ML20107F629

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Rev 1 to ECCS Mod Core Spray Electrical Crossconnect
ML20107F629
Person / Time
Site: Oyster Creek
Issue date: 06/24/1975
From:
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML18039A986 List: ... further results
References
FOIA-95-258 NUDOCS 9604220407
Download: ML20107F629 (56)
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Text

j' ATTACllMENT II JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGliT COMPANY OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Docket 50-219 ECCS MODIFICATION CORE SPRAY ELECTRICAL CROSSCONNECT l

June 24,1975 l

o Revision 1, Tuly 15,1975

-9604220407 960213 PDR FOIA DEKOK95-250 PDR

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'. TABLE OF. CONTENTS SECTION

' TITLE PAGE 1,.

' INTRODUCTION 1-1

)

2.

DESCRIPTION OF MODIFICATION 2 4 2.1

. Objectives of the Modification 2-1

' 2.' 2 Modification Details -

2-1

' 3.-

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MODIFIED 3-1 i

~ SYSTEM' 3;l LCore Spray System-

. 3-1 l

3;2 Automatic Depressurization System 3-4

' 3.3 Emergency Condensers 3-4'l

^

'4.

SAFETY EVALUATION 4-1 4,1-Modification Interfaces With Existing 4-1 2

Systems

^

i 4

-4.1.1

.4100 VAC Emergency Switchgear, 4-1 Bus 1C and Bus ID 4.1.2 -

460 VAC Substations 1A2 and 1B2 4-4 4.1.3 460 VAC Vital MCC 1A2 and MCC IB2 4-4 4.1.4 460 VAC MCC 1AB2 and MCC 1A21B 4-5 4.1.5 460 VAC MCC 1A21A and MCC 1B21A 4-5 4.1.6 Automatic Depressurization System 4-6 4.1 7 Other Interfaces 4-6 4.2 ECCS_ Analysis Considerations

  • 4-6' r

4.3-Single Failure Analysis 4 :

f 5.-

SCHEDULE.

5-1

- Appendix A Single Failure Analysis Revision 1, July 15,1975 1

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1.

INTRODUCTION This document is submitted in compliance with condition 2.D.1 incorporated into the Oyster Creek Nuc1 car Generating Station Provisional Operating License as part of Amendment No. 8 dated May 24, 1975. The condition states that:

"Within 30 days from the effective date of this amendment the licensee shall submit for NRC review and approval proposed design modifications which will enable the facility to automatically accommodate a single passive failure of the emergency diesel gen-erator bus without adverse effect on the ability of the ECCS system to conform to the evaluation submitted to demonstrate compliance with 10 CPR 50.46 in the applications for license amendment set forth above. Such modifications shall be completed within 30 days after approval, or within such other time as may be specified in such approval."

The safety evaluation in support of issuance of Operating License Amendment Number 8 contains a section entitled " Evaluation of ECCS Performance" in which the postulated coincident occurrence of a core spray line break and a passive failure of the unbroken spray system main electric bus results in a conclusion that the design must be revised.

)

The Oyster Creek Core Spray System design modification proposed herein l

consists of interchanging the electrical feeders in one set of redundant electri-

.cally driven components for each of the core spray loops'.

4.

In addition, the design effort which produced the modification described

)

herein was expanded to encompass a number of the potential single failures j

which were postulated as a result of the single failure analysis presented In conformance to license condition 2.D.2 of Amendment No. 8 to the,0yster i

1-1 i

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4 Creek Provisional Operating License. This is presented as Attachment I to this submittal. Section 2 presents the modification details and Section 3 indicates the system characteristics relative to the existing system with consideration given to the single failure improvements.

A cafety evaluation was conducted and is presented in Section 4. Consider-ation has been given to the modification interface with existing safety systems, the diesel capability to accommodate the revised loading sequence and the improvement which will be experienced over previous ECCS performance analyses for the core spray line break with respect to 10 CPR 50.46. In addition, a single failure analysis for the modified system has been performed and is included in Appendix A as part of the safety evaluation.

A realistic schedule for implementation is given in Section 5 and reflects the need for approximately ninety days, subject to the availability of material and the extent and duration of the Commission review.

1-2

2.

DESCRIPTION OF MODIFICATION 2.1 Objectives of th6 Modification The major objective of the modification described herein is that under all conditions the ECCS nkodification shall enhance the system capabilities by enabling it to provide core cooling water for a postulated core spray line break (LOCA) coincident with a single failure of the diesel generator or diesel gen-erator bus which is currently configured to power the unbroken core spray loop.

With this set of circumstances, the ECCS shall deliver to the reactor core the required quantity of coolant at the required pressure and flow rate to meet the acceptance criteria set forth in Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50, Section 50.46 and Appendix K (effective 2/4/74).

This is accomplished by the ECCS active subsystems consisting of the spray /

booster pumps and valves for each flow path being powered by separate and redundant vital power sources, under the conditions set forth above.

2.2 Modification Details l

The core spray system design modifications will enable the facility to i

accommodate a singic passive failure of either diesel generator bus without.

any adverse effect on the ability of the ECCS system to conform to the evalu-ation submitted to demonstrato compliance with 10 CPR 50.46.

The existing AC load diagram for.the core spray system components is pro-sented in Figure 2-1. The modification to the existing load diagram is 2-1

4 e

presented in Figure 2-2. No change to the DC load schedule is required by the modification.

