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4 REGION 11 EDSFI PLANT RATINGS i
s PLANTS
. ELECTRICAL
, PROTECTION $
ENGINEERING.&
CONFIG.e _ SURV &L
-DESIGN %
-C00RDINATIONs TECH: SUPPORT:
. CONTROL 1 MAINTEN; l BF (10.5) 2.0 3.0 1.5 2.0 2.0 i
BRU (14.0) 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 CAT (12.4) 2.9 3.0 2.0 3.0 1.5 d
CR3 (9.0) 2.0 1.5 2.2 1.8 1.5 FAR (11.5) 2.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 2.5 GG (7.0) 1.5 1.5 1.0 2.0 1.0 HAR (9.0) 2.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 l HAT (8.7) 1.0 1.5 2.2 1.5 2.5 MCG (12.0) 2.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 2.0 NA (14.5) 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.5 3.0 1 000 (12.0) 2.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 3.0 I
i R08 (9.3) 1.8 1.5 2.0 1.5 2.5 SEQ (10.0) 2.0 2.u 2.0 2.0 2.0 i STL (6.0) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 i
j SUM (6.3) 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.8 1.0 l SUR (6.3) 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.0 2
TP V0G (8.9) 2.4 2.0 1.5 1.0 2.0 1
he Plant Systems Section has assessed the Region 11 plants based on the EDSFIs completed to date.
e selected 5 categories to be used as rating factors: (1) Electrical Design, this included the verall EDS design ie. calculations at all voltage levels including current, design bases,etc. (2) rotection and Coordination, this included all EDS protection and coordination problems identified t all voltage levels, (3) Engineering and Technical Support, this assessment was to assess the apport to the plant as it related to the EDS, (4) Configuration Control, as it related to fuse, reaker overloads control, electrical equipment installation etc. (5) Surveillance and aintenance as it related to the EDS.
Each of these areas were assigned a value from 1 to 3 with being the best, the total of the 5 areas is noted after the plant name.
The plants that have at had an EDSFI inspection will be added as they are conducted.
OCTOBER 1993
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REGION II EDSFI PLANT RATINGS UPPER GROUPING PLANT OVERALL RATINt STL 6.0 SUM 6.3 SUR 6.8 GG 7.O HAT 8.7 VOG 8.9 MIDDll_GRQUPING PLANT OVERALL RATING CR3 9.0 RAR 9.0 ROB 9.3 SEQ 10.0 BF 10.5 i
LONER GROUPING PLANT OVERALL RATING FAR 11.5 MCG 12.0 OCO 12.0 CAT 12.4 BRU 14.0 NA 14.5 TP did not have an EDSFI.
The plants are ranked by overall rating which is the total of their ratings for the 5 EDSFI rating categories.
The 5 rating categories were Electrical Design, Protection and Coordination, Engineering and Technical Support, Configuration Control, and Surveillance and Maintenance.
The
' lowest score is the best.
Plants in the up'per grouping tended to have fewer significant findings and only exhibited weaknesses in 1 or 2 of the' rating categories.
The middle group had more findings and were weaker in more categories.
The lower grouping generally had a significant number of findings in all the EDSFI rating categories.
~0BER 1993
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.m EDSFI CFFORT FOR REGIC" II Septett'ner 27, 1993 Page 1 5
PLANTS INSPECTION DATES TEAM LEADER TEAM MEMBERS CONSULTANTS iINSPEC'IORS sr REPORT NUtiBERS DATES OF COMPLETED FOLLOWUP INSPECTIONS 2/12-3/16/1990 J. Jacobson, T. Dunning R.McFadden, SAIC NO F/U REQUIRED Harris 50-400/90-200 Gautam P.
Kang, D. Solorio V.
J.Houghton, RTS LICENSEE RESPONDED McCree, Fillion, JULY 6,1990 Merriweather 11/13-12/14/1990 Merriweather, Fillion, J.Arsenault, AECL Fillion, Moore, Grand Gulf 50-416/90-24 Hunt Smith, Miller A.Josefowicz Rudisail F/U H.Leung, AECL 12/16-20/91 1/14-2/14/1991 Fillion, Harmon SRI, L.Lazic, AECL
- Shymlock, Sequoyah 50-327/91-02 and Shymlock Smith, Thomas H.Leung, AECL Merriweather F/U 50-328/91/02 P.Pattantyus,AECL 6/8-12/92 2/19-3/22/1991 Miller, Moore, H.Singh, AECL Miller, Moore, St. Lucie 50-335/91-03 and Hunt Scott RI I.Kuperman, AECL Rudisail F/U 50-389/91-03 J.Haller AECL 7/20-24/92 3/25-5/21/1991 Fillion, Shannon, J.Weinburger, EPM Brunswick 50-325/91-09 and Shymlock Keller, J. Ball (NRR),
J.Cahill AECL 50-324/91-03 Prevatte, Nelson, N.Tseng,AECL Carroll 4/22-5/24/1991 Merriweather, Miller, I.Kuperman,AECL Miller, Moore F/U McGuire 50-369/91-09 and Hunt Moore, VanDoorn, SRI S.Leelananda,AECL 8/31-9/4/92 50-370/91-09 L.Maggio, EPM 6/10-7/12/91 Fillion, Wert, SRI, H.Leung,AECL Hatch 50-321/91-202 and Sanders, NRR, P.Lyles,AECL 50-366/91/202 Gautam Tran,NRR L.Maggio, EPM B. Gunther,BNL S.Wong,BNL 7/29-8/30/91 Merriweather, Moore, J.Weinburger, EPM Shymlock, Moore, North Anna 50-338/91-17 and Shymlock Keller, Garner, SRI, O.Mazzoni, AECL Miller, Rudisail, 50-339/91-17 Burrows,NRR, Prat.t,NRR J.Beaton, AECL Liu, Watkins F/U 9/21-25/92
~~
~
September 27, 1993 Page 2 EDSFI EFFORT FOR REGIcel II
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(0[ ll fjQQ{fL,.R, 'Qf'ggQf;* ) ' l$}jW f p-- rey..- - p.,. <pg4 i tPLANTS,.,i JINSPECTION;DMESilN iTRAIE-M - r-h ~ l '., [; 9/23-10/25/91 Moore, Miller, J. Dick,AECL Miller, Moore, Robinson. 50-261/91-21 Merriweather SRI Garner L.Maggio, EPM Salgado F/U J.Lindley,AECL 4/5-9/93 r 1/13-2/14/92 Fillion, Miller, Moore, M.Goel,AECL Moore, Salgado F/U .5x. 50-413/92-01 Dreslau MacDonald, Talbot, S.Indamdar,AECL 4/5-9/93 Catawba 50-414/92-01 Hopkins,RI G. Skinner,AECL ,'Suomer.. ~ 3/2-4/3/92 Girard Fillion, Moore, Miller, M.Goel, AECL Fillion, Rudisail q. e - 50-395/92-04 Keller. SRI Haag A.Josefowlcz,AECL F/U 3/15-19/93 G. Skinner, AECL +
- BrkMane Ferry.'
