ML20127H601
| ML20127H601 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200002 |
| Issue date: | 01/15/1993 |
| From: | Wambach T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9301220379 | |
| Download: ML20127H601 (56) | |
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- pm%'o UNITED $TATES 8' 7. NUCLEAR REGUL ATORY COMMISSION
$ n$ W ASHlfM T ON. D. C. 20%5 k..* e January 15, 1993 Docket No.52-002 APPLICANT: ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc. (ABB-CE)
PROJECT: CE System 80+
SUBJECT:
PUBLIC MEETING OF DECEMBER 9, 1092, TO DISCUSS THE REVIEW STATUS OF THE CE SYSTEM 80+ DESIGN WITH SENIOR MANAGEMENT On December 9, 1992, a public meeting was held at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Rockville, Maryland, between senior management representa-tives of ABB-CE and the NRC. Enclosure 1 provides a list of attendees.
Enclosurc 2 is the material presented by ABB CE.
ABB-CE opened the meetii,9 with a review status of the System 80+ project.
The Associate Director for Inspection and Technical Assessment expressed concern that receiving inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC) after the draf t safety evaluation report (DSER) response due date of January 21, 1993, could create a sequential review process between DSER issues response review and associated ITAAC review. Subsequently, a sequential review precess could impact the review schedules for development of the System 80+ final safety evaluation report (FSER) due to potential iteration or revision of the CESSAR-DC document or System 80+ design from the ITAAC review findings. The staff also noted that closure of DSER open items for a system I
or CESSAR-DC chapter should be performed prior to final development and submittal of the associated system ITAAC.
ABB-CE will reevaluate their schedule for submitting ITAAC to accommodate a parallel review path with closecut packages of DSER open items, since the staff expressed significant reservation that a two-month review period of the ITAAC (March through May of 1993) would be insufficient time to appropriately evaluate System 80+ ITAAC.
ABB-CE expressed concern over staff resources to review System 80+ due to the staff's review of the lead -design (the advanced boiling water reactor (ABWR)).
However, ABB-CE noted that the review process established for developing the FSER has been functioning extremely well. The recent severe accidents meeting held on December 2 and 3, 1992, at the ABB-CE facilities in Windsor, Connecti-cut was cited as a productive example of the review process. ABB-CE urged continued efforts to conduct similar workshop meetings for other design-related issues.
210017f ifb 9301220379 930115 4 PDR ADOCK 05200002 '
A PDR
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l January 15, 1993 for ITAAC related to structural design, the staff indicated that nominal wall thickness, loadings, and approved modeling and analytical methods for estab-lishing acceptability of tie as-designed /as-built cot. figuration would be required as a minimum. ABB-CE agreed to do more for structural detail. In addition, the staff suggested that ABB-CE review the report on the structural audit performed on the ABWR design. The System 80+ design will also be ,
audited in the future to verify acceptable application of approved methods.
ABB-CE presented the ITAAC for the System 80+ emergency feedwater (EFW) system. The staff commented, in general, that the ABB-CE approach to ITAAC appeared to be a viable and reasonable approach; however, the EFW ITAAC had not been technically evaluated by the staff.
The staff commented that the ITAAC should specify the methodology to determine as-designed and as-built structures, systems, and components (SSC) configura-tion adequscy. Net positive suction head (NPSH) calculations for EFW and safety inject (SI) pumps were cited by the staff as an example. The staff stated that the methodology should provide the appropriate and standard :
assumptiont and parameters for calculating the available NPSH such as fluid temperature, line loss coefficients, debris levels, room temperatures, etc.
Therefore, these standard parameters would :)ermit two engineers to indepen-dently arrive at the same conclusion that tae NPSH available exceeds .the NPSH required.
In addition, the staff commented that the ITAAC should have configuration management provisions fnr coping with as-built deviations in SSC. The ITAAC should specify the approach and methodology for accommodating said deviations.
Also, ABB-CE should provide standardized definitions for terms such as visual inspections, walkdowns, functional tests, etc.
ABB-CE noted that the Tier 2 information included in the ITAAC was for review purposes only and is not part of the ITAAC. The staff noted that in addition to this type of review aid, the staff will need to have roadmass that provide directions for locating key design-features and insights that lave evolved from the System 80+ probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). Roadmapping should provide connections between the PRA and relevant portions' of the Combustion Engineering Standard Safety Analysis Report (CESSAR-DC) chapters. Assumptions cited in the CESSAR-DC Chapter 15, " Accident Analyses," also need to be roadmapped to indicate where the assumptions are verified in the plant or system ITAAC. Roadmap information will point to where the design-feature resides in the CESSAR-DC document, then transcribed to Tier 1 information, and subsequently lifted to the appropriate system ITAAC.
Another camment provided by the staff involved the lack of specificity in the ITAAC. Acceptance criteria for the EFW system ITAAC should provide specific infort.ation on code class and piping class breaks for pressure retaining
- cotvonents, NDE welding, and 151 requirements. These requirements should cite the appropriate portions of the ASME code. In' addition, the certified design
- ' commitment (column one of the ITAAC) should be kept more functional and i
column three should be expanded with the details.
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January 15, 1993 ABB-CE also provided a status report in the progress achieved in the human factors engineering review of the Huplex 80+ control room design (Enclo-sure 2). The staff agreed that the Nuplex 80+ design features should be Tier 2.
