ML20137D618
| ML20137D618 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 03/20/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20137D580 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-498-97-10, 50-499-97-10, NUDOCS 9703260241 | |
| Download: ML20137D618 (18) | |
See also: IR 05000498/1997010
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ENCLOSURE 2
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
l Docket Nos.: 50-498;50-499
Report No.: 50-498/97-10;50-499/97-10
Licensee: Houston Lighting & Power Company l
Facility: South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2
Location: FM 521 - 8 miles west of Wadsworth
Wadsworth, Texas
Dates: February 17-21,1997 l
Inspector: Michael P. Shannon, Radiation Specialist
Approved By: Blaine Murray, Chief )
Plant Support Branch
ATTACHMENT: Supplemental Information
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PDR ADOCK 05000498
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY l
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South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2
NRC Inspection Report 50-498/97-10;50-499/S7-10
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Enaineerina
- No deviations to the commitments in Section 12.5 of the Updated Final Safety
Analysis Report were identified (Section E2.1). i
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Plant Support '
- Overall, a good external exposure control program was in place. However, a i
number of problems were noted with an as low as is reasonably achievable l
(ALARA) prejob briefing. High radiation area controls were effective. Not all !
radiation work permit packages contained information that was consistent with l
management's expectations (Section R1.1). !
- Housekeeping within the radiological controlled arca was very good (Section R1.1).
- In general, the internal exposure control program was adequately implemented. No i
respiratory equipment had been issued for radiological work. No positive whole i
body counts were identified during the outage (Section R1.2).
- A violation was identified for the failure to determine: (1) airborne radioactivity
levels inside the . primary side of the steam generators during the installation of the j
nozzle dams (Section R1.2), and (2) contamination levels inside the primary side of i
the steam generators prior to start of work (Section R1.4). ,
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- Radiological outage work planning was very good. Lessons learned were captured l
and incorporated in work packages. The "one stop shopping area" was a program
strength (Section R1.3).
- Overall, effective controls were implemented to prevent the spread of radioactive ,
contamination. However, some high efficiency particulate air filtration vacuums '
were found with the inlets uncovered, increasing the potential spread of
contamination. All radioactive material was properly labeled and posted. Radiation
protection portable survey instrumentation was properly calibrated and source I
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response checked (Section R1.4).
- An effective ALARA program was maintained. The licensee was likely to meet or
beat their estimated refueling outage exposure goal (Section R1.5).
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- A good contractor radiation protection training prcgram was maintained. An i
appropriate number of well-trained and properly qualified contractor radiation I
protection technicians were onsite to support the cutage work (Section R5.1).
- Effective quality assurance and radiation protection department self-assessment I
programs were implemented. Radiological condition report corrective actions were
closed in a timely manner. Only one qua':ty assurance radiation protection f
operational surveillance had been performed since June 1996 (Section R7.1).
- A violation was identified involving the transfer of licensed materiel that exceeded 1
the receiving licensee's possession limit (Section R8.1). I
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Report Details
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Summary of Plant Status
Unit 2 was in a refueling outage during this inspection. Unit 1 was at full power. There
were no events during this inspection that adversely affected the inspection results.
Ill. Enoineerina
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E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment
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E2.1 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Review (UFSAR) .
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a. Inspection Scone
The inspector reviewed selected topics presented in Section 12.5, " Health Physics i
Program," of the UFSAR to ensure agreement with commitments. ;
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b. Observations and Findinas
A recent discovery of a licensee operating their facility in a manner contrary to the
UFSAR description highlighted the need for a special focused review that compares
plant practices, procedures, and/or parameters to the UFSAR descriptions. While
performing the inspection discussed in this report, the inspector reviewed the
applicable portions of the UFSAR that related to the areas inspected. The inspector
verified that the UFSAR wording was consistent with the observed plant practices,
procedures, and/or parameters.
c. Conclusions
No deviations to the commitments in Section 12.5 of the UFSAR were identified.
