation of relevant accident detection and mitigation systeam are not impacted in any way.

e.3 Does the proposed activity increass the probability of occurrence of a aalfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR7 The probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR has not been increased. Section 5 of this evaluation analyzes the  ;

potential failure modes and effects of the proposed changes  !

and concludes that no new failure modes or tsystem interactions are introduced. The CEA handling tool and gripper operating tool have been engineered by the NSSS vender for their inten. dad applications. The use of an actual fuel assembly in lieu of a dummy fuel assembly does not increase the probability of a malfunction of the ref'aeling machine.

s.4 roes the proposed activity increase the consequences of a smitunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR?

The proposed activity does not inexease the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR. Ttte charges . provided via this evaluation are all associated with fual handling equipment.

There is no impact to any FSAR accident analysis asseptions or to the operation of any system required for accident detection or mitigation.

8.5 Does the proposed activity create the passibility of an accident of a difforent type than any previously evaluated in the SAR? ,

\

r l The proposad activity does not create the possibility of an i

accident o: a different type than any previously evaluated f in the SAR. Section 5 of this evaluation analyzes the i potential failure modes and effects of the proposed changes

3 nd concludes that no new failure sexies or system interactions are introduced.

. ~ . . . - - . .- . .. . . . - . ~ . .. . . . _ _

i I

. I I

l i

l 9

l 1

i l

.  : /. c , r. p e t acc.. -

cr . :- ...: . . ,

9 malfunction c: equipun; :: Port.sn t to sa ety u: a d::inren; M type than an'* previously evaluated in the SAR?

. l 9 The proposed activity does not create the possibility of a ,

i .

malfunction of equipment important to safety of a different i type than an, previously evaluated in the SAR. As stated e coove, tnere are no new f ailure modes or syr*e: .uteractions as a result of the changes provided via this evaluation.

j 8.7 Door the proposed activity reduce the margin of safety as l defined in the basis for any Technical Spesitication?

I The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any ,

, TechnicaA Specification has not been reduced. The~ FSAT. I l changes provided by this evaluation do not effect any i Technical specification Limiting Conditi'.a for operation,  ;

i surveillance or Bases.

1 j The foregoing constitutes the determination, per 10 CFR 50.59(b), I that the subject activity does not involve an unreviewed safety  !

question. Based on this determination, prior NRC approval for I implementation is not required.

l 9.0 ACTIONS REQUIRED l 1. Plant procedures should be reviewed and revised as

! appropriate.

i 1o.o ggrzornens ..

1. St Lucia Unit 2 FSAR, Amendment 9.
2. St Lucia Unit 2 Technical Specifications, Amendment 78.
3. NUREG-0843, Safety Evaluation Report related to the l operation of St. Lucie Plant Unit No. 2, U.S. Nuclear '

Regulatory Cocaission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, October 1981 (also Supplements 1, 2, 3&4 issued 12/81, 9/82, 4/83, & 6/83).

4. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.70, Rev. 3, Standard Format and content of Safety Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants, November 1978. j
5. Regulatory Guide 1.13, spent Fuel Storage Facility Design Basis, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,',tevision 1, December 1975.
6. Interdepartmental Procedure IP-903, Failed Fuel Action Plan, Rev. 1.

I  ;

. . - . . . - - . .. - ~

s i

}

4 l

. '..o C .: : s ; . : a *. . :.6  : a. u : : -

. : .; . . . , . . .: u.

j Elevater Operation, Rev. 5.

B. St. Lucie Unit 2 Operating Procedure 2-1630022, Spent Fuel

' Handling Mschine Operation, Rev. 15.

9 St. Lu-ie Unit 2 Operat ng Procedure 2-1610023, Ni ~1?1

Handling Crane 'oeration, Rev. 24.
10. St. Lucie Unit 2 Operating.Prc:edure 2-1630024, Refueling
. Machine Lperatinn, Rev. 21.

i

11. St. Lucie Unit 2 Opera, ting Procedure 2-1630028, New Fu.1 Handling Crara operation, Rev. 24.
12. st. Lucie Unit 2 Operating Procedure 2-011022, Coupling and Uncoupling of CEA Extension Shafts, Rev. 15.

l 13. st. Lucie Plant Preoperational Procedure 3200090, J Refueling Operation, Rev. 8.