The next management meeting was scheduled for January 11, 1993, at the ABB-CE office in Windsor, Connecticut.
Sincerely, Ofhd8Icnod13 Thomas V. Wambach,pProject Manager Standardization Project Directorate Associate Directorate for Advanced Reactors and License Renewal Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
As stated cc w/ enclosure:
See next page DISTRIBUTION w/ enclosures:
Docket File PDST R/F MFranovich JLyons PDR' RJones GBagcht JRichardson RPerch MRubin JWermiel GBagchi DTerao DISTRIBUTION w/o enclosures; TMurley/FMiraglia DCrutchfield WTravers RPierson RBorchardt WRussell -
ACRS (11) JMoore, 15B18 GGrant, ED0 JPartlow,12G18 TWambach EJordan, MNBB 3701 AThadani, 8El RParrett, 801 TBoyce CMcCracken, 801 MMalloy BBoger, 10HS WBeckner, 10E4 MWaterman, 8H3
- MChiramal, 8H3 SBSun, BE7 0FC: LA:PDST:ADAR PM:PDfADAR PM n,
S :AD l SC:P :ADAR NAME: PShea / MXfra'ho ich:tz TVWambach RB hardt DATE: 01/ 9 01/{4/93 01/g93. Ol/jff93 0FFICIAL RECORD-COPY: HTGSUM09.MXF l
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I ABB-Cornbustion Engineering, Inc. Docket No.52-002 1 cc: Mr. C. B. Brinkman, Acting Director (w/o encl.)
Nuclear Systems 1.icensing Combustion Engineering, Inc.
1000 Prospect Hill Road Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500 Mr. C. B. Brinkman, Manager (w/o encl.)
Washington Nuclear Operations Combustion Engineering, Inc.
12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 330 Rockville, Maryland 20852 Mr. Stan Ritterbusch (w/o encl.)
Nuclear Systems Licensing Combustion Engineering, Inc.
1000 Prospect Hill Road Post Office Box 500 Windsor, Connecticut- 06095-0500 ,
Mr. Daniel F. Giessing (w/o encl.)
U. S. Department of Energy '
NE-42 Washington, D.C. 20585 Mr. Steve Goldberg (w/o encl.)
Budget Examiner 725 17th Street, N.W.
'. Washington, D.C. 20503 Mr. Raymond Ng (w/o encl.)
1776 Eye Street, N.W.
Suite 300 Washington, D.C. 20006 Joseph R. Egan, Esquire (w/o encl.)
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 2300 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037-1128 4
,/ .
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i HEETING ATTENDEES DECEMBER 9, 1992 ,
HahE ORGANIZATION H. Franovich NRR/PDST T. Wambach NRR/PDST R. Pierson NRR/PDST R. Borchardt NRR/ POST D. Crutchfield NRR/ADAR W. Russell NRR/ADT T. Hurley NRR/00 B. Boger NRR/DRCH A. Thadani NRR H. Waterman NRR/DRCH/HICB T. Boyce NRR/PDST- l W. Beckner NRR/SPSB N. Chiramal NRR S. B. Sun NRR R. Barrett NRR S. Ritterbusch ABB-CE C. Brinkman ABB-CE J. Longo ABB-CE J. Rec ABB-CE J. E. Robertson ABB-CE L. D. Gerdes ABB-CE
, H.' Windsor ABB-CE D. Harmon ABB-CE R. Matete ABB-CE W. Fox Duke Eng, & Sys.
J. Burnette Duke Eng, & Sys.
T. 0swald Duke Eng. & Sys.
T. Crom Duke Eng, & Sys.
H. Ceraldi Duke Eng. & Sys. ,
A. Heymer NUHARC J. Egan Shaw Pittman l
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Enclosure 1 Wf 4
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ABB CE - NRC MANAGEMENT MEET!NG DECEMBER 9,1992 PROPOSED AGENDA F
- 1. OPENING REMARKS (W. Russell and R. Matzlo)
- 2. SCHEDULE FOR SUBMITTALS FOR DSER CLOSEOUT (10 mln) (J. Longo)
B. SAMPLE COMPLETED lTAAC AND SUPPORTING TIER 2 INFORMATION (60 min) (H. Windsor, et all C. SCHEDULE FOR SUBMITTAL OF SYSTEM 80 + ITAAC (15 min) (C. Brinkman)
- 4. SAFETY ANALYSIS ISSUES (10 min) (J. Longo, et a!)
- 5. REANALYSIS USING NEW SOURCE TERM (20 min) (S. Ritterbusch)
- 6. HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING REVIEW STATUS (30 min) (D. Harmon)
- 7. l&C DIVERSITY (10 min) (NRC and D. Harmon)
- 8.
SUMMARY
- 9. NEXT MEETING Enclosure 2
DSER OPEN ITEM CLOSEOUT ,
PROGRESS TO DATE ,
4 :
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9-28 92 DSERISSUED 10-15-92 PROJECT MANAGEMENT 11-5 92 DSER OPEN ITEM CLOSEOUT KICKOFF MEETING r AND BREAKOUT SESSIONS-11-6-92 HFE MEETING ,
11-16-92 CHAPTER 15 ANALYSES ISSUES MEETING 11-16 92 PIPING DESIGN AND LBB MEETING (2 DAYS) o 11-18-92 INITIAL SUBMITTAL OF OPEN ITEM RESPONSES 11-19-92 MANAGEMENT MEETING ON HFE 11-23-92 STRUCTURAL DESIGN MEETING 11-24-92 SECOND SUBMITTAL OF OPEN ITEM RESPONSES 12-1-92 SUBMITTAL OF TWO SYSTEM ITAAC 12-2-92. SEVERE ACCIDENT MEETING (2 DAYS) ,
12-9-92 MANAGEMENT MEETING .