IV. Plant Support
R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls
R1.1 External Exposure Controls
a. Insoection Scoce (83750)
Selected radiation workers and radiation protection personnel involved in the
external exposure control program were interviewed. A number of tours of the
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radiological controlled area, including the reactor containment building, were
l performed. The high radiation area key issue process was reviewed and an
inventory of high radiation area keys was performed. The following items were
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, * Control of high radiation areas and high radiation area keys
- Radiation work permits i
- Job coverage by radiation protection personnel
- Housekeeping within the radiological controlled area
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- Dosimetry use
- b. Observations and Findinas
I No problems were identified with the high radiation area key program. All Technical
] Specification high radiation areas were properly posted and secured. All high 1
- . radiation area flashing lights were operational. t
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l Radiation work permits were written in a clear, consistent manner. The special
! instructions section was divided into three areas; restrictions, requirements, and
I cautions /ALARA notes. The inspector concluded that, by dividing the special
l instructions into these areas, clear direction was provided to radiological workers.
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During the review of active radiation work permits, the inspector noted that airborne *
radioactive conditions were not recorded on radiation work permits. Radiation
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protection management stated that they do not document airborne conditions on !
, the radiation work permit until it exceeds their posting limit of 0.25 derived air
. concentration. However, the inspector observed that contamination and radiation :
l conditions have in the past, been documented regardless of the level. For example,
i the inspector noted that contamination conditions in " clean areas" were written as
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< 1000 disintegrations per minute. The inspector commented that the inconsistent i
documentation of radiological conditions could confuse station workers. Radiation
protection management stated that they would evaluate the documentation process
of radiological conditions for consistency.
A review of randemly selected radiation work permit packages concluded that
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documentation was not being filed in accordance with management's expectations. ,
The inspector noted that approximately 30 percent of the radiation work permit
packages did not contain survey information used to establish radiological
conditions for the radiation work permit. Radiation protection management stated
that they would review the radiation work permit package documentation process. i
The inspector determined that job coverage provided by radiation protection
technicians was appropriate for the radiological work observed. Field radiological
briefings, given by the job coverage radiation protection technicians, discussed the
radiological conditions in the work area and potential radiological hazards and hold
points.
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The inspector attended both the night shift and day shift ALARA briefings held on
February 18 and 19, respectively, for work being performed on Unit 2 seal table and
incore thimble guide tubes. The night shift radiation protection manager was in
attendance during the night shift briefing. The following problems were noted
during the night shift briefing:
(1) Three radiation work permits were discussed during the same briefing. The I
radiation protection lead technician conducting the briefing did not discuss
the radiation work permits in sequential order, which resulted in confusing
radiological information presented to the workers.
(2) The radiation dose rates for the two rooms involved were not similar.
However, the lead radiation protection technician conducting the briefing did
not clearly distinguish which room each work group would be working in and
the dose rates in their work area. j
(3) Survey maps were not distributed or used when discussing radiological
survey information. Instead, radiological data were read from the radiation
work permit.
(4) The plant page system was operational in the briefing room, and when
station personnel were making announcements, it made it difficult to
concentrate on the briefing.
After, approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of listening to the briefing, the inspector questioned the i
night shift radiation protection manager about the adequacy of the ALARA briefing.
The night shift radiation protection manager stated that he had made some notes to :'
help clarify the radiological information. The inspector noted that, after the
discussion with the night shift radiation protection manager, he took control of the
radiological briefing, dividing the workers by radiation work permit and briefing the
crews separately with the help of the radiation protection lead technician. The ;
inspector noted, that, at that point, the workers received the proper radiological i
information to aid in their job performance.
No problems were noted with the day shift ALARA briefing. However, the inspector
noted that the industry lesson learned events discussed were not consistent
between shifts.
Housekeeping within the radiological controlled area was very good. All trash and
laundry containers were properly maintained.
All personnel observed by the inspector wore their dosimetry properly and knew to
contact radiation protection personnel if their electronic dosimeter alarmed.
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c. Conclusions i
Overall, a good external exposure control program was in place. All Technical
Specification required high radiation area doors were locked and properly posted.