The modified load schedule enables both core spray fluid systems to function if one diesel generator bus is out of service. This was accomplished by power-

~

ing redundant spray system components (i.e., components associated with a single core spray fluid system) from opposite buses. Each diesel generator can support the power requirements of two independent core spray fluid systems.

The existing core spray system actuation logic is presented in Figure 2-3.

Modification of the existing logic is presented in Figure 2-4. The modifica-tion does not alter the normal core spray system start sequence. Additional constraints or conditions have been added to the start sequence logic so that one of the two existing diesel generators will not be required to support the load transient associated with the simultaneous starting of any two core spray system pumps. To assure that the control logic cannot command the simultaneous starting of two pumps on the same diesel generator bus, inter-locks have been added to provide concurrent start sequences for both core spray fluid systems. The r st sequence interlocks increase the start sequence reliability. The modification to the control system logic will automatically start both diesel generators and initiate the core spray system pump sequence in both fluid systems if either a low-low reactor level or a high drywell pressure signal is present in any one of the four core spray system logic channels.

j With the modification, the start sequence interlock must be inhibited when a logic channelis in test to prevent test signal starting of the pumps in the loop not bein'g tested. Four keylock switches will be used for this purpose (one

. for each logic channel). Only a single key will be available to assur,e that 2-2

4 only one start sequence interlock circuit can be disabled. An alarm in the control room will indicate when any start sequence interlock circuit is inhibited.

After logic channel test, the control room has a positive indication when the 1

interlock circuit is restored.

Figure 2-5 presents the core spray control system pump start sequence block diagram for the modification. The diagram depicts the starting sequence associated with fluid system I. All interfaces with fluid system II have.

been identified. The starting sequence associated with system II may be directly translated from Figure 2-5 by substituting system II for system I and bus ID for bus IC. The nominal starting sequence is highlighted by the bold block outline. Figures 2-4 and 2-5 disclose that with the nominal start-ing sequence, each core spray fluid system is available ten seconds after the start signal sequence and power is available at the associated bus. If no power is available at one bus, both fluid systems will automatically start.

The fluid system with the preferred pumps operating is available ten sec-onds after the start sequence signal. The other fluid system is available fifteen seconds later.

The core spray system responsiveness to valid start sequence signals has been enhanced by the modification. The existing system will initiate the start sequence for one of the two fluid systems after a single high drywell pressure signal or a low-low reactor water level signalis present in the con-trol system logic. The modified system will initate the start sequence for both fluid systems after the first high drywell pressure signal or low-low reactor water level signal is present in the control system logic.

The modification will be designed, engineered, and installed in accordance with criteria equivalent to or better than that to which the original system was n

2'-3

y built. Precent day criteria will be used where it can be reasonably and practicably applied, and will result in significant safety improvement.

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3.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MODIFIED SYSTEM The system design modification greatly enhances the ECCS availability and performance during the design basis condition (i.e., postulated LOCA).

Features which shall,be incorporated into the ECCS based on the designed modification are subsequently presented. The design modification addresses the ECCS core spray system (CSS) and the automatic depressurization system (ADS).

3.1 Core Spray System The features to be incorporated into the CSS are as follows:

o A CSS actuation logic channel shall initiate operation of its assigned fluid system via the preferred spray and/or booster pumps and their associated power source and via the alternate (backup) spray and/or booster pumps which are powered by a separate and independent power source from the preferred pumps. An actuation channel shall start the alternate spray and/or booster pumps when the respective preferred pumps of that loop do not start.

o A CSS actuation logic channel shall open its redundant and independent valves in its assigned fluid sytem with similarly redundant and independent power source configuration.

o' The tripping of a single input parameter (i.e., low-low level or high drywell pressure) shall initiate the CSS start sequence in the actuation channels for both spray systems I and II, which will result in commanding both 2500 KW diesel generators to start.

3'-1 4

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t i

.o The spray / booster pump and suction / isolation valve motor con-trol center (MCC) assignments have been selectively rearranged, thereby enabling both spray systems I and II to operate at rated conditions based on either of two independent and redundant power-sources.

o The power source breakers for the test recirculation bypass valves (i.e., V20-27 and V20-26) and the discharge (test) valves (i.e.,

V20-12 and V20-18) shall be locked out (off) during non-test opera-tional periods. Valve position indication shall be maintained in-dependent of breaker status.

o Keylock test switches to enable testing of the CSS actuation chan-nels shall be installed. The test switch permits testing of an l

individual actuation channel independent of the interchannel inhibit interlocks. When testing an actuation channel, the interchannel

]

inhibit is annunciated in the control rc'm.

These design features enable the CSS to achieve operational advantages not afforded by the currently installed system.

A summary of operational enhancements is presented below. Table 4 1

of Appendix A can be compared with Table 6 of the existing ECCS single failure analysis to demonstrate the favorable impact of the modification with regard to the single failure vulnerability of the ECCS systems. This is accomplished as follows.

o The modified actuation channellogic and the reassignment of motor power sources enable the system to provide rated coolant 3-2 9

flow conditions in both core spray fluid systems I and II uncier all combinations of a postulated LOCA coincident with a single active mechanical or electrical failure or a single passive electrical failure. Of particular emphasis is the ability of the CSS to provide rated coolant flow to the reactor vessel when the postulated LOCA -

occurs at one CSS pipe-reactor vesselinterface and either 4160 VAC bus ID or IC has failed. (See Attachment I, Itsms 211, 212, 553, and Attachment II, Items 211A, 212A, 553A and Figures 2-2, 2-9.)

o The reassignment of CSS componen't power sciurces has corrected the system vulnerability to single failure of undervoltage relays 27X-1C, 27X1-1C, 27X-ID, and 27X1-1D. No single vital bus -

undervoltage relay failure can prevent spray system I or II from operating. (See Attachment I, Items 517, 518 and~ Attachment II, Items 517A, 518A and Figures 2-2, 2-4.)

o The modified CSS actuation logic initiates total system response

_(diesels 1 and 2 start and systems I and II pressurization) upon the receipt of a high drywell pressure signal or a low-low reactor water level signal to a single actuation channel. (See Attachment II, Items 509A, 514A and Figure 2-4.)

