ML20107G608
See also: IR 05000219/1975021
Text
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.En ssermD vRS esCt0suRE xi,Dte ra1s mcoxEur is usctiss1,1Eo.
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3 Fers 12
10 C F R 2.790
iNFORMATION
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6 75) ()tev) ~
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGUIATORY COMMISSION
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OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
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' REGION I
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50-219
_ Docket No:
50-219/75-21
Inspection Report No:
License No:
Jersey Central Power and Light Company
conseet
Madison Avenue at Punch Bowl Road
_ Priority:
C
Morristown, New Jersey
07960
Category:
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Safeguards
Group:
Forked River, New Jersey
a gg.jgg
p cf Licensee:
Routine, Unannounced
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rpe cf Inspection:
)
August
6-29, 1975
stes of Inspection;
kW@
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August 4-5, 1975
? zs of Previous Inspection:
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ATE
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ting Inspector:
E.~G//Greenman, Reactor nspector
let
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9 30
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b espanying Inapectors:
/ DATE
M}orrhopn,ReactorInspector
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D. L. Caphton,Ie'nTor Reactor inspector
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9604230289 960213
DATE
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DEKOK95-258
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NONE
Ether Accompan ng Personnel:
DATE
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ReviCved By:.
D. L. Caphton, SenlbY 1keactdr Inspector,
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Reactor Operations Branch
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10 t F R 2.790
INFO.
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SIFIED.
' LilEN SEPARATED FROM ENCLOSURE HANDLE THIs DOCIDIEN
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
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Enforcement Action
A.
Items of Noncompliance
1.
Infractions
Contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instruc-
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tions, Procedures. and Drawings", the Oyster _ Creek' Opera-
tional Quality Assurance Plan,Section V and. Technical
]
Specifications Section 6, the following examples of
failure to follow procedures were identified:
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(1) Differential pressure measurements required by
" Secondary Containment Leak Rate Test Procedure"
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602.6, Revision 6 dated ~ July 11,.1974, to deter-
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mine and subsequently record air flow through the
Standby. Gas Treatment System were not recorded for
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testing conducted October 7, 1974, to verify
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Secondary Containment integrity.
(Details, Para-
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graph 2.d)
9"0%
(2) Pressure testing of Spent Fuel Cask cap double "0"
ring seels was conducted on August 27, 1975, with
an applied test pressure as observed, in excess of
the indicated 0-100 psig ranga of the pressure gauge,
whereas Station Procedure 219.0, Revision 4 dated
June 19,1975, " Spent Fuel Handling with NFS-4 Cask"
stipulates pressurization with air, of the annulus
between the double "0" ring seals to between 80-100
psig.
(Details, Paragraph 8.a)
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b.
Contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion II, " Quality
Assurance Program", the implementing provisions of the
Oyster Creek Operational Quality Assurance Plan, Section
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II, (Reference JCP&L letter to Division of Reactor Licen-
sing dated May 2,1974) and ANSI N45.2.3 - 1973, Section
3.2.1 " Cleanliness" during an in plant inspection of areas
and components; items of trash. litter and excess materials
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were observed in the Cable Spreading Room and Battery Room
at the Station, and such materials had not been-removed.
(Details, Paragraph 10.a)
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Contrary to the O' ster Creek Industrial Security Plan
c.
dated January 7, 1974, Section 4.2, one physical access
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control was found inadequate on August 26, 1975.
(Re-
current item).
(Datails, Taragraph 10.c.1)
d.
Contrary to the Oyster Creek Industrial Security Plan
dated January 7,1974, Section 4.2 which establishes pro-
cedural requirements and Procedure No. 1.0 " Security
Guide Lines" dated April 11, 1974, area logging require-
ments were not followed on August 28, 1975.
(Details,
Paragraph 10.c.2)
2.
Deficiencies
None
B.
Deviations
None Identified
Licensee Action or Previously Identified Enforcement Items
Not laspected
Design Changes
None Identified
Unusual Occurrences
The following Abnormal Occurrences were reported by the licensee since
the last inspection ar.d were reviewed by the inspector.
