ML20056G073

Summary of 930816 Senior Mgt Meeting w/ABB-CE in Rockville, MD Re Design Certification Status of CE Sys 80+ Std Plant Design

ML20056G073
Person / Time
Site:	05200002
Issue date:	08/25/1993
From:	Wambach T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 9309010280
Download: ML20056G073 (36)

Text

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j hw /Q UNITED STATES j

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h. 1 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  ;

WASHINGTON. D C, 2 7.45-0001  ;

%, . . . . ." August 25, 1993 1

i Docket No.52-002 4

APPLICANT: ABB-Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE)

PROJECT: System 80+

SUMMARY

OF SENIOR MANAGEMENT MEETING BETWEEN THE NUCLEAR i

REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC) AND ABB-CE ON AUGUST 16, 1993 l

A senior management meeting (SMM) with ABB-CE was held August 16, 1993, at the headquarters office in Rockville, Maryland, to discuss the design certifica-tion status of the CE System 80+ standard plant design. The purpose of the '

meeting was to discuss issue resolution progress and determine when the '

System 80+ inspecticns, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC) review should begin. As a result of the meeting, the staff has determined that the remaining technical issues would not have a substantial impact on the design to preclude a review of the ITAAC. The staff will complete the review

• of the ITAAC by September 3,1993. A list of the attendees is provided in Enclosure 1. The material presented by ABB-CE is provided in Enclosure 2.  ;

Several significant technical issues were discussed during the meeting.

The first issue involved the potential for containment bypass during a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR). SGTR containment bypass involves potential -

challenges to the main steam safety valves. ABB-CE agreed to augment their transient analysis for multiple tube ruptures with a single tube rupture case. ,

By August 30, 1993, ABB-CE will also provide an engineered resolution to prevent SGTR containment bypass. The leading design alternative under evaluation relies upon a main steam nitrogen-16 monitor signal, automatic isolation of the faulted steam generator, and automatic primary depressuriza-tion using pressurizer auxiliary sprays.

The second issue involved technical resolution of hydrogen control for the System 80+ design in accordance with s50.34(f) requirements. The staff convened a panel of experts from the national labs and NRC to provide guidance on the hydrogen phenomena. The two-day internal meeting was held August 10 and 11, 1993, in Bethesda, Maryland. Basically, the staff performed a defense-in-depth and systematic evaluation of the System 80+ containment design under a spectrum of severe accident scenarios. Based on expert judgement, the staff recommended an increase from 66 igniters to approximately l

80 igniters including placement of igniters within the in-containment refuel-ing water storage tank. A minimum set of igniters (50 percent) would also i

l have the capability of receiving power from the station batteries. Staff recommendations were provided to ABB-CE during an August 12, 1993, meeting.

Some confirmatory analysis will be performed by the staff to provide added assurance of the adequacy of hydrogen control for System 80+.

I LE 9309010280 930825 ECFIECMTBiCtPY /

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August 25, 1993 The third issue involved the potential for the System 80+ primary containment to slide during a seismic event. The System 80+ containment is a 1.75 inch thick, 200 ft diameter stainless steel spherical containment that is a free-standing structure. ABB-CE agreed to anchor the containment with shear bars.

The shear bars will affix the containment shell to the interior concrete and '

to the exterior concrete structure in the lower dish region. However, a design option without shear bars for low seismicity sites would be available for a combined license applicant. l A meeting to resolve the NRC staff comments on ITAAC was tentatively scheduled {

for October 4-6, 1993. No schedule was proposed for the next SMM.

(Original signed by}

Thomas V. Wambach, Project Manager  ;

Standardization Project Directorate ,

' Associate Directorate for Advanced Reactors l and License Renewal Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation r

Enclosures:

As stated cc w/ enclosures:

See next page DISTRIBilTION w/ enclosures:

Docket File PDST R/F DCrutchfield '

PDR PShea TWambach DISTRIBUTION w/o enclosures:

TMurley/FMiraglia WTravers REmch, 1004 KEccleston,10D4  ;