4/20-5/22/92 Breslau Fillion, MacDonald, F.Nuzzo, AECL Rudisail F/U 50-260/92-15 Rudisail, Christnot B.Pendelbury,AECL 4/5-9/93 G. Skinner, AECL h. ^ $.... 6/8-7/10/92 Fillion, Keller, Moore, S.Leelananda,AECL Farley 50-348/92-17 Girard MacDonald E. Moskal,AECL 50-364/92-17 B.Pende1 bury,AECL " Crystal-River 6/28-7/30/93 Girard Fillion, Miller J. Haller,INDEP l 50-302/93-18 l ~ h_ 5/10-6/11/93 Fillion, Moore, M. Goel, AECL 50-424/93-11 Girard Rudisail, Salgado, H. Leung, AECL .yogtle; 50-425/9-11 Bonser J. ~ Weinburger, EPM ^ ; Surry. 8/23/17/93 Shymlock Fillion, Moore None ^ 50-200/92-50-281/92- $Oconee 1/25-3/5/93 Baldwin, Fillion, H. Leung, AECL 50-269/93-02 Shymlock Poertner, Raughley, P.Pattantyus,AECL 50-270/93-02 Rogers, Rudisail, G. Skinner, AECL i 50-287/93-02 Salgado, Wert i i N\\ l +
e l l l l i m O< t
j j 1 PLANT MOV PERFORMANCE J MOV programs are ranked by two criteria. Those plants who are in i part 1 of the program have ranking criteria that emphasizes program design. For plants in part 2 of the MOV program, the criteria is based on implementation of the program. } FOR PART ONE PLANTS THE RATING CRITERIA USED IS AS FOLLOWS: i SCHEDULE: 4 2 1. LICENSEE WILL COMPLETE TESTING BY JUNE 1994. 4 2. LICENSEE WILL COMPLETE TESTING BY DECEMBER I 1994 j 3. LICENSEE HAS REQUESTED AND RECEIVED AND EXTENSION FOR THE COMPLETION OF TESTING. i i SCOPE OF DP TESTING: j 1. 50% > OF VALVES IN PROGRAM WILL BE TESTED 2. 25 TO 50% OF VALVES IN PROGRAM WILL BE TESTED 3. LESS THAT 25% OF VALVES IN PROGRAM WILL BE i TESTED s MANAGEMENT SUPPORT: 1 1. MANAGEMENT IS FULLY INVOLVED IN THE PROGRAM, ) THERE IS ADEQUATE STAFF ASSIGNED TO SUPPORT THE PROGRAM. TRAINING IS PROVIDED FOR THE l PERSONNEL INVOLVED. i 2. MANAGEMENT SUPPORTS THE PROGRAM BY PROVIDING { PERSONNEL BUT DOES NOT PROVIDE TRAINING FOR i ALL PERSONNEL. DEPENDS ON THE SERVICES OF CONTRACTORS AND DIAGNOSTIC EQUIPMENT SUPPLIERS. 3. ONLY THE LEAST AMOUNT OF MANAGEMENT IS { INVOLVED IN THE PROGRAM. TRAINING IS HELD TO A MINIMUM AND A LARGE DEPENDENCE IS PLACED ON CONTRACT PERSONNEL FOR ALL PORTIONS OF THE PROGRAM. QUALITY OF THE PROGRAM: 1. PROGRAM APPEARS WELL PLANNED AND HAS GOOD PROCEDORES AND WELL TRAINED TECHNICIANS TO PERFORM AND ENGINEERS TO EVALUATE THE TEST RESULTS. i 1 1 i t w-
1 4 4 i-s 2. PROGRAM MEET 8 THE INTENT OF GL 89-10 BUT IS i NOT OVERLY AGGRESSIVE IN TESTING OF MOV8 AT l THE FULL DP. WILL USE CONTRACT PERSONNEL TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR TESTING PERSONNEL AND ASSIST IN THE EVALUATION. 3. PROGRAM APPEARS TO BE ON HOLD WAITING FOR THE 1 INDUSTRY TO PERFORM TEST 8 TRAT WILL JUSTIFY A J l MINIMUM NUMBER OF VALVE 8 TO BE TESTED. l i FOR PART TWO PLANTS THE CRITERIA IS A8 FOLLOW 8 l MOV CORRECTIVE ACTION AND TRENDINGt j } 1. PROGRAM IS PROACTIVE IN CORRECTING MOV j. PROBLEMS. MOV PROBLEMS TRENDED AND q ,INFORMATION USED TO. IMPROVE OVERALL MOV PERFORMANCE. { 2. PROGRAM CORRECTS MOV PROBLEMS, BUT NOT ALWAYS I BEFORE PROBLEM OCCUR 8. TRENDING PROCESS IS IN THE DEVELOPMENT STAGE. 3. PROGRAM OFTEN DELAYS CORRECTING MOV PROBLEMS. } TRENDING PROGRAM Z8 MINIMAL. DESIGN-BASIS CAPABILITY TESTING: l j 1. PROGRAM IS AGGRESSIVE IN CONDUCTING i DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE TESTING WHERE I PRACTICABLE. SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF MOV TESTS ARE COMPLETED. TEST PROCEDURES AND j ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ENSUE DESIGN-BASIS j CAPABILITY BEFORE MOV RETURNED TO SERVICE. 1 TEST INFORMATION I8 APPLIED TO OTHER APPLICATION 8. TEST INFORMATION I8 EVALUATED WITH FEEDBACK INTO CALCULATIONS. 2. . DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE TESTING IS DONE BY GROUPING MOVs. AVERAGE NUMBER OF MOVs TESTED TO-DATE. TEST PROCEDURES AND ACCEPTANCE l CRITERIA ENSURE CAPABILITY, BUT LACK DETAILS j OR CONSIDERATION OF UNCERTAINTIES. TEST j INFORMATION IS EVALUATED BUT NOT TIMELY. 3. ONLY A SMALL NUMBER OF MOVs TESTED TO-DATE. l TEST PROCEDURES AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA NOT j CLEARLY DEFINED. TEST INFORMATION IS NOT d EVALUATED AND LITTLE FEEDBACK. ] l-i 2 i- [,
i a 4 } i MANAGEMENT SUPPORT 1. MANAGEMENT FULLY INVOLVED IN THE PROGRAM. } SIGNIFICANT TRAINING IS PROVIDED. STRONG i INVOLVEMENT IN INDUSTRY EFFORTS. PROACTIVE ON NEW ISSUES AND FEEDBACK OF INFORMATION INTO THE PROGRAM. j i i 2. MANAGEMENT SUPPORTS PROGRAM. SUFFICIENT, BUT MINIMUM TRAINING PROVIDED. LITTLE INVESTMENT { IN DIAGNOSTIC AIDS. MINIMAL INVOLVEMENT WITH 1 INDUSTRY EFFORTS. MODIFICATIONS MADE, BUT l NOT ALWAYS PROMPT. NEW ISSUES ADDRESSED WITH I j FEEDBACK, BUT NOT AGGRESSIVE. j' 3. LITTLE MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT. MINIMAL ) TRAINING. LITTLE INVESTMENT IN DIAGNOSTIC i EQUIPMENT. ESSENTIAL MODIFICATIONS OFTEN } DELAYED. SLOW IN ADDRESSING NEW IS8UES AND i FEEDBACK INFORMATION INTO PROGRAM. l 4 MOV SIZING AND SETTING CALCULATIONS: a f 1. VALVE FACTORS AND STEM FRICTION COEFFICIENTS l BASED ON TEST DATA. MARGIN FOR LOAD j SENSITIVE BEHAVIOR, TORQUE SWITCH i REPEATABILITY, DIAGNOSTIC ERROR, AND STEM i LUBRICATION DEGRADATION INCLUDED. ( ) 2. VALVE FACTORS AND STEM FRICTION COEFFICIENTS CONSERVATIVELY ASSUMED, BUT NOT YET i JUSTIFIED. MARGIN FOR SOME UFCERTAINTIES j INCLUDED. j 3. VALVE FACTORS AND STEM FRICTION COEFFICIENTS j BASED ON OUTDATED INFORMATION. MARGIN NOT INCLUDED FOR UNCERTAINTIES. 4 i f ] i 1 4 o l 1 i 3 i i
NOTES ON LOWER THIRD (RED) DATE/RPT SITE RATING ASSESSNENT/ JUSTIFICATION 3/25/92 BROWNS FERRY Y 12/18/91 BRUNSWICK Y i 4/4/92 CATAWBA Y 1/25/93 CRYSTAL RIVER G 12/17/92 FARLEY R This plant has not committed to DP testing to max extent even though recent DP tests indicate that assumptions used for setup were not correct. They continue to take credit for test performed prior to GL 89-10 even after aknowledgement that test equipment used for the earlier testing was not reliable. On a positive note however, their valve operators appear to be conservatively designed and switch setting are at or near max. 2/14/02 GRAND GULF Y 8/9/93 HARRIS
- G
- Note: Part II evaluation 7/30/93 HATCH
- Y
- Note: Part II evaluation.