14. Combustion Engineering Drawing No.s E-FIST-501-300 through 4

-306, Lightweight CEA Handling Tool, Rev. 1.

i 15. AB3/ Combu:Jtion Engineering Procedure No. SL-400-003, Procedure for the Operation of the Control Element

' Assembly Handling Tool; Florida Power and Light Company St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant Units I & II, Rev. O.

j 16. 2998-9678, Rev. 1 i

j 17. 299S -9879, Rev. 1 11 0 ATTacIDmarTs

1. FSAR Change Package (12 pages) l 1

I I

l

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 4%

._.-maa-- .- u.___. -.N- J - m ----a *---"4d* * * - '-8^ *'"-'^"#* * ****-#"" " " " ' '" '#" ' ' ' ' ' ' " '

I i I

. m . . .

i l

i m'u e l

l wg;;

1 'g + g'f;'~

_g

.{' Z: 0' '

y. '

u o ,

I

;a sj:xxx s

z s es w' <

m .

j R t' s

\x \s. *g .

l lNe ~}f'[f >b '

}

m'- _

' '  : 'sb 4 m~

hs xs x sb5k' M'cbl i s'3S'#$$$S')q':25$$ .x- . . . s '

- ep. 4 mm a-mmsm _ma w.r-mmww-w.mwwww-=

- - =www =w=-w 4

4 f*n' g% '*

.y M

K'(' 'j:.: [!f

s. xsy. ,

's:;

N

\ \  ;

m wa, 9 5

/

i

EXTERIOR PRESSURIZER VISUAL INSPECTIOb PLAN M

iiXTE.RIOR PRkSSURIZER DUkAILUD INSPECTION PLAN '

.__._= _. . - . -.

INTERIOR PRESSURIZER DETAILED INSPECTION PLAN -

RGOT CAUSE ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION m, ,

? ,

'" " ' I NRC (FRACTURE MECHANICS) & (CODE CASE; SUBMITT'AL l.

PZR NOZZLE REPAIR CONTRACT'/ MOBILIZATION

- -m -m---

s ENGINEERING PACKAGE FOR REPAIR METHOD

_. = _ ._ _. _

REPLACEMENT NOZZLE MT.L PURCHASE AND DELIVERV PRESSURIZER NOZZLE REP. AIR - PREWORK

- ED ..-

PRESSURIZER N.OZZLE REPAIR (C,B) & (A,D) e MZ. l Z .. T7 M]

RETURN PRESSURIZER READY FOR STARTUP'

. l ..Z . E I PLANT STARTUP (BEGIN FILL & VENT)

+

IIt 5 12 0 12 5 12 0 12 5 12 ~ d

~

^ ~

5 12 0 12 0 12 5 12 5 12 51'2 51'2 5 12 51'2 51'2 0 12 0 12 5 12 d 12 51'2 d 12 5

~

I'2 16 1 17 l 18 l 19 l 20 1 21 l 22 1 23 l 24 l 25 1 26 l 27 I 28 l 29 I 30 l 31 1 1 2 I 3 1 4 l 5 I 6 I 7 I8 MAR APR

~ '

%.U*. $ =" % M '

' R ~***

^"

CI5 Ym"". 's'E - o" =* ST. LUCIE PLANT- UNIT 2

-~

m e.. s,. w -

~ - - '

-- I  !

e A

4 v.