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SECY 91-161 SCHEDULE 1-21-93 ABB-CE DSER OPEN ITEM RESPONSES COMPLETED l >
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5-26-93 STAFF FSER INPUTS TO PROJECT MANAGER-7-30 93 FSER TO ACRS AND COMMISSION .
11-1-93 FSER ISSUED TO ABB-CE e
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SXSEM180+"
NRC-'MANAGEMFNT MEETING December 9,1992 i
ITAAC ,
- Extunple ITAAC and related infornmtion
- Purpose 1for Review of. Example ITAAC
- Basis for ITAAC Preparation -
ITAAC ENTRIES including:
- Correlation to PRA and Safet'y Analysis a
- " Upward Pointing" Tier 2 Information r
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SYXMM 80+" !
. SYSTEM 80+ ITAAC DEVELOPMENT PURPOSE- ,
Obtain NRC Management Concurrence with ABB-CE i approach for:
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+ Form and Content of specific ITAAC entries '
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- Using Emergency Feedwater System (EFWS) and Component Cooling Water System '
(CCWS) ITAAC as. Examples A
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- PRA insights and safety analysis assumptions :
Focus on hardware matters
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- Level of detail in ITAAC and " upward pointing" Tier 2 information, as appropriate e
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SXM %l80+"
BASIS FOR CURRENT CONTENT OF ITAAC l
. AND RELATED INFORMATION Participation in NRC/ Industry / Lead Plant ITAAC Avelopment activities
- Incorporation of NRC/ Industry Guidance
- NRC Review of initial pilot ITAAC submittal
.(4-30-92)
- Industry Review of pilot ITAAC (7-16-92) '
- -NRC Review of revised pilot ITAAC submittal (8-10-92) ;
- Industry Review of 5 ITAAC (San Jose
- Review 9-92) 6 Exclusion of progranunatic and generic topics pending NRC/ Industry resolution
- Preparation of supporting Tier 2 information to be supplied but not formally incorporated. .
-pending NRC/ Industry Resolution
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SJhTEM 80t" EXAMPLE ITAAC and RELATED INFORMATION - l EFWS -
- System overview
- PRA insights t
- Safety analysis assumptions
- Selected ITAAC entries
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- Relationship to System Conceptual Diagram a
- Entries applicable to many or all system ITAAC
- Entries having associated " upward pointing" information ,
- System-specific entries where level of detail may be an issue CCWS ;
- System overview .
- PRA insights '
- Safety analysis assumptions
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4 SYSTEh180+"
sal [ETY FUNCTIONS ,
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- Provide an independent, safety-related feedwater. l supply to steam generators to remove core heat ,
and to prevent core uncovery
- Applied to:
loss of normal feedwater steam /feedwater line break
- LOCA-to keep SG tubes covered :
- Required performance: remove heat,. maintain ,
hot standby, and cool plant with limiting faihire 1 and no offsite power .
', FEATURES
- 2 separate mechanical trains
- 4 EFW pumps (2 diverse pump drivers per division, only 1 pmnp of 4 needed) .
- 2 redundant EFW storage tanks -
- flow-limiting venturis on feedwater delivery lines- l ACTUATION
- automatic by APS (AFAS)
- manual from control ro'om-i I, a , , . . .J.+,-,-... , ,, , ,,m,,...%,, - . . . . - .. _ . , , - . , , ,,, . . . _ , . _ . , , d.~...-,..,-.,-
SXSIEhtR01" EFWS ITAAC/PRA Insights ERA-base 1LSLSTFAL80+ design enhancements.
- two independent EFWS divisions
- diverse EFW pump drivers:
a turbine driven and a motor driven pump in each division l
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&YETEM 80+"
EFWS ITAAC/ Safety Analysis Insights AJ11tlysillhtsis
- Miniinuni flow rate to a steani generator requiring emergency feedwater is 500 gallons per ininute with stetun generator '
pressure at 1200 psia.
- Maxiinuin flow rate to a stenin gener-ator requiring emergency feedwater is 800 gpm at runout conditions.
- Emergency feedwater storage tank capacity at least 350,000 gallons each.
- A single failure in the EFWS will not prevent the system from performing as stated above.
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SYSTD180+"
Conceptual Diagram i
Purpose of . Conceptual Diagram
- Depict general system configuration-
- Present information that minimizes ITAAC verbiage (e.g. Control Room indications)
Content
- General system configuration and principal components
- Control Room instrumentation indications and alarms for the functional flowpaths
- Actuation and termination signals
- . :ASME Code Class boundaries
- Relevant connections to other components and systems 1
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EFAS OR AFAS STARTS b h T "i FIGURE 1.10.41 EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM
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3 sysmi so+~ EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM.
L Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Insocctions. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria i Certified Desien Commitment
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1 I.a) Visualinspections of the 1.a) The as-built configuration of i 1.a)~ A basic configuration for the EITVS is shown in Figure as-built system configuration the EFWS is in accordance will be performed. with Figure 1.10.4-1 for the 1.10.4-1.