Comments con-
cerning specific areas are noted within this report.
A.
Two electromatic relief valve pressure switches tripped in excess
of limits during surveillance.l
B.
A core spray parallel isolation valve failed to demonstrate opera-
bility during surveillance due to a broken valve motor breaker.2
C.
Two hand hole covers in the 1-1 SBGTS filter train were not in
place with the reactor at steady state power conditions.3
(Details, Paragraph 7)
1.
JCP6L let ter to Region I dated June 16, 1975, Subject A0 75-16
2.
JCP6L letter to Region I dated June 19, 1975, Subject A0 75-17,
3.
JCP&L let ter to Region I dated June 24, 1975, Subject A0 75-18
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Three reactor'high pressure sensors tripped in excess of required
D.
. values during surve111ance.4
One high drywell switch tripped in excess of required values during
E..
p.M
surveillance.5
One isolation condenser system steam line valve failed to close
'F.
during surveillance and simulation of a high steam line flow
isignal.6
Other Significant Findings
A.
Current Findings
1.
Pla'nt Status
On August 27, 1975, a reactor scram occurred due to loss of
condenser vacuum apparently attributed to restoration of a
valved out condenser to service. The licensee has experienced
significant condenser tube leakage problems. Radwaste system
processing capability and necessity to obtain new resins for
the cleanup system delayed startup. Licensee plans to.in-
stall inserts to eliminate condenser tube leakage problems.
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(Details, Paragraph 4.a)
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2.
Mechanical Seismic Shock and Sway Arrestors
Licensee plana to purchase and install 110 mechanical snubbers
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(Pacific Scientific Company) during the next refueling outage
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scheduled for April 1976.
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3.
Contaminated Spent Fuel Shipment
Spent Fuel Shipment No. 48 arrived at West Valley, New York
(Details,
with contamination levels in excess of DOT limits.
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Paragraph 8.b)
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4.
Acceptable Areas
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Organization and Administration - PORC.
(Details,
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a.
Paragraph 2.b)
)
b.
Logs and Records.
(Details, Paragraph 3)
c.
Operations.
(Details, Paragraphs 4a and b)
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d.1
Containment.
(Details, Paragraph 7)
e.
Radiation Protection.
(Details, Paragraph 9)
,
JCP&L letter to Region I dated July 9,1975, Subject A0 75-19
4.
5.
.JCP&L letter to Region I dated July 18, 1975, Subject A0 75-20,
6.
JCP&L letter to Region I dated August 4,1975, Subject ,A'O 75-21
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5.
Unresolved Items
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These are items for which more information is required to -
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determine whether the items are acceptable or Items of
Noncompliance.
a.
Current Items
Quorum requirements for c'onduct of GORB meeting 55-A
(1)
pursuant to Technical Specifications and GORB Adminis-
_ Details, Paragraph 2.c)
(
trative Procedures.
(2) GORB Audits, Administrative Procedures and corporate
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involvement.
(Details, Paragraph 2.c)
Electrical Systems and Openings (Design Evaluation). #
(3)
(Details, Paragraph 6)
b.
Status of Previously Reported Items
Item remains
Valve Wall Thickness Verification Program.
unresolved.
(Details, Paragraph 4.c)
6.
Followup Items
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These are items of inspector's concern which require additional
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evaluation and will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
75-21-1 Condenser Tube Leakage Problems.
(Details, Paragraph 4.a)
75-21-2 Isolation Condenser Steam Leaks.
(Details, Paragraph 4.b)
75-21-3 Control Rod Statistical Data.
(Details, Paragraph 5)
75-21-4 SBGTS Procedure Changes.
(Details, Paragraph 7)
75-21-5 Planning, coordination and procedures for handling
Station Emergencies.
(Details, Paragraph 10.b)
{
Infractions and Deficiencies Identified by Licensee
7.
