ML20115F448
| ML20115F448 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 04/11/1985 |
| From: | ILLINOIS POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20113D416 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8504190517 | |
| Download: ML20115F448 (170) | |
Text
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Attacamsnt #1 Page 1 of 39 0
j Illinois Power Company Clinton Power Station (CPS) Unit #1 SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM (SPDS)
NRC PRE-IMPLEMENTATION AUDIT RESULTS/ CPS RESPONSES O
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Attechrcnt #1
-Pags 2 of 39
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Introduction
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This report identifies the NRC Staff concerns stated during the December 12-13, 1984, Pre-Implementation Audit of the Clinton Power Station-(CPS) Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and the associated Illinois Power responses.
The NRC's report on this audit, as well as the technical evaluation report prepared by Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) serving as the NRC SPDS consultants,'have been provided to Illinois Power Company (IP) and document the basis for the items identified and responded to in this report (See NRC Letter, from A. Schwencer to F. A. Spangenberg, dated 2/8/85).
In the NRC Staff audit report the Staff refers to the SPDS Pre-Implementation Audit as the " Design Verification Audit" (DVA). The purpose of the DVA is to obtain additional information required to resolve any outstanding questions about the SPDS Verification & Validation (V&V) Program, to confirm that the V&V Program is being correctly implemented, and to audit the results of the V&V activities to date.
The audit consisted of discussions with IP representatives at Clinton and visits to the Clinton Simulator. The SPDS design evaluation and present hardware / software features were reviewed by the NRC Staff. Discussions relevant to each SPDS requirement of NUREG-0737, Supplement #1 were generally structured around slide presentations given by various members of IP's staff. IP entertained questions regarding points of concern raised by the NRC Staff in its evaluations of the CPS submittals made prior to the audit. Walk-throughs of a selected scenario involving the SPDS using the Clinton Simulator were conducted.
()g Prior to the NRC Staff's departure, a brief walk-through of the CPS Main Control
(_,
Room was conducted.
As a result of the NRC/SAIC concerns identified at the audit exit meeting on December 13, 1984, Illinois Power developed a Corrective Action Plan (CAP) to i
l resolve each of these items. The SPDS CAP was submitted to the NRC Staff via IP Letter U-0771, dated December 21, 1984.
The NRC Staff and SAIC's audit reports were reviewed on a line-by-line basis and evaluations / responses of the identified concerns have been provided. Each separate concern, recommendation, and/or IP commitment has been provided on a separate sheet for ease of review. In addition, the NRC or SAIC audit report referenca and the applicable Illinois Power Corrective Action Plan (CAP) section is identified for each line item.
o
Attachm:nt #1 Pags 3 of 39 NRC Staff - DVA Results For CPS SPDS h
NRC Item #1
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Audit Raport
Reference:
SUMMARY
", Page 2.
Reference:
Element II, Items 1-6.
NRC Concern:
The design that was (sic) audited is a revision of the original design. The applicant verbally committed to providing two documents on the NRC docket that describe the revised design. These documents are titled "Clinton Power Station Safety Parameter Display System Requirements Document, Revision 1" and "Clinton Power Station Safety Parameter Display System and Supporting Displays Design Document, Revision 2".
CPS Response:
As part of the IP Design methodology a document tree with the design / testing / verification and validation was developed. The scope of these documents has been expanded to include:
(
1.
CPS SPDS REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT 2.
PROGRAM PLAN a)
History b)
Design Methodology / Control c)
Documentation Requirements 3.
CPS SPDS FUNCTIONAL DESIGN REQUIREMENTS (Will replace CPS SPDS and Supportive Displays Design Document, Rev 2) 4.
DETAILED DESIGN a)
SPDS Parameter Set Selection b)
SPDS Display Design c)
CRT Color Code Study d)
SPDS Parameter Validation 5.
DESIGN REVIEW REPORT a)
SPDS Parameter Set Selection b)
SPDS Display Design c)
CRT Color Code Study d)
SPDS Parameter Validation e)
SPDS Validation and Verification Review Report f)
SPDS Static V & V E0P Walk-through g)
SPDS V & V Requirements Report The Document Flow / Chart is part of the February 20, 1985 IP NRC presentation and
[U) is enclosed here for reference.
Attachmtnt #1 Pags 4 of 39 NRC Staff - DVA Resu:'ts For CPS SPDS The CPS SPDS documents referenced in this item by the NRC were reviewed during the DVA. As a result of the SPDS CAP efforts, significant changes have been v
made to the SPDS to resolve the Staff's audit concerns. As such, portions of the referenced documents are no longer applicable. An SPDS Functional Design Requirements document will be developed to describe these changes and this document will supercede those referenced above.
In any case, the current documents that describe this design are provided as attachments to this package
-and should be sufficient to fulfill this commitment.
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Attcchment #1 Prgo 6 of 39 NRC Staff - DVA Results For CPS SPDS (mI NRC Item #3
. 'O Audit Report
Reference:
" DISCUSSION", Section 1.0, " Parameter Selection",
Page 3.
Reference:
Element II, Item 1.
NRC Concern:
The audit confirmed that the variables selected are consistent with the presently approved BWR EPGs.
The revised design, however, does not include variables for the assessment of the Radioactivity Control function. The Staff requires that IP add variables to the SPDS that aid operator assessment of radioactivity control, such as containment high radiation and stack noble gas release rate.
CPS Response:
The design review committee approved SPDS parameter set contains the following radioactivity parameters:
()
1.
Off-sito release rate from common station HVAC stack 2.
Standby Gas Treatment System release rate (flow and activity combination) 3.
Containment and Drywell high range gamma 4.
Various primary and secondary containment area gamma and atmospheric radioactivity concentration alarms These paraneters are itemized in more detail in the SPDS Parameter Selection Report.
O
Atttchatnt #1 Paga 7 of 39 NRC Staff - DVA Results For CPS SPDS NRC Item #4 Audit Report
Reference:
" DISCUSSION", Section 1.0, " Parameter Selection",
Page 3.
Reference:
Element II, Itema 5 & 6.
NRC Concern:
IP stated that further validation of the parameter set will take place later in two phases:
(1) a static walk-through/ talk-through of the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) using a non-operational SPDS display, and (2) a dynamic validation of the Clinton control room, including the SPDS, using the Plant-specific simulator.
Of concern to the staff is the scope of the validation effort. The staff understands that IP plans to clarify its validation plan in a later submittal.
CPS Response:
The static walk-through/ talk-through of the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) using a non-operational SPDS display has been conducted by Clinton Power Station. The walk-through/ talk-through program consisted of a procedure and questionnaire.
The integrated walk-through identified and developed plant accident scenarios that statically tested the useability of the design basis display formats, parameters, and coding techniques. A team of individuals were assembled to evaluate the operators response to the performance of the SPDS design.
/. set of operator review questionnaires were developed and issued to accomplish three tasks: First, to address the content, format and useability of the SPDS and displays. This evaluation by the operators was to obtain the parameters an operator needed to perform his casi.
Secondly, the operators were used to evaluate the reliability of the displayed
~
parameters and identify the need for back up information.
Lastly, the human factors characteristics of the displays were evaluated by the operators.
The results of the walk-through and questionnaire were fed back into finalizing the SPDS design.
The second phase in the validation of the parameter set is the dynamic validation of the control room using the plant specific simulator. At the current time, the details of the validation plan has not been developed, however O
a major input to the validation plan is the criteria for selecting the event scenarios. The scenerio selection will encompass both anticipated plant transients and plant accident scenarios.
Attachmint #1 Pegs 8 of 39 NRC Staff - DVA Results For CPS SPDS CPS Response - Item #4 (Cont'd)
The scenerio selection criteria to be used are :
a.
Events selected shall exercise each of the plant Critical Safety Functions (CSFs) to the fullest extent possible. The CSFs identified for the SPDS are Level Control, Containment Control, Reactivity Control, Combustible Gas Control and Radiation Release Control.
b.
Events chosen shall evaluate the SPDS affects on the operator's decision-making process (i.e., actions and decisions) to respond to the events.
c.
Events shall exercise each of the E0Ps. This will test the adequacy of the SPDS to provide the explicit and/or implicit information requirements of the symptom-based EPG's.
d.
The events chosen shall require operator interface with the rest of the control room to measure the consistency between SPDS and the control room instrumentation. For example, the ARM /PRM " Status Grid" and secondary display provide the detailed information required for the operator to correct a " RAD" problem.
The detailed scope of the SPDS Dynamic Simulation Test has not yet been determined. IP will provide this scope information to the NRC Staff once it is available.
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Attcchm:nt #1 Pags 9 of139 NRC Staff - DVA Results For CPS SPDS NRC Item #5 i
/
Audit Report
Reference:
" DISCUSSION", Section 1.1, "Information Needed to Continue Review", Page 3.
Reference:
Element II, Item 6.
4 NRC Concern:
The applicant should provide information on how the plant simulator or installed system will be used to demonstrate the useability of the SPDS.
Identify the' test cases which will encompass the variable ranges and setpoints for systems actuation and operator actions.
Include consideration for variables for beyond design basis events, such as primary containment pressure limit used in the emergency venting procedure and various degrees of system liquid level degradation.
The test cases should demonstrate that each selected SPDS Parameter is appropriate to assess the safety status of the Critical Functions (i.e., is
{"'}
useable).
v CPS Response:
The criteria for selecting the dynamic validation test events specified for the response to Item 4 would encompass the var 1able range for the plant transient and accident events. The events would include the FSAR Chapter 15 plant transients as well as beyond design basis events to consider the wide range of variables and setpoints for system actuation and operator actions. These events will exercise the Technical Specification setpoints as well as E0P entry l
conditions and observe the operator actions using the E0Ps.
l The test cases will exercise-the SPDS parameters and will evaluate the display (both Primary and Secondary) ability to adequately present the required operator information.
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Attachm:nt #1 Paga 10 of 39 NRC Staff - DVA Results For CPS SPDS D
k_s NRC Item #6 Audit Report
Reference:
" DISCUSSION", Section 1.1, "Information Needed to Continue Review", Page 3.
Reference:
Element II, Item 1.
NRC Concern:
An updated list of SPDS Parameters should also be provided, including a discussion of the basis for any deletions.
CPS Response:
The revised list of parameters for SPDS is provided in the SPDS Parameter Selection Task Force Report. This report provides the basis for deletion of main steam and reactor feed flows from the parameter set as previously reviewed by the NRC. The referenced report was provided in the February 20, 1985, IP/NRC Meeting and is attached to this package herein.
In addition to the above referenced report, a table of the CPS SPDS Parameter, O
which identifies the # of sensors and validation scheme (s) for each, is attached, as requested by the Staff.
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Attachmint #1 Pago 11 of 39 NRC Staff - DVA Results For CPS SPDS O
NRC Item #7 Audit Report
Reference:
" DISCUSSION", Section 1.2, " Conclusion", Page 4.
Reference:
Element II, Items 1 & 6.
NRC Concern:
Based on the Staff's review of the Clinton Parameter set, IP presentations during the audit, and the observed consistency of the Clinton Parameters with approved BWR Emergency Procedure Guidelines, the staff finds the variable selection for Clinton acceptable contingent upon the addition of variables for the assessment of the Radioactivity Control function and subsequent to final review of the information requested above pertaining to validation and to the validation results.
CPS Response:
The variables necessary for assessment of radioactivity control have been added.
Response to Item #3, addresses the Staff's concern. The scope of the proposed
)
SPDS Dynamic Simulation Test and the schedule for its performance will be s_
/
submitted to the Staff as per the Item #2 response.
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AttachOnt #1 4
Pags 12 of 39 NRC Staff - DVA Results For CPS SPDS NRC Item #8 Audit Report
Reference:
" DISCUSSION", Section 2.0, " Reliability", Page 4.
Reference:
None NRC Concern:
Based on the information presented at the time of the audit, it appears that IP has committed to installing a highly reliable system.
Information from the audit will be reviewed by ICSB and the staff's final conclusions regarding SPDS reliability will be reported in a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) or a Supplement to the Clinton SER.
CPS Response:
This issue is an NRC Staff's action item. No response is required by IP at this time.
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Attachm:nt #1 Pags 13 of 39 NRC Staff - DVA Results For CPS SPDS NRC Item #9 Audit Report
Reference:
" DISCUSSION", Section 3.0, " Electrical and Electronic Isolation", Page 4.
Reference:
None NRC Concern:
NUREG-0737, Supplement #1 requires the SPDS to be suitably isolated from electrical or electronic interference with equipment and sensors that are in use for safety systems. At the time of the audit and NRC reviewer from the ICSB was not available to review this issue. However, IP has provided further information to ICSB by courier. This information will be reviewed and the staff's final conclusions regarding the adequacy of the proposed isolation devices will be reported in a SER or SER Supplement.
CPS Response:
IPC has submitted the test report of the electrical isolators per the Staff's request. The submittal reference is IP's letter U-0779, "Clinton Power Station
(}
Unit i Safety Parameter Display System", dated January 11, 1985. There is no
(,/
further action required by IP at this time.
9
.Attachmnt #1 Paga 14 of 39 NRC Staff - DVA Results For CPS SPDS NRC Item #10 Audit Report
Reference:
" DISCUSSION", Section 4.0, " Display Data Validation",
Page 5.
Reference:
Element II, Item 1.
NRC Concern:
Generally this data validation method is acceptable; however, in the case of Reactor System Integrity, there is only one Parameter (Drywell Floor Drain Sump Flow) proposed to represent this Critical Safety Function (CSF); and as the staff understands it, this parameter cannot be subjected to a confidence check.
Therefore the staff recommends that other parameters be evaluated to supplement this parameter so that the operator can rapidly and reliably assess the status of the Reactor System Integrity function. Examples are reactor water level, safety relief valve position, as well as other relevant parameters that may indicate loss of reactor system integrity inside or outside of containment (e.g., as in a loss of coolant through an interfacing system as the control rod drives).
CPS Response:
The Critical Safety Function (CSF) related to reactor system integrity is "LVL",
corresponding to the Emergency Operating Procedure entry conditions of the Level Control Procedure. Inputs to this CSF initiation parameters include the following:
Reactor Water Level Drywell Pressure Reactor Pressure Reactor-Scram MSIV Isolation Drywell Floor Drain Flow These signals provide functional redundancy to provide reliable detection of potential challenges to reactor system integrity.
m
Attach =2nt #1 Pegs 15 of 39 l
NRC Staff - DVA Results For CPS SPDS NRC Item #11 Audit Report
Reference:
" DISCUSSION", Section 4.0, " Display Data Validation",
Page 5.
Reference:
Element II, Item 1.
NRC Concern:
In addition, the staff recommends that other data validation techniques such as rate of change algorithms and analytical redundancy be considered for use with those parameters that IP considers primary to the SPDS Critical Safety Functions.
' CPS Response:
4 Both rate of change algorithms and analytical redundancy methods were considered for several of the primary SPDS Critical Safety Function Parameters. A number of additional redundant parameters have been added to the SPDS Parameter list that will improve the data set.and provide a validated display. Therefore, redundant methods of rate of change algorithms and analytical redundancy are not t O necessary.
The methods currently in use were presented at the gebruary 20, 1985, IP/NRC Meeting. The slides of this presentaion material are taken from the " CPS SPDS Display Formats Design and Task Force Evaluation Results" report and are enclosed herein.
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Attachm:nt #1 Paga 16 of 39 i
NRC Staff - DVA Results For CPS SPDS 1
NRC Item #12 Audit Report
Reference:
" DISCUSSION", Section 4.1, "Information Needed to Continue Review", Page 5.
Reference:
Element II, Items 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6.
NRC Concern:
IP responses to the staff's recommendations should be provided.
CPS Response:
The responses provided herein for Item 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 complies with the Staff's request for further information needed to continue the review.
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.Attachmint #1 Pags 17 of 39 NRC Staff'- DVA Results For CPS SPDS
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NRC Item #13 Audit Report
Reference:
" DISCUSSION", Section 4.2, " Conclusion", Page 5.
Reference:
Element II, Item 1.
NRC Concern:
The proposed' data validation methodology is acceptable.
However, since the Reactor System Integrity function is represented by only one variable (of unknown reliability), the staff requires that further action be taken by IP to provide valid and reliable indication of Reactor System Integrity.
CPS Response:
- Additional parameters have been added to assess reactor system integrity.-
Response to Item 10 addresses this issue.
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Attach =snt #1 Paga 18 of 39 NRC Staff - DVA Results For CPS SPDS V[
NRC Item #14 Audit Report
Reference:
" DISCUSSION", Section 5.0, " Human Factors", Page 6.
Reference:
Element II, Item 1.
NRC Concern:
Regarding the IP team's data validation finding, the staff also finds that the methods used could be improved and has made recommendations above in the section titled, " Display Data Validation".
CPS Response:
The SPDS data validation has been fortified by the addition of redundant instrument channels to improve the reliability. The additional instrument channels added are:
Drywell Temperature (2 channels)
Drywell Pressure (2 channels; no change)
Containment Temp (2 channels)
Os Suppression. Pool Temp (4 channels and SRV position)
Containment Pressure (2 channels)
Reactor Pressure (2 channels)
Reactor Level (2 channels)
Reactor Power (2 channels of APRM)
Suppression Pool Level (3 overlapping channels)
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Page 19 of 39 NRC Staff - DVA Results For CPS SPDS
[s NRC Item #15 D )-
Audit Report
Reference:
" DISCUSSION", Section 5.0, " Human Factors", Page 6.
Reference:
Element II, Item 1.
NRC Concern:
7 The problem of providing radioactivity data on a separate display was addressed by IP by redesigning the main SPDS display to include " status boxes" which provide an annunciator function for the critical safety functions. The current SPDS design still has no parameters represent 1ng Radioactivity Control but does
~
have a status box that uses alarm data from the ARM /PRM rad monitoring system as
'its input.
After seeing this design prototyped in the control room, and after watching a walk-through/ talk-through of a Clinton EPG (secondary containment / radioactivity control), the staff has. tentatively concluded that the problem has not been solved and that rad control variables should be added to the SPDS display.
CPS Response:
m y
)
The SPDS design has been expanded by adding new parameters and specifying the parameters to initiate the Critical Safety Function indicators. The parameters used to initiate the Radioactivity Control CSF indicator are as follows:
Secondary Containment Delta Pressure (2 parameters)
Fuel Bldg Delta Pressure Fuel Bldg Exhaust Vent Alarm Offsite Radiation Release Race Alert Level a)
Common Stack b)
SGTS Vent Secondary Containment HVAC Delta Temperature Alarm Secondary Containment Area Temp Alarn Secondary Containment Area Radiation alarm Secondary Containment Floor Drain Level High-High Containment and Drywell high range gamma A second display to provide additional information has been added to the design.
The second display contains the radiation control variables identified above in addition to other related variables.
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Attachmsnt #1 pags 20 of 39 NRC Staff - DVA Results For CPS SPDS
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NRC Item #16 Audit Report
Reference:
" DISCUSSION", Section 5.0, " Human Factors", Page 6.
Reference:
Element II, Items 1 & 2.
NRC Concern:
The last "significant concern", that the SPDS does not provide separate displays for each operating mode, is not considered to be a problem by IP because the parameters selected for display are regarded by the IP staff to be representative of all plant modes.
The staff agrees with this position in concept, but will reserve final judgement until the SPDS parameters have been dynamically evaluated in the validation phase of the V&V program.
CPS Response The plant operating mode switch position has been added to the SPDS design.
/"'
Alarms for such parameters as MSIV Isolation signals, SRM Position, and Drywell Floor Drain, Sump Flow, for example; are provided from Algorithms that incorporate the mode switch position logic. Software to support the display changes resulting from the mode switch position is incorporated in the design.
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Attachmint #1 i'
Paga 21 of 39 NRC Staff - DVA Rasults For CPS SPDS
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NRC Item #17
_ -%d Audit Report
Reference:
" DISCUSSION", Section 5.0, " Human Factions", Page 6.
Reference:
Element II, Items 2 & 5.
NRC Concern:
The human factors review done by IP also identified " minor concerns". Among these " minor concerns" was inconsistent color-coding.
"The staff's observations confirmed that the use of color in the Clinton SPDS is a problem, and further, that as a result of the EPG walk-through/ talk-through, the' staff concludes that the color-coding problem (in combination with other design deficiencies) may constitute a serious safety problem.
CPS Response:
The evaluation of the use of colors on SPDS was performed taking into account the relevant human factors, operational, and engineering requirements and 1
constraints. The criteria for establishing the color convention were:
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1.
Colors available on nuclenet.
2.
Relative discriminability and legibility of the available colors.
l 3.
Operational requirements for displaying categories of information.
4.
Desirability of using color coding to enhance speed and accuracy of the information.
5.
Standard meaning of colors.
6.
Compatibility of SPDS/Nuclenet color coding.
= 7.-
Previous study of color code convention.
8.
SPDS/EOP integrnted walk-through results.
9.
Acceptable human factors principles.
Based on these evaluations, performed as part of the SPDS CAP, the color code i
convention was modified, as noted in the 2/20/85 SPDS presentation to the Staff.
The presentation material is enclosed herein. Also, the human factors evaluation reports are attached to this package justifying the design basis.
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Attachm nt #1 Peg 2 22 of 39 NRC Staff - DVA Results For CPS SPDS
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NRC Item #18 Audit Report
Reference:
" DISCUSSION", Section 5.0, " Human Factors", Page 6.
Reference:
Element II, Items 2 & 5.
NRC Concern:
0 The color-code used (yellow = normal, red = abnormal, white a intalid, cyan =
static information, e.g., mimics, boxes, outlines) is inconsistently used within the SPDS.
For example, the tick-marks on the bar graphs that denote normal range are t'
green, not yellow. The symbols for containment isolation valve groups turn red or green based on valve position rather than the abnormality or normality of the 3,
isolation.
j CPS Response As a result of the color convention study, the following colors; and their use and meaning were adopted:
Black display background 4
Cyan static display elements, includind labels, tabular lines, i
borders, outlines of pictorial representations, and conventional j
component symbols.