' components and equipment shown.
b)' Inspections of the construction . b) The Certified Design Commit-l: b) Figure 1.10.4-1 depicts the '
records and the as-built install- ment is met. i AsME code classifications for !
the pressure retaining ation will be performed.
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L ITAAC 1.a verifies the EFWS configuration based on PRA insights.
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6 s3rrENiso r _ EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Acceptance Criteria Lnspections. Tests. Analgses Certified Desien Commitment .
- 2. The results of the pressure test
- 2. A pressure test will be con- of ASS 1E Code portions of the
- 2. ASSIE Code portions of the ducted on those portions of the ERVS retain their integrity ERVS required to be pressure EDVS conform with the under internal pressures that requirements in the ASNIE tested by the ASSIE Code.
will be experienced during Code Section III.
service.
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sysmi so+- EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM
! Inspections. Tests, Analyses, and Accep_tance Criteria -
l Certified Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses A(sptance Criteria Water is supplied to each EFW 3. Test to measure EFW pump 3. The calculated-available NPSn 3.
NPSII will be performed. An exceeds pump NPsH requimd pump at a pressure greater than the net positive suction analysis to determine NPsH by the vendor for the pump.
head (NPsH) required. available to each EFW pump will be prepared based on test data, as-built data and vendor pump records.
Tier 2 information EFWS Pump NPSH The EFW NPSH is measured with the EFW pump suction taken from the EFWST with two pumps running in the EFW division and EFWST pressure at atmospheric pressure. The analysis will be based on the following:
- Elevation of EFW pump suction line penetrations in the EFWST and EFW pump locations and elevations.
EFWST minimum water level Design basis EFW temperature
- Pressure losses for EFW pump inlet piping and components
- Both EFW pumps operating in a division.
The NPSH will be adjusted by analysis to the maximum allowable EFWST temperature.
- . SvSTim sov- EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM . ,
Inspections. TcStri, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria s
.Cyrtified Design Commitment !
4.a) The .notor-driven and 4.a) .An Emergency Feedwater 4.a) Testing will be performed by generating a simulated EFAS turbine-driven pumps start, :
Actuation signal (EFAS) i l for its corresponding steam . and the steam generator actt ates the EFWS .;
generator. The test will be isolation and flow control ~
components. An Alternate '
repeated using a simulated valves open, in the division Feedwater Actuation Signal
~ A FAS.
receiving the simulated EFAS ,
(AFAS) nctuates the EFWS The same components actuate ;
components.
in response to a simulated ;
AFAS.
I b)' A simulated high SG - ;
b) SG water level signals cycle the b) Functional tests of each division will be performed by level signal closes the su SG isolation and flow control valves. simulating high and low SG isolation valves and flow l water level signals. control valves in its associated [
i division. A simulated !cw SG water level signal opens the SG J isolation valves and flow control valves in its associated division.
a Tier 2 information EFWS Actuation Confirmation of EFWS actuation on an EFAS or an AFAS will be conducted with the EFWS in th
- normal s: mdby lineup. The test may be coducted by sequentially testing individual component actuation when the EFAS or 'AFAS output relays are energized l(i.e., the tignal and/or power Icads to the other components may be lifted.) Each - [
component will be tested using both an AFAS and an EFAS. The test to confirm cycling of valves on EFAS or AFAS l}
signals and resets will be performed by first introducing a signal that. energizes the Engineered Safety Features - t Component Control System (ESF-CCS) output relays and then introducing a signal that deenergizes the ESF-CCS output i relays. This process places the ESF-CCS logic in its reset state for the next actuation signal and in its actuated state for the next reset signal.
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. s svSTm s0+- EMER_GENCY FE_EDWATER SYSTEM Inspections. TcSts, Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Inspections. Tests. Analyses Mceptance Critrria Certified Design Commitment 5.a) The Certified Design Commit-5.a) Each ERVS pump delivers at 5.a) ERVS functional tests of each ment is met.
ERYS pump will be per-I least 500 gallons per minute to the steam generator (s) against formed to determine as-built a steam generator feedwater system flow vs. steam gener-ator pressure. Analyses will nozzle pressure of 1217 psia.
be performed to convert the
, test results to the conditions of .f the Certified Design Commit-ment.
b) The Certified Design Commit-b) ERVS functional tests will be ment is met.
b) Maximum flow to each SG is performed with both pumps in 800 gpm with both pumps in a division running. Analyses the division running, against a steam generator pressure of 0 wi!I be used to convert the test
' results to the conditions of the psig. Certified Design Commitment. f kTAAC 5.a and 5.h support a safety analysis basis. !
j Tier 2 Information EFWS Flow System minimum flow will be determined by operating one EFWS pump ct a time. j E l
pump will be tested with flow aligned to the steam generator flow at 1217 psia SG reedwater nozzle pressure, using calculated system resistance.
The test to determine system maximum flow will be conducted by operating both EFW pumps in a division with flow aligned to the steam generator supplied by that division. Analysis will convert flow results to an expected flow at 0 psig SG feedwater nozzle pressure using calculated system resistan ;
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sysrEm 80+~ EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM.
Inspections. Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria l
l Acceptance Criteria Inspections. Tests. Analyses Certified Design Commitment
- 6. Each ERVsT internal volume 1
- 6. Inspection of construction is at least 350,000 gallons f
- 6. Each emergency feedwater records for the ERVsTs will storage tank has an internal above the ERV pump suction be performed and the internal volume of at least 350,000 line penetrations. f volume of each tank available gallons above the ERV pump for emergency feedwater will I
I suction line penetrations.
be calculated.