Plant rating changed from green to yellow. Program is not fully incorporating MOV testing feedback. OCTOBER 1993 4
i DATE/RPT SITE RATING ASSEBBMENT/ JUSTIFICATION 3/6/92 MCGUIRE R The number of MOV determined to be testable was in the bottom 1/3 of i plants. The results of the phase 1 inspection ) indicated a large number 1 of open concerns. Additionally, the plant j has only tested 12 of the 99 valves scheduled to be DP tested. 7/2/91 NORTH ANNA Y 6/24/91 OCONEE R The number of MOVs determined to be testable was in'the bottom 1/3 of plants. The results of the phase 1 inspection indicated a large number of open concerns (??). Additionally the plant has only tested 23 of the 94 valves that require DP testing. 6/10/91 ROBINSON G 11/18/91 ST LUCIE G i 9/26/91 SEQUOYAH R The licensee scheduled program completion date is approximately 1 year later than the original GL schedule. The scope of DP testable valves is in the bottom 1/3 of plants. 2/23/93 SUMMER R GL 89-10 followup inspection identified lack of approved design basis for valve setup data. 1/18/92 SURRY Y 4/17/92 TURKEY POINT G OCTOBER 1993 5
DATE/RPT SITE RATING ASSESSMENT / JUSTIFICATION 11/15/92 VOGTLE R Until late in 1992 this plant had not agreed to DP testing. Because of the late commitment to GL j testing the completion schedule had to be extended by the NRC. During the phase 1 inspection 18 open concerns were identified and the licensee program was not fully developed. Management commitment to the GL program was not evident and because of I this the program suffered. The plant, however, is ] modifying approximately 50 1 valves to ensure valve operation under design basis conditions and the current program appears to be solid. OCTOBER 1993 l l + i 6
MOV PROGRAM APPRAISAL SITE a b c d avg Last Remarks Date Reviewed BROWN 8 FERRY 1 3 2 2 2.00 3/25/92 BRUNSWICK 3 2 2 3 2.25 12/18/91 1 CATAWBA 2 3 2 3 2.25 4/4/92 l CRYSTAL RIVER 1 2 2 2 1.75 1/25/93 FARLEY 2 3 2 3 2.50 12/17/92 GRAND GULF 3 3 1 2 2.25 2/14/92 HARRIS
- 1 1
1 1 1.0 8/19/93 HATCH
- 2 3
2 2 2.25 7/30/93 McGUIPE 2 3 2 3 2.50 3/6/92 l NORTH ANNA 2 3 2 2 2.25 7/2/91 OCONEE 2 3 2 3 2.50 6/24/91 ROBINSON 1 1 1 3 1.50 6/10/91 ST. LUCIE 1 1 2 3 1.75 11/18/91 SEQUOYAH 3 3 2 2 2.50 9/26/91 SUMMER 2 2 3 3 2.50 2/23/93 SURRY 2 3 2 2 2.25 1/18/92 TURKEY POINT 2 1 1 2 1.50 4/17/92 VOGTLE 3 3 2 3 2.75 11/15/92 WATTS BAR, 1 1 2 2 1.5 3/8/93 NR
- Part II evaluation Part I Part II a = Schedule a = Corrective Action b = Scope of DP Testing b = Design Basis Testing c = Management Support c = Management Support d = Quality of Program d = MOV Sizing & Calc's Average, Range 1.00 - 1.99 - Good = "G" 2.00 - 2.49 - Average =
"Y" 2.50 - 3.00 - Poor = "R" 7
a aaau .m_aa 4 4 9 1 r 1 4 0 ? i i e o i 4, 4'l 1 a e t i n 4 3 e i i 1 i P .f i a e i d.
- 1 4
4 d m
INSERVICE INSPECTION PROGRAM ASSESSMENT ISI Attributes (Note 1/) Last SITE Inspection Remarks Browns Ferry 3 2 2 2 3 2.40 5/93 Note 2/ Brunswic'k 3 3 2 2 2.50 8/93 } Note 2/ Catawba 2 2 1 2 1.75 3/93 Crystal River 2 3 3 3 2 2.60 6/92 Note 1/ Farley 2 3 2 2 2 2.20 10/93 Grand Gulf 1 1 1 1 2 1.20 5/92 Harris 2 2 3 3 2.50 .10/92 Note 5/ Ilatch 1 2 1 2 1.50 3/93 McGuire 2 2 1 2 2 1.80 8/93 North Anna 2 2 1 2 2 1.80 3/93 Oconee 2 2 2 2 2.00 5/93 Robinson 3 2 2 3 2.50 9/93 Note S/ St Lucie 1 1 2 1.33 4/93 Sequoyah 3 2 2 2 2 3 2.33 5/93 Note 7/ Summer 2 1 1 1.33 3/93 Surry 2 2 2 1 1.75 3/93 Turkey Point 1 1 2 1.33 4/93 Vogtle 1 1 2 1.33 10/93 OCTOBER 1993
.. - + INSERVICE INSPECTION PROGRAM ASSESSMENT i Note 1/ ~ Program Segments to be evaluated: a.. Section XI & TS High Energy - Volumetric and Surface examinations b. Section XI Leak Testing - Visual examinations and coordination i t c. Section XI & TS - Snubbers and supports visual and functional I examinations d. Generic and TS Special - PWR steam generator inspections BWR IGSCC examinations e. Repair and Replacement - GL 90-05, temporary repairs and IWA-7000, i Suitability Evaluation f. Erosion / Corrosion - Use of EPRI CHEC-codes for large bore and RT or equal for small bore. Each segment evaluated on a scale of 1 to 3, with minimum or marginal compliance a 3, and licensee's that show initiative in determining the true condition of plant systems e and components a 1.- Total ISI rating will be based on combination of evaluated segment scores. (All elements do not have to be evaluated each rating period.) Note 2/ Browns Ferry ISI and Erosion / Corrosion programs are developed and implemented from the corporate office. The lines of responsibility and authority at the site are fragmented. They-have done adequate work in the areas of leak testing and IGSCC i inspections, but there is no confidence that they are more than marginal in the other areas. Note 3/ Brunswick ISI programs have suffered from a lack of stability. An almost continual turnover of key ISI personnel at the site has resulted in incomplete programs and marginal performance. IGSCC and Erosion / Corrosion inspections have been adequate i but not special. CP&L has spent a considerable amount of effort and resources i doing augmented inspections of Reactor vessel interior structures.. i k OCTOBER 1993 t
INSERVICE INSPECTION PROGRAM ASSESSMENT Note 4/ Crystal River has not been evaluated this fiscal year because they are on a 24 month fuel cycle which ends March 1994. When last reviewed, they were perceived to have not been aggressive in staffing and controlling their ISI programs. They. have been content to hire B&W to do the minimum Section XI program with almost no oversight by licensee personnel. Note 5/ Harris gets more assistance from the corporate office than either Brunswick or Robinson because of their location, but there is no assurrance that efforts in Steam Generator and Erosion / Corrosion inspections are anything more than what it takes to meet minimum requirements. Note s/ Robinson is the poorest of the CP&L family when resources are allocated. ISI programs have been marginal in the past, and there is no assurance that things will improve in the near future. Note 2/ Sequoyah had suffered from the same type of fragmentation of lines of responsibility and authority that has affected Browns Ferry. At Sequoyah, the problem has been the subject of a major reorganization of technical support personnel since the extraction steam line failure in March 1993. i i ( t i t i OCTOBER 1993 ..m. m--
INSERVICE INSPECTION PROGRAM ASSESSMENT ISI Attributes (Note 1/) Last SITE Inspection Remarks Browns Ferry 3 2 2 2 3 2.40 5/93 Note 2/ Brunswick 3 3 2 2 2.50 8/93 Note 2/ Catawba 2 2 1 2 1.75 3/93 Crystal River 2 3 3 3 2 2.60 6/92 Note 1/ Farley 2 3 2 2 2 2.20 10/93 Grand Gulf 1 1 1 1 2 1.20 5/92 liarris 2 2 3 3 2.50 10/92 Note 5/ 1 2 1.50 3/93 IIatch 1 2 McGuire 2 2 1 2 2 1.80 8/93 North Anna 2 2 1 2 2 1.80 3/93 Oconee 2 2 2 2 2.00 5/93 Robinson 3 2 2 3 2.50 9/93 Note f/ St Lucie 1 1 2 1.33 4/93 Sequoyah 3 2 2 2 2 3 2.'33 5/93 Note 7/ 1.33 3/93 Summer 2 1 1 Surry 2 2 2 1-1.75 3/93 Turkey Point 1 1 2 1.33 4/93 1.33 10/93 Vogtle 1 1 2 OCTOBER 1993
r INSERVICE INSPECTION PROGRAM ASSESSMENT Note 1/ Program Segments to be evaluated: a. Section XI & TS High Energy - Volumetric and Surface examinations b. Section XI Leak Testing - Visual examinations and coordination c. Section XI & TS - Snubbers and supports visual and functional examinations d. Generic and TS Special - PWR steam generator inspections BWR IGSCC examinations e. Repair and Replacement - GL 90-05, temporary repairs and IWA-7000, Suitability Evaluation f. Erosion / Corrosion - Use of EPRI CHEC-codes for large bore and RT or equal for small bor.e. Each segment evaluated on a scale of 1 to 3, with minimum or marginal compliance a 3, and licensee's that show initiative in determining the true condition of plant systems and components a 1. Total ISI rating will be based on combination of evaluated segment (All elements do not have to be evaluated each rating period.) scores. Note 2/ Browns Ferry ISI and Erosion / Corrosion programs are developed and implemented from the corporate office. The linee of responsibility and authority at the site are fragmented. They have done adequate work in the areas of leak testing and IGSCC inspections, but there is no confidence that they are more than marginal in the other areas. Note 3/ Brunswick ISI programs have suffered from a lack of stability. An almost continual turnover of key ISI personnel at the site has resulted in incomplete programs and marginal performance. IGSCC and Erosion / Corrosion inspections have been adequate but not special. CP&L has spent a considerable amount of effort and resources doing augmented inspections of Reactor vessel interior structures. OCTOBER 1993