Contrary to Technical Specifications 2.3.4, relief valve
a.
pressure switches 1A83B and 1A83E tripped in excess of
1070 psig during surveillance.
(JCP&L letter to Division
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of Reactor Licensing dated June 24, 1975, Subject A0 75-16)
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b.
Contrary to Technical Specification 3.5.B.2, two (2)
hand hole covers in the 1-1 SBGTS were not in place and
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the 1-1 filter train was selected for operation.
(JCP&L
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letter to Division of Reactor Licensing dated July 1,
1975, Subject A0 75-18) .
(Details, Paragraph 7)
.
Contrary to Technical Specification 2.3.3 RE03A, B and
c.
D reactor high pressure sensors tripped in excess of .
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1060 psig during surveillance (JCP&L letter to Division
of Reactor Licensing dated July 17, 1975, Subject
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A0 75-19).
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d.
Contrary to Technical Specifications, Table 3.1.1 high
drywell pressure switch RV46B associated with core spray
actuation tripped in excess of 2 psig during surveillance
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(JCP&L letter to Division of Reactor Licensing dated
July 25, 1975, Subject A0 75-20).
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Management Interview
An exit interview was conducted on August 29, 1975, with Mr. D. A. Ross,
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Manager Nuclear Gr trating Stations,* Mr. D. Reeves, Chief Engineer,**
Mr. J. L. Sulliva , Operations Engineer and Mr. K. O. E. Fickeissen,
Technical Supervisor.
Items discussed are summarized below:
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A.
General
The inspectors described the scope of the routine unannounced in-
spection as related to Abnormal Occurrence review, plant operations,
organization and administration, review and audits related to on-
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dite and of f-site committees, determination of status of certain
battery room cable runs and separation, observations of spent fuel
shipments in progress and security access controls.
B.
Valve Wall Thickness Verification Program
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The inspector as a followup item concerning Region 1 Inspection
50-219/75-15, stated the Region I position that Jersey Central
Power and Light Company complete inspection of all valves as
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designated.in the Region I letter of June 22, 1972, concerning
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the referenced 'subj ect.
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Participation via intercom at Corporate Offices.
- Acting Plant-Superintendent, August 29, 1975
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A licensee representative acknowledged the inspector's remarks and
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stated that.the licensee would take exception to the Region I
position, based upon prior correspondence describing the scope of
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the program based on a sampling number of valves.
The_ inspector further stated that this matter would be forwarded
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to_01E Headquarters for resolution.
(Details, Paragraph 4.c)
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C.
Housekeeping Hazards
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The inspector stated that during conduct of facility tours, visual
observations in the Battery Room and Cable Spreading Room resulted
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in findings which included disclosure of storage of wooden crates
and boxes in the cable spreading room, a newspaper located within
a cable tray and trash and litter on the floors of both referenced
The inspector expressed concern regarding the potential fire
areas.-
hazard such materials represented. The inspector expressed his
additional concern that Station management had permitted such
hazards to exist.
A licensee representative acknowledged the inspector's remarks.
(Details, Paragraph 10.a)
Planning Coordination and Procedures for Handling Postulated
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D.
IS*4N
Station Fires
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The inspector expressed his concern regarding what he observed
following a sampling review of planning and existing procedures
for handling a station fire. Licensee representatives were
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apprised that this matter would be addressed during a subsequent
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inspection.
(Details, Paragraph 10.b)
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E.
Cabic Spreading Room and Battery Room Openings
The inspector stated that his visual observations of unsealed open-
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ings leading from the Cable Spreading Room and Battery Room appeared
to require design evaluation regarding potential for contributing
to a potential hazard.
(Details, Paragraph 6)
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F.
Enforcement Action
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Items as listed under Enforcement Action were identified as apparent
Items of Noncompliance.