ITAAC 6 supports a safety analysis basis. i
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- sysrim 80+- lEMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM .
Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and AccentanceiCriterit k .N Inspections. Tests. An_abh Acceptance Criteria Certified Desien Commitment
- 7. Inspection of the control room - - 7. The instrumentation indica :
- 7. EFWS instrumentation indica-for the ava;! ability of instru- ' tions and alarms shown on' tions and alarms shown on .
mentation indications and Figure 1.10.4-1 are available'in' Figure 1.10,4-1 are available in..
the Control Room. Controls .alanns identified in the Cer--- the Control Room. EFW con.
- tified Design Commitment will trols operate as specified in the are available in the control be performed. Tests will be. Certified Design Commitment.
room to start and stop the :
EF V pumps, and open and . performed using the EFW con-close the EFW pump steam trols in the Control Room.
turbine supply valves, steam generator isolation valves, and flow control valves. __
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sysmi so+~ EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM Insp3ctions. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acccotance Criteria Certified Desinn Commitment A test of the power availabliity 8. The Certified Design Commit-safety-related ERVS compon- 8.
- 8. ment is met.
ents described in the Design to the comoonents described in Description for each division of the Design Description for the the ERVS are powered from EFWS will be conducted with their respective Class IE power supplied from the per-busses with the exception of manently instnIIed cIcctrical containment isolation valves power buses.
and associated containment isolation valve instrumentation and controls. (Power for con-tainment isolation valves and their associated instrumen-tation and contrGls is ad-dressed in Section 1.6.6.)
ITAAC 8 supports-a safety analysis basis (Single Failure).
' /
sysT nt80+~- EMERGENCY: FEEDWATER SYSTEM ..
- Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Inspections. Tests, Analvs_es Acceptance Criteria-Certified Desien Commitment Visual Inspections of ERVs 9. Outside of containment, a
- 9. - Outside containment, the two 9.
divisional mechanical separ- divisional wall separates the mechanical divisions of the ations will be perfomied. two EITVs mechanical EIRVs are physically separated divisions.
except for the cross-connect
. lines between EFWSTs and between divisional EBV pump dischargilines.
ITAAC.9 verifies the design based on PRA insights and a safety analysis' basis (Single Failure)..
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sxrns so+- EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM Lnspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Acceplance Criteria Inspections. Tests. Annines Qrtified Design Commitment
- 10. Tests of each EFW pump in lu. Minimum recirculation flow meets oc acceds the pump
- 10. The now recirculation line the minimum now and full from each EFW pump vendor's required now. Full l Dow test modes will be flow from each pump (at least t discharge back to its associated conducted with Dow directed 500 gpm) is returned to the EFWST provides required to the EFWST through the l
EFW pump minimum now and EFWSTs.
pump's recirculation lines.
permits testing each EFW l
l pump at full now.
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COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM SalMy_Fametions
- Removes heat generated from plant's safety and non-safety components during:
- Normal Operations Shutdown
- Refueling
- Design Basis Accidents Feainrfs
- Two separate CCW Divisions - Each division has the heat dissipation capacity to achieve and maintain safe cold shutdown.
- Normally operating
- Automatic isolation provisions
- Redundant valves are provided on the supply and return lines to cooling loops composed of non-ASME Code Component Cooling Water piping. These valves close upon receipt of an SIAS.
- A Low-low CCW surge tank level signal j terminates cooling water flow to cooling loops composed of non-ASME code piping.
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SYSTERIQi" CCWS ITAAC/PRA Insights- ,
PRA-based SYS 80tdesign enhancements
- two independent divisions . .
- two redundant pumps per division
= capability of isolating non-safety related-loads when required t
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CCWS ITAAC/ Safety Analysis Insights' j .
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- Minimum flow rate to a containment '
spray heat exchanger is 8000 gallons per j
- minute I * "'A single failure in the CCWS will not
- prevent the system from performing as
. sf ated above.
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WATEM SYSTEM MAXfuP UNE TO EACH . FIGURE 1.9.2.2-1 SYSTEM 80+"
eCw suocE wt COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM
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Inspections. Tests. Analyses.:and' Accep_tance t Criteria y
Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria Certified Desien Commitment -
.Visualinspections of the as. 1. The as-built configuration of ' ei
- 1. - A general configuration for the .. 1.
built CCWS configuration will the Component Cooling.Wa'ter Component Ccoling Water System is in accordance with :
. Syrtem is'shown in' Figure . be conducted. 4 Figure 1.9.2.21 for the ecm- -
-1.9.2.2 1. ponents and equipment shown.
t ITAAC 1 verified the CCWS configuration based on PRA insights.
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jCOMPONENT COOLING _ WATER: SYSTEM- -
- lnspections. Tests; Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
' Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria .
Certified Design _ Commitment Visual inspections of the as- 2. Outside of. containment, a
- 2. Outside 6f containment, the. 2.
built system configuration will divisional wall separates the two' CCWS ditisions cre
- be conducted. two CCWS divisions.
physically separate 1 - ._
ITAAC 2 verifies the CCWS configuration based .on PRA insights.