INSERVICE INSPECTION PROGRAM ASSESSMENT Note 4/ Crystal River has not been evaluated this fiscal year because they are on a 24 month fuel cycle which ends March 1994. When last reviewed, they were perceived F to have not been aggressive in staffing and controlling their ISI programs. They have been content to hire B&W to do the minimum Section XI program with almost no oversight by licensee personnel. Note jli/ liarris gets more assistance from the corporate office than either: Brunswick or Robinson because of their location, but there is no assurrance that efforts in Steam Generator and Erosion / Corrosion inspections are anything more than what it takes to meet minimum requirements. Note s/ Robinson is the poorest of the CP&L family when resources are allocated. ISI l programs have been marginal in the past, and there is no assurance that things will improve in the near future. Note 2/ Sequoyah had suffered from the same type of fragmentation of lines of responsibility and authority that has affected Browns Ferry. At Sequoyah, the problem has been the subje-t of a major reorganization of technical support personnel since the extre '-. steam line failure in March 1993. t k l t i b OCTOBER 1993
0 4 I 1 I I Cm M Mi H h
4 J L 4 i i 1 I i OPERATOR TRAINING MATRIX '(1 = top third, 2 = middle third, 3 = lower third) J i Plant (update) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Sum Rank BF (9/93) 1 1 3'1 h 2 1 1 1 2 1 13.00 2 I BRU l10/93)' 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 15.00 3:N s, j-CAT (4/93) $5IM 2 $lR 2 2 1 2 2 2 19.00 3' '4 CR3 (5/93) Y $5Y - 53t! 6@ 1-2 2 1 1 19.00 Sii! ~ FAR '(4 /93 ) 1 2 Nh 1 1 2 1 1 2-14.00 2 (10/93) .a 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 i3e /~ 16.00 T1 GG .c.., ($ w- } HAR (8/93) 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 14.00 2 HAT (10/93) 1 1 1 f$N 1 1 2 1 1 12.00 1 1 MCG (7/93) 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 15.00 2 ) j NA (9/92) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9.00 1 i f. OCO (7/93) 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 13.00 2 3 ROB (7/93) 1 1 1 f5k 1 2 2 E55 2 16.00 i5?! I* } STL (10/92) 3/ 1 2 2 1 1 1 1-1 13.00 2 2 SEQ (5/93) 2 1 1 f9 2 53i 2 2 1 17.00 (3 @ 3 'l SUM (5/93) 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 13.00 1 SUR (9/93) 1 1 $E 1 1 1 1 1 1 11.00 1 TP (2/93) 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10.00 1 VOG (8/93) 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 12.00 1 WB (7/93) 2 2 M 2 355 $3h 2 ik 23.00 til! e 1. Requal pass rate 2. Crew performance 3. Initial exam pass rate 4. Timeliness of corrective actions 5. Operations / Training Interface 6. EOP.and AOP use 7. Operator Aida 8. Exam bank quality 9. Simulator capability / utilization October 13, 1993
NOTES ON PLANTS IN THE LOWER THIRD Brunswick 1. Three individuals failed the simulator portion of the 4/13/92 requal examination 2. One crew failed the 4/13/92 requal examination. 5. No plant operators were rotated to training. There was little involvement or even observation by Operations in requal. Catawba 1. 5 of 22 failed the 1992 requal examination. 3 of 13 failed the 1993 requal examination. 3. 4 of 5 ROs and 1 of 7 SROs failed the 10/19/92 written initial examination. There was an 81% average score. Candidates were studying the examination bank only and were'not prepared for the NRC examination. This also showed a weakness in their i audit / screening process. Crystal River 1. 3 of 15 failed the 1992 requal examination. 2. One crew failed the simulator examination and another crew performed poorly but passed. Crews showed poor use of ARPs. SROs could not identify stuck open PORV. l 3. Three written failures and one borderline simulator performer on the 5/24/93 initial examination. 4. Poor follow up observed on 5/24/93 for the comments on the 11/16/92 examination. Grand Gulf 1. 2 of 13 failed the July 19933 requal exam, (85% pass rate) 9. Their simulator is unable to override automatic ECCS actuations. Several models do not reflect actual plant operation. d October 13, 1993
1 Pace 2 Robinson h 4. IFIs from the January 1993 requal report concerning procedure problems were closed out by the facility without making j changes. Procedure problems still existed. 1 8. Weak question bank was reported in the January 1993 requal i exam report. i i i Seouovah 4. Procedure group was reluctant to make changes to comply with WOG EOP guidance. They did not have five of the-WOG procedures. They received a violation on'the QA of their EOP verification and validation. 6. IFI on 5/93 initial exam. Operators would use AOIs 1. concurrently with EOPs. No plant philosophy existed regarding this. Il i Watts Bar i 1. Watts Bar is not required to have a formal requal program until af ter operating. This grade is based on the performance I of previously licensed individuals taking the July 1993 exam. l 3. One RO failed the initial simulator exam in July 1993. l 5. Training can not evaluate on plant systems until Operations i can finish the systems. Some of the training will be obsolete i by the time the plant is completed. Training is hard pressed i co keep up with the volume of changes. r 6. Many comments noted in the April 1993 EOP inspection. They are currently writing procedures for consistency with the WOG guidelines. 8. Exam banks do not reflect what the final plant will look like. 9. A large number of significant simulator fidelity and capability problems are listed in the July 1993 examination report. Note: numbers refer to the Operator Training Acceptance Criteria. October 13, 1993
4 OPERATOR TRAINING ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA I 1. Recual exam nass fail - based on individual pass / fail results on exams from last 12 months 4 1) 100% 2) 90% - 100% pass rate 3) < 90% pass rate 12 Simulator crew nerformance - Review NRC crew evaluations made with the six competencies in ES 604. 1) No crews fail; < 25% of competencies are "2"s or "1"s. 2) No crews fail: 25% - 50% of competencies are "2"s or "1"s. 3) Any failing crews -or- > 50% of the competencies are "2"s or 3 "1"s. 1. Initial==== nass fail based on exams from last 12 months 1) No failures, average written score > 90%; less than 10% of the JPMs are missed; less than 10% of the competencies are rated ac "2"s on scenarios. 2) No failures; average written score < 90%; several greater than 10% of the JPMs are missed; greater than 10% of the competencies are rated as "2"s on scenarios. 3) Any exam failures 1. Timeliness of Corrective Actions - Review of open items and weaknesses from past two exam trips. 1) All items resolved to our satisfaction 2) Most items resolved, some resolutions incomplete or weak 3) Problems still exist, corrective action ineffective 12 Ooerations/Trainino Decartment Interface - Observation of interactions batween Ops. and Training. 1) Operators on rotation to training; feedback systems between Ops, and Training are in place and utilized; strong Operations Management involvement in training; Training's recommendations are followed. 2) Few operators on rotation to Training, feedback systems exist but infrequently utilized; weak Operations Management involvement in training; Training's recommendations are sometimes ignored. 3) No rotation of operators to Training; no feedback systems; Operations Management not involved in training; Training's recommendations are ignored.
L EOP's and' AOP's, ease of use and effectiveness.. - Collate comments from ob::ervations during simulator scenarios, JPMs, written exams, and exam review process etc. Also any comments from actual plant events. 1) Transitions between EOPs are timely and deliberate; rules cf usage are followed; procedure steps contain sufficient information to complete the task. 2) Transitions are delayed, operators are tentative; minor errors in rules of usage; some procedure steps do not contain complete information 3) Transitions are incorrect or delayed to the point of jeopardizing recovery; rules of usage are not used or understood; procedure steps are inadequate to complete desired task L operator aids - quality and status of aids such as plant drawings, SPDF, procedures, communications equipment, etc. 1) Controlled, legible, up-to-date, user friendly. 2) Some problems with aids which could be improved. 3) No control process, hard to read, out dated, aids are difficult to use or are ignored. L Exam banks - review of facility exam banks in accordance with ES-601. 1) Large bank numbers preclude memorization of test items, appropriate cognitive level, exams would identify " weak" areas for remediation as well as " unsafe" operators. 2) Quantity at ES-601 minimums, average cognitive
- level, would identify unsafe operators but few " weak" areas.
3) Does not meet minimum bank numbers, low cognitive level, would not identify an unsafe operator. L Simulator capabilitv/ utilization 1) No significant fidelity problems, simulator capability is good, adequate simulator time for training. 2) Some minor fidelity
- problems, some minor tasks can not be conducted, simulator time meets the minimum.