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
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Mr. D. A. Ross, Manager, Nuclear Generating Stations
Mr. D. L. Reeves, Chief Engineer
Mr. J. Sullivan, Operations Engineer
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Mr. K. O. E. Fickeissen, Technical Supervisor
Mr. R. Swift, Maintenance Engineer
Mr. E. Skalsky, Radiation and Protection Supervisor
Mr. J. Maloney, Operations Supervisor
Mr. J. Edelhauser, Associate Engineer
Mr. R. Lang, Associate Engineer
Mr. R. A. Parshall, Engineering Assistant
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Mr. E. Roessler, Instrument and Electrical Foreman
Mr. T. Johnson, Instrument and Electrical Foreman
Mr. B. Cooper, Shift Foreman
Mr. R. Wenz, Control Room Operator A
Mr. H. Callahan, Control Room Operator A
Mr. N. Boulware, Control Room Operator B
Hr. C. Silvers, Control Room Operator B
Mr. J. Beh, Radiation Technician
"4NA
2.
Organization and Administration
a.
Personnel Changes
None
b.
Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) Meetings
The inspector verified that all on-site review committee meet-
ings for the prior year had been held within frequency require-
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ments as established by Technical Specifications and that
quorum requirements had been satisfied.
(Region I Inspection
Reports 50-219/75-04 and 50-219/75-18).
No inadequacies were
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identified for the one year interval as examined.
The inspector
also verified on a sampling basis that proposed Technical
Specification changes had been reviewed as required by facility
Technical Specifications. PORC review of violations of Techni-
cal Specifications, and rules and regulations will be examined
in a subsequent inspection.
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General Office Review Board (GORB) Meetings
c.
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The inspector verified that all off-site review committee
meetings for the prior year had been held within frequency
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requirements.as established by Technical Specifications.
Quorum requirements were satisfied for the one year interval
examined exclusive of GORB meeting 55A held November 27, 1974.
(Special) Acceptability of quorum requirements, adherence to
administrative procedures, conduct of audits and corporate
management involvement is considered unresolved based on
information available on-site as of the date of this inspec-
tion.
The inspector also verified that GORB had investigated
reported instances of Technical Specification noncompliance
with respect to A.O.s 74-5 and 74-20;
No inadequacies were
identified.
d.
10 CFR 50.59 Reviews
The inspector reviewed Semi-Annual Reports No. 10 dated August
29, 1974 and No. 11 dated February 28, 1975, Sections VIII,
Tests and Experiments.
Items reviewed included eddy current
testing of control rod blades, shutdown margin testing, and
secondary leak rate testing. No inadequacies were identified
with respect to reviews of shutdown margin testing and eddy
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current tests of rod blades. Differential pressure measure-
ments as required by Secondary Containment Leak Rata Test
Procedure 602.6, Revision 6, dated July 11, 1974, were not
recorded for testing conducted on October 7, 1974, when test-
ing was performed to verify Secondary Containment Integrity.
This item as listed as an example of failure to follow pro-
cedure under Enforcement Action constitutes an apparent In-
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fraction level Item of Noncompliance.
c,
3.
Logs and Records
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The following logs and records were reviewed for the periods indi-
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cated.
Comments concerning specific areas were as noted.
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Station Log Book - June 16 - August 28, 1975
a.
b.
Shift Foreman's Log - July 1 - August 28, 1975
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Jumper Log - all active items
c.
d.
Job Order Index - June 1 - August 27, 1975
PORC Minutes - August 1974 - August 1975
c.-
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CORB Minutes - March 1974 - thy 1975
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The inspector noted that some logkeeping activities conducted by
the licensee had not been administrative 1y defined. As a result,
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inconsistencies were observed in logkeeping.
The Control Room
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Operator's Data Log contained entries such as " BUSY" instead of
operating data, resulting in a loss of information for periods up
to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. No licensee requirements covering the use of such
entries was found by the inspector. Additionally, a daily source
check of the stack gas radiation monitor, normally entered in the
Station Control Room Operator's Log daily, was not conducted on
August 14 and 15, 1975. No requirement was found for performing
this check daily although it had been a continuing practice.
The inspector informed licensee representatives that if the above
were desired activities, administrative definition should be pro-
vided to the operators.
4.
Operations
Condenser Leaks
a.