Green normal conditions for dynamic numerical data, both digital readouts and bar graphs and successful completion of operations.
Red alarm and operating conditions outside normal range for dynamic numerical data, both digital readouts and bar graphs.
J White invalid data Each of the colors now used for SPDS (green, red, cyan, white) is used for a particular category of'information.
The usage is consistent within displays and between displays. The numerals that identify containment isolation valve groups now illuminate green upon successful isolation.
i O
i I
EAlcLosuRE O
EVALUATION OF COLOR USE IN'SPDS
- ~~RELEVANTHUMAFFACTORS, OPERATIONAL,ANbENGINEERING CONSIDERATIONS
- COLORS AVAILABLE IN NUCLENET
-..--.DISCRIMINABILITY AND_ LEGIBILITY 0F COLORS
-1
'* REQUIREMENT TO DISPLAY DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION
- COLOR DESIRABLE TO ENHANCE SPEED AND ACCURACY OF..:.
.. o..
IDENTIFICATIONS
- STANDARD ~ MEANINGS OF COLORS
- COMPATIBILITY OF COLOR CODING IN SPDS AND NUCLENET 1
'* TESULTS'0F CRT COLOR CODE STUDY' PERFORMED BY TPT
- RESULTS OF SPDS/EOP INTEGRATED WALKTHROUGH
- ACCEPTED HF PRINCIPLES AND CAUTIONS REGARDING USE OF COLOR
- NUREG-0700 l
t l
l COH 2/20/85 f
l
EMCLOSURE
_ ~,
'SPDS COLOR USE AND MEANING
~
BLACK DISPLAY BACKEROUND
~
~ CYAN 13TATICTISPLAY ELEMENTS-LABELS, TABULAR LINES, BORDERS, PICTORIAL OUTLINES, CONVENTIONAL COMPONENT SYMBOLS INDEX FOR BAR GRAPH. SCALES GREEN $
DYNAMIC DATA:
NORPRL-DIGITAL READOUTS, BAR
~ZGRAPHS:
' SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF OPERATIONS RED
^
DYNAMIC DATA:. ALARM AND OPERATING CONDITIONS 0UTSIDE NORMAL RANGE--DIGITAL READOUTS AND BAR GRAPHS i
WHITE INVALID DATA e
O COH 2/20/85
ENcLost1RE O
NRC COLOR CODING CONCERNS AND CPS SOLUTIONS CONCERN SOLUTION 1.
CONSISTENCY WITHIN FOUR COLORS--EACH FOR A DISPLAYS PARTICULAR CATEGORY OF INFORMATION.
- CONSISTENT USE WITHIN AND BETWEEN DISPLAYS.
- NUMERALS IDENTIFYING CONTAIN-MENT' ISOLATION VALVE GROUPS ILLUMINATE. GREEN ON. SUCCESSFUL
' ISOLATION.
~
f 2.
COLOR CODING' STER 0 TYPES
~
- COLOR ~ CODE CONFORMS TO STEREO-f
TYPICAL EXPECTATIONS AND TO HF i
DESIGN PRINCIPLES IN-NUREG 0700
~
l!
AND OTHER~ REFERENCES..
' ' COLORS ARE EITHER EASILY
~
- 3. ~DIsCRIMINABILTTY OF COLORS DISCRIMINATED INTRINSICALLY OR AS RESULT OF REDUNDANT INFORMATION CODING TECHNIQUES.
- YELLOW IS NO LONGER USED.
- WHITE FOR INVALID DATA APPEARS
[
IN A NORMALLY BLANK AREA AND HAS A SHAPE-CODED TAG.
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COH 2/20/85 O
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N_____,,_.-._--y,_
EWcLosttRE COLOR CODING CONCERNS AND CPS SOLUTIONS (CONTINUED)
CONCERN SOLUTION ll.
REDUNDANT CODING.
USE OF:. PICTORIAL' REPRESENTATIONS STANDARD SYMBOLS:FOR COMPONTENTS COLOR CODING SHAPE CODING LOCATION CODING TEMPORAL CODING
^
ALPHANUMERIC LABELS AND MESSAGES 5.
RED COLOR CONTRAST CRTS IN CONTROL ROOM ^WILL BE O'
UPGRADED O
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C COH 2/20/85
Attachucnt #1 Page 23 of 39 NRC Staff - DVA Results For CPS SPDS OQ NRC Item #19 Audit Report
Reference:
" DISCUSSION", Section 5.0, " Human Factors", Page 6.
Reference:
Element II, Items, 2 & 5.
NRC Concern:
. 2he v.onse-codes also viniste the stereotypical expectation, i.e.. green = go or normal. yellow = caution or abnormal, red = stop or danger.
CPS Response:
The color code. maw conforms'to stereotypical expectations and standard hrman 1
facters destgrr principles as-delineated in'NUREG-0700, and other human factors
.'st'Andards, handbo6ka'and references. G.reen is used for normal and red is used i
f'r abnormal / alarm.
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Attachnent #1 Pegs 24 of 39 NRC Staff - DVA Results For CPS SPDS tm
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NRC Item #20 Audit' Report
Reference:
" DISCUSSION", Section 5.0, " Human Factors",
Pages 6 & 7.
Reference:
Element II, Items 2 & 5.
NRC Concern:
The colors were not easily discriminable, especially when used in coding text or numbers.
White and cyan could not be discriminated from each other.
Green and yellow could be discriminated from each other.
CPS Response:
The colors now used are easily descriminated one from the other either intrinsically or as a result of redundant information coding techniques. Since O
yellow is not used there is no potential for confusing yellow and green.
The possibility of confusion between cyan and white is no longer considered to be significant. Cyan and white are both used on the same display but when white is used for coding invalid data the change of status from valid to invalid is signified by the appearance of the white display element in a normally blank (black background) area. White " inverse video" is now used for indicating invalid data.
Attechment #1 Pass 25 of 39 NRC Staff - DVA Results For CPS SPDS NRC Item #21 Audit Report
Reference:
" DISCUSSION", Section 5.0, " Human Factors", Page 7.
SPDS CAP References Element II, Items 2 & 5.
NRC Concern:
Color-coding was used as the primary coding technique for important information but no redundant coding techniques were used to assure that a loss of color (electronic failure, color-blindness) would not result in a loss of information.
CPS Response:
Several s'ignificant steps have been taken to provide redundant coding where it is appropriate to do so.
Use has been made of pictorial representations, standard symbols for system components, color coding, shape coding, location coding, temporal coding and alphanumeric labeling and messages. These are described in the report on evaluation of display formats.
O O
4 Attechmint #1 4
Pags 26 of 39 NRC Staff - DVA Results For CPS SPDS i
j NRC Item #22
+
i Audit Report
Reference:
" DISCUSSION", Section 5.0, " Human Factors", Page 7.
Reference:
Element II, Items 2 & 5.
r j-NRC Concern:
j The specific red color used on the Clinton system was of such low contrast that number strings and text that were colored red (denoting abnormal or emergency.
conditions) were very difficult to-read.
CPS Response:
i The DCRDR will encompass the task of evaluating the low contrast of the color red.
Inverse video (i.e. dark solid characters on a colored background) is now used j
and has resolved this problem.
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Attachasnt #1 Paga 27 of 39 NRC Staff - DVA Results For CPS SPDS
("/
\\
NRC Item #23
(
Audit Report
Reference:
" DISCUSSION", Section 5.0, " Human Factors", Page 7.
Reference:
Element II, Item 2.
NRC Concern:
Based on these findings the staff concluded that, given the limited palette of colors available, IP has misused and overused the color-coding concept to the p'oint where serious confusions are probable.
CPS Response:
The containment isolation display has been redesigned to eliminate the color code dependency leading to the identified confusion. The isolation group 8
parameters are depicted on both the LVL/RCTY and CNMT/H -GAS displays. The inboard / outboard groups are combined into a single character (number) for each group. A box containing the eleven characters corresponding to the eleven group isolations,is located just under the MSIV's on both the above displays. Upon a successful group isolation, the group number will be displayed in green (the normal color for closed valves). The operator is expected to confirm the status by performing the checklist specified in the E0P's.
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- achmint #1
' 28 of 39 NRC Staff - DVA Results For CPS Si,o NRC Item #24 Audit Report
Reference:
" DISCUSSION", Section 5.0, " Human Factors", Page 7.
Reference:
Element II Items 2 & 5.
NRC Concern:
For example, the staff observed during the walk-through/ talk-through of the EPG that the operator had difficulty with the containment isolation display. The containment isolation is a horizontal list of numbers, 1 through 11,'.
representing isolation groups. Under each number are the letters "1" and "0",
meaning inboard and outboard. The display is normally green denoting valves open. When an isolation occurs, the "I" and/or "0" turn red. The operator in the walk-through had other expectations for the colors in this display, as well as for the abbreviations. LAs far as the staff could tell, the operator could not tell that the display was green, because he stated that the display would turn green when the group isolation was complete. He quickly corrected that to red but hesitated again and said that the "I" meant isolated and that the "0"
meant open. Since the color-meaning errod,vas in the direction of the
(
stereotypical convention (green - go. OK, tiornal), the most effective resolution appears to be to change the color-code to the conventional meanings. However, given the discriminability problem, the staff feels that IP should consider not using color at all unless a palette of easily discriminable and readable colors can be developed.
CPS Response:
See Response to Item 23. The "I" and the "0" have been deleted from the-display.
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AttachnInt #1 Paga 29 of 39 NRC Staff - DVA Results For CPS SPDS
().
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NRC Item #25 Audit Report
Reference:
" DISCUSSION", Section 5.0, " Human Factors",
Page 7 & 8.
Reference:
Element II, Items 1, 2 & 5.
NRC Concern:
In general the concept'of using status boxes as cues for changes in parameter status is a good one.
However, the status boxes or alert boxes do not replace the data, variables, or J,
parameters that support SPDS function. They are only cues that the status has changed. The operator must still be able to access the underlying variables rapidly and reliably.
The Clinton design presents a problem related to the " status box" concept, i.e.,
all SPDS variables are not continuously displayed, nor are all SPDS variables input to a status bax. The staff's position is the SPDS parameters must be continuously displayid or an alerting mechanism provided so that the operator is
/N aware of changes in parameter status and can easily access the changing
- l. )
parameter. The current design does not comply with this staff position.
CPS Response:
The SPDS design has been changed to provide all parameters necessary to monitor an approaching challenge to a critical safety function parameter via the CSF alarm boxes. In addition, the value of critical parameters is either continuously displayed or readily accessible to the operator when he is alerted.
The SPDS was designed to provide information to the operator in carrying out the Symptom-oriented Emergency Operating Procedures. Additional parame,ters used for monitoring the status of the plant during recovery or further degradation of the plant conditions have been input to the SPDS and are available on the Secondary SPDS Displays or the displays which support the E0P's.
However, they are not continuously displayed or input to the CSF alarm boxes. Displaying all the parameters at all times would clutter the display.
tv
Attachmtat #1 Pags 30 of 39 NRC Staff - DVA Results For CPS SPDS NRC Item #26 Audit Report
Reference:
" DISCUSSION", Section 5.0, " Human Factors", Page 8.
Reference:
Element II, Item 1.
NRC Concern:
The " Power Control" status box lacks input for a " failure to scram" condition, e.g., APRM downscale trip within "x" amount of seconds.
CPS Response:
The Power Control status box has been replaced by the Reactivity (RCTY) Status box. The SCRAM signal, with power above the 3% APRM downscale trip after 6 seconds, is used as the initiating ATWS signal.
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Attachatut #1 Page 31 of 39 NRC Staff - DVA Results For CPS SPDS O
NRC Item #27 Audit Report
Reference:
" DISCUSSION", Section 5.0, " Human Factors", Page 8.
Reference:
Element II, Item 1.
NRC Concern:
Containment Pressure and secondary containment delta P are not input to any of 4
the status boxes.
CPS Response:
Drywell pressure and secondary containment differential pressure are input-to CSF alarms. Drywell pressure is an input to the containment control (CNMT) CSF Alarm Status Box. Secondary Containment differential pressure is input to the Secondary Containment / Radiation Release Control (RAD) Alarm Status Box.
Containment pressure is not provided because there are redundant drywell vacuum breaker valves to permit pressure equilibration.
1 I
Attachn:ent #1 Page 32 of 39 NRC Staff - DVA Results For CPS SPDS O
NRC Item #28 Audit Report
Reference:
" DISCUSSION", Section 5.0, " Human Factors", Page 8.
Reference:
Element II, Item 1.
NRC Concern:
Containment of drywell high radiation and stack noble gas release rate are not displayed nor do they provide inputs to the Radiation Control status box.
CPS Response:
e Containment and Drywell high range gamma activity HVAC and SGTS stack noble gas activity and their respective flow rates have been added to SPDS (See Item #3).
The HVAC and SGTS rad release rates feed the RAD CSF.- The containment and drywell gamma radiation alarms appear on a supporting display as discussed undet Item #25. These.are not sensitive detectors indicating impending problems but
-rather are used in the Emergency Plan to perform backup offsite dose O
calculations.
4 i
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Attacharnt #1 Page 33 of 39
.NRC Staff - DVA Results For CPS SPDS
. ~
~
NRC Item #29 Audit Peport
Reference:
" DISCUSSION", Section 5.0, " Human Factors", Page 8.
Reference:
Element II, Item 1.
NRC Concern:
None of the ARM /PRM variables are easily accessed as. witnessed during the EPG walk-through (the staff recommended at the time of the audit that drywell high radiation and stack noble gas release rate be added to the SPDS). -
CPS Response:
Drywell radiation and stack noble gas release rate have been added to the design (See Item #28).
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Attachmsnt #1 Page 34 of 39 NRC Staff - DVA Results For CPS SPDS
/'N NRC Item #30 s.s Audit Report
Reference:
" DISCUSSION", Section 5.0, " Human Factors", Page 8.
Reference:
Element II, Item 2.
NRC Concern:
The " AIDS" concept (display only on alert) does not comply with the requirements for continuous display and therefore, the applicant cannot take credit for parameters in the " AIDS" portion of the display unless they are continuously displayed or are provided as inputs to the critical safety function status boxes and are easily accessible to the operator.
CPS Response:
The SPDS redesign has eliminated the AIDS concept. The AIDS area is now used for the CSF alarms, plant mode, CRT color gun operation and system operation (tim'a clock displayed). The CSF alarm boxes are continuously displayed.
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Attachmtnt #1 Page 35 of 39 NRC Staff - DVA Results For CPS SPDS O
NRC Item #31 Audit Report
Reference:
" DISCUSSION", Section 5.0, " Human Factors", Page 8.
Reference:
Element II, Item 2.
NRC Concern:
On the positive side the staff was told that IP had lately recognized the need to supply an indicator of SPDS failure and was adding a time-clock display to the design.
CPS Response:
As stated in Item 30 response, the time clock has been included on each of the SPDS displays (
Reference:
CPS SPDS Display Format Design and Task Force Evaluation Results) to signify.the functioning of the computer and display systems. Upon a system failure, the time clock would no longer be updated.
Such indication is clear and unambiguous to the operators. In addition, the Plant Process Computer system mimic is provided on the Standby Information Panel (just behind the NUCLENET) and is used to assist the operators in a deter-mination of the system failure cause. This simic is a one-line "information flow path" showing the status of the major system components (e.g. the Display.
Control Processors, the Data Aquisition Processors and the Test and Recon-figuration Unit).
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Attachment #1 Page 36 of 39 NRC Staff - DVA Results For CPS SPDS O
NRC Item #32 Audit Report
Reference:
" DISCUSSION", Section 5.0, " Human Factors", Page 8.
Reference:
None NRC Concern:
Procedures for operating the SPDS'are available.
4 CPS Response:
The purpose of the SPDS is to serve as an information system for the operator, 1
during both normal and off-normal plant operating conditions. Operator actions will not be performed based solely upon the SPDS information. The operator will perform such actions based upon the operational and emergency procedures, operator training, the safety-grade Control Room instrumentation, and the CRT displays provided by the remainder of the NUCLENET-system. As such, the SPDS provides the operator information related to the overall plant safety status to aid him in the assessment of plant conditions.
Another SPDS design basis is to provide information to the Shift Technical Advisor to verify that the operator is taking the proper corrective action in accordance with the procedures, training, and Control Room indications.
Attachmnt #1 Paga 37 of 39 NRC Staff - DVA Results For CPS SPDS N. -
]
NRC Item #33 Audit Report
Reference:
" DISCUSSION" Section 5.0, " Human Factors", Page 8.
-SPDS CAP
Reference:
Element II, Item 6.
NRC Concern:
The SPDS is being reviewed as part of the control room review now underway.
Human engineering discrepancies (HEDs) involving the SPDS, their assessed safety significance, and changes to the SPDS design that are intended to improve deficiencies of the control room will be reported.
CPS Response:
The evaluations and results will be reported in the Detaiied Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) Summary Report.
In addition, as previously commited by IP, an SPDS Dynamic Simulation Test will be performed, using the CPS Simulator, which will validate the acceptability of the designed display formats and the parameter set chose. The scope of this validation test will be provided to the Staff as soon as this information is available.
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Attachmsnt #1 Page 38_of 39 NRC Staff - DVA Results For CPS SPDS N_
NRC Item #34 Audit Report
Reference:
" DISCUSSION", Section 5.1, "Information Needed to Continue Review", Page 8.
SPDS CLP
Reference:
Element II, Item 6.
NRC Concern:
The applicant should provide a listing of HEDs associated with the SPDS that are identified as part of the control room review, an assessment of their safety significance,(in terms of likely effect if an error is made), and a description of the propcsed resolution. The applicant should also identify any changes to the SPDS that are made to alleviate deficiencies in the control room.
CPS Response:
The DCRDR Summary Report described in Item 33 will. report the details of this review. The report will include the assessment of safety significance and the description of the proposed resolution as part of the evaluation task. Any O-changes required to resolve the DCRDR identified deficiencies will be identified in the referenced report.
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Attai.: ent #1 Page l? of 39 NRC Staff - DVA Results For CPS SPDS
()
NRC Item #35 Audit Report
Reference:
" DISCUSSION", Section 5.1, "Information Needed to Contirue Review", Page 8.
Reference:
Element II, Item 6.
NRC Concern:
The applicant should provide detsils concerning SPDS validan;cn/ man-in the-loop testing including operator sampLa size, a list of transients and events used in the dynamic validation, and validation results.
CPS Response:
The dynamic simulation test validation program has not been datailed at the current time. However, the criteria for selecting the validation test case are given in response to Item 4.
The design basis operator sample size will be determined and cacumented in the I
document which describes the scope of this validation when cav41cped. See f--
(
Response Item 33.
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Atts,chmnt IA i
Paga 1 of 48 SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit T
)
SAIC Item No. 1 Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
" INTRODUCTION", Page 1.
NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
NRC #34 i
SAIC Concerns:
Presently, IPC has the assistance of Torrey Pines Technology (TPT) in performing a e
checklist review of intended SPDS using criteria from industry guidance documents
. (e.g.. NUREG-0700). This second checklist review will be integrated into the Detailed Control Room Design. Review (DCRDR) scheduled for completion in June of 1985.
']
CPS Response:
The DCRDR Summary Report described in the NRC Item 34 response will include the checklist review results for the SPDS.
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Attatchment 1A Pags 2 of 48 SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit O
SAIC Ites No. 2 Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
" PRE-IMPLEMENTATION AUDIT FINDINGS", page 3.
NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
i NRC #25
)
SAIC Concerns
- The NRC position concerning continuous display is-that all SPDS parameters should be continuously displayed or a method of alerting the operator to changes in the status of SPDS parameters should be provided.
such as the critical safety function boxes.
IPC is planning to display.some plantesafety status information on the SS CRT on a continual basis. However, all SPDS parameters are not continuously displayed, nor are all SPDS parameters input to the critical safety function boxes. Therefore, IPC appears to have met the provision in Supplement I to NUREG-0737 regarding a concise display of critical plant variables but has not fully satisfied the provision for continuous display.
CPS Response:
All parameters necessary to monitor approaching challenges to critical safety functions are input to the CSF boxes. Further discussions are contained in NRC Item 25 response.
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Attachmsnt 1A Page 3 of 48 SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit SAIC Item No. 3 1
Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
" LOCATION CONVENIENT TO THE CONTROL ROOM OPERATOR", page 4.
NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
i None SAIC Concerns:
The SPDS CRT appears generally adequate for seated observation by control room operators. However, the NRC audit team noted that the top of the display is obscured when observed from a standing position directly in front of the SPDS.
CPS Response:
O The identified problem existed temporarily caused by the CRT monitor being pulled back in its case for maintenance. The CRT monitor has been repositioned to its proper location. The view angle problem no longer exists.
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Attcchment 1A Page 4 of 48 SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit SAIC Item No. 4 Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
" LOCATION CONVENIENT TO THE CONTROL ROOM OPERATOR", Page 4.
NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
None SAIC Concerns:
The staff noted that a plan exists to perform wiring changes to prevent the operators from moving the SPDS display to an alternative CRT. Since operators may have other displays during certain plant evolutions which are more appropritte for displays on the two CRTs closest to the rod control panel, the NRC audit team suggested that IPC.
consider using dedicated line space on everv CRT showing the CSF boxes, rather than dedicating the whole SS CRT solely to the SPDS function.
CPS Response:
The Critical Safety Functions have been relocated from the top of the display to the bottom of the display. This change will permit the CSF Status to be displayed on all the control room DCS monitors when an alarm occurs.
The SS CRT monitor is set up for display of the SPDS top level format, with the CSFs included, and the three secondary displays available as needed, for additional information.
The operational philosophy has been revised to direct the operator to the secondary displays when an alarm occurs by the use of the CSF Status Boxes. The operator would have the capability to select the desired display. This design approach was a direct
. feedback from the operators resulting from the static SPDS/EOP walk-through/
talk-through evaluation.