.o The locking out of the " test" valves power source breakers assures that no single hot short shall cause the " test" valve to go to a state which prevents or perturbs the spray systems I and II from operat-ing at rated conditions. Valve position indications, independent of valve operator power, will be provided in the control room. (See Attachment I, Items 804, 816.)

o The drywell pressure switches RV46B and RV46C shall be reassigned to CSS actuation channels C and B, respectively. (See Attachment II, Item 576A and Figu.re 2-4.)

3-3 Revision 1, July.15,1975

o The installation of an additional booster pump minimum recirculation valve (V-20-94 for System I and V-20-95 for System II) in parallel with the existing valves. (See Attachment I, Item 806 and Attachment II, Item 806A and Figure 2-7.)

3.2 Automatic Depressurization System (ADS)

In addition to upgrading the CSS, the design modification shall concurrently enhance ADS performance. These modifications shall be as follows:

o CSS relay 16K115C will enable ADS relay 16K214B.

o-CSS relay 16K115B will enable ADS relay 16K215A.

These modifications shall eliminate the following single failure:

o The failure of vital DC panel D or E shall not' prevent the ADS from initiating reactor depressurization. (See Attachment I, Item 310.)

1 3.3 Emergency Condensers As identified in the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (Table 2 of Attachment I, Items 211 and 212) a loss of power to motor control center DC-1 can prevent both emergency condenser isolation valves (V-14-34 and V-14-35) from operat-ing. This will prevent both emergency condenser systems from initiating.

Figure 2-8 shows the present configuration.

o The modification will enable at least one system of the emergency

~

condensers to operate in the event of a loss of power to motor control center DC-1. The modification consists of disconnecting the motor operator of emergency condenser isolation valve V-14-35 from MCC-DC1 and connecting it to a separate motor starter whose power source will be the 125 VDC distribution center A as shown on Figure 2-9. Table 5 of Attachment IIis the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis for this modification.

~

3-4 Revision 1, July 15,1975 1

'4..

SAFETY EVALUATION -

- 4.1 Cre Soray. Modification Interfaces'With Existing Systems Presented herein is a' discussion of the modifications and their respective inter-

. face and impact on eRisting systems.

4.1.1 4160 VAC Emergency Switchgear, Bus 1C and Bus ID The'4160 VAC emergency switchgear bus 1C and bus ID are supplied by

. diesel generators 1 and 2, resp.ectively, or the offsite power source.

The design modifications presented herein do not alter this configuration.

The principle CSS related load assignments for the bus 1C and bus ID are substation bus 1A2 and bus 1B2, respectively, and two 500 hp core spray pumps on each bus (1C and ID). Currently, core spray puinps NZ01C and NZ01A are assigned to bus 10, while pumps NZ01B and NZ01D are assigned to' bus ID. Based on the CSS modification, two of the core spray pumps shall be reassigned relative to' bus 1C and 1D. The revised spray pump

- assignments are as follows:

o Bus l'C:

Core spray pumps NZ01A and NZ01D o

Bus ID:

Core spray pumps NZ01B and NZO1C l

The net effect of this modification is to enable both core spray systems I and II to establish rated spray pump operation as a function of two independent and redundant AC power supplies. There is no change in-the number of 500 hp core spray pumps assigned to a 4160 AC emergency switchgear bus (i.e.,

11C or 1D).

4-1

s. n

~

, + - -

,-,.e,.

n.-

=

7

+

Dased on the revised philosophy of operation','both CSS I and II must supply rated core spray when one of the vital AC power sources (i.e., bus 1C or bus ID) is unavailable. The load on the as'sociated diesel generator as in-creased by 800 hp. The load increase is due to the operation of the preferred spray (500 hp) and booster (300 hp) pumps associated with one. core spray fluid system and in addition, the' alternate spray and booster pumps 'associ-

~

ated with the other core spray fluid system. Under normal operating conditions, that is both bus IC (diesel generator.1) and bus ID (diesel generator 2) opera-tional, each vital bus (i.e., bus IC or ID) shall provide power to the preferred spray (500 hp) and booster (300 hp) pumps associated with a' single core e

spray system. The load schedule for an emergency switchgear bus such as bus 10 (diesel generator 1) for normal operation and for operation assum-ing a bus (bus 10 or bus 1D) is unavailable is presented on Page 4-3. The load schedule reflects both the nameplate rating of each load and the load required to achieve rated condition.

Each diesel generator has a nominal rating of 2500 KW. The estimated loads, when based on the nameplate ratings of the motors, exceed 2500 KW. However, the actualload of these motors when operating at rated conditions reduce the total bus load to 2500 KW Each of the existing diesel generators is fully capable of carrying the 2500 KW load.

