IR 05000254/1985016

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Insp Repts 50-254/85-16 & 50-265/85-08 on 850321-0531.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Inservice Insp Activities,Ie Bulletin 80-07 & Previous Insp Findings
ML20127P599
Person / Time
Site: Quad Cities  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 06/18/1985
From: Danielson D, Kaufman P, Muffett J, Ward K
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20127P506 List:
References
50-254-85-16, 50-265-85-08, 50-265-85-8, GL-84-11, IEB-80-07, IEB-80-7, IEB-82-03, IEB-82-3, IEB-83-02, IEB-83-2, NUDOCS 8507020466
Download: ML20127P599 (16)


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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

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Report No. 50-254/85016(DRS);50-265/85008(DRS)

Docket No. 50-254; 50-265 License Nos. DPR-29; DPR-30 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company P. O. Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690 Facility Name: Quad Cities Station, Units 1 and 2 j

Inspection At: Quad Cities Site, Cordova, Illinois Sargent & Lundy Engineers, Chicago, Illinois i

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Inspection Conducted: March 21-22, 28, April 3, 11-12, 15, 25 and May 6, 7, 16, 31, 1985

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bk $3A F

Inspectors:

K. D. Ward

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(March 21-22, 28, April 3,11-12,15, 25 and Date May 6, 7, 16, 31, 1985)

Mu fe d' /

(May 7, 1985)

Date G b. W L -

G /l8 /85 P. D. Kaufhwn (May 7, 1985)

Date

Accompanied By:

D. H. Danielson (March 21-22, May 16, 1985)

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l Approved By:

D. H. Danielson, Chief j

Materials and Processes Section Date

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Inspection on March 21-22, 28, A)ril 3, 11-12, 15, 25, May 6, 7, 16, 31, 1985 (Report No. 50-254/85016(DRS); 5EJ-265/85008(DRS))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of inservice inspection (ISI)

activities, IE Bulletin 80-07, previous inspection findings and corrective action related to welding on the transfer panels. This inspection involved a total of 66 inspector-hours by three NRC inspectors including four inspector-

hours during off-shifts.

Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO)

  • N. Kalivianakis, Station Manager
  • C. Smith, QC Supervisor
  • A. Scott, QA Engineer
  • J. Ford, QC Inspector R. Bax, Sr., Production Superintendent K. Medulan, ISI Coordinator D. Gibson, QA Supervisor W. Witt, Level III, NDE Sargent & Lundy Engineers (S&L)

R. Kurtz, Supervisor, Projects Section J. Skiles, QC Coordinator NUTECH Engineers, Inc. (NUTECH)

D. Pitcairn, Engineer Director Lambert, MacGill & Thomas, Inc. (LMT)

D. MacGill, Level III G. Adams, Level III Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Insurance Company (HSB)

F. Roose, ANII United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

  • A. Madison, Senior Resident Inspector
  • K. Ward, Reactor Inspector The inspector also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor employees.

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  • Denotes those present at the final exit interview May 31, 1985.

2.

Licensee Action on IE Bulletins (Closed) IE Bulletin 80-0(254/80-07-88; 265/80-07-88) BWR jet pump assembly

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failure.

Ceco personnel responded April 23, 1980, May 9, 1980, and August 5, 1980. One cracked beam was reported in Licensee Event Report LER/R0-80007/03L-0 dated April 9, 1980.

The cracked beam was replaced.

The following is a summary of the commitments now in effect and the actions planned pertaining to both Units 1 and 2.

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a.

It is Ceco's intent to continue to ultrasonically examine (UT)

jet pump beams during each refueling outage.

Any cracked beams will be replaced prior to unit startup.

b.

It is CECO's intent to continue to perform jet pump operability surveillance testing as follows:

Individual jet pump flow readings are taken prior to unit

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startup from a cold condition, and after starting a recirculation pump with the reactor at rated temperature and pressure.

(Ref. CECO procedures QOS 202-4, QOS 202-S1, and QOP 202-2.)

Per the Technical Specifications, recirculation pump speed

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and pump flow are compared daily to the characteristic established speed / pump flow curves.

If the comparison is greater than 10%, a test is performed which compares the indicated total core flow to the total core flow value derived from the established power / core flow curve.

If this comparison is greater than 10%, a jet pump problem exists.

(Ref. Ceco procedures QOS 005-51, QOS 202-6, and QOS 202-3.)

A daily test is performed similarly to the above paragraph,

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except that recirculation pump speed and jet pump loop flow

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are compared to the characteristic established speed / loop flow curves.

