ML20133A735
| ML20133A735 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1985 |
| From: | Cahn R, Hughes E, Parkinson G BECHTEL GROUP, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20133A723 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8510020294 | |
| Download: ML20133A735 (167) | |
Text
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CLINTON POWER STATION HELB/MELB SUPPLEMENTARY REVIEW For ILLINOIS POWER COMPANY i
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l SEPTEMBER 1985 I
BECHTEL POWER CORPORATION
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CLINTON POWER STATION HELB/MELB SUPPLEMENTARY REVIEW For 4
ILLINOIS POWER COMPANY 1
l SEPTEMBER 1985 i
BECHTEL POWER CORPORATION
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l This ritport is s Jbmitted 'on behalf of the Supplementary Review Team by the
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following lead r. embers:
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Submitted by:
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0tu b Q G.'t.
Parkinson E. M. Hughes D
Project Manager Deputy Project Manager Bechtel - San Francisco Bechtel - Ann Arbor R. S. Cahn J. A. Shoulders Bechtel - San Francisco Bechtel - San Francisco Concurrence by:
I I / C 7W. Jordan' Manager of Sys s Engineering Bechtel Powe anagement i
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^ /M/L f
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_P. Karpa Manager of Engineering Bechtel Power Management I
CLINTON POWER STATION HELB/MELB SUPPLEMENTARY REVIEW SEPTEMBER 1985 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page EXECUTIVE SJMMARY l
Background
1 Activities 1
Results 1
Conclusions 1
REPORT 3
4 Introduction 3
Overview 3
HELB/MELB Open Items 4
Conduct of the Supplementary Review 5
Description of the Review 6
General 6
HELB Pipe Whip and Jet Impingement Review 7
MELB Spray Review 8
HELB/MELB Flooding Review 9
Conclusions 11 Appendix Page g
A IDR FINAL REPORT OPEN ITEMS A-1 B
HELB PIPE' WHIP AND JET IMPINGEFENT REVIEW B-1 C
MELB SPRAY REVIEW C-1 D
HELB/MELB FLOODING REVIEW D-1 E
RELEVANT IDR OBSERVATION REPORTS, RESOLUTION E REPORTS AND COMPLETION REPORTS
- i 09/85 Rev. 0
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1 EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
BACKGROUND This report supplements the January 1985 Final Report of the Independent Design Review (IDR) submitted by Bechtel Power Corporation for the Illinois Power Company's Clinton Power Station, Unit 1.
It addresses the further work on high energy line break (HELB) and moderate caergy line break (MELB) analysis identified as outitanding, commitments in Observation Reports 55, 57, 64, and 73 of the IDR.
ACTIVITIES The HELB/MELB Supplementary Review began in June 1985 with review team members meeting initially with Sargent'& Lundy in their Chicago offices to establish the status of design for review since the completion of the IDR Final Report.
S'ubsequent information gathering and examining of the HELB/MELB aspects of the Clinton design included te16 shone conference calls, transmittal of documents, plus additional extended visits to Sargent & Lundy of fices by various team reviewers.
The completed work is documented in this report. The main body of the report describes the overall approach, results, and conclusions.
Appendix A identifies the IDR open items relevant to HELB/MELB. Appendices B, C, and D document the depth of review of each open item. Appendi( E contains the IDR Observation Reports, related Resolution Reports, and Completion Reports.
t.
RESULTS
-c.
Th'e review team has determined from the Supplementary Review that all issues identified as open items in ors 55, 57,-64, and 73 have been resolved.
The resolution for each of the 27 identified open items is summarized in Appendix A.
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09/85 Rev. 0
Sixteen of the items were resolved through completion of the analysis, production of new or revised calculations, and additional documentation.
Five of the items were resolved with revisions to the FSAR or clarification of the NRC position on methodology.
The remaining six items related to the design change process and were satisfactorily resolved with the implementation of Clinton Project Instruction PI-CP-75, " Senior Designer:
Review Process."
CONCLUSIONS All review items which were not completely resolved during the IDR in the HELB/MELB area have been evaluated again on the basis of current design status. The Supplementary Review has concluded that all these issues have been resolved satisfactorily, subject to NRC review and acceptance of the FSAR revisions. Therefore, it is the assessment of the review team that the Clinton Power Station is adequately designed for HELB/MELB ef fects.
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09/85 Rev. O
INTRODUCTION OVERVIEW In January 1985, Bechtel Power Corporation (BPC) submitted a final report documenting the Independent Design Review (IDR) of the Sargent and Lundy (S8L) design of the Illinois Power Company's (IPC) Clinton Power Station (CPS).
It was recognized at the start of the IDR that CPS design work was still in progress. Specifically, in the area of high energy line break and moderate energy line break (HELB/ELB) design, it was found that additional work remained to be done and, in some of the completed work, insufficient documentation existed to provide sufficient assurance of design adequacy.
The
-IDR Final Report thus concluded that the HELB/ELB design was incomplete in its existing form, and final design review conclusions as to its design adequacy should be deferred until commitments made as a result of IDR were implemented. These commitments were documented in IDR Observation Reports 55, 57, 64, and 73.
In May 1985, with the HELB/ELB design nearing completion, IPC requested Bechtel to conduct a Supplementary Review (SR) with the purpose of reaching a f_inal conclusion regarding the adequacy of the HELB/ELB work.
This report documents the results of the HELB/ELB Supplementary Review.
It identifies the concerns expressed in the IDR Final Report, records the review conducted by the review team, and reports the resolution of each of these Finally, this report arrives at a conclusion regarding the design concerns.
adequacy of the Clinton Power Station in the HELB/ELB area.
The appendices herein provide details of the review. Appendix A identifies i
the.open items from the IDR Final R6 port. Appendices B, C, arid D provide details of the open items reviewed for pipe whip and jet impingement, spray, and flood effects, respectively.
Finally, Appendix E contains the Observation Reports, related Resolution Reports, and Completion Reports.
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us C
HELB/MELB OPEN ITEMS As part of the licensing process, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission requires that nuclear power plants be protected against the dynamic effects associated with the postulated rupture of piping. Normally operating high and moderate energy fluid systems are selected for the postulated piping failures. The piping failure effects considered are pipe whip, jet impingement, spray, flooding, pressurization, and temperature effects.
Coincident with the piping failure, CPS has comitted to consider the occurrence of the failure of a single active component, a safe shutdown earthquake, and a loss of offsite power. Given the above requirements and comitments, the purpose of the HELB/MELB analysis is to ensure that the l
safety functions of essential systems, structures, and components will not be l
impaired beyond whatever is required to bring the plant to a safe shutoown. A complete and well documented design which meets FSAR comitments, uses correct methodology, and demonstrates a controlled design process will allow the reviewer to confirm that safe shutdown is ensured.
As of April 1, 1984, the cutoff date for design work considered in the IDR, much of the S&L HELB/MELB design work was complete. The IDR did find HELB/MELB design and documentation adequate in many aspects, such as pressure and temperature transient analysis, and pipe whip restraint design. However, other areas were found inadequate and four Observation Reports (OR) were written covering HELB (pipe whip and jet impingement) analysis outside the drywell (OR 55), HELB analysis inside the drywell (0R 73), MELB spray effects (OR 57), and HELB/MELB flood effects (0R 64). For convenience, copies of the ors, the subsequent Resolution Reports submitted by S&L, and the Completion Reports written by Bechtal are provided in Appendix E of this report.
A list of 27 open items carried forward from the IDR was obtained by reviewing the OR documentation. These 27 open items (and their SR resolutions) are identified in Appendix A of this report. These open items formed the basis of the Supplementary Review.
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Rev. O
Appendix A (Page A-2) also provides a tabulation of the open items categorized by the type of resolution to be performed by S&L to close out these items.
CONDUCT OF THE SUPPLEMENTARY REVIEW The HELB/MELB Supplementary Review was conducted by a team of qualified Bechtel personnel including key members of the previous IDR review team.
It was conducted under the direction of Bechtel Power Management.
Short-term technical assistance was provided, as necessary, by other Bechtel personnel in the areas of pipe break and safe shutdown analysis and in structural engineering.
Communication between S&L and Bechtel personnel provided the technical information necessary to reach conclusions. These conclusions were based on available evidence and information and were not restricted to the information in existence at the start of the SR.
S&L design documentation was used as the basis for the conclusions.
The review team attempted to be fully responsive to all open items, ensurii g that they were resolved in a technically i
satisfactory manner. All conclusions were independently reached without participation of S&L or IPC.
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09/85 Rev. O
i DESCRIPTION OF THE REVIEW GENERAL The IDR open items identified in Appendix A were evaluated based on the current design status. Many of these items could be addressed by confirming that the S&L documentation showed that the Clinton Power Station could be safely shut down.following postulated HELBs and MELBs.
In these cases, specific break locations or plant areas were independently chosen by the SR reviewer and the necessary documentation was reviewed to confirm that safe shutdown had been demonstrated.
Certain of the open items, such as the need to revise part of the FSAR, do not relate directly to the evaluation of safe shutdown capability, and could not be resolved by the above method of examining specific line break effects.
In these cases, the review was tailored to address the specific open item.
For each of the open items, the SR resolution.is given in Appendix A, along with the cross reference to the review details given in Appendices B, C and D as follows:
o Appendix B - HELB Pipe Whip and Jet Impingement. Open Items 1 through 11 (0Rs 55 and 73) o Appendix C - MELB Spray. Open Items 12 through 18 (OR 57) o Appendix 0 - HELB/MELB Flooding. Open Items 19 through 27 (0R64)
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1 Appendices B, C, and D evaluate the open items against acceptance criteria and
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arrive at an acceptability determination. A listing of the S&L documentation examined in the course of the review and pertinent comments are also given for each open item. Because of the hundreds of documents created by S&L in the HELB analysis', checklists were used to aid in the SR. These hsts appear at the end of Appendix B.
Checklists were not employed in the SR of flooding ar.d MELB spray because the S&L analyses were centralized in a few documents.
09/85 SP:0223f 6
a.rt. 0
HELB PIPE WHIP AND JET IMPINGEMENT REVIEW To address the adequacy of the HELB pipe whip and jet impingement design, the SR consisted of:
o Independently selecting breaks on piping located inside and outside the drywell o
Identifying the essential systems and structures which are required to remain functional to assure safe shutdown o
Developing a standardized checklist that would list the essential systems and_ structures and aid the reviewer in determining that these essential items remain functional Identifying the existing analysis documentat' ion o
(calculations, drawings, etc.); S&L filled in this i
information o
Reviewing this information to confirm the adequacy of the process used by S&L and the ability to achieve safe shutdown for the cases selected Appendix B documents the above review.
A total of ten pipe breaks were reviewed, using checklists to providc organization and documentation. The ten completed checklists are provided in Appendix B and provide detailed backup for the review of the S&L HELB design process and design adequacy.
Certain HELB issues required additional work and documentation by S&L to satisfy the reviewers. These issues related to jet effects on drywell structural steel, jet effects on hydrogen ignitor cables, and break point elimination. As noted in Appendix B, the added work was reviewed and found acceptable.
The results of the SR for HELB pipe whip and jet impingement design are as follows:
o The S&L evaluations for all plant areas inside and outside the drywell are documented. These evaluations show and the SR confirmed, on a sample basis, that the plant can be safely shut down, assuming both the loss of offsite power and a single active failure.
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Rev. O
An acceptable design change review process which covers.the o
effects of HELB has been instituted.
o Revisions to FSAR Section 3.6 that adequately update the FSAR for the HELB analyses have been submitted to IPC.
i MELB SPRAY REVIEW To address the adequacy of the MELB spray design, the SR consisted of:
o Reviewing the S&L spray analysis to determine if all required plant areas had been analyzed and sufficiently documented Confirming that the single failure and loss of offsite power o
criteria had been properly applied and that MELB effects in HELB areas were examined o
Reviewing the design change control program o
Determining if the spray sections of the CPS FSAR are being updated
' Appendix C documents the above review.
Two MELB spray issues required FSAR revisions to satisfy the reviewers: (1) to clarify the analytical method employed to show design adequacy in the Class lE switchgear area (i.e., stress analysis), and-(2) to identify the S&L assumption that the MELB spray effects are analogous to the effects of 100 percent relative humidity. As noted in Appendix C,'the revised wording f
was reviewed and found acceptable.
The results'of the SR for MELB spray design are as follows:
o The documentation of the spray evaluations for all safety-related areas of the plant is complete.
o The S&L evaluations show and the SR confirmed, on a sample basis, that the plant can be safely shut down assuming botn the loss of offsite power and a single active failure.
o The MELB effects in HELB areas have been considered adequately by S&L.
An acceptable design change review process covering the o
effects of MELB spray has been instituted.
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a,r.. O
o Revisions to FSAR Section 3.6 which adequately update the FSAR for the MELB spray analysis have been submitted to IPC.
HELB/MELB FLOODING REVIEW To address the issue of the adequacy of the HELB/MELB flooding design, the SR consisted of:
o Reviewing the entire flood level calculations to determine if the methodology and the calculated maximum flood heights for a sample of plant areas were acceptable o
Reviewing the entire safe shutdown analysis for several independently selected plant areas where safe shutdown equipment has been identified as submerged o
Reviewing a sample of the structural calculations for plant areas which had high maximum flood levels, large structur61 panels, and possible local problems such as compartments which flood completely o
Confirming from this information that the process used by -
S&L and the demonstrated ability to achieve safe shutdown is adequate for the flood levels experienced Appendix 0 documents the above review.
The open items which could not be resolved by the above review processes (Items 23, 24, and 27) were addressed by a specifically tailored review and accordingly are covered in Appendix D.
Certain flooding issues required additional work and documentation by S&L to satisfy the reviewers. These issues related to the capability of block walls to withstand flooding, the elimination of previously postulated break locations using stress analysis or extension of pipe break exclusion zones, and the clear identification of the equipment flooded and its effect on shutdown capability. As noted in Appendix D, the added documentation confirmed that the existing design was adequate.
It should be noted that discussions are currently in progress between S&L, IPC, and the NRC to ensure that the proposed extension of the break exclusion zones is acceptable.
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Rev. O
Tne results of the SR for flooding are as follows:
o Flood level and structural load calculaticns and safe shutdown analyses are shown to be well documented, This information shows, and the SR confirmed, that the plant o
can be safely shut down, assuming a single active failure and a loss of offsite power.
Both seismically and non-seismically qualified piping have o
been evaluated as potential flood sources, The FSAR flooding discussions have been adequately updated o
and submitted to IPC.
An acceptable design change review process covering the o
effects of flooding has been instituted.
l 09/85 SP:0223f 10 xev. u
CONCLUSIONS The documentation of the HELB/PELB analysis is in place and covers all required plant areas for the effects of pipe whip, jet impingement, spray, and flooding. Recently, a design change control program has been instituted by S&L'which acceptably reviews future plant design changes for the effects of pipe break on safe shutdown items. The parts of the FSAR covering pipe break are being updated to adequately reflect the criteria used and the results obtained.
The Supplementary Review has determined that all issues identified as open items in ors 55, 57, 64, and 73 have been resolved satisfactorily, subject to NRC review and acceptance of the FSAR revisions.
From a detailed review of the HELB/MELB documentation, the SR team found:
o In all cases selected, it was shown that the plant is protected against postulated pipe break effects so that safe shutdown is achievable.
o The methodology and control of the design process by S&L was acceptable.
It is concluded that the plant has been adequately analyzed for postulated pipe break effects on high and moderate energy lines.
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SP:0223f 11 09/85 Rev. O
Appendix A IDR FINAL REPORT OPEN ITEMS Appendix A identifies the 27 Independent Design Review (IDR) open items pertinent to high energy line break (HELB) pipe whip and jet review (0Rs 55 and 73), moderate energy line break (MELB) spray review (OR 57), and HELB/MELB flooding review (0R 64). The description and supplementary review resolution of each of these items is presented and each is cross-referenced to a subsequent appendix wherein detailed review results are presented.
Page A-2 provides a tabulation of the open items categorized by the type of resolution which was required to be performed by S&L in order to close out these items.
09/85 SP:0165f A-1 Rev. O
TABULATION OF RESOLUTIONS Description of Observation Number /
Resolution Action Appendix A Item Number Provide, modify or 55/1, 2, 3 complete analysis or 57/12, 13, 14, 16, 17 calculations 64/19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 26 l
73/6, 7 Implement program to 55/4 ensure design changes 57/18 l
are considered and 64/21, 27 reevaluated for HELB/
73/8, 9 MELB Revisc FSAR or obtain 55/5 NRC acceptance of 57/15 methodology 64/25 73/10, 11 09/85 SP:0165f A-2 D, g y, Q
APPENDIX A IDR FINAL REPORT OPEN ITEMS Supplementary Review Subject IDR Open Item Supplementary Review Resolution Cross-Reference HELB outside 1.
Prepare documentation of the The pipe whip and jet impingement Appendix B, Item 1 drywell -
HELB pipe whip and jet impinge-evaluations for all plant areas pipe whip and ment engineering evaluations outside the drywell are complete.
jet impingement for all plant areas outside the (OR 55) drywell.
2 In the calculations and Existing calculations conclude that Appendix B, Item 2 supporting documentation, the plant can be safely shut provide sufficient information down.
Using these calculations about the purpose, method, and their supporting documents, the assumptions, design input, SR team examined in detail references, and results to a sample of HELBs outside permit an independent review the drywell and concluded that the for design adequacy.
design was adequate.
3.
For any plant areas where Existing calculations evaluate the Appendix B, Item 3 physical or divisional HELB effects in these plant areas.
separation was not used as the The design adequacy determination basis for ensuring HELB design has been made properly using both the adequacy, describe how accepta-loss of offsite power and single bility was determined.
Include active failure assumptions.
the use of loss of offsite power and single active failure j
assumptions.
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APPENDIX A (Cont'd)
IDR FINAL REPORT OPEN ITEMS Supplementary Review Subject IDR Open Item Supplementary Review Resolution Cross-Reference HELB outside 4.
Implement a program for SR issued a Clinton Project Appendix B, Item 4 drywell - pipe reviewing future design changes Instruction PI-CP-75, Rev. O, whip and jet for the effects of pipe break.'
" Senior iv.:igner: Review Process,"
impingement to revir-s 4 U iSysical changes for (Cont'd) pipe brsak effects including pipe whip-a'd Jet impingement in areas outsiaa tne drywell. This procvJp;e is an adequate process for l
rev'ading future design changes.
E amples were found that it has been l
~.mpl eme.. ced.
5.
Revise FSAR sections on pipe Re isions to FSAR Section 3.6 have Appendix B, Item 5 break to include revised teen drafted by SE and submitted consnitments and analysis to IPC for submittal to the results.
NRC as amendments to the Clinton FSAR. These revisions adequately update the FSAR for the pipe break analyses outside the d rywell.
HELB inside 6.
Complete the HELc F.41ysis for The pipe whip and jet impingement Appendix B, Item 6 drywell -
all lines. List d i the EMD, analyses are complete for all high pipe whip and SED, PMD, etc. ca.'culations energy lines in the drywell.
jet impingement which constif ate tJiis complete (OR 73) analysis.
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APPENDIX A (Cont'd)
IDR FINAL REPORT OPEN ITEMS Supplementary Review Subject IDR Open Item Supplementary Review Resolution Cross-Reference HELB inside 7.
In the calculations and Existing calculations conclude Appendix B, Item 7 drywell'- pipe supporting documentation, that the plant can be safely shut whip and jet provide sufficient information down. Using these calculations impingement about the purpose, method, and their supporting documents, the (Cont'd) assumptions, design input, SR team examined in detail l
references, and results to a sample of HELBs inside the permit an independent review drywell and concluded that the for design adequacy.
design was adequate.
8.
Verify that all calculations All but two of the HELB effects Appendix B, Item 8
-are current and valid, in order calculations have been revised since to ensure that plant design 5/3/85.
The two remaining calculations changes made since the are being tracked by IPC to ensure calculation was performed completion. All plant design have not adversely affected changes occurring after 5/3/85 will be its results.
reviewed for effects on the HELB analysis under the PI-CP-75 review process.
9.
Provide a design change control S&L issued a Clinton Pr) ject Instruction Appendix B, Item 9 program that would ensure that PI-CP-75, Rev. O, "Seni3r Designer:
future design changes will be Review Process," to review all physical evaluated for their effect in changes for pipe break affects including safe shutdown.
pipe whip and jet impingement inside the drywell. This procedure is an adequate process for reviewing future design changes. Examples were found of its implementation.
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APPENDIX A (Cont'd)
IDR FINAL REPORT OPEN ITEMS Supplementary Review Subject IDR Open Item Supplementary Review Resolution Cross-Reference HELB inside 10.
For the calculation of jet This method has been approved for
. Appendix B, Item 10 drywell - pipe loads on essential items, use on Clinton by the NRC.
whip and jet determine if the NUREG/CR-2913 impingement methodology used by S&L has (Cont'd) been fully accepted by the NRC.
been drafted by S&L and submitted to IPC for submittal to the o
Figures and tables NRC as amendments to the Clinton showing the final break FSAR. These revisions adequately types and locations cover the four open items.
o Figures showing the final restraint locations o
Description of the analyses results in the attachments o
Jet load calculations using tAJREG/CR-2913 SP:0150f 09/85 A-6 Rev. O
APPENDIX A (Cont'd).
IDR FINAL REPORT OPEN ITEMS 1
Supplementary Review Subject IDR Open Item Supplementary Review Resolution Cross-Reference MELB spray
- 12. Prepare a documented. analysis S&L has prepared a report, "IIELB Jet Appendix C, Item 12 (OR 57) for all plant areas where Impingement and MELB Spray Summary postulated MELBs occur, Report," which provides a summary of covering the effect spray the S&L analyses for areas where spray has on safety-related components. fro?. NELBs may affect safety-related components. This summary is supported by a number of design documents, including calculations, which comprise the documented analyses.
Appendix D addresses the verification of.the S&L determination of equipment and components necessary to achieve safe shutdown.
13.
In the resultant supporting In its supporting documentation Appendix C, Item 13 documentation, provide for spray effects resulting from sufficient information about the a MELB, S&L has provided purpose, method, assumptions, information about the purpose, design input, references, and method, assumptions, design input, results'to permit an independent references, and results.
review for design adequacy.
i S&L's conclusions in MELB spray calculations were reviewed and found technically adequate.
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APPENDIX A (Cont'd)
IDR FINAL REPORT OPEN ITEMS Supplementary Review Subject IDR Open Item Supplementary Review Resolution Cross-Reference MELB spray
- 14. Undocumented use of engineering S&L has modified Calculation OlME4 to Appendix C, Item 14 (Cont'd) judgment in Calculation OlME4 specify the S&L application of the results in an inability to single active failure and loss of verify the calculation offsite power criteria, conclusions and the proper application of the single active failure and loss of offsite power criteria.
- 15. MELB effects in HELB areas were The sample selected for review in Appendix C, Item 15 not examined. This is the areas noted confirmed the design acceptable only if the HELB adequacy of the S&L practice of not effects are more limiting in evaluating MELB effects in HELB those plant areas.
It is not areas. No cases were identified clear from the documentation relative to MELB spray where HELB reviewed that this is the case effects were not more limiting.
in such areas as the auxiliary building, main steam tunnel, and containment annulus.
16.
Because Calculation OlME4 was The SR did not identify any specific Appendix C, Item 16 completed in July 1982, design changes required.
changes made after its completion must be evaluated in The S&L process for reviewing such order to determine their impact changes was tested separately and found on the adequacy of this satisfactory.
calculation.
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APPENDIX A (Cont'd)
IDR FINAL REPORT OPEN ITEMS Supplementary Review Subject IDR Open Item Supplementary Review Resolution Cross-Reference ELB s ay 17.
Initiate revisions, as As a part of the ELB spray Appendix C, Item 17 (Cont'd appropriate, to the FSAR SR, in process FSAR sections on pipe rupture to-revisions were reviewed in include revised commitments draft form and found satisfactory.
and/or analysis results.
- 18. Implement a program to review S&L has implemented a program for Appendix C, Item 18 future design changes for the review of future changes for spray spray effects from postulated effects as well as other HELB/MELB pipe breaks; this program will effects.
be controlled by a project procedure.
HELB/MELB
- 19. Provide documentation of a flood S&L Calculation 3C10-0485.001, Rev. O.
. Appendix D, Item 19 flooding evaluation for all HELB/MELB Flood levels for all areas of all (OR 64) in all areas of safety-related the buildings have been evaluated buildings.
for all high and moderate postulated energy line breaks.
- 20. Provide documentation which.is S&L Calculation OlME77, Rev.1.
Appendix D, Item 20 sufficiently detailed to allow a All safety-essential components reviewer to verify that safe shut-which could be submerged during a down can be achieved and that the postulated flood event are single active failure and loss of identified. The safe shutdown of offsite power criteria have capability is demonstrated in suf-been properly applied.
ficient detail to the reviewers during the verification process and the safe shutdown analysis is found adequate.
SP:0IS0f 09/85 A-9 Rev. O
APPENDIX A (Cont'd)
IDR FINAL REPORT OPEN ITEMS Supplementary Review
-Subject IDR Open Item Supplementary Review Resolution Cross-Reference HELB/MELB
- 21. Provide sufficient documentation It is demonstrated in Calculation Appendix 0, Item 21 flooding to show that the specific OlME77, Rev. I that the flood (Cont'd) flood protection design protection design, as described requirements in Design in flood level Calculation Criteria DC-ME-01-CP, Rev. 4 3C10-0485-001, Rev.-D is adequate and are adequate and correct.-
safe shutdown is 7.chievable in all potential flood events. The Design Criterir. DC-ME-01-CP, Rev. 4 is replaced by a revision to the Project Inciruction PI-CP-75 which wili require a review of the listed maximum flood levels for all areas of safety-related buildings whenever a need for future design l
l changes in those safety-related l
buildings arises.
22.
Provide evidence of an adequate Both Seismic Category I and Non-Appendix D, Item 22 evaluation of flooding impact Seismic Category I piping are of Seismic Category I piping.
evaluated as potential flood sources in the flood level Calculation 3C10-0485-001, Rev. O.
i SP:0150f 09/85 A-10 Rev. O
APPENDIX A (Cont'd)
IDR FINAL REPORT OPEN ITEMS Supplementary Review Subject IDR Open Item Supplementary Review Resolution Cross-Reference HELB/MELB
- 23. Provide justification that areas The internal flood level Calcula-Appendix 0, Item 23 flooding containing both high and.
tion 3C10-0485-001, Rev. 0 (Cont'd) moderate energy lines need assumes.the pipe failure which not be evaluated for MELB would result in the highest flood if they have been evaluated rate. The pipe failure postulated for HELB.
could be from any piping system, including both high and moderate energy lines.
In addition, all HELB whip induced pipe breaks are evaluated as potential flood sources.
- 24. Resolve discrepancies between Discrepancies between FSAR Sections Appendix D, Item 24 FSAR Sections 3.11.9 and D.3.6.4.
