ML20056E193

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Summary of 930715 Meeting w/ABB-CE in Windsor,Ct Re Differences Between Palo Verde Steam Generators & Sys 80+ Steam Generators in Connection W/Sgtr Event at Palo Verde. List of Attendees & Viewgraphs Encl
ML20056E193
Person / Time
Site: 05200002
Issue date: 07/30/1993
From: Wambach T
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 9308200240
Download: ML20056E193 (39)
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Text

Dr L.1 IT L 7- t UNITED STATES g

  • k I ,,Ij NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON D C. 2055&0001 f

July 30,1993

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Docket No.52-002 APPLICANT: ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc. (ABB-CE)

PROJECT: CE System 80+

SUBJECT:

MEETING

SUMMARY

FOR NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC) AND ABB-CE SENIOR MANAGEMENT MEETING ON JULY 15, 1993 A public management meeting between ABB-CE and NRC was held on July 15, 1993, at the ABB-CE office in Win *or, Connecticut. The attendees at the meeting are listed in Enclosure 1. e material presented at the meeting except for proprietary material is provided in Enclosure 2.

ABB-CE gave a presentation on the differences between the Palo Verde steam generators and System 80+ steam generators as they relate to the steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) event at Palo Verde. This led to the discussion on SGTR containment bypass. The ABB-CE position is given in Enclosure 2 and concentrates on prevention. The NRC stated that certain mitigation features (e.g., N-16 monitors on the steamlines, safety valve discharge routing back to containment, increased design pressure and safety valve setting for shell-side of the steam generators, etc.) should be explored further.

The severe accident hydrogen analysis was discussed and ABB-CE presented the material shown in Enclosure 2. The NRC stated that more analyses may be needed for stratification and hydrogen concentration distribution to justify number and placement of igniters. The NRC also stated that the use of passive autocatalytic recombiner should be considered and discussed. An NRC panel to provide a guidance position on hydrogen control would meet in early August.

ABB-CE will be quickly informed of the results.

For the human factors engineering issue of a plant operating procedures inspection, test and analysis acceptance criteria, which ABB-CE proposed in response to an NRC staff request, NRC management indicated that the staff position was under reconsideration.

9308200240 930730 PDR A

ADOCK 05200002 PDR QFo3 l \\ J

(/' July 30, 1993 The information presented at this meeting that was declared proprietary by ABB-CE is expected to be submitted on the Palo Verde docket (Docket No. 50-529). The next senior management meeting was tentatively scheduled for August 16, 1993, at the NRC office in Rockville, Maryland.

(%8gi y y Thomas V. Wambach, Project Manager Standardization Project Directorate Associate Directorate for Advanced Reactors and License Renewal Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

As stated cc w/ enclosures:

See next page DISTRIBUTION w/ enclosures:

Docket File PDST R/F DCrutchfield PDR TWambach RPerch, 8H7 PShea DISTRIBUTION w/o enclosures:

TMurley/FMiraglia, 12G18 WRussell, 12G18 RBorchardt AThadani, 8E2 BDLiaw, 7D25 SMagruder MFranovich JMoore, 15B18 TGody Jr., 17G21 ACRS (11) MPratt, 7E4 EJordan, MNBB3701 0FC: LA:PDST:ADAR PM: PDST; ADAR/ (A)SC:PDST:ADAR 4

NAME: PShea A ta TWimbakhhsf TEssig'/0t, DATE: 07/;3C/93 07/7(/93 07/b/93 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY:

DOCUMENT NAME: MTSUM715.TW

s' I , ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc. Docket No.52-002 cc: Mr. C. B. Brinkman, Acting Director Nuclear Systems Licensing ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc. -

1000 Prospect Hill Road Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500 Mr. C. B. Brinkman, Manager Washington Nuclear Operations ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc.

12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 330 Rockville, Maryland 20852 Mr. Stan Ritterbusch Nuclear Systems Licensing ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc.

1000 Prospect Hill Road Post Office Box 500 Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500 Mr. Sterling Franks U.S. Department of Energy NE-42 Washington, D.C. 20585 Mr. Steve Goldberg Budget Examiner 725 17th Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20503 Mr. Raymond Ng 1776 Eye Street, N.W.