WRussell RBorchardt AThadani, 8E2 BDLiaw, 7D26 BBoger, 10H5 AEl-Bassioni,10E4 WBeckner,10E4 GBagchi, 7H15 i SMagruder TBoyce JNWilson MChiramal, 8H3 CMcCracken, 803 REckenrode, 10D24 ACRS (11) TEssig j MFranovich 1 0FC L A:PDST: ADAR PM;PDSI:AQAR,' SC:PDST:ADAR _ ,

NAME PShea m 1 6 TWababY TEssig N DATE 08/1kh93 08/,4593

/ 08/t('/93 _

0FFICIAL RECORD COPY: MSUM0816.TVW l

I

ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc. Docket No.52-002 cc: Mr. C. B. Brinkman, Acting Director Nuclear Systems Licensing ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc.

1000 Prospect Hill Road Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500 Mr. C. B. Brinkman, Manager Washington Nuclear Operations ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc.

12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 330 Rockville, Maryland 20852 Mr. Stan Ritterbusch Nuclear Systems Licensing ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc.

1000 Prospect Hill Road Post Office Box 500 Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500 Mr. Sterling Franks U.S. Department of Energy NE-42 Washington, D.C. 205B5 Mr. Steve Goldberg Budget Examiner 725 17th Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20503 Mr. Raymond Ng 1776 Eye Street, N.W.

Suite 300 Washington, D.C. 20006 Joseph R. Egan, Esquire Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 2300 N Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20037-112B Hr. Regis A. Matzie, Vice President Nuclear Systems Development ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc.

1000 Prospect Hill Road Post Office Box 500 Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500 J

MEETING ATTENDEES AUGUST 16. 1993 E AFFILIATION M AFFILIATION M. Franovich NRC A. Hyde ABB-CE W. Travers NRC L. Gerdes ABB-CE R. Emch NRC C. Brinkman ABB-CE K. Eccleston NRC S. Ritterbusch ABB-CE T. Wambach NRC T. Rudek ABB-CE W. Russell NRC R. Matzie ABB-CE T. Murley NRC F. Carpentino ABB-CE D. Crutchfield NRC J. Longo, Jr. ABB-CE R. Borchardt NRC P. Lang DOE A. Thadani NRC T. Crom DE&S B. D. Liaw NRC S. Stamm SWEC B. Boger NRC A. El-Bassioni NRC W. Beckner NRC '

G. Bagchi NRC S. Magruder NRC T. Boyce NRC J. N. Wilson NRC  ;

M. Chiramal NRC C. McCracken NRC R. Eckenrode NRC '

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- Roadmap Documentation 11:30 Branch Review and Schedules o Civil and Geosciences Branch o Containment Systems Branch o Technical Specifications Branch a Safety Assessment Branch c Human Factors Engineering Branch o Reactor Systems Branch o Mechanical Engineering Branch o Plant Systems Branch a Safeguards Branch A It El SABRmed 8M6m

Agenda (Cont.)

12:00 Lunch 1:00 Branch Review and Schedule (Cont.)

2:00 Significant Technical Issues a Hydrogen Control o Containment Bypass a PASS Design o Structural Design 3:00 Action item Summary ARR SABRitterl 8/16/93

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o Tracking System:

o Milestone Dates Added v Each Open Question Assigned to One of 34 Technical issues e CESSAR-DC, Amendment R (2000 pages) o in-Service Valve Testing o Seismic Analysis v Safety Analysis o Probabilistic Risk Assessment o Resolution of Other Questions A It It SABR4ter18/16/93

Overview - Accomplishments (Cont.)

e Meetings with NRC Staff:

o Containment Sliding - 7/28/93 o Hydrogen Igniter Placement - 8/2/93,8/12/93 o SGTR Containment Bypass - 8/5/93,8/16/93 u Probabilistic Risk Assessment- 8/9/93 o Containment Buckling - 8/10/93 - 8/11/93 o Human Factors Engineering - 8/12/93 o Sabotage Vulnerability - August 18,1993 o Proposed Meetings Not Yet Scheduled c Technical Specifications Branch c Mechanical Engineering Branch o Plant Systems Branch o Reactor Systems Branch A It It sen-e-3 7%EpMD