Tests have been successfully performed on the diesel generators at the plant to ascertain the capability of a diecel to start a 1000 HP condensate pump while carrying a load of 850 HP. Since these tests imposed more severe transient loads on the diesel generator than anything outlined in the foregoing starting sequence it can be conservatively assumed that starting transients with the CSS modification are acceptable.

l i

4-2 4

a 1

Normal Operation II (Bus 1C and Bus ID Available)

Nameplate Rating Rated Condition Emergency Lighting (immediately')

70

.70 Instruments, Controls, Misc. Small.

250 250 Motors, and System Losses (immedi-ately)

Closed Cooling Water Pumps (immedi--

200 176 ately).

Standby. Gas Treatment (immediately) 70.

70 Corf Spray Pump (immediately 500 462 on command)-

Core Spray Booster (5 seconds 300 285.

after ' CSP)

Control Rod Drive Feed Pumps 250 252 (After booster discharge pressure attained)

Service Water (2 minutes delay).

250 252 Containment Spray (45 seconds delay) 300 237 Emergency Service Water Pump 400

~405

'(5 minutes after containment spray)

Normal Operation-Total 2590 HP 2457 HP Category I Load Additional CSS (2) Loads (Bus IC or Bus ID Unavailable)

Additional Core Spray Pump 500 462 (5 seconds after first booster)

Additional Booster Pump 300 285 (5 seconds after additional CSP)

Total Category I Load which must 3390 HR 3204 HP start automatically Equivalent KW 2528 KW 2390 KW Assume-95% efficiency for 2646 KW 2500 KW large motors, total load (1) Load sequence identical to existing load profile.

-(2) Additional loads imposed based on the proposed CSS modification.

4-3 s

9

. +. - -

m

~

4.1.2 460 VAC Substations IA2 and IB2 The independent and redundant bus IA2 and btis 1b2 are powered from bus 10 and bus ID, respectively. The design modification does not alter this power service network.

Currently, CSS booster pumps NZ03A and assigned to bus lA2 and CSS booster pumps NZO2B and NZ02D are assigned.o bus 1E2. Under the proposed modifica-t tion the pump-bus assignments are as follows:

o Bus lA2:-

CSS booster pumps NZO3A and NZO3D o

Bus 1B2:

CSS booster pump NZ03B and NZ03C.

The net effect of the modification is no load change on bus IA2 or bus IB2, but enhanced capability for CSS I and II through the use of independent and redundant AC power sources.

4.1.3 460 VAC Vital MCC 1A2 and MCC IB2 The vital MCC busses IA2 and IB2 are energized, respectively, from substation buses lA2 and 182. The design modification does not alter this network.

Currently, vital MCC 1A2 provides power to both CSS System I isolation valves (i.e., V20-15 and V20-40) and alternate power to the MCC 1AB2 bus via the automatic transfer switch. Vital MCC bus IB2 has no CSS associated load other than providing power to MCC 1AB2 via the automatic transfer switch (ATS).

ne 4-4 9

1 Subsequent.to the modification, the load pattern shall be as follows:

t.

. Vital MCC 1A2 - System Iisolation valve V20-15 and ATS.

o o'

Vital MCC IB2 - System Iisolation valve V20-40 and ATS.

The net result of this change shall be a balanced CSS load on the respective'

^ busses. 'In~ addition',~ CSS I shall be enhanced via an independent and redundant-

' isolation valve power source configuration.

4.1.4 460 VAC MCC 1AB2 'and MCC 1A21B

Currently,'MCC 1AB2 provides power to the CSS IIisolation valves V20-21 and.V20-41..MCC 1A21B provides power to System I recirculation valve V20-27.

Subsequent to the modification, MCC 1AB2 shall power CSS I V20-41 only and MCC 1A21B shall power CSS 1 V20-27 and CSS II V20-21.

The result of this modification is to assure an independent and redundant CSS IIisolation valve power source configuration.

4.1.5 460 VAC MCC 1A21A and MCC IB21A t

As presented on Figure 2-1, the currently configured MCC 1A21A provides power for CSS 1 suction valves V20-32 and V20-3 and CSS I discharge (test) valve V20-12. MCC IB21A powers CSS II suction valves V20-4 and V20-33,-

CSS II recirculation valve V20-26, and CSS II discharge (test) valve V20-18.

To provide an-independent and redundant valve-power source configuration, l

the suction val.ves V20-32'(CSS.I) and V20-33 (CSS II) shall be reassigned i

4-5' 4

l w

V as shown on Figure 2-2. The current recirculation and discharge (test) valve-f.

power source urrangement meets the independent and redundant power.-

source requirements.

4.1.6 Automatic Depressurization System (ADS)

As discussed in Section 3.2, the design modification concurrently enhances ADS performance.

4.1.7 Other Interfaces i

During the evolution of final design, all other interfaces that may exist will be identified and evaluated.

4.2 ECCS Analysis Considerations The core spray line break loss-of-coolant accident, when coupled with a single failur'e of the diesel generator or a diesel generator bus fault which provides power to the unbroken core spray loop, has been analyzed and found to require operator action in order to mitigate the effects of the acci-dent. The modification to the ECCS system described in this submittal provides the system with the capability to automatically respond to the above failure assumptions and to satisfactorily mitigate the effects of the accident in com-pliance with 10 CFR 50.46 without operator action.