If this comparison is greater than 5%, a jet pump problem may exist.

(Ref. CECO procedures QOS 005-51 and QOS 202-6.)

A daily jet pump surveillance test is performed when the

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reactor mode switch is in RUN.

Individual jet pump flow readings are recorded.

Normalized flow values are calculated by dividing each fet pump flow reading by the average jet pump flow for the corresponding recirculation loop.

These normalized values are compared against the range of characteristic values for each jet pump.

If a normalized value falls outside this characteristic range, there may be a jet pump problem.

(Ref. CECO procedures QOS 202-7 and QOS 005-51.)

c.

It is not Ceco's intent to replace any jet pump beams with the new type.

The licensee's review of related documentation did not identify the use of BWR 4-6 beams.

The NRC inspector reviewed the above reference procedures, related documents utilized to UT the jet pump beams, other associated documentation and determined that the actions being taken by the licensee meet the intent of " closeout of IE Bulletin 80-07."

No violations or deviations were identified.

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3.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (265/85012-01); During review of restraint installation, conducted as part of 151 surveillance, the licensee observed hanger 3001A-W-102 on the Main Steam line "A: which had a travel stop (pre-set pin) engaged which locks the hanger. Hanger 3001A-W-102 is a Bergen-Patterson constant support hanger CS4-26, type D1. Additionally, the licensee observed that a auxiliary steel plate attached to this hanger was permanently deformed and that a weld on the top retaining plate was cracked.

The licensee committed to take a number of actions in response to this deficiency. These were:

a.

Analyze the piping for stress effects of the locked hanger b.

Inform GE about the increased Nozzle Loads on the Reactor c.

Inspect adjacent areas for damage These actions have been completed. The inspector reviewed these actions and a number of associated documents. These were:

a.

Calculation B2-3016, May 20, 1985, calculation No. 7190-30-RB-02 b.

GE letter from R. E. Legate (GE) to J. Frizzell (CECO) accepting nozzle loads c.

S&L letter from A. Walser to J. E. Hausman (CECO), May 9, 1985, repair plan to put hanger in original design condition The piping system has been placed in its original design condition and the analysis has determined that the piping, pipe supports and the reactor nozzles were not damaged by the stress effects of the improper hanger. No violations or deviations were identified.

This item is closed.

4.

Inservice Inspection Unit 2 a.

General NRC Generic Letter 84-11 " Inspections of BWR Stainless Steel Piping" was sent to all licensees of operating reactors, applicants for operating license, and holders of construction permits for boiling water reactors on April 19, 1984. Examinations conducted at several boiling water reactors (BWRs) revealed intergranular stress corrosion (IGSCC) in large diameter Recirculation and Residual Heat cracking (RHR) piping.

Removal These examinations were conducted pursuant to IE Bulletin 82-03, Revision 1, and IE Bulletin 83-02, and the NRC August 26, 1983, Orders. The NRC believes that the results of these examinations mandate an ongoing program for similar reexamination of all operating BWRs.

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The Tables in Attachment A provide the licensee's sampling plan for addressing the Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC)

concerns for the Unit 2 outage. During the previous outage for this unit, all the identified accessible welds in nonconforming materials were ultrasonically examined (UT) by procedures and examiners complying with IE Bulletin 83-02.

Induction Heating Stress Improvement (IHSI) was performed on the Recirculation System and portions of the RHR System. These welds were UT'd after IHSI.

Partial replacement of the RWC System was accomplished with Heat Sink Welding (HSW) used for welds attaching the new low carbon type 304 stainless steel piping to the existing material.

Generic Letter 84-11 does not provide clear guidance on the examination requirements for uncracked welds that have received IHSI or HSW stress mitigation. Guidance was taken by CECO from NUREG-1061, Volume 1, Table 1 identifies the mitigated welds by system and size for Category B welds. Seven welds (next to the last column) constitute the Category B examination sample. The 72 mitigated welds have been subtracted from the total type 304 stainless steel welds, resulting in 171 welds (last column in Table 1 of Attachment A) that were addressed under Generic Letter 84-11.

Table 2, Generic Letter 84-11, addresses uncracked and cracked welds from the previous examination. The uncracked welds are shown in the second column in Table 1 of Attachment A with a sample of 46 welds (third columnn Table 2 of Attachment A) that were examined.

Although not specifically covered by Generic Letter 84-11, three of the 12 recirculation system safe end to nozzle welds (2 inlet and 1 outlet) were examined including the thermal sleeve to safe end welds on the inlets.