3.11.9 and D.3.6.4 have been resolved Provide documentation of the by revisions to these sections.
review process to determine the Revision to Section D.3.6.4 will submergence of certain describe the review process to determine components during accident.
the submergence of the safety-related components in a postulated flood event.
This review is documented in S&L Calculation OlM377, Rev. 1, which lists all submerged safety-related components.
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SP:0150f
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^~II Rev. O
APPENDIX A (Cont'd)
IDR FINAL REPORT OPEN ITEMS Supplementary Review Subject IDR Open Item Supplementary Review Resolution Cross-Reference HELB/MELB
- 25. Provide justification for the FSAR Section D3.6.3.5.
The flood Appendix D, Item 25 flooding existence of. doors between the level calculation does not (Cont'd) standby diesel generator rooms take credit for these openings and the HPCS diesel generator to reduce flood height in those room.
rooms. An adequate floor drainage system keeps the maximum flood level to about 3 inches for those r60ms. FSAR Section D3.6.3.5 will be revised to show existence of doors. A review of the draft of Section D3.6.3.5 found it adequate.
- 26. Provide explanation for using Calculation OlME3, Rev. 1.
Appendix D, Item 26 a lake level of 677' instead Rev.1 of Calculation OlME3 of the maximum level of 697' in assumes the maximum lake level l
Calculation OlME3. Resolution of 697'. The resulting flood could impact evaluation of rate is then used in flood level flooding effects.
Calculation 3C-10-0485-001, l
Rev. O.
27.
Implement a program to review PI-CP-75, Rev.1. includes tables Appendix 0, Item 27 future design changes for flooding listing maximum flood levels effects from postulated pipe for all areas in all safety-breaks.
related buildings. Review of these flood levels is required s
by PI-CP-75 when design changes are needed in these safety-related buildings.
SP:0150f A-12 09/85 Rev. O
Appendix B' l
HELB PIPE WHIP AND JET IMPINGEMENT REVIEW Appendix B provides the detailed supplementary review results of the high energy line break (HELB) effects due to pipe whip and jet impingement.
During the IDR, two Observation Reports were written on this subject: OR 55 for line breaks located outside the drywell and OR 73 for line breaks inside the drywell.
For these two ors, a total of 11 open items (Items 1 through 11, Appendix A) could not be resolved with the documentation in existence at the time of the IDR. Since that time, S&L has addressed these issues by f
(a) completing the HELB analyses and its documentation, (b) developing a design change review procedure to identify HELB effects, and (c) submitting l
changes to the pipe break section of the Clinton FSAR.
The SR of the S&L HELB design process and the design adequacy in achieving safe shutdown was performed by a detailed review of a sample of postulated pipe breaks. Ten pipe breaks were selected and either jet or whip aspects analyzed to ensure that all essential systems, structures, and components were protected. These reviews were organized and documented by the use of a standardized checklist.
l l
Appendix B also contains the completed checklists documenting this review.
09/85 SP:0155f B-1 Rev. u
APPENDIX B HELB PIPE WHIP AND JET IMPINGEMENT REVIEW
- Area Reviewed Acceptance Acceptability for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No
- 1. Documentation of A pipe whip and jet "HELB Jet Impingement and MELB Spray Summary HELB effects for impingement evaluation is Report, Clinton Power Station Unit 1,"
lines outside documented for each plant June 4, 1985 drywell (OR 55) area containing safety-related items and high
" Design for Postulated Pipe Rupture Summary energy lines.
Report, Clinton Power Station Unit 1,"
August 1, 1985 Calculations:
OlME55 Rev. O SDQ12-26DG07 Rev. 5 EMD 049453 Rev. 01 EMD 053625 Rev. 00 EMD 021555 Rev. 0 EMD 052987 Rev. 00 OlME40 Rev. 0 OlME46 Rev. O SDQ10-96DG27 Rev. 0 EMD 022417 Rev. 01 DIT-CP-MDD-1431 7/9/85 OlME64 Rev. O DIT-CP-MDD-1409 7/2/85 OlME58 Rev. 0 EPED 19-AI-17 Rev. 0 l
09/85 Si:0153f Rev. O B-2
N APPENDIX B (Cont'd)
HELB PIPE WHIP AND JET IMPINGEMENT REVIEW Area Reviewed Acceptance Acceptability for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Canments Yes No
- 1. Documentation of Sargent & Lundy prepared the two summary X
HELB effects for reports cited above which address the lines outside plant design for pipe whip and jet impingement effects resulting from HELB.
drywell(Cont'd)
The HELB design requires a large amount of J
work performed over a long period of time by several separate S&L engineering disciplines. These evaluations are documented in hundreds of calculations, etc. These two reports describe the design criteria, evaluation methodology, essential systems and, for each area of the plant, list the applicable calculations. Final calculations exist for the containment and the auxiliary, control, and fuel buildings. Other areas of the plant that did not need analysis because of the lack of either safety-related items or high energy lines are also discussed for completeness.
These summary reports organize this information, demonstrating that the HELB evaluations were organized and comprehensive.
09/85 SF:0lS3f Rev. 0 B-3
APPENDIX B (Cont'd)
HELB PLPE WHIP AND JET IMPINGEMENT REVIEW Acceptability i
Area Reviewed Acceptance for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No
- 1. Documentation of In the IDR it was noted that S&L did not HELB effects for have complete documentation of their HELB lines outside analysis in the auxiliary building steam drywell (Cont'd) tunnel and in the ECCS cubicles in the auxiliary building. Documentation has since been prepared. The summary report shows that mechanical, electrical, and structural calculations are now in existence for these areas.
The calculations listed above were reviewed l
in detail during the SR. From the combination of the information presented in the summary reports and the detailed review of a sample of the HELB evaluation, it was concluded that the pipe whip and jet i
impingement evaluations for all plant areas l
outside the drywell are complete.
- 2. Design adequacy of Documentation is sufficient Same documents as listed in No. I above, j
HELB analysis for to confirm that the plant plus the following:
piping outside can safely shut down in drywell (0R SE) accordance with FSAR commitments.
i l
i i
l I
09/85 l
SI:0153f Rev. O
^
B-4 J
APPENDIX B (Cent'd)
HELB PIPE WHIP AND JET IMPINGEMENT REVIEW Area Reviewed Acceptance Acceptability for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Connents Yes No
- 2. Design adequacy of M05-1076 Rev. T HELB analysis for M27-1002-01 A Rev. F piping outside M27-1002-04A Rev. F drywell(Cont'd)
M27-1719K Rev. G M27-1726K Rev. P S27-1422 Rev. P S27-1938 Rev. N S27-1200-03A Rev. E S27-1002-01A Rev. AZ S27-1002-04A Rev. BE E26-1003-02A-EI Rev. T E26-1604A-El Rev. L E26-16048-EI Rev. G E26-1612-EI Rev. K E26-1613-EI Rev. S E26-1620-EI Rev. L M26-1002-02A Rev. F M26-1001-028 Rev. F M26-1003-02AK Sheet 1 Rev. AE M26-1002-02AK Sheet 2 Rev. T M26-1002-02AK Sheet 3 Rev. E S26-1002-02A Rev. Z S26-1201-028 Rev. L NRC letter to IPC, " Elimination of Arbitrary Intermediate Pipe Breaks," 7/12/85 IPC letter to S&L, " Jet Impingement - Sandia Report," 10/2/84 IPC letter to NRC, " CPS Postulated Piping Failures - SER Outstanding Issues #5," 6/7/85 SF 0153f 09/85 B-5 Rev. 0
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p APPENDIX B (Ccnt'd)
HELB PIPE WHIP AND JET IMPINGEM".r;T REVIEW Area Reviewed Acceptance Acceptability for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No
- 2. Design adequacy of The calculations and supporting documentation X
HELB analysis for listed above were reviewed in detail by the f
piping outside SR team. These documents provided the key drywell (Cont'd)
HELB pipe whip and jet impingement information for the high energy line break points independently seMeted by the review team.
These break potuts cire in the following systems located outside the drywell:
Pipe System Line Size Location RHR 10" MS Tunnel /RHR HX Room B RWCU 4"
MS Tunnel RWCU 6"
Containment The calculations permitted the SR team to verify that the pipe whip and jet impingement effects from these breaks would not prevent the plant from safely shutting down. The break points were properly postulated in high energy lines by S&L. The extent of pipe whip and jet zone was defined. The essential items were identified and shown to remain functional, assuming that an SSE and a single active failure both occur following the HELB.
A standardized checklist'was created to aid in the SR. For each of the six HELB cases examined outside the drywell, S&L listed the applicable documentation where protection of SF:0153f 09/85 B-6 Rev. O
l APPENDIX B (Cont'd)
HELB PIPE WilP AND JET IPPINGEMENT REVIEW Area Reviewed Acceptance Acceptab111ty for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No
- 2. Design adequacy of essential items was evaluated. The reviewer HELB analysis for examined each document for adequacy.
piping outside drywell (Cont'd)
The number of postulated HELBs has been. reduced
'by S&L as the Clinton design progressed.
Various methods used included using breaks at every.
fitting, using stress analysis criteria, and eliminating breaks at arbitrary intermediate points and terminal ends at closed valves. The final list of break points is given in S&L Calculation EMD 053625, Rev. O, " Identification of Mandatory and Arbitrary Intermediate Breaks." S&L has submitted revised FSAR Section 3.6 figures and text to IPC for inclusion in a future amendment to the CPS FSAR.
For jet impingement evaluations, NUREG/CR-2913-practices were used by S&L in calculations performed af ter 4/84. This methodology was authorized by IPC in a letter to S&L dated 10/2/84.
IPC notified the NRC of this practice in a 6/7/85 letter and revised the FSAR Section 3.6 l
wording to reflect this in Amendment 34. This methodology was recently accepted for use on Clinton by the NRC.
Outside the drywell, physical separation of high energy piping and essential systems has been used to a great extent to provide the necessary protection. Therefore, many of the essential systems are not located near high energy lines.
l This is seen repeatedly in the checklists.
l l
Sr:0153f 09/85 B-7 Rev. O
APPENDIX B (Cent'd)
HELB PIPE WHIP AND JET IMPINGEMENT REVIEW l
Area Reviewed Acceptance Acceptability for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No
- 2. Design adequacy of
' Jet impingement and' pipe whip impact on HELB analysis for essential structures generally is not avoided piping outside outside the drywell by physical separation.
drywell (Cont'd)
The SR examined these structural effects in the-RWCU compartments and the auxiliary building steam tunnel. Calculations were reviewed for compliance with FSAR commitments, references for analytical methods and input loads, and resulting margins available in the design.
These analyses were shown to be conducted in a conservative manner with the designs capable of withstanding the loads from the HELB events.
The reviewer.noted that the Clinton FSAR references the Petry formula for missile input effects in Section 3.5.3 but S&L was using.the modified NDRC formula that is current industry i
practice and is accepted by SRP 3.5.3.
For clarification, S&L submitted to IPC a revision to FSAR Section 3.5.3 to reference using the modified NDRC formula.
The reviewer found that the jet impingement and pipe whip impact effects were properly analyzed in the structural calculations.
In fact, one example was found which clearly demonstrated good design process control by S&L.
In this case S&L found that one wall of the RWCU compartment was marginal for the original pipe whip load. A more refined analysis using acceptable methodology lowered impact velocity l
and energy, indicating that the original design of the wall was adequate.
SF:0153f 09/85 B-8 Rev. O l
c APPENDIX B (Ccn't'd)
HELB PIPE WHIP AND JET IMPINGEMENT REVIEW I
f l
Area Reviewed Acceptance Acceptability l
for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No
- 3. Loss.of offsite LOSP and SAF assumptions "HELB Jet Impingement and MELB Spray Summary power and single used in evaluating HELB Report, Clinton Power Station Unit 1,"
active failure
' effects outside the drywell.
June 4, 19ES assumptions (OR 55)
" Design for Postulated Pipe Rupture Summary Report, Clinton Power Station Unit 1,"
August 1, 1985 OlME55 Rev. 0 l
OlME40 Rev. O l
01ME46 Rev. 0 OlME58 Rev. 0 EPED 19-AI-17 Rev. 0 OlME64 Rev. O Both of the summary reports cited above state clearly that the SAF and LOSP l
assumptions are made in the evaluation of HELB effects.
09/85 SF:0153f B-9 Rev. O
I i
APPENDIX B (Cont'd)
HELB PIPE WHIP AND JET IWINGEMENT REVIEW Area Reviewed Acceptance Acceptability for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Coments Yes No
- 3. Loss of offsite power The LOSP assumption follows from the assumed X
and single active occurrence of a safe shutdown earthquake failure assumptions which would result in the loss of all (Cont'd) non-safety related equipment, including offsite power.
l The actual implementation of these l
assumptions was verified by the checklist l
method in the supplementary review of the i
HELB analyses listed above. These S&L analyses document that the required essential systems remain functional following the postulated HELB, assuming LOSP and an SAF.
- 4. Design change review A controlled process in PI-CP-75, Rev. O, 5/3/85, " Senior Designer:
for pipe break existence to evaluate plant Review Process" effects (OR 55) design changes for pipe break effects.
S&L Review Log for PI-CP-75 covering the l
period from 5/21/85 to 8/13/85 Completed PI-CP-75 Pipe Whip Checklist dated 7/18/85 for Drawings M07-1078-1 and M07-1078-2 1
09/85 SF:0153f Rev. O B-10
f l
l APPENDIX B (Cont'd)
HELB PIPE WHIP AND JET IW INGEMENT REVIEW Area Reviewed Acceptance Acceptability for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Coments Yes No
- 4. Design change review This new Clinton specific Project Instruction X
for pipe break establishes the requirements for an effects (Cont'd) additional level of review for all physical changes to ensure that any plant design changes do not violate the specific desigr.
bases. Physical changes in the plant as shown on cable tray, electrical installation, instrumentation piping, flood protection, sleeve and penetration, piping system, and HVAC duct drawings are reviewed by a senior designer using a checklist given in PI-CP-75. All apparent violations identified by the senior designer are forwarded to the responsible engineer for resolution. Any changes required as a result of this review must be submitted to the responsible division for incorporation in accordance with normal S&L standards and other Clinton Project Instructions. The SR team concludes that this procedure would adequately identify and disposition design problems caused by pipe l
break effects.
This design change review process is controlled because it is covered by a formal written instruction, the process followed is documented, and quality control audits can be performed.
l 09/85 SF:0153f B-11 Rev. O
APPENDIX B (Cent'd)
HELB PIPE WHIP AND JET IMPINGEMENT REVIEW I
l Acceptability t
(
Area Reviewed Acceptance l
for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No
- 4. Design change review There are separate checklists for jet for pipe break impingement and pipe whip. Both of these effects (Cont'd) lists would enable the senior designer to l
l identify whether previous pipe break analyses may be affected by the design change. The responsible engineer then completes the review, signs off and, if necessary, identifies a drawing revision for incorporation.
Finally, the SR team sought evidence that X
this Project Instruction had been implemented. The PI-CP-75 Review Log for the period from 5/21/85 to 8/13/85 was examined. During that time, over 440 drawings had been reviewed, with 28 drawings requiring checklist review. The pipe whip checklist for Drawings M07-1078-1, Rev.11 and M07-1078-2, Rev. K was examined by the SR team. The implementation of PI-CP-75 was found acceptable.
- 5. FSAR Section 3.6 Actual or draft changes to Clinton FSAR Section 3.6, " Protection Against (OR 55)
FSAR accurately reflect the Dynamic Effects Associated with the design conditions.
Postulated Rupture of Piping," including Amendment 34, July 1985 S&L Letter SLLI-1323, 8/9/85, "FSAR Attachment D3.6, Draft Revisions" NRC letter to IPC, " Elimination of Arbitrary Intermediate Pipe Breaks," 7/12/85 SF:0153f 09/85 B-12 pey, o
APPENDIX B (Cont d)
HELB PIPE WHIP AND JET IMPINGEMENT REVIEW l
l Area Reviewed Acceptance Acceptability for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No Se FSAR Section 3.6 EMD 053625, Rev. 00, 7/3/85, " Identification (Cont'd) of Mandatory and Arbitrary Intermediate Breaks" l
S&L Letter SLLI-1320, 8/7/85, "FSAR l
Subsection D3.6.4, Draft Revision" The SR team examined Amendnent 34 and the X
the draft FSAR revisions noted above with the following results:
1.
As reflected in the final postulated break points given in EMD 053625, terminal ends are no longer postulated at the boundary of high energy systems at closed isolation valves. The FSAR text has been revised to delete this criterion (FSAR Amendment 34, Page 3.6-3).
S&L has justified this by extending the logic used in the NRC approved elimination of arbitrary intermediate breaks. These break points are arbitrary in the sense that they are not points of high stress.
2.
Postulated high energy line break point locations and break exclusion areas are shown in revised Figures 83.6-1 through B3.6-28, Tables 83.6-1 through B3.6-18A of FSAR Amendment 34 Some changes in the number of postulated break points occurred after Amendment 34 was finalized.
The 09/85 S T:0153f Rev. O B-13
APPENDIX B (Cent'd)
HELB PIPE WHIP AND JET IPPINGEMENT REVIEW l
l Acceptability Area Reviewed Acceptance for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No locations are given in Calculation
- 5. FSAR Section 3.6 EMD 053625. This information shows the (Cont'd) reduced number of break points. postulated in the final pipe break analysis using final stress analyses instead of breaks at fittings, and by the elimination of arbitrary intermediate breaks, and breaks at terminal ends at closed valves. This information has been submitted to IPC by S&L and will be added in a future FSAR Amendment.
3.
Jet impingement load calculations prepared after 4/1/84 use NJREG/CR-2913 "Two-Phase l
Jet Loads" methodology. This is based on a multidimensional computer study which I
accounts for the shock effects of the jet / target interface (FSAR Amendment 34, j
Page 3.6-36). This method is less conservative than the previous FSAR I
commitment and has been recently approved for use on Clinton by the NRC.
j t
4.
Table 3.6-2, "High Energy Fluid Systems,"
was revised to add Post Accident Sampling and Containment Monitoring Systems.
1 5.
Attachment D3.6, " Summary of Failure Mode i
Analysis for Pipe Breaks and Cracks," has been updated to reflect the results of the completed pipe break jet impingement and SI:0153f 09/85 B-14 pey, o
F APPENDIX B (Cont'd)
HELB PIPE WHIP AND JET IWINGEMENT REVIEW Area Reviewed Acceptance
~
Acceptability for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No
- 5. FSAR Section 3.6 pipe whip analyses. Sections 03.6.2.7.5, (Cont'd)
"RHR Heat Exchanger Rooms," D3.6.2.1.4, "Inside the Auxiliary Building Main Steam Tunnel," and D3.6.2.8.3, "RWCU System Inside and Outside Containment," have been updated. These descriptions agree with the results given in the calculations reviewed l
by the SR team in its vertical review.
- 6. Documentation of A pipe whip and jet impinge-
"HELB Jet Impingement and MELB Spray Summary l
HELB effects for ment analysis is documented Report, Clinton Power Station, Unit 1,"
l lines inside for each high energy line June 4, 1985 drywell (OR 73) inside the drywell.
" Design for Postulated Pipe Rupture Summary Report, Clinton Power Station, Unit 1,"
August 1, 1985 EMD 049318 Rev. 3 l
OlME09 Rev. 1 EMD 041874 Rev. 0 OlME06 Rev. 3 OlME56 Rev. 0 OlHE38 Rev. 0 OlME07 Rev. 1 l
01ME69 Rev. 0 OlME37 Rev. 0 SDQ12-25DG07 Rev. 7 SD)12-24DG12 Later OlME36 Rev. 0 EMD 048911 Rev. 3 01ME08 Rev. 1 S!:0153f 09/85 B-15 Rev. 0
APPENDlX B (Ccnt'd)
HELB PIPE WHIP AND JET IWINGEMENT REVIEW Area Reviewed Acceptance Acceptability for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Coments Yes No
- 6. Documentation of SDQ12-54DG39 Rev. 8 HELB effects for 50012-51DG04 Rev. 0 lines inside drywell OlME60 Rev. 00 (Cont'd)
EMD 014937 Later l
GE 22A7193 Rev. 0 X
Sargent & Lundy prepared the two summary X
reports cited above which address the plant l
design for pipe whip and jet impingement effects resulting from HELB inside the drywell. These reports describe the design criteria, evaluation methodology, essential systems, and, for each area of the plant, list the applicable mechanical, electrical, and structural calculations. Final calculations exist for the inside of the drywell HELBs. Because the complete HELB analysis for each postulated break is documented in several calculations, the summary reports assist the reviewer by organizing the information and identifying the specific calculation numbers.
Breaks within the drywell are postulat~1 to occur in the following high energy lines:
main steam, feedwater, reactor core isolation cooling, reactor water cleanup, high pressure core spray, low pressure core spray, residual heat removal, nuclear boiler, standby liquid control, and reactor SF:0153f 09/85 B-16 Rev. O j
l APPENDIX B (Cont'd)
HELB PIPE let!P AND JET IfflNGEfENT REVIEW Area Reviewed Acceptance Acceptability for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No i
60 Documentation of recirculation system piping. The control HELB effects for rod drive, post accident sampling, and lines inside drywell containment monitoring systems are high (Cont'd) energy but are not analyzed because of small size or insignificant jet and whip loads.
l l
These 13 systems agree with the list of high energy fluid systems given in FSAR Table 3.6-2 Amendment 34, July 1985.
I The S&L HELB analysis methodology determines the essential items within the drywell and l
evaluates whether there are any jets or whipping pipes that can damage these items.
Therefore, there is no single calculation that documents the HELB effects from HPCS i
breaks.
Instead, there are one or more I
calculations for each essential item that consider effects from breaks from all 10 i
high energy systems.
For this reason, the SR team identified from GE 22A7193, " Mechanical Equipment Separation for Engineered Safety Features," the set of essential items for both large and small line breaks inside the drywell and determined that calculations existed for i
each of these essential items. The i
referenced calculations provide this i
documentation for the pipe whip and jet impingement examples reviewed (HPCS and MFW system breaks).
SI:0153f 09/85 B-17 Rev. 0
APPENDIX B (Cont'd)
HELB PIPE WHIP AND JET IMPINGEMENT REVIEW Area Reviewed Acceptance Acceptability for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No t
- 7. Design adequacy of Documentation is sufficient Same documents as listed in No. I above, plus HELB analysis for to confirm that the essential the following:
lines inside systems and structures drywell (OR 73) remain functional following M27-1602-01B Rev. K postulated HELBs.
M27-1603-OlA Rev. J M27-1602-OlA Rev. K M27-1602-OlBK Rev. T M27-1603-01AK Rev. AA M05-1035, Sh. 1-8 Revs. L, KK, A, A, A, AA, & A M05-1036, Sh. 1&2 Revs. J & M M05-1052, Sh. 2 Rev. R M05-1032, Sh. 3 Rev. L M05-1105, Sh. 1-4 Revs. J. H, C, & C S27-1422 Rev. P S27-1938 Rev. N S27-1200-03A Rev. E S27-1002-01A Rev. AZ I
M05-1074 Rev. T M27-1603-02A Rev. J M27-1603-04A Rev. J M27-1602-04B Rev. J M27-1602-028 Rev. K M27-1603-02AK Rev. Y M27-1603-04AK Rev. N M27-1602-04BK Rev. U M27-1602-02BK Rev. AC 527-1003-02A Rev. Z 527-1003-04A Rev. AG l
SF:0153f 09/85 l
B-18 Rev. 0
l APPENDIX B (Cont'd)
HELB PIPE wilP AND JET IWINGEENT REVIEW i
Acceptability Area Reviewed Acceptance for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Consnents Yes fio
- 7. Design adequacy of DIT-CP-SED-1711 8/21/85 HELB analysis for DIT-CP-SED-1728-1 8/28/85 lines inside DIT-CP-SED-1798 8/28/85 drywell (Cont'd)
DIT-CP-MDD-1697 8/14/85 DIT-CP-EMD-1623 8/8/85 l
DIT-CP-EMD-1621-1 8/23/85 k
DIT-CP-PMD-1605 8/2/85 DIT-CP-MDD-1788 8/23/85 The calculations and supporting documentation X
l listed above were reviewed in detail by the SR team. These documents provided the key I
HELB pipe whip and jet impingement information for the high energy line break points which j
were independently selected by the review team. These break points are in the following l
systems:
Pipe System Line Size Location
.l t
HPCS 10" Drywell
.l WW 12" & 18" Drywell The calculations permitted the reviewer to verify that the pipe whip and jet impingement effects from these breaks would not l
unacceptably damage the following essential i
l systems and structures:
1 09/85 ST:0153f B-19 Rev. O j
APPENDIX B (Cont'd)
HELB PIPE lei!P AND JET IWINGEENT REVIEW Area Reviewed Acceptance Acceptabi11ty for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Consnents Yes No 70 Design adequacy of 1.
Shutdown instrumentation HELB analy:.is for 2.
CRD system lines inside drywell 3.
Diesel generator system (Cont'd) 4.
Containment isolation system valves and cables 5.
Shutdown service water system 6.
Standby gas treatment system 7.
Hydrogen ignitor system (ignitors and cables) 9.
ECCS cooling units
- 10. Hydrogen recombiner system
- 11. Structural integrity of Zero degree structure Drywell head Weir wall Drywell structural steel Walls These documents show that (1) the break points were properly postulated in high i
energy lines, (2) the extent of pipe whip and jet impingement zones were identified, (3) the effects, if any, on the essential systems and structures were identified, and (4)'these essential items remain functional assuming an SSE and an SAF.
SF:0153f 09/85 8-20 Rev. 0
APPENDIX B (Cont'd)
HELB PIPE wtIP AND JET IWINGEENT REVIEW Area Reviewed Acceptance Acceptability for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No
- 8. HELB calculations Process in place to update PI-CP-75, Rev. O, 5/3/85, " Senior Designer:
are current and HELB calculations dated Review Process" valid (OR 73) before May 3, 1985.
Review Log - Senior Designer Review Process from 5/21/85 to 8/13/85 l
Completed Checklist-Pipe Whip dated 4/18/85 for Drawings M07-1078-1 and M07-1078-2 S&L IOM A.W. Szechowycz to W.G. Schwartz, "IHinois Power Company's Conunitment Tracking System," 8/13/85 01ME06 Rev. 3 OlME09 Rev. 1 OlME36 Rev. 0 ole 41 Rev. 0 ole 32 Rev. 1 01E53 Rev. 0 ole 58 Rev. 0 OlME07 Rev. 1 ole 08 Rev. 1 During the IDR, it was noted that once a pipe X
break effects calculation was completed, there was no mechanism to review future design changes for pipe break effects. S&L resolved this concern by issuing PI-CP-75 on May 3, 1985 (see SR Item No. 4).
In adoition, the IDR recognized that calculations in existence before the issuance of the above procedure s
would have to be reviewed and updated, if Sf:0153f 09/85 B-21 Rev. 0 l -.
l APPENDIX B (Cont'd) l HELB PIPE letIP AND JET IWINGEENT REVIEW Area Reviewed Acceptance Acceptability for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No 8.