Remaining Open DSER Questions by 9,

NRC Branch

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DD/ITAAC Status e Attended GE DD/ITAAC Meeting o impact of Technical issue Closure e Minor DD/ITAAC Changes Due to CESSAR-DC Amendments o NRC/ABB-CE DD/ITAAC Review Meeting Tentatively Scheduled for Early October A It Et 7%EFER s em , ,,,,

Roadmap Documentation

. _ _ . ~ - _ - - . _ _ _ _ _ _ - - .

e Rationale for Tier 1 Items Documented Prior to Development of DD/ITAAC o Current Roadmap Effort Provides Review of Documentation and Checks for Tier 1 Completeness o Rationale for Safety Analysis and PRA Uniquely Documented a DD/ITAAC Entered into Database Management System (1506 line items) o DD/ITAAC Line items Cross-Tied to CESSAR-DC and/or Cross-Reference Database (6861 line items) o in Progress: Check Cross-Reference Database items Not Tied to DD/ITAAC for Consistency with Rationale; Add items to Tier 1 if necessary o Will Present Rationale and Tier 1 Items From Safety Analysis and PRA in CESSAR-DC, Section 14.3 A BI Et

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DD/ITAAC Status Conclusion

_ _ - - - _ ~ _ - c. . . - . - . _ . . . _ _ _ _ ~ _ . ~ .. . . - .~

e ABB-CE Believes that NRC DD/ITAAC Review Can Begin Now:

o Only minor impacts due to recently resolved issues and CESSAR-DC Amendments o Potential design changes due to resolution of remaining technical issues would not have a major impact on DD/ITAAC A It It saanuri 8,iem ESEEEE

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e Containment Sliding Question Resolved - July 28,1993 v Containment Buckling Question Essentially Resolved -

August 11,1993 o Completion of Analysis for Containment and Critical Areas - September 15,1993 o Remaining Audits (and Expected Dates):

e Containment Stability Analysis - September 15-16,1993 o Other Category i Structure Design - September 22,1993 o Nuclear Island Design - October 13,1993 c Seismic Margins Fragility Data - October 14,1993 o FSER Input on a Tight but Achievable Schedule A El Et SABRitter18/16/93

Containment Systems Branch o Additional Hydrogen Concerns identified - June 1993 o Preliminary Analysis of Hydrogen Mixing with MAAP Code initiated Re-Review of Igniter Placement - July 1993 o Preliminary Meeting with NRC - August 2-3,1993 v Criteria for Igniter Placement Documented - August 10, 1993 o Approach to Hydrogen Control Established with NRC -

August 12,1993 o Remaining Work:

o Document Analysis, Hydrogen Igniter Placement, and Responses to Questions c> Review of Valve and Instrument Survivability A It It SABRitter18/16/93

Technical Specifications Branch o First Submittal, Amendment K, November 1992 o Bases Submittal, Amendment 0, .May 1993 o Miscellaneous Revisions, May-July 1993 a Initial Questions (24), July 1993 e More Questions Expected A El Et saamimi siiem E EEIE

Safety Assessment Branch a Fire, Flood, Human Reliability, and Miscellaneous:

- CESSAR-DC Submittal - March 1993 u Questions / Responses - June 1993 a Additional Questions - August 16,1993 e; Shutdown Risk:

o Guidance Established January 1992: Primarily Deterministic Evaluation with Probabilistic Supplement for insights o initial Report - July 1992 o Questions - December 1992 o Meeting - January 1993 o Final Report Submittal- March 1993 o Additional Questions Expected - August 23,1993 A It El SABRitter18/16/93

Safety Assessment Branch (Cont.)