1 O
Attachm:nt 1A Pags 5 of 48 SAIC Pre-implementation Audit SAIC Item No. 5 Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
" LOCATION CONVENIENT TO THE CONTROL ROOM OPERATOR", Page 4.
NRC -
DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
SAIC #6 SAIC #9 SAIC #7 SAIC #8 SAIC Concerns:
IPC is apparently still in the process of conducting a human factors review of the SPDS. The review is to be completed by IPC with the assistance of Torrey Pines Technology in conjunction with the DCRDR.
CPS Response:
The reference SAIC items addresses the revised design approach being taken on the SPDS Program.
Dr. C. O. Hopkins is the human factors expert design contributor.
Torrey Pines Technology will provide the SPDS design review. The design review results will be included in the DCRDR Summary Report.
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Attcchment 1A Pags 6 of 48 SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit O
SAIC Item No. 6 Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
"SPDS HUMAN FACTORS DESIGN APPROACH", Page 5.
NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
The design process does not reflect the necessary top down (safety parameter driven) system function and task analysis activities which would have resulted in an adequate SPDS display format.
CPS Response:
The design process now adopts a top-down design methodology. The project plan reflects the top-down approach. See the design flow chart and document tree provided in the response to NRC Item fl.
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Attcchment IA Pcg2 7 of 48 SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit l
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SAIC Itat No. 7 i
Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
"SPDS HUMAN FACTORS DESIGN APPROACH", Page 5.
1' 1
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NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Iten No.
Reference:
i l,
None E
)
SAIC Concerns:
i:
Purthermore, it appears that although a human factors professional was involved in the development of the assessment checklists, they were applied and interpreted by non-human factors personnel.
CPS Response:
f The " top-down" design philosophy adopted by IP includes the human factors consideration directly into the design process. Dr. C. O. Hopkins, of the University l
of Illinois has provided this assistance in the SPDS redesign. The results of this
{
human factors evaluation are provided in the reports attached to this submittal.
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Attcchment lA Pcg3 8 cf 48 SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit OO SAIC Item No 8 Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
"SPDS HUMAN FACTORS DESIGN APPROACH", Page 5.
NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
NRC #34-NRC #4 SAIC Concerns:
The next step in the SPDS design evaluation process will be taken during the DCRDR supported by Torrey Pines Technology. This will apparently include an E0P walk-through/ talk-through approach to SPDS and DCRDR validation, the administration of operator surveys, and a checklist review of the SPDS. This effort will commence in July 1985. However, the SPDS may not be operational in time for dynamic evaluation.
CPS Response:
Response to NRC concern Item 4 details the Static and dynamic walk-through/
talk-through to validate the SPDS design. The dynamic validation test case selection criteria are specified in the same response.
Operator surveys have been conducted in two questionnaires. The first set of operator questionnaires were completed as part of the parameter selection and Critical Safety Function identification process. A second set of questionnaires was subsequently completed by the two operators used in the static SPDS/EOP walk-throughs. This second survey provided additional information related specifically to the information as displayed on the SPDS. Ths checklist review of the SPDS will be included in the DCRDR Summary Report as previously stated.
O
Attcchment IA Pcgs 9 of 48 SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit O
SAIC Ites No. 9 Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
"SPDS HUMAN PACTORS DESIGN APPROACH", Page 6.
NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
Overall, the design process was not optimal for the development of an SPDS. The process should have been driven by the safety parameters first, human factors requirements second, and consideration of convenience / cost last.
CPS Response:
The top-down design methodology adopted by IP resolves the concern stated herein.
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Attechnent 1A Pcgs 10 of 48 SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit O
SAIC Ites No. 10 Pre-Implementation Audit Referencet "SPDS HUMAN FACTORS DESIGN APPROACH", Page 6.
NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No. Referencet NRC #34 NRC #35 SAIC Concerns
- IPC should commit to an adequate verification and validation process to compensate for its less than optimal design approach. This verification and validation effort must be capable of identifying the need for additional parameters and identifying human factors deficiencies in regard to the manner in which the parameters are displayed. IPC should also commit to implementing the upgrades identified during verification and validation.
CPS Response:
The " top-down" design approach now adopted by IP optimizes the design. The verification and validation process previously exercised was a sound and effective one. The concerne expressed by the V&V team have been incorporated into the recommendations contained in the Design Review Report. The Dynamic Simulation Test will accomplish the V&V identified in this concern. Any required upgrades will be accomplished in accordance with the DCRDR Program Plan criteria.
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Att chment 1A Pass 11 cf 48 J
SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit
- O SAIC Item No. 11 i
l e
Pre-laplementation Audit
Reference:
" COLOR CODING", Page 6.
t NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No. References NRC #23 i
j.
SAIC Concerns i
The basic concern here appears to be an over reliance on the concept of color coding i
as a method to support the discrimination of information by operators.
CPS Response:
I
]
The use of colors have been reviewed by the Human Factors expert and major design changes have been implemented. The use of symbols, shape coding, consistency in j
color convention and additional non-ambiguous display methods have corrected this concern.
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Attechme2t 1A Pcg3 12 of 48 l
SAIC Pre-Implarentation Audit SAIC Ites No. 12 L
r Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
" COLOR CODING", Page 6.
t NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No. References
{
l NRC #24 i
l SAIC Concerns:
It appears that tho system can generate a limited number of colors (i.e., white, j
yellow, cyan, red. etc). The use of these colors is not only inappropriate due to the difficulty in detecting the differences in hoe but also at at odds with the
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accepted human factors principles concerning the meaning associated with colors.
i CPS Ressonse:
A standard color convention has been established based upon Human Factors consideration, industry standard and the capability of the Nucionet system.
The nucionet system and SPD8 are being changed to adopt a standard color convention as defined in the Design Review document.
t See response to NRC Items #17 and #18.
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i Attcchment 1A Pcg3 13 of 48 SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit l
SAIC Item No. 13 i
Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
" COLOR CODING", Page 6.
I NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Ites No. References NRC #19 l
l I
t' SAIC Concerns:
I j'
The SPDS display uses yellow rather than green to indicate a parameter is within tolerance.
j CPS Responset The color convention now employs green for parameters within tolerance and dynamic i
numerical data.
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SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit O) 1
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SAIC Item No. 14 Pre-Implementation Audi:
Reference:
" COLOR CODING", Page 6.
NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
NRC #18 D IC Concerns:
In addition, green tic :aarks are used to indicate normal ranges in the bar graph while the ri'merics which indicato normal readings are yellow.
CPS Responset O
Cyan color ;onve.ation is used for static parts of the display such as titles, units,
)
tic marks and structurai boundaries. Green is now used to indicate " normal" conditions.
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Attcchment 1A Pcs3 15 cf 48 SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit O
SAIC Item No. 15 Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
" COLOR CODING" Page 6.
NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No. Reference NRC #22 SAIC Concerns Furthermore, the NRC audit team observed that the hue / saturation of the red alphanumeries do not show up well against the CRT background. This may be aggravated in situations where emergency ambient lighting is used.
CPS Response:
" Inverse video" (dark black characters on a colored background) have been adopted to highlight the alarm states (red) and invalid data (white) to improve the visibility.
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, _ _ A Pag 3 16 cf 48 SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit SAIC Item No. 16 Pre-Imolementatiot Audit
Reference:
" COLOR CODING", Page 6 & 7.
NRC - DVA Ites No. or SAIC Ites No. Reference NRC #23 SAIC #11 NRC #24 SAIC #15
^
SAIC Conceras:
There is an over dependence on color coding for information transfer and subsequently there is no redundant (backup) coding scheme to account for partially color blind operators or for SPDS use in a lighting environment other than optimal. Since the colors are limited, hard to distinguish, inappropriate to human factors conventions and inconsistent, perhaps flashing symbols, shape coding, size coding or some other It is therefore suggested that O
more innovative approach may be more appropriate.
alternative approaches to information coding be explored by IPC with help from its human factors consultant.
CPS Resoonse:
This concern has been addressed by the the four reference responses.
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Attrchm:nt lA Pegn 17 of 48 SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit O
SAIC Item No. 17 Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
" LABELING", Page 7.
NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
NRC #18 SAIC Concerns:
From the NRC discussion with operators during the audit it appears that the use of the letters "I" and "O" as designators of " isolated" and "open" in the containment isolation field of the display are confusing. At least one operator thought the "I"
and "0" referred to " inboard" and " outboard."
CPS Response:
The "1" and "0" designation are no longer used in the SPDS design.
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Atttchzant IA Pag 2 18 of 48 SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit OV SAIC Item No. 18 Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
" LABELING", Page 7.
NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
NRC fl SAIC Concerns:
It is apparent from the preceding discussions that IPC has not fully met the requirement to incorporate acceptable human factors principles. It is strongly suggested that both the analyses which resulted in the parameters selected and the design process which led to the display format be subjected to rigorous diagnostic evaluation by the IPC team supported by the human factors consultant.
O CPS Response:
IP conducted a Design Review as described in the NRC Item #1 response. Represented in the design review were personnel from the following disciplines:
Control on Instrumentation
- Technical Assessment Staff Computer Systems Emergency Planning Plant Technical Staff Human Factors Specialist Licensing IP believes the evaluation concern expressed by SAIC has been met.
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Attachm nt 1A Pega 19 of 48 SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit O
SAIC Item No. 19 Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
" LABELING", Page 7.
NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
NRC #32
-SAIC Concerns:
Supplement I to NUREG-0737 states that " Procedures which describe the timely and correct safety status assessment when the SPDS is and is not available will be developed by the licensee in parallel with the SPDS."
IPC has neither developed nor connaitted to develop specific procedures describing safety status assessment with and without SPDS.
CPS Response:
It is IP's position that the SPDS design basis as specified in NRC #32 is an information system to the operator. All operator actions are te be taken on the control room information, plant operating procedures,.and training knowledge. The loss of the SPDS function would not impair the operator's ability to maintain plant control under all conditions since plant operating procedures, i.e. E0Ps, have been developed specifically for maintaining plant control.
'SPDS operating procedures will be included in the plant procedure for use of the Plant Process Computer.
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Attachmsnt lA Pags 20 of 48 SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit
.J i
l SAIC Item No. 20 4
i Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
" LABELING", Page 7.
1 I
i NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
NRC #4 NRC #35 SAIC Concerns:
.It is recommended that as a minimma IPC personnel incorporate tests of the operators' ability to cope with an unexpected loss of the SPDS during upcoming verification and validation activities.
CPS Response:
()
The procedure guidelines such as E0Ps and EPGs, etc. have been developed to cope with plant operations without SPDS. Therefore, IP expects the operator's ability to cope with an unexpected loss of the SPDS has been addressed.
The dynamic validation testing is planned to evaluate the enhancements of the information presented by the SPDS.
()
4
l Attcchment 1A Pegs 21 cf 48 SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit 4. (
SAIC Item No. 21 Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
" TRAINING FOR ACCIDENT RESPONSE WITH AND WITHOUT THE SPDS", Page 8.
1 4
NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
a None i
SAIC Concerns:
Supplement I to NUREG-0737 states that "... operators should be trained to respond to accident conditions both with and without the SPDS available." IPC states that it intends to develop rudimentary training via instructions for SPDS operators.
However, those training plans were not ready for presentation at the NRC audit.
CPS Response:
The detail classroom lesson plans had been submitted to the staff as part of the Emergency Operating Procedures Generation package, IP letter U-708 dated May 1, 1984 4
in reference to NRC Generic Letter 82-83. These lesson plans will be revised to reflect the SPDS design revision.
The hands-on training (the CPS simulator) lesson plans will be developed in accordance with the ERCIP schedule, as submitted to the Staff.
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Attcchment 1A Pag 2 22 cf 48 SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit SAIC Item No. 22 Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
" SAFETY PARAMETER SELECTION SUFFICIENT TO ASSESS SAFETY STATUS FOR IDENTIFIED FUNCTIONS", Page 8.
NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
NRC #3 NRC #28 NRC #7 NRC #29 NRC #15 j
SAIC Concerns:
It appears that the SPDS design philosophy has changed since the last docketing of
- design information in October 1984 (Reference 3). The original concept treated the area radiation monitor / process radiation monitor (ARM /PRM) display as part of the SPDS. Since then a new critical safety function (CSF) alarm for the ARM /PRM display has been added to the SPDS upper level display. This alarm is actuated by any of the several ARM /PRM alarms associated with the ARM /PRM system. Under the original O.
concept the operator had no direct alarm or display of radiological conditions on tha primary SPDS display. While the new concept / design places an alarm directly on the primary SPDS display, the following potential problem exists:
- Radiological parameters are not directly displayed, nor are they directly accessible to the operator. When an ARM /PRM alora occurs, a second operator must be sent to the ARM /PRM panel about 10 feet away to determine the alarming channel and to obtain parameter values.
In order to address this potential problem IPC SPDS design personnel should evaluate the adequacy of the arrangement during upcoming verification and validation (V&V)'
walk-throughs of the E0P's, DCRDR and SPDS.
CPS Response:
I The HVAC and standby gas treatment system discharge activity concentrations and flow rates have been added to the SPDS to provide off-site release rates. In addition, containment and drywell gassia radiation have been added. The remainder of the radioactivity control parameters alarm on SPDS. The operator will be using the ARM /PRM panel as the primary " RAD" control and assessment " tool." The static valk-throughs illustrating the situation caused no problems for the operators. The SPDS Dynamic Simulation Test will validate the acceptability of this design concept j
for the " RAD" CSF information.
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Attcchment 1A Pega 23 cf 48 SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit SAIC Item No. 23 Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
"SAFETT PARAMETER SELECTION SUFFICIENT TO ASSESS SAFETY STATUS POR IDENTIFIED FUNCTIONS", Page 9.
NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
SAIC #6 SAIC #7 SAIC #9 SAIC Concerns A pre-implementation package submitted by IPC in October of 1983 includes the SPDS verification and validation team report on human factors. Based on a close inspection of these documents and the findings of the NRC audit it appears that neither the selection nor operational definition of the safety parameters was based on any formal top down system function and task analysis. In addition the team that O
developed the pre-implementation package, although multidisciplinary, had no input from human factors professionals. There appears to have been no a priori integration of human factors criteria into the parameter selection process.
CPS Responses A formal top-down design approach has been adopted by IP. The design process now includes experts in a wide r.ange of disciplines such as human factors and radiological control. The concerns stated have been resolved by the implementation of the SPDS Corrective Action Plan.
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Att chment 1A P gs 24 of 48 SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit c
SAIC Item No. 24 Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
" SAFETY PARAMETER SELECTION SUFFICIENT TO ASSESS SAFETY STATUS FOR IDENTIFIED FUNCTIONS", Page 9.
NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No. Reference None SAIC Concernst During the course of the audit the NRC audit team received and reviewed numerous documents and presentations concerning verification and validation work performed on the SPDS design project. However, all of this work was oriented toward the SPDS hardware and software operability and reliability. None of the work appeared to emphasize the identification of operator information and action needs as they relate to identifying and assessing the safety status of the plant.
C CPS Responset The static and dynamic walk-throughs and operators questionnaires are all part of involving the operator's feed back to the design of the SPDS. Several design characteristics resulted from the operator's input. For example, the operators expressed a strong opinion that reactor water level is important and should be displayed on both the Containment Control and the Level Control secondary SPDS Displays. This recommendation and others have been implemented.
Identication of operator information and action needs, as they relate to identifying and assessing plant safety status, is addressed in the report of the SPDS Parameter Selection Task Force, included herein.
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Attcchment 1A Pass 25 of 48 SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit O
SAIC Ites No. 25 Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
" RADIOACTIVITY RELEASR", Page 10.
NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
NRC f3 NRC f25 NRC #7 NRC #28 NRC #15 NRC #29 t
SAIC Concerns:
Current design does not transmit drywell high radiation monitor output to the ARM /PRM panel and therefore will not actuate the radiation control CSF alarm.
CPS Response O
The drywell and containment high range gasma alarm has been added to the SPDS Parameter Set. Further discussions are provided in NRC #25 and #28 responses.
O
Attache:nt 1A Page 26 of 48 SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit U
SAIC Item No. 26 Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
"RADI0 ACTIVITY RELEASE", Page 10.
NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
NRC #3 NRC #28 NRC #7 NRC #29 NRC #15 SAIC Concerns:
A plan exists to add plant vent stack noble gas concentration instrumentation to the ARM /PRM panel. Vent sta,ck flowrate is already available on the ARM /PRM panel. Since technical specifications, emergency plan classification guides (EPIP or EALS), E0P entry conditions, etc. are all written in terms of release reates instead of concentrations, the SPDS designers should consider developing a simple algorithm to e
display release rate directly. This would eliminate the need for operators to make the hand calculation to determine the relationship of release rate to the various action statements in the procedures referenced above.
CPS Response:
The off-site release rate (flow rate times the activity. concentration) will be calculated for both the HVAC stack and the standby gas treatment system. SPDS will display the composite release rate.
Attcch nt IA Page 27 of 48 SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit SAIC Item No. 27 f
Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
" RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE", Page 10.
NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
NRC #15 i
SAIC Concerns:
j None of the ARM /PRM parameters were selected for direct display on the SPDS. With the change in philosophy which excludes the ARM /PRM panel from being part of the SPDS, the designers should evaluate the be efits of adding key radiological i
parameters such as containment radiation and stack release rate directly to the SPDE.
display.
CPS Response:
i The key radiological parameters have been added to the SPDS (see NRC #15 response).
I o
Attachm:nt 1A Page 28 of 48
{.
SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit
'k SAIC Item No. 28 4
4 i
Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
" RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE", Page 10.
t NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
None j
I SAIC Concerns:
IPC's SPDS design team demonstrated only a cursory knowledge of the new radiological monitoring equipment being installed in the plant. The design team should add this expertise for the remainder of the implementation phase of SPDS.
CPS Response:
Members of the Plant Radiological Section have been included in the Corrective Action Plan and the subsequent design review of the SPDS.
i 4
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x Attacha nt 1A Page 29 of 48
- g SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit SAIC Item No. 29 Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
" CONTAINMENT P", Page 10 & 11.
4 NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
E NRC #27 SAIC Concerns Secondary containment P (Combustible gas control volume to outside atmosphere) does not trigger the containment integrity CSF alarm. The design team should consider adding this parameter as a trigger point to the existing containment integrity CSF or adding a separate CSF for secondary containment (leaving the existing CSF dedicated i
to dryvell and primary containment). Note that Revision 3 of the CE emergency O
procedure guidelines treats primary and secondary containment control as separate i
guidelines.
CPS Response:
6 Secondary Containment differential pressure is an input to the " RAD" Critical Safety Function (see NRC #27 response).
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Attechatnt 1A Page 30 of 48 SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit SAIC Item No. 30 Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
" CONTAINMENT P", Page 11.
NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No
Reference:
None SAIC Concerns:
The SPDS design team contended that secondary containment P units on the SPDS of PSID was correct. Upon further investigation by the NRC audit team, it was shown that the proper units are inches of water. Errors such as this must be corrected prior to the final installation stage of the project.
CPS Response:
The correct unit for secondary containment differential pressure is inches of water column. The display will indicate the correct unit. The display units will be reviewed to assure correct units for all parameters.
Attach = ant lA Page 31 of 48 SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit
\\.s SAIC Item No. 31 Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
" REACTIVITY", Page 11.
NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
NRC #26 SAIC Concerns:
The power control (reactivity control) CSF is triggered only by the upscale average power range monitors' (APRMS) trip at 108% of the CSF. As a minimum, it should also be triggered by a signal indicating valid reactor protection system (RPS) trip with failure to achieve a downscale ( 3%) APRM trip within a few seconds. This is the entry condition for the ATWS emergency procedure guideline. Failure to evaluate and
(,/)
include such features may be due to the fact that no formal system function and task analysis was conducted during the SPDS design process.
CPS Response:
The "RCTY" CSF is triggered by a SCRAM signal, with power above the 3% APRM downscale trip after 6 seconds (see iten NRC #26 response).
Attachmtnt 1A Page 32 of 48 s
SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit SAIC Item No. 32 Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
" COOLANT CONTROL", Page 11.
NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
NRC #10 NRC #13 SAIC Concerns:
The reactor coolant system integrity CSF alarm is triggered by only one parameter:
drywell floor drain sump flow. This parameter is provided to the SPDS from a single, non IE instrument which monitors the coolant level in a V-notch located in a Weir i
upstream of the sump pump. Therefore, the sole input to the reactor coolant system l
integrity CSF cannot be subjected to any kind of confidence check. Other parameters l
should be evaluated as possible redundant indicators of failure of the reactor coolant system. Possibilities include safety relief valve position, reactor vessel level and drywell temperature.
CPS Response:
The "LVL" CSF is now initiated by diverse and redundant parameters (see NRC #10 response).
V
Attacharnt 1A Page 33 of 48 l
SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit-3 SAIC Item No. 33 1
l Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
" COOLANT CONTROL" Page 11.
NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
NRC #10' NRC #13 SAIC Concerns:
The present design does not provide for a CSF alarm associated with a break in an interfacing system outside the drywell. Addition of the suggested parameters as triggers to the CSF would provide indication of the interfacing LOCA situation.
CPS Response:
Secondary containment parameters associated with leak detection, such as ECCS room temperatures, differential temperatures, and sump levels have been added to the SPDS.
The SPDS Parameter Selection Task Force report itemizes the rooms, parameters, and instruments used. These parameters are inputs to the " RAD" CSF.
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Attachatnt lA P gs 34 of.48 SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit SAIC Item No. 34 i
Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
" GROUP ISOLATION", Page 11 & 12.
i NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
[
SAIC Concerns:
The existing SPDS display for group isolations is triggered only by a successful closure of all valves in.the isolation group. A demand signal for an isolation is not indicated. Questioning of the SPDS team and available operators did not confirm that positive indication of the conditions, warranting a group isolation exist elsewhere in the control room. The SPDS design team should evaluate the benefits of O
successful isolation indication provided.
including group isolation demand signals on the SPDS in addition to the current CPS Response:
The new SPDS design indicates a successful closure of all valves in an isolation
- group. Operator and plant operations interviews during the design walk down showed that the present annunciator system would indicate valve demand and closure signals.