HELB calculations are hecessary, to ensure that all design changes current and valid made after the calculations' completion did not (Cont'd) affect the pipe break analysis.
As a result of this concern, S&L committed to confirm, prior to fuel load, that design changes would not adversely affect the ability to safely shut down the plant.
The SR identified nine HELB effects calculations that were in existence before the issuance of PI-CP-75 and therefore require updating. Seven of the nine had been revised between 5/3/85 and 8/15/85 and include Calculations ME06, HE09, ME32, ME36, ME41, MES3, and ME58. The revisions involved reviewing the latest version of all the referenced drawings to ensure that nothing had affected the calculation's conclusions. Two ut the nine remain to be updated: ME07 ar.d ME03.
This activity is being monitored by IPC to ensure closecut. The Commitment Tracking System (referenced above) ensures that this item will be closed out. On this basis, the SR team concludes that the updating of all calculations is acceptable.
SI:0153f 09/85 8-22 Rev. O
APPENDIX 8 (Cor.t'd)
HELB PIPE lai!P /de0 JET IWINGEENT REVIEW Area Reviewed
.icreptance Acceptability for Adequacy triteria Documents Reviewed and Conenents Yes No 9.
Design change review A controlled process in PI-CP-75, Rev. O, 5/3/85, " Senior Designer:
for pipe break existence to evaluate plant Raview Process" effects for line design changes for pipe inside drywell break effects.
See comments in Item No. 4 above.
X (OR 73) 100 Use of MJREG CR/2913 NRC acceptance of this See discussion on this topic in Open Item 5.
X l
(OR 73) methodology for use on Clinton.
l I
11e FSAR Section 3.6 Actual or draft changes to Clinton FSAR Section 3.6, " Protection (OR 73)
FSAR accurately reflect Against the Dynamic Effects Associated design conditions.
with the Postulated Rupture of Piping,"
(
including Amendment 34, July 1985 S&L Letter SLLI-1323, 8/9/85, "FSAR Attachment D3.6 Draf t Revisions" The SR team examined the Amendment 34 and the draft FSAR revision identified above for the four HELB inside the drywell open items:
1.
The figures and tables showing the final X
break types and locations. See conenents in Item 5 above.
2.
The figures showing the final restraint X
locations. See conenents in Item 5 above.
SF:0153f 09/85 B-23 Rev. 0
T i
APPENDIX B (Cont'd)
HELB PIPE leilP AND JET IWINGEENT REVIEW Area Reviewed Acceptance Acceptability for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Cossments Yes No
~
110 FSAR Section 3.6 3.
The description of the analysis results in X-(Cont'd) the FSAR D3.6 Attachments. Attachment 03.6, " Summary of Failure Mode Analysis for Pipe Breaks a'nd Cracks," has been updated to reflect the results of the completed pipe break jet impingement and pipe whip analysis inside the drywell.
The reviewer found that FSAR Sections D3.6.2.2, "Feedwater System Piping," and D3.6.2.6, "High Pressure Core Spray" have been updated. These revisions agree with the results given in the calculations listed in Appendix B, Item 6 above.
4.
Jet load calculations using NtJREG/CR-2913.
X See consnents in Item 5 above.
SF:')153f 09/85 B-24 pey, o
Appendix B
CHECKLISTS l
l I
i 4
l l
Appendix B HELB. PIPE WHIP AND JET IMPIN,GEMENT CHECKLISTS j
Piping Break Point Location Whip or Checklist System No.
in Plant Jet Reviewed
(
B-1 RWCU RT-C174C Containment Jet l
Jet
& MS Tunnel i
B-3 RWCU RT-C802 MS Tunnel Jet
)
B-4 RWCU RT-C174C Containment Whip i
B-5 RWCU RT-C801 MS Tunnel Whip 1
B-6 RHR RH-C587 MIR HX Room B Whip i
& MS Tunnel i
B-7 HPCS HP-C8 Drywell Jet B-8 MF W FW-C12 Orywell Jet B-9 MFW FW-Cl2 Drywell Whip B-10 HPCS HP-C9A Drywell
. Whip l
I 1
I E
I i
r l
t i
1 f
i i
1 09/85 SP 0157f B-25 Rev. 0
Appendix B CHECKLIST B-1 HELB JET IMPINGEMENT CHECKLIST HELB Jet Review Category: Line Break Inside Containment Specific Case System:
RWCU Subsystem: RT-05 Break Point: RT-Cl/4C (Terminal end)
Location:
Containment main steam tunnel 1.
Identified as High Energy Line on Colored P&ID No. 5105-1076 Sht. 4 Additional
References:
Line No. - RT06A 6" 2.
The postulated break. point is shown on FSAR Fig. No. B3.6-27 Sht. 7 (Amend 34) as determined in Calc. No. EMD-049453, Rev.01, 5/29/85 Subsystem drawing RTOS, Sheet 2 (See EMD 053625, Rev.0, 7/3/85)
EMD 021555, Rev.0,1/23/80, Pipe Rupture Analysis for RWCU Inside Containment, Non-Class 1 Piping 3.
Jet zone defined in Dwg. See next page and Calc. No. See next page 4
Essential Systems Components and Structures See: Table B-1, "HELB Essential Items" l
09/85 SP:0157f B-26 Rev. 0
Table 3-1 NEl.3 ESSENTIAL ITTMS (Systeme, Components, St ruc tu res )
Jet Zone fee System:
twCU Breek Point No.,
RT-C174C Shown on Refrsence(s) meere Essestaal itees def seed:
C.E. Dx. 22 A719 3, tee. O Piping Dwg:
M27-lod?-01A l
Master List of tree Locaties of Essential item if Yes, Is lt If Yes, Is if No. What Reviewer Essentaal Itees Essential Essential Itee located Withia Damaged ? T/N, shutdown Still Was Done to Comments for This Showe De Zonel Y/N, Calculation /
Achievable With Resolve issue?
Sreakt Drawing #
Calculation f Beference #
Y/N (List)
L Lia t )
(Lis t )
Reference 4 (List)
(List)
(1) 42)
(3)
(4)
(5) 46)
(2)
(8) l 1.
Suc!DOWN Yes M27-1002-01A No. Per calcelation Shutdown instrumentation not hit per Dif-CP-MDD-Il89; INSTED1ENTATICe M27-1002-04A OlME55. Bew. O, confirmed by drawing review. CE 22A7193 Pis. 5 shows M27-1719E 5/31/85 ne S/D instruments are to be located in containment M27-1726E main steam tunnel.
2.
C D SYSTEM Yes Same as above No System is not inside containment main steam tunnel.
01ME55 Thus, no potential to be damaged.
3.
DIESEL CENERATOR Yes Same as above No System is not inside containment.
SYSTEM CIME55 4.
CDaTAINE NT Yes Saee as above No None hit per OlME55 and DIT-CP-M00-1189. Confirmed ISOLATIOE SYSTEM CIME55 by drawing review. valve ICC10A hit,but it is not a containment isolation valve.
- TALTES
- CA5LLS S.
SEUTtchat Yes Same as above No System is not located inside main steam tunnel.
51RTICE WATER SYSTEM OIME55 6.
STANDBY Yes Same as above No System is not located inside mala stese tunnel.
CAS TREATE NT SYSTEM OlME55 7.
ECCS Yes Same as above h
None of these systema is hit by this break per E55
- EPCS OlME55 and DIT-CP-MDD-l!89; confirmed by drawing review.
- LPCS DIT-Ct e ll89 Valve ICC10A hat but this is not sa fety related.
- LPC
- as
- 0T= =
SP:0:58 09/85 Rev. 0
TaLle B-1 (Catt'd)
Master List of Ices tecation of Essential Ites If Tes. Is It if Tes. Is if No. What Seviewer Essential Items Essentaal Easential ites 14cated Wachan Dama ged ? T/N.
Shutdown Still Was Done to Cosament s foe This Showe on Zone? T/N.
Calculation /
Achievable With Besolve Issue 7 Breauf Drawang #
Calculation #
Beterence #
SAF. LOSr7 T/N.
Reference #
T/N (List)
(Lis t )
(Lis t )
Reference # (List)
( Lis t )
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7).
(8)
System is not located inside main steam tunnel.
8.
ETLa0 GEN IGNIIGS SYSTDs Yes M2 7-1002-01 A No
-~
~
- ICNIToa M27-1002-04A 01ME55
- CARLES M27-1719E M27-1726E 9.
ECCS COOLING UNITS Tes 3ame as above No System is not located inside main stese tunnel.
01ME55
- 10. ETDaocEN Recon 31 met Yes
$ame as Above No
-~
~
System is not lu sted inside main steam tunnet.
SYSTEM OlME55
- 11. STRUCTURAL INTECBITY OF:
Yes
- ZERO DEcaEE STacCTURE S27-1422 See commments.
These structural components are not located in the
- CaTWELL READ
$27-1938 See comments.
area of the break.
- WEIR WALL
$27-1200-03A See comments.
- DaTWELL STRUCTURAL S27-1200-03A See comments.
STEEL
- STRUCTURAL STEEL See comments.
FAILURE EFFECTS ON ESSENTIAL SYSTEM Jet impingement loads provided in the M.S. tunnel l
- COTSIDE CRTWELL
$27-1002-Ola Assume yes WALLS. etc.
$27-1002-04A SDQ12-26DC07 No.
SDQ12-26DC07 inside containment were bounding loads. FSAS Sec.
i
$2 7-1003-olc 6.2.1 2.3.5 provides calculated compartment pressure S27-1003-04C of 4.9 psid. Compartment access plugs will not
$27-1201-Olc lift. Calculation has been revised to combine 527-1202-Olc pressure and seismic loads per FSAR Table 3.8-1.
Revised missile energies were provided because during the analysis S&L found that the 18-inch well adjacent
. to containment liner was marginal for original values. Wall thickness is shown acceptable for revised values.
l i
t
$r : 015
09/85 Rev. 0
Appendix B CHECKLIST B-2 HELB JET IMPINGEFENT CHECKLIST HELB Jet Review Category: Large Line Break Outside Containment Specific Case System:
RHR Subsystem: RH-08 Break Point: Rn-C587 (terminal end)
Location:
RHR HX Comparment B and MS tunnel 1.
Identified as High Energy Line on Colored P&IO No, M05-1075 Sht. 2 Additional
References:
M05-1004 2.
The postulated break point is shown on FSAR Fig. No. See below as determined in Calc. No. EMD-052987 Additional
References:
Subsystem drawing IFWO3, Sheet 14 has been submitted to IPC to update the FSAR EMD 053o25, Rev.0, 7/3/85, Identification of Mandatory and Arbitrary Intermediate Breaks 3.
det zone defined in Dwg. See next page and Calc. No. See next page 4
Essential Systems Components and Structures See:
Table B-2, "HELB Essential Items" 09/85 SP:0157f B-29 Rev. 0
f I
l l
Tatte S-2 HELS ESSENTI AL ITEMS (Systems. Component s, St ruc t ur e s )
Jet Zone For Sretes:
EHs Bresh Point No.
RN-0987 (See Note)
Shown on Reference (s) where Essential Itees defined:
C.E. Doc. 22A7193, Table Ile Paping Dwg: M26 1002 02A, Sev. F Master List of item Eocation of Essential Item If Tes, is it If Tes, is If No, What Reviewer Easential tress Essential Easential ites Located Within Damaged! Y/M.
Shutdown Still Was Done to Comme n ' s for This Shown on Zane ? Y/M, Cal:ulat ion /
Achievable With Resolve issue?
i Break?
Drawing #
Calculation f Reference f SAF, LOSP? Y/M, Seference f I
T/N (List)
(Lis t )
(List)
Seference f (List)
(List)
(
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
I E26-100-302A-El M26-1002-02 A 1.
SMUTDOWN Yes See comment s.
No.
Per drawing IESTRUMENTATION review and Calcs.
E26-1604A-El M26-1001-025 CIME40 and OIME46 E26-16045-El M26-ID03-02AE. Sht. I and DtT-CP-MDD-E26-1612-El P26-ID02-02 AE, Sht. 2 E26-1613-El M26-1002-02 AE, Sht. 3 l
1409 E26-1620-El l
, Confirmed that there is no shutdown instrumentation an this area, f
2.
CED SYSTEM Yes See above.
No.
Per drawing Confirmed that CRD system is inside containment so I
review and Cates.
not affected by this break.
OlME40 and OlME46
[
and DET-CP-MDD-l 1409 l
3.
DIESEL CENELATOR Yes See above.
No.
Per drawing Confirmed that diesel generator system not located in SYSTEM review and Cales.
chis area.
01ME40 and 01ME46 and DIT-CP-MDD-1409 l
4.
CD%TAINMENT Yes See above.
No There are containment isolation valves nearby, but ISOLATION SYSTEM PMD Calculation review of ME40 with piping plan M26-1002-02 A, Bew. F.
and section M26-1201-028 Rev. A shows that break
- VALVES 01ME40 RH-C587 at El. 779' produces a jet which does not
- CABLES impact any CIVs within 8 pipe dieseters. Calc ME 46 analytes the jet ef fect on electrical cables for the break. Since there are no conduits within this jet cone, another break point (mode) was examined to evaluate the methodology. Conduit C61421-2"C is hit.
It supplies control valve IWIO20. Calc ME06 shows that this is not a cent. iso. valve and so is not essential. Also within the jet cone, dwg E26-1620-E!!! shows three conduits which are not listed in ME46. C61055 C61054, and C61077 for component s RT178. RT17A. and RT34 A, respec tively.
These are nonsafety related RWCU components which are NOTE: This break was identified and analysed in Calculation 01ME46 as #38 Ell.
properly not included in the scope of ME46.
SP:0156f 09/85 Rev. O
i l-Tskte B-2 (Cont'd)
Master List of Itee tocation of Essential Item If Yes, is It If Yes, Is If No, What Deviewer
. Essential items Essential Essential Itse tacated Within Damaged? T/N, Shutdown Still Was Done to Comusen t s for this Shown on Zone? T/M, Calculation /
Achievable With Resolve Issue?
Break?
Drawing 8 Calculation #
Reference f SAF, LOSPT T/M, Reference #
T/N (Lis t)
(List)
(Lis t)
Reference # (List)
(List )
(!)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8) l
-~
Confirmed by drawing review.
5.
SuvTDOWN Tes See above.
No.
Drawings SERVICE WATER SYSTEM show no SI System in Auz. Steam Tunnel.
Confirmed by drawing review.
4.
STANDST Tes See above.
No.
Drawings
-~
~
-~
CAS TREATMENT SYSTEM show no VC System in Auz. Steam Tunnet.
7.
ECCS Yes See above.
No (in MS Tunnel).
-~
-~
Jet hits line IRH29588 as shown in DIT-CP-MDD-1409.
- WPCS PMD Cales.
Calc 01ME58. Rev. O, and 19-AI-31. Rev. O show safe
- LPCS OtME40 and shutdown is still achievable.
- LPCI 01ME46
- ADS Yes in RHR Assumed yes Yes
- OTNER NX Roos B 01ME58 01ME58 DIT-CP-MDD-1409 EPED-19-Al-31 Not essential per CE 22A7193.
8.
ETDm0CEN 1CNETOR SYSTEM No
~~
- IGNITOR
- CARLES 9.
ECCS COOLING UNITS Tes same as Shutdown No.
Drawings show
-~
Confirmed by drawing review, lastrumentation no ECCS cooling in Auz. Steam Tunnel.
- 10. RYttoCEN RECOMathER No
-~
-~
Not essential per CE 22A7193.
SYSTEM
- 11. STRUCTURAL INTECalTT OF:
Tes No
- ZERO DECREE SitUCTURE S27-1422
.First four are
- DRYWELL NEAD S27-1938 not outside
- WEtt WALL S2 7-1200-0 3A containment.
- DRYWELL STRUCTURAL S 27-1002-01 A STEEL
- STRUCTURAL STEEL FAILURE EFFECTS ON ESSENTIAL SYSTEM
- OUTSIDE DRYWELL Tes 526-1002-02A Yes No WALLS, etc.
S26-1201-023 SDQ10-96DC27 SDQ12-960C27
-~
Pipe break ef fects combined with other loads are 526-1201-025 shown to be acceptable. NSLD Calc 3C10-12 74-001, Rev. 1. provides final calculation pressure of
$26-1405 526-1004-02A 13.8 psi. Design pressure is 15 psi (see FSAR Table 3.6-3).
Also, dugs confirm hold down bolts 521-1613 prevent lif ting plug during pressurisation.
SP:0156 f 09/85 Rev. O
L Appendix B CHECKLIST B-3 HELB JET IMPINGEMENT CHECKLIST HELB Jet Review Category: Small Line Break Outside Containment Specific Case System:
RWCU Subsystem: RT-08 Break Point: RT-C802 1.
Identified as High Energy Line on Colored P&ID No. M05-1076 Sht. 4 Additional
References:
2.
The postulated break point is shown on FSAR Fig. No. See below as determined in Calc. No. EMD-049468 l
Additional
References:
l l
Subsysten drawing IRT08, Sheet I has been submitted to IPC to update the FSAR EMD 053625, Rev.00, 7/3/85 3.
Jet zone defined in Dwg. See next oage and Calc. No. See next page 4
Essential Systems Components and Structures See: Table B-3, "HELB Essential Items" l
09/85 i A SP:0157f B-32 Rev. 0 l
T1ble B-3 NELB ESSENTI AL ITEMS (Systema. ' Component s. Structures)
Jet Zone For System:
RWCU Break Point No.
BT-C802 (See Note)
Shown on M26-1201-02C Rafarence(s) where Essential items defined:
C.E. Doc. 22A7193 Table Ile Piping Dwg:
M26-1002-02A, Rev. F i
Master List of item location of Essential Item If Yes, Is it if Yes, Is if No. What Reviewer Essential items Essential Essential Item located Within Dama ged ? T/N.
Shutdown Still Was Done to Cosoments for this Shown On Zonef Y/N, Calculation /
Achievable With -
Resolve Issue?
Break?
Drawing #
Calculation #
Reference #
SAF. LOSPT Y/N.
Reference f Y/N (List)
(List)
( Li s t )
Reference # (List)
(List)
(L)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8) 1.
SHUTDOWN Yes See comment s.
No.
Per drawing E26-100302A-El M26-1002-02A INSTRUMENTATION review and Cales.
E26-1604 A-El M26-1001-028 OIME40 and OlME46 E26-16048-EI M26-1003-02AK. Sht. 1 E26-1612-El M26-1002-02AK Sht. 2 E26-1613-El M26-1002-02AK Sht. 3 E26-1620-Et Drawing review confirmed that there is no shutdown 4
instrumentation in this ares.
2.
CRD SYSTEM Yes See above.
No.
Per drawing Confirmed that CRD system is inside containment so not affected by this break.
review and Calcs.
OlME40 and OlME46 3.
DIESEL CENERATOR Yes See above.
No.
Per drawins
-~
-~
Drawing review confirms that diesel generator system is not in this area.
review and Cates.
SYSTEM 01ME40 and OLME46 4.
CONTAINMENT Yes See above.
No ME40 shows that the jet from this break does not hit ISOLATION SYSTEM PMD calculation any containment isolation valves. ME46 shows that 4
the jet from this break does not hit any Civ cables.
- VALVES 01ME40
- CABLES l
S.
SHUTDOWN Yes See above.
No.
Drawings Confirmed by drawing review.
SERVICE WATER SYSTEM show no SI System in Aux. Steam Tunnel.
i 6.
STANDBY Yes See above.
No.
Drawings Confirmed by drawing review.
CAS TREATMENT SYSTEM show no VC System in Aux. Steam Tunnel.
1 1
NOTE: This break was identified and analyted in Calculation 01ME46 as #A7(RT).
09/85 Se:Ots6f Rev. 0
Table B-3 (Cott'd) i-Item location of Essential Item If Yes, Is It If Yes, Is -
If No. What Reviewer Master List of
- Essential Essential item located Withia
-Damaged? T/N, Shutdown Still Was Done to Coseents Eassatial Items for This Shown on Zone? Y/N, Calculation /
Achievable With Resolve Issue?
Break?
Drawing 8 Calculation f Reference #
SAF..LOSPT Y/N, Reference #
Y/N (List)
(Lis t )
(List)
Reference # (List)
(List)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(1)
(6)
(7)
(8)
[
7.
ECCS Yes See above.
No Confirmed by drawing review.
CIME40 and
- LPCS
- LPCI 01ME46
- ADS
- OTHER 8.
HYDRCCEN IGNITOR SYSTEM No' Not essential per CE 22 A7193.
l
- IGNITOR
- CJ.8LES 9.
ECCS COOLING UNITS Yes Same as shutdown No.
Drawings Confirmed l y drawing review.
. Instrumentation show no ECCS cooling in Aux.
Steam Tunnel.
l Not essential per CE 22A7193.
- 10. HYteZCCEN RECOMBINER No l'
SYSTEM l
- 11. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF:
Yes
-~
~
j
- ZERO DECREE STRUCTURE S27-1422 Not outside
- DRYWELL HEAD
$27-1938 containment
- WEIR WALL S27-1200-034
- DRYWELL STRUCTURAL
$27-1002-01 A STEEL
- STRUCTURAL STEEL FAILURE EFFECT3 ON ESSENTIAL SYSTEM
- OUTSIDE DRYWELL Yes S26-1002-02A Yes No Jet impingement force from break RT6-602 is enveloped WALLS, etc.
S26-1201-02B SDQ10-96DC27 SDQ12-96DC27 with other breaks and the bounding loads were analyzed.
i l
Se:Ois
09/85 Rev. 0 1
1 I
i l
i Appendix B CHECKLIST B-4 HELB PIPE WHIP CHECKLIST HELB Review Category: Line Break Outside Containmer.1 Specific Case System:
RWCU Subsystem: RT-05 Break Point: RT-C174C (terminal end)
Location:
Containment main steam tunnel 1.
Identified as High Energy Line on Colored P&ID No. M05-1076 Sht. 4 Additional
References:
L ine No.-RT-06 A 6" 2.
Tne postulated break point is shown on FSAR Fig. No. B3-6-27 Sht. 7
( Amend 34) as determined in Calc. No. EMD-049453, Rev.01, 5/28/95 Additional
References:
EMD 053625, Rev. 00 EMD 021555, Rev. 0 3.
Jet zone defined in Dwg. See next page and Calc. No. See next page 4.
Essential Systems Components and Structures See: Table B-4, "HELB Essential Items" 09/85 SP:0157f B-35 Rev. 0
f.
~
~
1 l
Tz.ble 3-4 HELS ESSENTIAL ITEMS (Systems, components, Structures) l l
1 Whip Zone Break Point No.
RT-C174C Shown on For System SWCU Raference(s) where Essential items defined:
C.E. Doc. 22A7193 Fiping Dws:
Master List of item tocation of Essential item If Yes, Is it if Yes, Is If No, What Reviewer Essential items Essential Essential item located Within Damaged? Y/N, Shutdown Still Was Done to Comments for This Shown On Zone? Y/N, Calculation /
Achievable With Resolve issue?
Break?
Drawing #
Calculation f Reference #
SAF, LOSPT T/N, Re ference f Y/N (List)
(List)
(List)
Re ference # (List)
(List)-
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
This break is located in the containment main steam 1.
SHUTDOWN Yes M27-1002-01A See comments.
tunnel. The evaluation performed in PMD Calc. No.
INSTRUMENTATION M2 7-1002-04 A M2 7-1719E OlME64, shows that this postulated break will not af f ect saf e shutdown because of physical separation M27-1726E of high energy piping f rom safety-related components.
2, CRD SYSTEM Yes Same as above.
Same as No. 1
-~
3.
DIESEL CENERATOR Yes Same as above.
Same as No. 1
-~
-~
SYSTEM 4.
CONTAINMENT Yes Same as above.
Same as No. 1 ISOLATION SYSTEM
- VALVES
- CABLES SHUTDOWN Yes Same as above.
Same as No. I
~
l SERVICE WATER SYSTEM 6.
STANDBY Yes Same as above.
Same as No. 1
-~
CAS TREATMENT SYSTEM i
7.
ECCS Yes Same as above.
Same as No. !
-~
- HPCS
- LPCS
- LPCI
- ADS
- OTHER SP:0156f 09/85 Rev. O
- Trble B-4 (Cont 'd)
Master List of Item location of Essential item tf Yes, Is It if Yes, Is If No, What Reviewer Essential teema Essentist Essential Item
- tocated Within Dama ged? Y/N.
Shutdown Still Was Done to Comments for This Shown On Zonet Y/N.
Calculation /
Achievable With Resolve Issue?
. Break?
Drawing #
Calculation f Reference i SAF, LOSPT -Y/N, Reference #
Y/N (List)
(List)
(List)
- Reference # (List)
(i.is t )
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(S)
(6)
(7)
(8) i 8.
HYDROCEN ICNITOR SYSTEM Yes M27-1002-01A Same as No. 1
- IGNITOR M2 7-1002-04 A
- CABLES M27-1719K M27-1726K 9.
ECCS COOLING UNITS Yes Same as above.
Same as No. 1
- 10. EYDROGEN RECOMBINER Yes Same as above.
Same as No. 1 SYSTEM
- 11. STRUCTURAL INTECRITY OF:
Yes No
- 2ERO DECREE STRUCTURE S27-1422 The let four items
- DRYWELL HEAD
$27-1938 are in drywell
- WEIR WALL
$27-1200-03A only.
- DRYWELL STRUCTURAL S27-1002-01A STEEL
- STRUCTURAL STEEL FAILURE EFFECTS ON ESSENTIAL SYSTEM
- OUTSIDE DRYWELL S27-1002-01A Yes Yes Yes DIT-CP-EMD-1274 transmits pipe whip loads f rom break WALLS, etc.
527-1002-04A DIT-CP-EMD-1274 SED Calc. No.
SED Calc. No.
RTC174C as impact energies on essential structural 3
SD-Q12-60DG08 SD-Q12-60DG08 targets (in this case, drywe!! well). SED cale i
qualifies this load.
4 l
1 l
i 4
1 l
i SP 0156f 09/85 Rev. O l
Appendix B CHECKLIST B-5 HELB PIPE WHIP CHECKLIST HELB Review Category: Small Line Break Outside Containment Specific Case System:
RWCU Subsystem: RT-08 Break Point: RT-C601 (terminal end) 1.
Identified as High Energy Line on Colored P&ID No. M05-1076 Sht. 4 Additional
References:
2.
Tne postulated break point is shown on FSAR Fig. No. See below as determined in Calc. No. EMD-049468 Additional
References:
Subsystem drawing IRT08, Sheet 1, Rev.7 has been submitted to IPC to update the FSAR EMD 053625, Rev.0, 7/3/85 5
3.
Jet zone defined in Dwg. See next page and Calc. No. See next page 4.