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e se so+~ COMPOBENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM Inspections, Tests, Analyses. and Acceptalice Criteria Inspections,_ Tests, Analyses beceptance Criteria CediGed Design Commitment 3.a) Test will be performed and 3.a) The heat dissipation capacity 3.a) The CCWS has the capacity to analysis prepared to determine of the CCWS exceeds the heat dinipate the heat loads of con- gener-ation capacity of the nected cc:idensers, coolers, heat dissipation capacity based connected condensers, coolers, and heat exchangers during on as-built CCWS serviced and heat ex-changers during operation, shutdown, com-ponents and measured flow rates. The analysis is operation, shut-down, refueling, and design basis refueling and design basis accident conditions. based upon the following:
accident conditions.
- CCWS flow to cooled com-ponents for each plant mode.
- SSWS flow to each component coolitig water heat exchanger.
- Maximum design basis station service water inlet temperature.
- Vendor heat exchanger data.
b) Test will be performed and b) The heat dissipation capacity b) Each division has heat of each CCWS division exceeds dissipation capacity to achieve analysis prepared for each division for heat dissipation the heat loads generated for and maintain cold shutdown. achievement and maintenance capacity to achieve and maintain cold shutdown. of cold shutdown.
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sysrgs so+- COMPONENT CODLING WATER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Acceptance Criteria Certified thign Commitment Insgwions. Tests. Analyses
- 3. (Continued) c) Test will be performed to c) The CDC is met.
c) The CCWS provides at least l confirm CCWs flow rate to 8000 gpm to each containment the conhinment spray heat spray heat exchanger. exchangers.
l ITAAC 3.c supports a safety analysis basis.
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svsTsu 80+- COMPONEN'I' COOLING WATER SYSTEM Inspections, Tests; Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria Certified Desien Commitment Inspections of the construction 4. The Certified Design Com-
- 4. Figure 1.9.2.2-1 depicts the 4.
records and the as-built mitment is met.
ASME code classifications for the pressure retaining ' installation will be perfonned.
components.
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SYSTEM 80+" _ COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests - Anal.yses, and Acceptance Criteria T
Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria .
- . Cer@ed Desitm Commitment
- 5. A hydrostatic test will be ' 5. Tne results of the' hydrostatic
- Component Cooling Water
' System retain their integrity the Component Cooling Water .the Component Cooling Water under internal. pressures System required to be
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System confor:n with the hydrostatically tested by the requirements in the ASME -
experienced during service.
ASME code. Code, Section HI.
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sys m iso +~ _ COMPONENT COOUNG WATER SYS'IT!_,M hisputions. Tests, Analyses,_and Acceptance _ Criteria Arcepiance Cn3rda i Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyfes Certi&5Uhtgn_ .
f Test to mcasure CCWS pt;mp 6. The calculated available NPSII Component cooling water is 6. exceeds pump NPSH required !
- 6. NPSH will be performed. An !
supplied to each CCWS pump by the vendor for the pump.
analysis for NISII will be pre-at a pirssure greater than the pared based upon test data. as- )
nel positive suction head built data and vendor pump ;
(NPSH) required.
records. -._
kisr 2 information CCWS Pump NPSH The analysis will be based on the fo!!owing:
Component cooling water surge tank and component cooling water pump locations and cicvalimts.
- Component cooling water siirge thnk water Icvel at minimum value.
- Design basis component cooling water temperature.
Pressure losses for pump inlet piping and components.
- Both CCW pumps operating in a division.
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It svSTem 80+- COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM
. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Accept. ta nce Criteria
~ Certined Desien Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 7.a) Redundant _ valves are provided 7.a) Inspection of the as-built 7.a) The Certified Design -
on the supply and return lines configuration will be Committment is met.
to cooling loops composed of' performed.
non-ASME code component cooling water piping.
7.b) A test will be performed using 7.b) The valves close upon receipt-7.b) Redundant valves on the supply and return lines to a simulated SIAS signal. of a simulated SIAS. ,
cooling. loops composed of non-ASME code component cooling water piping close upon receipt of a Safety injection Actuation -
Signal (SIAS).
c) The valves on the supply and c) A test will be performed using c) Valves close on loss of motive return lines to cooling loops Ja simulated or actual loss of - power.
composed of non-ASME code . motive power to the valves.
component cooling water
- piping fail to closed positions.
ITAAC 7.a and 7.b: verifies the design based on PRA-insights.
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svsT at80+ - -COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTFsM Inspections, Tests. Analyses, and Accep_t_ance Criteria Certified Desien' Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 8.a) The containment isolation 8.a) Tests will be performed using . 8.a) Containment isolation valves to-valves in the CCWS piping to simulated CiAS and SIAS the RCP do not close in -
the reactor ccolant pumps do- , signals. response to a CIAS or a SIAS.
not close upon receipt of a.
Containment Isolation Actua-tion Signal (CIAS) or a Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS).
b) Tests closure capabilities will b) The Certified Design b) These containment isolation valves can be' operated to be conducted for the Commitment is met.
opened and closed positions containment isolation valves.
with controls in the Control Room.
f ITAAC 8.a and 8.b verifies the design based on PRA insights.
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sysTat80+ - , COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM' Inspections, Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Certified Design Commitment- Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 9. Inspections of Control Room 9.a) The Certified Design
- 9. Instrument indications and instrument indications and Commitment is met.
alarins depicted in Figure 1.9.2.2-1 are available in the alarms will be performed.
Control Room.