The licensee was continuing to experience difficulty with con-
denser tube leakage which resulted in equilibrium chloride
concentrations of 100 ppb in primary coolant water.
This
concentration is a factor of 10 below Technical Specification
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3.3.E limits for steaming rates in excess of 100,000 pounds
per hour, but was equal to limits for operation below 100,000
pounds per hour.
On August 27, 1975, a reactor scram occurred
due to loss of condenser vacuum upon restoration of a valved
out condenser half to service.
Startup was delayed until
new resins could be obtained.
The licensee was apprised by a cognizant licensee representa-
tive that the licensee was purchasing copper-nickle inserts
approximately three (3) feet in length with a fiber seal at
one end which will be rolled into tube sheets.
Condenser
tube leakage problems have been pronounced and metal loss
apparently due to hydraulics and cavitation has been identi-
fled in the condensers.
According to the licensee, the.
problem is localized to within the first 2.5 to 3 feet of the
inlet of the tube sheet. Tube leakage is evidenced in 10-25%
of the tubes in all condenser halves.
This item will be
reviewed further during a subsequent inspection.
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b.
Facility Tour
4.
'$E'$
During conduct of a f acility tour, the inspector noted a steam
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leak in the area between the two (2) Isolation Condensers.
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The floor area had been appropriately roped off as a contami-
nated area. The inspector was apprised that the leak would be
repaired during the current shutdown.
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Valve Wall Thickness Verification Program *
c.
Status of completion remains unchanged.
Discussions with
licensee representatives indicated that the licensee has con-
cluded that a representative sample which has been completed
and as was described in a JCP&L letter to Region I dated
' July 21, 1972, completes licensee action.
This item was dis-
cussed at the exit interview and remains unresolved.
5.
Reactivity Control and Core Physics
Control Rod Blade Inspections
The inspector reviewed the licensee's data and supporting documenta-
tion related to inspection and evaluation of Control Rod Blade
inspection.
No inadequacies were identified with respect to scope
hMy
of required 10 CFR 50.59 reviews completed and/or in progress.
Data further indicated a total reduction in shutdown margin capa-
bility of less than 0.09% Ak.
Control Rod Statistical Comparative Data
The data reviewed indicated apnaient inconsistencies in exam re-
sults as reported.
Data based on examination of identical blades
over a two (2) year cycle indicated the following:
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Inverted Pins
Core
Wing
Wing
Wing
Wing
location
A
B
C
D
1974
22-23
None
None
None
5, 6, 17
1975
22-23
3, 5
None
3, 5
None
1974
38-31
None
None
17
10, 12, 17
1975
38-31
None
4, 6
7,9,15
None
- Region I Inspection Report 50-219/75-15, Details, 3.
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The >capector also reviewed.the licensee's letter to GE dated
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Augus:. 25,1975, requesting resolution of the referenced conflict-
p,
Disposition of data related to control rod locations
ing reports.
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22-23 and 38-31 and review of data results for all control rods
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vill be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
6.
Electrical Systems
The inspector visually examined electrical cables supplied from the
Battery Room Distribution Panels A and B.
Findings were as follows:
Redundant 125 volt DC control circuits, serving as backup for
a.
the battery and controls occupy a single common tray from the
power distribution panels in the battery room to the point
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where they enter conduits to continue underground to the
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diesel generator building.
(DC-2 cable 86-68 and DC-1 cable
86-19)- These cables are in a common tray and terminate into
tray 24.
b.
Redundant 125 volt DC control circuits serving the 4160 volt
vital busses (1C and 1D) do not occupy the same common tray.
The 1C bus feed (Cable 62-88) which is located in Panel A has
been placed in separate conduit outside the common tray, and
the 1D bus feed from Panel B (Cable 62-100) is located inside
5%A9
the tray.
Physical separation provided in this instance is on
the order of 2.5 ~ to 3 feet except at the point where cable 62-
100 exits the distribution panel adjacent to the common tray.
.