Essential Systems Components and Structures See: Table B-5, "HELB Essential Items" 4
e 9
09/85 SP:0157f B-38 Rev. 0
r Table S-5 net.B ESSENTIAt, ITEMS (Systems, Components. Structures) l 1
I Whip Zone
( For System:
RWCU Break Point No.t 37-C801 Shown on Raftrence(s) where Essent&al items def1ned:
C.E. Doc. 22A7193 Table IIe Piping Dwg:
M2 6-1002-02 A, Rev F Master List of Ites location of Essential item If Yes. Es It If Yes, Is if No What Reviewer l
Essential Items Essential Essential Item located Within Damaged ? Y/N.
Shutdown Still Was Done to Consnents for This Shown on Zone? Y/N.
Calculation /
Achievable With Resolve Issue?
l Break?
Drawing #
Calculation #
peterence #
SAF LOSP7 Y/N.
Reference #
Y/N (Li s t )
(List)
(List)
Reference # (List)
(List) l (1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8) l l
1.
SHUTDOWN Yes See comments.
No
~~
E26-1003-02A-Et M26-1002-02A le INSTRUMENTATION DIT-CP-MDD-14 31 E26-1604A-El M26-1001-028 E26-1604 B-El M26-1003-02AK, Sht. 1 E26-1612-El M26-1002-02AK. Sht. 2 E26-1613-El M26-1002-02AK Sht. 3 E26-1620-El Confirmed by drawing review that item is not in area, 2.
CRD SYSTEM Yes See above.
Same as No. 1 Confirmed by drawing review that system is not in j
area.
3.
DIESEL CENERATOR Yes See above.
Same as No. 1 Confirmed by drawing review that system is not in area.
SYSTEM 4.
CONTAINMENT Yes See above.
Same as No. I
~~
DIT-CP-MDD-1431 documents that cent. isolation valves and cables not hit.
ISOLATION SYSTEM
- VALVES
- CABLES Confirmed by drawing review that system is not in 5.
SHUTDOWN Yes See above.
Same as No. 1
-~.
a re s.
SERVICE WATER SYSTEM 6.
STAND 5Y Yes See above.
Same as No. 1
-~
Confirmed by drawing review that system is not in area.
CAS TREATMENT SYSTEM l
Confirmed by drawing review and review of l
7.
ECCS Yes See above.
Same as No. !
DIT-CP-MDD-1431 that the ECCS pipes are not a f fected.
- HPCS i
- LPCS
- LPCI
- ADS
- OTHER i
l l
SP:Ots6f 09/85 Rev. 0 I
Ttble B-5 (Cost'd)
Natter List of Item
-Location of Essential Item If Yes, Is It If Yes, Is If No What Reviewer Essential items Essential Essential item tocated Within Damaged ? Y/N.
Shutdown Still Was Done to Comnents for This Shown On Zone? Y/N, Calculation /
Achievable With Resolve Issue?
Break?
Drawing #
Calculation #
Reference #
SAF, LOSP7 Y/N, Beference #
T/N (Lis t )
(List)
(List)
Reference # (List)
(List)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7) i8) 8.
MYDROCEN IGNITOR SYSTEN No Not essential per CE 22A7193.
- IC21 TOR
- CABLES 9.
ECCS COOLING UNITS Yes Same as Shutdown Same as No. 1 Confirmed by drawing review.
Instrumentation 10.'NTD M EN RECON 8tMER' No Not essential per CE 22A7193.
SYSTEN
- 11. STRUCTURAL INTECRITY OF:
Yes No.
Not outside
- ZERO DECREE STRUCTURE S27-1422 containment.
- DRYWELL HEAD S27-1938
- WEIR WALL S27-1200-03A
- DRYWELL STRUCTURAL S27-1002-OLA STEEL
- STRUCTURAL STEEL
~~
FAILURE EFFECTS ON ESSENTIAL SYSTEN Bounding load qualified in SD-Q10-96DC27. Pipe break
- OUTSILE CRYWELL Ye s 526-2002-02A Yes Yes Yes WALLS, etc.
526-1201-028 DET-CP-NDD-1431 SED Calc. No.
SED Calc. No.
af fects combined with other loads were reviewed and SD-Q10-96 DC2 7 '
SD-QL O-96DC2 7 found acceptable per FSAR Section 3.8.4.
SP:0156f 09/85 Rev. O
Appendix B CHECKLIST B-6 HELB PIPE WHIP CHECKLIST HELB Review Category: Large Line Break Outside Containment Specific Case System:
RHR Subsystem: RH-08 Break Point: RH-C6d7 (terminal end)
Location:
At mainstream tunnel - RHR Room B wall 1.
Identified as High Energy Line on Colored P&ID No M05-1075 Sht. 2 Additional
References:
M05-1004 Line No. IRH 40 BB-10" 2.
The postulated break point is shown on FSAR Fig. No. See below as determined in Calc. No. EMD-052987 Rev 0, EMD 053413, Rev. O.
Additional
References:
Subsystem drawing IFWO3, Sheet 14 EMD 053625, Rev.00, 7/3/85 This break point has recently been eliminated by extension of the break exclusion zone to include all of the RH40BB line inside the Auxiliary Building main steam tunnel. This zone is now shown on FSAR Figure B3.6-3.
T.his break point was eliminated after all the HELB analyses were completed and after its selection by the SR. For the purpose of the SR the fact that it was eliminated does not affect the review.
Its elimination was not connected with the HELB SR.
3.
Jet zone defined in Dwg. See next page and Calc. No. See next page 4.
Essential Systems Components and Structures See: Table B-6, "HELB Essential Items" 09/85 SP:0157f B-41 Rev. 0
Tatste B-6 MFLB ESSENTIAL ITEMS (3ystems. Components, Structures)
I Whip Zone For System:
RHR Break Point No..
RH-C587 Shown on-Reference (s) where Essentaal items defined; C.E. Doc. 22 A719 3 Table lie Piping Dwg; M26-1002-02A. Rev F Master List of item location of Easential Item If Yes, is It if Yes. Is If No. What Reviewer i
Essential items Essential Essential Item 14cated Within Damaged? Y/M.
Shutdown Still Was Done to Counsents I
for this Shown on Zone 2 Y/M, Calculation /
Achievable With Resolve Issue?
Break?
Drawing #
Calculation #
Reference #
SAF. LOSPT Y/M.
Reference #
Y/N (Lis t )
(List)
(List)
Reference # (List)
(List)
(t)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(6) 4
-~
-~
E26-1003-02A-Et M26-1002-02A 1.' SHUTDOWN Yes See comments.
No INSTRI; MENTATION DIT-CP-MDD -
E26-1604A-El M26-1001-028 E26-16048-Et M26-1003-02AK Sht. 1 E26-1612-EI M26-1002-02AK, Sht. 2 E26-1613-El M26-1002-02AE, Sht. 3 E26-1620-Et Confirmed that no shutdown instrumentation is in this area.
2.
CRD SYSTEM Yes See above.
Same as No. 1 CRD system is inside containment so it is unaf fected -
by this break.
3.
DIESEL GENERATOR Yes See above.
Same as No. 1
-~
Diesel generator system is not located in this area.
SYSTEM 4
CONTAINMENT Yes See above.
Same as No. 1 No containment isolation valves located in this area.
ISOLATION SYSTEM
- VALVES
- CABLES 5.
SHUTDOWN Yes See above.
Same as No. 1 Shutdown service water lines not hit ny whipping pipe per DIT-CP-MDD-1409.
StkVICE WATER SYSTEM 6.
STANDBY Yes See above.
Same as No. 1
~~
CAS TPIATMENT SYSTEM 7.
ECCS Yes See above.
No No ECCS piping hit by this whipping pipe pet
- HPCS DIT-CP-MDD-1409 Mechanical Design and Draf ting Division review documented in Calc. MDD-27-92 (see DIT-CP-MDD-1409 l
- LPCS for transmittal of results).
- LPCI
- ADS
- OTHER 1
SP:0156f 09/85 Rev. 0 i
T.tbla B-6 (Cost'd)
Mascar List of ites location of Essential iten If Yes, is It if Yes, is if No What Reviewer Essantial items Essential Essential Ites located Within Dama ged ? Y/N.
Shutdown Still Was Done to Cosaments for this Shown on Zone? Y/N, Calculation /
Achievable With Resolve Issue?
Break?
Drawing 8 Calculation #
Beference i SAF. LOSFf Y/N, Reference f Y/N (List )
(List)
(List)
Reference f (List)
(List)
(1)
~(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Same as No. I
~
~
Not essential per CE 22A7193.
8.
MYDROCEN IGNITOR SYSTEM No
- IGNITOR
- CABLES Confirmed by drawing review.
9.
ECCS C00LINC UNITS Yes Same as Shutdown Same as No'. I
~
~
~
Instrumentation
- 10. EYDCOGEN RECOMBINER No Same as No. I
~~
Not essential per CE 22A7193.
SYSTEM
- 11. STRUCTURAL INTECRITY OF:
Yes No.
Not outside
- ZERO DECREE STRUCTURE
$27-1422 containment.
- D2YWELL NEAD
$27*1938
- WEIR WALL
$2 7-1200-03A
- DRYWELL STRUCTURAL
$27-1002-01A STEEL
~
- STRUCTURAL STEEL FAILURE EFFECTS ON ESSENTIAL SYSTEM Bounding lead qualified in SDQ1096DC27. Pipe break
- OUTSIDE DRYWELL Yes
$26-1002-02A Yes.
- Yes, SED Yes. SED WALLS. etc.
326-1201-025 DIT-CP-MDD-1409 Calculation No.
calculation No.
ef fects combined with other loads were reviewed and SDQ1096DC27 SDQ1096DC27 found acceptable per TSAR Section 3.8.4.
SP:0156f 09/85 Rev. 0 i
l i
s k
i Appendix B CHECKLIST B-7 HELB JET IMPINGEMENT CHECKLIST HELB Jet Review Category: Small Line Break Inside Drywell Specific Case System:
HPCS Break Point:
HP-Cd 1.
Identified as High Energy Line on Colored P&ID No, M05-1074 Additional
References:
^
Line No. - lHP02010" 2.
Tne postulated break point is shown on FSAR Fig. No. B3.6-4 (Amendaent 34) as determined in Calc. No. EMD-048911, Rev. 3 Reviewer Comment: Calculation EMD 048911 shows break point HP-Cl at the closed check valve, but this does not appear in the FSAR figure because terminal ends at closed valves on a normally pressurized line were no longer being postulated by S&L. The reviewer requested that the FSAR text be revised to clarify this practice. Amendment 34 has been issued with this change.
s s - s s 3.
Jet zone defined in Dwg. See next oage and Calc. No. See next page Reviewer Comment: This pipe is fully restrained so there is no pipe whips resulting from this break.
Break is at El. 782'.
Essential Systems Components and Structures 4.
See:
Table B-7, "HELB Essential Items" 09/85 SP:0lS7f B-44 Rev. O
s Ttble B '
.1ELB ESSENTIAL ITEMS (Systems. Components, Structures)
Jet Zone for System:
NPCS Break Point No.
1 48 Shown on M27-1602-028 Refarsace(s) where Essentaal itees detsmed: C. E. Doc. 22 A 7193 Rev D T,31 e 11 Cl C2 C3 Piping Dug:
M2 7-160 2-045 t
Matter List of Ites location of Essential tem if Yes, is it If Yes, is If No, What Reviewer Essential Itees Essential Essential item located WO hin Damaged? Y/N, Shutdown Still Was Done to Comments for This Shown on Zone 7 1(N, Calculation /
Achievable With Resolve lasuet Break?
Drawing #
Calculatijn #
Reference #
SAF, LOSPf Y/N.
Re ference f T/N (List)
(List)
(List)
Reference # (List)
(Lis t )
r (1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8) r u sumed Yes M2 7-1603-02 A M27-1603-02AK l.
SHUTDOWN Yes See comment.
Assumed r
INSTRUMENTATION yes yes PMD Cal ulation M2 7-1603-04 A H2 7-1603-04 AK OIME09. Rev. 1 M2 7-1602-048 M27-1602-04BK M2 7-1602-02 5 M2 7-1602-02 s t
(
No shutdown instrumentation lines (NB or CM systems) are located above or below the break in this vicinity. The physical separation of the shetdown instrumentation lines. coupled with thetr redundancy e
i provides protection. Calculation OlME09 methodology I
evaluates whether any postulated break could threates M
the separated channels.
1 2.
CRD SYSTEM Yes See comment.
Assumed Assumed Yes
!mcation of CRD piping was not considered because EMD l
yes yes EMD Calculation calculation 041874 provided a generic evaluation of 041874. Rev. O all CRD piping.
l 3.
DIESEL CENERATOR Yes M05-1035 No.
See comment.
Drawings show none of the system is inside drywell.
l SYSTEM M05-1036 I
l 4.
CONTAthMENT Yes M27-1063-02A Assumed yes.
Assumed yes.
Yes OlME06 assumed that all inboard isolation valves were l
ISOLATION SYSTEM M27-1063-04A See comment.
See comment.
PMD Calculations inoperable. This calculation showed that certain l
- VALVES M27-1062-048 OlME06. Rev. 2 specific inboard isolation valves were required to be
- CABLES M27-1062-02B
& OlME56, Rev. O operable. OlME56 concludes that operability is not compromised. hUREC CR/2913 methodology used.
Reviewer confirmed that jet hit no isolation valves.
Electrical calculation EPED 19-Al-34 Rev. O esseines the consequences to cables for selected MOVs in the drywell.
5.
SHUTDOWN Yes M05-IOS2-2 No Portion of SI inside drywell is not essential.
SERVICE WATER SYSTEM M05-1032-3 6.
STAND 8Y Yes M05-Il05 No Drawing shows none of the system is inside drywell.
CAS TREATMENT SYSTEM SP:0156f 09/85 Rev. O
=
.m..
Ttble B-7 (Cont'd)
Master Liar of Ites Location of Essential Stes
!! Yes, Is it if Yes. Is If No, What Reviewer Essential Items Essential Essential Stes located Within Da ma ged ? Y/N.
Shutdown Still Was Done to comments for This Shown On Zonel Y/N, Calculation /
Achievable With Resolve issue?
Break?
Drauing #
Calculation f Reference f SAF, LOSPI Y/N, Reference #
l Y/N (Lis t )
(List)
(List )
Reference f (List)
(Lis t) i (1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8) 7.
ECCS Yes M2 7-1603-02A Aasumed Assumed Yes.
Calculatiou CIME08 evaluates the jet effects from
- HPCS N2 7-160 3-04 A yes yes PMD Calculation small UEL8s tecluding h. J' using NUREC/CR-2913
- LPCS M2 7-1602 -043 OlME08. Rev. I methodology. Calculation OlME07 determines if any
- LPCI M27-1602-028 6 OIME38, Bew. O ECCS lines (including HPCS) are hit by large HEL3s.
& OlME07. Rev.1 Of the 5 HELBs which produce jets which " hit" the
- ADS HPCS line as determined by this 1983 calculation, &
= OTnER of the cases were resolved by break point elimination and the final case by the application of NUREC/CR-2913. Calculation olME38 considers the jet affects on ADS valve conduita using NUREC/CR-2913.
It shows that physical separation prevents damaging ADS so that less than 3 valves would remain.
8.
MYDROCEN ICNITOR SYSTEM Yes See comment.
See comment.
See comment.
See comment.
See comment.
Break MP-C8 is not a problee for H1 systes. However.
Dif-CP-5E D-1711 review an this area espanded beyond HP-C8 because an
- IGNITOR DIT-CP-SED-1728-1 unacceptable number of hydrogen ignitor conduits are
- CASLES DIT-CP-SE D-1798 hit due to postulated HEL&s, as documented in PMD DIT-CP-MDD-1788 Calculation CIME37. Rev. O.
The calculation DIT-CP-MDD-169 7 identifies the options for solution ass reroute, Dif-CP-EMD-1621-1 qualification and/or acceptability for being lost.
DIT-CP-EMD-1623 S&L decided on the following approach which has been DIT-CP-PMD-1605 carried out: the field identified all problem cables based on walkdown; MDDD prepared sketches with break point to conduit dimensions; EMD calculated loads; a combination of new supports added to conduits, strengthening junction bones and relocating one conduit has solved this issue.
9.
ECCS COOLING UNITS Yes M05-1052 No.
See comment.
Drawing shows none of the ECCS cooling units are inside drywell.
Instrumentation I
- 10. HYDROGEN RECOMBINER Yes M2 7-1603-02 A No.
No hits confirmed.
SYSTEM H2 7-1603 -04 A PMD Calculation M27-1603-04B OIME69. Bew. O l
M2 7-1603-028 l
l
\\
SP:0156f 09/85
[
Rev. O I
l Table S-7 (Cont'd)
Master List of Ites location of Essential Ites if Yes, la It if Yes, Is.
If No. What Reviewer Essential Items
. Essential Essential Ites located Withis Damaged? Y/N, Shutdown Still Was Done to Comments for this Shown On Zone? Y/N, Calculation /
Achievable With Resolve Issue?
p Break?
Drawing #
Calculation #
Reference f SAF, LOSP? Y/M, Reference #
Y/N (LA s t )
(List )
(List)
Reference # (List)
(Lis t)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8) i I
The essential structures are not hit due to their
[
!!. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF:
- ZERO DEGREE SIRUCTURE Yes
$27-1422 No.
(See comment.)
locations in reference to the break jet zone per the t
- DRYWELL NEAD Yes
$27-1938 No.
(See commeet.)
M27-Series drawings listed in Column 3 for items 1
- WEIR WALL Yes
$27-1200-03A No.
(See comment.)
thru 10.
Calculation 500-125D004 determines weir
- DRYWELL STRUCTURAL Yes
$27-1003-02A No.
(See comment.)
wall impingement loads.
l STEEL
& 04A I
- STRUCTURAL STEEL Yes M23-1603-02A, 6 No.
PMD Calculation No structures hit.
FAILURE 04A, 1602-043 OIME36
(
EFFECTS ON ESSENTIAL
& 028 l
SYSTEM l
- OUTSIDE DRYWELL Ye s -
$27-1003-02A No.
(See comment.)
(dALLS, etc.
& 04A L
i l
t
?
l i
t Sr:0156f 09/85 Rev. O l
I F
si
Appendix B
~
CHECKLIST B-8 l
l HELB JET IMPINGEPENT CHECKLIST To be filled in for each specific case examined in the Supplementary Review.
HELB Jet Review Category: Large Line Break Inside Drywell 1
Specific Case System:
MFW Line #2 Break Point:
FW-Cl2 1.
Identified as High Energy Line on Colored P&ID No. M05-1004 Additional
References:
2.
The postulated break point is shown on FSAR Fig. No. B3.6-2 Amendment 34 as determined in Calc. No. EMD-049318, Rev. J Additional
References:
1 3.
Jet zone defined in Dwg. See next page l
and Calc. No. See next page l
4 E'ssential Systems Components and Structures See: Table B-8, "HELB Essential Items" i
09/85 SP:0157f B-48 Rev. O j
Table B-8 net t ESSENTI AL ITEMS (Systems, Components, St rue t u res )
Jet Zone For Systee:
MFW Break Point No..
FW-Cl2 Shown on M27-1602-Ott Reference (s) we ere Essential Items de fined:
C.E. Doc. 22A7193 Table II Dt. D2. D3 Piping Dws:
M27-1602-OIA Master List of Ites lacetion of Essential Ites If Yes, la It If Tee, Is If No, What Beviewer Essential Itene Essential Essential Iten located Within Damaged? Y/M.
Shutdown Still Was Done to Co m ats for This Shown on Zone? Y/N, Calculation /
Achievable With Resolve issuet Breakt Drawing #
Calculation #
Beforence #
SAP LOSPT Y/N, Reference #
T/N (Lis t )
(Lis t )
(List )
Reference # (List)
(List )
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(4) l 1.
SHUTDOWN Teo M27-1602-013 Assumed Assumed Yes No hite confirmed.
I IESTRUMENTATION M27-1603-01A yes yes PMD Calculation l
M27-1602-0IA CIME09, Sev. 1 M2 7-1602-01 BE i
M27-1603-01AE 1
2.
CRD SYSTEM Yes See comment.
Assumed Assumed Yes location of CSD piping was act considered because EMD yes yes EMD Calculation Calculation 041876 provided a generic evaluation of 041874, Bew. O all CRD piping.
3.
DIESEL CENERATOR Tes M05-1035 Shts 1-8 No.
See commeet.
Drawings show none of the system is inside drywe!!.
t SYSTEM M05-1036 Shts 1, 2 j
t 01ME06 assumed that all inboard isolation valves were 4.
CONTAINitNT Tes M27-1602-01B Assumed yes.
Assumed yes.
Yes ISOLATION SYSTEM M27-1603-01A See cwusent.
See cosusent.
Pt*D Calculations inoperable. 1his calculation showed that certain
- WALVES M2 7-1602-Ola 01ME06 Rev. 2 specific inboard isolation valves were required to be i
6 OIME56 Rev. O operable. 10ME56 concludes that operability is not
- CABLES compromised.
i 5.
SHUTDOWN Tes M05-1052-2 No.
See comment.
Portion of SI inside drywell is not essential.
SERVICE WATER SYSTEM M05-1032-3 1
Drawing shows none of the system is inside drywell.
6.
STANDsY Yes M05-1105 Shts 1-4 No.
See comment.
CAS TREATMENT SYSTEM
[
7.
ECCS Yes M2 7-1602-01B Assumed yes Assumed Yes Yes Calculation ME07 determines if any ECCS lines are hit
[
- MPCS M27-1603-01 A PMD Calculations by jets. including f rom TV-Cl2. No problems found.
- LPCS M27-1602-Ola OlME38, Rev. O, 01ME38 considers jet ef fects on ADS valve conduits
- LPCI
& OlME07, Rev. I but since large line HELBs do not require ADS (per CE 22A7193) this is not a problem.
- ADS
- OTHER SP:0156f 09/85 Rev. 0
.-. = - ~ -.
-..~-n_
. -.. -. - - -. ~ -.
t l
Table B-8 (Cont'd)
Master List of item location of Essential ites If Yes. Is it if Tes. Is
!! No. What Reviewer Essenti.at items Essential Essential ites Imated Withis Damaged? T/N.
Shutdowa Still Was Done to Coms.en t s for h is Shown On Zone? T/M, Calculation /
Achievable With Resolve lesue?
Break!
Drawing #
Calculation f Beierence #
$sF. LOSPF T/N.
Reference f T/M (List)
(La s t )
(List)
Reference f (List)
(List)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8) 4 3.
RYD20CEN IGNITOR SYSTEM Tes See comment.
See comment.
See comument.
No See comment.
Break FW-Cl2 is not a problem for the al system. See FMD Calculation.
Appendir B2 Table S-7 for additional reviewer
- ICMITOR OlME37 comments.
- CABLES 9.
ECCS Co0 LING UNITS Tes M05-1052 No.
See commment.
-~
~
~
Drawing shows some of the ECCS cooling units are inside drywell.
i i
- 10. ETD20CEN REcoMBINER Tes M27-1602-ORB No.
Confirmed that there are no hits.
SYSTEM M2 7-1603-01 A FMD Calculation NM2 7-1602-O! A OlME67-De essential structures are not hit due to their II. STRUCTURAL INTECRITY OT:
locations in reference to the break jet some per the
- ZERO DECREE STRUCTURE Yes S27-1422 Yes. SDQ12-25DG07 No.
SDQ12-25DC07
- DRYhtLL MEAD Tes
$27-1938 No.
See comment.
M-27 series drawings listed in Coluna 3 for itens 1
- WElk WALL Tes
$27-1200-03A No.
See comment.
through 10.
- DRYb1LL STRUCTLEAL Tes
$27-1002-01A Yes.
SDQ12-24DCl2 No.
SDQ12-24DG12 The sero degree drywell structure was conservatively STEEL
- STRUCTURAL STEEL Tes See comment.
Assumed yes Assumed yes Tes. Calculation checked for jet impingeoest loads since the CIME36 accompanying pipe restraint loads act opposite to FalLURE,
impingement loads and reduce their effect. Even for EFFECTS CN ESSENTIAL this conservative assumption the structure was shown l
SYSTEM
- CUTSIDE DRYhtLL Tes
$27-1002-Ola No.
See comment.
acceptable for jet impingement loads.
l WALLS etc.
Calculation CIME36 showed that sufficient ECCS operation was maintained even when large sectors of L
the drywell were assumed lost due to conservatively collapsing the drywell structural steel af ter being hit by jets. D e reviewer felt that it was dif ficult to predict all the consequences when a large sector of the drywell was assumed lost. herefore, i
additional work was requested of S&L to determine if the otME36 jets would collapse drywell steel. ne drywell structural steel was reviewed for jet loads.
The drywell steel at el 737' was shown to be not subject to jet loads. The most severe impingement leading at el 758' and a typical loading at el 767 *-10" were selected for review. The drywell beams sub jec t to these loads were shown to be acceptable.
De reviewer concluded that structural steel would not collapse from postulated HELB jets.
SP:015ef 09/85 Rev. 0 i
}
. - -. - _. - ~. _. _. - -. - -
i Appendix B l
l CHECKLIST B-9 l
HELB PIPE WHIP CHECKLIST l
l l
To De filled in for each specific case examined in the Supplementary Review.
HELB Jet Review Category: Large Line Break Inside Drywell Specific Case System:
MFW Line #2 Break Point:
FW-Cl2 l
t l
1.
Identified as High Energy Line on Colored P&ID No. M05-1004 l
Additional
References:
l l
2.
Tne postulated break point is shown on FSAR Fig. No. 83.6-2 l
l as determined in Calc. No. EMD-049318, Rev. 3 Additional
References:
l 3.
Jet zone defined in Dwg. See next page l
and Calc. No. See next page
'i l
4 Essential Systems Components and Structures See:
Table B-9, "HELB Essential Items"
\\
l i
i l
1 09/85 j
SP:0157f B-51 Rev. O i
Tatte B-9 NELS ESSENTI AL ITEMS ($ystema Component s, Structuree)
Whip Zone Break Point No.+
FW-Cl2 Shown on For Systes:
Mfv Beforence(s) waere Essentsal tsees def amed: C. E. Doc. 22A7193 Piping Dwg:
N/A Master List of iten location of Essential item If Yes, Is It If Yes, le if Me, What Reviewer Essential items Essential \\ Essearial Iree tacated Within Dama ged T T/M, Shutdown Still Was Done to Comments for This Shown On Zone? T/W, Calculation /
Achievable With Resolve issue?
Steak ?
Drewing e Calculation #
8eference #
SAT, LOSP? T/N, Reference f 1/N (List)
(List )
(Lis t )
Seference # (List)
(Lis t )
(6)
(2)
(3)
( 4.)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8) 1.
SmUTDcWW Tes M27-1602-015 No Per calculation EMD 014937 pipe whip restraints fW-92, fW-R4, FW-R6, FW-R7, FW-RI A (non-ga p INSTEL; MENTATION M27-1603-CIA PMD Calculation restraint) and the shield wall provide full restraint M27-16G2-01 A No. 01ME60 f or HELS fW-C12 such that no whipping of this pipe M27-1602-OtBE See coassent.