4

h

- $bg

--s ,

s

' s

's A

's l s, .N

3) ',: g,. .. . . . . . - - .... .

r y NV- Yd.M c"r:*w.ygm'nyn

<,. .+ <u..: ww ox*s## ;.usr ,4. k. A(.- .- ## ,,e i( s)

. m

~

$NGINEERING PACKAGE FOR REPAlR METHOD g

3091 RD 42 RESP JPN ES 24M AR94 6 00 EF 25 MAR 94 23 59 FINAL S1HLSS ANALYSIS REVIEW APPROVAL (PZR VSSL) .

NRESSURIZER I

NOZZLE REPAIR - FREWORK si60 RD 1 RESP WSi @

AS 23 MAR 94 6 00 EF 24 MAR 94 6 59 PREPARE / APPROVAL COOPERHEAT PROCEDURE 6162 RD 1 RESP MM l . .

ES 24 MAR 94 7 00 EF 24 MAR 94 7.59 ISSUE PWO FOR COOPERHEAT PROCEDURE S165 RD 0 RESP 1EAM $ .

ES 24M AR94 8 00 EF 24 MAR 94 7:59

[RG APPROVAL COOPERHEAT PROCEDURE

$16e RD 0 RESP HP $ .

ES 24 MAR $4 9 00 EF 24tMR94 0 59 TAILB_OARD MEETING FOR COOPERHEAT __

URESSURIZER NOZZLE REPAIR (C,B) & (A,D) 0120 RD 18 RESP WSI M ES 24 MAR 94 9 00 EF 25 MAR 94 2:59 INSTALL HEATING EQUIPMENT / PRE: HEAT 'C & B* ~

S320 RD 15 RESP WSI . . .

ES 25 MAR 94 3 00_ _ EF 25 MAR 94 20.59 _ . INST ALL HEATING EQUIPMENT / PRE-H' EAT *A & D' E330 RD 36 RESP *Si .

ES 25 MAR 94 2100 ._ EF ptAAR94 8 59 APPLY IEMPERBEAD PAD 'A' B335 RD 36 RESP W$i .

ES 27 MAR 94 9 00 _ EF 28 MAR 94 20.59 APPLY TEMPERBEAD PAD 'D' 5342 RD 44 RESP WSI .

ES 2eM AR94 2100 EF 30MA_R94 20 59 POST WELD HEAT TREAT (HEAT HOLD) *A & D' E350 RD is RESP WSI 'M. .

ES 30 MAR 94 3 00 EF 30 MAR 94 20p BORE PENETRATION AND GFilND J PREP 'A' C355 RD I4 RESP WSt M, . .

ES 30 MAR 94 2100 EF 3tMAR9414.55 BORE PENETRATION AND GRIND J PREP 'D' s360 RD 18 RESP WSI . .

ES }1 MAR 9415 00 EF 33PR94 0,59 , EMPERBEAD PAD *A & D' 8370 RD 20 RESP WS1 .

[31 APR94 g 00_ [F 2A@94 4 59 A L & WELD NE,W NOZZLE 'A' 4375 RD 20 RESP WEl .

[S 2APR94 pg _ _ EF 3APR94 @5s . L & WELD NEW NOZZLE *D' 4300 RD 6 RESP WS8 .

Q 3APR94100__ . EF 3APR94 6 59 __ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _

E 'A & D* NOZZi E WELD _ _ _ _ _

RETURN PRE.SSURIZER READY.FOFi STARTUP 10060 RD 13 RESP CS ES 3APR94 7.00 _EF 4AkR94 0 59 , STALL 'A & D' F1 PING 10065 RD 4 RESP OC g ES 4APR941.00 _ EF 4APRS4 4 59 _

.PTNT PIP 1NG 'A & D' 10006 RD e RESP CS g ES 4APR94 5 00 EF 4APR9412:59 REMOVE INTERIOR PAESSURiZER PLATFOR54 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 1'2 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 1'2 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 $~

24 l 25 l 26 l 27 l 28 l 29 l 30 l 31 1 l 2 1 3 l 4 1 5 l 6 l 7 l 8 l 9 l 10 l 11 l MAR APR Plot Date 24 MAR 94 06 49 g E**,f. 'E.,, U"*"U i7%

____ - --w ' aR"!.AmvbSeerEarly

. :av

  • Desee FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY o ,, ,,,7,u, r - es.c6,a 4 ,,,,,,o Project FinWs HAPR94 5 59 - O# mens "' ST. LUCIE PLANT - UNIT 2 - --

(c) Palermere Symems, Inc.