Radiation work permits were written in a clear corisistent manner. Airborne
radiological conditions were not normally recorded on radiation work permits. Not
all radiation work permit packages contained information that was consistent with
management's expectations.
A number of problems were notcd with the night shift ALARA briefing for work
being performed on Unit 2 seal table and incore thimble guide tubes. Housekeeping
within the radiological controlled area was very good. All personnel observed wore
their dosimetry properly.
R1.2 Internal Exoosure Controls
a. Insoection Scoce (83750) l
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Selected radiation protection personnel involved with the internal exposure control
program were interviewed. The following items were reviawed:
- Air sampling program, including the use of continuous air monitors and
filtration units; ,
- Respiratory protection program; and,
- Whole body counting program,
b. Observations and Findinas
As of February 20,1997, no respiratory equipment had been issued for radiological
work. No positive whole body counts were identified that exceeded the licensee's
administrative action level for recording internal dose.
Ai cir sampling equipment observed in the field had current calibration dates and
were response checked in accordance with station procedures. The use and
positioning of continuour air monitors and air filtration units were appropriate to
monitor and limit airborne exposures.
In general, the inspector determined that job coverage air sampling was appropriate.
However, on February 18,1997, the inspector determined through interview * with
cognizant radiation protection personnel that air sampling was not performed during
the installation of nozzle dams inside the primary side of the steam generators on
February 11,1997.
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Section 6.2.4 of Radiation Protection Procedure OPRPO4-ZR-0013, Revision 3, j
" Radiation Survey Program," states, in part, " Determination of airborne radioactivity
levels shall be performed . . . when the potential exists for air concentration to
exceed 0.25 DAC."
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Technical Specification 6.11.1 states that procedure for personnel radiation
protection shall be prepared consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20
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and shall be approved, maintained, and adhered to for all operations involving
personnel radiation exposure.
The failure to determine the airborne radioactivity levcis, as required by
Procedure OPRPO4-ZR-0013, during installation of nozzle dams inside the primary
side of the steam generators when the potential existed to exceed 0.25 derived air
concentration is a first example of a violation of Technical Specification 6.11.1 l
(50-498/9710--01:50-499/9710-01). ,
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c. Conclusions
In general, the internal exposure control program was adequately implemented. No j
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body ;ounts were identified during this outage, which required internal dose
! assessment. A violation was identified for the failure to determine airborne ,
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l radioactivity levels inside the primary side of the steam generators during the
! installation of the nozzle dams.
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R1.3 Plannina and Preparation
a. Inspection Scope (83750)
Radiation protection department personnel involved in radiation protection planning
and preparation were interviewed. The following items were reviewed:
- ALARA job planning;
- Job scheduling and sequencing;
- ALARA packages;
- Incorporation of lessons learned from similar work; and,
- Supplies of radiation protection instrumentation, protective clothing, and
consumable items,
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b. Observations and Findinas
The inspector determined that radiation protection personnel were actively involved
with the outage radiological work job planning. The ALARA packages included
lessons learned from past similar work. A review of ALARA committee meeting
minutes concluded that the committee was appropriately involved in outage
exposure goal setting.
The inspector noted that the licensee established a "one stop shopping" area which
kept abreast of the outage scheduling activities and hold points. Radiation
protection personnel were assigned to this area and provided the station with
updated radiological information and radiation work permits as necessary. The
inspector viewed this practice as a program strength.
The inspector reviewed several ALARA field observation reports which were written
during ongoing work and determined that appropriate items to improve future similar
work were identified.
No problems were identified with the adequacy of radiation protection
instrumentation, protective clothing, and consumable supplies to support
radiological work.
c. Conclusions
Radiation protection personnel were effectively involved with outage planning.
Lessons learned were captured and incorporated in work packages. The ALAR /.
committee was appropriately involved in exposure goal setting. The "one stop
shopping area" was a program strength.
R1.4 Control of Radioactive Materials and Contamination: Survevina and Monitorina
a. Inspection Scope (83750)
Areas reviewed included:
- Contamination monitor use and response to alarms;
- Control of radioactive material;
- Portable instrumentation calibration and performance checking programs;
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- Adequacy of the surveys necessary to assess personnel exposure.