FSAR Fag. 8 3.6-2 shows these restraints.
occurs.
M27-1603-CIAK Calculation 01ME60 evateates the ef fect on safe shutdown of large bore MELBs, including FW-C12.
It shows that the designed restraints are adequate to limit pipe deflections and protect essential components. Support 1FWO20137 is identified as hit l
by the deflecting pipe but it is determined to be Saee as No. 1 non essential. The subject of restraint design was revaewed and found acceptable in the IDR.
2.
CRD SYSTEM Tes 1
1 3.
DIESEL CENERATOR Tes M05-1035 Same as No. 1 M05-!036 SYSTEM 4.
CONTAINMENT Tes M27-1602-OtB Same as No. 1
-~
~
ISOLATION SYSTEM M27-1603-Ota
- v1LTES M2 7-1602-01 A
- CABLES 3.
520TDoWN Tes M05-1052-2 same as No. 1 SERvtCE WATER SYSTEM M05-1032-3 6.
STANDsY Tes M05-It05 Same as No. 1 CAS TREATTENT SYSTEN
.SP:0156f 09/85 Rev. 0
Table B-9 (Cont'd)
Master List of Isee Incation of Essential Ites If Yes, Is It If Yes Is If 90 Ea t seviewer Essential Itese Essential Essential itee Located Withan Damagedf. T/M.
Shutdove Still Was Done to Cosewers fee This Shown on Zone? T/N.
Calculation /
Achievable With Resolve issue?
Sreek?
Drawing #
Calculation #
Seference #
SAF. LOSPT Y/N.
Deference #
l Y/N (Lis t)
(List)
(List )
Reference # (List)
(List)
I l
(1)
(2)
O)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(3) t L
7.
ECCS Yes M27-1602-OlB Yes Assumed yee Yes
- BPCS M2 7-1603-01 A PMD Calculation PMD Calculation PMD Calculatica
. {
- LPCS M27-1602-01A No. 01ME60 No. OtME60 No. 01ME60
- LPCs
- OTutt l
S.
RTt40CEN 1C51T08 SYSTEM Yes l
- ICetTCt
(
- CASLES t
l 9.
ECCS C00LluG UNITS Yes M05-1052 Same as No. 1 t
I I
I
- 19. EYtC0CEN REconstWEa Yes M27-1602-01B Same as No. 1 SYSTEN M27-1603-Cla l
l M2 7-1602-01 A l
h I
- 11. STEUCTURAL tuTECBITY OF:
Same as No. 1
-~
~
- ZERO DECaEE STSUCTURE Yes
$27-1422
- DATWELL READ Tes
$27-1938
- WEta WALL Yes
$27-1200-034
- DeTWELL STRUCTURAL Yes
$27-1002-01A STEEL t
- STRUCTURAL STEEL Yes FAILCat EFFECTS ON ESStuTIAL SYSTEM
- CUTSIDE DATWELL Yes
$27-1002-Ola WALLS. etc.
I f
i i
t k
l 1
l l
SP:015ef 09/85 Rev. O I
I l
L l
1
l Appendix B l
CHECKLIST B-10 HELB PIPE WHIP CHECKLIST To be filled in for each specific case examined in the Supplementary Review.
HELB Jet Review Category:
Small Line Break Inside Drywell Specific Case System:
HPCS Break. Point:
HP-C9A 1.-
Identified as High Energy Line on Colored P&ID No. M05-1074 Additional
References:
2.
Tne postulated break point is shown on FSAR Fig. No. 83.6-4 as determined in Calc. No. EMD-048911, Rev. 3 i
Additional
References:
3.
Jet zone defined in Dwg. See next page and Calc. No. See next page 4
Essential Systems. Components and Structures See:
Table B-10, "HELB Essential Items" r
L L
l /
i 09/85 SP:0157f B-54 v 0 t
Table B-19 HELB E?W NTIAL ITEMS (Systees. Components. St ruc t u res )
Whip Zone For Systes:
NPCS Break Point No.:
NP-c9A shown on Beforence(s) where Essential items def seed; G.E. Doc. 22A7193 piping thg:
N/A i
i Master List of Itee Incation of Essentist ites If Yes, Is It
!! Yes, Is if No. What Reviewer l
Essential trema Essential Essential tres tocated Within Damaged? T/M.
Shutdown Stitt Was Done to Commsen t s I
for This Shows on Zone? T/M.
Calculation /
Achievable With Besolve Issue?
t Break?
Drawing #
Calculation f Beference #
SAF. LOSPT T/M.
Reference #
T/N (List)
(Lis t)
(Lis t )
Reference # (List)
(List)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
~
L l
r M27-1603-02A M2 7-1603-02 AK l
1.
SHUTDOWN Tes See comment.
No IN$1BUMENTATf0N FMD Calculation M27-1603-04A M27-1603-04AK I
No. OlMI60 M27-1602-045 M27-1602H)4BK l
M27-1602-025 M27-1602-02BK r
See reviewer comments in Appendia B. Table B-9.
Location of CBD piping was not considered because EMD 2.
CBD SYSTEM Tes See comment.
Samps as No. 1 Calculation 041874 provided a generic evaluation of att CRD piping.
3.
DIESEL CENERATOR Tes M05-1035 Same as No. 1 SYSTEM M05-10 36 6.
CONTAIN!ENT Tes M27-1063-02A Same as No. 1 ISOLAftom SYSTEM M27-1063-04A
- v&LVES M27-1062-048
- CABLES M2 7-1062-028 5.
5xv7DOWN Tes M05-1052-2 Same as No. 1
~~
Stay!cE WATER SYSTEM M05-1032-3 I
6.
STANDBY Tes M05-1105 Same as W. 1 CAS TREATENT SYSTEM 7.
ECCS Tes M27-1603-02A Same as b. 1
~~
- EPCS M27-1603-04A
- LPCS M2 7-t $02-04A L
- LPCI M27-1602 -J25
- ADS
- OTHER SP:0156f 09/85 Rev. O
I Table B-10 (Cont'd)
Martet List of Ites location of Essential Ites if Yes, Is It if Yes, Is If No, What Reviewer Essestial itees '
Essential Essential Ites located Within Damated? Y/N, Shutdown Still Was Done to Comunent s for This.
Sown on Zone? T/N, Calculation /
Achievable With Resolve Isswe?
Sreak?
Drawing #
Calculation #
Reference #
SAF, LOSP7 T/N, Reference f T/M (List)
(Lis t )
(List)
Reference # (List)
(List) i t
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8) l 8.
ETCCOCEN IGNITOR SYSTEM Yes Same as No, 1
- IGNITOR
- CAT.LES 9.
ECCS COOLING UNITS Yes N05-1052 Same as No. 1 i
- 10. HTDROCEN RECONRIMER Yes N27-1603-02A Same as No. 1 SYSTEM N27-1603-04A N27-1603-04B M27-1603-028
- 11. STRUCTURAL INTEG81TY OF:
- ZERO DECREE STRUCTURE Yes
$27-1422 Same as No. 1
- DRYWELL HEAD Tes
$2 7-19 38
- WEIR WALL Tes
$27-1200-03A
- DRYWELL STRUCTURAL Tes
$27-1003-02A 6 STELL 04A
- STRUCTURAL STEEL Tes N27-1603-02A 6 FAILURE 04A; 1602-048 EFFECTS ON ESSENTIAL 6 028 SYSTEM
- OUTSIDE DRYWELL Yes 527-1003-02A WALLS, etc.
6 04A SP;0156f 09/85 Rev. 0
r Appendix C MODERATE ENERGY LINE BREAK SPRAY REVIEW Appendix C covers the detailed review results concerning the effects of spray resulting from a moderate energy line break (MELB).
During the IDR, Observation Report 57 was written to identify conditions relative to the S&L design analyses in the MELB area that prevented the review team from reaching a conclusion as to the compliance with connitments/ requirements and the adequacy of the design. A total of 7 open items (Items 12 through 18, Appendix A) for MELB spray could not be resolved with the documentation in existence at the time of the IDR. Since that time, S&L has addressed these items by completing the MELB analysis documentation and issuing a MELB Spray Summary Report.
l l
I i
i 09/85 SP:0239f C-1 Rev 0
APPENDIX C MELB SPRAY REVIEW l
Areas Reviewed Acceptance Acceptability for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No 12, Documented analyses Existence and completeness.
In compliance with their commitment relative to X
s for all plant areas of documented analysis.
OR 57, S&L has concisely documented their for MELB spray analyses for MELB spray effects in their "HELB effects.
Jet Impingement and MELB Spray Summary.
Report." This report identifies the S&L assumptions and conclusions, and provides references to supporting documentation. The report was found to correctly reflect.the analytical work performed by S&L for MELB spray.
It identifies that MELB analyses were not required in plant areas where more stringent HELBs occur (e.g., drywell, containment, and RCIC pump cubicle).
Calculation OlME04, Rev. 3, dated 8/3/85, updates the previous MELB analysis using current design data. Calculation OlME43, i
Rev. O was written to cover the control building areas which were not covered by Calculation OlME04.
The above documents the i
MELB analysis for all plant areas with safety-related equipment. For completeness, the MELB Spray Summary Report also discusses i
the non-Seismic Category I buildings, which do not h' ave safety-related equipment.
- 13. Supporting documenta-Total documentation is S&L report "llELB Jet Impingement and MELB X
tion to permit an sufficient to confirm Spray Summary Report" independent review that the plant can safely for design adequacy.
shut down.
OlME4, Rev.3 01ME43, Rev.0 09/85 SP:0180f C-2 Rev. 0 4
APPENDIX C (Cont'd)
MELB SPRAY-REVIEW Areas Reviewed Acceptance Acceptability for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed,and Comments Yes No
- 13. Supporting documenta-OlME61, Rev.0 tion (Cont'd)
Also see drawings listed in Item 15.
The calculations and other S&L documentation are sufficient to establish design adequacy.
Calculation OlME4 presents the results of an evaluation process which an independent reviewer must verify by a detailed check of each conclusion, using several existing design documents. That documentation is sufficient for a knowledgeable reviewer to reach a conclusion relative to design adequacy.
All cases examined during this SR proved accurate. The general adequacy of the identification of components required for t
safe plant shutdown is addressed in Appendix 0, Item 20.
l SP:0180f C-3 Rv 0
~-w
'(
~
APPENDIX C (Cont'd) m MELB SPRAY REVIEW
^
Areas Reviewed Acceptance
' ~
Acceptability Yes No Documents Reviewed ' and Consnents for Adequacy Criteria' a
- 14. Calculation conclu-Adequacy of design such The calculations were reviewed in-depth for X
sions, and proper that plant can be safely adequacy and application of licensing requirements, application of single shut down under particularly as to the application of single active active failure and postulated conditions;.
component failure and loss of offsite powe'r
~
loss of offsite power FSAR D.3.6.3; BTP MEB 3-1; assumptions, and were found adequate.
criteria.
BTP ASB-3.1 FSAR D.3.6.3, Calculation OlME04, Rev. 3, 8/5/85, and Calculation OlME43, Rev. O, S/3/85, apply the single active failure and loss of offsite power assumptions as appropriate to each area containing safety-related components. Moderate energy line breaks are not postulated in redundant trains of water lines which have been stress analyzed and verified to meet the BTP MEB 3-1 criteria for crack exclusion.
FSAR D.3.6.3. notes that exclusion of the single active failure assumption (in accordance with BTP MEB 3-1 Subsection B.3.b(3)) is applied to the RHR and shutdown service water systems.
FSAR D3.6. 3.2.10, S&L Calculation OlME4, Rev.3, 8/5/85 and S&L Calculation OlME43, Rev.10, 5/3/85, note the application of crack postulation exclusion on the allowed stress basis where portions of the shutdown service 09/85 SP:0180f C-4 Rev. O
APPENDIX C (Cont'd)
MELB SPRAY REVIEW Acceptability Areas Reviewed Acceptance for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No water lines have been analyzed and verified
- 14. Calculation conclusions (Cont'd) to meet the BTP MEB 3-1 criteria. Adequacy was established by the stress-analysis for Subsystems ISX358, ISX368, ISX39, and ISX40.
Division I-and II electrical switchgear/ motor control center romns and DC inverter rooms in the control building'contain shutdown service water piping which was analyzed for stress.
Stresses were found to be within allowable limits to permit classification of these areas as no break areas.
areas, particularly in plant shutdown under postu-OlME4, Rev.3, 8/5/85,' note the methodology that auxiliary building, lated conditions; FSAR "MELBs are not postulated in areas where HELBs main steam tunnel, D.3.6.3; BPT MEB 3-1; BTP are postulated." This omits the specific containment annulus.
ASB-3.1 quhlification (required in BTP MEB 3-1, Section-B.2.d):
"provided such cracks would i
not result in more limiting environmental conditions than the high energy piping break."
l l
The "HELB Jet Impingement and MELB Spray Summary Report" specifically states that MELBs were not postulated in the drywell, RWCU pump cubicles, RWCU pipe tunnel, RiiR heat exchanger cubicles, and RCIC pump cubicle where more stringent HELBs have been postulated.
09/85 SP:0180f C-5 Rev. 0 i
I APPENDIX C (Cont'd)
MELB SPRAY REVIEW Acceptability Areas Reviewed Acceptance for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No
- 15. HELB effects (Cont'd)
Appendix D addresses the verification of the S&L determination of equipment and components necessary to achieve safe shutdown.
The SR of the S&L MELB anal'ysis for spray
-described in this appendix noted no cases where cracks in moderate energy systems could be expected to produce more limiting spray conditions.
The SR was structured to sample the completed work by selecting areas expected to be limiting situations. These were selected specifically from the IDR Final Report.
In this fashion, it was expected that, where the work was adequately performed in the selected areas, other areas would similarly be' judged as adequate.
For MELB spray, certain areas are reviewed by-S&L generally, based on the existence of more limiting HELB conditions. Specific areas are:
area)
MELB spray external to containment in o
areas qualified to meet HELB conditions 09/85 SP:0180f C-6 Rev. O i
lu-.
APPENDIX C (Cont'd)
MELB SPRAY REVIEW Acceptability Areas Reviewed Acceptance for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Comnents Yes No
- 15. MELB effects (Cont'd)
For MELB spray inside containment, it is S&L's conclusion that potential HELB conditions (separately analyzed) envelop potential MELB effects. The SR team chose to examine the basic postulation (i.e., the existence of enveloping conditions) as a suf'ficient measure of design adequacy in this area. As a result of this review, the reviewers agree with the S&L conclusion that items required for safe plant shutdown which have been adequately qualified for in-containment service in a LOCA, including spray effects, require no further qualification for MELB spray effects.
The SR-also examined a number of design documents to confirm the S&L identification of moderate energy systems inside the drywell. Based on comparison of this result with the environmental maps in FSAR Section 3.11, the SR team agreed with the S&L conclusion that none of the potential MELB situations could produce more severe environmental conditions than those resulting from HELBs postulated in the area.
Similarly, the SR concluded that MELB spray inside containment had been adequately addressed by S&L.
09/85 SP:0180f C-7 Rev. O
APPENDIX C.(Cont'd)
~
MELB SPRAY REVIEW Areas Reviewed Acceptance Acceptability for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No
- 15. MELB effects (Cont'd) for areas external to containment, several were selected for in-depth review. The review concluded that the design for MELB spray was adequate for the control building at elevation 762'-0", for the RHR heat-exchanger cubicles (the B room was examined),
.for the HPCS room, and for the Class 1E switchgear/ motor control center rooms. An additional area examined was the auxiliary building main steam tunnel, and drawing review substantiated the S&L analytical basis' (i.e., enveloped by a postulated HELB) in that area.
Calculations 01ME4, Rev.3, and OlME43, Rev.0, provide an evaluation of each area of the-plant which contains moderate energy piping and safety related equipment.
- 1. Areas reviewed as supplementary review sample:
Inside drywell; inside containment; control building El. 762'-0"; auxiliary building main steam tunnel; RHR heat exchanger room B (auxiliary building);
HPCS room 09/85 SP:0180f C-8 Rev. 0
r-APPENDIX C (Cont'd)
MELB SPRAY REVIEW Acceptability Areas Reviewed Acceptance Yes No for Adequacy Criteria Docu,ments Reviewed and Comments
- 15. MELB effects (Cont'd)
- 2. Drawings reviewed during supplementary review (number / sheet /rev.):
j Auxiliary Building Piping Drawings M26-1000-01A, Rev.F l
M26-1000-02A, Rev.G M26-1001-02A, Rev.F l-M26-1002-02A, Rev.F j
l M26-1003-02A, Original Rev.
Auxiliary Building Electrical Drawings E26-1000-02A-Ei, Rev.AA E26-1001-02A-EI, Sh.1, Rev.0 E26-1001-02A-EI, Sh.3, Rev.F E26-1001-028-EI, Rev.R E26-1002-02A-EI, Rev.S l
E26-1003-02A-EI, Rev.T j
E26-1100-02A-EI, Rev.S l
Auxiliary Building Instr. Drawings M26-1000-02AK, Sh.1, Rev.Z l
M26-1000-02AK, Sh.2, Rev.C M26-1001-02AK, Sh.1, Rev. AA -
l M26-1003-02AK, Sh.1, Rev. AE M26-1003-02AK, Sh.2, Rev. H
'M26-1003-02AK, Sh.3, Rev.E 09/85 SP:0180f
'C-9 Rev. O
APPENDIX C (Cont'd)
MELB SPRAY REVIEW i
Areas Reviewed Acceptance Acceptability for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No
- 15. MELB effects (Cont'd)
Auxiliary Building Electrical Drawings E26-1604A-EI, Rev.L E26-1000-02A-EI, Rev.AA E26-1604B,EI, Rev.G E26-1001-02A-EI, Sh.1, Rev.J E26-1607-EI, Rev.N E26-1001-02A-EI, Rev.F E26-1612-EI, Rev.R E26-1001-028-EI, Rev.R E26-1613-EI, Rev.S E26-1002-02A-EI, Rev.S i
E26-1620-EI, Rev.I E26-1003-02A-EI, Rev.T l
E26-1100-02A-EI, Rev.S Fuel Building Piping Drawings M28-1000-Ol A, Rev.E M28-1000-03A, Rev.F M28-1001-01A, Rev.F M28-1001-03A, Rev.G Fuel Building Electrical Drawings E26-1000-03A-EI, Rev. AC l
l E26-1001-01 A-EI, Rev. J E26-1001-03A-EI, Rev. U Fuel Building Instr. Drawings l
M28-1000-OlAK, Rev.W M28-1000-03AK, Sh.1, Rev.S M28-1000-03AK, Sh.2, Rev.A M28-1001-01AK, Rev.G l
l l
09/85 SP:0180f C-10 Rev. 0
__. ~ _ _
l APPENDIX C (Cont'd)
MELB SPRAY REVIEW Acceptability Areas Reviewed Acceptance for Adequacy
-Criteria Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No
- 15. MELB effects (Cont'd)
Control Building Piping Drawings M30-1003-OlA, Rev.J M30-1004-05A, Rev.F M30-1003-02A, Rev.G M30-1004-06A, Rev.H M30-1003-03A, Rev.F M30-1005-01 A, Rev.J M30-1003-04A, Rev.li M30-1005-02A, Rev.H M30-1003-05A, Rev.G-M30-1005-03A, Rev.H j
M30-1003-06A, Rev.F M30-1005-04A, Rev.H M30-1004-01 A, Rev.G M30-1005-05A, Rev.H M30-1004-02A, Rev.E M30-1005-06A, Rev.F j
M30-1004-03A, Rev.D M30-1006-04A, Rev.B M30-1004-04A, Rev.J M30-1006-06A, Rev.B i
Control Building Instr. Dr nings i
M30-1002-02AK, Rev.B M30-1004-04AK, Rev.D
]
M30-1003-OlAK, Rev.C M30-1004-05AK, Rev.B M30-1003-02AK, Rev.C M30-1004-06AK, Rev.E M30-1003-04AK, Rev.E M30-1005-01AK, Rev.L l
M30-1003-05AK, Rev.E M30-1005-02AK, Rev.G 3
M30-1004-01AK, Rev.C M30-1005-03AK, Rev.H M30-1004-02AK, Sh.1, Rev.C M30-1005-05Ak, Rev.J M30-1004-02AK, Sh.2, Rev.A M30-1005-06AK, Rev.M M30-1004-03AK, Rev.C Control Building Electrical Drawings
[
E30-1002-04A-EI, Rev.V E30-1005-01A-EI, Sh.1, Rev. Z j
E30-1002-06A-EI, Rev.H E30-1005-02A-EI, Sh.1, Rev.M E30-1003-01A-EI, Rev.AF E30-1005-02A-EI, Sh.2, Rev.H E30-1003-02A-EI, Rev.R E30-1005-03A-El, Sh.2, Rev.M l
E30-1003-03A-EI, Rev.A E30-1005-03A-EI, Sh.3, Rev.F i
E30-1003-04A-EI, Rev.AD E30-1005-04A-El, Sh.1, Rev.Z j
SP:0180f C-Il e
0
APPENDIX C (Cont'd)
MELB SPRAY REVIEW Areas Reviewed Acceptance Acceptability for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Comments -
Yes No.
150 MELB effects (Cont'd)
Control Building Electrical Drawings (Cont'd)
E30-1003-05A-EI, Rev.T E30-1005-04A-EI, Sh.2, Rev.M E30-1002-06A-EI, Rev.A E30-1005-04A-EI, Sh.3, Rev.H E30-1004-02A-EI, Rev.N E30-1005-05A-EI, Sh.1, Rev.T E30-1004-03A-EI, Rev.G E30-1005-05A-EI, Sh.2, Rev.D E30-1004-04A-EI, Rev.W E30-1005-06A-EI, Sh.1, Rev.V E30-1004-05A-EI, Rev.T E30-1005-06A-EI, Sh.2, Rev.M E30-1004-06A-EI, Rev.P M03-1101, Sh.1, Rev.A M03-1102, Sh.4, Rev.G M03-1101, Sh.2, Rev.A M03-1102, Sh.5, Rev.H M03-1101, Sh.3, Rev.A
.M03-1102, Sh.6, Rev.J M03-1102, Sh.1, Rev.W M03-1102, Sh.7, Rev.E M03-1102, Sh.2, Rev.V M03-1102, Sh.8, Rev.A M03-1102, Sh.3, Rev.U FSAR Figures 3.11.4.1-5 through 16, Amendment 34 Calculation OlME61, Rev.0, environmental zone maps. FSAR Figures 3.11.4.1-1, Drawing M01-1600 (Rev. 2), FSAR Sections 3.11.1, 3.11.2, 3.11.3, 3.11.4, 3.11.5, 3.11.6, 3.11.9.8, 3.11.9.13, 3.11.9.14, Amendment 34, July 1985 j
CPS Mechanical Penetration Schedule Calculation OlME61, Rev.0, analyzed HPCS, LPCS RCIC, RilR A, B, and C cubicles, and
~
09/85 SP:0180f C-12 Rev. O u-
g, APPENDIX C (Cont'd)
MELB SPRAY REVIEW Acceptability l
Areas Reviewed Acceptance for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Cmanents Yes No l
- 15. MELB effects (Cont'd) containment /drywell area. The equipment in these areas where HELB is present are qualified for LOCA conditions or steam flooding conditions.
In some instances, equipment external to containment which is required for safe shutdown is not specifically qualified for spray.
It is
. assumed that the LOCA qualification would envelop the MELB spray condition because of LOCA test conditions for temperature, pressure, and relative humidity. Since the moderate energy-sprays are not considered as jets, the spray effect would be similar to a l
" wetting," which can be considered similar to condensation after steam flooding. Based on this logic, the SR has concluded that the equipment qualified for steam flooding or 100 percent relative humidity conditions can reasonably be expected to perform intended safety functions. However, this reasonable expectation has not been confirmed by
-specific qualification testing for MELB spray conditions. S&L.has agreed to submit an FSAR revision to clearly call out the analytical assumption. The SR team has reviewed the draft FSAR change and found it satisfactory for the purpose.
09/85 SP:0180f C-13 Rev. 0
i l
~ APPENDIX C (Cont'd)
MELB SPRAY REVIEW Areas Reviewed Acceptance Acceptability for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Coments Yes No
- 16. Effects of design Demonstrable plan in effect S&L has stated that additional review efforts to X
changes since July, to consider past design date have not identified any required revision of 1982 considered in changes in completing MELC Calculation 01ME4 for post-July 1982 changes.
MELB spray analyses.
analyses.
The S&L commitment to confirm that design changes made between July, 1982, the base date for Calculation OlME4, and the issuance of Pl-CP-75 on May 3, 1985 (see MELB Spray Item No. 7) was separately checked for current practice as part of the llELB pipe whip and jet impingement review and found satisfactory. See Appendix B, Item No. 8 for details of this check.
to reflect MELB spray actual design conditions, to clarify the analytical method employed to analyses.
and clearly and completely show design adequacy in the Class 1E Switchgear identify assumptions, area (i.e., stress analysis), and to clearly methodology, and identify the S&L analytical assumption relative conclusions.
to MELB acceptable spray. These revisions were reviewed and found acceptable.
- 18. Program for reviewing Program should appear to be PI-CP-75, Rev.0, 5/3/85, " Senior Designer:
X future design changes complete, effective.
Review Process" for MELB spray effects.
See Comments for Appendix B, HELB Pipe Whip and Jet Impingement, Item No. 4.
The procedure for reviewing future design changes with respect to the MELB spray area was reviewed and found acceptable.
09/85 C'-14 SP:0180f Rev. O
Appendix D HELB/MELB FLOODING REVIEW Appendix D covers the detailed review results of tne high energy line break / moderate energy line break (HELB/MELB) flood review.
During the IDR, I
Observation Report 64 was written to identify conditions relative to insufficient and incomplete S&L documentation which prevented the review team from reaching a conclusion on design adequacy. A total of 9 open items (Items 19 througn 27, Appendix A) for flooding effects on safety-related compor.ents caused by postulated high and moderate energy line breaks could not be resolved. Since that time, S&L has addressed these items by completing the l.
HELB/MELB flooding review and documentation.
1 i
i 1
I I
r 1
t' i
l 4
l 1
09/85 j
SP:0214f D-1 Rev. 0 l
APPENDIX D HELB/MELB FLOODING REVIEW l
Area Reviewed Acceptance Acceptability l
for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Consnents' Yes No
- 19. Flood evaluation Documentation of a flood Calculation 3C10-0485-001, Rev. 0 - Final X
for all HELB/MELB evaluation for all HELB/MELB (July 26,1985), titled " Internal Flooding in all areas of in all areas of safety-related Calculation" safety-related buildings.
I buildings. (OR 64)
This calculation provided a conservative estimate.of the maximum flooding level for all compartments within all safety-related and nonsafety-related buildings. The non. safety-related buildings (i.e., turbine building and radwaste building) are considered as potential flood sources to the safety-related buildings. Each building is divided into flood zones which correspond to the environmental zones as shown in FSAR l
Figures 3.11-1 through 3.11-15.