All of the 13 cracked welds which were IHSI treated (Column 4 in Table 2 of Attachment A) were examined.

The nine overlayed welds (Column 5 in Table 2 of Attachment A) were not examined. CECO and Lambert, MacGill & Thomas, Incorporated (LMT)

performed the ISI in accordance with ASME Section XI, 1980 Edition, 1980. Addenda.

CECO performed visual examinations (VT) and LMT performed liquid penetrant (PT), magnetic particle (MT) and ultrasonic examinations (UT). The Level II and III UT personnel performing evaluations on crack indications were qualified at the EPRI NDE Center by successfully performing the practical IE Bulletin 83-02 examination. All Level I and II personnel not qualified at EPRI performing UT scanning duties were trained by LMT onsite and the training was observed by the NRC inspector. Ceco's Level III UT personnel who reviewed LMT's results were also qualified by the practical IE Bulletin 83-02 examination at the EPRI NDE Center.

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The examination sample for this Unit 2 outage was 74 welds.

The examination was expanded in accordance with IWB2430 of ASME Code Section XI for that system and size.

Each flaw indication was evaluated in accordance with the guidance of NUREG-1061, Volume 1.

Weld overlays were utilized to make some repairs which took into account flaw characterization, depth, length, and material toughness concerns for the deposited material, NUTECH performed weld overlay design for the licensee. The following defective welds were weld overlay repaired and ten welds were analyzed by NUTECH to " leave-as-is."

Weld 02M-F7 (12-inch sweepolet-to-pipe weld)

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Weld 02E-F6A (12-inch pipe-to-pipe weld)

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Weld 02M-S3 (12-inch pipe-to-elbow weld)

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Weld 10S-F5 (20-inch pipe-to-valve weld)

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Weld 024AS-54 (28-inch pipe-to-elbow weld)

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The overlay thickness was designed to meet IWB-3600 limits based on a thru wall flaw for the measured length. The length of the overlay was selected to reinforce the weld structure and minimize the end effects. The licensee calculated the shrinkage stresses based on the actual measured shrinkage.

The repairs met the requirements of the ASME Code,Section XI, 1980 Edition with Addenda through Winter 1980.

In addition, guidance was taken from Subarticle IWB-3640, Winter 1983 Addenda. As allowed by ASME Section XI, repairs were performed in accordance with the original Code of Construction and Design Specification referenced in Section III, except as modified in Section V, Repair Requirements.

The companies performing the actual welding were: GAPCo, and Schneider Power Corp. The welding filler metal used was Type E308L-16 for repairs and type ER308L for weld overlays. The design of the weld overlay was to the original design margins using the Net Section Collapse Methodology of Section XI, Subarticle IWB-3640. Physical dimensions of the weld overlay were based on the flaw sizing and were shown on design drawings for each of the individual weld joint configurations. All welding was performed in accordance with welding procedure specifications written and qualified in accordance with ASME Section IX. The inspector observed some of this welding. All welders were qualified in accordance with ASME Section IX, the latest addition in the Code. The repair was exempt from postweld heat treatment. The preparation, application, and examination of the weld overlay were described in the Station Traveler and procedures for the work.

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Each overlay was examined by the liquid penetrant (PT) method in accordance with the latest revision of CECO Procedure NDT-D. PT was extended to include base metal within one inch of each end of

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the overlay.

An ultrasonic examination was performed in accordance with CECO Procedures to establish the soundness of the weld overlay and its fusion to the base metal.

Ultrasonic examinations were performed in accordance with the latest revision of CECO Procedures written for ultrasonic examination of weld overlays.

A hydro was performed in the areas that were repaired / overlaid and found to be acceptable.

Code symbol stamping of the repairs was not required by ASME Section XI.

A piping replacement commitment has not been made for Quad Cities, Unit 2.

However, plans are underway to be prepared for replacement during the Fall 1986 outage.

b.

Radiography of IHSI and Weld Overlay Induction Heating Stress Improvement (IHSI) and weld overlay (W0)

are both boiling water reactor (BWR) short-term pipe crack remedies when IGSCC has been found.

Due to the absence of an appropriate nondestructive examination (NDE) method, the service allowed for these remedies is in question.

EPRI suggested that an adequate examination could be performed using the MINAC (miniature accelerator) radiographic (RT) source.

The NRC inspector was informed that the MINAC has proven capable of detecting IGSCC in water filled, 12" nominal size, Schedule 100 pipes under laboratory conditions.

Both axial and circumferential cracks were detected.