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mmui mm mumm sys nm 80+~ COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM hnspretions, Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria i
Acceytance Criteria Lnspections. Tests. Analyses 7
Certified Desien Commitment
- 10. CCWS controls operate in l
Controls are available in the
- 10. Tests of initiation and accordance with the Certified 10.a) teimination, both Control Room as specified Design Commitment.
automatically and manually, of below: component cooling water flow l will be performed. STAS and
- 1) Component cooling water CSAS signals will be flow to each shutdown simulated. A component cooling heat exchanger can cooling water surge tank low-be initiated and terminated. low level signal will be simu-lated.
- 2) Component cooling water flow to each containment spray heat cy. changer can be terminated.
- 3) Component cooling water flow to each spent fuel pool heat exchanger can be initiated and terminated.
ITAAC 10.a)3) verifies the design based on PRA insights.
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. SYSTEM 80+"- COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM - 1[ .-[
InSnections. Tests. AnativSes. and Acceptance Criteria 1 Certified Design Committnent Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria t
10.b) Automated initiation or ter- ,
mination~of component cool- ,
ing flow is as specified below:
1)' Component cooling water ,
-flow to cooling loops com-
- posed of non-ASME code-piping is terminated auto- ,
matically upon the receipt-of a componer. (ooling water surge tank low-low Icvel signal.
- 2) Component cooling water.-
now to each containment -
spray heat exchanger is init-lated automatically upon re-.-
ceipt of a Containment Spray Actuation Signal-(CSAS).
- 3) Component cooling water flow to each spent fuel pool heat exchanger is temi- .
inated automatically by a
- Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS).
ITAAC 10.b)1) and 10.b)3); verifies 'the design based on PRA . insights.
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sys REM 80+- COMPONENT CdOLING WATER SYSTEM ^
2 Lnspections, Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Acceptance Criteria .
Inspections. Tests. Analyses Certified Desien Commitment
- 11. Safety related CCWS com-. 11. -A test of power availability to 11. Safety related CCWS com-the CCWS components des- ponents described in the ponents described in the cribed in the Design Descrip- Design Descriptio'n for the Design Description for each tion will be conducted with Component Cooling Water division'of the CCWS are powered from their respective power supplied from the per- System receive electrical power divisional Class IE busses with manently installed electric in accordance with the Cer-the exception of containment; power busses.' tified Design Commitment.
isolation valves and associated containment isolation valve.-
instrumentation and controls.-
(Power for containment isol-ation valves and their assoc-iated instrumentation and con-trols is addressed in Section 1.6.6J h
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. . DLH271.ep1 I&C DIVERSITY AND HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING REVIEW STATUS 4
ABB-CE - NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING DECEMBER 9, 1992 l
_m ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _
M DLH267.wp 1
NRC HUMAN FACTORS: PROGRAM REVIEW-MODEl. ELEMENTS 1
- 1. HFE PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 1 2.. OPERATING EXPERIENCE REVIEW :
- 3. FUNCTION ANALYSIS
- 4. FUNCTION ALLOCATION
- 5. TASK ANALYSIS
- 6. HUMAN SYSTEM INTERFACE DESIGN
- 7. PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT
- 8. HF VERIFICATION-AND; VALIDATION 1
e 9
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DL}i26 6 . WP - 5 AS.8-CE / NRC AGREEMENTS ON 11FE PROGRAM REVIEW ELEMENTS 1 - 4 a
(FROM Aua 20, SEPT 10-11, & SEPT 28 MTo.s)
THE FOLLOWING DESIGN PROCESS ELEMENTS CAN BE CLOSED-00T PRIOR TO CERTIFICATION:
o HUMAN FACTORS PROGRAM PLAN (1) o OPERATING EXPERIENCE REVIEW (2) o SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS (3) o ALLOCATION OF FUNCTION (4)
AS CLOSED ITEMS, THESE HFE ELEMENTS WILL BE OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF ITAAC, WHICH WILL THUS NOT PLACE REQUIREMENTS ON ELEMENTS 1-4, PER SE. (FSER WOULD IDENTIFY THESE ELEMENTS AS COMPLETE.)
Dul266 NP
- AD ARB-CE / NRC AGREEMENTS Oy i
HfE PRODRAM REVIEW ELEMENT.S 5 - 8 (FROM Auo 20, SEPT 10-11, & SEPT 28 MTG.S)
THE F0' LOWING DESIGN PROCESS HEIHODOLQEIES WILL BE A) EVALUATED, WHERE APPROPRIATE, IN TERMS OF THE RCS PANEL DESIGN; e) AEPROVED PRIOR TO CERTIFICATION:
c) APPLIED FOLLOW 7.NG CERTIFICATION (VIA ITAAC/DAC):
o TASK ANALYSIS (5) o HUMAN-SYSTEM INTERFACE DESIGN (6) o PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT (7) o VERIFICATION & VALIDATION (8) t l
CLOSURE OF THESE ELEMENTS WILL BE ACHIEVED BY PERFORMING THE TESTS AND MEETING THE CRITERIA -
SPECIFIED IN THE ITAAC/DAC.
n
, DTJf 26 6.WP
- 14 ADJ.-EfLEE3315.T FOR APPROVAL Of NUPLEX 80+ DESGN FEATURES (ALWR-92-203, APR 9: ALWR-92-422, SEPT 18) r BESIDES REVIEWING THE HFE PROCESS ELEMENTS, ,
IE1T_(f.E., VERIFY) '(HE_ SUITABILITY OF Tile MAIN CONTROL ROSM (MCR) TIER 1-D151GH FEATURES:
o MCR CONFIGURATION o IPS0 .
o STANDARD (I.E., GENERIC) CONTROL PANEL FEATURES (EXEMPLIFIED IN RCS PANEL DESIGN & HOCKUP):
DPS DISPLAY HIERARCHY
- DIAS ALARM TILE DISPLAY
- DIAS DEDICATED PARAMETER DISPLAY
- DIAS MULTIPLE PARAMETER DISPLAY I - CCS PROCESS CONTROLLER DISPLAY l - CCS PUSH 80TTON SWITCH CONFIGURATION i
l THESE STANDARD FEATURES WILL BE DETAILED IN f THE DESIGN CONTROL DOCUMENT.