Circuitry is described on DC line drawing 302-8 Revision 10,
c.
reviewed for as-built conditions, June 10, 1970.
This item with respect to adequacy of separation is considered
unresolved.
The inspector also observed openings in the battery room and cable
r/r.ading room.*
No requirements were identified to seal such
ope ings.
'cnis item is cansidered unresolved with respect to
design evaluation.
7.
~ Containment
-The licensee has committed, following Abnormal Occurrence (A0 75-18)
to provide a procedure for HEPA filter testing in the SBGTS, to
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- Region I-Inspection Report 50-219/75-13
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preclude a subsequent failure to properly reinstall hand hole covers-
which' provide filter access.
At the conclusion of this inspection,
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This item
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the referenced procedure had not been approved by PORC.
will be reviewed further during a subsequent inspection.
8.
Fuel Handling
a.
Spent Fuel Handling
The inspector observed the loading of two fuel bundles into-
the NSF-4 shipping cask and the subsequent handling of the
cask for spent fuel shipment #54 on Angust 27, 1975.
Station Operating Procedure 219.0 (Revision 4, dated June 19,
1975), Spent Fuel Handling with NSF-4 Cask, Step 8.40 requires
a test of the cask cap double o-ring seals be performed as
" Pressurize with air the annulus between the double
follows:
o-ring seals to between 80 and 100 psig, isolate, held for 10
minutes, and check for zero pressure leak down with NFS supplied
pressure test equipment".
It was observed by an inapector on August 27, 1975, at approxi-
mately 1330, following cap installation on the cask for spent
fuel shipment number 54, that the o-ring pressure test was not
4644
conducted in accordance with the approved procedure specified
above.
Specifically, the test pressure applied exceeded the
indicated range of the pressure gauge (0-100 psig range) on
the NF3 supplied equipment. The indicated pressure corres-
ponded to approximately 110 psig by visual extrapolation of
the gauge scale. The gauge indicator did not contact the
mechanical stop.
A licensee representative stated that the 80-100 psig pressure
was difficult to obtain because the service air supply pressure
is 140 psig and is provided via a gate valve.
The inspector stated that this was an apparent failure to
follow procedure and that the absence of scale markings on
the gauge in the range over 100 psig makes the application
of the test acceptance criterion (i.e., no leakge) difficult.
Technical Specification 6.2.c, requires adherence to operating
procedures for refueling operations which are required by
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Technical Specification 6.2. A.-
Additionally, Title 10. Code.
of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion 5
requires procedures be used'for activities affecting quality.
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This failure to. follow procedures when considered collectively
with others as listed under Enforcement Action, constitutes a
Infraction level Item of Noncompliance.
b.
Spent Fuel Cask Contamination
Shipment No. 48 nrrived at NFS on August 22, 1975, with six
.
of eight' amears exceeding the 2,200 dpm limit established by
.
DOT. The highest reading was reported to be 56,000 dpm.
The
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inspector reviewed the licensee's Smear Survey 2024-75 dated
August 21, 1975, which indicated 54 smears had been taken in-
cluding decontamination. No unusual results were noted, and
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smear data indicated measured levels within limits. The
licensee's investigation was continuing.
9.
Radiation Protection
During observation of spent fuel handling operations, the inspector
noted that personnel on the 119' elevation (refueling floor) did
not. routinely use, nor have easy access to a frisker to verify 'that
58dM
no contamination was leaving that level following fuel cask decon-
+
tamination.
A licensee representative stated that a frisker which was being
,
used to count smears of the cask was available in the stairwell
area.
.
The inspector's statement that this was not convenient and probably,
J,
for that reason not used, was acknowledged by the licensee.
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10.
Miscelleneous
a.
Housekeeping
,
During the conduct of facility tours, selected site areas were
'
examined with respect to housekeeping practices, including the
reactor building'in general, tank farm area, canal area, out-
j
' side storage, diesel generator area, battery room and cable
spreading room. The following inadequacies were identified.
,
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(1) Battery Room
'&".