Suite 300 Washington, D.C. 20006 Joseph R. Egan, Esquire Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 2300 N Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20037-1128 Mr. Regis A. Matzie, Vice President Nuclear Systems Development ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc.

1000 Prospect Hill Road Post Office Box 500 Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500

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1

! ABB-CE SENIOR MANAGEMENT MEETING JULY 15, 1993 l

NAME ORGANIZATION -

Thomas E. Murley NRR William T. Russell NRR/ADT Ashok Thadani NRR/DSSA B. D. Liaw NRR/DE R. W. Borchardt NRR/PDST Thomas V. Wambach NRR/PDST Michael Franovich NRR/PDST Stewart L. Magruder NRR/PDST Charles Brinkman ABB-CE Regis Matzie ABB-CE Stan Ritterbusch ABB-CE Kashmira Mali DOE George Hess ABB-CE Henry Windsor ABB-CE Wan-yong Chon ABB-CE Lyle Gerdes ABB-CE Fred L. Carpentino ABB-CE Tom Crom DE&S Steven Stamm SWEC Laird Bruster SWEC Bill Heilker ABB-CE George A. Davis ABB-CE Enclosure 1

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Agenda o 9:00 NRC Opening Statement o 9:10 DOE Opening Statement o 9:20 ABB-CE Opening Statement o 9:30 Schedule issues a 10:00 Technical issues Discussion o Steam Generator Design Summary )

o SGTR Containment Bypass o l&C Diversity LBB Applicability o Severe Accident Hydrogen Analysis o ECCS Bypass e Structural Design a Seismic Margin Analysis o Human Factors Engineering a 12:00 Lunch g g gg 7%EFER

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ABB-CE Overview Progress since June 3rd Senior Management Meeting o ITAAC submitted o Amendments O, P and Q submitted o Technical resolution reached on DSER Open items and Follow-On questions o Integrated review complete o Tracking system implemented o Meaningful o Thorough o Common e Resolution reached on several complex technical issues o Remaining issue resolutions not expected to significantly impact ITAAC Sk E EE e- _ ,_

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O Schedule Focus o ABB-CE submittals on schedule with structural design detail slightly behind e Major areas of schedular concern:

o Structural design analysis o Selected submittals stC! unreviewed e Comrnission policy decisions o e.g., LBB for l&C diversity and PASS a ACRS review will require staff initiatives o DCD approval before FDA issued A Et Et e-e_,_

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Resources Focus o ABB-CE commitment o ABB-CE expectations of NRC o Current reviewers continue until open items technically resolved and then closed o Commitment to resources for reviews which have just begun or are not yet initiated o Management of subcontractor reviews A It It f'% FIF

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ITAAC Focus

_ _ _ _ _ _ .. . . _ _ _ _ .~ ., _ _ _ . , _ _ _ , _ , _ = _ , , _ _ _

o Submittal completed o Supplementary material provided to NRC and added to CESSAR-DC e Reviewed by ABB-CE management e No significant impacts expected from remaining open items t

l l e Recommend ITA'AC Team review begin immediately A EP Et

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Schedule Overview o Significant review effort and productive meetings a Integrated review completed in June a CESSAR-DC Amendments O, P, Q totaling 6600 pages e Structural design effort remains on a tight schedule 4

a Follow-on questions, especially on new issues, incomplete reviews, or NRC subcontractor reviews remain a challenge A It It

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Purpose:

Track all DSER and Follow-On items to closure o Detailed database for daily use:

o 937 DSER items o 718 Follow-On questions l e Each is tied to one of 37 issues for management reporting l

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o For'each item in the database:

o NRC tediich o Chapter and item number o Description o NRC status (open, technically resolved, closed;!

o Milestone dates for...

o initial agreement (technically resolved) o Draft SAR submittal o Draft SAR agreement o SAR printing o FSER writeup (closed)

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O ABB-CE Resource Resolutions

- - - _ _ _ = - _ , _ _ _ - ~ . _ _ . _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ . , _ _

a Revised safety analysis now completed a DD/ITAAC required significant management and engineering effort o Integrated review completed o PRA now revised and SAMDA report updated a Piping design nearing completion o Structural design ongoing A It El 7%EDEp

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e Potential NRC Resource issues o Technical specifications (and EPGs) o Severe accident evaluation o Valve and instrument operability o Core-concrete interaction audit eSAMDAs e9 Sabotage vulnerability analysis 4