" " = ~ =' =

. = . - . ~ . . .. . - ~ . . . - . . . . . . .~. . - . ..

s l'tETURN PRE.SSURIZER READY.FOR STARTUP 10067 RD 10 RESP CS E ,

ES 4APR9413 00 EF 4APR94 22:59 INSTALL PRESSURIZER MANWAY . .

~ ~

PL ANT STARTUP (BEGIN FILL & VENT) 20100 RD 0 RESP OPS $

E3 4APR94 23 00 EF 4APR94 22:59 BEGIN FILL APO VENT t

^

' ~

1'2 0 12 0 1'2 0 1'2 0 1'2 0 1'2 0 1'2 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 1'2 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 1'2 0 24 l 25 l 26 l 27 l 28 l 29 l 30 l 31 1 l 2 l 3 l 4 l 5 l 6 l 7 l 8 l 9 l 10 l 11 l MAR APR i W FW2 he 11APRS4 5:59

  • O" h(($ ' ~~

"-m "*

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMYANY ST. LUCIE PLANT - UNIT 2 n.,, -

%c7; e,,,,,,,a 3 ,,,,,,3 PZR NOZZLE REPAIR CRITICAL PATH .__ _ .  :. r;  ;-

tem . S,.. ine.

I

x__.a = '- - -a_ _ na.u u+s....mm,..~aum m m um mnmmn -- - -

-.~maae-m.a-~-- -~m.-~-<o=~"-=.="- "- - > - - ---a f

i i

l i

(

i l .e..*

{

l i

i l

l l

1 i

i i

j s w, . , .

1 i

I ,

1 i

(

l

- - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ . ._ ~ _ . - _ _ _ _ - _ .

~ ,

R. ,OOT CAUSE AN. ALYSIS AND R.ECOMM.ENDATI.ON 742 RD 24 RESP CSI b _]

AS 2mARv3 6 00 , EF 25 MAR 94 5 59 MANANGEMENT REVIEW OF. ROOT CAUSE 745 RD 12 RESP CSI ES 25M AR94 6 00 EF 25 MAR 9417.59 i AL ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS SUBhMTTAL TO PLANT N,RC (FRACTURE MECHANICS) 8e (CODE CASE).' SUBMITTAL 754 RD 12 RESP CSI Mj AS 20MAfs94 6 00 EF 24 MAR 9417 5, P.REPARE FRACTURE MECHANICS ANALYSIS 755 RO 72 RESP CSI .

ES 24 MAR 94 is 00 EF 27 MAR 9417.5, T .c M,ECHANICS ANALYSIS TO N,RC 760 RD 240 RESPtlC l

[Niid APPROVAL OF FRACTU.REiMECRANICS ANALYSIS Es 2? MAR 941s 00 Er 6Arn9417.59 782 RD 198 RESP LIC U [ l

.y 23 MARS 4 to 00 EF 1APR9411:59 NRC APPROVAL OF CODE CASE 2142 SUBMITTAL _ .

EiMGINEERING PACKAGE FOR REPAIR METHOD- -

3089 RD 2 RESP MM b AS 2 WAR 93 20 00 _ EF 2 MAR 94 L59 ISSUE PWO FOR PCM SUPP. 'O' FOR NOZZLE REPAIR 3090 RD 0 RESP TE AM O .

ES 24 MAR 94 s 00 EF 24 MARE 4 7.59 FRG APPROVAL SUPP. 'O' FOR NOZZLE REPAIR 3091 RD 42 RESP JPN ES 24 MAR 94 6 00 . EF 25 MAR 94 23 59 0 .SS ANALYSIS REVIEW APPROVAL (PZR,VSSL)

W92 RD 36 RESP JPN l l ES 24M AR94 5 00 EF 25 MARS 419 59 ISSUE PCM SUPPLEMENT *1* RELEASE HOLD POINTS 3093 RD 0 RESP TE AM O .