Similar flaws were detected in water filled 10" - 20" nominal pipe size, Schedule 80 pipes in the field in the presence of high (1-2 R/hr) radiation backgrounds.

The objectives of this work were to acquire confirming information on a proposed radiographic method of verifying weld overlay integrity and to identify plant logistics and other practical factors influencing the inspection cost and approach.

The MINAC was used to radiograph welds #020-F6 and #02F-F6 on the Recirculation System (12" diameter) weld overlay, weld #02BS-F7 on the Recirculation System (28" diameter) weld overlay and weld

  1. 02E-F6A on the Recirculation System (12" diameter) no weld overlay.

The MINAC consists of three basic modules and an option of three basic modules and an optional auxiliary.

They tre a modulator power supply unit which furnishes controlled pulse power to a radiation head housing, a miniaturized linear accelerator guide and magnetron microwave source as principal components and an operator console containing intensity control equipment status indicators, safety interlocks and adjustable exposure time or accumulated dose recorders and shutoffs.

A radiographic image enhancement machine was also used to view the above weld raongraphs taken by the MINAC and also the original radiographs thr.t were taken by a IR 192 radiographic source.

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Image enhancement is a general term for techniques used to modify an original image so that important information may be more easily detected and displayed.

In nondestructive examination (NDE), the usual purpose of image enhancement is to display the low contrast detail of cracks, voids or inclusions or to aid in better definition of boundaries, e.g., edges, or part orientations, than can usually be perceived by the eye.

In interpreting the radiographs of the four welds radiographed by the MINAC, the NRC inspector and Ceco agreed that they were not in accordance with the ASME Code.

EPRI may submit to Ceco a report on the total program in the near future.

c.

Procedures The inspector reviewed the following procedures:

Ceco, Magnetic Particle Examination, NDT-B-1, Revision 2.

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Ceco, Ultrasonic Inspection of Pipe Welds, NOT-C-2,

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Revision 15.

Ceco, Ultrasonic Inspection of the Inner Radius of

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the Nozzle to Vessel Junction, NOT-C-10, Revision 9.

Ceco, Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Vessel Welds

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to NRC Regulatory Guide 1.150 for Boiling Water Reactors, NDT-C-30-80, Revision 0.

CECO, Beam Spread and Refracted Ar.gle Determination of

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NRC Regulatory Guide 1.150 for BWRs, NDE-C-31-80, Revision 0.

Ceco, Liquid Penetrant Examination, NDT-0-2, Revision 5.

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Ceco, Visual Examination, Welds, Pressure Retaining Bolting

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and Component Internals, VT-1-1, Revision 0.

Ceco, Visual Examination, System Hydrostatic and Leak

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Tests, VT-2-1, Revision 0.

Ceco, Visual Examination, Component Supports, VT-3-1,

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Revision 0.

Ceco, Visual Examination, Snubbers, Shock Absorbers, Spring

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and Constant Load Type Supports, VT-4-1, Revision 0.

EPRI, Piping Radiography, General, 001.

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EPRI, MINAC Operation, 002.

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EPRI, Radiographic, 003.

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EPRI, Film and Equipment Placement, Location, Marking, 004.

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EPRI, Inspection of IHSI and Weld Overlay for Integrity

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and Fitness for Continued Service, Revision 1.

d.

Observation of Personnel, Material and Equipment Certifications, Data Reports and Audits The inspector observed the work and had discussions with personnel during review of the ISI activities.

These observations included calibration, performance of ultrasonic examinations, and the documentation.

The inspector reviewed documents relative to the following items:

Ultrasonic instruments, calibration blocks, transducers

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and UT couplant certifications.

Liquid penetrant, cleaner and developer materials.

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Magnetic particle, materials and equipment.

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NDE personnel certifications in accordance with SNT-TC-1A.

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Data reports including strip charts of scans.

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Audits and surveillances.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

5.

Transfer Panel, Units 1 and 2 Purchase Order 286745 was issued by Station Nuclear Engineering Department (SNED) to Hatch on April 23, 1984, for Quad Cities Station, purchasing transfer starters and transfer panels in accordance with Sargent & Lundy Specification T-3307.

Five of the transfer panels were received and accepted by Substation Construction and Quality Assurance, although General Office Quality Assurance Audit G-84-110 identified two findings which directly affected the work quality as follows:

Welding personnel had not been certified.

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Welding procedures and welding procedure qualifications had not

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been submitted to Sargent & Lundy for approval.

Nonconformance Reports were initiated to resolve the situation.

The five panels received were found to be already installed.