The operator's action would be to follow plant procedure CPS # 10N4001.02S and the valve line up will verify the successful isolation. The plant operators felt strongly that this must be done, and that the SPDS indication would be an early indicator'of what was occurring.
Following the automatic initiated valve closure and verification, the walk down would be continued.by the operator to actuate the manually-actuated valves as the procedure specifies.
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Attachmint 1A Page 35 of 48 g
. SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit SAIC Item No. 35 Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
" CONTAINMENT PRESSURE", Page 12 NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
NRC #27 SAIC Concerns:
Primary containment pressure (outside drywell, inside primary containment) does not trigger the containment integrity CSF alarm. This is probably the primary indicator l
of abnormal conditions in the primary containment and yet was not included in the CSF alarm logic.
CPS Response:
Drywell pressure is included in the "CNMT" and "LVL" CSFs. Since there are four redundant vacuum breakers between the drywell and containment, the probability that containment pressure will be higher than the drywell pressure is low. See item NRC #27 response.
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L A Page 36 of 48 SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit bd i
SAIC Item No. 36 1
4; Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
" CONTAINMENT PRESSURE", Page 12.
NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
NRC #4 NRC #34 NRC #35 SAIC Concerns:
i s The above examples demonstrate the need to utilize the task analysis results and V&V process being developed for the E0P and DCRDR project for the final parameter selection and SPDS design activities. Should IPC personnel identify SPDS deficiencies during the DCRDR, the findings and their resolutions should be reported to the NRC. IPC personnel stated that the SPDS is to be operational just prior to the submission of the DCRDR summary report. The SPDS related HEDs should be included as a separate section of the DCRDR summary report.
CPS Response:
4 This concern has been addressed in the three reference responses, i
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l Attechm:nt 1A Page 37 of 48 SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit SAIC Item No. 37 Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
" SUITABLE ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC ISOLATION",
Page 12.
NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
NRC #9 SAIC Concerns:
Supplement I to NUREG-0737 states that "The SPDS shall be suitably isolated from electrical or electronic interference with equipment and sensors that are in use for safety systems." The NRC audit team did not include and I&C specialist and therefore did not evaluate the final test results for the TEC model 2200 isolation devices being used to isolate SPDS signals f om class IE safety equipment. IPC personnel O
coamaitted to submit results for this testing to the NRC for evaluation by specialists in the field (Re: GDC 24, APP A, 10 CFR 50).
CPS Response:
IP has submitted the electrical isolation device test report, transmittal letter-U-0779, dated January 11, 1985. There is no further action required of IP.
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Attechmint lA Page 38 of 48 SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit
~.3 (U
SAIC Item No. 38 Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
" CONCISE CONTINUOUS DISPLAY", Page 13.
NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
NRC #25 SAIC #2 SAIC Concerns:
To ensure that the plant safety status information will be continuously displayed, IPC should consider (1) incorporating into the design a continuous display of the critical safety function boxes which includes input of all SPDS parameters as well as direct access to the underlying parameter values, or (2) centinuous display of all SPDS parameters on a dedicated CRT.
-CPS Response:
The two reference responses, NRC #25 and SAIC #2 resolves this concern. All.
parameters necessary to assess an incipient conditions are input to the appropriate CSF (i.e. E0P " Entry Conditions"),
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Attech: nt 1A Page 39 of 48 SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit SAIC Item No. 39 Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
" LOCATION CONVENIENT TO OPERATOR", Page 13.
NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
SAIC #3 SAIC #4 SAIC Concerns:
SPDS may not be visible to a standing operator and may be fixed to one specific CRT in order to support the provision for " continuous display." IPC should consider (1) a means to reduce glare and still allow observation by a standing operator and (2) not establish the SS CRT as the only location SPDS information can be displayed.
CPS Response:
a The CRT monitor screen glare will be addressed in the DCRDR and is not expected to be a problem when the control room construction and lighting are completed.
The revised SPDS design alarms the CSF on all Display Control System CRT Monitors and the SPDS formats can be requested at other locations including the Shift Supervisor Console.
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Attachmint lA Pags 40 of 48 SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit SAIC Item No. 40 i
I Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
" INCORPORATION OF ACCEPTED HFE PRINCIPLES",
Page 13.
NRC --DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
SPDS design approach in general and color coding and labeling specifically are areas of non-compliance with accepted human factors principles. IPC personnel together with substantial support from human factors consultants should subject the design process and display format to rigorous diagnostic evaluation with regard to human factors principles.
O CPS Response:
The top-down design methodology includes the design involvement and Design Review participation of the experts in the area of human factors and radiological assessment. Therefore, this concern is considered adequately addressed.
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Attachm:nt 1A Page 41 of 48 SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit
{g SAIC Item No. 41 Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
" INCORPORATION OF ACCEPTED HFE PRINCIPLES",
Page 13.
NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
NRC #32 SAIC #19 SAIC Concerns:
IPC should commit to the implementation of changes which enhance operator ability to rapidly and accurately respond to off-normal sequences.
CPS Response:
~
IP's SPDS design philosophy has been stated in the NRC #32 response.
O
Attechment 1A Page 42 of 48 SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit i
0O
\\
l SAIC Item No. 42 Pre-Implementation' Audit
Reference:
" PROCEDURES FOR SAFETY STATUS ASSESSMENT",
Page 14.
NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
NRC #32 SAIC #19 SAIC Concerns:
IPC contends the SPDS specific operating procedures are not required.
IPC should test operator ability to use SPDS information and to cope with SPDS outages during upcoming V&V activities. If specific procedures are demonstrated to be necessary than IPC should cc= ply.
CPS Response:
IP believes the three reference responses addresses the concern and considers this concern adequately addressed.
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Attachaint 1A 3
Page 43 of 48 SAIC Pre-impknentation Audit SAIC Iten No. 43 Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
" TRAINING FOR ACCIDENT RESPONSE WITH AND WITHOUT SPDS", Page 14.
NRC - DVA Ites No. or SAIC Iten No.
Reference:
SAIC #21 j-SAIC Concerns:
),
Rudimentary training / orientation instructions and exercises should be developed to assure effective SPDS use.
i i
CPS Response:
The response to SAIC #21 identifies the training lesson plans developed and submitted to the staff. These lesson plans will be updated as the SPDS implementation is j
finalized.
O
Attecha:nt 1A Page 44 of 48 SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit O
SAIC Item No. 44 Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
" PARAMETER SELECTION", Page 14.
NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
IPC has not conducted formal SPTA in support of parameter definition, seaction, or verification. Without a priori knowledge of operator information requicements it is not likely to ensure the necessary parameters in an adequate display format.
IPC should subject parameter selection and information presentation to rigorous evaluation during the joint SPDS review and DCRDR.
CPS Response:
IP has subjected the parameter selection and display format to a design review by a multiple-discipline committee and operator static E0P walk-throughs. Additional reviews will be conducted as part of the SPDS Dynamic Simulation Test evaluation.
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Attachatnt IA Page 45 of 48 SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit O
SAIC Item No. 45 Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
" ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC ISOLATION"; Page 14.
NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
NRC f9 SAIC i37 SAIC Concerns:
There was no evaluation of this provision during the NRC review. IPC will submit pertinent information to NRC specialists for assessment.
CPS Response:
The two reference responses addresses this concern.
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Attachmint lA Pags 46 of 48 SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit O
SAIC Item No. 46 Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
" MISCELLANEOUS FINDINGS", Page 14.
NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
SAIC Concerns:
Only wide range reactor vessel water level is supplied to the SPLS. Due to lack of time and lack of knowledge by IPC personnel, it was not possible to ascertain the adequacy of this range of indication during all accident conditions.
IPC personnel should review the adequacy of the level instrumentation with respect to operation during elevated drywell temperatures and while controlling level to control power during the ATWS event.
CPS Response:
This task was performed. The parameter set has been expanded to include additional instrumentation signals.
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Attacicznt IA Page 47 of 48 SAIC Pre-Implementation. Audit O
SAIC Item No. 47 i
Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
" MISCELLANEOUS FINDINGS", Page 14.
NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
I NRC fil NRC f14
(
SAIC Concerns:
6 Numerous parameters used in the SPDS do not undergo a confidence check because they are measured by a single channel or by parallel channels of the same parameter. IPC personnel should evaluate alternative means of validating data such as rate of change, comparison to average, etc.
1 CPS Response:
This task was performed and responded to in the two reference responses. The number of redundant channels for the key SPDS parameter has been greatly increased. Visuals sensor and validation (comparison) failure is now indicated within the CSF Boxes.
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l Attachmsnt 1A Page 48 of 48
S SAIC Pre-Implementation Audit b
SAIC Item No. 48 Pre-Implementation Audit
Reference:
" MISCELLANEOUS FINDINGS", Page 15.
NRC - DVA Item No. or SAIC Item No.
Reference:
SAIC Concerns:
The provisions for a manual alarm acknowledge and for reflash of SPDS CSF alarms are presently in the conceptual stage of design. The SPDS design team should meet and agree on the exact hardware and features to be installed.
. CPS Response:
A manual alarm acknowledge and a combined Secondary Display Selection switching arrangement has been designed for the SPDS. Reflash of the CSF alarm feature is included and is detailed in the CPS SPDS Display Formats Design & Task Force Evaluation Results.
l C
A TTACHMENT -# 2 SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM RECOMMENDED PARAMETER SET 4
Report of SPDS PARAMETER SELECTION TASK FORCE
~& /Yf bf 1(
P. E. Walberg, Chair 5Een
-Co, rence by Design Review Committee
- 44. P. O'Brien
.5.l D. L. Holtzscher
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hA M. A. McLaughrin
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SPDS Parameter Selection Task Force Report
( j' Table of Contents Page I.
Introduction..................................
3 II.
Charter.......................................
3
- III. Requirements..................................
3 IV.
Parameter Selection...........................
4 V.
Setpoints.....................................
8 VI.
Source Selection..............................
8 VII.~ Validation....................................
8 VIII. References....................................
9 Figures
,['
l.
Flow Chart for Parameter Selection 2.
Boron Injection Initiation Temperature Graph Appendices A.
Key to Parameter Tables B.
SPDS Parameter Display Exemption Table Tabl'es i
1.
Parameters and Values for SPDS Selection a
2.
Comparison of NSAC 21 parameters with Clinton E0P parameters M
3.
Critical Safety Function Parameters 4.
SPDS Display Parameters (Non-CSF) 5.
List of Analog Data Available on Computer 6.
List of Digital Data Available on Computer 7.
~ List of hardware input parameter sources 8.
Cross reference to NUREG-0737 and plant conditions
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I.
INTRODUCTION' This report describes the requirements for a Safety Parameter i
Display System.
It rovides the criteria for selection of t
parameters to be dis layed.
Then it provides the SPDS parameter set developed from t ase criteria.
The final parameter set is listed in tables three and four.
Throughout this process, it i's kept in mind that the SPDS is primarily an aid to the control room operator in carrying out the symptom-oriented emergency operating procedures.
It is also used F
for assessing plant status and insuring safety of the plant in all modes.
It provides. additional plant status to emergency operations facility and technical support center ?arsonnel, But it does not substitute for other data system in these locations or in the control room.
~
II.
CHARTER This report is the output of a task force est'blished by a
Reference 1.
The task force charter was to define the parameters 4
to be included in the SPDS parameter set.
This effort included
~
the following tasks; 1.
Review the various emergency procedures and plans to identify the required parameters.
)
2.
Review requirements for the data set concerning source classification and redundancy.
3.
Establish SPDS parameter set and identify setpoints.
Identify and justify any emergency parameters not included.
4.
Assign data validation schem*es for the parameters.
5.
Include consideration of the input from human factors i
evaluations in selection of the parameter set.
III.
REQUIREMENTS The requirements for a Safety Parameter Display System are delineated in NUREG-0737, Supplement 1 (Reference 2).
Of primary importance to the effort of this task force are the following exerpts:
l "a.
The SPDS should provide a concise display of critical plant i
variables...the principal purpose and function of the SPDS
~
is to aid the control room personnel during abnormal and emergency conditions in determining the safety status of the plant and in assessing whether abnormal conditions warrant corrective action by operators to avoid a degraded core.
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"c. ~ The control room instrumentation required provides the 4
operators with the information necessary for safe reactor 5
- operation...The SPDS is used in addition to the basic j
components and serves to aid and augment these components.
Thus, requirements applicable to control room instrumentation are not needed for this augmentation.
The SPDS need not meet... single-failure criteria and.. 1E 4
requirements...(or] seismically qualified...
"d
...The selection of specific information that should be
^
provided for a particular plant shall be based on engineer-ing judgement of individual plant licensees, taking into account the importance of prompt bnplementation.
"f The minimum information to be provided shall be sufficient to provide information to plant operators about: (sic]
(i)
Reactivity control' (ii)
Reactor core coolant and heat removal from the primary system (iii)
Reactor coolant system integrity (iv)
Radioactivity control (v)
Containment conditions i
The specific paramenters (sic] to be displayed shall be determined by the licensee."
~The above requirements, as well as the NRC identified concerns during the Preimplementation Audit, as reported in Reference 1, are addressed by this report.
IV.
PARAMETER SELECTION A.
METHOD - In the process of selection of the SPDS parameter set, the following steps were followed:
Definition - of terms and functions Collection - of lists of parameters from Emergency Operating Procedures, Emergency Plan, Reg. Guide 1.97, and NSAC 21.
Selection
- of.which of the above parameters are to be displayed and how i
Assignment - of each parameter to a critical safety function.
Comparison - of selected data set with previous data set and NRC audit comments.
Cbnclusion The collection and selection process are illustrated by Figure 1.
t B.
DEFINITION - In order to select the parameters for display i
by the SPDS, the term " critical plant variables" as used in
)
Requirement III. a above must be defined.
Then, in order to meet 4
the objective of " concise" display (Requirement III. a) the i
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-also recognized that the SPDS will not carry all parameters that number of parameters to be displayed must be minimized.
It was the operator or emergency facility personnel will need to make i
i decisions.
This is in accordance with Requirement III. c.
The SPDS will be used in conjunction with the control room instrumentation required by Reg. Guide 1.97, other computer systems such as the Display Control System, The Process Computer, l-the Nuclear Data System, and others.
I Several references, including at least NUREG-0835 (reference 13),
EPRI OEI Document 8304-1 (reference 14), and NUTAC Guideline j
(reference 3), tie the SPDS closely to the symptom-oriented i
Emergency Operating Procedures.
Reference 14 gives licensing and technical justification for using the E0P s as the primary input to the SPDS parameter. set as i
follows:
"The logic of the operator's decision-making process is embodied in the symptom-based E0Ps developed from the symptomatic EPGs prepared by the Boiling Water Reactor j'
Owner's Group (BWROG).
Development of displays to su L
these procedures will therefore support the operator'pport s
decision-making process.
Since the new EOPs deal with unanticipated multiple failures and severely degraded plant conditions, use of procedure-based displays within the SPDS should accomplish its intended function Reference 3 contains the following function clarifications:
i "SPDS aids the control room operating crew in monitoring the status of the Critical Safety Functions (CSFs) that t
constitute the basis of the plant-specific symptom-oriented E0P's."
i and "The SPDS input parameter set should be those parameters used to define the critical safecy functions referenced in the symptom-oriented E0P's."
i Clinton-specific E0P's, although not final, now exist.
They are s
based on the Clinton specific EPG's that the NRC has reviewed (reference 9 and 10).
These, in turn are based on NRC approved l-BWR Owner's Group EPG's (reference 11 and 12).
References 2,3,6,13,14, all emphasize conciseness and minimum set l
of display parameters to allow the operator to assimilate the information.
However, it is noted that the E0P's are focused primarily on high l
temperature, power operating plant conditions, and therefore do j
not constitute a complete basis for a parameter set to monitor all critical safety functions in all operating modes.
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Based on the above, the " critical plant variables" as defined for
- Clinton's SPDS are primarily those required to carry out the Clinton E0P's with a few additions and exceptions as defined in t
the following sections.
1 C.
COLLECTION -
1 1.
The parameters and values referenced in the E0Ps were listed in Table 1.
2.
Even though the Emergency Plan (Reference 4) addresses much broader aspects than the plant parameters for which SPDS is intended, the initial parameter set was reviewed against it.
Tables 4-3 and 4-4, Example Initiating Conditions for Site Area Emergency and General Emergency, were reviewed especially, and all essential plant variables in these tables were already included in the SPDS table 1 parameter list.-
F 3.
In developing the SPDS parameter set, post accident
{
monitoring capability was considered.
Clinton meets the intent of Reg Guide 1.97, Rev. 3 for post accident-l monitoring, with specific exceptions and clarifications, as described in Reference.5.
However, in order to insure that 4
the SPDS is most useful for the operator,'the Type A i
(require operator cetion) and B (required to verify
/ ~
automatic safety functions are accomplished) parameters for
(' '
the RG 1.97 program were reviewed.
All of these parameters 5
l were already included on table 1 with the following four i
exceptions:
Parameter SPDS Implementation Rod position Not added-power level incl.
Boron concentration Not added-grab sample Core temperature Not added-see Ref. 5 Containment isolation Added to table 1 valve position 4
Next, the parameter set was compared to that recommended by NSAC 21 (Reference 6).
This comparison is shown in Table 2.
The parameters recommended by NSAC 21 which were not already included in Table 1 were added.
Even though thc.se specific parameters are not required by the E0P's or the Emergency Plan, it was determined that they are significant for monitoring overall plant status in various plant modes and assessing proposed operator actions.
5.
Finally, it was determined in design review that drywell i
gamma radioactivity should also be added to table 1..
l l
- At this point in the process, table 1 included all parameters-considered for SPDS.
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SELECTION - Subsequently, these parameters were reviewed in light of Requirement III. a abova.
Those parameters that are not related to ' avoiding a degraded core" (such as turbine generator status) were eltninated from further consideration.
In general, system status is exempted from SPDS display in accordance with reference 6.
For example, system "Available" is a composite of many conditions, including tank levels, piping fill and vent conditions, valve positions, power supplies, etc.
These are not, in general, measurable, changing variables for which SPDS is intended.
Stnilarly, individual valve positions after operator action to change them, or pump operating conditions after procedure steps to start them, are considered out of the SPDS scope.
Each of the above examples is adequately indicated at the system control stations where the operator must be anyway, in order to take the specified actions.
Other exemptions are defined in Appendix C.
The column marked " Display" was added to table 1 to identife reasons for exempting each parameter that is not to be displayed.
The remaining parameters constitute what is defined by the-task force as the SPDS Parameter Set.
This set contains the appropriate set of parameters to measure all the characteristics listed in Requirement III. f.
E. ASSIGNMENT - Critical Safety Functions - In order to.most aid Q'
the operator (Requirement c) and meet the objective of Reference 3 of supporting the E0P's, each included entry condition of the E0P's is assigned to a Critical Safety Function (CSF) display.
The CSF's to be displayed are chosen to have a direct correspondence to the. procedure to which the operator is directed, in order to eliminate any ambiguity for the operator.
The CSF displays should correspond to the E0P's as follows:
CSF Procedure Number and Title LVL 4401.01 Level Control-Emergency CNMT 4402.01 Containment Control-Emergency none 4403.01 Cooldown-Emergency-(no entry condition parameters)
RCTY 4404.01 Reactivity Control-Emergency HYDN 4405.01 Combustible Gas Control-Emergency RAD 4406.01 Secondary Containment / Radiation Release Control-Emergency Because of this grouping, it is possibl'e that two CSF indications will be alarmed by one parameter.
This corrasponds to actual entry conditions for the procedures.
For example, high drywell pressure requires use of both the Containment Control and Reactor Level Control procedures.
There is no priority specified between the two procedures or CSFs, because both procedures must be followed concurrently.
Of The CSF to which the parameters are assigned is also shown in' Column " Display" of Table 1.
.x.
I
'l Other Displays - The remainder of the parameters listed in table s/
1 should be displayed in other forms on the SPDS.
Some of these are referenced in the E0P's in a form similar to "if pressure is between a.and b do" type statements, and therefore should have the actual value displayed.
This task force did not address i
whether these displays should be numerical, graphic, or otherwise.
This is left to the SPDS Display Design Format Selection Task Force with human factors -input.
These are indicated with " VAL" in the " DISPLAY" column of the tables.
Other parameters are setpoints on other instruments, such as "if parameter exceeds alarm do".
These are indicated in the table with the CSF to which they relate.
Since both the value displays and the setpoint displays are EOP-related parameters rather than entg conditions, they should not display with the same priority as the CSF parameters.
4 Summary - Table 1 has been sorted to show the CSF parameters on Table 3 and the supporting parameters on Table 4.
Tables 3 and 4 constitute the recommended display parameter set.
4 4.
Since some of the displayed parameters are actually composites of several input parameters, all the input instruments and computer data points are listed in Tables 5 through 7.
F.
COMPARISON - This parameter set (table 3 and 4) was compared with the previous SPDS set which the V&V team had reviewed, as i.
identified in Reference 8.
All parameters included in the previous set are also included in this set, with the exception of steam flow and feed flow.
Since these flows are not E0P parameters and they are backed'up by power level, which is displayed, they were not considered essential for SPDS.
- However, some of the groupings are different, and the various radiation and radioactivity parameters to be included as part of SPDS are specifically defined.
The parameter set was also compared with the NRC. comments from the pre-implementation audit and comments received by phone from l
the NRC'on 1/15/85.
All requirements have been met.
In addition, the parameter set was compared again with the.five i
functions identified in Requirement III. f, and paramete'rs 'to monitor each of the five functions in all plant conditions have i
been included.
This comparison is shown on table 8.
Operating Mode - Mode switch input is not required to be, displayed, because it is an operator function, not a plant variable subject to change.
However, because it is used in developing various different displays, it is also included as an i
input.
However, the display of mode is not stictly mode switch position, but is a composite to indicate plant mode in accordance with technical specifications.