ES 25 MARS 4 20 00 EF 25MARD419 59 FRG APPROVAL SUPP. *1* FOR IMPLEMENTATION 3094 RD 6 RESP Ci N j AS 23 MAR 94 6 00 _ EF 24 MAR 941149 b.Ei1 FORM PIPING STRESS A,NALYSIS 3095 RD 4 RESP JPN ES 24 MAR 9412 00_ EF 24 MARS 419.59 Q ' LUATE PIPING STRESS ANALYSIS EvA 3096 RD 0 RESP JPN ' O g 24 GAR 94 20 00 __ EF 24 MAR 9139J9 _ DECISION TO INCLUDE IN SUPP 'O' OR SUPP *1*

P RESSURIZER NOZZLE REPAIR'- PREWORK- - -

-l .

5141 RD 24 RESP WSI unund J

_AS 22 MAR 94 6.00 EF 25 MAR 94 5:59 FABRTCATE/ RECEIVE' CAL BLOCK -

5142 RD 10 RESP CSI ES 25 MARS 4 6 00 , EF 256LW4 QS9_. LIBRATE llNSTR.UMENTS AFTER RECEIPT OF CAL BLOCK 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12'O l'2 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 l 24 l 25 l 26 l 27 l 28 l 29 l 30 1 31 1 l 2 13 l 4 l 5 l6 17 l 8 l 9 l 10 l 11 l MAR APR EaE** E E U 07 07Ic~~T' ~

~ FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COM7ANY oM.-- m--- ca.c6,e , ,a N Ea E YE

  • N" ^** ST. LUCIE PLANT- UNIT 2

~~

~

PZR NOZZLE INSPECTION / REPAIR ---

(c) Pr6mavera Systems _. Inc.

~ -

U RESSURIZER NOZZLE REPAIR'- PREWORK 4160 RD 1 RESP WSI l AS 2 MAR 94 6 00 EF 24 MAR 94 6 59 PREPARE / APPROVAL COOPERHEAT PROCEDURE S162 RD 1 ' RESP MM l ES 24u AR94 7 00 EF 24u AR94 7.5, ISSUE PWO FOR COOPERilEAT PROCEDURE 6165 RD 0 RESPIEAM $

ES 24 MAR 94 e 00 EF 2 uAR94 7 5, ' FRG APPROVAL COOPERHEAT PROCEDURE 6i6s RD 0 RESP HP $

ES 24 MAR 94 9 00 EF 24 MAR 94 8 39 TAILBOARD MEETING FOR COOPERHEAT P RESSURIZER NOZZLE REPAIR'(C,B) &'(A,D)

- - - - - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - .I AS 2) AR94 3 00 EF 2A , M1 ARY OF 'C & B'NCZZLE RnP iR~

3120 RD 18 RESP WS8 J ES 24 MAR 94 9 00 EF 25 MAR 94 2 59 INSTAL L llEATING EQUI.'*JENT/ PRE-HEAT 'C & B' 4130 RD 36 RESP WS8 ES 25 MAR 94 3 00 EF 26 MAR 9414 59 -[PP A MPERBEAD ?AD 'C' e135 RD 36 RESP WSI L l ES 26 MAR 9415 00 EF 28 MAR 94 2 59 APPLY TEMFdFtBEAD PAD *B'

$140 RD 48 RESP WSI J Es rem AR94 3 00 EF acuAR94 2:59 WE[6 HEAT TREAT (HEAT HOLD) *C & D*

e150 RD to RESP WS8 l ES 29M AR94 9 On tr souAR94 2.59 [~6Rh B PENETRATION AND GRIND J PREP 'C' e151 RD 1s RESP WSa [.