3) Fidelity problems result in negative training, limited capability hinders,the scope of exams, operators are not allotted adequate training time.
a4 Jr _.,es -J.--- eea-v M .--ea-ae r 9 e a.
i ENGINEERING AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT ASSESSMENT October 1993 SITE a b c d e Average Last Reviewed Date BROWNS 2 2 2 2 2 2.00 7/93 FERRY BRUNSWICK 3 3 3 3 3 3.00 8/93 I CATAWBA 2 1 2 2 NR 1.75 9/93 i CRYSTAL 2 3 3 NR 2.75 7/92 RIVER FARLEY 3 3 3 2 NR 2.75 5/92 GRAND 1 2 1 2 NR 1.50 7/92 GULF HARRIS 1 2 1 2 2 1.60 8/93 j HATCH 3 2 2 2 NR 2.'25 7/93 1 MCGUIRE 3 2 2 2 NR 2.25 9/93 NORTH 1 2 2 2 1 1.60 3/93 ANNA OCONEE 2 3 2 3 NR 2.50 5/93 ROBINSON 2 2 2 2 NR 2.00 10/91 ST. LUCIE 2 2 2 3 NR 2.20 1/93 SEQUOYAH 3 2 2 3 NR 2.50 8/93' SUMMER 3 3 2 3 NR 2.75 6/93 SURRY 1 1 2 2 NR 1.50 5/93 r TURKEY 2 2 1 1 2 1.60 11/92 POINT VOGTLE 2 2 2 2 NR 2.00 10/92 RANKING
- 1. 0 0 ' - 1.99 - TOP THIRD - GREEN 2.00 - 2.50 - MIDDLE THIRD - YELLOW 2.50 - 3.00 - BOTTOM THIRD - RED NR - Not Rated ASSESSMENT CRITERIA SEE PAGE 1.
PLANT ENGINEERING AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT PERFORMANCE Each plant's performance in the area of Engineering and Technical Support is ranked below. The performance criteria used included the following: a. Licensee initiative to identify and implement modifications to improve reactor safety. Well planned and executed modifications with good post modification testing and a good 50.59 evaluation. b. Design basis documents updated to reflect modifications. Controls in place to assure as-built plant is consistent with documented design basis. c. Licensee engineers aggressively identify and resolve technical issues for operations and maintenance. Engineering positions adequately staffed with knowledgeable personnel. d. Engineers take ownership of equipment and provide support for maintenance, test procedures and reactor physics. Engineers initiate actions based on emerging technical issues. e. PRA/IPE results are used by station engineers in making safety decisions. The rankings fall into the following categories: Top third is Green (G), middle third is Yellow (Y), and bottom third is Red (R). Plants are listed alphabetically.
l NOTES ON BOTTOM THIRD DATE/RPT SITE RATING ASSESSMENT / JUSTIFICATION j 8/93 BRUNSWICK R The Technical Support 9338 Unit was not providing 3/92 the support needed for 9210 timely upgrade of the 4/92 material conditions in 9212 the plant. Resources were being consumed in reacting to equipment failures and little attention was being given to predicting and preventing future failurea. Temporary modifications were not 4 being permanently corrected in a timely manner. There was a i large backlog of engineering work assigned to the i Technical Support Unit which had not been 4 evaluated. Some Design Engineering evaluations were deficient relative to defective bolting in the EDG room walls, and l other structures. 3/92 CRYSTAL RIVER R Resolution to problem 92201 reports by TS lacked 7/92 details, root cause, and 9219 safety consequences. Also, problem reportability and safety significance were not clear. Commercial grade dedication program had less than adequate evaluations. EDSFI inspection identified repetitive failures of large transformers. OCTOBER 1993 4
.._.__. ~. _. 5/92 FARLEY R There was no onsite 9216 system engineering 1 6/92 organization to provide 9217 monitoring and aid in 6/93 improving system 9315 conditions. Support for problem identification was too limited. Identified weaknesses in the design control process related to updating design documents, inadequate post mod testing, and inadequate evaluation of RTD Bypass mod for impact on ESF response times in TS. EDSFI identified safety margins for some that were lower than intended in the original 1 licensing design. Inadequate determination of cause and corrective actions for relays that failed to meet TS. A i recent inspection at Farley noted that 50.59 reviews were adequate, that the engineering staff was improved, and that some improvements were made in documentation of modifications. 0CTOBER 1993 .e
5/93 OCONEE R Some 50.59 evaluations 9312 performed by TS onsite for minor mods lacked detail. System engineers who were assigned systems i considered the assignments as collateral assignment and did not provide proper oversight. EDSFI findings on engineering controls for important equipment. Configuration control problems identified in Drawing Control. 8/93 SEQUOYAH R Many programmatic 9332 problems were identified 9/93 by several inspections. 9345 Inspectors found programmatic problems with Erosion / Corrosion, drawing control, BOP condition, and TS areas. These problems are being addressed by TVA during the restart inspection process. Many of the programo are recovering from past problems. OCTOBER 1993
6/93 SUMMER R Problems identified in 9316 50.59 evaluation of RHR NPSH calculations and with-DBD calculations on i Safety Injection system. Lack of-involvement by system engineers for problem solving. Weakness in resolution of problems was compounded by the inadequate implementation of the corrective action program. EDSFI inspection issued a violation due to motor load data being omitted from motor control center drawings and numerous incorrect sizes for some overloads. Another violation was issued for undersized thermal overloads installed for 2 safety related SW pump house ventilation fans. A third violation was issued due to the procedure not adequately prescribing the criteria to be used to assure that a failure was due to " normal wear and aging." GL 89-10 followup inspection identified lack of approved design basis for valve setup data. OCTOBER 1993 e r h )
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- 93FPPERF.GRW, SEPTEMBER 1993 PLANT FIRE PROTECTION SITE a
b c Avg Last Remarks / Reviewed ~ BROWNS FERRY 2.8 2.3 2.5 2.53 5-93 BRUNSWICK 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.54 8-93 CATAWBA 2.5 2.0 2.0 2.16 10-91 due >10-93 CRYSTAL RIVER 1.1 1.0 1.5 1.20 8-92
- due >02-94 FARLEY 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.00 5-93 GRAND GULF 1.0 1.6 1.0 1.26 2-92 due >02-94 HARRIS 2.0 2.5 1.8 2.10 5-93 HATCH 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.58 4-93 due <11-93 McGUIRE 2.3 1.0 2.0 1.77 3-93 NORTH ANNA 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.50 3/93 OCONEE 2.4 2.4 2.0 2.26 7-91' due <10-94 ROBINSON 2.4 2.5 2.7 2.53 7-90 due <12-93 ST. LUCIE 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.23 11-91 due >01-94 SEQUOYAH 2.6 2.5 2.9 2.66 5-92 due >10-93 SUMMER 1.0 2.3 2.2 1.83 9-93
- due >09-94 SURRY 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.50 7-93
- due >12-94 TURKEY POINT 1.0 1.1 1.6 1.23 10-92 due >07-94 VOGTLE 2.6 2.8 2.5 2.63 7-93 WATTS BAR N/A N/A N/A N/A due <06-94 NOTES:
Inspected during current SALP cycle within period 10/01/1992 to 09/15/1993; Future Inspection due: <=before; >=after Each plants performance in the area of Fire Protection is ranked according to Performance Factors as follows: a= Management of Fire Protection Program b= Fire Brigade Performance in drills and fires Maintaining the material condition of fire protection and c-Appendix R barrier / safe shutdown features. Plants are listed alphabetically. These rankings fall into these categories based on their average range: 1.00 - 1.99 - TOP THIRD (1/3), 2.00 - 2.50 - MIDDLE THIRD (2/3), 2.51 - 3.00 - BOTTOM THIRD (3/3). k
- 93FPPERF.GRW, $EPfDIBER 1993 PLANT FIRE PROTECTION RANKING (FP)
DATE/RPT SITE RATING ASSESSMENT / JUSTIFICATION 0593/9319 BRONNS 3/3 A weakness involving the control 1192/9237 FERRY and timely update requirements 0792/9224 of the licensee's Fire 0492/9211 Protection Report and the Limited Conditions for ) Operations (LCO) determinations i for fire protection features impacted by recent design changes was identified. The licensee's fire watch program w'as adequate but inconsistent during the past year. Missed and inattentive fire watches were identified but promptly corrected. The fire uatch program implementation now is considered acceptable and no other problems have been identified recently. Inadequate implementation of the program for control of transient combustibles was also identified. The licensee has adequately implemented a restart committment and upgraded the station fire detection systems. 4 4
.._m t i 't
- 93FPPERF.GRW, SEPTEMBER 1993 DATE/RPT SITE RATING ASSESSMENT / JUSTIFICATION 0893/9338 BRUNSWICK 3/3 A violation was cited that 0293/9308 involved two examples of the 0992/9231 specification of inappropriate SALP/9230 post maintenance hydrostatic pressure test criteria for fire protection piping replaced under Work Request / Job Orders (WR/JOs).
