ML20112E487
| ML20112E487 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/12/1984 |
| From: | Murley T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20105B226 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-84-250 NUDOCS 8501150160 | |
| Download: ML20112E487 (9) | |
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UNITED STATES 8
'g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION M
a REGION I 4, * *,< <,o KING OF PM A,PE YLVANIA IS y/A.
April 12, 1984 MEMORANDUM FOR: William J. Dircks, Executive Director for Operations FROM:
Thomas E. Murley, Regional Administrator l
SUBJECT:
MEETING WITH NEW YORK STATE OFFICIALS On Wednesday, April 11, members of my staff and I met in Albany with a number of New York state officials.
This was one in a series of meetings we are having with states in Region I to meet state officials and discuss issues of mutual interest.
The meeting lasted most of 4he day, and I found it to be highly beneficial.
One of the topics discussed was Shoreham.
I summarized the activities under-way within NRC, including the newly constituted hearing board to deal with LILCO's proposal for low power operation in view of the problems with the TDI diesel generators.
Dr. Axelrod, Commissioner of the Department of Health, asked if NRC is considering a low power license before the offsite emergency planning issues are resolved, in view of Governor Cuomo's and Suffolk County's opposition.
I carefully explained that such a decision would undoubtedly be reserved for the Commissioners and that I had no idea what their decision might be.
I stated that the regional staff was gearing the inspection program to complete the open items by June and that I understood the hearing board's schedule for decision was June as well.
We did not discuss any of the specific issues surrounding the offsite emergency plan for Shoreham.
A c"s Thomas E. Murley Regional ~ Administrator cc:
H. R. Denton R. C. DeYoung bcc:
J. M. Allan R. W. Starostecki T. T. Martin 60 840518 4~250 p
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TMI REQUIREMENTS 1.
SHIFT IECHNICAL ADVISOR - PROVIDE AN STA FOR EACH SHIFT.
(l.A.1.1) 2.
SHIFT ihNNING - PROVIDE ADDITIONAL R0 AND SRO ON SHIFT.
PROVIDE 5 SHIFT ROTATION.
LIMIT OPERATOR WORKING HOURS.
(l.A.1.3) 3.
UPGRADE OPERATOR AND SRO TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION. (I.A.2.1) 4.
REVISE SCOPE AND CRITERIA FOR LICENSING EXAMINATIONS. (l.A.3.1) 5.
PROVIDE AN INDEPENDENT ONSITE SAFETY ENGINEERING GROUP TO PERFORM INDEPENDENT REVIEWS OF PLANT OPERATIONS. (l.B.1.2) 6.
REVISE OPERATING PROCEDURES TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR THE EVALUATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF PROCEDURES FOR TRANSI-ENTS AND ACCIDENTS. (l.C.1) 7]iREVIEWANDREVISEPROCEDURESTOASSURETHATANEFFECTIVE SYSTEM FOR VERIFYING THE CORRECT PERFORMANCE OF OPERATING ACTIVITIES EXISTS TO REDUCE HUMAN ERRORS.(l.C.6)
-8.
REVIEW AND REVISE NSSS POWER-ASCENSION AND EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES.
-(l.C.7) 9.
REVISE EMERGENCY PROCEDGIS IN ACCORDANCE WITH NEWLY DEVELOPED
-GENERIC GUIDELINES.
(l.C.8) 10.
' CONDUCT A DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW TO IDENTIFY AND CORRECT HUMAN FACTORS DESIGN DEFICIENCIES.
LILCO HAS PERFORMED
'ONE OF THESE ALREADY AND IS SCHEDULED TO PERFORM ANOTHER, MORE DETAILED ONE'IN THE NEXT'18 MONTHS.
(I.D.1)
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1 11.
DEFINE AND CARRY OUT A SPECIAL LOW-POWER TESTING AND TRAINING PROGRAM.
(1.G.1) 12.
REVIEW THE DESIGN AND OPERATION OF REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS AND PROCEDURES.
(ll.B.1) 13.
PERFORM A DETAILED RADIATION AND, SHIELDING DESIGN REVIEW.
-IHIS RESULTED IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW SAMPLE ANALYSIS FACILITY AND A NEW IECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER.
(ll.B.2) 14.
PROVIDE EXPANDED CAPABILITIES TO OBTAIN AND QUANTITATIVELY ANALYZE REACTOR COOLANT AND CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE SAMPLES.
(II.B.3) 15.
DEVELOP A TRAINING PROGRAM FOR OPERATORS REGARDING THE USE OF INSTALLED PLANT' SYSTEMS TO CONTROL OR MITIGATE AN ACCIDENT IN WHICH THE CORE IS SEVERELY DAMAGED.
(11.3.4) 16.
PROVIDE A PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INERTING SYSTEM TO CONTROL THE COMBUSTION OF HYDROGEN.
(ll.B 8) 17.
CONDUCT TESTING TO QUALITY SAFETY AND RELIEF VALVES.
(ll.D.1) 18.
PROVIDE DIRECT INDICATION OF RELIEF AND SAFETY VALVE POSITION.
(II.D.3) 19.
MODIFY. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEMS TO IMPROVE RELIABILITY AND REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE.(II.E.4.2)-
20.
PROVIDE A NOBLE GAS EFFLUENT. MONITOR.
(ll.F.1.1) 21.
PROVIDE ADDITIONAL SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS CAPABILITY FOR PLANT EFFLUENTS.
(II.F.1.2)
I 22.
PROVIDE 2 ADDITIONAL CONTAINMENT HIGH-RANGE RADIATION MONITORS.
(II.F.1.3)
23.
PROVIDE ADDITIONAL CONTAINMENT WATER LEVEL MONITORS.
(ll.F.1.5) 24.
PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS TO DETECT INADEQUATE CORE COOLING.
(ll.F.2) 25.
REVIEW THE DESIGN AND OPERATION,0F ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES SYSTEMS.
(ll.K.1.5) 26.
REVIEW AND REVISE PROCEDURES FOR REMOVING SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEMS FROM SERVICE.
(II.K.1.10) 27.
REVIEW THE ACTIONS NECESSARY FOR PROPER FUNCTIONING OF AUXILIARY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEMS.
(ll.K.1.22) 28.
REPORT CHALLENGES TO SRVS IN ANNUAL REPORT.
(ll.K.3.3) 29.
MODIFY THE RCIC INITIATION LOGIC TO PROVIDE FOR AUTOMATIC.
A RESTART.
(ll.K.3.13) 30.
MODIFY 'THE BREAK DETECTION LOGIC CIRCUITRY TO PREVENT SPURIOUS ISOLATION OF HPCI AND RCIC.
(II.K.3.15) 31.
PARTICIPATE IN STUDY OF METHODS TO REDUCE CHALLENGES AND FAILURES OF RELIEF VALVES.
IMPLEMENT CHANGES RESULTING FROM STUDY.
(ll.K.3.16) 32.
MODIFY AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM LOGIC TO ELIMINATE THE NEED FOR MANUAL ACTUATION.
(ll.K.3.18) 33.
STUDY THE NEED TO PROVIDE FOR AUTOMATIC RESTART OF CORE SPRAY AND LPCI SYSTEMS.
N0 HARDWARE MODIFICATIONS WERE SUBSEQUENTLY DEEMED NECESSARY.
(ll.K.3.21) e,-
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34.
MODIFY THE RCIC SYSTEM TO PROVIDE FOR AUTOMATIC SWITCHOVER FROM THE CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK TO THE SUPPRESSION POOL.
(ll.K.3.22) 35.
PROVIDE A COMMON REFERENCE LEVEL FOR REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL.
(ll.K.3.27) 36.
VERIFY THE QUALIFICATION OF ACCUMULATORS ON THE AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION (ADS) SYSTEM VALVES.
(II.K 3.28) 37.
VERIFY SMALL BREAK LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT METHODS SHOW COMPLIANCE WITH 10 CFR 50, APPENDIX K.
(ll.K.3.30) 38.
PERFORM' ANALYSES TO SUPPORT THE USE OF DEPRESSURIZATION MODES OTHER THAN FULL ACTIVATION OF ADS.
(II.K.3.45) 39.
PROVIDE RESPONSE TO MICHELSON CONCERNS.
(ll.K 3.46) 40.
REVISE AND UPGRADE EMERGENCY PLANS.
(Ill.A.2) 41.
UPGRADE EMERGENCY SUPPORT FACILITIES - INCLUDES MODIFICATIONS AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER AND AN OFF-SITE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY.
(Ill.A.1.2) l l
42.
IMPLEMENT PROGRAM TO REDUCE. LEAKAGE FROM SYSTEMS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT THAT WOULD CONTAIN RADI0 ACTIVE FLUILS AFTER'AN ACCIDENT.
(Ill.D.1.1) 43.
PROVIDE IMPROVED IN-PLANT IODINE MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION.
(Ill.D.3.3) 44.
PROVIDE A C0 IN THE CONTROL (Ill.gDETECTIONANDALARMCAPABILITY U.3.4)
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45.
PR0 VIDE A SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM.
(l.D.2) 46.
IMPLEMENT THE PROVISIONS OF REG. GUIDE l.97, REv. 2.
(GENERIC. LETTER 82-33) i k,.
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REGULATIONS 1.
10 CFR 50.48 AND APPENDIX h - FIRE PROTECTION.
NOT DIRECTLY APPLICABLE TO SHOREHAM BUT REVIEWS DONE TO ESSENTIALLY THE SAME STANDARD.
2.
10 CFR 50.47 AND APPENDIX E - REVISED CRITERION FOR ON-AND OFF-SITE EMERGENCY PLANNING.
3.
10 CFR 50.44 - ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL CH }'
2 4.
10 CFR 50.49 - ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT.
5.
10 CFR 73 - CHANGES TO PHYSICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.
6.
10 CFR 50.55A - REVISIONS TO MOST RECENTLY ACCEPTABLE VERSION OF AS.'iE CODE.
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GENERIC LETTERS 1.
HEAVY LOADS (#81-07) - IMPOSED NEW REQUIREMENTS FOR LIFTING DEVICES AND METHODS FOR HANDLING HEAVY LOADS.
REQUIRED CRANE MODIFICATIONS AND PROCEDURE REVISIONS AS WELL AS ANALYSES.
2.
STATION BLACK 00T (#81-04) - REQUIRED DEVELOP MENT OF PRO-CEDURES AND TRAINING TO HANDLE STATION BLACKOUT.
3.
EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION (#81-05) - PRECEDED 10 CFR 50.49, 5
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MISCELLANEOUS 1.
ANALYSES AND MODIFICATIONS TO SCRAM SYSTEM PIPING - RESULT FROM NUREG-0803 AND FROM BROWN'S FERRY FAILURE TO SCRAM.
2.
I&E BULLETINS - NUMEROUS BULLETINS REQUIRED REPLACEMENT OF RELAYS, RE-EXAMINATION OF CONTAINMENT PENETRATION WELDS, MODIFICATIONS TO ESF RESET CIRCUITRY, ETC.
3.
INDEPENDENT DESIGN VERIFICATION PkOGRAM DONE BY IELEDYNE TO VERIFY MECHANICAL DESIGN OF CORE SPRAY SYSTEM.
REQUIRED AS A RESULT OF DIABLO CANYON QA PROBLEMS.
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