The response of the modified system to the core spray line break and diesel generator failure or diesel bus fault in the unbroken loop is such that the sys-tem will be capable of automatically delivering rated core spray under the conditions of high drywell pressure or low-low water level and permissive system pressure. The effect on the peak cladding temperature in this case l

4-6

can be seen from Figures 20 and 24 of our April 28,1975 analysis. The core spray isolation valves will automatically open when system pressure reaches i

285 psig. This occurs when the water level is slightly below the top of the active fuel. From that point on, the water level behavior can be considered to behave analogously with the feedwater line break presented in Figure 25 for comparison purposes. On this basis, the water level will begin to turn around in approximately 300 seconds. This can be compared to the results presented in Figure 24 which shows that the peak cladding temperature will be less than 1800 F, far less than the 2200 F criterion.

Consideration has also been given to the modified system effectiveness in mitigating the effects of the remaining spectrum of analyzed breaks. The capability of the system in this regard has not been degraded and has been enhanced by providing for both core spray systems to operate when one diesel generator is inoperative. In previous analyses, when a diesel gener-1 ator failure was assumed, only one core spray system was available. With the modified system, two core spray fluid systems will be available.

4.3 Single Failure Analysis A single failure analysis for the modification has been performed and is included as Appendix A. No additional single failures have been created by this modification. Of those single failures which have been identified in the analysis performed to comply with Condition 2.D.2 of Amendment 8' to the Oyster Creek Provisional Operating License, several have been corrected and are identified in the Appendix. The resulting single failure analysis reflects the ECCS system as modified.

417

}-

l.

e 5.

SCHEDULE 4

The implementation of this modification can. reasonably be conducted over a ninety day schedule, subject to the availability of material and the extent and duration of the Commission review requirements. A significant portion of this period is required for verification, review and Q. A procedures which apply to the nuclear grade safety system design, procurement, con-struction 6nd testing. Work is proceeding while awaiting NRC approval and assuming no major disagreements, the ninety day period can be assumed to have started. The availability of materials to the proper specifications does not appear to be a problem, however all the hardware has not been defined and therefore reservations on a ninety day commitment must be expressed with regard to the availability of special hardware (and its required docume'n-tation) which may be beyond our control.

With regard to the schedule, the tasks that must be accomplished are

~11sted below with a schedule shown in Figure 5-1 for a ninety day pre-shutdown implementation. The tasks are:

1.

NRC approval received.

2.

Plant Operations Review Committee and General Office Review Board review of modification.

3.

Verify existing wiring diagrams; although no discrepancies are expect' d, it is prudent to conduct a verification and establish e

pre-modification documentation of terminal connections and cable routing.

4.

Conduct detailed design; the new cable and conduit runs, instru-ment and control re-wiring and new relay installation must be detailed.

5-1 9

u.--

. g Verification and Q. A.. procedures applied to the detailed design.

5,

.6.

Write procurement specifications and purchase orders.

Review and Q. A. procedures applied to procurement specifications 7.

.and purchase orders.

8.

Delivery, receipt and inspection of materials.

^

9.

Work packag'e preparation; for this type of modification, each l

wire to be changed must be pre-documented and inspection checkoff lists developed. Working from drawings alone is not an adequate procedure.

10.

Verification of work package.

11.

Preparation'of specific component, subsystem and system _ test procedures; new components will have to be tested, interfaces verified and an integrated sytem test performed.

Test procedure review and approval; whenever a new or modified 12.

detailed test is to be performed on a safety system such as is the case here, review and approval by the Plant Operations Review Committee is required.

l 13.

Installation and installation inspection.

J l

14.

Testing.

1 2

5-2 1

T'o-

- 1 1

FIGURE 5--1 t-OYSTER CREEK CORE SPRAY MODIFICATION 90 DAY SCHEDULE l

MONTHS I

2 3

i I

i 1

i i

B I

I I

I i

t i

I ASSUMED NRC APPROVAL VERIFICATION OF AS-BUILTS

~

D i" " "

DETAll DESIGN l

l Approve BILL OF MATERIALS l

en

"~

COMPILE SPECIFICATIONS l

ISSUE SPECIFICATIONS

~

l,

""h*D**'-

' "'Di**

PROCUREMENT l

""Y WORK PACKAGE V"'

D'*"""i'*

"*i'Y

^P N TEST PROCEDURE Pre-Shutdown

~

INSTALLATION 9

Q. A. AUDIT h

W PRELIMINARY DESIGN ESTABLISHED (6/24/75).

SHUTDOWN FOR INSTALLATION

,e m.

With respect to the emergency condenser sinijle failures, items 211A and 212A 2

on Table 5 (sheet 3), the modification described in section 3 will be implemented during ths next scheduled refueling outage. It should be noted that the effect of the loss of both emergency condensers on ECCS performance has been eval-uated in our letter dated July 3,1975, which considered the following ECCS 2

2 system combination's for the 0.35 ft limiting break and the 4.69 ft design basis break:

f 2 Core Spray + 0 Emergency Condensers + ADS The results of the ECCS performance considerations under these conditions have been accounted for by appropriately conservative MAPLHGR reductions.

Thus, Oyster Creek operation is in complete accord with this single failure assumption and modification during the next scheduled refueling outage is -

appropriate.

1 W

5-4 Revision 1, July 15,1975 f

e

%"d i

e APPENDIX A Sheet 1 of 16 TABLE 1 CORE SPRAY SYSTEM TAI 1rRE ?'0DE AND EITECTS ANALYSIS AFTER ?ODIFICATION Failure Symptouts and Local Effects Method of No.'

