ML20137L116
| ML20137L116 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 09/06/1995 |
| From: | FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20137K821 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-96-485 JPN-PSL-SENP-95, JPN-PSL-SENP-95-106, NUDOCS 9704070157 | |
| Download: ML20137L116 (9) | |
Text
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PAGE 1 OF 9 t.
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JUIPER/ LIFTED LEAD FOR PDIS-02-1 A
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3 UNIT 1 JPN-P8L-5EEP-95-105
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JPN-PSL-SENP-95-106
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REVISION O j
PAGE 2 0F 9 REVIEW A 2 APPROVAL RECORD i
PLANT ST. LUCIE UNIT 1
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TITLE JUNPER/LIFTFD LEAD FOR P015-02-1 i
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LEAD DISCIPLINE LICEN11NG 4
i ENGINEERING ORGANIZATION ST LUCIE PRODUCTION ENGINEERING GROUP d
b REVIEW /APPROYAL:
j IRTERFE t TYPt Jt0VP Petpaat's VERIFILD APPROVED FPL APPRDVED*
i IsPUT REVIEW h/A MEmmmmmmmm MECH X
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- For Contractor tvals As Determined Sects
- Review Interface As A Min en All 10CFt50.59 Evals and PLAs DATE: M&II FPL PROJECTS APPROVAL:
OTHER INTERFACES M
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JPN-PSL-SENP-95-106 REVISION O PAGE 3 0F 9 TAnte or CONTENTS P. AGE SECT 7.QN TITLE 1
cover 2
Review and Approval Record 3
Table of contents 4
Abstract S
1.0 Purpose and Description S
2.0 Licensing Requirements 5
3.0 Analyses of Effects on Safety 4
4.0 Failure Modes and Effects Analys 5 6
i 7
l 5.0 Plant Restrictions 6.0 Ef fect on T'achnical Specifications 7
i 7.0 Unreviewed r Question 7
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Determination 1
8 8.0 Actions Required l
2 9
9.0 References l
Attachments i
None 1
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JPN-PSL-SENP-95-106 REVISION 0 I
PAGE 4 OF 9 ABSTRACT The purpose of this safety evaluation is to demonstrate the acceptability of applying a jumper to the pressure differential switch (PDIS,02-1) in +h=-chemical & vnlu== <antrol system (CVCS) letdown line. Mis jumper will remain in effect until the switthiswa-tred x
/'or replaced. A
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[ PDIS-02-1 functions to sense high differential pressure across the - - -..
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regenerative heat exchanger.
High differential pressure is indicative I
of high flow from a seismically indu~ed break of the letdown line
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outside containment.
Upon reaching setpoint, it initiates a signal to close isolation valve V2516.
However, PDIS-02-1 serves as a backup to 1
TE-2221 located immediately downstream of the regenerative heat i
i exchanger.
TE-2221 is the primary instruisent credited in the FSAR for l
l isolating letdown via V2515 in the event of a letdown line break l
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outside containment (Ref 2, Table 9.3-25 & Appendix 3D).
With PDIS-i 02-1 jumpered, isolation capability is available via V2515 either l
i automatically or by manual action, and via V2516 by manual action.
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This safety evaluation involves an assessment of safety related systems, and therefore, is classified as safety related.
This evaluation concludes that operation of the plant with the proposod jumper on PDIS-02-1 does not represent an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10CFR50.59, does not require a change to plant Technical Specifications and does not adversely affect plant operation or safety.
Therefore, prior NRC approval is not required for implementation.
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4' JPN-PSL-SENP-95-106 REVISION O PAGE 5 OF 9 1.0 PURPOSE AND DEscRTPTTON The purpose of this safety evaluation is to demonstrate the acceptability of applying a jumper to pressure differential indicating svitch PDIS-02-1 in the chemical & volume control system (CVCS) letdown line.
The jumper of this switch will defeat closure of V2516 on high differential pressure.
This jumper will remain in effect until the switch is repaired or replaced.
PDIS-02-1 functions to sense high di12erential pressure across the regenerative heat exchanger.