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i RESOLUTIDH DT CONCCRNS VIA DESIGl PROCESS ITERATIDN DSER SUDHITTALS4
- 1. HP PQn - Staff Resolutions Plan s 2. Operatino [qRevlew l Experience n
r
- 3. Systen -
Qrg Review A
) Functional Analysts
- 4. Allocaton of y
Functons C "C'rn5
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Upen Itens, e tc. V DAC/ITAAC ACTIVITIES -
Cer tification - ,
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1 Approval
- 5. Task Amtysis < I Statt $ r,, ggt ,',
Review )< 7,y, g , 3,,gn 3
/ Procedur e
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d' 8. VerlFication < Guidelines 4-W tidsflon 4 - a u s Itoms Concerns Trad<!ng D-Base Resolutions V
DPERATIONS i
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DLH271.wp2 RECENT ABB-CE - NRC HUMAN FACTORS INTERACTION
_DATE MEETING /RESULTS-11/19 HEETING WITH NRC HF STAFF /BNL*
- VERBAL COMMENTS ON: .
HUMAN FACTORS PROGRAM PLAN (HFPP)
OPERATING EXPERIENCE REVIEW (OER) REPORT CLOSURE OF NUPLEX 80+ SPOS APPROACH TO NUREG-0737, SUPPLEMENT 1 11/19 HEETING WITH NRC MANAGEMENT
- EPG INVENTORY COMMITMENT BY ABB-CE RE-ESTABLISHED GOAL TO CLOSE HFE PROGRAM REVIEW HODEL ELEMENTS 1-4 PRIOR TO CERTIFICATION RE-ESTABLISHEn GOAL TO APPROVE NUPLEX 80+
DESIGN FEATu 12/4 CONFERENCE CALL WITH NRC HF STAFF /BNL.
REs0LuTION OF COMMENTS ON:
HFPP ,
OER REPORT
- BNL - BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY
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t
. Out271,wo3 STATUS OF SUBMITTALS FOR HF ELEMENTS 1-4 LLEMENT . SUBMITTAL, STATUS.
I 1 DRAFT REVISED HFPP SusMITTED 11/5/92 l STAFF /BNL COMMENTS RECEIVED 11/19 & 11/29/92 FINAL REVISION EXPECTED 12/11/92 2 DRAFT OER REPORT SUBMITTED 11/5/92 STAFr/BNL COMMENTS RECEIVED 11/19 & 11/29/92 FINAL REVISION COMPLETED 2 DRAFT NUPLEx 80+ INFORMATION EXPECTED COMPLETION SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION BASES 12/11/92 DOCUMENT FINAL SUBHITTAL PENDING COMMENTS 3/4 DRAFT FUNCTION ANALYSIS AND EXPECTED 12/9/92 FUNCTIONS ALLOCATION REPORT FINAL SUBHITTAL PENDING COMMENTS
- w w
, ,, . DLH271.wp4 STATUS OF SUBMITTALS FOR HF ELEMENTS 5-8 ELEMENT . SilBMUlat, S.IAT_llS 5 TASK ANALYSIS HETHoDotoGY ORAFT 1/4/93 REVISION SUDMITTAL 1/21/93 6 RESPONSES To HSI OPEN ITEMS IN DRAFT 12/15/92 DSER SUBMITTAL 1/21/93 7 OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SUDMITTAL 1/21/93 INFORMATION PaoGnAM REv: SED EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SunMITTAL 1/21/93 GUIDELINES 8 HF VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION DRAFT 1/4/93 MAN SUDMITTAL 1/21/93
________________-______-____N_________-__-__-____-___
DLil271 Wp5 POST JANUARY HUMAN FACTORS EFFORTS
&QTIVITY/SRilli1TTAL LEJ1T_ATIVE DATE HUMAN FACTons ITAAC 2/93 NUPLEx 80+ DCRDR AUDIT fly NRC 3/93 EPG INVENTORY OF ALARMS. INDICATIONS AND 3-4/93 CONTROLS
. _ _ = .. __ _ _- - . - .- - . - - - - . -. -
t
, DLH271,wp6 I&C DIVERSITY - STATUS
- PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADF AT IDENTIFYING TECHNICAL OPTIONS FOR MANUAL ACTUATION OF ESF FUNCTIONS AND DEDICATED DISPLAY OF KEY PARAMETERS VIA MEANS NOT SUBJECT TO A COMMON HODE FAILURE.
- THE COMMON MODE FAILURE ANALYSIS HAS BEEN REVIEWED, A HEE. TING TO RESOLVE OPEN ISSUES IS SCHEDULED FOR JANUARY 6, 1993.
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