Name Function Mode Cause Including Dependent Failures' Detection

.Effect on System

' Remarks i

t

$?C r101A Auto Start IV 1

Prevents Chnn,el A free rtset*nt Periodic Test Degrades System I redundaecy Channel C is av:11able to all Systes 1 pe=pe cesf r: 5 " tee frca 1/2 to 1/1.

start Systes I.. Talves 7

I valves cA. AC. 3A. IA and 3C. anc 5A, lA. and 1C are ner : ally t1orin: valve 13A. Pre-crts St.-rt epen. Talce 12A is cer-of dietel #1 f rre C'. annal !

eally close".

FE 2-Starts C3 Puup (01A or n1C).

1.neunciater Eas to effect on Systes 1 Tyraws lines are previded C1cses CS va!ve 13A. C ent CS ability te respend to so that pu.ps can be Valves 1A. IC. Starts Diesel #!.

legiticate actuation signal.

nerated witheet data;a.

$01' K100A Auto Start FD 1

Prevents Channel A frcs starti9g Periodic Test Detrades System I redm -

Chsnnel C is available ts Syste-I Moster putps. System !

dancy fren 1/2 to 1/1.

start System 1 initiation is not sealeJ in by Chancel A TE 2

Enerri-es TICIA. Starts CS p ep Arnunciater Eas r.o effect en System t Evoass lines are provided (01A wr 01C). Cleses CS vaP c 13A abitity to resterd te se that pc.pr t-e be Opens CS valves 1A. 1C. Start s legitimate act ution signal.

ostrated wat'ast daea6**

booster p e- * (03A er 03C).

i

%2 E103A Start Pump F3 1

Chan wl A cannot start CS yrp 01A.

Periodic Test Degrades legte redundancy to Channel A can start pumps 01A etart CS pun CIA frc: 1/2 01A and 03A. Channel C can 50 ill but dces set affect start all pumps.

System T operatien.

TE 2

Starts CS pu p 01A.

Antenciator Has ne effect en System I ability to respeed to legiti=ste actsatien signal.

I 503A M04A Seq. Start FD 1

Prevents stut of backup CS prp '

Periedic' Test Degrades logic redundancy to Channel A can start pumps Psamp 01C 01C and Booster Pump 03C by start CS pump 01C and booster 01A and 03A. Channel C Channel A.

pump 03C from 1/2 to 1/1 but can start all pumps.

does not affect System I everation.

7E 2

Permits CS ptrap 01C and booster pump Periodic Test Degrades S;. sten I redundse:y 03C to start. CS pump 01A and from 1/2 t.' 1/1.

i booster pump 01A prohibited frem starting because of trip signal fror K105A and K113A. Therefore, backup oumos are not available in System I.

506 K10)A Start Prp TD 1

Prevents start of bietup CS pro Periedic Test Deerades logic redundancy to Channel a can start CS 01C 01C and trip cf rec.- C1.$.

start CS pep 01C frem 1/2 pr: CI A.

Char. net C car.

to 1/1 b t does cet affect start either CC pu=c CIA c,,t e I ccersttan.

av Mr.

Revision 1 dated 7-15-75

.i

um - -

4-.

t CCRE Sr2AY SYSTDt Sheet 2 et 16 FAILURE 200E AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS AFTER NDDIFICATION Failure Syepters and local Effects Method of No.

Nace Function Mode Cause Including Oc;endent railures Oetectien Effect on Syste:

Re= arks FE 2

Starts backup CS purp 01C and trips CRI for pu=p Degrades System I redundancy er prohibits start of CS pung 01A.'

fre= 1/2 to 1/1.

$05 K106A Readies FD 1-

one reriedie Test Does not aff ect auteestic OS eperatien of valves and Valves therefore does act affect System I eperation.

FE 2

?revents manual closing of valves Periodic Test Does not affect autematic Degrades.canual valve cen-SA, 6A and 6C (Valves 6A and 6C CS operatica ef valves and trol ekt. (clesing direc-are norcally clesed).

therefere does not affect tien) redundancy.

System I operation.

306 K107A Readies FD 1

Prevents Channel A frem opening Periodic Test Degrades Syste= 1 redundancy Chennel C is available to Valves CS discharge velves 6A, 6C (and from 1/2 to 1/1.

open Systen I valves.

Manual operatien ef valves opening SA, if required).

6A 6C and 5A is available.

FE 2

Opens CS discharge valves 6A, 6C CRI for valves Does not af fect Systen I Isolatica valves NIO2A and (and SA, if closed). Provides Event Recorder operatice. System 1 depends N202C will isolate CS autenatic intctruption of'clesing en two parallel check valves System I fren reacter ekt. for valves IA, IC.

to isolate low pressure f rem

pressure, reactor pressure.

507 KIC8A React'r FD 1

Prevents Channel A from opening CS Periodic Test Degrades System I redundancy Channel C is available to or Fressure or discharge valves 6A, 6C (and fres 1/2 to 1/1.

open'Systes,I valves.

o RE17A Reactor FH 3

openin: 5A, if required).

Pressure (open)

Sensor K10BA FE 2

Permits CS dischar,ee valves 6A, 6C Annunciator Oces not affect Syrtes I Isolation valves NZO2A and (and SA, if closed) to be opened operation. System I depends NZOIC vill isolate CS RE17A FL 4

when Channel A starts CS purp en two parallel check valves System I fren reactor pres-or to isolate low pressure sure until pressure is re-(closed) regardless of reactor pressure.

Also permits CS valves 6A, 6C er piping from reactor duced to peint where N202tf N202C (perered check SA to be opened manually regardless pressure.

valves) open.

of reactor pressure.

Revision 1 dated, 7-15-75

_ _ = - - = -.

v,u 3..