High differential pressure is indicative of high flow from a seismically induced break of the letdown line l
outside containment. 'Upon reaching sotpoint, it initiates a signal to close isolation valve V2516.
However, PDIS-02-1 serves as a backup to l
TE-2221 located immediately downstream of the regenerative heat TE-2221 is the primary instrument credited in the FSAR for exchanger.
isolating letdown via V2515 in the event of a letdown line break With PDIS-outside containment (Ref 2, Table 9.3-25 & Appendix 3D).
02-1 jumpered, isolation capablity is available via v2515 either automatically or by manual action, and via V2516 by manual action.
l 2.0 LTcENSTNG REOUTREMENTS Technica*,.eecifications (Ret 1) do not contain provisions for The Technical Specifice' '
FDIS-02-1 and associatec c.:cuits.
ESAE PDIS-02-1 is shown on FSAR Figure 9.3-4, however, the FSAR does not TE-2221 is provide a description of PDIS-02-1 and/or its function.
discussed and credited for the isolation function of letdown following Note that the FSAR a line rupture (Ref 2, Table 9.3-25, Appendix 3D).
analysis of a letdown line break outside containment does not include a single active failure.
Damien Bania Daemnant The CVCS DBD describes PDIS-02-1 and its function as a backup sensing The letdown isolation mechanism to the temperature element TE-2221.
valves and associated instrument loops are situated inside containment and thus are not affected by a letdown line break outside containment.
s.o m LYara or urFacts ON REFETY Primerv Taelation for Latdows f3na Braak TE-2221 is the primary instrust it used to sense high temperature f
downstream of the regenerative heat exchanger caused by excessive letdown from a line break.
The line break is from a postulated seismic event (Ref 7, Section 7.5.2c).
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I JPN-PSL-SENP-95-106 REVISION 0
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j TE-2221 provides annunciation in the control room to alert operators 1
of a high temperature condition.
It also provides for closure of letdown isolation valve V2515 on a high-high temperature signal (Ref 5 1
& 6).
The jumpering of PDIS-02-1 does not affect the function of TE-2221 to isolate a letdown line break.
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Rankun Tuolation for Latdown tf = Break i
PDIS-02-1 serves as a backup to TE-2221.
PDIS-02-1 measures the differential pressure across the regenerative heat exchanger as a means of detecting high fluid flow that would occur from a downstream.
i The swit;h provides a "close" signal to letdown isolation line break.
valve V2516 and has a setpoint of 275 paid (Ref 4a & 8).
The valve i
closure isolates the non-seismic portion Of the letdown line and j
terminates the leak.
4 With PDIS-02-1 jumpered, isolation capablity is i
available via V2515 either automatically or by manual action, and via
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V2516 by manual action.
I Isolation of Letdown Line Break Usine Plant Proceduren Isolation of a letdown lin'a break can be accomplished via operator action in the control room by closing either V2515 or V2516 as j
described in off-normal procedures (Ref 4a,4b,4c,4d) and the CVCS DBD i
(Ref 7, Section 7.5).
The jumpering of PDIS-02-1 does not affect the i
i ability of the operators to isolate either v2515 or V2516 in response to a letdova line break, f'
STan and cts closure of "- *<
PDIS-02-1 is not used for accident.titigation in that letdown is automatically isolated by SIAS and CIS via separate !nstruments.
The safety function of isolating the letdown line on SIAS or CIS is unaffected by the jumpering of PDIS-02-1.
Environmental cualification i
TE-2221 functions to ensure that a letdown line break outside containment is isolated such that safety related equipment in the vicinity of the break is not adversely affected.
The jumpering of i
PDIS-02-1 does not affect the capability of TE-2221 to isolate a l
letdown line break.
Safety clannification J
This safety evaluation involves an assessment of the effects on safety related systems, and therefore, is classified as safety related.
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4.0 FATLURE MODES kND krrzcii RwitYsIs
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I The jumper of PDIS-02-1 is bounded by the failure modes and effects analysis in the FSAR (Ref 2, Tabl 9.3-25).
The jumper does not create new failure modes or adversely affect the function of TE-2221.