-[

ES SouaR93 , w tr aoMAR94 20m BORE PENETRATION AND GRIND J PREP *B' 8160 RD 18 RESP WSI ES 30uAR9 2100 EF siuAR9414 59 EMPERBEAD PADS 'C & B' e170 RD 20 RESP WS8 j ES 31 MAR 94 p 00 EF 1 APR9410.59 (NSTALL I .& WELD NEW NOZZLE 'C' s175 RD 20 RESP WSI l l ES KPR9411 M EF 2APR94 6 59 INSTALL & WELD NEW NOZZLE *B' sie0 RD e RESP WSt O FJ 2APRM 7 00 EF 2APR9412:59 HDE 'C & B'. NOZZLE WELD C300 HD 241 RESP WSI AS 23uARio 3 00 EF 3APR94 6.50 3UMMARY OF 'A & D* HOZZLE REPAIR .

8320 RD 10 RESP WS8 -

ES 25 MAR 94 3 00 _ EF 25 MAR 94 20y _ N ALL HEATING GOUIPMENT/ PRE-HEAT *A & D' S330 RD 36 RESP WSI >

ES 25 MAR 94 2100 EF 27 MAR 94 E.59 L MPERBEAD PAD 'A'

' ^ ^

i [2 0 IN O 12 0 12 0 1'2 0 12 0 1'2 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 1'2 0 12 0 1'2 0 12 0 1'2 0 12 0 1'2 0 12 0 12 0' I 24 l 25 1 26 l 27 l 28 l 29 l 30 l 31 1 l 2 l 3 l 4 l 5 l 6 I7 l 8 I9 l 10 l 11 l  ;

MAR APR Ptos Date 24 MAR 94 06 45 t _3 aue. emetwey pae N 2 se 6 P mt 17 0 _

i "o'e"<+s?sy FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY p.,,- -

s,,,,,- es,3,, ,,,,,,,,

Protect Finish 11APR94 5 59

  • __O '" ***'*a** oar"..' ST. LUCIE PLANT - UNIT 2 - -

~

~ ~ ' 7- - - - -

PZR NOZZLE INSPECTION / REPAIR x - -

(c) Primavera Systems, inc .

___~ '

PkESSURIZER NOZZLE REPAIR. (C,B) & (A,D)

SMS RD 36 RESP WSt ES 27 MAR 94 9 00 LF 2sMAR94 20 59 APPLY TEMPERBEAD PAD 'D' C345 RD 48 RESP WS8 ES 28 MAR 94 2100 EF 30 MAR 94 20 59 EAT TREAT (HEAT HOLD)'A & D' C350 HD 18 RESP WS4 ES 30M AR94 3 00 EF 30tJAR94 20 59 PENETRATION AND GRIND J PRE,P 'A' ES 30 MAR 94 24 00 E F 3tMAR9414 5, BORE PENETRATION AND GRIND J PREP 'D' C360 RD 18 RESP WS4 ES 31 MAR 941'5 00 EF 9APR94 8 59 EMPERBEAD PAD 'A Si D' C370 RD 20 RESP WSI ES it.PR94 9 M LF 2APR94 4 59 INSTALL &. WELD NEW NOZZLG 'A' 8375 RD 20 RESP WS8 ES 2rPR94 5 00 EF 3APR94 0 59 INSTALL & WELD NEW NOZZLE *D' 8380 RD 6 RESP WS8 g ES 3APR94 } M EF 3APR94 6 59 _ _ _ _ _ _N_DE 'A_& D' NOZZLE WELD RETURN PRESS.URIZER READY.FOR STARTUP 9010 HD 2 RESP WSt Q ES 3APR94 7 00 EF 3APR94 8 59 REMOVE CONTR EQUIP FROM PZR AREA 9030 RD 4 RESP PLNT C E3 3APR94 7 00 EF 3APR9410 59 CLEAN / VERIFY PRESSURIZER INTERIOR  ;

9048 RD 2 RESP WSI l ZS 2 IPR 9413 M EF 2APR9414:59 REMOVE WSt EQUIP FROM 'C & B' NZZLE AREA RD 18 9050 ES 2LPR94 O M RESP CS