J Sheet 3 of 16 CCPI. SPRAY SYSTEM FAILURE NDDE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS ATTER EDIFICATIC3 Failure S rept: s an:! Local Effects Method of No.

  • ace Ti.r.ction Mode Cause Including Oc gcdent F.tilures Detection Effect on Syste:

Re= arks 3CS K109A ' System I FD 1

Prevents Channel A from iterting Periodic Test Degrades Syste= I re-Chsenel C is arailable to Discharge Systen I beo:;ter ;"s: ps.

dundancy from 1/2 to 1/1.

start System I booster or Pressure pumps.

or RV29A Syste= I FL 3

Discharge (open)

Pressure Sensor K10?A FE 2

Starts System I booster pun Annunciator Booster purp 03A may cavi-Bsekup booster pe p 03C is or simultaneously with CS puty OlA.

tate until CS peep 01A is available if 03A cannot RY29A FH up to speed. Short tera develop pressure. CS pu=p (Closed)

Prevents CS pump OlC from bein;,

envitation vill not affect 01A is available for operated by either Channel A or System I operation.

te-actustion by eithar Channe' Channel C.

grades Systen I redundancy A or C.

from 1/2 to 1/1.

~

$09A K110A Reactor FD 1

Prevents Channel A and Channel B Periedic Test Degrades Channel A diver-Channel A is available to Vessel

  • from starting on Low low Level sity. Dees ret affe'et start System I and System Let Level signal from Channel A sensor.

System I cycratien for II on High Dryvell Pressure.

or either Low Low Level or Channel C is available to or High Dryvell Pressure.

start System I and Systes RZ02A Reactor Low FP.

3 II on Low' Lev Level and/or Level Senso:

(open)

High Dryvell Pressure.

K110A FE 2

Energizes K101A, K102A starts CS Annunciator Ras no effect on Systes I Relay provides interlocks or pun (OlA or CIC) closes CS valve or System II ability to to Emergency Cecdenser RE02A FL 4

13A (if not closed) epens CS valves respond to legitimate actu-and Contain=cet Spray (Closed) 1A 1C, starts booster pump (93A or ation signal.

(16K6A).

03C). Auto starts System II (Chsnnel B).

510 KillA Start Puep FD 1

Channel A cannot start booster Periodic Test Degrades logic redundancy Channel A can start booste:

03A pu p 03A.

to start booster pump 03A pump 03C. Channel C can from 1/2 to 1/1 but does start either beoster pucp not affect Systen I oper-03A or 03C.

ation.

FE 2

Starts booster pump 03A.

Annunciator Has no ef fect on System I ability to respond te legit: -

-ute vtuetion sinnsl.

6 Revision 1 dated 7-15-75;

n s.. *

?

CORE SPRAY SYSTEM Shee't 4 of 16 FAII,URE PDDE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS AITER iTDIFICATIC3 Failure Sv=sters and '.et21 Ef fects Mathed of No.

Na e Fur.ction Mode Cause Includia:; h;enle-t F.nilures Cetection Effect on Systen -

Remarks 311 K112A

' Seq. Start FD 1

Prevents start of backup booster Periodic Test Degredes logic redundancy Channel A can start Pu=p 03C pump 03C by Channel A.

to start booster pu=p 03C

. booster pu p C3A. Channel from 1/2 to 1/1 but does '

C can start either beester not affect Systes I cper-'

pump 03A or 03C.

ation.

FE 2

Permits booster purp 03C to start.

CRI Degrades Syste:s I re-Booster pu*p 03A vould not start dundancy from 1/2 to 1/1.

because of trip signal fres K113A.

Therefore a bachip booster purp is not available.

512 K113A Start Pu=p FD 1

Prevents start of backup booster Periodic Test Degrades logic redundancy

' Channel A can start beester 03C pump 03C by Chaneci A.

to start booster purp 03C purp 03A. Channel C can from 1/2 to 1/1 but does no : start either hcester pu=7 affect System I eperaties.

03A or 03C.

FE 2

Starts backup booster pu-p 03C and CRI for.N M Degiades System I re-trips or prohibits start of booste' durdancy from 1/2 to 1/1.

pu=p 03A.

513 K114A Booster FD 1

Kone Periodic Test Degrades logic redundancy' Channel'C relay Kll4C Puep Dis-which sequences beester will perform required or charge pumps fren 1/2 to 1/1 but pump sequencing.

Pressure.or does not affect Systes I Rv40A Booster TI.

3 operation.

Pu_p Dis-(open)

Charge Pressure Sensor K114A FE 2

Prevents booster pump 03C fros Annunciator Degrades System I redundancr Booster pump 03A is avail-being operated by either Channel A from 1/2 to 1/1.

rable for actuation by eith $

or or Channel C.

Channel A or channel C.

RV40A TH Relay provides intericcks (Closed) to ADS (16K201A. 202A, 2026A, 207A).

Revision 1 dated 7-15-75

s.

CORE S?::AY SYSIC8 Shett 5 Ef 16 n

FAILUPI 1CDE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS AMER NCDIFICATIC26 J

Failure Sv?pte s and " cal Iffects Method of w

  • c.

Nane Fu=ction Mode Cause includi g EepeMent Failures Detectien Effect on Syste.

Remarks

, High Dryvel:, FD 1

Prevents Channel A and Channel B Periodic Test betredes Channel A Diversity. Channel A is available to

$14A Kil5A er Pressure.or from starting on High Dryvell Dees not affect Systes 1 start System I and System II RYt6A High Dryve1L PL Pressure signal from Channel A aperatlen for either Lev Lov on Low Lev level. Channel C Pressure (cpen) sensor.