~ Appropriate corrective actions were recently implemented to resolve this enforcement issue and that of NRC Inspection Report No. 50-325, 324/201. Fire Barrier Reinspection Program inspections by Nuclear Engineering Department (NED) were completed. This has been a positive initiative for self-identification and correction of numerous fire barrier deficiencies. Prioritization and scheduling of outstanding fire barrier masonry block wall gaps and penetration seal repair work was adequate. Fire brigade performance has improved. During observation of a fire drill, the brigade exhibited good command and control, fire ground tactics, and personnel rescue operations. The Operations Fire Protection /Radwaste Unit has procedurally reaffirmed its responsibility for maintaining the overall site Fire Protection Program. The current program adequately addressed previous NRC concerns about ownership of fire protection at Brunswick Nuclear Plant (BNP). The licensee's actions to correct self-identified (Licensee Event Reports) problems were good. 2
5-i* l, 393FPPERF.GRW, SEPTEMBER 1993 DATE/RPT SITE RATING ASSESSMENT / JUSTIFICATION 1091/9122 CATANRA 2/3 Housekeeping. weak in DGB. SALP/9210 Comprehensive QA audit program onsite. Support of fire brigade i good. Strong engineering support for FP and Appendix R j features. 0892/9223 CRYSTAL 1/3 FP program implemented well. ] SALP/9221 RIVER Housekeeping generally good. i Fire brigade performance strong. Fire occurrences was low. Problems w/RCP oil collection system under NRC review as an Appendix R exemption request. SALP/9314 FARLEY 2/3 Significant management 0593/9308 attention given to correcting 1192/9229 previous leaks in the yard FP water piping system. Jockey pump replacement has reduced frequency of main fire pump starts and associated stresses on the yard loop. Past problem with reluctance of fire brigade to don protective gear in drills was resolved. Strong compliance with fire prevention procedures. SALP/9220 GRAND 1/3 The Fire Protection Program had 0292/9206 GULF several strong features. Engineering staff's technical expertise was strong and 10 CFR 50 Appendix R requirements were clearly understood. Management was actively pursuing prograns to ensure that long-term Appendix R actions were met. Implementation of the Fire Protection Program was good as demonstrated by good control of combustibles, cleanliness of the plant, and effective fire brigade training. 3
- _ _. _.- ~._ .m___._ -__2.___. i I e 93FPPERF.GRW, SEPTEMBER 1993 DATE/RPT SITE RATING ASSESSMENT / JUSTIFICATION 0593/9312 EARRIS 2/3. Fire protection program is /9310 satisfactory. Housekeeping good. /9308 M/S very good for fire barriers /9307 for Appendix R and FP equipment SALP/9220 in general. Overall fire brigade performance satisfactory. Some unsatisfactory drills detected. A licensed-operator was assigned. to the brigade as an advisor allowing less impact on main control board personnel. 0493/9305 EATCE 3/3 A significant number of LCOs had 0492/9209 been initiated addressing 1191/9130 deficencies of Kaowool Cable Tray fire barriers installed in the intake structure (URI93 02). Good FP engineering expertise from Engineering Support group for inoperable fire barrier compensatory measures. Fire brigade 4 performance is very weak and not improving significantly. FP equipment and instruments not calibrated for M/S tests. 0393/9303 MCGUIRE 1/3 The fire brigade was 0292/9201 consolidated under operations 1291/9130 shift command. Fire brigade 1 drill frequency and responses are excellent. Fire brigade equipment and plant FP systems are well maintained. Storage of fire damage control equipment for safe shutdown has been improved. i 4
4
- 93FPPERF.GAW, SEPTEMBER 1993 DATE/RPT SITE RATING ASSESSMENT / JUSTIFICATION SALP/9315 NORTE 2/3 Fire protection program is 0393/9313 AMMA incomplete for BTP 9.5-1 FP i
0992/9218 features. Implementation of FP program improved for operations and SGRP outage. Fire prevention measures have prevented significant fires. Corporate support onsite for Appendix R issues is established. Fire brigade performance is good. Improved and standardized the requirements for maintaining Appendix R fire protection features. SALP/9311 OCONEE 2/3 Strong and active fire 0791/9114 protection staff. Fire brigade performance good. Plant housekeeping fair - control of combustibles improving. Fire protection system operability record is high - control of open fire doors is a problem - NCV's. { 0790/9015 ROBINSON 3/3 . Fire protection organization is good - technical assistance provided on all shifts for operations. Completed a fire barrier reinspection program over last 3 yrs. to upgrade penetration seals. Fire brigade performance is good. Fires ) occurred during outage on reactor head in sitdown area and in EDG cell.. Failures of fire j hose nozzles has been identified ~ by licensee. 1191/9121 ST LUCIE 1/3 Fire protection management is 0491/9109 very strong. Fire brigade 0290/9003 performance good. No major problems identified in last few years. 5
l
- 93FPPERF.GRW, SEPTEMBER 1993 I
DATE/RPT SITE RATING ASSESSMENT / JUSTIFICATION 0793/9318 SEQUOYAH 3/3 Programmatic problems with fire 0793/9320 protection program were 0592/9214 identified and are being addressed by the licensee. Problems involved fire barriers, training, fire watches, and control of combustibles. Inspections and repairs are underway for microbiolcJical biofouling and corrosion (MIC) caused leaks in carbon steel fire protection piping. Complex ) compensatory measures to provide backup fire water to containment for these repairs were developed. A task group was I setup for the MIC area of concern; however, their communications with other TVA groups i.e.; operations and corporate was weak at first. Increased Management attention to the area has resulted in improvement. 0993/9322 SUMMER 1/3 Fire protection program SALP/9307 implemented in s cessful manner 0992/9217 with the fire protection 0792/9213 officer's coordination being the key element. Fire brigade performed well in drills. Problems identified during fire barrier inspections promptly resolved. SALP/9316 SURRY 2/3 Fire protection reorganized 0793/9318 onsite. Fire brigade per'armance 0490/9017 was good, but drills shoald be performed in more Appendix R shutdown areas. A high priority I placed on resolving inoperable or degraded FP or safe shutdown systems. 6
I l'.