Reactor temperature is also included for mode verification.
i
,/
In general Critical Safety Function input parameters are not disabled based on plant mode, but additional parameters may be emphasized in modes other than normal power operation.
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V example, while high drywell pressure indicat'es a definite problem during refueling, it is not a sensitive indication of loss of reactor coolant system integrity, so it is supplemented by drywell floor drain system flow in refueling mode.
Two additional examples may require clarification.
The first is source range monitor position.
Computer points C51-NC091-094 are included and provide trip signals from SRM, IRM, and APRM.
The operator is required to position the SRM's and to switch the IRM range switch to keep both of these instruments on. scale.
Therefore, any restart accident or other unintentional approach to criticality will be indicated by monitoring this point.
In addition, this same signal will detect exceedence of lower set APRM trips (flow biased or mode switch selected).
Therefore, disabling SRM input in some modes is unnecessary and would unnecessarily complicate the SPDS logic.
The MSIV isolation signal is an exception in that it is a normal CSF input but is bypassed in all modes except "RUN".
This is because the valves are normally shut in other modes.
G.
CONCLUSION - The display parameter set defined.by Tables 3 and 4, made up fran the monitored parameter set defined by Tables 5 through 7 make up a complete parameter set for SPDS implementation.
{
V.
SETPOINTS There are no setpoints developed just for SPDS except ATWS indication.
The ATWS indication is based on a scram signal concurrent with greater than 3% power (APRM not downscale).
Because for every scram from high power the power will be above 3% for a shorr period of time, a time delay must be included for this signal.
The signal should be implemented as scram.with APRM-not downscale after six seconds.
The basis for selection.of-six-seconds is as follows:
FSAR figure 15.2.2-1 indicates that power drops below 3%.
after about 2.5 seconds.
.In order to avoid false alarms, this was rounded off and doubled.
The actual timing is'not -
critical because 1) there is automatic ATWS protection, including recire pump trip and alternate rod insertion independent of SPDS and 2) the ATWS accident is relatively slow--NUREG 0640 allows a two minute time delay for SLC.
injection.
The setpoints for all other parameters are those referenced in the E0P's and justified by the EPG Calculations.
These se.tpoints are developed by the system designers and contained in the various design records and tech specs.
VI.
SOURCE SELECTION
(
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-The recommended signal source for each parameterzis existing.
. computer signals where available.
These are shown in Tables 5
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and 6.
For signals not already available in the computer, other hardware sources are recommended.
These are shown in Table 7.
The recommended source for each parameter is listed in Tables 1, 3, and 4.
Wherever practical, the signals are taken from lE, seismic qualified instruments.
This is shown on the tables as "S" in the column "SC" for source classification.
In addition, wherever there is more than one instrument for a particular parameter, all are included.
Signal processing to make the most reliable indication is covered by the SPDS Display. Design Format Task Force.
In some cases a display parameter is made up of signals from both safety-related and non-safety related instruments.
This is also indicated in the tables.
VII.
VALIDATION Although the charter of the parameter selection task force included identification of data validation schemes, this function has been reassigned to the SPDS Display Design Format task force as a result of the design review.
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REFERENCES
(_,7 1.
Y-25633, NRC SPDS Pre-Implementation Audit IP Corrective Action Plan (CAP), dated December 17, 1984, P07-84 (12-17)-L 2.
NRC Generic Letter No. 82-33, Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 -
Requirements for Emergency Response Capability, dated December 17, 1982 3.
Guidelines for an Effective SPDS Implementation Program, INPO 83-003 (NUTAC), January, 1983 4.
Clinton Power Station Emergency Plan, Revision.4, 12/15/84 5.
Compliance Report, Regulatory Guide 1.97 (Rev.3), Revision 1, November 1983 6.
Fundamental Safety Parameter Set for Boiling Water Reactors, NSAC 21, December 1980 7.
SPDS Parameter Validation Schemes, Y-73949, December 18, 1984 8.
Clinton Power Station Safety Parameter Display System Parameter Set Validation Report 1
~
9.
Operating Procedures Generation Package, U.0708,
()
mergen 10.
Responses to NRC Questions Regarding Emergency Operating Procedures Generation Package, U-0755, October 24, 1984 l'l.
" Pre-Publication Draft of Revision 3 of BWR Emergency Procedure Guidelines", SROG-8262 of December 22, 1982.
12.
NRC letter L505-83-ll-045 of November 23, 1983, " Safety Evaluation of ' Emergency Procedure Guidelines, Rev.
3".
13.
NUREG-0835, Draft October 1981, " Human Factors Acceptance Criteria for the Safety Parameter Display System."
14.
EPRI OEI Document 8304-1, Draft revision OC, August, 1984,"
Graphic Display Development Program."
e O
.--,w-c-_-.---,y-,
+,
,-.----,-,y--
SPDS PARAMETER SELECTION FLOW CHART 2- ' TECH SPEC
^
M VALUES EOP E PLAN RG 1.T1 NSAC 11 2 REFERENCED EXAMPLE TYPE AEB gyER PARAMETERS CONDITIONS PARAMETERS SET (TAsi.sa i
EPG's A
~
\\/'
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_NRC_
APPROVED TOTAL LIST FOR REVIEW AND SELECTION (TABLE O BWROG EPG's
~\\/
. Rams YES WNY s
8s EXEMPT EVEPfPTION OPERATOR WALKgogGH O
FACTORS REVIEW
\\/
i FINAL PARAMETER SET IS gojRA yER go g
y canariu V
\\ /
~~
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(73gte g l
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APPENDIX A O
KEY TO SPDS PARAMETER TABLES
\\s /
(applies to tables 1 and 3-7)
COLUMN CONTENTS AND/OR EXPLANATION Requ't Number of procedure or other source in which parameter is listed Parameter Description of parameter Value Value of parameter significant to procedure Related Parameters Other parameters referenced in conjunction
-with principle Type Whether the parameter and value are entry conditions to a procedure (E) or are follow-on parameters and values (F)
Display Indicates display recommendation or exemption EXM -indicates that the parameter is not included in the recommended SPDS parameter set.
Appendix B is a table of.the justifications for the exemptions.
CSF indicates a recommendation for including in a 6-Critical Safety Function as follows:
LVL - Reactor Water Level Control CNMT - Containment Control RCTY - Reactivity Control HYDN - Combustible Gas Control RAD - Secondary Containment / Radiation Release ADD-indicates a recommendation for displaying the parameter other than as CSF VAL - Display the value LVL, CNMT, RCTY, HYDN, RAD - included in supporting displays for CSFS above.
Source Indicates recommended' source of signal as follows:
Computer signals - by function ID
~~
Hardware signals - by instrument number r
SC Indicates safety grade of sensor and related cabling and processing S - indicates lE and seismic quality l
N - indicates non-lE or seismic B - indicates includes both IE and non-lE sensors iG i
1 r
APPENDIX A rs
.O KEY TO SPDS PARAMETER TABLES
%.J SOURCE 1.-
Reactor Power Sources - C71-DC015, 016; NOTES:
C51-DA001-4: C51-DA021-24: C51-NC-091-094 (includes SRM, IRM upscale) 2.
Reactor Level Sources - NB-DA401-405, B21-DA001-002, C34-DA007-009, C34-NA004 3.
Secondary Containment DP Sources - VA-BA201-202, VF-BA201 4.
Boron Inj ection Req' uired - made up of " reactor cannot be shutdown and suppression pool tempera-ture.
Because of subjective nature of " reactor cannot be shutdown" based on rod patterns, time-in-life., etc, the SPDS display should read
" Boron Injection Indicated" and be based on suppression pool temperature and reactor power as indicated on Graph 1 of EOP 4404.01 CM-BA001-6 and C51-DA021 Setpoint values will be provided later (Graph 1 of procedure 4404.01 is not yet issued).
5.
MSIV isolation signal is bypassed in modes other than "RUN".
(
6.
Secondary Contmt Floor Drains - SPDS dis drivenfromthesummaryalarm(E02-LCM 9900f)is l
Table 5 of E0P 4406.01 identifies the following i
required areas:
- 1LS-RF055A, B HPCS area sump
- 1LS-RF056A, B RHR-A area sump - lLS-RF057A, B RER-B area sump - 1LS-RF058A, B RHR-C area sump - lLS-RF059A, B l
RCIC area sump - ILS-RF060A, B Aux Bldg Floor Drain Sump
- lLS-RF069 l
Fuel Bldg Floor Drain Sump - lLS-RF071 Aux Bldg Floor Drain Sump is not included in the summary alarm.
Therefore it is included as a separate paramater.
7.
Containment level - SPDS display input from e
computer points SM-BA401-404.
Hardware I
instruments LT-CM260, 261 A-F (to 70 feet) not included on SPDS (EXM-C).
8.-
Drywell Floor Drain Flow is not mornally an input-to a CSF box because it is not an E0P entry condition.
However, when the plant 10 in refueling mode, it is added to the LVL CSF alarm-.
)
for greater sensitivity to loss of reactor system
/
integrity.
1 APPENDIX A i
KEY TO SPDS PARAMETER TABLES 9.
Plant Vent Monitor - Off Site Rad Rate - composed of vent stack flow times vent stack radiation plus SGTS flow times SGTS radiation -
Plant vent stack rad - ORIX-PR008 SGTS exh rad - ORIX-PR012
~ Plant vant stack flow - 0FY-VR500 SGTS flow - 0FE-VG001 i
10.
Sec Cont Area Rad - SPDS display driven from ARM /PRM summary alarm (SPS-DC001).
EOP 4406.01, table 5 includes the following areas.
Fuel Bldg exhaust-1RIX-PR006A-D Containment exhaust-1RIX-PR001A-D Contmt Fuel Xfer poci vent plan-lRIX PR008A-D E
Aux Bldg West-lRIX-ARO10 RWCU pump area-lRIX-AR0ll
+
RCIC Equip Room-lRIX-AR013 lRIX-ARO15 Fuel Xfer, Fuel bldglRIX-AR016 3
Spent Fuel Stg area-Cnmc Equip Hatch-lRIX-AR017 CRD service area-lRIX-AR018 New Fuel Storage area-lRIX-AR019
^'
Fuel Xfer iso viv. room-lRIX-AR023 Fuel b1dg Fuel handling plant-lRIX-AR036 Aux Bldg Cam-lRIX-PR018 i
Fuel Bldg Cam-lRIX-PR019 (CNTMT continuous purge - 1RIX-PR042A-D not i
yet in EOP).
[
11.
Contmt Isolation valves - composed of computer position indication points SPSDD0ll-032 indicating successful isolation.
i i
l i
l i
APPENDIX A KEY TO SPDS PARAMETER TABLES 12.
Sec Cont HVAC Diff Temp - SPDS display driven from recorder E31-R611 which is a summary alarm of the following points from EOP 4406.01 Table 5:
MSL Pipe Tunnel - lE31-N605A-D i-RHR HX A Room - E31-N600A,B RHR HX B Room - E31-N611A,B RCIC Equip Room - lE31-N603A,B RWCU Pump Room A - lE31-N613A,B RWCU Pump Room B - IE31-N614A,B RWCU Pump Room C - lE31-N613E,F 13.
Sec Contain Temp - SPDS display is driven from the i
summary alarm from recorders 1TR-CM326 and ITR-CM327 including the following points from E0P 4406.01 Table 5:
MSL Pipe Tunnel - lE31-N604A-D RHR A Room - 1TE-CM292 RHR HX A Room - 1TE-CM293 RHR B Room - 1TE-CM287 RHR HX B Room - ITE-CM288 RHR C Room - ITE-CM289 RCIC Rocm - 1E31-N602A,B RCIC Equip Area Cooler - 1E31-N603A,3 LPCS Room - 1TE-CM294 O
HPCS Room - 1TE-CM285 RWCU Pump Room A - 1E31-N621A,B RWCU Pump Room B - lE31-N622A,B RWCU Pump Room C - IE31-N621E,F MSIV Outbrd alarm - 1TE-CM317, 318 MSIV Inbrd alarm - EXM-F 1
i e
f 4
- O
~ ~-.-e.w-.-.ee
- ~
.w.w.
.. ~ -
m APPENDIX B SPDS PARAMETER DISPLAY EXEMPTION TABLE A-exempt because, although referenced in the EOP, is not in any action steps, but is in the discussion section or provided for background information C-exempt because this is a parameter that will change only as a result of operator action as a controlled evolution D-exempt because this parameter is redundant to another that will include this value F-exempt because E0P is being revised to remove this parameter G-exempt by design review based on multiple other control room indications of isolation requirements.
L-exempt from SPDS monitoring because the step in the EOP. lists options for operator actions, and this parameter is a system status for the least preferable option M-exempt because the variable is not available (eg. reactor coolant activity and boron concentration are obtained by manual sample only, there is no installed instrument to measure)
N-exempt because this variable is not. a parameter related to degraded core considerations (eg. turbine generator status)
P-exempt because this variable is not a plant variable (eg. occurrance of tornado or train. crash) r R-exempt because this parameter is a response to operator action rather p
than a changing variable (eg. did the valve shut) i S-exempt because this indicates a system condition made up of many considerations, some subjective (ie. is SLC available) b i
i I
i
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AGEr.'0.00G01 TAE!.E :
FAFMETERS #40 E..!! FCR SPOS 3ELECTIOi r
-02/11/85 RS21'T FAR/cETER VAL'JE REATED ?AR#tETERS TYPE DI5?LM SOURCE SC 4401.01 R9C**R LP!EL LEJEL 3 E
C5F-LVL NG@401-403 5
44:41 -;FfELLFRE530E 275I3 E
C5F-LVL 22!-0A003-9 5
'401.01 REACTCH<.iE55tRE 1064.7PSIG E
CSF-LVL RP-9 201,202 S
4401.01 RSCT;R
?C?M NR)3,1NCETER!rai!
E C3F.VL C7 -DC:5.:$ NT! !
4401.01 NSIV
!501ATICN E
CSF.VL NG*E 5 S
4401.01 SCRON INJECTIO4 REAIIRED F
40-RCT( NOTE 4 S
4401.0: 3RV's CYCL:NG F
ADD-LVL *i3-0C337-552 S
440!.01 R9C*0R ' EJEL INCETERMIMT F
ADD + L 52!CA05: r C E 2 3 431.01 39C CR i! VEL TCA* TO 3 4CML. 22!'4001 '40*E 2 3 4
201.01 %.s reE!3LRE 50 TO !!D3 F
ACD e t R? G 201.202 3
402.0! E ? 200L LB.'E' 6 FE T F
C4L iM-Ew-402.404 5 40:.01 INiT:!!tE4T AIR iMARABLE F
EC'-L 801.0
- Ef EL
- . T2*8EMTUR 2:2
-F ADDCL 01-9007.003 5
u0:.01. C04Ta!! CENT PRE 35 15 PS:3 F
A00-!st C'-9203-206 5
440.01
- 9C*CR 30JER eB~.r<E 3 "
F AC0@L C:1@021-024 i 301.01 tW ST:1 L'4 M01Ai!0 HISH ALATdi F
Ed-C 44:.01 0FF9s M0!.aTIO4 MIGH r.l.Ard F
E&C 441.01
.?4 ST'1 LIhE E HIGd F
EXM-C M0:.01 iTM T';AEL T2 P.;T niGd F
EM-C O
4401.31 :*SL TEF IN TF33LD n!GH F
Ec-C V
441.01 :455 !M PLE ACTIVI h!3H F
Ed-1 401.01 iCIC IISTEM AAIL4 ELE F
E01-3 J41.01 ii8C3 ff5'91 NOTAVAILABL_
F EC'-S
. 401.01 RCIC SYST91 NOT mAILABL F
Ect-i 30:.01 RX :EED PL"P C NOT AVAILr,BL F
Ed-S 301.01 iLC ?STD NOT XA!!.A!L F
Ect-3
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i 4 2.01 SL.? ?OCL LEJEL
>17'5' E
CSF-CliT SMG401.43 3
4402.01 !UPP 3 COL LEJEL
<:13'!!' '
E
!F-CliT SM-940:.403 S
302.0: -00iTAI'cEhi TEMP :22 F C3F-Otti OiG009.019 3
302.0: 3U?? : COL *?8
- 0*
F 40dA Ci-9001-4
's u02.h ?9CTORFRESSURE !0 9:
F 40% sP 20!.002 S
442.01 SUF? POOL 79tP 195 F F
ADD-VAL "It-MG01-4 3
u02.01 OR'fJEL 79'PEMTUR 240 F F
A004L Ct-M007,J03 3
4402.01 SUPP 700t. LP>EL 15 FEET F
ADD-uAL SM-M-401.403 3 442.01 CO M w iER LEJEL 73 c:::
e.d-C t40TE 7 442.01 C047'1T *2tPEMTLRE 122-195 F F
4D4L CM-9009.0:0 3
n02.01 CO M F9E55URE 1-3 F51 F
A00 4 CM S 203-206 3
402.01 SRV LIFT!N3 F
ADD-LVL ttS-DC337-i!2 3
442.J1 DRf) ELL FL ;RN :LO H!!H OSF-LVL NGTE 3 4
302.0: RCIC T M LEiEL ' LOW Ec'-3 442.0! COT 41 M Mt9 AL4H F
c-Ot*T C'9:07,709 5
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?.4E 140. M002 TAELE'1 MWETERS 40 VALUE5 FCR 3F05 3EECT:21 32/11/55 RE01'T Fa W ETER
ALLE REATED MWETERS TYFE O!3? LAY SCURCE 5
403.2: NCNE E
Em 303.31 ECRCriC34C26.
it;FFICIEJ F
Et'i 4403.01 RC:C SYS 21 AVAILABLE F
Eti4 403.01 RE4CCR FCE!EJRE 50 ?i!
F 200-4L FP-04201,202 i
303.01 IN5TR!*e4T AIR
'faVAILABLE F
EW.
403.01 EF5 F00L LEVE 6 FEIT F
+0D u L Si-M-402. 404 5 803.01 SEACOR PRE 3SURE 135 PSI F
A0D-GL R:-M201.202 3'
4403.;i REACTOR LP.EL 134 INCHE3 F
ADD,R 51:04401 t40TE 2 !
303.01 F 9CTOR PRES 5URE 17.8 F.
ADD + L AP-9231.202 5
403.31 REAC';R FRES$!.RE Is.3 F
400-#L RP-N201.202 3
4403.01 R SciCR FRE55tRE 130 F
ADD-st RP-0A20,202 3
203.01 COCLLC!da 975 100 OE3/HR F
4CD-let 333-9002 N
4403.0: :EACTOR INJ T2*P 70 lE3 F
E01-C 404.): iLC TA K LEJEL LCW F
EC-C
. AIN itRBINE '
CN-L:NE F
E#4 4404.01 304.01 5:V MORi ' AVE 3 NOT OP94 F
EQ4 404.31 1C:1-7024 CT CL. m r
Eci-R 404.31 COCRCL RCD 3 LOCK F, 400-4CTf 01:-0C;09,'j:0 i (A) u s.0; ECp04 InJEC 9 F
Em-1 404.01 iSCCR ICRat PW3,IN0ETERt!?aiE E'
C3F-sCTf C7:-0C15,:4 7612 U
404.31 CCC10L ROSS tt0T ALL IN WITi' 3CFe E
Ec4 405.01 af0ROGEi 1%
E CSF-ifCN C1-39901.902 S
uC6.01 LIQ 7#,0WA3TE ACTIV Alt.Ri E
E41-0 406.01 FLi !!RV WiR ACT ALA01 E
E01-E 406.01 3ECGiMRY C3T CP.!25
CSF-90 NOTE 10 306.01 0FFiITE M3 MTE ALE:T LEJE E
- 3F-40 v0 E ?
1 40s.31 FiEL 3'J:'2 NG OF.:25
- E
- 3F-93 tf-920!
N 303.01 SEC CO.T WAC ST A!,ARi E
CIF-40 NCE :2 3
304.01 IEC CO CAIN TE"?
LADi E
CSF-90 NCTE 13 i
806.01 !EC COC AREA FAD ALAR 1 E
C3F-40 NOTE 13 N
u06.31 3EC CO C FL ;A L9) HIGH HIGH E
C3F-40 10! 6
- i 20c.31 7'JEL E05 @ C lS0!.ATD F
Ecd-i
~
30e.): !!37 itSTEd Mt'T iTART E0t-!
40:.01 50 !!?> 4TR MD ALARM E
Eet-E 40s.]! Fi.EL ?L' 3 WTR 90 ALARN E
Ec-E 40a 01 CD R 31 AIR IN 90 ALA41 E
Ed-P CE3 M O M ELL G4fm ACT ALARr1 A00-4) CM-M705.906 3
N 9C 21 CCRE ELOW ADD-RCTY 233NA001 N
NSAC 21 LSK ISOLATIGI REGulsED E014 NOTE !!
3 NSAC 21 MCCE SW FCSITION SEE TEXT C714000!-304 3 NSAC 21 ?9IM CCOL ACTIVITY Eci 'i NSAC 21 SOURCE *-44GE N041T ALD-4L C:10A001-4.7-13 N NSAC !! 3CURCE eM GE PC31T E?-R 79 1.77 02G ISO 1.'1 P051T 200-Ot1T iF9-?D011-033 i ex r
\\u -}
.=
+..o+
emew..-m m...
-w%e_.
-as-..