The maximum flow rate for each flood zone was calculated assuming a single initiating pipe failure in either the high energy or moderate energy piping systems.
In considering HELB, all possible pipe whip induced pipe breaks, in either high eneroy or moderate energy lines,'are reviewed for maximum flood flow rate. The position as stated in SRP..d.2 is taken in estimating break sizes.
Fluid removal occurs by means of open
'i stairwells, equipment hatches, gaps under doors, and floor drains.
j A vertical review of a sample area of each building is performed as part of the SR.
fev SP:0158f D-2 0
m-m.
'.n-e-
---m
i APPENDIX D (Cont'd)
HELB/MELB FLOODING REVIEW
~~
Acceptability Area Reviewed Acceptance for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No i
- 19. Flood evaluation Sample areas were selected by areas of special for all HELB/MELB
- interest, i.e., auxiliary building, and by in all areas of the high maximum water levels calculated.
In safety-related.
checking the flood level calculation, the.
buildings (Cont'd) following additional documents were reviewed:
- PMD Calculation OlME53, Rev. 1, "Identifica-tion of High Energy Lines" - 7/12/85
- PMD Calculation 01ME3, Rev. 1, " Turbine, Radwaste and Control Buildings Flooding.
Following CW Expansion Joint Rupture" -
12/13/84
- DIT-CP-ADD-1013, Rev. O, 5/3/85
- DIT-CP-EMD-1016, Rev. O, 5/3/85
- DIT-CP-PMD-1422 7/3/85
- DIT-CP-PMD-1487, Rev. O Drawings reviewed:
M26-1000-04A, Rev. E_
A26-1000-04A, Rev. M M26-1000-OlA, Rev. F A26-1000-01A, Rev. Z M26-1300-02A, Rev. G A26-1000-02A, Rev. U M26-1000-03A, Rev. F A26-1000-03A, Rev. T M26-1001-02A, Rev. F A26-1000-05A, Rev. L M26-1000-05A, Rev. F A26-1001-01A, Rev. W i
M26-1001-01A, Rev. F A26-1001-02A, Rev. K M26-1001-03A, Rev. G A26-1001-03A, Rev. R M26-1302, Rev. C A26-1001-05A, Rev. J M27-1002-04A, Rev. F A26-1002-02A, Rev. K M27-1311, Rev. F A27-1002-01A, Rev. F 09/85 l
SP:0158f D-3 Rev. 0
i APPENDIX D (Cont'd)
HELB/MELB FLOODING REVIEW 1
Area Reviewed Acceptance Acceptability for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Connents Yes No
- 19. Flood evaluation M27-1003-01A, Rev. F A27-1002-04A, Rev. G for all -HELB/MELB M27-1305, Rev. E A27-1003-01C, Rev. C in all areas of M27-1310, Rev. F A27-1004-04A, Rev. G safety-related M30-1000-OlA, Rev. H A30-1001-OlA, Rev. Y buildings (Cont'd)
M30-1000-02A, Rev. H A30-1003-05A, Rev. P M30-1000-05A A29-1000-OlA, Rev. K M30-1000-06A A29-1000-04A, Rev. K H30-1001-OlA, Rev. G A29-1000-02A, Rev. J M30-1003-05A A29-1000-03A, Rev. T M29-1000-04C A29-1001-01A, Rev. R I
M29-1000-05C, Rev. J A29-1001-04A, Rev. P l
M29-1000-01A, Rev. G A28-1000-06A, Rev. V l
M29-1001-01 A, Rev. F A28-1001-06, Rev. A M28-1000-06A, Rev. F A22-1032, Rev. L M28-1001-06A A22-1028, Rev. K M22-1012, Rev. C M22-1054, Rev. C M22-1008, Rev. B M05-1047 Series M05-1054 Series An adequate and complete evaluation of flooding for all safety-related buildings has been presented in Calculation 3C10-0485-001, l
Rev. O.
Rev. 1 of this calculation will be I
issued to correct maximum flood levels of some flood zones in the control building, the diesel building, and the fuel building to the maximum l
flood level of Elev. 719' - 0".
l l
SP:0158f D-4 Rv 0 l
l
F I
l APPENDIX D (Cont'd)
HELB/MELB FLOODING REVIEW Area Reviewed Acceptance Acceptability for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Coments Yes No
- 20. Evaluation of safe Documentation of an evaluation - Calculation OlME77, Rev. O, 8/06/85, X
shutdown capability to verify that safe shutdown
" Safe Shutdown Analysis" following a HELB/
is achievable with proper
- Calculation OlME77, Rev. 1, 8/08/85, l
MELB flooding event. consideration of loss of
" Safe. Shutdown Analysis" l
(OR 64) offsite power and single
- Calculation 3C10-0785-002, Rev. O, 7/25/85 active failure.
"Drywell Flooding from Moderate Energy Line l
Cracks"
- Calculation CL-FP-SS-1, Rev.1, 7/30/85 l
" Identification of Safe Shutdown Systems"
- Calculation OlME74, Rev. 1, 7/30/85
" Safe Shutdown Equipment List - Mechanical"
- Calculation OlME75 7/22/85 l
" Safe Shutdown Equipment List - Mechanical" (CID-related)
- Calculation OlME76, Rev. O, 7/23/85
" Safe Shutdown Instrument List" (HVAC-related C&D) l
- Calculation 19-AI-35, Rev. O, 7/23/85 l
" Electrical Equipment Required for Safe Shutdown"
- Calculation VZ-25, Rev. O, 7/22/85
" Identification of Safe Shutdown Systems" (HVAC for Fire Protection)
- Calculations 19-AI-36 through 19-AI-57
- Calculation SD-Q10-96-DG27 l
- Calculation SDQ-1248-DG05
- DIT-CP-EPED-1609, Rev. 0 l
- DIT-CP-EPED-1610, Rev. 0
- DIT-CP-PMD-1407, Rev. 2
- DIT-CP-EPGD-1614, Rev. 0
- DIT-CP-PMD-1683, Rev. O SP:0158f D-5 v 0
APPENDIX 0 (Cont'd)
HELB/MELB FLOODING REVIEW I
Acceptability Area Reviewed Acceptance for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No
- 20. Evaluation of safe
- DIT-CL-C00-300201-00, Rev. O shutdown capability
- DIT-CP-HVACD-1427, Rev. O following a HELB/
- DIT-CP-CID-1515, Rev. O
- DIT-CP-CID-1416 Rev. 1 MEL8 flooding event (Cont'd)
- DIT-CP-EPED-1568, Rev. 0
- Calculation 3C10-0584-001, Rev.0, 6/29/84
" Station Blackout - Temperature Transient Study for the RCIC Equipment Cubicles"
- Calculation 3C10-0882-001, Rev.1, 11/9/83 "RCIC Equipment Room Environmental Conditions from Adjacent Fire Corridor"
- Calculation 3C6-0780-004, Rev.0, 8/28/80 "ECCS Room Temperature Transient Due to the Loss of Spare Cooling"
.S&L letter to IPC, SLMI-1677, August 8, 1985, "Feedwater Break Exclusion Extension"
(
l Drawings reviewed:
E28-1000-OlA-EI, Rev. G E28-1001-06A-EI, Rev. H E28-1001-08A-EI, Rev. T E26-1617-EI, Sh.1, Rev. N E28-1000-03A-EI, Rev. AC E26-1604A-EI, Rev. L E26-16048-EI, Rev. G E26-1001-02A-EI, Rev. U E28-1001-01 A-EI, Rev. H E28-1001-03A-EI, Rev. R E28-1001-04A-EI, Rev. M E28-1001-05A-EI, Rev. T E28-1001-07A-EI, Rev. P 09/85 SP:0158f D-6 Rev. 0
f-APPENDIX D (Cent'd)
HELB/ELB FLOODING REVIEW Acceptability Area Reviewed Acceptance for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Consnents Yes No-The analysis performed by S&L to verify that i
l
- 20. Evaluation of safe safe shutdown capability is retained for each shutdown capability postulated flooding event due to pipe break is following a HELB/
documented in Calculation 01ME77.
This MELB flooding calculation uses as input information the event (Cont'd) compartment flooding levels that were l
determined in Calculation 3C10-0485-001, except i
in a small number of cases for which the l
previously postulated pipe cracks were l
eliminated through consideration of piping stress analyses as allowed for by the NRC's criteria.
In addition, it has been proposed by l
S&L to eliminate four postulated pipe breaks by extending the break exclusion region associated with the feedwater headers. For each compartment that was determined to be l
potentially subject to flooding, an analysis of safe shutdown capability was performed, l
including the following considerations:
I o Unavailability of the safe shutdown system in which the initial pipe failure occurred (if applicable) l 0 Unavailability of electrically-operated safe shutdown components located below the calculated flood level in the flooded compartment (and in any compartments flooded simultaneously, if applicable) 09/85 l
SP:0158f D-7 Rev. O
l APPENDIX D (Cent'd)
HELB/MELB FLOODING REVIEW Area Reviewed Acceptance Acceptability for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No
- 20. Evaluation of safe o Potential loss of offsite power if reactor shutdown capability or turbine trip is a direct consequence of following a HELB/
the initial flooding event MELB flooding event (Cont'd) o An assumed single active failure in systems used to shut down the reactor and mitigate the consequences of the piping failure r
l Tables la through Ih of Calculation OlME77 list the individual flooding zones into which the l
plant was divided for analysis purposes, as well as the maximum postulated flood level in I
each zone. Also listed for each flooding zone I
are the safe shutdown components that are l
located below flood level within the given zone. For each flooding zone in which the postulated flood level did not affect any safe shutdown components (i.e., all such components were located above the flood level), safe shutdown was considered to be assured and no further analysis was performed. For each flooding zone in which safe shutdown components i
are located below the flood level, an analysis of safe shutdown capability was provided. Each of these zone-by-zcne analyses was reviewed, and it is judged that these analyses were performed logically and consistently and do in fact provide verification that safe shutdown can be achieved in the event of flooding.
09/85 SP:OlS8f D-8 Rev. 0 r-,
I APPENDIX D (Ccnt'd)
HELB/MELB FLOODING REVIEW Area Reviewed Acceptance Acceptability for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Comnents Yes No
- 20. Evaluation of safe For four postulated pipe breaks, S&L shutdown capability identified a problem demonstrating plant following a HELB/
safe shutdown (two breaks in the 4-inch RWCU MELB flooding line in the main steam tunnel and two breaks event (Cont'd) in the 10-inch RHR lines in the RHR heat exchanger rooms). Proposed resolution of this problem is to extend the break exclusion region associated with the feedwater headers. S&L has provided IPC with the proposed methodology.
If l
this approach is acceptable, the plant meets the safety shutdown criteria.
The evaluation of the flooding effects on structural design was also reviewed. The structural analysis was reviewed for analytical approach, references, structural assumptions, i
and calculated margins present in the design.
I The load equations are provided in FSAR Sections 3.8.3 and 3.8.4.
Three sample areas were selected for review. Ti.ete areas were identified as having high flood levels, large structural panels which are likely to have l
limited margins, and areas of potential l
problems such as compartments which are calculated to fill completely. The analytical approach included manual techniques utilizing l
standard references such as the U.S. Bureau of l
Reclamation Monograph No. 27, " Moments and Reactions for Rectangular Plates" and U.S.A.E.C. TID-7024, " Dynamic Pressures on Fluid Containers, Nuclear Reactors and Earthquakes." Structural assumptions SP:0158f as:Rev.12 0-9 Page 9
1 APPENDIX 0 (Cent'd)
HELB/MELB FLOODING REVIEW Area Reviewed Acceptance Acceptability for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Conenents Yes No
- 20. Evaluation of safe were found to be conservative. Yield line shutdown capability theory was used for some structural panels following a HELB/
with high loads or long spans.
MELS flooding event (Cont'd)
Based on review of selected structural calculations, the Clinton structural analysis for flooding was shown to be executed under a controlled process. Structural assumptions and analytical techniques are conservative and capacity is shown to exist in the design to accommodate the calculated flood loadings due to HELB/ELB.
In areas where block walls are assumed to fall, a review of the impact on safe shutdown systems and components due to these block wall failures is provided and safe shutdown capability is not impaired.
09/85 l
SP:0158f D-10 Rev. O
APPENDIX D (Cer.t'd)
HELB/E LB FLOODING REVIEW i
Acceptability Area Reviewed Acceptance for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Comunents Yes No
- 21. Flood protection Adequate documentation to Calculation 3C10-0485-001, Rev. 0 X
design requirements show that the specific flood Calculation 01E 77, Rev. 1 in Design Criteria protection requirements in PI-CP-75, Rev. 1 l
DC-ME-01-CP, Rev. 4.
Design Criteria DC-ME-01-CP (OR 64) are correct and adequately S&L does not intend to continue using addressed.
Design Criteria DC-ME-01-CP as the design basis for flood protection.
l' This document has been replaced by a revision to the Project Instruction PI-CP-75.
The existing design for flood protection is described in detail in Calculation 3C10-0485-001, Rev. O.
The data used by that t
calculation is from latest design drawings l
(architectural and mechanical). The safe shutdown analysis, Calculation 01ME77, Rev.1, determines that safe shutdown capability is i
maintained with the current flood protection
[
requirements as shown in existing design i
- drawings, t
As for future design changes, Project l
Instruction PI-CP-75 will require a review of r
j the maximum flood levels tabulated for the
(
flood zones in all safety-related buildings.
This review will assure that no safety-related components will be damaged by a potential
[
l.
flood event which endangers the capability of i
j l
09/85 f
SP:0158f D-11 pey, o t
APPENDIX D (Cont'd)
HELB/MELB FLOODING REVIEW Area Reviewed Acceptance Acceptability for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No
- 22. Flooding impact of Evidence of an adequate Calculation 3C10-0485-001, Rev. 0 X
Seismic Category I evaluation of flooding impact piping. (OR 64) of Seismic Category I piping The internal flood level Calculation has been adequately addressed. 3C10-0485-001, Rev. O, assumes the most severe pipe break, ie., a pipe failure which would result in the highest flood rate possible for each flood zone, as shown in FSAR Figures 3.11-1 through 3.11-15. Seismic Category I piping failures were evaluated for each zone containing Seismic Category I piping.
It was concluded that the flooding impact of Seismic Category I piping has been adequately addressed.
09/85 0-12 Rev. O SP:0158f
APPENDIX D (Cent'd)
HELB/ELB FLOODING REVIEW Acceptability Area Reviewed Acceptance fcr Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No
- 23. Areas containing Justification that areas Calculation 3C10-0485-001, Rev. 0 X
both high and containing both high and moderate energy moderate energy lines need The internal flood level Calculation lines need not be not be evaluated for ELB 3C10-0485-001, Rev. O assumes a single evaluated for E LB if they have been evaluated initiating pipe failure which would result if they have been for HELB.
in the highest flood rate for any one flood evaluated for HELB.
zone. This initiating pipe failure could either be a HELB or a MELB, as long as it (OR 64) l pr'ovides the highest flood level for the particular flood zones. Also, for areas where j
HELB is postulated, any potential pipe whip l
induced pipe break is evaluated for additional l
flood scurces (Zone C.3.4 in the contain-l ment).
It was concluded that HELB/MELB were adequately addressed in the flooding level calculation.
09/85 i
SP:0158f D-13 Rev. O
l APPENDIX D (Cont'd)
HELB/MELB FLOODING REVIEW Area Reviewed Acceptance Acceptability for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No
- 24. Discrepancies Resolution of the dis-Calculation 01ME77, Rev. 1 X
between FSAR crepancies between FSAR Draft of FSAR Section D3.6.4 Sections 3.11.9 and Sections 3.11.9 and 03.6.4.
l 03.6.4, and the All safety-related items The safe shutdown analysis Calculation OlME77, l
process by which submerged for postulated Rev. I lists all safety-related components the submergence breaks are identified and essential for safe shutdown that are sub-of safety-related safe shutdown shown to be merged in the case of potential flooding. No components during achievable.
credit is given to the operability of submerged i
postulated breaks components. The calculation provides justifica-cas established.
tion / verification that safe shutdown is (OR 64) achievable without the operation of these submerged components. The calculation was reviewed and found to be adequate. See No. 20
(
previously addressed.
FSAR Sections 3.11.9 and 03.6.4 will be revised l
and draf ts of these revisions for D3.6.4 have been reviewed and found to be adequate: FSAR Section 3.11.9 revision will not address flooding while FSAR Section D3.6.4 will describe safe shutdown analysis performed to l
ensure safe shutdown capability.
l l
l l
09/85 SP:0158f D-14 pey, o l
P l
APPENDIX D (Ccnt'd) l HELB/MELB FLOODING REVIEW l
Acceptability Area Reviewed Acceptance for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No
- 25. Existence of doors Resolve discrepancies between FSAR Figure 3.11-9 between the standby the FSAR and the as-built FSAR Section D3.6.3.5 diesel generator conditions.
rooms and HPCS A door opens from the standby diesel generator diesel generator room to the HPCS diesel generator room. FSAR room.
(OR 64)
Section D3.6.3.5 will be revised to indicate a door opening between these two rooms.
Concurrent pipe failure is postulated for these two rooms to estimate maximum flood level. An I
adequate drainage system limits the flood level to about 3 inches. The door described above has an insignificant effect on the flood level calculation.
- 26. Calculation of the Explanation of the use of Calculation 3C10-0485-001, Rev. 0 X
inflow from a break 677' lake level in the Calculation OlME3, Rev. 1 in circulating water calculation of the flow from expansion joint.
a break in the circulating Calculation OlME3, Rev. I corrected the erroneous (OR 64) water expansion joint.
use of the 677' lake level. The correct 697' Revision to the calculation lake level is now used in Calculation OlME3, of break flow from the Rev. 1.
The corrected flood rate calculation in circulation water expansion OiME3, Rev. 1 is found adequate and flood level joint and the impact of this Calculation 3C10-0485-001, Rev. O provides justifi-revision to the conclusions cations for the maximum flood levels attained in of this calculation and the radwaste, control, and the diesel generator Sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.3.b of buildings, i.e., El. 719'.
Design Criteria DC-ME-01-CP, Rev. 4.
Rev. 1 of Calculation 3C10-0485-001 will correct flood level to El. 719' for areas D1.7 and D1.11 in the diesel generator building; I
areas Dl.8, Dl.9, Dl.10, and Dl.16 in the 09/85 SP:0158f D-15 Rev. O
l APPENDIX D (Cont'd) i HELB/MELB FLOODING REVIEW Acceptability Area Reviewed Acceptance for Adequacy Criteria Documents Reviewed and Comments Yes No
- 26. Calculation of the control building; areas F1.ll through Fl.ll, inflow from a break excluding F1.7, in the fuel building; and area in circulating water R.1 in the radwaste building.
expansion joint (Cont'd)
Design Criteria DC-ME-01-CP, Rev. 4 is replaced by PI-CP-75, Rev. I which lists the maximum flood levels as calculated in 3C10-0485-001, Rev. 1.
j
- 27. Project procedure Evidence of a controlled Project Instruction PI-CP-75, Rev.1 X
to review future project procedure to review design changes for all future design changes for For all future design char.ges, responsible flooding effects the flooding effects from engineers will review the flood levels from postulated postulated pipe breaks.
in areas affected by the design changes. The pipe breaks.
Project Instruction PI-CP-75 lists the maximum (OR 64) flood level for each area in all safety-related buildings. Should any water piping (greater than 1 inch) and any safety-related electrical components be added in any areas of safety-related buildings, as listed in PI-CP-75, a safe shutdown assessment for flooding submergence is to be provided by the responsible engineers.
L SP:0158f D-16 ev 0
l l
Observation Report 55 I
CLINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003
~
OBSERVATION REPORT File No.
55 File Revision No.
1 Date November 19, 1984 1.
Level 1 classification of Observation:
r Not significant to safety T Additional information required *See 5, Committee
" Recommendation for resolution" Significant to safety, send to Level 2
. 2.
Structure (s), system (s), or component (s) involved:
Safety-related cructures, systems and components outside containment subject to HELB.
3.
Description of Observation:
(See continuation sheet) 4.
Significance of Observation:
In the absence of a complete detailed evaluation of the adequacy of the Clinton HELB protection provisions outside containment, it cannot be concluded that all required systems and components necessary to achieving a saf e shutdown condition are completely protected from adverse HELB effects, and that the design process for HELB analysis was carried out in sufficient detail to assure meeting the design objectives.
i 5
Recomendation for resolution (optional):
l (See continuation sheet) 6 Signatures:
Level 1 Review Comittee du 1%f/fV
$. b
'ud at WU l
N 0413C 1
CLINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003 OBSERVATION REPORT (continuation sheet)
File No.
55 File Revision No.
1 l
Date Novemoer iv, isus l
l i
3.
Description of Observation (continued) l There is sufficient evidence to conclude that S&L had established, in conformance with licensing requirements for this area, a high energy line break (HELB) design process to provide adequate protecti.on from postulated high energy pipe whip and jet impingement effects for those structures, systems and components required to achieve safe shutdown in the event of a HELB outside containment.
However, documentation reviewed by the IDR team was insufficient to establish with confidence that this design process was implemented with sufficient thoroughness and in sufficient detail to ensure providing the required degree of protection from all HELB effects outside containment.
The design process itself is described in FSAR Section D3.6 " Failure Modes Analysis for Pipe Break and Cracks," which states:
The method used to protect essential systems, components and equipment was physical separation.
In order to'effect physical separation of safety systems, certain generalized procedures were followed during design. All piping, mechanical equipment, electrical components and instrumentation for each of the safety systems and in each of the four divisions were numbered to indicate their division.
In the desi.gn of the systems and in the layout of general arrangements all equipment and components in each of the safety divisions were marked with different colors so that it was possible to determine from looking at drawings that they have been given separation from equipment and components in i
the other three divisions.
This technique facilitated the location of systems.not in the safety divisions which need to be checked for their impact on safety systems.
Improper interconnections between safety divisions also were located by this mechanism.
In areas where adequate distance could not be maintained between two or more safety-related divisions or between high-energy non-divisional equipment and a nuclear safety-related division, a failure mode analysis approach was taken to determine that the safety-related equipment involved was not adversely affected by the pipe breaks or cracks in the immediate area.
Significant points of this observation are:
1.
No documentation was found such as who did the above area by area analysis when it was done 0413C 2
CLINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003 OBSERVATION REPORT (continuation sheet)
File No.
55 File Revision No.
I Date November 19, 1984 3.
Description of Observation (continued) what drawings (and revision numbers) were used what equipment was identified as being in another safety division. (in the case of electrical cables many safety-related areas have several examples of this type) how acceptability was determined including the use of loss of offsite power and single active failure assumptions whether a multidiscipline review was made whether the analysis and results were independently reviewed how design changes were reviewed to ensure safe shutdown capability had not been affected
- 2. The IDR team found the following specific examples of areas where divisional separation was not complete and which, according to the FSAR method, "need to be checked for their impact on safety systems."
'RCIC pump room (division 1) which contain the division 2 cables a.
associated with junction boxes 1JB644 and 1JB645, b.
RWCU pump rooms (non-divisional) - 1PB6168K and 1PB645K (division
- 2) and 1PB645K (division 1)
RHR HX A room (division 1) - 1JB619,1PB6192K,1PB666K,1PB667K and c.
1PB6151 (all division 2) d.
Auxiliary building main steam tunnel which contains numerous electrical cabling of all four divisions.
Other cables within these areas and other areas within the plant may exist where full divisional separation was not achieved.
For these cases, insufficient evidence was found which would allow the IDR team to conclude that HELB design requirements had been met.
0413C 3
CLINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003 OBSERVATION REPORT (continuation sheet)
File No.
55 File Revision No.
1 Date November 19, 1984 5.
Recomendation for Resolution (Continued)
S&L should provide a commitment to implement the following recommendation:
For every plant area (such _as RCIC pump room, RWCU cubicles inside and outside containment, and auxiliary building main steam tunnel where physcial or divisional separation is used as the basis for assuring HELB design adequacy, S&L should provide an analysis which meets the FSAR commitments, complies with ANSI N45.2.11 and with the NRC guidelines in SRP 3.6.1 and 3.6.2.
The documentation of these analyses should include:
A general discussion of what constitutes physical separation and how safe shutdown is assured if it is achieved.
All assumptions used.
Design input including the drawings and revisions used.
If colored composistes are used, they should be retained.
A References and their role in the analysis.
Documentation of all interfaces within S&L and outside organizations (e.g. GE).
Methodology used and sufficient details of its implementation to allow verifier to understand analysis without recourse to the originator.
For any items not satisfying divisional separation criteria, describe how acceptability was determined including the use of the loss of offsite power and single active failure assumptions.
Consideration of the HELB effects on safety-related structures.
Results showing safe shutddown has been achieved.
Also, provide the design change control program that would ensure that future design changes will be evaluated for their effect on safe shutdown.
Finally update, Clinton FSAR Section 3.6 including the figures, tables and appendices to more currently reflect the results of this HELB analysis.
0413C 4
CLINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003 RESOLUTION REPORT File No.
55 File Revision No.
1 4
Date November 19, 1964 1.
Resolution by Level 1
Internal Review Cormiittee 2
Classification of Observation:
a.
Not valid (see continuation sheet) b.
Not significant to safety c.
X Additional information required d.
Significant to safety 3
Program resolution is:
a.
Closed item b.
X Action to be taken by Reviewee 4.
Review Committee signatures:
//41///
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$ b:'!!
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5 Reviewee proposed resolution:
- a. Description of proposed resolution:
- b. Basis of proposed resolution:
6 Reviewee res a repgf sib' b
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Illinois Power Co. Review:
/
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I Date /
/
0413C
CLINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003 RESOLUTION REPORT (continuation report)
File No. OR-55 File Revision No. 1 Date 12-01-84 Page 1 Revised:
January 8, 1985 Sa.
This observation report is not significant to safety. The design process as described in FSAR Section D3.6 and as referenced in Observation Report 55, describes how the high energy line break analysis was implemented on the Clinton project.
Documentation supporting this design process consists of the construction design drawings.
The physical arrangement of the plant, meaning the room arrangement, the equipment location, and physical routing of piping, HVAC ducts, and electrical raceways clearly documents the separation provided between the four safety-related divisions for the Clinton Power Station.
The documentation is therefore shown on the plant general arrangement drawings, the composite physical drawings and the physical routing drawings.
The basic auxiliary / fuel / containment buildings and equipment, locations in cubicles were established by General Electric Rev in 1972, and modified as required by S&L during the design process.
Therefore, consideration of the high energy line break design process was started at that time.
This process continued as the design progressed and evolved.
In 1978, color coded prints of the physical composite piping drawings were prepared for the purpose of reviewing divisional separation.
These color coded prints identified the divisional designation of a component.
These color coded prints were utilized to periodically rev'.ew the plant arrangement, component location, and physical routing for separation considerations. These prints were also used by the designers as a reference for routing such items as cable trays, conduit, piping, and HVAC ducts.