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7 SECONDARY MANWAY 2 40 0 8 HANDHOLE ECONOMlZER FEEDWATER 2 \

9 10 RECIRCULATION NOZZLE 1

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Steam Generator Parameters SMALL SYSTEM 80 SYSTEM 80 SYSTEM 80+

Plant Thermal Rating, MWt 3817 2825 3931 Steam Pressure at 100% Power, PSIA 1070 1070 1000 Primary Flow Rate, LBM/HR x 10 5 82.0 60.8 82.9 Hot Leg Temperature, F 621 621 615 Cold Leg Temperature, F 564.5 564.5 555.8 Feedwater Temperature, F 450 450 450 Liquid Inventory (Min. 45% WR), LB, 92,185 85,710 118,100 Boil Dry Time, Min.

Normal Level 40 44 54 Low Level (45% WR) 22 24 31 Tube Material 1600 1600 1690TT Number of Tubes 11,012 8,214 12,580 Avg. Tube Length, Ft 57.7 63.6 63.9 Heat Transfer Area, Ft2 124,800 102,500 157,838 Tube Support Grids 6F + 2P 8F + 3P 8F + 3P Longest Tube Span, in 43.25 39.72 36.83 Tubesheet Thickness, in 23.5 21.5 25.0 Dry Weight, Tons 743 ,

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Comparison of Sludge Management Capability

, SMALL Parameter SYSTEM 80 SYSTEM 80 SYSTEM 80+

Circulation Ratio 3.0 3.9 3.7m Hot Side Flow Dist. Baffle Yes No No Blowdown Rates:

A. Continuous Mode, LB/Sec.:

1. Normal Operation (0.2%) 4.8 3.5 4.8
2. Chemistry Excursion (1.0%) 23.8 17.7 23.8 B. High Capacity Mode, LB/Sec.:
1. Hot Side Full Power 131 147 ~150
2. Cold Side Full Power 336 295 ~ 300
3. Either Side Hot Standby 205 199 ~ 200 Provisions for Sludge Lancing No Yes Yes Notes: (1) Based on CRIBE Analysis A ED ED 7%BDED

4 Problem Statement

1. Tube rupture during steady state operation
2. Region of severe corrosion attack limited to upper hot side tube bundle -

" arc region"

3. Attack:

A. Some general shallow IGA B. 124-150 tubes have ODSCC indications C. Extensive metallography from four long pulled tubes (cut below 09H)

D. Consensus metallurgical diagnosis - caustic crevice attack aided by sulfur E. Some freespan attack under " ridge" deposits (consensus opinion that close tube spacing aided sludge buildup)

F. Deepest SCC initiated at local tube scratches under ridge deposit G. Some increased wear (fretting - corrosion?) in " arc region" H. Some ODSCC indication in tubesheet crevice and at 01H flow distribution baffle based on two short pulled tubes

4. Thermal-hydraulic analysis using ATHOS2, predicts high fluid quality and high " deposit parameter" in the " arc region" A ED ED 7"%EDER

O System 80+ SG Design Features which

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Mitigate Fouling and Tube Corrosion

1. Extensive laboratory testing by ABB-CE and reported in the literature have determined that inconel 690TT tubing has significantly more resistance to all forms of chemical induced cracking than inconel 600
2. Lower hot leg primary coolant temperature (615 F vice 621 F) improves tube material's resistance to all forms of corrosion attack
3. Higher circulation ratio due to decreased hot leg flow resistance - elimination of hot side vice cold side. The net result will be lower values of both steam quality and the deposit parameter on the upper hot side A ED ED H EFEB

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System 80+ SG Design Features which Mitigate l Fouling and Tube Corrosion (Continued)

4. High Capacity blowdown system can remove up to

! 150 lb/sec of fluid and solids deposited on the tubesheet during full power operation ,

5. The advanced design handholes provide efficient access for tubesheet sludge lancing including a wider tube lane and specially adapted economizer divider plates
6. The ventilated and unitized upper tube bundle support system provides greater resistance to i

small amplitude tube. fretting and wear

7. Increased heat transfer area margin provides ample tube plugging margin and higher margin relative to o tube fouling and subsequent steam pressure loss due to degradation of performance l