[CT/j NSTALL 'C & B' PIPING

~EF 3APR94 6 59 9055 RD 4 RESP OC O PT/VT PIPING 'C & B' 9 2^F"'? ?:M EF 3Am94 30 359 9075 RD 86 RESP CS Ll 7 ES 3APR941100 EF 4APRM 2:Se INST. ALL SNUBBERS / SPRING CANS *C & B' 9080 RD 2 RESP CS E3 4APR94 3 00 EF 4APRM 4 58

.[OUCll-UP T -

PRIME COAT PAINT SNUBBERS '

E_3 4APR$__4_ 5 00 - E_F_ 4APRM 22:Se_

CURE PRIMG COAT 'C & B' ES 4APR94_23_00 _ EF 4APR94 23 59 QC ACCEPTANCE PRIME COAT'C & B' 10020 RD 2 RESP CS 0 E} 5APR94 8 M EF SAPR 94 9 59 FINAL COA.T PAINT SNUBBERS 'C & B*

b 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 1h 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 l 24 l 25 l 26 l 27 l 28 l 29 l 30 l 31 1 l 2 l 3 l 4 l 5 l 6 1 7 l 8 l 9 l 10 l 11 l ,

MAR APR '

Plot D.to 24 MAR 94 06.45 * * ' "

t -- - ~ ~ -~1 Amey smtmey emes

  • E.,i '"

'!"i"" i7 00 .E%,0 7*~v RMOA NER & WM @@MY o ,,

n,j,ar,7-; c3 c6,, ,,,,,,,,

L% Fw.n u APRu 5 59 - . _ _ _o- =~m .

ST. LUCIE PLANT - UNIT 2 - - - ---

PZR NOZZLE INSPECTION / REPAIR = _

_ :;- .c 2 _ __

(c) Prtmavers Syssoms. tric.

RETURN PRESS'URIZER' READY'FOR STARTUP' 10022 RD 24 RESP CS l l ES SAPR 9410 W EF 6APR94 9 59 CURE FINAL COAT PAINT *C & b 10025 RD 1 RESP OC l ES SAPR 94 to oo _ EF 6APR9410;59 _ 'OC ACCEPTANCE PAINT ON SNUBBERS'C & B' 10030 RD 48 RESP CS l ES 4APR94 3 00 EF 6APR94 2.59 [ESTORElN5ULATION R .

/ LAGGING 'C & B' AREA 1*c35 RD 6 RESP CS E3 6APR94 3 00 EF 6APR94 8 59__ R VE $CAFFOLDING FROM 'C & B' AREA 10045 RD 8 RESP CS ES 6APR94 9to EF 6APR9416 59 AL CLEAN-UP'C & B* AREA 10050 RD 2 RESP WSI Q ES 3APR94 7 00 EF 3APR94 8 59 REMOVE WSI EQUIPMENT FROM 'A & D' AREA 10060 RD 18 RESP CS E'$ 3APR94 7.00 EF 4APR94 0 59 C/S INSTALL *A & D* PIPMG 10065 RD 4 RESP OC g ES 4APR94100 EF 4APRM 4 59 PT/VT PIPING 'A & D' 10068 RD 5 RESP CS g ES 4APR94 5 M EE 3APR94_]2 59 REMDVE INTERIOft PRESSURIZ8R PLATFORM 10067 RD 10 RESP CS ES 4APRM 13 00_ _ _ EF 4APR94 22:59 t. TALL PRESSURIZER MANWAY 10070 RD 6 RESP CS ES CAPR94 5 M EF 4APR94 to 59 .