The inspector visually observed _the presence.of trash-
on the battery' room floor.. The' referenced materials were
'
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removed by the licensee and the area was reverified to be
clean by the inspector. The battery-room was appropriately
identified as a no-smoking area.
,
(2)
Cable Spreading Room
The inspector visually observed the presence of trash on
the' cable spreading room floor. Additionally, the licensee
had been storing materials in containers situated inside
the cable spreading room. The inspector also located and
,
c
removed a newspaper from inside a cable tray.
The refer-
"
,
"
enced' materials were removed by the licensee and the area
was reverified.to be clean by the inspector.
Prior to
i
. the conclusion of the inspection, the cable spreading room
,
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was appropriately posted as a "No Smoking" area.
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4
10 CFR 50,- Appendix B, Criterion II, the implementing pro-
visions of the OQAP,Section II and' ANSI Standard N45.2.3 -
'
1973 establish cleanliness requirements (Reference JCP&L
letter to Division'of Reactor Licensing dated May 2, 1974).
es4N
Section 3.2.1 of ANSI N45.2.3 - 1973, states in part, that
garbage, trash, scrap, litter and other excess material shall
be collected, removed from the job site, or disposed of in
.
accordance with specified requirements or standards.
This
failure to maintain cleanliness as listed under Enforcement
Action constitutes an apparent Infraction level Item of Non-
compliance.
b.
Planning, Coordination and Procedures for Handling Station
'
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Emergen cies
I
The inspector audited on a sampling basis the licensee's pro-
cedures for fire protection, coordination, and training.
This
area will be reviewed further during a subsequent inspection .
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Contains 2.790 Information
c.
Security Controls
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(1)
Reactor Building Doors and Locks
During the course of a facility tour conducted of areas
external to the Reactor Building on August 26, 1975,
.the inspector observed that the Northeast door (outer
airlock door) to the reactor building was ajar. Accomp-
anied by a licensee representative, the inspector veri-
fled inner door integrity (Secondary Containment) and
observed the outer door as locked but not capable of
complete closure without a manual assist. The door was
properly closed prior to proceeding with the facility
tour. Two licensee representatives were located in the
,
vicinity of the Nitrogen Tank and Station, however, these
personnel did not have the subject door under surveil-
lance.
Failure of the closure to selflock was attributed
by the licensee to door sill problems, which were sub-
sequently resolved.
The Oyster Creek Industrial Security Plan, dated Janu-
i
ary 7,1974, Section 3.4.2, " Control" specifics, that
access be controlled by locked doors or security / opera-
ting personnel. This failure to maintain the referenced
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door in a locked status as listed under Enforcement
Action constitutes an apparent Infraction level Item of
Noncompliance.
Additionally, this item is recurrent in
that the Northeast door to.the reactor building was found
ajar due to a faulty door closure during a prior inspection.*
(2) Vital Area Access Logs
The inspector during the conduct of a facility tour on
August 28, 1975, was accompanied by a licensee repre-
sentative to the cable spreading room, a designated Vital
A area. The Cable Spreading Room door was posted with
respect to Vital Area Log requirements for sign-in and
sign-out. No entries were required during this tour of
the inspector or licensee representative.
During a sub-
sequent tour on August 29, 1975, appropriate sign-in and
sign-out procedures were in effect.
Contains 2.790 Information
- Region I Inspection Report 50-219/75-02.
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IE:I:177
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10 CEP27VO INFURfdkHOl0
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Con
on
The Oyster Creek Industrial Security Plan, dated Janu-
,>; ;
ary 11, 1974, Section 4.2, establishes procedural re-
'
quirements, and Procedure No. 1.0 " Security Guidelines",
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,4
dated April 11, 1974, states in part that personnel,
"shall be instructed to sign in and out on the Vital "A"
,
Area Log located at the entranc( to each Vital Area".
Failure to complete appropriate sign-in and sign-out re-
quirements as listed under Enforcement Action constitute
an apparent Infraction icvel Item of Noncompliance.
..
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IE:I:177
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