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SGTR Containment Bypass

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(Continued) o The SGTR analyses in Chapter 15 are technically resolved and show acceptable results in conformance with SRP guidelines o Best-estimate multiple SGTR (3 ruptures in each SG?

analyzed and 10 CFR100 dose criteria were met a Several RAls (440.156 - 159,229? have been answered by considering the feasibility and cost / benefit of additional design changes to System 80+ )

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SGTR Containment Bypass

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o SG design improvements o SGTR detection:

e Steam line area radiation monitors e SG blowdown radiation monitors

  • Condenser air radiation monitors e RCS pressure measurements e Pressurizer and SG level measurements A It EP

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SGTR Containment Bypass (Continued) o SGTR Mitigation:

a Four HPSis

  • Four ADVs with block valves a Four EFW pumps with cross-connects u Two EFW storage tanks a Safety Depressurization System

- Reactor Coolant Gas Vent System

- Rapid Depressurization System

-In-Containment Refueling Water Storage Tank

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SGTR Containment Bypass '

l (Continued) l l e A recent meeting with the staff (July 7-8) cites the issue of containment bypass from SGTRs as Unresolved a NRC objective is non-lifting of main steam safety valves o ABB-CE has looked at design changes to prevent safety valve actuation and has concluded that they are not cost-beneficial and would raise new safety issues A It It

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L I&C Diversity LBB Applicabilty o ABB-CE believes this issue is technologically resolved, based on the SECY-93-087 rationale for break areas o ABB-CE understands that NRC staff is considering this concern as a potential policy issue e_. ,_ 7%EDIF

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o Hydrogen Igniters added to System 80+ based on:

a 10 CFR 50.34(f) requirement for hydrogen control (prevention of detonable mixture) e PRA analysis of containment reliability e Open containment designed to promote hydrogen mixing by natural circulation a Igniters located based on geometry of containment o Recent NRC questions emphasize detonation and mixing; number and location of igniters not yet reviewed e ABB-CE believes that additional igniters would adversely impact battery capacity during a severe accident A It It

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J ECCS Bypass o A new RAI cites one Upper Plenum Test Facility (UPTF) test run (21-D) which suggests significant bypass of DVI water from the downcomer to the broken cold leg. The test report issued by MPR (MPR-1329 dated September, 1992) cites significant bypass during blowdown and reflood periods e During blowdown phase, ABB-CE models 100% bypass e During reflood phase, UPTF test data:

a is of questionable validity because of test conditions a is not directly applicable to System 80+ because of test geometry A Et Et

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o UPTF scaling relative to the System 80+ upper downcomer and DVI designs enhances bypass during reflood a System 80+ downcomer flow area is more than twice that of UPTF (8.6 vs. 3.9 ft2) e System 80+ DVI nozzles have more than twice the displacement from the cold legs (7.1 vs. 3.4 ft)

= System 80+ DVI nozzle height above the cold legs is six times greater than in UPTF (82.8 in. vs.13.8 in.)

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4 rum- e w w nw 1 v=w m .; 2 .. m m: warum ; a --+tmmmw mmn~enw~ n ~m o ABB-CE has scaled the test results and ECCS bypass during reflood is less than the spillage predicted by the conservative evaluation model e The staff is considering best-estimate audit calculations with the 3-D TRAC code to quantify ECCS bypass in System 80+

o ABB-CE does not believe that such audit calculations are necessary A It It

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anm x~s wxc~te 5m m+ wwv1m .wre mx.:x mmenmeuwwrwnnmwzamem*mxmemv mmweme o Status:

o Technical resolution reached on most issues o Remaining tasks involve primarily design details a Audits tentatively planned for August o Remaining tasks:

<> Complete final containment analyses e Complete detailed structural design of critical areas a Finalize structural design specification / guide a Detailed audits by staff a incorporate sunimary of results into CESSAR-DC A It It MEpEp C *2

l Seismic Margin Assessment i

o Status: '

  • Seismic margin assemment performed a PNt High Confiderm of Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF)

-:Ge of 0.6g demonstrated a Methodology /results described in CESSAR-DC Amendment Q, Section 19.7.5 o Remaining tasks:

a Finalize documentation in auditable form

. Staff audit A It Et M DED

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Human Factors Engineering Status (Continued)