REMOVE TEMP $UPP/REINSTL PERM SUPP 'A & D' 10090 RD 2 RESP CS ES 4APR94 it 00 EF 4APR9412.59 (OUCH T UP PAINTING BASE CDAT *A & D '

  • S100 RD 18 RESP CS J ES CAPR9413 00 EF SAPR 94 6 59 [URE C TOUCH UP PAINT BASE' COAT 'A & D' u110 RD 1 RESP OC l ES SAPR 93 7 M EF _5APR94 7;59 _ OC ACC'EPTANCE TOUCH UP PASl$ COAT. PAINT *A & D' 10120 RD 2 RESP CS l E3 SAPR 94 s 00 EF 5APRM 9-59 FINAL COAT PAINT 'A & D*

10130 RD 24 RESP CS E'15APR9410 00 EF 6APRM 9:19 AL TOUCH UP PAINT 'A & D' 10140 RD 1 RESP OC l ES sAPRM 10 00 EF SAPRM 10-Se . OC ACCEPTANCE FINAL COAT PAINT'A & D*

10150 RD 49 RESP CS [ J n 4APR941:00 EF 6APRM 0 59_ .RESTOMElRS. ULATION/ LAGGINGA & D' AREA 11160 RD 6 RESP CS O ES 6APR94 L90 . EF 6APR94 8 59 elEMOVE SCAFFOLDING FROM OUTSIDE 'A & D' AREA 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 l 24 l 25 l 26 l 27 l 28 l 29 l 30 l 31 1 l 2 l 3 l 4 l 5 l 6 l 7 l 8 l 9 l 10 l 11 l MAR APR Plot Dat, 24M AR94 06 45 g- --1 ac engarty panee "*#

  • E"f."ll,, 'OS" ii"M

> '" dew.=;av FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY o ,,, -

n% 77 - es,a., i,,,,,,o

=..= -w a'* *v

- . _ _ _ .o-Pag.ci rini iiAPR94 5 59 ST. LUCIE PLANT - UNIT 2 -- - - -

(c) Primavere Systems, Inc.

PZR NOZZLE INSPECTION / REPAIR .2 _r .. x _r

" + - . -m.4 e s RIETURN PRESS.URIZER READY.FOR STARTUP ictro no e REsecs ES 6APR94 7 00 EF 6APR9414 $9 L CLEAN UP ',A & D* AREA 2001o RD 72 RESPW9 l n 3APR94 900 LF 6APR94 8 59 EMOBILIZE WSI EQUIPMENT FROM CONTAINMENT _

P LANT STARTUP (BEGIN FILL & VENT) 20ioo no o RtsP OPS $

D 4APR94 23 00 EF 4 APR94 22.59 BEGIN FlLL AND VENT

' ' ' ~ ' ' ' ~ '~

0 1'2 0 1'2 0 12 0 12 U~12'O 12 5 1'2 0 12 0 1'2 0 12 0 1'2 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 1'2 0 12 0 12 U l 24 l 25 l 26 l 27 l 28 1 29 l 30 l 31 1 l 2 l 3 1 4 l 5 l 6 l 7 l 8 l 9 l 10 l 11 l MAR APR EN=** 2EINE "~~

~ ' $22I~~'E' "" FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COM7ANY o m ,- - a Ole k Act*my ~~Z--

D IS+"sh 4 55

  • i ST. LUCIE PLANT- UNIT 2 - --

" '" ' ^' == - === -

(c) Pdmews systems, Inc. _

,05/15/56 12:07 NUCLEAR FvEL JB 4 64677556 SO.201 A002

$N 3 -)vd veume.N _t.li g {p.E9 i Intar-office correspondence l

@ FPL l NF-96-167 To: S.A. Valdos Date: May 2, 1996 From: D.J. Den Department JPN/NF/JB subject: St. Lucie Unit 1 Refueling Equipment Underload and l Overload Settings JPN-PSL-SEFJ 96-020. Rev.0 Attached is an engineering evaluation performed by Nuclear Fuel to determine the refueling equipment load cell setpoints. These setpoints are based on the available equipment and fuel assembly weight information. The actual weights should be checked during the upcoming 1996 outage to confirm the range of values used.

If you have any questions, please contact Jay Kabadi in Juno at I 694-3364.

Attachment:

JPN-PSL-SEFJ-96-020, Rev. O xc:

R. Dailey F. Gusmano D. W. Howard ~

J. N. Kabadi R. M. Klein L. A. Martin K. H. Nordmeyer C. G. O'Farrill C. Villard w/o b

. . - -

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML20137L162&oldid=2832436"