TABLE 2 (f
Comparison of NSAC 21 Parameters with Clinton EOP Parameters Corresponding CPS EOP Parameters NSAC 21 Parameters Average Power Range Monitor Reactor Power Core Flow NOTE Drywell Floor Drain Sump Drywell Floor Drain Flow Drywell Pressure Drywell Pressure Drywell Temperature Drywell Temperature Hydrogen Concentration Hydrogen Leakage Isolation Demand NOTE Offsite Radiation Rate Main Stack Monitor Mode Switch Position NOTE Plant Ventilation Monitor Offsite Radiation Rate Containment Air Particulate Primary Containment Activity Primary Coolant System Activity NOTE Reactor Pressure Primary Coolant System Pressure Reactor Level Primary Coolant System Water Level Safety / Relief Valve Positions SRV Lifting Scram Demand Signal Scram Secondary Containment Pressure Secondary Containment DP L
NOTE Source Range. Monitor Source Range Monitor Position NOTE Suppression Pool Level Suppression Pool Level Suppression Pool Temperature Suppression Pool Temperature
() NOTE:
Each parameter that was not already listed on table *1 from the EOPs was added to t.ible 1 for consideration in the SPDS parameter selection process.
i Q
m\\
'\\
/-
,V 4Gi140. 00001 TA!LE 3 Cn! TIC /.L MFFFf PJtCT!Ci P4ME*is5 02/11/35 i
P
?AFWtETIR GL';E A00!TICat 03401T:013 7tPE 015FLM
$0LRCE 30 02CAIPMNT T91P 122 F E
C3F-CF' Ci-kC09,010 3
CRY 4LLPRESSLRE 2 PS!3 E
03F-CeT 321-M008-?
O M ELL TDPE.4TUR 135
- E CSF-CMT C1-%007.038 iUPP P0CL LEVEL
>t9'5' E
C5F-Cet 9t-3MJ!.403 i
EUpa POOL LElfi (19'!!'
E C3F-CNT SHM01.403 iLPP F00L T9'P 95 F E
057-CNT Ct-9001-4 3
et*C224 1%
CSF-W:N C1-9 501,?02 l m ELL FL l31 FLG H!3H F
C3F-i;'!L 240iE 3 to C M ELL P9E12"*E 282!3 E
CSF-LVL 821-0A003-8
.13IV
!SCL9715 i
CiF.'VL N0i! 5 i
FE4C R 5:541 PJR)2.IN !~ER'It45 i
C3F.'t.
C71-00:!,!6 NT! 9 8GC*C1 '.EsE LE E 3 i
CIF.VL Na-M401-403 3
89CTOR 78553'.8E 1044.7PSIG i
C5F-LVI. ".P-04201,202 F.E EL 3 M 99C UF41 i
- !F-4 0 NGi! IG 3
Fi.!L iu!LON P
.:25-E C3F-4 D VF-!4231 N
'!F:31 ! 40 472 ALERT L9)E i
C37-4 0 NOT! ?
N
!!: :C.i iE4 is 0 G m i
037-4 0 NCTE ;0
!!; :CC FL CR ' ~1 HIGH M!3H E
C37-40 4CT! i s
SIC 007 W/C OT 68*
E C1 -4 0 NC*E 2 i
t V
C37-40 90*E 13 3
!E m %Rf Cmf DP.125*
E C3F-40 W - 9 201 N0*E 3 N
.29CIC2 SC?#1 PJR)3,1NDETE9titait i
C;F8 Circ 71-00!!, lint!3 9
e
,e n
y
(]h
(
~
7 GE tiG. 00001 TABLE 4 speg ogsptAy was mm459 12/12/i5 WLUE 0!SP'JfS i
PAMMETH PWISE
$0U9CE S
RELATED C
CSFs C NTAlteENT PoES$URE
-!-+45* SIS C'-M203-206 S CFT.PA0 CCiTAlfetNT TEMPEbTLRE 40 200 OEGREE3 F C1-9010 S Cdst,W SUPPRE3 SIC 4 POOL LEVEL 6-22 FEET NOTE 7
$ CMT.LVL,R D CCRE E'JJ 01007.
932t&001 N LVL j
l % ELL TP?EMTL95 40-3!0 CEGPE!3 F C1-k007 i 'J:17,LVL,1CTf 8t#4T VENT t*C41TCR 0-50 C/SEC 40TE 8 N W
?!ACTCH LP/EL FJLL MNGE !NCP!3 NE-t*401-5 NOTE 2
! LVL,8CTf (r~LEL2*E-#$57)
SOURCE MNGE TO 105 " C51-04001-4 CE ! 9 L7..RC'Y iBCTORP8Ei!UAE 0-!!03PSIG iP-N201-2 3 OcT.LVL,8C*f SUP88Ei310N POOL T PP 20-200 CEEREES F C1-94001-4 5 LVL.;C*r RE4TCRiPPEMILPE 50a00CEGREEiF
!33d8002 ti LLL.iCTY Sp*RY 0!SPLAf3 Q
84T**ETER WL';E SCLRCE i
C v/
BORC4 NECTIM INCICATED NCTE 4
$ L'A,RCTf CCNTMT !$0LATIC4 WL'JE3 703! Tim SP3-000! H 32 3 CMT.L%.9CTf C E 0L #00 BLOCX C11d4017A.B 3 L % RCTY SW POSIT!W 195-0C837152
$ C M,L % 7CTY O M ELL E O SIN FLOJ HIGH RF-i4301 N L % 1CTf CST n! MGE **tw ALAAM Cf M107,133
$ CM.40
- E ELL -l % GE *,4tw ALMi C1-510! *05 i
0.T.FAO 1
f
((
W4
---e+--
w-wi.
ow-eM-,-
r='
-Wnr~Mye..Me m+----vv--w'4
--+-?-e-+r-+Tp
+m.
_-&-t-WM-Mma----er e-e-&
Me
- - -"m"
+ -- +
,-m.
(
)
l MiNO.00001 TABLE 5 LIST OF #4 LOG CATA EA!LA2LE 01 C3189fEK t
E 11/i!
o
?M,WETD
- wGE t74175 CJtCT!34 SENSCR 3EN50RCL 4 H PNIR LE!EL CH A 0-125
% Pit C:::A321
!C!:46;!!V 3
4 :N % I3 LE/EL CH 9 3-!!!
- 7.R C!!0A022
- C:!-<60!D i
48;t PNIR LE/E CH C 0-125
%PL R C!109022 1C!1-63!D
- ? F04G LP/EL Ch 3 3-:~!
P4R C:!CA024
- 051-m !EY 3
Aux iLOG NE D!F: PFE!! 2 lN 920 VA-!A202 OP0Y-w4!!
N awl iLOS ?fJ DIF~ 78!53 2 IN M23 u-!A20!
OP"Y44010 4
OM & :J 42 C74 CEC HO Ot-SA?tt n-0112!
3 OM & % 42 CO:02ii 3-!0 01-9902
- UCl2i 3
OM AER TEiP e H 50 CE3 F CM-M037
!*f-C'2!i CM AER TP8 4 H !0 CE; F C' Moto
- r-O'2!?
3
..;0if 8C* ECCk (SN !U ELC3 1C:1-CA0C7 C11-Ns0:A 3
l0F E00 E0CX L5N '.'!U 800iLOCX 1C11-9013 1C1!-Na029 3
- k.EL *tii!Li!
M ti!3 521kOCs
- 321sia*4 1
li?.E. 281!E:E M
PS!3 22:*-009
!!!!s468Ji i
% e tim ';IRT?c 20-!!C
?!iF 01-1-001 17-C'2!!
i N G EL?,AER??P 4H!)
CE3 F 01-9007 13-0'2!4 S
S FL 8 P H'/'8 :LN 0 :!
P*
- F-i W 1
- La ~138 9
- .**!!!.RI lM)
- !:4 CM-9221
- -? Si 3
7y C.E' E;5 ::~: ::E!3 2
- N 23 t"-920:
FOM':~45 4
- S'. 4;IAT:044 1-:21
?W C170A001
- 017s#00 A i
lC)
N!'. :4!ATIOi i
- -:Ei MOH 3:7:a002
- ,17s40:33 S
~SL 90!Aii0s C 1-tis MR/'4 017%03 1017*003C i
-S'.?A0!Ai!013 1-:E6 MR 'H O!7".,A004 1:17 N0033 i
W*> ME t 'JR.';L - J-s3
- .109E3 ;34 CMC 7
- C34-4004
'I W 3N kO! U iJE Lu 8 0-s0 DiCH!i C34 M 03
!C34s4:43 N
W8.N NE a '/1 LVL C 0-:0 INC:Ei C34NOC)
!C Js4004C N
- . w.e. ::::: c.:.
- 9.. w
- 4
%.wm..
.. a.n a
- P' OM *:!!Ei!
20 20 i>
O' iC 4 l Of0!!
i
- P CM 7'EEEsE Fi:A 0'-iA20!
?T 'M it S
71:M OM 88!!!LE!
- 3 25 Pi!A Ot-!a234
!PTC032 3
28!:1 O M PAD it0i!TC1 1 -10!7 UHR 01-iA905
?!-21!9 5
8tM OM "A0 s0ili:2 1-1017 V9 CN-9M6
!?!-010!0 29::1 O M CAO N0iliCR l-10E7 8#9 0'- 9 907
!?!-?til i
- 8:P CM 90 t'341TC9 1-!0E7 wa Ot.iAc0!
- g.0.h2 i
29C**1 Wii) Li,E NO poi! C3 4 034 1C24 '40thi N
IN 08AIN LD.E ??8
!0 s20
- E3 F 1323s4002 332H0~2 N
- ?> Psi 33LREA 0 1!30 P113 2
- -9201 192:s40?M i
RP) 78Ei!URE 3 0 !!30 PS!3 AP-CA202
!B2:-N0719 k 4TR LE/EL FUEL 201E A -1! - !0 IN H2O NS-M404 19214044C N
O iTR LSJE FUEL lCNi 3 150 !J IN d20 h8-M405 1321s40R0 N
W '#2 LEsEL alDE M A
!aJ - $0 D1'423 NS-9401 1921-N021A S
U uia LP/IL 'JI;E %0 1
-140 - s3 lN w:0 N8-CA402
- 32
- -NCi!9 3
0.#2 LE/EL 'JICE M D 130 - 60 21 H2O N H A403 1921N3313 3
9 iTR LLL - ! HUT:0Ji 1-400 DDii 22:0:001 122:s4027 N
O WiiLvt 'J1;E M
-!s) s]
NCwii 12:40:2 132:-tsil; em im 4 L:3 ;>Jii 4f1
.-iis
- ?!
- !! M at
- C!! <a09 N
(
l
- i:::*
.C: - a i!;04
- !:>007
- !;-as;:-
-4 c
/%.
k.
~4GE NO. 20002 TABLE 5 LIST OF M.LCG WA A%:LABLE C4 C:MPUTER 02/11/95 T4MPETER MNGE WITS FlNCT!24 SENSCR SENSCR CL 32 9 LOG CGNT MTE
.1-1E6 CPS C510A002
- C51-K6009 N
Sm 9 PERICO
-100 - 10 SEC30 C51 W 08 tC51-M6009 N
!!IM C LC6 COWT MTE
.1-tE6 CPS C51DA003 1051-K600C N
5 2 C PERIOD
-100 - 10 SEC20 C510A007 1C51-X400C H
Sm 0 LO6 COWT MTE
.!-!E6 CPS C510A004 1C51-M4000 N
i9t0FERIOD
-100 - la SEC340 C510A010 IC11-X6000 N
3"PP POOL BULX 4'ER TEMP 40-250
'0ES F Ot-M005
!!Tf-252 S
t SLPP POCL SUL4 AER TDP 40-253 OES F CH-5A006
!!TY-253 S
3LPPPOOLLEEL 100-200 IN H2O SM-M401 ILT-9t014 S
SUPP PCOL LEEL 0-100 IN H2O SM-9A402 l'.T-iN0!!
1 3'JPF P00L LP/EL 100-200 IN H2O SM-M403
!LT-3M0!6 S
SU8P PCOL LE!!L
.0-100 lN H2O SM-9404 ILT-iMC17 S
l'JPP PCCL TEMP G AD 1 0-100 LEGF CM-M00!
SL'FP PCCL T2*P GSD 2 0-200 OEG F Ct-M002 ITE-cmc!2 S
iGFPOOLTEMPOWD3 0-300 DEG F Ot-M003 1TE-CMC 53 S
!UPP P0OL TE 9 0 $0 4 H00 CES F C1-9004
!TE-Ot054 S
TOTAL CORE F.34 0-100 ML95/H 933%001 15334612 N
qu o
+
\\
++w
+.,,
,,.. +
l%) '
'%/.
PAGENO.00001 TABLE 6 LIST CF DIGITAL DATA AVAILABLE CN CmPUTER 02/11/95 PARMETER SETPOINT FINCT!@l SOURCE S2iSCR CL AM/PM !!!?%RY ALAM SPSDC001 150 M VE SP 1 INBOARD Shui 5P500010 150 M VE GP 1 CUT 50ARD SHUT SPSD0012
!!C MVE i? 10 INBMAD SHUT 57500029 150 MVE GP 10 OUTSOARD SHUT SPSDD030
!!0 MVE GP !! IN80ARD SHUT SPSD0031 150 MVE GP !! OUT30ARD SHUT SPSD0032
!50 VALVE GP 2 Ih2 M D SHUT S7500013 ISO MVE GP 2 CUTBMRD SHUT SPSD0014
!!G MVE SP 3 IN60ARD SHUT
$P500015 130 M VE GP 3 CUTB0ARD SHUT SPSDD016 ISO MVE 3P 4 INBMRD SHUT SP500017 130 M VE GP 4 OUT30ARD SHUT SPSDD018 ISO VALVE GP 5 INBCARD SHUT SP500019 130 M VE GP 5 0UTB MRD SHUT SP3DD020 ISO MVE GP 6 IN9%AD SHUT SPS00021 150 M VE 3P 6 0UT90APD SHUT 57500022 ISO M LE GP 7 IN8 M AD SHUT SPSCD023 (y
ISO M VE GP 7 CUTB MAD SHUT SP500024
(
)
150 MVE GP 3 !NiMAD SHUT SPSD0025 150 MVE SP 3 OUTEMRD SHUT 5P500026 ISO VALVE GP 9 IN8 MAD SHUT SPS00027
!!O M VE GP 9 CUT 30ARD SHUT SPSD0029 MCDE SWITCH SHUTD0lJ4 C710C001 C71A-501 MODE WITCH
- REPJEL C7100002 C7!A-501 3
MODE 9JITCH I/'J+0T 3TSY C7100003 C7:A-301 3
G E SWITCH 8tN C71DC004 C71A-501 3
- .EUT: m t @ ITOR SYST21 TRIP C!1NC91 iRM M,4PCM 3
NEUTRW M741TDR SYST21 TRIP C5NC72 iRM,Im. APM 3
NEUT M M2ilTOR $1ST21 TRIP C!!NC93 SRM,IP,APDM S
NEUT M MONITCR SYST21 TRIP C31NC94 3RM,1H,ADH R SCRM SYS 1/4 TRIP.
C710C015 1C71A-CCI 3
D SCRM SYS 2/3 TRIP C710C016 1C71A-001 3
U STEM LINE A FL3J HIGH E31NC001 E31-N036A4 S
U STEM LINE 9 RN HIGH E3!NC002 E31-N097A-3 3
E STEM LINE C Fi3J
.41GH E31tC03 531-'40254-0 3
E STEM LINE D FL3J HIGH.
E31NC004 E31-M89A-D S
SM CK I CP94 MS4C337 IB21-F0478 S M C R 10 CPEN MS4CS44
!B21-F041A S
S M C R !!
OP94 MS-DC847 1921-F0513 S
SM CR 12 OP9i MS-DC848 IB21404tL SM CR 13 CP94 MS-DCS49 1921-F047C 3
SM CR 14 CP94 MS-DC850 1521-F0416 3
SM CR 15 OPel MS4C351 IS214051C 3
i M C R 16 CP24 MS-DC352 1911-F041C S
3MCR2 CF24 MS4C333 1921-F0419 3
y, iM CR 3
- P24 M5-00337 IS21 ~B519 i
... ~ - -........
1 4
\\
4 1
i:
MGENO.00002 TABLE 5 LIST CF O!GITAL DATA Ata!LaBLE 04 C;PJTER i.
02/11/55
~
i l-PARMETER SET?SINT FLNCTI@l
$3tiRCE
$24S",R CL l.
2' SM CR 4 OP94 MS-CS40 1921-F041F S
SM CR 5 CP94 NS-DC241
!!21-F047F 3
j:
. 5M CR 6 CPei MS-DC342 1921-F0410 S
f-
. SM CR 7 CP94 MS-0C343 132! :0470 S
3M CR 9 CPEN MS-LCS44 IB21 :0!!D 5
l eM CK ?
C?el MS-0C345 IS21-:047A S
t-I e
ij j'
i 3-4 l7 i
i
~
l6 r
I a
i I
l i
L 9
I b
t f
.+. -
-C-N98"@ y 9-PWp' T't
^mWMW
.ww-*-
-N--- - - - - - - - - - - - ' ' ^ ^ - - - ^ ^ ^ " '
l i
i.
t, -
4 1-i a
43E.'40. 00C01 TABLE 7A O!SITAL MENARE SISAL SCll?.CES FOR 3FDS OU:!/i!
s
?AkcETEs-SET?0hT ILEGIFICATICN SAFETY CL i
C 3L:3 P.R DRN LVL HIGH
!L3-nF049 N
- w. OMT DIFF TEMP MIGH 1E31-R411 5
SEC C PT T9 fEcATl!RE 91GH ITR-01326,327 3
j
!!C CeT SLMP LBJEL HISH E02-!Ct99-007 3
u.
I-t I,
4 -
1 l,
U:5NO.2000:
T'!LE 73 iMLOG 4:CW.RE SISMLS FOR SM5 02/:!;f5 i
1 t
4?R'ETER I:24TIFICAT;24 iAFET( CL' CATA i.*EET
?E'.cR<$
=
1 8 A G STACK FLOW 0FY-/R503 N
3C521 t
?.mi'26 $~ACK M0 GRIX 3A000 3
iST! EXWST FL34 0FT-4G001 N
F521 1-P l
2.
I l
i-1 t
i I
i E
k l
1 I
-'NW.
- &e.e-O--.e-
--.__m'-vdr.,,
w wWW Vw-F mC F T ew-v N.
.=a+y+.y+q-g-P-ey
~A2LE a RELAT 7tSh!? IETI.E24 SELECTED SPOS FAP/cETERS, NLsEG-P37 PliCT 249 40 FL+T OFEMT:hG C240!TI243 q
k O
\\M 2 Lei NOTAL FCUER STARitP WOT COL 3 REFLELU4G ACO:024T total LIST
. COE OFiMTICN SHbTCO' 4 ShcT00J4 0F 4 W ETERS J
W EE-0737 F3tCT121 EEACT M TY that Ncn Tris Neut Non Trip Nest Non THp Neut Nen Tr 314ut Non Tria Neut Nen Trip Neut non Trip ATWS signal AT2$ signal
)E power
)E ;mer
)3 :cwer
) E power Roc clocx e ?:wer 191
- Power 191
- Paar 191 * ?ser fue
- ?ser 191 for:n rea's ) E power Roo bicct Scren req's
- Power 191 * ?:wer 191 s
99CTCH CCRE Reacter water Reacter water React:r water React:r water Reactor water Peact:r water ea: tor water COOLING M D len!3 leal 3 leni 3 le al 3 len! 3 len! 3 len) 3 PRI M f MGT
- Rx ute :vi
- Rx wtr 191
- Rx wtr 191
- Rx wtr 191 + 3x wtr lui e Rx ute lvi + Rx wtr lui
- EG2L iSCTCA Rx water 191 Rx uator Iv! Rx watte 191 Rx water 191 Fx water 171 Rx water 191 Rx water bl CLST StSTEN ix press Rx press Rx press N F! Den Flo N FiDrn Flo Rx ;ress ax cress 2CEi;ITf Ornell
- ress Ornell press SW :osit
- Rt pressare Ornell cross Ornell :ress Ornell tmp Crr. ell no N F10 n Flo
.trywell tems Drywell tus
!W :s:t SW :csit
+ Rs ressure
!W sosit iW ses!!
N FiDen Fio N FIDen Flo N FILen Fi: N F: Ora Flo
+ ix sressure + ix Oressare
- ix ;ressue. + fx :ressure (m
- A0
- 0AC-F3 exh vent 53 ere vent F3 exn nnt F5 exa vent Fi exn ont F3 exa nnt
~9 exn ont I M Tf Fuel Oleg 0/P Foi bic; 0/P Fuel :lcg D/P Fuei 21:9 0/P Fuel blag 0/P Fuel 01:9 0/P Fuel :!:; 0/P 02CROL CHst raa rate 0Hst rac rate 0Hst raa ratt0Hst raa rateCHst raa rateCHit ras rate 0Hst rad rate
~ SecC area rac iecC area rad Sec0 area raa SecC area rad SecC area rac tecC area ra: iecC area rao SecC F0en lui tect FDrn 191 SecC F0en ivl Sec0 FDrn 191 Sec0 FDrn 191 Sect FD M lil SecC FDen Ivi Sec0 WAC D/* iec0 WAC D/T SecC HuAC O/T Sec0 MC D/T Secc WAC 3/T 3ect MC 0/T SecC CC D/T 3ecCat ten Sec5t tens Sec5 t tens 3echt im: 3echt reso fec ht t m lec5: tee SecSt 0/2 SecSt 0/P Secut 0/P Sec6t 0/a 3eccat 3/P tec5t 0/P iecht 0/?
N F Orn Fio 02 :!;rn Flo CO.*AIN-Hycregen Scre;en herogen Weregen heregen 9er: gen W:rogen
- 2 47 Samt im Cent.1t temo katst tms Orroll :ress Crv. ell press Cen nt tens hatst teco Orynit ;tess Orroll :rtss Orvaell sress sacs :cci 191 iu;: : col !vi Orywe!! :ress Deroit ;ress Orml1 tmo Orwell tems Deroll tems C:nnt ;i;-:a Sn.mt pra Ornell tmo Or-ol' tet:
iuss cool 191 c:3 3:01 191 isto 3:o1 bl 6 t :50 vivs b t iso vivs Su:; sce! 171 !u:: scot :ul
- ;; ::t tenosa:o acci tesiu:p :::t ten i.:: :coi tmei::p 3:ci tus Satat gamea Conet ;ama Damt ganna Samt gacna Connt ;ma S t 150 vivs S t iso vivs M t iss vivs S t iso vivs b t iso alvs J
- Indicates actual value normally displayed in addition to att.or alari unctices m
-.~.