During this design process, there were periodic Project Team Meetings for the specific purpose of reviewing separation concerns.
When a specific concern was identified, an evaluation was made to determine if the concern was significant.
It should be noted that although the Clinton plant is divisionally separated to the maximum degree practical there are specific intentional exceptions, such as
CLINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003 RESOLUTION REPORT (continuation report)
File No. OR-55 File Revision No. 1 Date 12-01-84 Page 2 Revised:
January 8, 1985 the case where two Divisions are required within a room for redundant leak detection protection, or where a motor operated valve in a line designated as one division is powered by a different electrical division to provide redundancy (i.e. containment isolation valves).
These
~
variances in plant arrangement were evaluated to determine the consequences of failure as described.in the FSAR D3.6.
The design proces's occurred over a long period of time and therefore, each of the areas was reviewed several times.
In order to pr' ovide documented evidence to confirm the 1
original evaluations, the following areas mentioned in Observation Report 55 were rereviewed to confirm their adequacy:
1.
RCIC Pump Room The RCIC Pump Room is designated Division 1.
However, there are a limited number of Division 2 components located in this cubicle necessary to provide redundancy.
Failure of these redundant components does not affect the ability to achleve safe shutdown.
The Division 2 components in this room are the Division 2 condensate drain pot isolation valves lE51-F004 and lE51-F025 which connect electrically to junction boxes lJB644 and 1JB645 and associated electrical cables which are Division 2.
Valves lE51-F004 and lE51-F025 are redundant to Division 1 valves lE51-F005 and lE51-F026.~ 'These valves are designed to fail closed on loss of air or electric power, and the power supplies to the valves
)
are individually fused.
Wiring diagrams show that any postulated failure of' Division 2 wiring within the room will only_ affect the operation of valves lE51-F004 and lE51-F025, causing at worst, loss of controls and indication of these i
valves.
Similarly, failure of the redundant valves (lE51-F005 and lE51-F026) will only affect the loss of controls and indication, which does not. affect the ability to achieve safe shutdown.
t 4
~.
CLINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003 RESOLUTION REPORT
.(continuation report)
File No. OR-55 File Revision No. 1 Date 12-01-84 Page 3 Revised:
January 8, 1985 2.
RWCU Pump Rooms (Non-divisional)
The RWCU Pump Rooms are non-divisional.
However, there are a few Division 1 and Division 2 components located in these rooms which are necessary to provide Leak Detection System redundancy.
The pull boxes identified in the Observation Report are located outside of the RWCU Pump Rooms in a " general plant area"; they are not in' side the room as identified in the Observation Report.
1PB6168 is a non-class lE Box, 1PB646K is a Division 2 Box, and 1PB645K is a Division 1 Box.
The only safety-related electrical equipment in these rooms is the Leak Detection System thermocouples.
Cables for the Division 1 thermocouples for RWCU Pump Room A pass through 1PB645K as they enter RWCU Pump Room A.
Similarly, cables for the Division 2 thermocouples for RWCU Pump Room A pass through 1PB646K as they enter RWCU Pump Room A Failure of the circuitry resulting from a line break only affects the Leak Detection System RWCU Isolation function.
- However, there are other means of achieving the detection and isolation functions.
3.
RHR Heat Exchanger A Room The RHR Heat Exchanger A Room is Division 1.
Howeher, there are a few Division 2 components located in this room which are necessary to provide redundancy.
Failure of the redundant component does not affect the ability to achieve safe shutdown.
Junction Box lJB619 and Pull Boxes IPB6192K, 1PB666K, 1PB667K, and 1PB6151 are Division 2.
-Junction Box lJB619 serves Division 2 valve lE12-F060A located in the RHR Heat Exchanger A Room.
This valve is in lRev piping series with valve lE12-F075A (Division 1).
Valve lE12-F060A provides a signal to the plant computer system which does not serve a safety function.
No unsafe action will occur as a result of a line break; only potential transmission of incorrect.information.
Valve lE12-F060A is
CLINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003 RESOLUTION REPORT (continuation reporC File No. OR-55 File Revision No. 1 Date 12-01-84 Page 4 Revised:
January 8, 1985 fed by a 120VAC power source from a common fused circuit which also powers valves 1E12-F060B and 1B33-F019.
These three valves are de-energized to close.
In the event of a postulated short circuit, the fuse will clear the circuit, and the valves will close.
Therefore, the ability to achieve shutdown is unaffected.
- 4. Main Steam Tunnel The main steam tunnel area is non-divisional (not assigned to any one particular Division).
However, there are electrical cables of all Divisions located in the tunnel.
These electrical cables include power feeds, controls and instrumentation cables.
The electrical power feeds are to various valves located in the tunnel.
Failure of these power cables will cause the valve to fail in place.
This failure does not affect the ability to achieve safe shutdown.
A postulated failure of a control cable can inadvertently indicate or fail-to indicate input to the computer in addition to causing the false operation of solenoid valves and valve position indicators.
The instrumentation cables are connected to the main steam tunnel leak detection system and also provide input to the computer.
A postulated failure of the instrumentation cable may provide false indication, but does not affect the ability to achieve safe shutdown provided only one channel out of four could be hit by a postulated jet.
In Summary for the above four specific areas, a postulated HELB event and consequent loss of Division 1 and Division 2 components and circuits, and any two of the four leak detection channels located in each respective area, the ability to achieve safe shutdown is not affected.
Calculations are in preparation to document the engineering evaluations for the four specific areas identified above.
1 CLINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003 RESOLUTION REPORT (continuation report)
File No. OR-55 File Revision No. 1 Date 12-01-84 Page 5 Revised:
January 8, 1985 A final summary report on the high energy break analyses will be prepared to identify the methodology and to provide sufficient details of the implementation to allow an independent verifier to understand this analysis.
A program will be implemented to review future changes for the effects of postulated pipe breaks.
This program will be Rev controlled by a project procedure.
Sb.
See Sa for a response.
)
I
CLINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003 RESOLUTION REPORT (continuation sheet)
OR 55,.57 Fil.e No. 64 & 73 File Revision No.
1 Date 1/8/85 The following responses are provided in response to the supple-mental questions associated with Observation Reports Number 55, Rev. 1, 57, Rev.
1, 64, Rev. 1 and 73, Rev. 1:
1.
Will Sargent & Lundy provide a documented analysis for all plant areas where pipe breaks occur covering the effects of pipe whip, jet impingement, flooding,and spray?
S&L Response:
Sargent.& Lundy will prepare a documented analysis of the plant areas where pipe rupture occurs including the effects of pipe whip, jet impingement, flooding, and spray.
2.
Will the resultant documentation' provide sufficient infor-mation about the purpose, method, assumptions, design input, references and results to permit an independent review for design adequacy?
S&L Response:
The resultant supporting documentation will provide sufficient information about the purpose, method, assumptions, design input, references and results to permit an independent re-view for design adequacy.
3.
Will Sargent & Lundy revise the FSAR section on pipe break to update the commitments and analysis results?
S&L Response:
Sargent & Lundy will initiate revisions to the FSAR sections on' pipe rupture,as appropriate,to include revised commitments and/or analysis results.
Reviewee response e
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IJ Date
/
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CLINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003 COMPLETION REPORT File No.
55 File Revision No.
1 Date 1/11/85 The IDR effort related to the above file number is complete.
'l.
Observation subject:
Evaluation of effects of high energy line breaks occurring in plant areas where physical separation is the basis for protecting essential structures, systems and comp.onents.
2.
The action which completes the IDR effort is:
File revision No.
is a resolution report which recategorized this item as a closed item.
X Action commitment by Reviewee is acceptable 3.
Describe commitment / proposed resolution:
(See continuation sheet) 4.
Reference documents:
IDR Observation Report, File No~. 55, Rev.1 11/19/84 IDR Resolution Report, File No. 55, Rev.1,1/8/85 FSAR Section 3.6 f
c'uA9 5.
Signatures.
j Re fewer 1/
System Leader
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r 1031C CLINTON POWER STATION IDR Job 15478-003 COMPLETION REPORT (continuation sheet)
. File No.
55 File Revision No.
1 Date 1/11/85 3.
S&L has committed to:
a.
Prepare a documented analysis for all plant areas where high energy line breaks occur, covering the effects of pipe whip and jet impingement, b.
Provide, in the resultant supporting documentation, sufficient information about the purpose, method, assumptions, design input, references and results to permit an independent review for design adequacy.
c.
Initiate revisions to the FSAR sections on pipe rupture, as appropriate, to include revised commitments and/or analysis results.
d.
Implement a program to review future design changes for the whip and jet effects from postulated pipe breaks; this program will be controlled by a project procedure.
Completion of these tasks by S&L should provide sufficient HELB evaluation documentation to permit an effective future independent review of the methodology and results of this evaluation against the FSAR commitnents.
Upon completion of all commitments, there should be reasonable assurance of design adequacy for HELB whip and jet effects.
/
9 1031C l
l 4
]
1 4
4 Observation Report 57
CLINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003 OBSERVATION REPORT File No.
57 File Revision No.
I Date November 19, 1984 1.
Level 1 classification of Observation:
Not significant to safety X Additional information required *See 5, " Recommendation for resolution" Significant to safety, send to Level 2 Committee 2
Structure (s), system (s), or component (s) involved:
Safety-related components subject to MELB spray 3
Description of Observation:
(See continuation sheet) 4.
Significance of Observation:
In the absence of additional documentation which addresses the areas of concern identified, it cannot be adequately determined that all required systems and components necessary to achieve a safe shutdown condition are
- ompletely protected from adverse MELB spray effects.
5 Recommendation for resolution (optional):
S&L should provide a commitment to implement the following recommendation:
To show that design commitments have been properly implemented, S&L should revise calculation 01ME4 to address the concerns identified herein and to meet the guidelines provided in ANSI Standard N45.2.11.
S&L should.
resolve the discrepancies noted in FSAR Section'3.6 regarding moderate energy lines, and include the updated results of the spray analyses.
jfs 6
Signatures:
Level 1 Review Committee
/W4MY i'O &
4 0410 1
CLINTON POWER STATION t
Job 15478-003 OBSERVATION REPORT (continuation sheet)
File No.
57 File Revision No.
1 Date November 19, 1984
- 3. ' FSAR Section 3.6 states that essential.' systems are designed to remain functional against the effects of postulated ruptures and cracks in high and moderate energy lines resulting in. spray, etc.. The FSAR states:
4 4
1.
A single active component failure was assumed in systems used to mitigate the consequences of an accident and safely shutdown the pl ant.
Only seismic Category I equipment could be used.
(FSAR Section 3.6.1.1.4) 2.
Offsite power was assumed to be unavailable if a trip of the turbine generator or reactor protection system was a direct consequence of the postulated piping failure.
(FSAR Section 3.6.1.1.4) 3.
The consequences of spray were analyzed for each room in the safety-related buildings.
(FSAR Section 3.6.2.1.6.2.2)
In addition, the FSAR states that the design complies with Branch Technical Position MEB 3-1, including Section B.2.d which states that
. cracks need not be postulated in moderate energy fluid system piping located in an area in which a break in high energy fluid system piping is postulated unless such cracks would result in more limiting environmental conditions than the high energy piping break.
The design reviews of spray effects on safety-related equipment has not been able to find documentary evidence of a comp ~lete and adequate implementation of a design process to ensure that the required degree of 4
protection from spray effects is provided.
Significant points of this observation are as follows:
A.
Whereas the S&L spray effects analysis for MELB was completed before 4/1/84 and the results reported in the FSAR (Section D3.6.3),
documentation of the analysis to support these results for every room in the safety-related buildings was not found.
Calculation 01ME4, Rev. O, dated 7/15/82, "MELB Drawing Review", provides this analysis, but appears to omit some safety-related areas (e.g. control building on and above elevation 762').
I 0410 2
l
t CLINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003 OBSERVATION REPORT (continuation sheet)
File No.
57 File Revision No.
1 Date November 19, 1904 B.
Undocumented use of engineering judgement in calculation 01ME4 results in an inability to verify the calculation con ~clusions and the proper application of the single failure and loss of offsite power criteria.
An example is the Class 1E switchgear room which was evaluated under item 15d of calculation 01ME4.
This item provides the following statement:
"A MELB in division II switchgear cooling could knock out division Il switchgear.
This leaves offsite power and the other two divisions of ECCS.
With a single failure this leaves a minimum of 2 ECCS loops which is enough to shutdown the reactor."
After reviewing the above statement, it is not obvious why the loss of division II switchgear under MELB spray would not result in a turbine or reactor trip thus requiring the assumption of a loss of offsite power.
In addition, it is not clear what the limiting single failure was, nor how it was concluded that at least 2 ECCS loops would be available to achieve safe shutdown.
C.
Because calculation 01ME4 was completed in July 1982, design changes made after its completion must be evaluated in order to determine their impact on the adequacy of this calculation.
D.
MELB effects in HELB areas were not examined.
This is acceptable only if the HELB effects are more limiting in those plant areas.
It is not clear from the documentation reviewed that this is the case in such areas as the auxiliary building, main steam tunnel and in the containment annulus, f
0410 3
~
CLINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003 OBSERVATION REPORT (continuation sheet)
File No.
57 File Revision No.
1 Date November 19, 1984 E. The identification of moderate energy lines as documented in FSAR Figure 3.6-1 (total of 99 sheets) is incomplete because the P& ids identified below have not been included as a part of this figure.
At least some of these P& ids should have been included because they contain moderate energy lines.
M-1007 M-1035 M-1046 M-1057 M-1081 M-1112 M-1010 M-1039 M-1047 M-1058 M-1082 M-1113 M-1012 M-1040 M-1048 M-1059 M-1083 M-1114 M-1013 M-1041 M-1051 M-1060 M01085 M-1117 M-1018 M-1042 M-1053 M-1061 M-1088 M-1118 M-1030 M-1043 M-1054 M-1064 M-1101 M-1119 M-1032 M-1044 M-1055 M-1065 M-1107 M-1120 M-1033 M-1045 M-1056 M-1071 M-1108 To the extent that the color coded P& ids were used as input to the spray evaluation, the omission of the above P& ids could indi.cate that not all spray situations were adequately analysed.
~
0410 4
CL1bTON P0KER STATION Job 15478-003 RESOLUTION REPORT File No.
57 File Revision No.
1 Date November 19, TF 1.
Resolution by Level 1
Internal Review Comittee 2.
Classification of Observation:
a.
Not valid (see continuation sheet) b.
Not significant to safety c.
X Additional information required d.
Significant to safety 3.
Program resolution is:
a.
Closed item
- b. T Action to be taken by Reviewee 4.
Review Committee signatures:.-
wslA l'bW//
S.
d.4dat A 6 u b ti b L 5.
Reviewee proposed resolution:
- a. Description of proposed resolution:
- b. Basis of proposed resolution:
7
?
6 Reviewee respjgise r,e t
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- bd
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Illinois Power Co. Review:
/
///
/
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1 0410 i
CLINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003, RESOLUTION REPORT (continuation sheet)
File No.
57 File Revision No. 1 Date December 10, 1984 Page 1 Revised January 8, 1985 Sa Our response to Observation Report No. 57 will follow the same format and numbering as the significant points outlined in Section 3 of this Observation Report.
j 3A Part A of this Observation Report relates to the documentation for MELB Analysis in the Control Building above 762'-0" were not documented in Calculation 1
OlME04. A supplemental Calculation OlME43'is in preparation which confirms the original engineering evaluation that th.ese areas are'not adversely affected by MELB's.
The areas noted in 3A of the OR are not affected by spray for the following reasons:
1.
The Unit 2 areas on El. 762' of the Control
~ Building do not contain equipment which is Rev adversely affected by spray.
Therefore, no essential equipment impairment is associated with a MELB in these areas.
A11'other areas on El.
762' were-considered'in Calculation OlME04.
2.
DC Power Supplies for Divisions 3 and 4 and the AC Power-Supply for Division 3 can be affected by moderate. energy line breaks at Elevation 781' of the Control Building.
However, these power supplies are separated so that only one Division could be lost due to a single break.
The loss of'
-either of these divisional power supplies and a worst case-SAF in Division I or Division II will not impair the ability to safely. shut down the i
plant.
The remainder of the equipment in this area is either nonessential or located in areas where no MELB's are postulated.
Therefore, MELB's in this area do not adversely affect the ability to safely shut down the plant.
Calculation OlME04 is being revi' sed to document this information.
CLINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003 RESOLUTION REPORT (continuation sheet)
File No.
57 File Revision No. 1 Date December 10, 1984 Page 2 Revised January 8, 1985 3.
Control Building El. 800' consists of two types of areas each separately enclosed.
The first is the Control Room area in which there are no liquid containing MELB sources in these areas.
The other areas have living spaces, and general areas not containing safe shutdown equipment affected by spray.
4.
The heating, ventilatir.3 and air conditioning (HVAC) equipment in the Control Building on EL 825' is not required for safe shutdown.
The documentation for the other areas of the plant i was reviewed.
This review concluded that the l Rev other areas not documented in OlME04 were building.
roofs, Non-Seismic buildings, and specific areas of Seismic Category I buildings, which did not contain safety-related equipment.
3B Part B of this Observation Report questions why a minimum of two ECCS loops would remain after a.MELB in the divisional switchgear rooms.'
This conclusion is based on the assumption that a single active failure in the redundant power supply is not postulated when a line break occurs in the cooling water to the coolers for one train of a dual train power supply.
The basis for this assumption is NRC Branch Technical Position (BTP) MEB 3-1, Paragraph B.3.b.3, which states that an assumption of a redundant failure in one train of a dual function system is not required when a break is arbitrarily assumed to occur in the redundant train of l Rev the system. Our definition of a system consisted of not only those components bearing the system designator, but all equipment required to support the function of the system.
Based on this, we believe our original statement to be correct.
Additionally, alternate methodology. demonstrates that the plant is not adversely affected by failure of the cooling lines for the switchgear heat removal
CLINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003 RESOLUTION REFORT (continuation sheet)
File No.
57 File Revision No. 1 Date December 10, 1984 Page 3 Revised January 8, 1985 equipment. The only liquid containing line in the switchgear room is the "SX" cooling line for the switchgear.
Due to the inherent conservatism in the design of the "SX" piping in these divisional switchgear rooms, postulation of a piping crack is not required.
The stress analyses for the "SX" piping (subsystems 1SX35B 1SX36B, 1SX39 and 1SX40) in these rooms show that the sum of the Equation 9B and 10 stresses is less than.4 (1.2Sh+SA). Paragraph B.2.c.1 of BTP MEB 3-1 states that piping which meets this stress criteria need not be postulated to crack.
Calculation OlME04 is being revised to document this information.
A Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) revision will be initiated to document these conclusions.
3C Since most of the equipment was located and most of the piping was routed prior to July 1982, Calculation Rev OlME04 should not be adversely affected by changes made after July 1982.
3D Part D of this Observation Report discusses areas where MELB's were not postulated because HELB's were already postulated.
It specifically addresses the Auxiliary Building, Main Steam Tunnel, and Containment.
The areas of the Auxiliary Building with HELB's are the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling and Reactor Water Cleanup cubicles. There is no equipment in these cubicles which is required for safe shutdown after a MELB or HELB in these cubicles.
The safety-related equipment inside the steam tunnel can be categorized as follows:
1.
Instrumentation for systems not essential ~to shutdown.
2.
Valves for nonessential systems.
3.
valves associated with ECCS and containment isolation. These valves are specifically qualified for water spray as well as steam.
CLINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003 RESOLUTION REPORT (continuation sheet)
File No.
57 l
File Revision No. 1 Date December 10, 1984 Page 4 Revised January 8, 1985 4.
Junction boxes for nonessential equipment 5.
Cables and pu11 boxes for nonessential equipment.
6.
Cables and pullboxes for valves in Item 3.
These cables and pullboxes are specifically qualified for water spray as well as steam.
Based upon the above discussion, a MELB in this area
'would not jeopardize any of the paths to safe shutdown.
Our Equipment Qualification Program specifically addressed the affects of spray on safety-related equipent located in the containment.
This is documented in the environmental qualification program.
From the above it can be seen that the affects of HELBs is worse than the spray effects from MELBs.
Part E of this Observation Report addesses the color coded P& ids in the FSAR.
FSAR Figure 3.6-1 (total of
~
99 sheets) is used to identify to the NRC lines which are high energy. Lines not identified as high energy in the referenced figure, and those not included in the figure, were considered moderate energy for the purpose of the moderate energy line break evaluation.
The exclusion of the Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams listed on this Observation Report has no affect on the MELB evaluation.
As can be seen from the above responses the concern raised in this Observation Report are not significant to the safety of the plant.
A program will be implemented to review future changes for the effects of postulated pipe breaks.
This ney program will be controlled by a project procedure.
5b See Sa for resolutions.
CLINTON POWER STATION
~
Job 15478-003 COMPLETION REPORT File No.
57 File Revision No.
1 Date 1/11/85 The IDR effort related to the above file number is complete.
1.
Observation subject:
Spray effects on safety-related components caused by postulated moderate energy line breaks.
2.
The action which completes the IDR effort is:
File revision No.
is a resolution report which recategorized this item as a closed item.
Action commitbent by Reviewee is acceptable X
3.
Describe commitment / proposed resolution:
(See continuation sheet) 4.
Reference documents:
IDR Observation Report File, No. 57, Rev.1,11/19/84 IDR Resolution Report File, No. 57, Rev.1,1/8/85 FSAR Section 3.6 5.
Signatures
- ln/8f
~Revieker i'
LA.t 1 System Leader M
ct 6
I
' Revi y C mmittee f
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1032C.
CLINTON POWER STATION IDR Job 15478-003 COMPLETION REPORT (continuation sheet)
File No.
57 File Revision No.
1 Date 1/11/85 3
S&L has committed to:
a.
Prepare a documented analysis for all plant areas where postulated moderate energy line breaks occur, covering the effect spray has on safety-related components, b.
_ Provide, in the resultant supporting documentation, sufficient information about the purpose, method, assumptions, design input, references and results to permit an independent review for design adequacy.
c.
Initiate revisions, as appropriate, to the FSAR sections on pipe rupture to include revised commitments and/or analysis results.
d.
Implement a program to review future design changes for the spray effects from postulated pipe breaks; this program will be controlled by a project procedure.
In documenting the analyses, S&L should ensure that the issues and questions raised by this OR are thoroughly addressed.
Completion of these tasks should provide sufficient MELB spray evaluation documentation to pemit an effective future independent review of the methodology and results of this evaluation against the FSAR commitments.
At that time there should be reasonable assurance of design adequacy for MELB spray effects.
1032C 1
Observation Report 64
CLINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003 OBSERVATION REPORT File No.
64 File Revision No.
1 Date November 19, 1984 1.
Level 1 classification of Observation:
Not significant.to safety T Additional information required *See 5, " Recommendation for resolution" Significant to safety, send to level 2 Committee 2.
Structure (s), system (s), or component (s) involved:
Safety-related components subject to HELB/MELB flooding 3.
Description of Observation:
The design review of HELB and MELB flooding effects has not been able to find documentary evidence of a complete and adequate implementation of a design process to ensure that the required degree of protection from flooding is provided.
(See continuation sheet) 4.
Significance of Observation:
~
In the absence of additional documentation which addresses the areas of concern identified, it cannot, be adequately determined that all required systems and components necessary to achieve a safe shutdown condition are completely protected from adverse HELB and MELB flooding effects.
5.
Recommendation for resolution (optional):
(See continuation sheet) 6.
Signatures:
Level 1 Review Committee Y'fIC'4
'sA >Le fo'd>2tJ~
CLINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003 OBSERVATION REPORT (continuation sheet)
File No.
64 File Revision No.
1 Date November 19, 1984 3.
Description of Observation (continued)
FSAR Section 3.6 states that essential systems are designed to remain functional against the effects of postulated ruptures and cracks in high energy and moderate energy lines resulting in flooding, etc.
Safe shutdown capabilities can be adequately assured if the following two conditions are met:
1.
All areas containing safety-related equipment are covered by this design criteria.
2.
The original design and subsequent design changes are evaluated against this design criteria and sufficient documentation has been provided.
Significant points of this observation are as follows:
A.
Design Criteria DC-ME-01-CP does not cover all areas where safety-related equipment is located.
There is no documentation of HELB and MELB flooding evaluations nor evaluation of damages to safety-related equipment in these areas as a result of flooding.
It cannot be determined how the worst single active failure and loss of offsite power criteria was applied, or how safe shutdown capability was demonstrated.
B.
For some areas covered by Design Criteria DC-ME-01-CP, it cannot be verified that the basis of flood protection as stated in this design criteria is correct or adequate. For other areas of this design criteria where there was not sufficient backup documentation, a confirming calculation (S&L Calculation No. 84-617/751, Rev. O, dated 9/28/84, " Flood Protection Verification") has recently been prepared.
However, this was not done prior to 4/1/84 C.
Section 1.0 of Design Criteria DC-ME-01-CP states that flooding resulting from a rupture of non-seismic Category I component or pipe was addressed by this design criteria.
It is not clear from this wording that seismic Category I piping failure was considered, as is l
required by BTP MEB 3-1, section B.2.c could not be determined based on the evidence available, that flooding resulting from seismic Category I piping failures was adequately evaluated.
0434C,
i CLINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003
- s..
OBSERVATION REPORT (continuation sheet)
File No.
64 File Revision No.
1 Date November 19, 1984 3.
Description of Observation (continued)
D.
Section 3.11.9 of the FSAR refers to Section D3.6.4 for a discussion of flooding in many of the 57 harsh environmental zones at the plant.
However, Section 03.6.4 does not appear to contain such discussion for many of these areas.
In the absence of flood level evaluations, it is not clear how it was determined that some components listed in FSAR
. Table.c 3.11-1 and 3.11-2 would be submerged during an accident while other components would not.
J E.
There is a discrepancy between FSAR Section D3.6.5 which states that there are no doors or similar openings in the concrete walls separating the standby diesel generators and the HPCS diesel generator, and S&L general arrangement drawing M01-1106, Rev. J, sheet 1 of 7 which shows doors in walls separating these diesel generators.
F.
FSAR Section D3.6.3 states that rooms which contain high energy lines 3
-as well as moderate energy lines were not evaluated for moderate energy line breaks. The-IDR Team has found no basis as indicated in Branch Technical Position MEB 3-1, Section D.2.d, which shows that flooding resulting from a HELB will always be more limiting than that resulting from a MELB for such areas.
0434C CLINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003 OBSERVATION REPORT (continuation sheet)
File No.
64 File Revision No.
1 Date November 19, 1984 5.
Recommendations for resolution (continued)
S&L-should provide a commitment to implement the 'following reconnendations:
a.
Provide documentation to show that a flood evaluation has been performed for all high and moderate energy piping whose failure could affect safety-related equipment. All areas of safety-related buildings should be covered.
1 b.