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b. Observations and Findinas
All personnel observed exiting the radiologicai controlled area used the personnel
contaminatinn monitors properly. Radiation protection personnel assigned to
monitor the control point responded properly to personnel contamination alarms and
provided proper guidance to station workers who alarmed the monitors.
Contamination logs were maintained according to plant procedures. The inspector
observed the decontamination of a radiation worker by radiation protection
personnel and noted that care was taken not to spread contamination. Radiation ,
procedures were properly followed during the decontamination process.
Radioactive material observed was properly labeled and posted, in general, the
licensee provided good controls to prevent the spread of radioactive contamination.
Contamination boundaries were clearly marked and posted. Trash and laundry
barrels were properly maintained. However, some high efficiency particulate air
filtration vacuums in both units were found with the inlets uncovered, increasing the
potential spread of contamination.
All portable radiation protection survey instrumentation was property calibrated and
source response checked.
The inspector reviewed Radiation Work Permit 1997-2-0026, Revision 0, which was
used for work involved with the primary side of the steam generators and noted
that contamination levels listed on the permit were 800 millitad per hour. The i
inspector determined that the contamination survey information was written using
historical data from the last Unit 2 refueling outage conducted in the fall of 1995. l
During the review of survey data on February 19,1997, the inspector identified that !
contamination surveys inside the primary side of the steam generators were not
performed prior to the start of work on February 11,1997.
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Section 4.5.3 of Radiation Protection Procedure OPRPO7-ZR-OO10, Revision 4,
" Radiation Work Permits," requires a radiological survey prior to the start of work if
radiological survey data is more than 7 days old.
Technical Specification 6.11.1 states that procedure for personnel radiation
protection shall be prepared consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20
and shall be approved, maintained, and adhered to for all operations involving
personnel radiation exposure.
10 CFR 20.1501(a) states, in part, "that each licensee shall make or cause to be
made, surveys that . . . . (2) Are reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate
(i) The extent of radiation levels; and (ii) Concentrations or quantities of radioactive
material; and (iii) The potential radiological hazards that could be present."
The inspector determined that the failure to perform contamination surveys inside
the primary side of the steam generators prior to the start of work, as required by
Procedure OPRPO7-ZR-OO10, is a second example of a violation of Tachnical
Specification 6.11.1 (50-498/9710-01;50-499/9710-01).
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c. Conclusions
Station personnel used the personnel contamination monitors properly. Radioactive
material was properly labeled and posted. In general, good controls to prevent the
spread of radioactive contamination were maintained. However, some high
efficiency particulate air filtration vacuums were found with the inlets uncovered,
increasing the potential spread of contamination. Radiation protection portable
survey instrumentation was source response checked properly. A violation was
identified for the f ailure to determine the contamination levels inside the primary
side of the steam generators prior to the start of work.
R1.5 Maintainina Occupational Exposure ALARA
a. Insoection Scone (83750)
Radiation protection personnel involved with the ALARA program were interviewed.
Refueling outage exposure goals and status were reviewed.
b. Observations and Findinas
During tours of the radiological controlled area, the inspector noted that ALARA low
dose and radiological hot spot areas were identified throughout the units. In
addition, radiological field briefings given by radiation protection technicians at the
start of jobs identified low dose waiting areas.
The inspector determined after a review of the ALARA committee meeting minutes
that the committee was appropriately involved in establishing the refueling outage
goals.
The licensee estimated the Unit 2 refueling outage exposure goal to be 120 person-
rem. The inspector determined that as of February 19,1997, day 11 of a planned
20-day refueling outage, the licensee was slightly above their projected exposure
goal. However, a review of work needed to be performed to complete the refueling
outage activities concluded that the licensee was likely meet their refueling outage
estimated exposure goal. A review of outage goals for major tasks indicated that all
work was below the estimated goals and was likely to meet the projected task goal.
c. Conclusions
Overall, an effective ALARA program was maintained. The ALARA low dose
waiting areas were appropriately identified throughout the radiological controlled
area. The licensee was likely to meet their refueling outage estimated exposure
goal.