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JPN-PSL-SENP-95-106 l
REVISION 0 l
PAGE 7 OF 9 i
E.e putry unmenreTrown i
The FSAR, plant drawings and other affected engineering documents will I
n:t be revised due to the limited duration of the jumper.
i s.o 21, s em TrewwTent EPECIFICATIOMs i
j I plementation of the proposed jumper does not require changes to the Technical Specifications as discussed in section 2.0 of this i
ovaluation.
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f 7.e UwntvTFTED BAFETY OUERTION DETERMTNT M j
In accordance with 10CFR50.59, the responses to the following questions serve to determine whether the jumper constitutes an j
unreviewed safety question:
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7.1 Does the jumper increase the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR?
The probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated j
in the SAR will not increase because this jumper does not affect any equipment whose malfunction is retulated in the SAR to initiate an accident.
i 7.2 Does the jumper increams :.no consequences of an accident 4
previously evaluated in the SAR?
1 The consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR will not increase because this jumper does not affect the closure of V2516 upon receipt of a SIAS or CIS.
7.3 Does the jumper increase the probability of an occurrence of a 4
j malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR?
The jumper does not adversely affect the function of equipment important to safety.
Therefore, the jumper does not increase the probability of an occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR.
7.4 Does the jumper increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR?
The jumper does not adversely affect equipment required to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
Letdown isolation occurs from TE-2221 located immediately downstream of the regenerative heat exchanger.
Thcrefore, the jumper does not increase the consequences of a a lfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR.
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JPN-PSL-SENP-95-106 REVISION O i
PAGE 8 OF 9 l
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7.5 Does the jumper create the possibility of an accident of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR7 New accident initiators are not intreduced by the jumper, k
Therefore, the jumper does not create the possibility of an accident of a different type than any previously evaluated in the i
SAR.
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7.6 Does the. jumper create the possibility of a malfunction of 4
equipment important to safety of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR?
I The jumper was determined not to create any new failure modes.
1 Therefore, the jumper does not create the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety of a different type q
than any previously. evaluated in the SAR.
i 7.7 Does the jumper reduce the margin of safetiy as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification?
The jumper does not change assumptions in the basis of the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, the jumper does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification.
The jumper does not sely affect safe cperation of the plant (per Sections 3 and 4), oce.z r.ot constitute an unreviewed safety question (per Section 7) and does not require a change to the Technical Specifications (per Section 6).
Therefore, implementation of the l
change does not require prior NRC approval.
8.0 ACTIONS REOUIRED/ RECOMMENDATIONS 1.
Provide a jumper to defeat PDIS-02-1 and verify that the jumper does not affect the SIAS or CIS function.
2.
Isolate PDIS-02-1 from the process fluid utilising double isolation (2 valves on high and 2 valves on low side of e
instrument).
The following valves are available instrument (manifold / isolation) valves, root valves v2476 and v2478, and
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root val.es V2809 and V2810.
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3.
Verify proper operation of TE-2221 and associated TIC-2221 instrument loop.
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e JPN-PSL-SENP-95-106 REVISION O PAGE 9 OF 9 9 R REFERENCES 1.
St Lucie Unit 1:
Technical Specifications, Amendment No. 138 2.
St Lucie Unit 1 FSAR, through Amendiment No. 14 3.
St Lucie Unit 1:
NRC Safety Evaluation Repo;-t,~ through Supplement 2 4.
8t Lucie Unit 13 Off Normal Operating Procedures a.
OMP 1-0030131, Plant Annunciator Summary, M-7 & M-28, Revision 60 b.
ONP 1-0120031, Excessive RCS Leakage, Revision 23 c.
ONP 1-0120035, Pressurizer Pressure and Level, Revision 17 d.
ONP 1-0210030, Charging and Letdown, Revision 24 5.
St Lucie Unit 1 Drawing 8770-B-327, Sheet 150, Rev 16.
6.
St Lucie Unit 1: Drawings 8770-B-327, Sheet 159, Rev 16 and Sheet 157, Rev 8.
7.
St Lucie Unit 1 CVCS Design Basis Document, DBD-CVCS-1, Revision 0.
8.
Total Equipment Data Base 9/5/95
.