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o Seismic Margins Assessment

'. CESSAR-DC Submittal - July 1993 o Tentative Agreement - August 9,1993 w insights by ABB-CE - August 20,1993 o Questions Expected - August 31,1993 e SAMDA Review

=+ Revised Submittal- June 18,1993 4a Questions Expected - August 31,1993 o Resolution of Safety Assessment Branch issues a Meeting - August 31 - September 2,1993 A It Et saa m i 8,ie m ESEEIE

Human Factors Engineering Branch

~ , _ _ - - . _ . _ - . . _ - ~ . . _ . ~ . _ . _ _ . _ ...

e 95 Questions Technically Resolved; 67 Remaining o Plant Operating Procedures (POPS) e Additional plant operating sequences to be used for Verification and Validation in Main Control Room ITAAC o COL Action item for POPS o Main Control Room ITAAC Not Contingent on COL Action item Closure a 17 Recently-Issued Questions on Standards and Guidelines Review Addressed August 12,1993 A It It sien w en e 7%E9E9

Reactor Systems Branch

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o 14 Questions on EPGs Received - July 1993 e Responses and EPG Markups - August 23,1993 o Resubmit Set of Markups - August 31,1993 t

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Mechanical Engineering Branch e 19 in-Service Testing Questions Resolved o Agreement Needed on Technical Resolution for Remaining 48 Questions e Approval of Turbine-Generator Description Needed A BR Et SABRitterl 8/16/93

Plant Systems Branch

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e 7 DSER Questions Technically Resolved e Agreement on Technical Resolution for Remaining 61 Questions Needed i

t A ER SABRrtter18/16/93

Safeguards Branch

._ . .... . . - . - _ _ ~ . , . , .. ~

o Sabotage Vulnerability Analysis Meeting - August 18, 1993 o Expected Resolution a Revision of Existing CESSAR-DC, Appendix 13A e Potential Addition of Control Room Position Indication for Critical Valves A It It s,emi en-3 7%EEEE

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! Hydrogen Analysis & Control e Hydrogen Igniter Placement Based on Set of 17 Criteria Which Have Been Established Based On:

o Containment Geometry e Known Hydrogen Behavior and Experimental Data o insights from MAAP Analysis .

A It It SABRitter18/16/93

k Hydrogen Analysis & Control (Cont.)

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o Criteria for Igniter Placement:

2 Placement Along Dominant Flow Path a Placement Near Expected Hydrogen Sources c Placement in Closed /Less Well Vented Regions a Multiple Levels of Burning in Dominant Flow Paths o Axial Spacing Based on Floor Spacing o Highly Reliable Power Sources for Minimum Set o Igniter Pair in Same General Vicinity for Redundancy l

v Independent Power Sources for Igniter Pairs o Ease of Maintainability and Surveillance o No More igniters than Reasonably Necessary A Et It SABRittert 8/16/93

Hydrogen Analysis & Control (Cont.)

o Criteria for Igniter Placement: (Cont.)

w Igniters Placed About 10 Ft Below Closed Surfaces (Floor, Dome, etc.)

e Containment Average Concentration to be Below 7% Using Minimum igniter Set e Less than 4 Hours Operation of Igniters Should Ensure that the Maximum Hydrogen Concentration is Below 10% .-

a Large Vents on IRWST o igniters in Dominant Flow Path Should Cover a Volume of Less than 50,000 cu ft (Exception: Dome Region) o igniters Placed in Positions Associated with Smaller Secondary Flow Patterns o Multiple Levels of Burning in Secondary Flow Paths A It It s e n o ,4 e,, -

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o ABB-CE Approach to Analysis:

a Hydrogen distribution analysis to determine bulk concentration within various compartments of the containment Hydrogen stratification evaluations within a compartment to determine concentration gradients

. Structural analysis to quantify impact of localized detonation loadings on containment integrity Review of experimental data to substantiate models and to aid in the placement of hydrogen igniters A It Et smen ., enem E IEII

SGTR/ Containment Bypass o ABB-CE Evaluation Shows That:

o With reactor power cutback and steam bypass systems operating, the safety valves are not challenged except for Loss of Condenser Vacuum and Main Steam isolation Valve closure.

a For severe accident scenarios with SGTR occurring along with severe core damage, the probability of containment bypass is very low < 10-9 events / year and almost independent of potential secondary side design changes.

A Et It SABRittert 8/16/93

SGTR/ Containment Bypass (Cont.)

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o For primary side potential design changes (e.g., automatic depressurization by N-16 signal), operator action is always necessary to prevent containment bypass ... automatic actuation does not provide any significant benefit but does introduce concerns.

N-16 monitors would provide better diagnostics for damaged steam generator tubes and design evaluation has been initiated.

A It It SABRitter18/16/93

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