- 93FPPERF.GRW, SEPTEMBER 1993 l
DATE/RPT SZTE RATING ASSESSMENT / JUSTIFICATION l SALP/9303 TURKEY 1/3 Strong fire protection l 1092/9223 POINT management an6 monitoring of FP program. Firt brigade performance good. The number of fire protection system impairments was reduced and maintained to a low number. There have been no missed surveillances in the fire protection area. Restoration from Hurricane Andrew damage to FP water. system performed in excellent and timely manner. 0793/9316 VOGTLE 3/3 Implementation of the fire 0493/9308 protection program was 0591/9110 inconsistent. Compliance with the plant fire prevention procedures regarding control of 3 ignition sources and combustible i materials during plant maintenance activities was good; but inappropriate storage of flammable materials in a safety-related auxiliary building area was identified and cited as a vimintion. The plant has experienced a low number of fires during the past several. years. Weekly Fire Protection Status and Trending Reports to plant Department Managers have been effective for monitoring the implementation of the site fire protection program and in the identification of adverse impairment trends of plant fire protection features. An Inspector Followup Item related to the conduct of fire brigade drills in specific safe-shutdown plant fire areas was identified. 7 I
1 i REGION 11: ' BULLETIN 92-OtAND: SUPPL.1 THERMOEAG MATRIX: 1 Plants With Plants with Plants with Plants That Meet Tech No Thermolag Bulletin 92 01 Suppl 1 Barrier Spec Or Have 8 Installed Barriers installed Assemblies Alternative Installed Compensatory Measures in Place: 4 Catawba Browns Ferry McGuire' Turkey Point: Farley Brunswick Harris' Vogtle' Oconee Crystal River Browns Ferry' North Anna.7 ] 1 2 Robinson Grand Gulf Crystal River
- Grand Gulf 8 Bellefonte Hatch St Lucie' Surry*
1 North Anna Summers 8 St Lucie 8 St Lucie Crysta' River 8 8 Sequoyah Sequoyah* Summer Browns Ferry ' 8 Surry Hatch
- Turkey Point Brunswicka Vogtle Summer
- TVA Watts Bar Nuclear (WBN) Plant, submitted for review and approval to s
NRC on July 9,1993, the results of qualification testing for Thermo-Lag 330 i one-hour fire barriers to protect circuits in conduits. TVA will rely upon testing i conducted by Texas Utilities (TU) for fire barrier installations on cable trays. 2 I THERMO-LAG STATUS:\\93THERMO.GRW SEPTEMBER,1993 l 4
['. a 2 i l GENERAL NOTES: l The NRC has been reviewing fire barrier systems to determine their ability l to adequately perform their 1-hour and 3-hour fire resistive functions, j The NRC has issued a bulletin, Supplement 1, five information notices j and a Generic Letter on this subject: I i a. Bulletin 92-01, " Failure of Thermo-Lag 330 Fire Barrier System to } . Maintain Cabling in Wide Cable Trays and Small Conduits Free i i from Fire Damage", June 24,1992.* i b. Bulletin 92-01, Supplement 1, " Failure of Thermo-Lag 330 Fire i Barrier System To Perform its Specified Fire Endurance Function", i August 28, 1992.* 1 l c. IN 91-47, " Failure of Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Material to Pass Fire Endurance Test", August 6,1991, d. IN 31-79, " Deficiencies in the Procedures for installing Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Materials", December 6,1991. e. IN 92-46, "Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Material Special Review Team Final Report Findings, Current Fire Endurance Tests, and Ampacity Calculation Errors", June 23,1992. f. IN 93-40, " Fire Endurance Test Results for Thermal Ceramics FP-60 Fire Barrier Material", May 26,1993. g. IN 93-41, "One Hour Fire Endurance Test Results for Kaowool,3M Company FS-195 and 3M Company Interam E-50 Fire Barrier Systems", May 28,1993. h. Generic Letter 92-08, "Thermo-Lag 330-1 Fire Barriers", Decernber 17,1992.*
- Required Licensee Written Response THERMO-LAG STATUS:\\93THERMO.GRW SEPTEMBER,1993
b e 3 f i SPECIFIC NOTES: i 1. McGuire uses Thermolag in MOV and cable panel wall enclosure applications in the Unit 1 Pipe Chase, B Train Switchgear Room, and, Unit 2 Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room W/ fire watches. 3 l 2. Compensatory measures accepted are: 15 minute rover or monitored TV coverage for Thermolag in a. e i ac::essible areas which require continuous monitoring. l b. For high radiation area, monitoring area temperature detectors. i 3. Following requirements of Tech Specs with Thermolag declared l Inoperable,i.e. that all required fire watches are set. 4. Harris has 5 areas with Thermolag, but not in same application as i described in Bulletin. However,1 hour roving fire watches have been implemented. 5. Suppl 1 barrier applications required 5 additional fire watches. j 6. Existing Bulletin 92-01 fire watch comp. measures adequate to address additional Suppl 1 barrier applications. i l 7. North Anna on June,1993 began replacing Thermo-Lag on charging system armored powsr cables with 3-M fire barrier product. Fire watches are to remain in place after system installation is complete until NRCs approval. 8. Suppl 1 barrier applications required 1 additional fire watch. ) 9. A series of full scale one-hour fire exposure tests was conducted by TVA at Omega Point Laboratories to qualify typical configurations to be installed at WBN, including upgraded Thermo-Lcg thicknesses. NRC personnel observed and reported on most aspects of this testing. 4 THERMO-LAG STATUS:\\93THERMO.GRW SEPTEMBER.1993
I l f I i l ] e 1 l 1 I 4 s#,
r n i l SERVICE WATER INSPECTIONS 10/12/93 Facilities Insnection Color Band Comments Brown's Ferry TBD Brunswick TBD Crystal River 6/14 - 7/17 Farley 8/16 - 9/3 Yellow Design good except waterhammer analysis; Numerous testing deficiencies Pump testing-poor due to instruments
- used, TS l
surveillances inadequate, scope of IST for valves inadequate, no as-found out-of-tolerance evaluations for instruments, heat exchgr testing developing; Operations OK; Good self assessment in 1987 Hatch TBD ] North Anna TBD ) Oconee 11/1 - 12/3 i Robinson 6/14 - 7/2 Red Design marginally acceptable - EDGs operate with high temperature alarms in DBE; inadequate design controls on pump minimum flows, SWS pressure and pressure boundary repairs; inadequate interface between engring and plant; no heat exchgr testing program; deficient heat exchgr inspection program - no acceptance criteria; inadequate abnormal operating procedure probably programmatic); valve lineup not consistent with operating procedure; good piping inspections Sequoyah 1/10 - 2/11 Surry 4/12 - 5/15 Turkey Point TbD ti
4 SWS INSPECTION RATING CRITERIA Operations Critical System operable as determined by licensed operators Abn:rmal operator actions can be performed Noncritical Operators have identified any system abnormalities System is aligned within design requirements System is aligned per operating procedures Operators demonstrate adequate SWS knowledge Operators perform properly on simulator Operator logging SWS out of service haintenance Critical Equipment Availability consistent with IPE Noncritical Equipment performance trending Corrective maintenance packages complete Preventive maintenance consistent with vendor manuals Integrated Preventive maintenance SWS piping inspected SWS heat exchangers inspected Craft training / knowledge adequate Testing Critical Critical Parameters Periodically Tested e TS Surveillance Requirements Met Heat Exchanger Fouling Factor Testing Being Performed Noncritical IST for valves of adequate scope IST.for pumps of adequate scope IST procedures adequate & properly accomplished Ins.trument cal program of adequate scope Instrument cal procedures adequate & properly performed j Adequate procedures for SWS flow testing Adequate procedures for monitoring system performance Equipment trending page 1
i 4 Engineering Critical Design consistent with operability requirements (single failure, common mode, natural phenomenon). .l Critical operational information conveyed to plant staff 1 Noncritical Design documents (drawings, specifications) accurate i Calculations conservative j Alarm and setpoints conservative Minimum SWS flow requirements established Proper instruments to monitor system performance provided 4 Quality Involvement, i Critical 4 Operability Decisions Appropriate Comparison of Team's Findings to Licensee's Own e Noncritical CATQ system threshold s CATQ system timeliness CATQ system root cause analysis i Onsite Review Committee performance l Offsite Review Committee performance j Audits of SWS l l i 10/12/93 e t
e L November 1,1996 PLANT MAINTENANCE DATA PLANT OPERATOR CORRECTIVE SAFETY MAINTENANCE RULE A(1) SYSTEMS Workarounds MAINT BACKLOG SYSTEM NON-OUTAGE UNAVAILABILITY B. FERRY Unit 2 - 1 Unit 2 - 47 stable EDG -.009 None - Licensee re-evaluating Unit 3 - 4 Unit 3 - 51 stable HPCI -.010 RHR -.004 BRUNSWICK 27 items Unit 1 - 400 Unit 1 Recirc system (both units) Unit 2 - 400 EDG -.023 Condensate (U1) i HPCI -.008 HPCI (U1) RHR -.001 Isophase Bus ducts (U1) RHR room coolers (U1) Unit 2 Circ Water (U1) l EDG -.007 MSIVs (U2) HPCI -.058 CAC (U2) RHR -.003 Aux Boiler (U2) SSFPC (U2) l Turbine Building HVAC (U2) CATAWBA 31 items 455 declining Unit 1 and 2 - Control area HVAC EDG -.011 Chilled Water ECCS -.005 Nuclear Service water (both units) AFW -.0'33 AFW Containment penetration valve injection [' Main steam Annulus ventiation Liquid radwaste O/9 m .m .m.. - m.m. a. .m.. . m.