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! R5 Staff Training and Qualification in Radiological Protection and Chemistry :
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l Personnel involved with contractor radiation protection technician training and j
, resume evaluation were interviewed. The following items were reviewed: ;
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- ' * Contractor radiation protection technician training lesson plans; ,
j * Contractor radiation protection technician qualification cards; and, I
i- * Resumes of contractor radiation protection technicians.
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b. Observations and Findinos '-
l Forty-six contractor radiation protection technicians were hired to support outage
- radiological activities. The inspector noted that approximately 60 percent of the ,
[ contractor radiation protection technicians were returnees. Randomly selected j
- contractor resumes were reviewed. It was noted that all these contractor workers !
- were all American Nuclear Standards Institute 3.1 (3 years of radiation protection i
- experience) level technicians. The inspector noted that the licensee's Technical
l Specifications only required American Nuclear Standards Institute 18.1 (2 years of
j radiation protection experience) level technicians.' The inspector identified this as a -
j program strength,
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j Contractor lesson plans were well organized, developed, and site and industry
i lessons learned were incorporated. Radiation protection management was .
j- appropriately involved in developing the training topics.
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1 The Northeast Utilities' radiation protection screening program was used to evaluate
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j brought onsite to support outage activities. The Northeast Utilities program is
} recognized and approved by a number of utilities as an acceptable method to
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evaluate a radiation protection technician's general radiological knowledge. All
j contractor radiation protection technicians were r* quired to pass this examination
- prior to being placed in the licensee's training prog im.
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j All contractor radiation protection technicians wera .ested on site-specific
- information, and on-the-job evaluations were given and tracked by radiation
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The on-the-job evaluation qualification program was reviewed. Tasks listed were
I appropriate and evaluation guidelines were clearly stated. The irispector noted that
! some contractor radiation protection technician qualification records, which
l recommended certification and granted certification, were signed by the same
( individual. Radiation protection management stated that the same individual signing
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the qualification record in bon places was not in accordance with their expectation.
The licensee stated that they would communicate management's expectations
pertaining to the qualification record sign off process to all personnel involved.
c. Conclusions
An appropriate number of trained and qualified contractor radiation protection
technicians were onsite to support outage work. A large percentage of contractor
! radiation protec' ion technicians were returnees. Radiation protection supervision
was involved in the development of the contractor radiation protection training
program. All contractor radiation protection technicians were American Nuclear
Standards Institute 3.1 level technicians, where as, the Technical Specifications ;
only required American Nuclear Standards institute 18.1 level technicians. !
R7 Quality Assurance in Radiological Protection and Chemistry Activities
R7.1 Quality Assurance Audits and Surveillances and Radiation Department
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Self-Assessments and Radioloaical Occurrence Reports
a. Inspection Scone (83750) l
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Selected personnel involved with the performance of quality assurance audits and j
surveillances and radiation department self-assessments were interviewed. The j
following items were reviewed
- Qualifications of personnel who performed quality assurance audits and
surveillances;
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- Quality assurance audits performed since June 1996;
- Quality assurance surveillances performed since June 1996;
- Radiation protection department self-assessments performed since
June 1996; and,
l * Radiological condition reports written since June 1996.
b. Observations and Findinas
The inspector reviewed the qualifications of the lead quality assurance auditor
assigned to oversee radiation protection department activities. The inspector noted
that this individual had a number of years of auditing experience but a limited
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radiation protection background. During discussions with quality assurance
l personnel, the inspector was informed that the lead quality assurance radiation
protection auditor had qualified as a junior radiation protection technician and had
supported the radiation protection department during outages. Additionally, vendor
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l supplied radiation protection courses were being scheduled to enhance this
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l between November 11 and December 12,1996. The audit focused primarily on a
I review of radiation protection procedures and identified five deficiencies and ten !
l recommendations. Deficiencies were tracked by the licensee's condition reporting ;
l system, which was used to track corrective actions. The inspector reviewed the
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recommended corrective actions pertaining to this audit and determined that they :
l appeared appropriate to correct the deficiencies identified. The inspector noted that i
tnese items were closed out in a timely manner. l
The inspector reviewed the audit schedule and determined that it covered the
appropriate program areas to provide management with a good overview of the ;
radiation protection program. Radiation protection management was properly
involved in the development of the audit scope.
