ML20056G954

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Summary of 930818 Meeting W/Duke Engineering & Svcs in Charlotte,Nc Re Staff Review of Safeguards Aspects of ABB-CE Sys 80+ Design
ML20056G954
Person / Time
Site: 05200002
Issue date: 08/30/1993
From: Stewart Magruder
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 9309070367
Download: ML20056G954 (5)


Text

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! [., UNITED STATES j.!;/  %}y PtlUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. D C. 20555 0001

, "i ( jb 9.,,,," August 30, 1993  :

Docket No.52-002 APPLICANT: ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc. (ABB-CE)

PROJECT: CE System 80+

SUBJECT:

PUBLIC MEETING AUGUST 18, 1993, REGARDING SAFEGUARDS ISSUES FOR ABB-CE SYSTEM 80+

On August 18, 1993, a public meeting was held at the offices of Duke Engineering and Services (DE&S) in Charlotte, North Carolina, between representatives of ABB-CE, DE&S, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The purpose of the meeting was to discuss issues rehted to the NRC staff's review of the safeguards aspects of ABB-CE's System 80+ design. The main topics of discussion included: (1) insider vulnerability analysis, (2) control room indication of critical manual valves, and (3) the vital equipment list. During the meeting, five draft safety evaluation report (DSER) open items were technically resolved. Enclosure 1 provides a list of attendees. Enclosure 2 contains the material presented by ABB-CE.

The first topic discussed at the meeting was the insider vulnerability analysis. In order to make sure that everyone was clear on the scope of the analysis, some ground rules were agreed upon by the group. An insider was defined as a single individual with no weapons or bombs. It was decided that the purpose of the analysis was to determine what could reasonably be changed in the design to prevent an insider from manipulating valves or damaging equipment such that he or she could cause a core melt. The NRC staff emphasized the importance of being able to detect when an insider is tampering with important equipment, and that the equipment of concern should be determined by probabilistic risk assessment insights.

The insider vulnerability analysis is the only remaining DSER open issue in the safeguards review. During the meeting, the following actions were agreed upon as a path to resolution:

(1) ABB-CE will review the damage control measures listed in CESSAR Appendix 13A, Section 5.1 and state why they were, or were not, implemented.

(2) ABB-CE will add a COL action item to CESSAR Section 13.6 on insider  :

vulnerability.

(3) ABB-CE needs to add a more detailed discussion to the CESSAR describing how the design is protected from the accidents of interest.

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ADOCK 05200002 PDR

t August 30, 1993 The next topic was the issue of adding indications in the control room for critical manual valves. After a brief discussion, it was agreed that the valves listed in Enclosure 2 should have position indications in the control room.

The last topic was the list of vital equipment and areas. The list provided in the CESSAR was reviewed by the group. It was agreed that the steam generator pressure isolation valves in the wet layup and blowdown systems should be added to the list.

The meeting concluded with a review of the status of all of the DSER open items in the safeguards area. It was agreed that, with the exception of the insider vulnerability analysis, all of the issues have been resolved. The NRC reviewer will continue to interact with ABB-CE m DE&S personnel to resolve this remaining issue.

(Original signed by T. Essig for)

Stewart L. Magruder, Project Manager Standardization Project Directorate Associate Directorate for Advanced Reactors and License Renewal Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

As stated cc w/ enclosures:

See next page DISTRIBUTION w/ enclosures:

Docket File PDST R/F DCrutchfield PDR PShea SMagruder Distribution w/o enclosures:

TMurley/FMiraglia WTravers RBorchardt MFranovich TWambach TEssig PMcKee, 9D24 FYoung, 9D24 ACRS (11)

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

[

OFC: LA:PD Q A R PM:PDST:ADAR* PSGB:DRSS* AR NAME: PShea WN SMagruder:sg. FYoung TEssig DATE: 08 L3 08/27/93 08/27/93 08/Jo/93 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY: DOCUMENT NAME: MSUM0818.SLM

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l ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc. Docket No.52-002 cc: Mr. C. B. Brinkman, Acting Director Nuclear Systems Licensing ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc.

1000 Prospect Hill Road Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500 L

Mr. C. B. Brinkman, Manager Washington Nuclear Operations ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc.

12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 330 Rockville, Maryland 20852 Mr. Stan Ritterbusch Nuclear Systems Licensing ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc.

1000 Prospect Hill Road Post Office Box 500 Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500 Mr. Sterling Franks U.S. Department of Energy NE-42 Washington, D.C. 20585 Mr. Steve Goldberg l Budget Examiner 725 17th Street, N.W. -,

Washington, D.C. 20503 Mr. Raymond Ng 1776 Eye Street, N.W.

Suite 300 Washington, D.C. 20006 Joseph R. Egan, Esquire Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 2300 N Street, N.W.  !

Washington, D.C. 20037-1128 Mr. Regis A. Matzie, Vice President Nuclear Systems Development ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc.

1000 Prospect Hill Road -

Post Office Box 500 Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500 *

/

ABB-CE SYSTEM 80+

SAFEGUARDS ISSUES MEETING ATTENDEES August 18, 1993 Name Oraanization T. Crom DE&S G. Pollard DE&S L. Davis DE&S D. Finnicum ABB-CE S. Ritterbusch ABB-CE ~

F. Young NRC S. Magruder NRC L

i Enclosure 1 l

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a These are manual isolation valves which should have position 4 indication in the control room for security purposes. Please run this list by Joe Longo's people.

SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM I Safety Injection Pump 1 Suction Isolation Valve SI-470 Safety Injection Pump 3 Suction Isolation Valve SI-130 Safety Injection Pump 2 Suction Isolation Valve SI-402 Safety Injection Pump 4 Suction Isolation Valve SI-131 Safety Injection Pump 1 Discharge Isolation Valve SI-476 Safety Injection Pump 3 Discharge Isolation Valve SI-435 Safety Injection Pump 2 Discharge Isolation Valve SI-478 Safety Injection Pump 4 Discharge Isolation Valve SI-447 NOTE: The valves for pumps 1 and 3 are shown on Figure 6.3.2-1A. The valves for pumps 2 and 4 are shown on Figure 6.3.2-1B. All valves are locked open and have extension stem operators.

EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM I

l Steam Driven EFW Pump 1 Suction Isolation Valve EF-208 l Motor Driven EFW Pump 1 Suction Isolation Valve EF-210 Steam Driven EFW Pump 2 Suction Isolation Valve EF-209 Motor Driven EFW Pump 2 Suction Isolation Valve EF-211 Steam Driven EFW Pump 1 Discharge Isolation Valve EF-338 Motor Driven EFW Pump 1 Discharge Isolation Valve EF-340 Steam Driven EFW Pump 2 Discharge Isolation Valve EF-339 Motor Driven EFW Pump 2 Discharge Isolation Valve EF-341 NOTE: These valves are shown on Figure 10.4.9-1.1. All valves are locked open.

l SG 1 Supply to EFW Pump Turbine 1 Isolation Valve EF-238 SG 2 Supply to EFW Pump Turbine 2 Isolation Valve EF-239

[ NOTE: These valves are shown on Figure 10.4.9-1.2. All valves l

are locked open.

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0 %Irpen Spy f,w s, B la ch,r g Enclosure 2