For each area containing safety-related equipment subject to flooding, J
provide documentation which should be in sufficient detail to allow a j
reviewer to verify that safe shutdown can be achieved and that the single active failure and loss of offsite power. criteria have been properly applied.
c.
Provide sufficient documentation to show that the specific flood protection design requirements in Design Criteria DC-ME-01-CP, Rev..4 are correct and adequate.
N d.
Provide evidence that the flooding impact of seismic Category I piping has been adequately addressed.
e.
Provide justification that areas containing both high and moderate energy lines need not be evaluated for MELBs if they have been evaluated for HELBs.
i f.
Resolve discrepancies between FSAR Sections 3.11.9 and D3.6.4 and provide documentation to show how it was determined that some components listed in FSAR Tables 3.11-1 and 3.11-2 would be submerged
~
during an accident while other components would not.
f g.
Provide justification for the existence of doors between the standby diesel generator rooms and HPCS diesel generator room in light of the FSAR commitment that there will be no doors.
The discrepancy between j'
the FSAR and the as-built conditions should be resolved and the FSAR revised if necessary.
I k
I 0434C CLINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003 OBSERVATION REPORT (continuation sheet)
File No.
64 File Revision No.
1 Date November.19,1984 5.
Recomendations for resolution (continued) h.
For calc 01ME3, Rev. O, explain why a lake level of 677' was used in the calculation of break flow from the circulating water expansion joint instead of the maximum lake level that would still allow the operation of the circulating water pumps.
Explain why the elevation difference which was subtracted from the pump discharge head (see page
- 5) was based on the difference between the expansion joint and the pump discharge nozzle center line.
If the resolution of the above results in a higher break flow, how would that impact the conclusions of this calculation and sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.3.b of Design Criteria g
DC-ME-01-CP, Rev. 4.
j i.
Describe the design change control program that would ensure that future design changes will be~ evaluated for their effect on safe j
shutdown.
All items described above should comply with the documentation requirements of ANSI N45.2.11. The FSAR should also be updated to reflect any new infonnation developed as a result of this OR.
l' l
i I
f l
0434C CLINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003 RESOLUTION REPORT File No.
64 File Revision No.
1 Date November 19, TF 1.
Resolution by Level 1
Internal Review Committee 2.
Classification of Observation:
a.
Not valid (see continuation sheet) b.
Not significant to safety c.
X Additional information required d.
Significant to safety 3.
Program resolution is:
a.
Closed item b..
X Action to be taken by Reviewee 4.
Review Committee signatures:
I'41/74 h.b.
e
' d2. /~at f>6u%A 5.
Reviewee proposed resolution:
- a. Description of proposed resolution:
- b. Basis of proposed resolution:
6.
Reviewee response,r
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Mahayer 7.
Illinois Power Co. Review:
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0434C
CLINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003 RESOLUTION REPORT (continuation sheet)
File No.
64 File Revision No. 1 Date December 10, 1984 Page 1 Revised January 8, 1985 Sa.
Our response to Observation Report No. 64 will follow
'the same format and numbering as the points outlined in the Observation Report.
3A & 3B In 1976, the required areas of the Clinton Power Station containing safety-related equipment were reviewed for the potential of flooding from sources inside and outside these areas.
Flooding Design Criteria DC-ME-01-CP was prepared to document those areas (i.e.
areas which'did not have inherent capabilities to handle flooding such as hatches, floor drains, stairways, and doorways) where special provisions for flooding were required such as curbs, flood doors, and penetration seals.
A supplement to the design criteria.will be prepared.- This supplement will provide additional documentation to support the conclusions stated in the design criteria.
3C The water sources (safety-related and non-safety-related) were evaluated to determine the most limiting source of flooding-in
(
specific areas as required by BTP MEB 3-1.
For example, the safety-related ECCS suction lines were determined to be the controlling 3
water source for establishing the maximum flood level in the ECCS rooms.
.The design criteria specifies that penetrations are to be sealed such that a postulated flood in one cubicle could not affect more than one division. Similarly, in the diesel generator rooms, the safety-related day tanks for the diesel oil system have curbs to contain the fluid released from a postulated tank rupture.
CLINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003 RESOLUTION REPORT (continuation sheet)
File No.
64 File Revision No. 1 Date December 10, 1984 Page 2 Revised January 8, 1985 1
3D Equipment and components outside the containment building were not required to be qualified for submergence since the effects of flooding are restricted to one division.
Spray. effects due to postulated pipe rupture 1
were evaluated in our MELB and HELB calculations.
A revision will be initiated to FSAR Section 3.11.9 to clarify that the
" Submergence or Spray" section applies to the containment and drywell for design considerations resulting from suppression pool dynamic e. vents such as suppression pool swell-
~
or weir swell, and from containment spray.
3E We will initiate a FSAR revision to Section D.3.6.3.5 to correct the inconsistency between the FSAR and the design drawings.
The existence of doors between the standby diesel generator rooms and the HPCS diesel generatcr room has no safety significance.
If a postulated line break occurs in the shutdown l
service water piping (which is the largest I
fluid source in the room), the floor drain i
system provided in the diesel generator cubicles is sized to accommodate the expected flow from the pipe break.
No water accumulation would occur such that the remaining other divisional equipment would be impaired.
3F No specific consideration was given to whether the water sources were high energy or moderate energy. Instead, the largest fluid source in
)
the area of consideration was evaluated; thus, l
the most conservative analysis was used.
)
l i
CLINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003 RESOLUTION REPORT (continuation sheet)
File No.
64 File Revision No. 1 Date December 10, 1984 Page 3 Revised January 8, 1985 i
1 5H The high water level instead of the low water level for the cooling lake should have been used in determining the break flow from the circulating water expansion joint.
As a result, the available time to flood to Elevation 719'-0" is reduced from 51 minutes to 46.6 minutes, and the maxinum flood le' vel in the turbine building is raised l'-7".
The increase in the flood level has no safety significance since the penetration sealant for the two penetrations within the revised flood level between the auxiliary and turbine building will not allow leakage based on 1 inch water head.
The appropriate documentation will be revised to identify these revised parameters.
5I A program will be implemented to review future changes for the effects of postulated pipe Rev breaks.
This program will be controlled by a project procedure.
Sb See Sa for resolution.
P' f
CLII; TON PO'JER STATION Job 15478-003 RESOLUTION REPORT (continuation sheet)
OR 5 5, 57 File ho. 64 & 73 File Revision no.
1 Date 1/8/85 The following responses are provided in response to the supple-mental questions associated with Observation Reports Number 55, Rev. 1, 57, Rev. 1, 64, Rev. 1 and 73, Rev. 1:
1.
Will Sargent & Lundy provide a documented analysis for all plant areas where pipe breaks occur covering the effects of pipe whip, jet impingement, flooding,and spray?
S&L Response:
Sargent.& Lundy will prepare a documented analysis of the plant areas where pipe rupture occurs including the effects of pipe whip, jet impingement, flooding, and stray.
2.
Will the r.esultant documentation provide sufficient infor-mation about~the purpose, method, assumptlons, design input, references and results to permit an independent review for design adequacy?
S&L Response:
The resultant supporting documentation will provide sufficient information about the purpose, method, assumptions, design input, references and results to permit an independent re-view for design adequacy.
3.
Will Sargent & Lundy revise the FSAR section on pipe break to update the commitments and analysis results?
S&L Response:
Sargent & Lundy will initiate revisions to the FSAR sections on pipe rupture,as appropriate,to include revised commitments and/or analysis results.
Reviewee response e
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CLINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003 COMPLETION REPORT File No.
64 File Revision No.
1 Date 1/11/85 The IDR effort related to the above file number is complete.
1.
Observation subject: Flooding effects on safety-related components caused by postulated high and moderate energy line breaks.
2.
The action which completes the IDR effort is:
File revision No.
is a resolution report which recategorized this item as a closed item.
X Action commitment by Reviewee is acceptable 3.
Describe commitment / proposed resolution:
(See continuation sheet) 4.
Reference documents:
IDR Observation Report, File No. 64, Rev.1,11/19/84 IDR Resolution Report, File. No. 64, Rev.1,1/8/85 FSAR Section 3.6 and 3.11
)
5.
Signatures y ilp la9 7
eviewer
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e System Leader (Ln LO
" Review mmittee m
M Mod-44L se
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O 1033C CLINTON POWER STATION IDR Job 15478-003 COMPLETION REPORT (continuation sheet)
File No.
64 File Revision No.
1 Date 1/11/85 3.
S&L has committed to:
a.
Prepare a documented analysis for all plant areas where postulated moderate and/or high energy line breaks occur, covering the effect flooding has on safety-related components.
b.
Provide, in the resultant supporting documentation, sufficient information about the purpose, method, assumptions, design input, references and results to permit an independent review for design adequacy. Also, a supplement to the Flooding Design Criteria, DC-ME-01-CP, will be prepared providing support to the conclusions stated in the criteria.
c.
Initiate revisicns, as appropriate, to the FSAR to revise commitments and/or analysis results, including Sections 3.11.9 and D.3.6.3.5.
d.
Implement a program to review future design changes for the flooding effects from postulated pipe breaks; this program will be controlled by a project procedure.
~
In documenting these analyses, S&L'should ensure that the issues and questions raised by this OR~are thoroughly addressed. Completion of these tasks should provide sufficient MELB/HELB flooding evaluation documentation to permit-an effective future independent review of the methodology and results of this evaluation against the FSAR commitments.
At that time there should be reasonable assurance of design adequacy for flooding effects.
1033C Observation Report 73 i
f
CLINTON POWER STATION Jcb 15478-003 OBSERVATION REPORT File No.
73 File Revision No.
1 Date November 19, 1984 1.
Level 1 classification of Observation:
Not significant to safety
-X Additional information required *See 5, " Recommendation for resolution" Significant to safety, send to Level 2 Committee 2.
Structure (s), system (s), or component (s) involved:
Safety-related structures, systems and components inside containment subject to HELB.
3.
Description of Observation:
(See continuation sheet) 4 Significance of Observation:
I There appears to be insufficient evidence to assure that all aspects of the HELB design process inside containment necessary to meet FSAR commitments have been adequately addressed.
{
)
l 5
Recommendation for resolution (optional):
(See continuation sheet) 6.
Signatures:
Level 1 Review Committee Y*///
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?
l CLINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003 OBSERVATION REPORT (continuation sheet)
File No.
73 File Revision No.
1 Date Novemoer is, i m 3.
Description of Observation (continued)
The design process for energy line breaks inside' containment does not appear to address the following items:
For postulated HELBs inside containment the documentary evidence a.
reviewed by the IDR Team that was in existence on 4/1/84 was insufficient to establish that there was a planned, controlled and complete design process to address all aspects necessary to provide protection for those structures, systems and components required to achieve a safe shutdown condition.
By this date S&L had not initiated all aspects of this HELB analysis nor did S&L have the remaining work adequately identified. Aspects of HELB not addressed include:
- 1) Pipe whip and jet impingement effects on containment structural steel and on electrical cables to containment isolation valves, hydrogen ignitors and automatic depressurization (ADS) valves..
- 2) Small (less than 8" diameter) HELB pipe whip effects on ECCS piping, RPS instrumentation, ADS valves, hydrogen ignitors and the control rod drive system.
j b.
Design calculations documenting the results of the HELB analyses are not sufficiently detailed to establish the reasonableness of the calculational results.
ANSI Standard N45.2.ll, " Quality Assurance Requirements for the Design of Nuclear Power Plants", requires that analyses shall provide enough infonnation about the calculations, purpose, method, assumptions, design input, references and~ units such that a reviewer can understand the analyses and verify the adequacy of the results without recourse to the originator.
Examples of calculations that do not conform to this standard are:
- 1). Calculation OlME09, Rev. O, 6/25/84, " Jet Impingement -
Qualification of Instrument Lines".
- 2) Calculation OlME32, Rev. O, 9/24/84, " Pipe Whip Subsystems -
Identification of Essential Components".
- 3) Calculation OlME08, Rev. O, 8/3/84 "Small HELBs Inside Drywell (Jet Impingement)".
i
?
0473C 2
CLINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003 OBSERVATION REPORT (continuation sheet)
File No.
73 File Revision No.
1 Date November 19, 1984 5
Recommendation for resolution (continued) '
S&L should provide a commitment to implement the following recommendation:
In order to demonstrate that S&L has properly analyzed for the high energy lines in the plant where a break by break analysis is used to ensure that essential items are protected from the effects of HELB the following is necessary:
a.
Complete the HELB analysis for all lines, b.
List all EMD, SED, PMD, etc. calculations which constitute this complete analysis, l
c.
Ensure that all calculations provide enough detail to permit verification in accordance with ANSI 45-2.11, by including all assumptions, design inputs, references, details of the method interfacing communications and results.
A d.
Verify that all calculations are current and valid, such that plant design changes made since the calculation was performed have not adversely affected its results.
I e.
Provide a design change control program that would ensure that. future design changes will be evaluated for their effect on safe shutdown.
{
f.
For the calculation of jet loads on essential items, identify if the i
NUREG/CR-2913 methodology as used by S&L has been fully accepted by the NRC.
If not, identify which calculations have used this method.
g.
Update FSAR Section 3.6 including:
(1) the figures and tables showing the final break types and locations (2) the figures showing the final restraint locations (3) the description of the analysis results in the appendices (4). jet load calculations using NUREG/CR-2913.
0473C 3
s CLINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003 RESOLUTION REPORT File No.
73 File Revision No.
1 Date November 19, TT6F 1.
Resolution by Level 1
Internal Review Committee 2.
Classification of Observation:
a.
Not valid (see continuation sheet) b.
Not significant to safety c.
X Additional information required d.
Significant to safety 3
Program resolution is:
a.
Closed item b.
X Action to.be taken by Reviewee 4.
Review Committee signatures:
SJh 'Muv
% %.LL k&
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5.
Reviewee proposed resolution:
- a. Description of proposed resolution:
- b. Basis of proposed resolution:
l l.
i 6
Reviewee response ort igned hy,,
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Illinois Power Co. Review:
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0473C
L.
I t
l CLIINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003 L
RESOLUTION REPORT (continuation shee-File No.
73 File Revision No. 1 DateDecember 11,1984 Page 1 Revised: January 8, 1985 5a Our response to Observation Report No. 73 will follow the same format and numbering as the significant points outlined in Section 3 of this observation Report.
3A.
A design process for High Energy Line Break (HELB) inside containment was in existence prior to April 1, 1984.
Documentary evidence which substantiates the existence of this design process includes the following
+
calculations completed or in progress prior to
-April 1, 1984:
Calculation Number OlME06 - Jet Impingement to Achieve Drywell Isolation, prepared February 16, 1983 and
. approved March 14, 1983 Calculation Number OlME07 - Large Line Break Jet Impingement Effects on ECCS Equipment prepared November 24, 1983 and approved November 28, 1983 Calculation Number OME08 - Small Line Break Jet Impingement Effects on ECCS Equip' ment and ADS Valves, prepared August 3, 1984 (originally prepared 1983) and approved September 26, 1984.
Calculation Number OlME09 - Jet.Impiagement Effects on RPV Instrumentation, prepared June 25, 1984 (originally prepared 1983) and approved June 29, 1984 Calculation Number EMD-041874 - Jet Impingement Effects on CRD piping, prepared March 16, 1983 and approved March 21, 1983 i
calculation Number EMD-047496 - Jet Impingement Effects l
on ECCS System, prepared April 27, 1984 and approved October 23, 1984 l
Calculation Number EMD-009952 - Kinetic Energy and
]
CLIINTON POWER. STATION Job 15478-003 RESOLUTION REPORT (continuation sheet)
File No.
73 File Revision No. 1 DateDecember 11,1984 Page 2 Revised: January 8, 1985 3A. (cont'd)
Impingement Forces Due to pipe Break at Elevation 707'-6", prepared September 8, 1977 Calculation Number EMD-009297 - Kinetic Energy and Impingement Forces Due to pipe Break at Elevation 707'-
6", prepared August 5, 1977 and approved August 5, 1977 Calculation Number EMD-010103 - Kinetic-Energy and Impingement Forces Due to Pipe Break at Elevation 707'-
6", prepared September 19, 1977 and approved September 19, 1977 Calculation Number EMD-010646 - Kinetic Energy and Impingement on Walls, prepared November 2, 1977 and approved November 2, 1977 Calculation Number EMD-010241 - Kinetic Energy and Impingement on Slabs,' prepared October'5, 1977 and approved October 5, 1977 Calculation Number EMD-010511 - Kinetic Energy and Impingement on walls, prepared October 19, 1977 and approved October 19, 1977 Calculation Number EMD-010103 - Kinetic Energy and Impingement on Slabs, prepared September 19, 1977 and approved September 19, 1977
- Calculation Number EMD-021555 - Jet, Inside Containment Upper Structure, prepared January 23, 1980 and approved April 10, 1980
- Calculation Number EMD-022425 - Jet, Shield Wall, prepared April 18, 1980 and approved April 24, 1980
CLIINTON POWER STATION y
Job 15478-003 RESOLUTION REPORT (continuation sheet)
File No.
73 File Revision No. 1 DateDecember 11,1984 Page 3 Revised: January 8, 1985 3A. (cont'd)
- Calculation Number EMD-022099 - Jet, Shield Wall &
Inside Drywell, prepared March 25, 1980 and approved April 1, 1980
- Calculation Number EMD-020199 - Jet, Weir Wall, prepared October 22, 1977 and approved October 26, 1979
- Calculation Number EMD-018463 - Jet, Weir Wall, prepared June 6, 1979 and approved June 26, 1979
- Calculation Number EMD-028390 - Jet, Inside Shield Wall, prepared February 9, 1981 and approved February 27, 1981
- Calculation Number SDQ12-54 DG09, Revision 2 - Drywell Top Slab, prepared November 19, 1982 and approved December 2, 1982
- Calculation Number SDQ12-48 DG05, Revision 1 - Drywell Compartments, prepared January 27, 1981
- Calculation Number SDQ12-41 DG02, Revision 0 -
Containment Wall, prepared May 26, 1977 and approved I
June 6, 1977
- Calculation Number SDQ12-51 DG02, Revision 0 - Weir Wall, prepared August 11, 1977 and approved August 12, 1977
- Calculation Number SDQ12-46 DG03, Revision 0 - Shield Wall Penetration, prepared March 19, 1984 and approved April 13, 1984
- CB&I Drywell Head Stress Report, Revision 0, prepared June 29, 1977 and approved September 28, 1977 Various means have been used to monitor the progress of l
the HELB evaluation.
Monthly status reports on l
CLIINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003 RESOLUTION REPORT (continuation sheet)
File No.
73 File Revision No. 1 DateDecember 11,1984 Page 4 Revised: January 8, 1985 3A. (con t ' d )
this subject were initiated in July 1983, and continue to be issued.
Project Team Meetings and Weekly Scheduling Meetings were and are, held to discuss the open action items on HELB evalutation.
These meetings and reports adequately control the HELB evaluation to ensure that the necessary areas of concern are addressed.
A summary report is in preparation which will summarize the HELB design.
This report will explain the methodology used and provide sufficient details to allow a reviewer to more easily understand and verify the adequacy of the design process.
'Al Pipe whip and jet impingement effects on containment structural steel are currently being completed.
Containment structural steel was addressed prior to April 1, 1984.
Evidence as documented in the S&L Weekly Scheduling Meeting Notes dated March 26, 1984 (Item D),
and the above listed calculations, which are denoted with an asterisk, identify that jet impingement on containment drywell steel was bei'ng considered.
Our initial evaluation of the containment isolation valves (Calculation OlME06, prepared 2/16/83). assumed that the inboard isolation valves would not function and a single active failure was also assumed to occur on the outboard isolation valves. Therefore, our assumption was that the cables to the inboard isolation valves need not be qualified.
Calculation No. OlME06 concluded that containment isolation was attainable, except for a few cases that were noted in the calculation.
These remaining cases are still under evaluation.
The evaluation of jet impingement effects on hydrogen ignitors was not initiated until early 1984, because the conduit routings and locations of the hydrogen ignitors
~
were not finalized.
The status reports that were issued prior to 04/01/84 provide evidence that HELB activities involving the hydrogen ignitors were being monitored.
Documentation in Calculation OlME08 and OlME38 provides W ------
CLIINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003 RESOLUTION REPORT (continuation sheet)
File No.
73 File Revision No. 1 DateDecember 11,1984 Page 5 Revised: January 8, 1985 3A.1 (con t 'd) evidence that the design to evaluate jet impingement effects on ADS were considered.
The design to determine the affect on small bore pipe whip on plant components began prior to 04/01/84.
Item 830010 from the Engineering Mechanics Division's Project Status Reports issued from July 26, 1983, to the present, documents the status of the small bore pipe whip evaluation.
3A2.
Small (less than 8" diameter) HELB pipe whip affects on ECCS piping, RPS instrumentation, ADS valves, hydrogen ignitors and the. control rod drive system are evaluated-in Calculation OlME32, Revision 0, approved 09/24/84.
Calculation OlME32 covers the affects of pipe whip on the equipment listed ~in this Observation Report in one calculation rather than having a separate calculation for each type of equipment as was done in the calculations for jet impingement.
If any ECCS piping, RPS instrumentation, ADS valves, hydrogen ignitors, Rev control' rod drive equipment,or supporting cables are located within the pipe whip zone, then this equipment was listed in Calculation OlME32 and subsequently evaluated for its affect on safe shutdown.
3B.
Part B states that design calculation documentation for HELB analyses does not meet the requirements of ANSI N45.2.11.
Our interpretation of ANSI N45.2.11 is that the-test for understandability of a calculation is based on a review of the calculation by an individual who is thoroughly familiar with the equipment and phenomena involved in the calculation and who has all of the referenced documentation at his disposal.
We believe that the calculations identified in the Observation Report do pass this test for understandability.
3B1,2s3. The Observation Report references three specific calculations.
These are OlME08 R/0, 01ME32 R/0, and 01ME09 R/0.
These calculations pertain to the review of
CLIINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003 RESOLUTION REPORT (continuation sheet) i File No.
73 File Revision No. 1 l
DateDecember 11,1984 Page 6 Revised: January 8, 1985 3B1,2&3. (con t 'd) i HELB phenomena inside the drywell.
These.are not calculations in the usual sense of solving a series of mathematical equations to arrive at numerical answers.
They are.instead, an attempt to provide objective evidence of a review'of the acceptability of the special arrangement of the equipment inside the drywell.
i Because of this, the reviewer must also refer 'to the t
break l location drawings in the FSAR and the physical drawings of the drywell to verify that equipment sprayed by a potential jet has been adequately evaluated for safe ~ shutdown.
A final summary report will be prepared
(
to identify the methodology and to provide sufficient detail to allow an independent verifier to understand i
H this analysis.
Sa&b.
Sargent & Lundy is preparing a summary report which provides an overview of the HELB evaluation on the Clinton Project.
This report will address the HELB analyses and will reference'the supporting calculations.
This report will list the areas of the HELB evaluation which are currently unfinished and will be revised as these areas are completed.
Sc.
This concern is addressed in 3b.
5d&e.
A program will be implemented to review future changes y
for the effects of postulated pipe breaks.
This program Rev will be_contro11ec by a project procedure.
5fsg.
The FSAR Section 3.6 is currently being updated to reference NUREG/CR-2913 and the final break / restraint locations.
Since NUREG/CR-2913 methodology is still j.
under consideration by the NRC, the few calculations i
that may use'this NUREG will be not'ed until the NRC fully accepts NUREG/CR-2913.
The FSAR is being updated o
to state that the tables in NUREG/CR-2913 may be used to
/
(
L
CLIINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003 RESOLUTION REPORT (continuation sheet)
File No.
73 File Revision No. 1 DateDecember 11,1984 Page 7 Revised: January 8, 1985 Sf&g. (con t 'd) determine jet loads.
As part of the Clinton FSAR Certifiation Program, FSAR Section 3.6 will.be reviewed for consistency with the current design.
Sb.
See Sa for re'sponse.
[
'CLDITON POWER STATION Job 15478-003 RESOLUTION REPORT (continuation sheet)
OR 55, 57 File No. 64 & 73 File Revision No.
1 Date 1/8/85 The following responses are provided in response to the supple-mental questions associated with Observation Reports Number 55, Rev. 1, 57, Rev.
1, 64, Rev. 1 and 73, Rev. 1:
1.
Will Sargent & Lundy provide a documented analysis for all plant areas where pipe breaks occur covering the effects of pipe whip, jet impingement, flooding,and spray?
S&L Response:
Sargent.& Lundy will prepare a documented analysis of the plant areas where pipe rupture occurs including the effects of pipe whip, jet impingement, flooding, and spray.
2.
Will the resultant documentation provide sufficient infor-mation abcut the purpose, method, assumptions, design input, references and results to permit an independent review for l
design adequacy?
S&L Response:
The resultant supporting documentation will provide sufficient information about the purpose, method, assumptions, design input, references and results to permit an independent re-view for design adequacy.
3.
Will Sargent-& Lundy revise the FSAR section on pipe break j
to update the commitments and analysis results?
S&L Response:
Sargent & Lundy will initiate revisions to the FSAR sections on pipe rupture,as appropriate,to include revised commitments and/or analysis results.
bl Reviewee response
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CLINTON POWER STATION Job 15478-003 COMPLETION REPORT File No.
73 File Revision No.
1 Date 1/11/85 The IDR effort related to the above file number is complete.
1.
Observation subject: High energy line break effects on safety-related structures, systems and components inside containment.
2.
The action which completes the IDR effort is:
File revision No.
is a resolution report which recategorized this item as a closed item.
X Action commitment by Reviewee is acceptable 3.
Describe commitment / proposed resolution:
(See continuation sheet) 4.
Reference documents:
IDR Observation Report, File No. 73, Rev.1,11/19/84 IDR Resolution Report, File no. 73, Rev.1,1/8/85 FSAR Section 3.6 i
5.
Signatures:
i n 89 Reviewer iif System Leader M/#
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' Revie)r0 nmittee
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CLINTON POWER STATION IDR Job 15478-003 COMPLETION REPORT (continuation sheet)
File No.
73 File Revision No.
1 Date 1/11/85 3
S&L has committed to:
Prepare a documented analysis for all plant areas where high energy a.
line breaks occur, covering the effects of pipe whip and jet impingement, b.
Provide, in the resultant supporting documentation, sufficient information about the purpose, method, assumptions, design input, references and results to permit an independent review for design adequacy.
Initiate revisions, as appropriate, to the FSAR sections on pipe c.
rupture to include revised commitments and/or analysis results.
d.
Implement a program to review future design changes for the whip and jet effects from postulated pipe breaks inside containment; this program will be controlled by a project procedure.
In documenting these analyses, S&L should ensure that the issues and questions raised by this OR are thoroughly addressed.
Completion of these tasks should provide sufficient HELB evaluation documentation to permit an effective future independent review of the methodology and results of this evaluation and their compliance with the FSAR commitments.
Upon completion of all connents there should be reasonable assurance of design adequacy for HELB whip and jet effects.
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