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Only one quality assurance radiation protection operational surveillance had been
performed since June 1996. However, seven quality monitoring reports (field
observations) were written. No problems were identified with the reports.
However, the inspector commented that a balance between surveillances and
monitoring reports could provide additional insight to the radiation protection
program. The licensee acknowledged the inspector's comment.
A summary of radiation protection division field observation reports performed by
radiation protection supervision were reviewed by the inspector. The inspector ;
determined that all program areas were covered and the reports provided a good !
overview of the radiation protection program, j
No problems were identified during the review of radiological condition reports. The !
inspector noted that recommendations to prevent a recurrence appeared to be
appropriate and corrective actions were closed out in a timely manner. No negative
trends were identified by the inspector during this review. l
c. Conclusions
Overall, effective quality assurance and radiation protection department
self-assessment programs were maintained. The inspector noted that the lead
quality assurance auditor assigned to oversee radiation protection program activities l
had a limited radiation protection background. No problems were identified with
l Quality Assurance Audit 96-10. Radiological condition report recommendations to
l prevent a recurrence appeared to be appropriate and corrective actions were closed
out in a timely manner. Only one quality assuranc9 radiation protection operational
surveillance had been performed since June 1996.
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R8 Miscellaneous Radiological Protection and Chemistry issues
R8.1 (Closed) Unresolved item 50-498/9605-04:50-499/9605-04: inappropriate transfer !
of by-product materials (86750). On June 17,1996, licensee personnel received a l
call from the Westinghouse facility in Spartansburg, South Carolina, notifying the ;
j staff that they had received a shipment of radioactive material from South Texas i
l Project that exceeded their state license radioactive material possession limit. i
l Specifically, the Westinghouse Spartansburg facility received a surveillance capsule i
containing 36 curies of Iron 55 from South Texas Project. Their license limited the ,
amount of any single isotope to 25 curias. I
On June 17,1996, the licensee initiated Condition Report 96-7906 to address i
this event. The licensee's investigation determined that among other things, s
the staff did not follow the steps identified in Radiation Protection
Procedure OPRP03-ZR-0011, Revision 3, " Shipment of Radioactive Material," which ,
required a review of the receiver's license prior to shipment. '
10 CFR 30.41(c) states, in part, before transferring by-product material to a specific
licensee of the commission . . . the licensee transferring the material shall verify g
that the transferee's license authorizes the receipt of the type, form, and quantity of j
by-product material to be transferred.
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Radiation Protection Procedure OPRPO3-ZR-0011, Revision 3, " Shipment of i
Radioactive Material," Section 3.1 states, in part, " Prior to the shipment of i
radioactive material, it shall be determined that the receiving facility is licensed to
receive the type and amount of material being sent."
The failure to verify that the transferee's license authorized the receipt of the
quantity of by-product material being transferred is a violation of 10 CFR 30.41(c)
(50-498/9710-02;50-499/9710-02).
The licensee completed the recommended changes to Procedure OPRP03-ZR-0011
and developed and presented a lessons learned session to personnel involved with
shipping radioactive material. The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective
actions to prevent a recurrence of this event and determined the actions to be
satisfactory.
V. Manaaement Meetinas
X1 Exit Meeting Summary
The inspector presented the inspection results to members of Ihensee's
management at an exit meeting on February 21,1997. The licensee acknowledged
the findings presented. No proprietary information was identified.