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o Task analysis methodology technically resolved a Human System Interface [HSl> issue resolution ongoing a Plant operating procedures / validation issue resolved o HFE V&V nearing technical resolution c Design features review completed A It EP e_._

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Proposed Operating -

Procedures / Validation Resolution

- _ , - - - _ _ _ _n- __--=___,_=c_ . ,,

e Issues:

<= Procedures (technically complete vs. final) to be used for HSI validation Need for plant operating procedures ITAAC

^ Resolution:

a Main Control Room (MOR) and Remote Shutdown Room (RSR) validation will be conducted with technically complete guidelines / operating sequences e A selected set of MCR and RSR validation scenarios using COL applicant final procedures will be used for confirmatory validation e A plant operating procedures ITAAC provides commitments for a COL procedures development program JL ER ER

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o All ITAAC submitted before July 1 deadline o Benefited from lead plant and many iterations with industry and NRC o ABB-CE management team review included DOE, NUMARC, and Legal o NRC comments on pilot ITAAC incorporated or dispositioned .

o ABB-CE currently comparing System 80+ ITAAC against NRC " Guidelines" distributed in June

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d ITAAC Status Tier 1 package o Section 1 - Introduction o Section 2 - System and structure based design descriptions and ITAAC o5 Building structures a 65 Systems and components e4 Rooms and panels a1 Procedure o Section 3 - non-systems based design descriptions and ITAAC o 2 DAC o 2 Programs

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ITAAC Vulnerability

_ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , = , _ - _ _ _ _ , _ , . , _ , _

a NRC staff and ABB-CE agree on open items o Ultimate resolutions are unlikely to cause any impact on ITAAC o Following issues represent various degrees for potential impact:

n Containment bypass e I&C diversity analysis o Post Accident Sampling System o ECCS bypass A It It 7%EFEp

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A ITAAC Review o ABB-CE considers:

o ITAAC submittal complete, high quality, and consistent with prior NRC and industry guidance o integrated review plus management review should eliminate inconsistencies within and between Tiers 1 and 2 o Remaining open issues represent minimum threat to re-review of ITAAC Jk EE EE R EFEF

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SECY-93-087 and Related Issues o Post Accident Sampling System o Design Reliability Assurance Program iTier 1) o initial Test Program l A RE i "

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N fA d.N Y. &[ @ D7 w M MN I DD D N N E T S_Y NT N 7 YI D D .'*%I.?DM' P.Y DRSE2..':M:E.?"$1' T^T ' Ift c' ABB-CE adopted ALWR URD position o NRC requiring sampling and analysis at pressure a System complexity has major impact on laboratory design, shielding, cost, operations and maintenance e' Need to bring some attention to this issue S

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Design Reliability Assurance

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NRC wants Tier 1 design description o ABB-CE objects because:

1. Opposed to programmatic entries in Tier 1 o Begs ITAAC entry e ITAAC acceptance criteria cannot be both meaningful and unambiguous
2. D-RAP of lesser safety significance on evolutionary ALWRs than on passive plants
3. Each programmatic Tier 1 entry weakens argument against others
4. Industry opposition a Recommend this be Tier 2 COL action item for System 80+

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Initial Test Program e

o NRC wants Tier 1 entry o ABB-CE opposed for reasons #1 and #3 of D-RAP o Recommend this become Tier 2 COL action item l

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s dttes'eespace :_ a ; m um asmep2N"t#WtTRt#@Mw**<4hwe*?*#f??fNRiftyvhf*mW?MYtrIMW:f?"MmW#i"#%N'N%?.e%%Nf4Whh'sst*W49:t1r&W:@b o industry position o NRC leRer of June 20,1993 o ABB-CE proposal e Tier 2 roadmaps provided on the docket for safety analysis, TMI regulations, severe accident policy issues, and PRA o Roadmaps based on the Tier 2 cross-reference database and crossties to Tier 1 identified by the ITAAC effort e Resolve DCD roadmap issue between NUMARC and commission when staff puts forth the DCD content paper A It El f%EFEF

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ex ;w v <s u . m mwesw n- we<u . x www a m m :mmmmm,mnewm o Waiting for precise NRC proposal on form and content a Proprietary material disposition o ABB-CE recommends that DCD not be linked to FDA issuance for System 80+

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