IR 05000321/1985002

Insp Repts 50-321/85-02 & 50-366/85-02 on 841221-850128. Violations Noted:Startup of Unit 1 W/Only Six Automatic Depressurization Sys Valves Operable,Noncompliance W/Tech Spec 6.8.1 & Failure to Perform Surveillance Per Tech Specs

ML20127L445
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	02/20/1985
From:	Crlenjak R, Holmesray P, Panciera V NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20127L428	List: IR 05000321/1985002 ML20127L424 ML20127L431 ML20127L440
References
50-321-85-02, 50-321-85-2, 50-366-85-02, 50-366-85-2, NUDOCS 8505220343
Download: ML20127L445 (6)

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REGION 11 101 MARIETTA ST., g ,, ATLANTA. GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.: 50-321/85-02 and 50-366/85-02 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Docket Nos.: 50-321 and 50-366 License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5 Facility Name: Hatch 1 and 2 Inspection Dates: December 21, 1984 - January 28, 1985 Inspection at Hatch site near Baxley, Georgia Inspectors: s _I, MMY esident Inspector

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1. V. NJ a k, Jfffi o Oate' Signed

, ddb/9E" oime na , Reffleg Inspector 'Dat( Signed Approvedby:k ,f$ /w AA w/A C V. W. ~Paficie~ra~,' cme'f , Project Section 28

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0' ate 6fgned Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This inspection involved 110 inspector-hours on site in the areas of Technical -Specification (TS) compliance, operator performance, overall plant operations, quality assurance practices, station and corporate management practices, corrective and preventive maintenance activities, site security procedures, radiation control activities, refueling (Unit 1) ,and surveillance activitie Results: Of the areas ' inspected, three violations were identified (startup of Unit I with only six ADS valves operable, paragraph 7; failure to comply with TS 6.8.1 - three examples,' paragraph 7; and- failure to perform surveillances within the frequency specified by TS - three examples, paragraph 9).

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REPORT DETAILS

, Persons Contacted-l Licensee Employees-

• H. C. Nix, Site General Manager

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LT;LGreene, Deputy Site General Manager L. Sumner, Operations Manager

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, _P..Fornel,; Site QA Manage' 'S. B.' Tipps, Superintendent of-Regulatory Compliance

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.*R. W.~ Zavadoski,-Health Physics Manager

• T..R.. Powers, Engineer Manager (Acting)

Other licensee ' employees contacted - included -technicians, . operators, mechanics,; security force members and office personne * Attended exit.. interview t

Exit Interview

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.The~ inspection scope and findings were summarized on Janu'ary 25,'1985,'.with

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those persons; indicated in paragraph'1 abov . -Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

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.Not-inspe'te c

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' Unresolved Items

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Unresolved items were not' identified'during this inspectio .. Plant Tours (Units 1 and 2)

<The inspectors conducted plant tours periodically during the inspection

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= interval to ' verify- .that ~ monitoring equipment was recording as required,

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' equipment Lwas properly tagged, - operations personnel 'were aware of plant conditions,~and. plant housekeeping efforts were adequate. The inspectors also determined. that.' appropriate radiation controls were properly esta-

' blished, . critical clean areas were being controlled in accordance with

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- tprocedures,-excess equipment or material was' stored properly and combustible

, material and : debris. were ~ disposed of expeditiously. : During -tours the-

. inspectors looked for .the~ existence of unusual fluid : leaks, piping vibra-

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tions, pipe hanger'and seismic restraint settings, various valve and breaker positions, equipment caution and danger tags, component positions, adequacy of- fire j fighting = equipment, and instrument calibration dates. Some tours were conducted on backshift _

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The inspectors routinely conduct -partia11walkdowns of- ECCS systems. Valve

'and breaker / switch ~ lineups. and equipment conditions are' randomely verified

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both locally Jand 'in

the: control l room. During the inspection period the inspectorsiconducted ;a. complete walkdown -in the accessable areas of' the Unit 2' core-~~ spray system to verify that the lineups were in _accordance with licensee requirements for operability and equipment material conditions were

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Esatisfactor Within'the'areaslinspected, no violations or deviations-were identifie ,

6.- Plant Operations. Review (Units 1.and 2)

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.The inspectors,.' periodically-during the inspection interval, reviewed shift tiogs .and, operations records; including . data sheets, instrument traces, and records:of equipment malfunctions. This review included control room logs and auxiliary logs,-' operating orders, standing orders, ' jumper logs . and

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equipment . tagout . records. The inspectors routinely -observed operator ~

_ alertness and. demeanor during plant tours. During normal events, operator performance and response actions were observed and evaluated.- The inspec-tors conducted random off-hours inspection during the reporting interval'to-

-_ assure:that operations. and security remained at an acceptable level. Shift

~ turnovers zwere observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance '

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with' approved licensee procedure ;

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Within the. areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie .- Technical Specificatiion Compliance (Units l'and 2)

Duringithis reporting = interval, the inspectorr verifled compliance with selected limiting conditions -for operations-(LCO's) and results of selected surveillance tests. These verifications were accomplished by direct obser-Tvation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions, and'

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review of. completed logs and records. The licensee's compliance! with selected LCO action statements were reviewed on selected occurrences as they

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-happened.

s On January 13,.1984, with Unit 1 in startup at about 500 MWT and 927 psig, n the ~ licensee = was performing ' the " Relief Valve Operability" procedure, L HNP-1-3901. The_"B" Safety. Relief Valve (SRV) did not open when the control -