-. ~ _. _
g w
-aws.-9.
ATTAeMMENT # y O
CLINTON POWER STATION SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM DI!! PLAY FORMATS DESIGN TASK FORCE EVALUATION RESULTS O
CPS R. O. Snelson M. Hollinden TPT R. Considine PRELIMINARY Jan 28, 1985 PRELIMINARY REV1 FEB 7, 1985 O
FINAL REV2 March 26, 1985
O
SUMMARY
During an NRC, Human Engineering Review Factors Branch, pre-implementation audit of the Clinton Power Station - Safety Parameter Display System, some concerns were expressed about the CRT displays and input parameter selection. Illinois Power, Clinton Pcwor Station responded by performing several coordinated studies to address and correct any identified problem areas.
This report gives the background, methodology, evaluation, conclusions and corrective action recommendations developed by the SPDS Display Format Task Force.
The task force concluded that the audited ~SPDS Display would need to be revised and several supporting critical safety function displays would be needed. These displays were developed, algorithms written and a display structure developed.
O i
[N TABLE OF CONTENTS
(
P,_ age, Section Title a
Summary i
Table of Contents 11 List of Figures 111 List of Appendices iv 1.0 BACKCROUND 1-1 2.0 METHODOLOGY 2-1 2.1 Ceneral 2-1 2.2 Document Review 2-1 2.3 Criteria Development 2-1 2.4 Cround rules for Task Team 2-2 Activities and Resulta
3.0 CONCLUSION
S 3-1 4.0 IMPLEMENTATION 4-1 4.1 Ceneral 4-1 0
4.2 SPDS Display System Structure 4-1 4.3 SPDS Display System Signal 4-1 Processing 5.0 DISLAYS 5-1 5.1 Ceneral 5-1 5.2 SPDS Summary Display 5-1 5.3 Critical Safety Function Displays 5-1 5.4 SPDS Display Algorithm 5-1 Determination 6.0 ALCORITHMS 6-1 6.1 Ceneral 6-1 6.2 Ceneric Display Algorithms 6-1 6.3 Critical Safety Function 6-5 Algorithms
7.0 REFERENCES
7-1 O
11
LIST OF FIGURES Finure No.
Title
- Pag, 1-1 Task Force Flow Chart 1-2 2-1 Criteria - SPDS Display Structure 2-3 2-2 Criteria - SPDS Suemary Display 2-4 2-3 Criteria - SPDS CSF Displays 2-5 2-4 Evaluated SPDS Display 2-6 4-1 SPDS Display System Structure 4-4 l
4-2 SPDS Display System Signal Processing 4-5
" PRELIMINARY DRAWINGS" 0F DISPLAYS 5-1 SPDS Summary Display 5-2 5-2 SPDS Level Control / Reactivity 5-3 l.
5-3 SPDS Containment control Display 5-4 5-4 SPDS Radiation Release 5-5 O
6-1 Procedure 1: Analog 6-7 l
6-2 Procedure 2: Analog 6-8 6-3 Procedure 3: Digital 6-9 6-4 Procedure 4: Analog Single Parameter l
O 111 l
_.___.___m_..
I O
1.0 BACKGROUND
V i
i In December 1984 the NRC Human Factors Engineering Review Branch reviewed the Clinton Power Station (CPS) Safety Parameter Display System. During the review they expressed some concern about the 1
CRT displays, the process used to develop the displays and input 1
parameters selected in support of the displays. Illinois Power 1
(IP) has roeponded by performing several coordinated studies of the 1,
SPDS to address and correct all problem areas identified by the NRC as follows:
j SPDS Parameter Selection CRT Color Codes SPDS Operator Experience Review l
SPDS Display Design SPDS Verification and Validation i
Thie report covers the results of the Task Force set up to resolve problems associated with the SPDS Display Format. The Task Force consisted of members from NSED Computer Engineering, Plant 3
Technical Staff (Operations). Torrey Pines Technology (Human Factors) and NSED Engineering as needed. The following individuals i
were designated members of this Task Team.
MEMBER ORGANIZATION I
i Richard O. Snelson NSED Computer Engineering
- 4 Max Hollinden Plant Technical Staff Dr. Charles Hopkins Univ of ILL, Human Factors Specialist Rett Considine Torrey Pines Technology
(
Human Factors Specialist t
Fig. 1-1 shows the flow diagram for the task force activities.
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1 Para =cter CRT Color Operator SPDS duman Selection Code Study Experience Format Factors Review Selection i
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Evaluate Task Force Results
.h Revise Display
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!~ Verification &
Validation i
TASK FORCE FLOW CHART FIGURE 1-1 1-2
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2.0 METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
(
2.1 General The task force utilized a structured "apriori" approach to evaluate the SPDS display requirements as outlined below and described in this section.
Document review, section 2.2 Criteria development, section 2.3 Evaluation auction 2.4 Derive conclusions, section 3.0 Formulation of display formats, section 4.0 2.2 Document Review r
The task force reviewed cypropriate documents noted in section 7.0 to ensure that any new display criteria would be based on consideration of the display concepts of existing designs and utilize techniques familiar to BWR reactor operators. The documents, references 1 through 10, were prepared for the NRC and deal specifically with human factors or BWR safety parameter display systems.
.2.3 Criteria Development O
The task force developed the following criteria for display formatting:
1.
The SPDS should provide concise displays of critical plant variables to the operator. In addition these displays should-provide information for the reactor operator to:
Detect Problems: show, through a top level' display, the relative status of the Critical Safety Functions (CSF).
Locate Problems show, through a hierarchial display selection, where a problem is developing or where there is a problem.
Correct Problems: show, through system flow diagrams the status of systems so that corrsceive actions can be developed and executed.
2.
The SPDS should make use of the plant computer to provide the reactor operator with support information.
Figure 2-1, SPDS Display Structure, is a block diagram showing the functional relationship of one SPDS display page to another.
3.
A set of fundamental criteria were developed for the top level SPDS Display (Figure 2-2) and the mid-level Displays (Figure 2-3).
2-1
n'( )
2.4 Ground Rules for Task Team Activities and Results The task force evaluated the SPDS Display (Figure 2-4) using the criteria developed in section 2.3 and the CPS guidelines described in the Corrective Action Plan (CAP), reference 14. Specific areas addressed in response to the CAP are:
1.
Consider various means of presenting the SPDS Parameter Set to the operators (retain as much of the display as possible).
RESULT (S)
The SPDS Display was evaluated using the criteria developed in section 2.3 and the.NRC concern about legibility of the CSF status boxes, and preliminary information on parameter selection. Significant revisions will be required.
2.
Evaluate various alternate display formats, including:
RESULT (S)
- Second page; a second, mid-level set of displays will be required.
- Automatic paging to support E0P display format; at present manual paging is the recommended method to link the CRT displays.
- Methods of alerting the operator to changing conditions:
O dynamic displays, color change and pattern recognition are methods that are compatible with the present hardware and software. Preliminary top level display formats have been evaluated to take maximum advantage of these methods.
3.
Review CRT hardware to resolve NRC concerns on resolution.
RESULT (S)
The task team examined and evaluated the clarity of the displays on the control room CRTs. The control room CRTs have been operating for about six years, the image has significantly degraded below the quality of the image produced by the simulator CRTs.
It is recommended that the control room CRTs be upgraded.
Concern was expressed that the upgrade take place prior to the DCRDR evaluation of the CRTs. A DCRDR human factors review of the existing CRTs would require a Human Engineering Deficiency (HED) to be written against them, ultimately ending in their being upgraded, or being an open item in the DCRDR Safety Evaluation Report.
4.
Perform the work within the framework of the existing computer system.
RESULT (S) n' The work performed by the task force has taken into account the present hardware and software. All of the work performed by the task force has been evaluated by the appropriate NSED Computer Engineering department personnel and is considered achievable.
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5 DETECT TOP 4
PROBLEM LEVEL (Primary)
DISPLAY
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SYSTEM LEVEL CORRECT DISPLAYS PROBLEMS (Detailed Diagnosis}
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Reactor Vessel Level Control CNMT: Containment RCTY: Reactivity Control 4
H -GAS: Hydrogen 2
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SPDS DISPLAT STRUCTURE
- CRITERIA -
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TOP-LEVEL DISPLAY CRITERIA The SPDS top level displays shall:-
1.
Show the safety status of the Critical Safety Functions.
o 2.
Show all Critical Safety Functions in a single display.
3.
Show the Critical Safety Functions arranged in order of importance.
4.
Use pattern recognition techniques.
5.
Use color coding to show a change in state.
6.
Use parameter limit marks..
7.
Show the plant mode.
i; 8.
Respond to normal, accident, and transient sequences.
9.
Identify each Critical Safety Function.
10.
Be a unique format.
- 11. Designate the next level display to go to.
12.
Show time and system updating.
~
j Note: These criteria for the SPDS Summary Display list the unique, or troublesome, areas. It is intended that the display also conform to the other criteria and conventions used on the CPS CRT displays.
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MID-LEVEL DISPLAY CRITERIA The SPDS mid-level displays shall:
1.
Show the input parameters used to derive the SPDS Summary Display input. This is not the instrument input. It is the most reasonable (accurate) calculation of several inputs.
2.
Use color coding to show change in state.
3.
Use limit marks at alarm and trip valves.
4..
Display the plant mode.
5.
Be dynamic and present the information that is needed only.
6.
Use the same " generic display elements" that the system displays use.
7.
.Show a summary status of the Critical Safety Functions shown on the SPDS Summary Display.
Note: These criteria for-the CSF Displays list the unique, or troublesome, areas.. It is intended that the displays also O'
conform to the other criteria and conventions used on the CPS CRT displays.
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CRITERIA CSF DISPLAYS Figure 2-3 r
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3.0 Conclusions
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As a result of the above work and review of other task force reports the task force concluded that:
i The SPDS display system should be implemented incorporating the recommendations developed in all other SPDS study reports.
The implementation structure for this is described in section 4.0 SPDS Formats.
There are three other reports concerning the IPC SPDS Corrective Action Plan program. The following summarizes the task force reports used in developing the results of this effort:
The SPDS Parameter Selection Report lists and catagorizes a set of parameters and inputs to be employed in the SPDS Display System.
The number and content of the set of parameters has been revised extensively. Appendix A is a summary of the conclusions and a complete list of the input parameter set.
The CRT Color Code Report sets down the generic color coding to be employed in all CRTs. This has been utilized in developing the SPDS displays. Appendix B is a summary of the conclusions.
Tbe Operator Experience Review Report is a feedback mechanism to ascertain the quality of work and provide operating experience input. Appendix C is a summary of the Operator Experience Review
\\s Report and a list of recommendations. It also shows that operator feedback has been implemented.
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4.0 SPDS DISPLAY FORMATS 4.1 General Development of the SPDS' display formats requires a hierarchical i
structure for the display system to work within. The structure must be simple but adequate and meet the criteria. Information contained on the displays must be clear and easy to understand when stepping from one display to another.
The display system must take advantage of the computer's ability to process input signals. Starting from an instrument sensor, or several sensors, the data is formatted to ensure that it is correct when stepping from one display to another.
4.2 SPDS Displa'y System Structure The SPDS Display system has been structured to meet the hierarchical display criteria developed in section 2.3 and figure 2-1.
This configuration meets the SPDS display requirements and maximizes the coordination with the existing system displays.
Figure 4-1 shows the SPDS display structure.
The task team, using the results of the associated SPDS studies formulated a series of potential displays which were evaluated j..
-against the section 2.3 criteria. See figure 5-1, 2, 3, and 4 for
(
)
the propoced family of displays.
Each display is explained in detail in section 5.0 Displays.
4.3 SPDS Display System Signal Processing.
. 1.
The SPDS Display System input signals are processed from the field sensor through the DCS computer as described in section 5.0.
The processed signals will be represented on:
Summary Display (Top-Level Display)
CSF Status Box Parameter Set i
CSF Display (Mid-Level Displays) g
. Parameter Set Supporting display (Non-CSF Displays) l Parameter Set Figure 4-2 is a block diagram showing the signal processing utilized by the SPDS display system.
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Plant Mode The system automatically determines the' plant " MODE" to be displayed by evaluating the following conditions:
PLANT MODE EVALUATE Power Operation Reactor Mode Switch in "RUN" Startup Reactor Mode Switch in "STUP/HSB" Hot Shutdown Reactor Mode Switch in
" Shutdown" and Reactor Temp is greater than 200*F Cold Shutdown Reactor Mode Switch in
" Shutdown" and Reactor Temp is less than 200*F Refueling Reactor Mode Switch in
" Refuel" 3.
Display Selection Display selection is accomplished by using the limited function buttons directly in front of the SPDS CRT, No. 5.
O The buttons and their functions are:
SUMMARY
DISPLAY: Brings.up the Summary Display as (described in section 5.2.
SPDS LVL: Brings up the reactor vessel level display as described in section 5.2.
SPDS CNNT: Brings up the containment display as described in section 5.3.
SPDS RCTY: Brings up the combined level control and-reactivity display as described in section 5.3.
H -GAS: Brings up the combined CNMT/H -GAS display as 2
2 described in section 5.3.
-SPDS RAD: Brings up the radiation display as described in section 5.3.
4.
Critical Safety Function Status Boxes The critical safety function status boxes show the alarm conditions for the critical safety function and the sensor input validity for analog and digital inputs.
Under normal conditions the CSP status box is green, during a first alarm it blinks and turns red. This alarm condition brings up the CSFS at the bottom of all Display Control System (DCS) CRTs. To acknowledge the alarm the appropriate CSF f
g
. Display selector push button (SW407) is used, which also rs
( j selects the matching secondary display on CRT#5. Additional design details are covered under section 6.2 (3).
4-2 l
Input validity is confirmed by green boxes in the lower portion of the CSF status box.
5.
Input Validation Input validation is accomplished by one of four procedures, each described in detail in section 6.2.5.
Procedure 1; two analog inputs: the inputs are individually given a reasonableness check, then a redundant instrument confidence check.
Procedure 2; more than two inputs: the inputs are individually given a reasonableness check, then the redundant instrument confidence check.
Procedure 3; digital inputs: the inputs are collectively given a group validity test. Parameters that have not passed the test are set invalid, the ones that pass are used.
i Procedure 4; one analog input: given computer 3
reasonableness test.
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/'N 5.0 DISPLAYS 5.1 General All SPDS Display System CRT displays, are described in adequate detail in this section to permit programming of the display when used with section 6 Algorithms.
The display has been developed to show the CSF Status Boxes and present a selected group of primary parameters used during normal plant operations.
The objective of the summary display parameter set 'is to give the operator a snap-shot summary of the most important plant parameters, integrating the normal plant operating information with the critical safety function information, resulting in its being a part of his normal surveillance routines.
5.3 Critical Safety Function Displays There are three CSF Secondary Displays. They are:
Level Control / Reactivity, figure 5-2 Containment Control /H -GAS, figure 5-3 2
Radiation Release, figure 5-4 O4 The displays have been developed to present the data for E0P entry, based on the Critical Safety Functions.
5.4 SPDS Display Algorithm Determination The results of the SPDS, Parameter Selection Report were used to determine the input parameters, input sensors and sof tware requirements for each display field.
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J 6.0 ALGORITHMS 6.1 General This section consists of the basic algorithms used to derive the computer progrneming for implementing the displays and hierarchial structure. It is divided into two sections:
Generic Display Algorithms Critical Safety Function Algorithms.
6.2 Generic Display Algorithms The generic display algorithms are the ones used several times in a display or in several displays.
1.
Plant Mode Presentation of the Plant Operational Condition " MODE" is derived as described below.
Develop this field from the reactor mode switch positions and the following algorithm.
CONDITION COMPUTER POLNT Fower' Operation C71DC004 Rx Mode.Sw - Run Posn Startup C71DC003 Rx Mode SW - STUP/HSB Posn Fot Shutdown C71DC001 Rx Mode SW - Shutdown Posa "and" Reactor Temp greater than 200*F Cold Shutdown C71DC001 and Reactor Temp less chan.200*F Refueling C71DC002 Rx Mode Sw - Refuel Posn Use computer point SPSDDC40 for the reactor temp parameter.
2.
Disolav Selection The Display Control System (DCS) integrated display tracking is done by DCS SW407 located directly in front of the SPDS #5 CRT, six spare positions on that switch have been allocated for SPDS format selection.
DCS PLANT OPERATING SWITCH l
(407) l EMER 517 518 519 520 SPDS SPDS SPDS SPDS SPDS SPDS S/D SUMRY LVL CNMT RCTY HCAS RAD l
DSPLY f)',
- Requires moving EMER S/D 2 slots to left.
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SELECTION MATRIX CSF BUTTON SELECTED DISPLAY LVL-Level Control /RCTY CNMT Containment Control /H2-GAS RCTY Level Control /RCTY H -GAS Containment Control /H2-GAS z
RAD Radiation Release 3.
Critical Safety Function Status Box X
X X
X e
SENSOR VAL Colors Normal Conditions Boxes green XXXX, SENSOR, VAL = cyan Alarm Conditions Box Red O,N Input Failures Analog a)
Reasonableness Test Failure turn SENSOR box White b)
Redundant Comparison Test Failure turn VAL box White c)
For a single input parameter, failure of (a) will turn (a) & (b) White Digital a)
Group Validity Test Failure turn SENSOR box White i
turn SENSOR box Red Generic CSF Alarm (1) First alarm in - Blink the corresponding CSF box, sounds the SPDS audible alarm,-displays the CSF's l
on all DCS crt's with the alarming condition.
(2) Second Alarm in - Blink the corresponding CSF box, and sounds the SPDS audible alarm.
(3) CSF displays will be removed from all DCS displays when all alarm condition are removed from alarm.
I (4) Selection of the corresponding "407" switch will
(
stop the blinking CSF condition, silence the audible l
alarm, backlight the "407" switch in use, selects I
and displays the selected secondary CSF display on all SPDS designated crt's.
6-2 i
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.... - -, - - -,. - - - - -.... -. - - ~, -.
4.
SPDS Summary Display Pushing the DCS switch 507 button "SPDS Summary Display" will call up the top level display. It will not acknowledge any alarm, or clear any alarm.-
5.
Input Validation Validation is done on each input, or group of inputs using one of four procedures.
Procedure 1: Two analog inputs, follow the flow diagram in Figure 6-1.
Procedure 2: More than two inputs, follow the flow diagram in Figure 6-2 Step 1: Throw out all parameters not passing reasonableness test.
Step 2: Perform comparison on the remaining parameters. Failure of any parameter to meet the comparison criteria results in CSF VAL box White and no average.
The last good value is displayed as invalid data.
Procedure 3:
Digital inputs, follow the flow diagram in O
figure 6-3.
Procedure 4:
Analog input, single parameter, failure of the reasonableness test will result in turning White both the " GENSOR " and the " VAL " areas of the CSF display.-
6.
Redundant Instrument Confidence Check For parameters / functions which are monitored with more than one (redundant) instrument, a confidence comparison check will be performed to establish the validity of the parameters / functions displayed by the computer.
The confidence comparison check is implemented in the following manner:
One of the instruments will be selected at random and used as the base. All of the other instruments for the given parameter / function will be compared to the base.
If any of the other in~struments deviate from the base by 6-3 9
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Given:
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6.3 Critical Safety Function Algorithms
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The critical Safety function algorithms have been derived to drive the CSF Status Boxes.
1.
Level - CSF The LVL CSF Box will be alarmed for the following driving algorithm.
ALGORITHM Alarm for the Following:
Drywell Pressure } 2PSIG "or" MSIV "ISOL" "or" (Reactor, Scram "and" Power ) 3%)
After Time 6 Seconds "or" ReactorWILevel{L3(10")"or" Reactor Pressure 2 1064.7 PSIG For Refuel Mode: ' Add if Drywell Floor Drain Hi Alarm Computer Point information is described in section 5.3.
2.
Containment - CSF The CNMT CSF Status Box will be alarmed for the following algorithm.
~
ALGORITHM If CONT TEMP > 122*F "or" DrywellPressure}2PSIG "or" Drywell Temperature > 135*F "or" SuppPoolLVL219'5""or"{18'11""or" Supp Pool Temp 2 95*F l
l Computer Point information is described in section 5.3.
3.
Reactivity - CSF The CSF RCTY Box will be alarmed for the following algorithm.
1 ALGORITHM l
If (C71-DC015 "and" C71-DC016) "or" SPSDD033 > 3% and
(
Time = 6 Seconds Alarm RCTY "or" Newtron Monitor Trip i
e~N 6-5 l
4.
Combustible Gas - CSF The CSF Hz-CAS Box will be alarmed for the following algorithm:
ALGORITHM If Hydrogen > 1% Alarm IfeitherCMIA901,"or"CMBA902}1% Alarm Computer Point information is described in section 5.3.
5.
Radiation - CSF The CSF RAD will be alarmed for the following algorithm:
4 ALGORITHM If secondary Containment DP (2 channels) > 0.125 inches l
"or" Fuel Bldg DP > 0.125 inches "or" FueI Bldg Exh Vent alarm "or" Offsite" Rad Rate alert level (STACK & SGTS VENT) "or" Sec Cont HVAC DT alarm "or" Sec Containment temp alarm "or" Sec Cont area Rad alarm "or" Sec Cont F1 Dr Lev High High, b
l tg Computer point information is described in section 5.3.
I Additional radiation parameters to be defined.