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ATTACHMENT
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
T. Cloninger, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering
J. Groth, Vice President, Nuclear Generation
R. Aguilera, Supervisor,. Radiation Protection
R. Gangluff, Manager, Chemistry
W Hamon, Supervising Engineer, Licensing
G. Lautt, Engineer, Quality Assurance i
R. Logan, Manager, Radiation Protection
R. Lovell, Manager, Unit 1 Operations
R. Masse, Plant Manager, Unit 2
M. McBurnett, Manager, Licensing
G. Parkey, Plant Manager, Unit 1 ;
R. Rehkugler, Director, Quality
J. Savage, Staff Specialist, Quality Assurance !
S. Smith, Technician, Quality Assurance i
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W. Sifre, Resident inspector !
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INSPECTION PROCEDURE USED
83750 Occupational Radiation Exposure
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED
Opened
50-498;499/9710-01 VIO failure to determine airborne radioactivity levels and
perform contamination surveys
50-498;499/9710-02 VIO failure to verify the transferee's radioactive material
license
Closed
50-498;499/9710-02 VIO failure to verify the transferee's radioactive material !
license 1
60-498:499/9605-04 URI inappropriate transfer of by-product materials i
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LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Quality Audit Report 96-10, " Radiological Controls /Radwaste," dated January 9,1997
Quality Surveillance Report 96-067, " Health Physics Activities," dated August 5,1996
Quality Monitoring Report 96-1-0609, " Monitoring Radioactive Material," dated June 5,
1996
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Quality Monitoring Report 96-2-0719, " Radiological Postings," dated July 9,1996 '
Quality Monitoring Report 96-1-0750, " Radiation Work Permit Review," dated July 23, !
1996
Quality Monitoring Report 96-2-0754, " Radiation Work Permit Review," dated July 29,
1996
Quality Monitoring Report 96-1-0765, " Radiation Postings," dated August 3,1996
Quality Monitoring Report 97-2-0057, " Steam Generator Meeting," dated January 16,
1997
Quality Monitoring Report 97-2-0120, " Steam Generator Work," dated February 11,1997
Procedure OPOP01-ZA-0001, " Plant Audits," Revision 1
Procedure OPOP01-ZA-0015, " Oversight Planning and Scheduling Process," Revision 3
Procedure OPRP03-ZR-0001, " Determination of Radioactive Material Curie Content,
Reportability, DOT Sub-Type and Waste Classification," Revision 5
Procedure OPRP03-ZR-0011, " Shipment of Radioactive Materials," Revision 3
Procedure OPRPO4-ZR-0004, " Release of Materials From The RCA," Revision 1
Procedure OPRPO4-ZR-0011, " Radiation Protection Key Control," Revision 3
Procedure OPRPO4-ZR-0013, " Radiation Survey Program," Revision 3
Procedure OPRPO4-ZR-0015, " Radiological Posting and Warning Devices," Revision 3
Procedure OPRP07-ZR-0009, "Perforrnance of High Exposure Work," Revision 8
Procedure OPRP07-ZR-0010, " Radiation Work Permits," Revisien 4
Procedure OPRP03-ZR-0051, " Radiological Access and Work Controls," Revision 7
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Procedure OPRP03-ZR-0052, "ALARA Program," Revision 2
Procedure OPRP03-ZR-0054, " Respiratory Protection r rogram," Revision 5
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Procedure OPRP08-ZR-0001, " Personnel Decontamination," Revision O I
Summary of Radiological Condition Reports Written since June 1996 ;
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Radiation Work Permit 1997-0-0141, Revision 0, " Plant Walkdown, Tours and Inspections"
Radiation Work Permit 1997-2-0026, Revision 0, "!nstall/ Remove Nozzle Dams"
Radiation Work Permit 1997-2-0021, Revision 0, " Perform LLRT and Inspections in the
RCB Fuel Transfer Canal"
Radiation Work Permit 1997-2-0064, Revision 0, " Disconnect / Reconnect Seal Table
Retract / Reinsert Thimble Tubes"
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Radiation Work Permit 1997-2-0081, Revision 0, " Install Freeze Seal on Thimble Guide
Tubes"
Radiation Work Permit 1997-2-0082, Revision 0, " Repair / Replace Thimble Tube Seal
Assemblies"
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