E ~ switch was cycled. The. "B" SRV. is one of the seven Automatic Depressuri-zation System (ADS) valves. All other SRVs functioned when called upon.-

The :"F" and "G" SRVs were found to have the amber tailpipe ~ pressure indicating lights reversed. When "F" was activated the "G" light came on

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and vice vers : Investigation by the ?1icensee revealed that the links which had been opened i ' in a accordance with procedure HNP-1-6020 (Main Steam Relief Valves LMaintenance) were still open with the lifted wire and jumper tags still l installed._ The~ 6020 procedure was signed off for the closure of these

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links; Further investigation found that a third person had placed the

! initials _ of the two others in the ". closed by" and " verified by" blanks for E

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SRV "B". This person.~ thought thelwork was done but the verification had ~

been missed. .This improper clearing off a work' document led to the startup-of Unit-1 with one ADS valve inoperable. - Since Technical Specification.(TS)-

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3.5.F.1.af requires all - seven ' ADS valves to be operable - prior to startup, -

this is a violation l(321/85-02-01). The improper signing for work-not c

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Laccomplished and -the" failure to. remove a lifted wire:and jumper tag on a

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link thatL was closed, is. not properLimplementation of a procedure :as

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required by TS 6.8.1 and is therefore a' violation (321/85-02-02).

Due to an oversight procedure HNP-1-3902 (Safety Relief Valve Functional i Test) was not completed prior to .startup .of ~ Unit 1 as required by mainte-

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- inance-procedure 6020. Had.this test been accomplished, the malfunction of

.the :"B" LSRV!would. have been, discovered prior to startup. The failure to

' perform this: Functional TestLis another example of violation (321/85-02-02),

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failure to' comply-with TS 6. In order to find where .the fault lay with the wiring to the "F" and "G" a' .-tailpipe ' pressure switches, procedure HNP-1-3820 (Safety / Relief ' Valve Position, Primary and Secondsry, Indicators' Functional Test and Calibration)

was attempted. While opening links .and. placing jumpers for.this test, one

- SRV. was activated -due to Low-Low Set logic.being satisfied. The procedure-

= was in error in that an internal jumper. installed as part of a Design Change -

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Request-(DCR) was missed when the procedure was~ changed'to incorporate the DCR. "The failure to maintain procedure HNP-1-3820 is also an' example of

. violation (321/85-02-02), failure to comply with TS 6. '86 Physical Protection (Units 1 and 2) ,

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The ? i.nspecto' r verified by observation and interviews during the reporting interval:that' measures taken to assure the physical protection of the facility net ~ current requirements. Areas inspected included the organi-

. zation: of the security force. .the establishment and maintenance of. gates,

' doors and isolation zones in the proper condition, that access control and ,

-badging was proper, and procedures were followe Within:the areas inspected, no violations or. deviations were identifie ' Review 1of NonroutineLEvents Reported by the Licensee (Units 1 and 2)

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The,:following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed _for potential-

? generic ' impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate. Events which were reported immediately were also -reviewed as they occurred to determine that Technical Specifications

were being met and that the public health and' safety were of utmost conside-

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ration. :The following LER is considered closed:

4 Unit 2: 84-33*

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-LER366-84-33isanother'exampleofimproper(untimely)reportingdueto'the deficiency. report not being written' and processed in a timely manner. . Tiis late reporting is not being processed _ as a new violation -since a similar

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event was; cited in NRC _ Inspection _ Report 84-48 and- corrective action for

that' citation has not had time to show whether or not it is effective.'

LLER 366-84-30, _Rev'.1, was reviewed in depth with the following result ~ Amendment No.'.39 to the Technical Specifications was issued in June 1984 and resulted; in a large change to instrument surveillance with the advent of-

~ ATTS.~ Accordingly, many. instrument _ surveillance frequencies were changed by Amendment -- 39. ~ However, in the case. with the associated instrumentatio listed below,'Lthe. implementation of the changes was-imprope Main Steam Line Tunnel _ Temperature - High ' Reactor Vessel Pressure (2821-R623 A, B) Reactor: Vessel Shroud Water Level (2821-R610, R615)

The failure o to make the proper frequency changes .resulted in missed

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surveillances in all'three cases. This is a violation (366-85-02-01).

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1 Refueling (Unit 1)

During this report period the inspectors verified by observation, interviews and procedure review that the startup was being conducted in accordance with regulations. . Areas inspected included adequacy of procedures and Technical Specification complianc >

-Within the area inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . Unit 2. Control Rod Speed Due 'to information s'uggesting that the cause of or_ contribution to the slow

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rod speed problems experienced at Monticello, following Recirculation System L' pipe' replacement, -was undissolved fibers from welding purge dams, the

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resident inspector: investigated this. area.

o The- purge dam material used at 'Monticello and that 'used at Hatch were the

? sam At-Hatch, the amount of material left in the piping was reduced by a  :

P ' crawl through of the piping prior to the closure welds.

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c-The Control Rod' Drives (CRDs) at Monticello are the "A" Model. SIL #52 L proposed a change to this- CR0 to reduce the screen clogging problem. Later

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versions of CRDs. had ~a. modification built in-to reduce the screen clogging problem. Hatch has "B" and-later model.CRD The;CRD timing test was run cold at Monticello during the reactor vessel hydrostatic L test. This test was run between 35% to 40% power at Hatc 'This temperature difference may have some bearing on purge dam fiber break-dow (

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- Hatch Unit 2 has : experienced no CR0 speed problems since the -Recirculatio '

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