PLANT OPERATOR CORRECTIVE SAFETY MAINTENANCE RULE A(1) SYSTEMS Workarounds MAINT BACKLOG SYSTEM NON-OUTAGE UNAVAILABILITY l 1 C. RIVER 48 items 373 declining EDG .010 A&B control complex HVAC l HPIS -.006 ATWS EFW .003 Circ Water Decay heat closed cycle Cooling B Demin Water A Emergency Feedwater B EDG EHC Instrument air Main steam Make-up water Remote Shutdown Station air FARLEY 42 items 930 stable Unit 1 Pressurizer (U1) r EDG .014 CVCS/HHSI (both units) HHSI .003 Liquid Radwaste (both units) AFW .006 Condensate and feedwater (both units) Blowdown treatment (U1) Unit 2 Make-up water (U1) t EDG .016 Instrument Air (both units) HHSI .004 Circ water (both units) i AFW .006 Load centers and low votage switchgear EDGs (U1) Turbine Control (U2) Service Water (U2) Component cooling water (U2) i i l
PLANT OPERATOR CORRECTIVE SAFETY MAINTENANCE RULE A(1) SYSTEMS l Workarounds MAINT BACKLOG SYSTEM NON-OUTAGE UNAVAILABILITY HARRIS 9 items 379 declining EDG .004 Rx vessel and intermals (Rx cavity seal) HHSI .006 Steam generator blowdown AFW .005 Main feedwater Heater drains [ Normal service wabr Emergency service water 6.9 Kv electrical 480 VAC electrical Containment cooling Containment Purge Off-site power / switchyard HATCH None-360 declining Unit 1 Primary containment chilled water EDG .006 EDGs HPCI .015 LPCI RHR .006 120 V RPS power Condensate and Feedwater system Unit 2 EDG .006 HPCI .001 RHR .026 I I i t [ [ .. -...- z -2.- .---.-...a.-...-
.... _ _ _.. ~... PLANT OPERATOR CORRECTIVE SAFETY MAINTENANCE RULE A(1) SYSTEMS .Workarounds MAINT BACKLOG SYSTEM NON-OUTAGE UNAVAILABILITY McGUIRE 42 items 402 declining Unit 1 Switchyard (both Units) EDG .006 Refueling water HPSI .007 Rx Coolant System AFW .003 Safe Shutdowm facility Unit 2 EDG .011 HPSI .007 AFW .004 N. ANNA 26 items 461 stable Unit 1 None EDG .007 HPSI .001 AFW .004 Unit 2 EDG .001 F HPSI .000 AFW .001 i ? i
4 i i ? PLANT OPERATOR CORRECTIVE SAFETY MAINTENANCE RULE A(1) SYSTEMS j Workarounds
- MAINT BACKLOG SYSTEM f
NON-OUTAGE UNAVAILABILITY OCONEE Unit 1 - 14 468 declining Unit 1 Control rod dnve Unit 2 - 14 HPSI .002 Feedwater system Unit 3 - 11 AFW .003 Heater drain system Lee / Central Power system i Unit 2 Low pressure injection HPSI .001 Low pressure service water [ AFW .003 Unit Main power system l 600/208 Vac safety related power sys Unit 3 600/208 Vac non-safety power system HPSI .002 SSF HVAC system l AFW .002 Aux Building ventilation l SSF/DG .009 Keowee generator system I ROBINSON 11 items 350 declining EDG .011 125 volt DC HHSI .006 Boric acid heat tracing AFW .011 Instrument Air j CVCS Containment isolation valves NI - source range Rx protection ST. LUCIE 14 items 1101 stable Unit 1 EDG governors [ EDG .019 EDGs HPSI .026 4.16 KV safety related breakers i AFW .010 PORVs C AFW system j Unit 2 RCP seals l EDG .013 HPSI .009 AFW .013 ( i
i PLANT OPERATOR CORRECTIVE SAFETY MAINTENANCE RULE A(1) SYSTEMS Workarounds MAINT BACKLOG SYSTEM NON-OUTAGE UNAVAILABILITY SEQUOYAH Unit 1 - 14 361 declining Unit 1 Rx Coolant Sys. Unit 2 - 24 EDG .015 Main Generator HPSI .034 Switchyard AFW .008 AFW C. Room HVAC Unit 2 Aux Building Gas treadment i EDG .015 Containment Air Retum fans HPSI .005 AFW .005 SUMMER ~ 12 items 341 declining EDG .007 Air handing l HPSI .006 Chill water AFw .007 CVCS i Building services l Leak detection RHR Service water i BOP power supplies i I&C process system i SURRY 29 items 149 stable Unit 1 AFW pump P-2 (both units) EDG .015 Rod control (both units) HPSI .002 ESWG room air handlers (both units) i AFW .009 Unit 2 i EDG .014 HPSI .001 AFW .002 1 I
..e-l ~ t 1 t f i PLANT OPERATOR-CORRECTIVE - SAFETY MAINTENANCE RULE A(1) SYSTEMS l Workarounds MAINT BACKLOG. SYSTEM-1 NON-OUTAGE UNAVAILABILITY T. POINT - 10 items 1035 stable Unit 3 38EDG EDG .006 ECCS (U4) l HPSI .008 B Charging pump AFW .015 POV-3-4882 l RD-3/4-11 I Unit 4 Feedwater check valve i EDG .003 Diesel driven service water pump HPSI .009 i AFW .012 VOGTLE 5 items Unit 1 - 120 Unit 1 Rx coolant system ' Unit 2 - 55 EDG .004 Nuclear Service closed cooling water - HPSI .001 l AFW .001 I i Unit 2 l EDG .021 HPSI .002 AFW .001 [ t WATTS BAR 14 items 115 declining EDG .010 AFW HPSI .004 Rad Monitors i AFW .009 incore instrumentation I Rx Protection I I i
~. i 4 3 l b l I INSPECTION RESULTS AND SALP INPUT a. l (per ROI 2210, Enclosure 5) j Sn-- rv of Insoection Results Facility: St. Lucie Nuclear Plant l Inspection Period: June 21-25, 1993 Inspectors: J. L. Kreh (lead), R. P..
- Schin, L.
K. Cohen, j G. W. Bethke (consultant) l i Inspection Report Nos.: 50-335, 50-389/93-16 Safety Objective: i 4 In order to assess the adequacy of the emergency response program, the implementation of the Emergency Plan, and the training program for emergency response, the licensee's required annual emergency response exercise for 1993 was observed and evaluated. Activation and response efforts of the emergency organization were selectively observed in the Simulator Control Room, Technical Support Center, Operational Support Center, and Emergency Operations Facility. The' inspection also included review of the scenario and observation of the licensee's exercise critique. Results: In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. In general, the exercise was a successful demonstration of the licensee's capability to respond to an emergency condition at the St. Lucie Plant. Most of the established exercise objectives were met. The following findings / issues were identified: (1) Exercise Weakness for failure to accomplish the initial minimum staffing and activation of the EOF in a timely manner; (2) Violation for failure to have a procedure which adequately implements the Emergency Plan requirement to provide periodic plant status updates to State and local authorities while in a declared emergency status; (3) IFI: insuring the consistency of scenario data in the future; and (4) IFI: evaluating EPIP requirements with respect to conveying information to offsite authorities regarding classifiable incidents of equal or lesser severity occurring during an extant classified event. Disposition of,open items reviewed during this inspection: CLOSED 91-301-01, 92-01-01, 92-14-01; LEFT OPEN 92-01-02 \\\\
1 1 s ? EALP Evaluation Functional area inspected: Plant Support (Emergency Preparedness) Comments: This was the first NRC-evaluated exercise at the St. Lucie Plant which was " driven" by the Simulator Control Room. At the individual as well as the organizational level, licensee personnel performed capably and professionally during the exercise. This observation' leads to the overall conclusion that the licensee's training and qualification program for emergency response personnel was very effective. Emergency response i facilities and equipment operated properly, with one exception. Because of lack of attention to detail, the automated system for j notifying EOF personnel was not properly configured to achieve an expeditious call-out (not an exercise artificiality). As a result, the time required to make the EOF cperational was excessive (109 minutes, which was actually 13 minutes longer than in last year's exercise). The licensee's interactions with offsite agencies (as observed in the fully activated EOF) were forthright and procedurally correct. However, as noted by an inspector and a State representative (the latter at the EOF critique), the licensee provided no plant status updates to State and local authorities for a period of more than two hours (between the Alert and Site Area Emergency declarations). The licensee planned to pursue this issue with the State as soon as j possible. The licensee's critique was candid and identified numerous matters needing resolution, although it did not explicitly include a recitation of performance relative to objectives, as is done by most licensees. Corrective actions for problens identified during previous exercises appeared to have been generally effective, especially for the OSC. The dispatch and control of emergency repair teams and other re-entry teams from.the OSC were notably improved from last year. Problems and inconsistencies similar to those noted last year in the area of dose assessment were observed once again; however, significant scenario disconnects precluded a determination as to whether the observed player performance problems were real or artificial (i.e., scenario-induced). INSPECTOR: [lI/Ud" L DATE: (' [3
Attachment:
Completed "SALP Feeder Information" Form Distribution Inspector's Branch Chief: W. E. Cline Inspector's Section Chief: K. P. Barr (approval: I A (,b 3) DRP Branch Chief: M. V. Sinkule DRP Section Chief: K. D. Landis DRP Project Engineer: R. P. Schin DRS Division Director: A. F. Gibson
4 88WRE"8 w =yw l; SALP FEEDER INFORMATION PLANT: 6[ /_ac,'e FUNCTIONAL AREA: Plant Suonort (EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS) l CONTACT: J, Krrk. k' Barr-i i STRENGTH / WEAKNESS / ISSUE REPORT NO. DATE NOTE j
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