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Or BOTH OK Parameter 1 = SPSDDIXIT Parameter 2 = SPSDDI:XX Set Sensor Failure Flag Set Sensor Failure Flag i
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REDt:NTANT COMPARISON
'IIST See Note 2 FAIL C00D RCT Failure Param 1 = SPSDDICC Last Good VAL. Invalid or Preferred
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DISPLAY LAST COOD VALUE AS INVAI.ID f
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DISPLAY OR ALARM Ffpure 6-2 l
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DIGITE DIGITAL INPUT UIPUT 1
2 or MORE ROUP vROUP FAIL VALIDID VALIDI T
TEST SET PARAMETER SET PARAMETER DIVALID UlvALID 1
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- j ir tr BUILD COMPOSED POINT OR DRIVE IF EITHER POUiT IS DIVALID OK TO USE THE OTHER I.T "0R" LOGIC ALARM (SE!SOR)
Proc 3 PICURE 6-1 6-9 v
/
7.0 REFERENCES
1.
Computer - Generated Display Systems Guidelines Volume 1: Display Design, EPRI NP-3701, September 1984.
2.
Computer - Generated Display System Guidelines, Volume 2: Developing an Evaluation Plan, September 1984.
3.
BWR Graphics Display System Dynamic Screening Program, ALO-1003, U.S.
Department of Energy Light Water Reactor Safety Technology Management Center, February 1982.
4.
BWR Graphics Display System Dynamic Screening Program Sof tware Configuration, ALO-1006, U.S. Department of Energy Light Water Reactor Safety Technology Management Center, February 1982.
5.
Simulator Evaluation of the Boiling Water Reactor Owner's Group (BWROG)
Graphics Display System (GDS), ALO-1019, U.S. Department of Energy. May i
1983.
6.
Guideline for Control Room Design Reviews, NUREG-0700, September 1981.
7.
Human Factors Review Guidelines for the Safety Parameter Display System, NUREG-0835.
O 8.
A Method for Analytical Evaluation of Computer Based Decision Aids.
9.
CRT Display Evaluation: The Checklist Evaluation of CRT Generated Displays, NUREG/CR-3557, December 1983.
- 10. Techniques for Displaying Multivariate Data on Cathode Ray Tubes with Application to Nuclear Power, NUREG-CR-1994.
11.
Evaluation of Generic Graphic Displays, EPRI/ Department of Energy; Operations Engineering letter JFS/84-01, November 9, 1984.
12.
Guidelines for an Effective SPDS Implementation Program, INPO 83-003 (NUTAC), January 1983.
- 13. Requirements for Emergency Response capability, NRC Generic Letter NO.
82-33, Supplement I to NUREG-0737', December 17, 1982.
- 14. NRC SPDS Pre-Implementation Audit /IP Corrective Action Plan, IOM Y-25633 December 17, 1984 to D. P. Hall from F. A. Spangenberg.
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1 HUMAN FACTORS i
EVALUATION OF DISPLAY FORMATS FOR SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM
!i CLINTON POWER STATION i
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Prepared by: Charles 0. Hopkins, Ph.D.
University of Illinois I
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. HUMAN FACTORS EVALUATION OF DISPLAY FORMATS FOR SPDS O
The SPDS displays consist of a summary display and critical safety function displays. The summary display includes the five 4
critical safety function boxes and also presents information about five plant operating parameters important during normal operations.
Descriptions of the.various display elements and their operation are provided in the Safety Parameter Display System Display Formats Task Force Evaluation Results.
Of interest here are the format and display coding considerations.
Current status for reactor water level, reactor vessel
. pressure, drywell pressure, suppression pool temperature, con-tainment pressure and reactor power are shown both graphically and quantitatively.
Horizontal bar graphs representing the status of these parameters are arranged from top to bottom in order of y
the relative importance of the information for normal operation.
The ranges of the values shown by the bar graphs have been selected to provide the most useful scale factors for monitoring safety status of the parameters during normal operation.
Examples are the narrow range scale (0-60 inches) for reactor water level and the display of drywell pressure between 0 and 5 PSIG.
Index marks at the appropriate positions on the bar graphs show EOP entry values.
The operator is also provided a quanti-tative display of the current value of each parameter in a digital readout at the right end of each bar graph.
O
s:
Page 2 a:
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Rate of change information for each of the displayed
)
parameters is indicated both pictorially and quantitatively.
The rate of. change for each parameter is displayed in the form of a digital readout with the appropriate units per minute.
The direction of change, increasing or decreasing, is indicated by the appearance of either an upward pointing arrow or'a down-ward pointing arrow.
Each of the two arrows appears in a separate
{=
locations thus providing location coding that is redundant with
}[
the shape and color coding of the arrows.
Normal operative w.
fluctuations within an appropriate dead band are indicated by i
the appearance of the word ZERO adjacent to the areas where the arrows appear to indicate increase or decrease.
The critical safety function displays have been designed to use appropriate comb,inations of pictorial representations, standard symbols, color coding, shape coding, location coding, and alphanumeric labeling and messages to ensure fast and accurate use of the information.
Pictorial representations are used to provide a meaningful, easily interpretable context for the detailed safety parameter information presented on the CSF displays.
A pictorial display is a spatial analogue in that it shows closely related information in terms of locations that are spatially analogous to the ones being represented without distortion of critical relations.
All three second level displays contain outline contours easily recognized as representing the boundaries of reactor pressure vessel, drywell, containment, secondary containment, s
O
Page 3 and fuel building.
The space representing each of these is C,,).
labeled except for the reactor. pressure vessel.
The reactor pressure vessel is represented by a standard, highly familiar outline drawing that mimics the salient external visual config-uration characteristics of the reactor pressure vessel.
The topological relationship of these contours is consistent in the three second level displays.
This facilitates the speed 1
4 and accuracy of identification of categorically.similar but quite significantly different information (e.g.
reactor vessel pressure, drywell pressure, containment pressure, and secondary containment differential pressures).
Display of related parameters in a common framework (e.g.,
drywell temperature and pressure inside the display contour
~.
representing drywell boundary) facilitates operator identification s,,)
and use of the information in decision making because of the relational correspondence between physical reality, display ele-ments, and the operator's mental model of the plant and plant operations.
Consistent with the use of pictorial representations and conventional equipment and component symbols, the reactor vessel i
water level and pressure valves are displayed inside the outline of the reactor vessel by vertical bar graphs and numerical read-outs.
Likewise, the suppression pool level is shown by a vertical bar graph display at the bottom of the display area representing the containment.
The vertical bar graphs of water level in the
~
4 l O'
Page 4 i
reactor vessel symbol and within the containment boundary contours
>are analogs of the physical world: water level in the real world varies along a vertical dimension.
The MSIV and the SRV are represented on the second level displays by conventional, easily recognizable valve symbols.
1 In addition to the use of pictorial representations and conventional component symbols the designs of the CSF displays I.
incorporate redundant coding in the display of dynamic and alarm information.. Coding redundancy serves two very important functions in the SPDS displays.
It facilitates the speed and accuracy of
,3 s !
operator location, identification, and use of information under normal conditions.
Furthermore, redundant coding is a backup technique to provide correct interpretation of displayed infor-l mation by operators with visual color deficiencies.
The different combinations of coding techniques used in the displays were selected to be most appropriate for particular i
parameters in the relevant display context.
Instead of slavishly following a predetermined set of rules for redundant coding, each category of information and each display element was considered separately and the most appropriate available techniques for l
redundant coding were evaluated and selected.
Among the more obvious techniques of coding for redundancy l
are the combined use of color coding and shape coding.
When the color code conforms to standard practice and population stereotypes and the shape code conforms to standard symbols and easily recognizable configurations, the useability of a display O
I.
l
. - - - +
Page 5 is greatly increased.
However, there are other coding techniques that also are highly effective and may be used when shape coding is either not appropriate or not feasible.
Alternative coding techniques include location coding, label or alphanumeric message coding (which increases likelihood of recognition and comprehension), and temporal coding (blinking of display elements).
All of these coding techniques are used i
to provide redundancy in the SPDS displays.
The appropriateness of each coding technique was evaluated
{
in terms of its compatibility with the information to be coded; the display space required, the association value of the symbols, th'e predicted ease and accuracy of learning and understanding the code and subsequently using the code, the possibility or likelihood of interfering with other codes, and the amount of information that needs to be coded and the limits of the code.
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O HUMAN FACTORS l
EVALUATION OF COLOR USE i
IN SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM CLINTON POWER STATION-4 l
!O i
i Prepared by: Charles O. Hopkins, Ph.D i
University of' Illinois I
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EVALUATION OF COLOR USE IN SPDS The use of color in the Clinton-Power Station SPDS has been re-evaluated taking into account the relevant human factors, operational, and engineering requirements and constraints listed below.
1.
The colors available in Nuclenet.
These.arenred,. magenta,' yellow, green, cyan, j
blue, white, black.
2.
The relative discriminability and legibility of the available colors.
Under some conditions of viewing distance and ambient lighting it may be relatively difficult i
to discriminate between yellow and green and between cyan and white.
Blue provides poor
(
legibility.
3.
The operational requirements for displaying different categories of information.
The categories of importance for SPDS are safety parameters within normal operating range, safety parameters outside of normal operating range, and invalid data.
4.
The desirability of using color coding to enhance the speed and accuracy of identifying different categories of information.
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5.
The standard meanings of colors when they are used to color code information in displays:
These are stereotypical expectations based upon people's experience with near universal use of certain colors.to convey standard meanings in our society.
6.
The compatibility of color coding in SPDS displays with color coding in Nuclenet displays.
7.
The results of a CRT color code study performed
- i by Torrey Pines Technology.
8.
The results of the SPDS/EOP integrated walkthrough.
9.
Accepted human factors principles and cautions concerning the use of color coding.
()
As a-result of the foregoing considerations, a set of guidelines for the use of color in SPDS was developed and was approved by the SPDS Design Review Team.
The colors and their use and meaning are:
display background Black static display elements, Cyan including labels, tabular lines, borders, outlines of pictorial representations and conventional component symbols.
V I
Page 3 Green normal conditions for dynamic O'x numerical data, both digital readouts and bar graphs and successful completion of operations.
alarm and operating conditions Red outside normal range for dynamic numerical data, both digital readouts and bar graphs.
Reverse video is used for digital readouts.
invalid data, reverse video used.
White Thus, static elements of the display that provide the context for interpreting information are presented in cyan.
g-K Dynamic elements that show the status of plant safety parameters are presented in green, red, or white indicating, respectively, normal conditions, abnormal or alert conditions, and invalid data.
These guidelines for use of color address the concerns listed in the NRC Design Verification Audit Results.
1.
Consistency of Color Coding Within Displays.
As indicated above, each of the colors now used for SPDS (green, red, cyan, white) is used for i
a particular category of information.
The usage is consistent within displays and between displays.
The scale marks on the green bar graphs that 4
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denote normal are now cyan, not yellow.
The f~3
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numerals that identify containment isolation valve groups now illuminate green upon successful isolation.
2.
Color Coding Stereotypical Expectation The color code now conforms to stereotypical g
expectations and standard human factors design principles as delineated in NUREG 0700 and other human factors standards, handbooks and references.
Green is used for normal and red is used for abnormal and alert.
Yellow is not used.
3.
Discriminability of Colors The colors now used are easily discriminated one from the other either intrinsically or as a result of s
)
redundant information coding techniques.
Since yellow is not used there is no potential for confusing yellow and green.
The possibility of confusion between cyan and white is no longer considered to be significant.
Cyan and white are both used on the same display but when white is used for coding invalid data the change of status from valid to invalid is signified by the appearance of the white alphanumerics using reserve video technique.
4.
Redundant Coding b.
Several significant steps have been taken to provide redundant coding where it is appropriate to do so.
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Page 5 Use has been made of pictorial representations, standard symbols for system components, color coding, shape coding, location coding, temporal coding, reverse video, and alphanumeric labeling and messages.
These are described in the report on evaluation of SPDS display formats.
5.
Red Color Contrast Color contrast is no longer a problem.
Red alpha-numerics will be presented with reverse video.
This provides improved legibility of alphanumerics (solid black characters against a red background), improved alerting capability, and redundant coding.
s 4
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Attachmtat #5 l
i 1
NRC Questions Regarding CPS Safety Parameter Display System
(
February 20, 1985 IP Presentation Material ~
(Provided by'telecon to Mr. G. Lapinsky (NRC) on March 14, 1985 f
NRC Question #1
'The data validation color code scheme utilizes " white" inverse video characters for sensor ("SEN") failures and " red" inverse video
- j characters for signal validation (" VAL") failures (i.e. signal reason-ableness check failures). Why are different color codes used and what happens to the Parameter bargraph and alphanumeric data when these signal sensor / validation failures occur (i.e. what color does the data j
change to)?
i-CPS Response #1 l.
The signal sensor (white "SEN" inverse video) failure code indicates that the data being displayed is still valid, since only one sensor has
. failed. The operator is thus made aware that a sensor failure has i
occurred while being provided with the remaining valid sensor data.- The signal validation (red " VAL" inverse video) failure code was intended to alert the operator under conditions where the sensed signal information l'
for the affected parameter failed the reasonableness test, and thus-would be invalid.
Red was chosen to emphasize the higher significance of the latter failure to the operator. However, further evaluations rN have determined that all signal sensor limit check / validation failures
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will be indicated in " white" inverse video. This will ensure that the operator will not confuse the meaning of this indication with a " red"
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alarming parameter.
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When either of the data sensor / validation check failures occur, the
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associated parameter bargraph will turn solid " white" and the numeric characters will turn " white" inverse video. The letters associated with the parameter name will remain " cyan" under all conditions since this data is static.
NRC Question #2 The time clock status, provided in the lower right-hand corner of each display, is also.used to provide an indication to the operator when a system failure has occurred. Since this data is dynamic, shouldn't it be displayed in " green" under normal system conditions and changed to i
" red" when a system failure occurs? 'Also, is the system capable of redundant coding techniques (e.g."??????") to indicate a system failure?
i.
CPS Response #2 The purpose of the time clock is correctly noted in Question #2.
However, when a system failure occurs, this is indicated by a lack of 1
i time updates to the clock (i.e. the clock " stops"). This means of l
indicating system failures is considered unambiguous. As such, redundant coding is not required. In any case, once the system has 1
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,. _,. _... _ _, _. _ _ _ _., _,. _ _ _ _ _., ~,. _. _....... _.. _
Attachment #5 failed, there is no means available to provide such redundant coding O
indication. Note that the system failure would also prevent color changes from occurring since the display is no longer updated.
Also, the system status can be easily ascertained by observing the Plant Process Computer System mimic located on the Standby Information Panel i
(just behind the NUCLENET Panel, where the SPDS display is located).
This system mimic provides a one-line "information flow path" status of all the major components (e.g. the status of the system's Display Control Processors (DCPs), the Data Acquisition Processors, (DAPs) and the Test and Reconfiguration Unit (TRU) is indicted on this mimic).
t Once a system failure has occurred, the operator would use this information to assist in a determination of the cause of this failure.
NRC Question #3 Does the Critical Safety Function (CSF) alarm box outline turn " red" in inverse video when a parameter enters an alarming condition?
CPS Response #3 Use of inverse video techniques will not be employed on the CSF alarm box outlines to indicate a CSF Parameter in the " alarm" condition.
However, software programming difficulties associated with placing the CSF name letters (e.g. "LVL" for the RPV Level Control CSF) inside the box outline associated with each corresponding CSF has necessitated relocating these just above each box outline. As such, when parameters O
associated with the appropriate CSF alarm box enter an alarming condition, the CSF box will turn solid " green" (normal) to flashing
" red" (alarm). The affected CSF box will turn solid " red" when the alarm is acknowledged. This technique provides additional assurance that the alarming CSF box (es) can be readily detected by the operator.
NRC Question #4 When a CSF box enters an alarming condition, do the letters associated with the affected CSF name also flash?
(The NRC Staff indicated that this was undesirable, since the operator would be overwhelmed with flashing color.)
CPS Response #4 Since the name letters associated with each CSF alarm box will be removed from inside the boxes themselves, as noted in Response #3, this data will become static information. As such, this data vill remain
" cyan" under all conditions and will not flash.
NRC Question #5 Mr. Lapinsky requested additional clarification related to the logic associated with the Containment " Isolation OK" portion of the SPDS display.
(After providing the information below, Mr. Lapinsky noted that this was acceptable and was no longer a concern to the Staff).
Attachment #5 CPS Response #5 The CPS Containment " Isolation OK" display provides information related to each of the Containment Isolation Valve Groups. Valve position signals are checked for each valve associated with each group. If all valves associated with a group are determined to be " closed", the corresponding isolation group number appears in " green" on the display.
Otherwise, the isolation group number does not appear on the display.
This " green" coding technique is consistent with the remainder of the valve position indication color scheme used in the CPS Main Control Room (i.e., " green" means valve " closed").
NRC Question #6 The SPDS Primary (Overview) Display utilizes horizontal bargraphs to provide relative magnitude dynamic data for several parameters. The color photographs of this display provided by Illinois Power show 25 tic marks on each of these bargraphs. What is the basis for each parameter bargraph having the same number of tic marks?
3 CPS Response #6 The color photographs provided to the staff were taken of the prototype SPDS displays. As such, each parameter bargraph was shown with the same number of tic marks for ease of display development. An engineering evaluation of the number of required bargraph tic marks will O
be performed during the detailed software design development and implementation process. The actual number of tic marks chosen for each bargraph will be based on parameter range monitored, scale required (as determined by operator action levels), and other display principles.
NRC Question #7 It was noted by Mr. Lapinsky that the SRM bargraph scale was not labelled (e.e., no numerical values were shown). A similar comment regarding the vertical bargraphs on the Secondary SPDS Displays was noted.
CPS Response #7 This was an oversight in the development of the prototype SPDS displays shown in the color photographs provided to the staff. The required namerical scales will be labelled on each bargraph associated with the SPDS displays during final software design development and implementation.
CPS Question #8 Why is the relative size and location of the plant structures shown on the pictorial representation different between the various SPDS displays? Also, the same parameter information should be placed in the same relative pictorial location on each SPDS display that it appears.
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Attschm.nt #5 CPS Response #8 b
Again, it should be emphasized that the SPDS color photographs provided to the Staff were intended to be prototypical of the final designed SPDS in these respects. In some instances the relative display size and location will require some differences between the four SPDS displays since different amounts and types of information are provided on each display. These differences will be minor in significance and minimized in quantity in the final design.
The final SPDS display design will ensure that same parameter information is placed in the same relative pictorial location on each SPDS display that it appears.
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Attechmint #6 CLINTON POWER STATION, UNIT #1 (V]
SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM (SPDS)
PARAMETER SET LIST 8 h
DATA l
PARAMETER DISPLAY 0F SENSOR / SIGNALS VALIDATION SCHEME (s)2 Containment CSF-CNMT 2
RC, RSC Temperature Drywell CSF-CNMT 2
RC, RSC Pressure
& LVL Drywell CSF-CNMT 2
RC, RSC Temperature Suppression CSF-CNMT 3
RC, SA Fool Level Suppression CSF-CNMT 4
(by Pool Quadrant)
Hydrogen CSF-H2 2
RC Concentration Gas (samples different con-tainment & drywell ports)
Drywell Floor CSF-LVL 1
GVC 0,
Drain Sump Flow High Alarm MSIV Isolation CSF-LVL 4
GVC Reactor Scram CSF-LVL 2 each ()3% or indeter-GVC
& RCTY minate after 6 secs.)
Reactor Water CSF-LVL 2 each (wide range &
RC, RSC Level (wide Fuel Zone) range) non-CSF (fuel zone)
Reactor CSF-LVL 2
RC, RSC Pressure Fuel Bldg CSF-RAD L
GVC Exh. Vent Fuel Bldg CSF-RAD L
GVC Delta Pressure Offsite Rad CSF-RAD Rad. Level - 1 each RC Release rate (2 ranges-Intermediate &
(stack, SGTS)
High).
- (
Flow - 1 each i
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Attachmsnt #6 C
CLINTON POWER STATION, UNIT #1 x
SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM (SPDS) 8 PARAMETER SET LIST DATA I
PARAMETER DISPLAY
- OF SENSOR / SIGNALS VALIDATION SCHEME (s)2 Secondary CSF-RAD 1 each GVC containment Area Rad.
Secondary CSF-RAD 1 each GVC containment Area floor drain level Secondary CSF-RAD 1 each GVC containment HVAC Diff.
Temperature Secondary CSF-RAD 1 each GVC containment Area Temps Secondary CSF-RAD 1 each RC O
containment
(,)
Diff. Press.
Containment Non-CSF 4
RC, RSC, SA Pressure Core Flow Non-CSF 1
R,C Reactor Power Non-CSF large # sensors /2 signals RC, RSC, already and rate each averaged (APRM)
Reactor Non-CSF 1
RC Temperature Boron Non-CSF 2 each (Reactor Power &
RC, RSC, SA Injection suppressionpooltemp.)I Containment Non-CSF 1 each (each group made up GVC,SA position indication siglnals).
of a large number of Isolation Control Rod Non-CSF 2
GVC Position SRV Position Non-CSF 1 each GVC O
Attachm:nt #6
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CLINTON POWER STATION, UNIT #1 Q
SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM (SPDS) 8 PARAMETER SET LIST DATA PARAMETER DISPLAY
- OF SENSOR / SIGNALS VALIDATION SCHEME (s)2 Containment Non-CSF 2
RC, RSC Hi Range Gamma Drywell Hi Non-CSF 2
RC, RSC Range Gamma NOTES:
1.
CSF indicates Critical Safety Function as follows:
LVL - (Reactor Water) Level Control CNMT - Containment control RCTY - Reactivity Control H2 GAS - Combustible Gas Control RAD - Secondary Containment / Radiation Release Control.
2.
Data Validation Schemes are as noted below and are explained in the report of the Display Formats Design Task Force:
RC - Reasonableness Check
( j RSC - Redundant Sensor Comparison AA - Averaging Algorithm SA - Special Algorithm (e.g. Suppression Pool Temperature checked with Suppression Pool Level and SRV Position).
GVC - Group Validity Check (digital points only) 3.
Additional parameter information (e.g. alarm values, source data, etc.) was provided in the report of the SPDS Parameter Selection Task Force.
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