These five, along with an additional shipment of four panels, were placed on hold.

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To resolve the nonconformances, a team from Sargent & Lundy and SNED Quality Control visited Hatch, Inc.

April 15-16, 1985, and approved welding procedure WQP-22, Revision 1.

Welders were requalified to this approved procedure.

Based on this correct action, the hold tags were released by Site Quality Assurance, although the Nonconformance Reports remained open pending completion of corrective action to prevent recurrence.

It was determined by Site Quality Assurance that the approved welding procedure and welder qualifications involved the shielded metal arc welding process (SMAW), when in fact a different weld process, metal inert gas welding had been used to fabricate the panels (a GMAW process).

This was confirmed by Sargent & Lundy April 27, 1985.

Nonconformance Report 18-85 was generated on that date and all Hatch transfer panels were returned to hold status.

Based on Ceco's conversation with Hatch's people it was apparent the Hatch welders performed the welding fabrication in accordance with their normal shop practice and that it was a lack of communication and control between their design section and the shop that caused this nonconformance.

Ceco obtained from Hatch, procedures for design control, test control, control of nonconforming material, GMAW process, welding procedure qualification, and welder qualifications.

These procedures have been reviewed and accepted by Sargent & Lundy, SNED.

The NRC inspector, reviewed these procedures and had no adverse comments.

In addition to the above and to give CECO further assurance of the panel's structural adequacy, Ceco had Sargent & Lundy prepare weld maps and a stress analysis of the welds.

The analysis was then compared to the panels seismically tested at Wyle Laboratory.

The results of their analysis and comparisons verifies the seismic adequacy of all the panels.

Based on review of the above actions and visual examination of the welds on the panels, the NRC inspector determined that sufficient corrective action has been taken to demonstrate structural integrity of the welding on these panels.

The NRC inspector agreed with the actions taken by the licensee and considers this item closed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6.

Exit Interview The inspector met with site representatives (denoted in Persons Contacted paragraph) at the conclusion of the inspection.

The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection noted in this report.

The inspector also discussed the likely informational c:ntent of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection.

The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietary.

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ATTACHMENT A AUGMENTED ISI QUAD CITIES 2 SPRING 1985 TABLE 1 NUREG-1061 CATEGORY 8 WELDS I

TOTAL l l

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l l WELDS l

IHSI l HEAT SINK l CATEGORY B l 84-11 l (304SS)

(UNCRACKED) l WELDS SAMPLE WELDS I

Recirculation l

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l Risers (12")

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l Ring Header l

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Butt Welds l

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l Sweepolets l

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l Outlets (28")

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l TOTAL-- l l

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l l WELDS l IHSI l HEAT SINK l CATEGORY 8 I 84-11 l (304S5)

(UNCRACKED)

WELDS SAMPLE WELDS

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Residual Heat l

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l Removal l

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l LPCI (16")

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Core Spray (10")

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i TOTAL l l

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l l WELDS l IHSI l HEAT SINK l CATEGORY B l 84-11 l

(30455)

(UNCRACKED)

WELDS SAMPLE WELOS

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Jet Pump Instru-l l

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l (Total Assemblies) l l

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l 243 l

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l 171 l

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1 Records indicate these welds are solution annealed.

They are included due to reported crack indications at other units.

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f AUGMENTED ISI

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QUAD CITIES 2 SPRING 1985 TABLE 2 GENERIC LETTER 84-11 WELDS

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84-11 UNCRACKED WELDS CRACKED WELDS I 84-11 l

WELDS TOTAL SAMPLE IHSI OVERLAY SAMPLE 1 l l

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Recirculation l

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84-11 UNCRACKED WELDS CRACKED WELDS l 84-11

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WELDS TOTAL l SAMPLE IHSI OVERLAY SAMPLE 1 l

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l Residual Heat l

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Removal l

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LPCI (16")

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I l 84-11 UNCRACKED WELDS CRACKED WELDS l 84-11 l

WELOS TOTAL SAMPLE IHSI OVERLAY SAMPLE 1 l l

Jet Pump Instru-l l

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l mentation l

l 104 l

l 0 l

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l (Total Assemblies) l l

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,

i 171

145 l

l 13 l

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1 Total of "uncracked welds" sample and " cracked welds" with IHSI.

Overlay welds are not in the sample due to no demonstrated UT technique available.

2 Records indicate these welds are solution annealed.

They are included due to reported crack indications at other units.

3Special Category not addressed by 84-11.

4 Includes welds not previously examined.

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16

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