  • evel or EIgh Drvvell Pres-is available to start Syster Sensor wr e.

I and System II on High -

Dryvell Pressure or Lew Low level.

K115A FE 2

Energized K101A, K102A, starts CS Annunciator 5 Pas no effect on System I or Relay provides icterlock -

or pep (CIA or OlC), closes CS valve Event Recorder System II ability to respond to ADS (16K214A).

KV46A FH 4

13A (if not closed), cper.s CS to legitimate actuation signa:

(Closed) valves lA IC. starts booster pur p (03A or 03C). Auto starts System II (Channel B).

515 Kil6A Control FD 1

None A nunciator

?cce.

System Power Failure FE 2

None.

Periodic Test None..

517A 27X-lC Under-volt-FD 1

Prevents operation of preferred Annunciater Degrades System I and II from relay Pumps of System I and backup 1/2 to 1/1 -

pumps of System II.

FE 2

Does not clear buss so that loads Periodic Test Possible overload of Diesel 1 may be sequenced after Diesel 1 degrades System I and II frem starts.

1/2 to 1/l.

518A 27X1-lc CS Purp Trip FD 1

Trips CS pumps OlA and OlD Annunciator Degrades System I and II from 1/2 to 1/1.

I TE 2

Ooes not protect CS peps (OlA, Periodic Test Does not prevent actuation System I and II available.

j 01C) against undervoltage of System I or II.

System I conditions.

vill operate if voltage is i

adequate.

~

Prevents " scal in" of K102A.

Periodic Test Fas no effect on System I Channel C will previde.

l 519A 302A Peset-Contact 5

=

1 fails operation.

required " seal in" fer open Systen I.

Contact 6*

Prevents reset of Channel A fol-Annunciater Mas no effect on System I 1 fails loving either test or cperation.

operation.

closed j

~

Revision 1 date,d 7-15-75 e

..m.

g._*

w CO2E STRAY SYSTD1 Sheet 6 of 16 TAILUPI 2CDE AND ETTECTS ANALYSIS AITER.TDITICATION Failure Svnpte s and :.ccal Ef fects Method of No.

Fane Tu.ction Mode Cause Including le;cncent Tsilures Cetectice Effect en Syste:n Renarks

$20 303A

. S nual Oper Contact}

5 Prevents nanual opening of valve Periodic Test Eas no effect on Systen I (See -

scion of I and/

6A and/or 6C.

operation.

else valves 6A or 5

$33) and 6C fail open Contacts 6

Prevents proper manual control of Periodic Test Ras no effect on Systen I

.May open valve 6A and/

1 and/or valve 6A and/or 6C during Systes operation.

or 6C but IV (check) 5 fail I test.

NIO:A and NZO2C protect closed Systen I piping fran resctor pressure.

Contacts 5

Prevents manual closure of valve Periodic Test Ras no effect on Systen I 4 and/or 6A and/or EC.

operation.

E fail opes Contacts 6

Prevents proper manual operation Periodic Test Has no effect on Systen 1 j Velves 6A and 6C are 4 and/or of valve 6A sad /or SC during perfornir.g ECCS function.

' nor= ally closed. This 8 fail Systen I test.

failure will not prevent closed crening cf vslve 6A er 6C since 2 contactsrs have priority and KlC6A and KlCSC contacts vill open.

Contset 3

Prevents proper ranusi operation Periodic Test Ras no effect on Systen I Valve SA is norrally 2 fails of valve SA during Systce I test.

operation.

open.

open Contact 6

Prevents proper manual operation Teriodic Test Fas no effect on Systen 1 2 fails of valve 5A during System I test.

eperation.

closed i

l l

  • nision 1 dated 7-15 i

CORE SPEAT SYSTD*

Shett'7 Af 16

~

FAILURE ICDE AND EFFECTS AKALYSIS AFTER PODIFICATION Failure Sv=pters ned Iccal Effects Yethod of' 3o.

Na:e Function-Mede Cause In:ludi g Cependent Failures Cetectie:-

Effect en System Remarks.

521 Motor 7alve 6A(6C) MC coil Hot Prevents Valve 6A (GC) froc being Periodic Test Degrades System I redundancy Overload device vill

(%+

Crerator Actuator is ener.

Short opened by either Channel A er C.

LI frem 1/2 to 1/1.

function to protect 4

n;<o 6A (6C) gized actuator ector.

E!!3)

No coil' Hot Valve 6A (6C) will open, overload CRI for valves Dees not affect System I' Isolation valves 3:02A &.

is ener-SMrt device will function to prctect LI operation.

NIO2C will isolate CS'sy's-gized actuator cotor.

tem fron reactor pressure.

i 522 305A Manual Oper-Contacts 5

Prevents raraal closure of valve Periodic Test Has no effect on System I Valves LA ard 1C are l

ation of '

1 and/or lA and/or IC.

operation, normally cpen.

valves lA, 3 fail i.

IC.

epen Contacts 6

Closes valve 1A (lC).

CRI for valve Has no effect on System I Valve 1A will open when 1 and/or operation.

System I is actuated since 3 fail M3 contactor has priority closed and K107A and KIN C cen-d tacts will open.

I Contacts 5

Prevents manual opening of valve Periodic Test Ras no effect on System 1 2 and/or IA (lC).

operation.

4 fail open Contacts 6

Prevents manual closure of valve Periodic Test Has no effect on System I 7alves lA and IC are 2 and/or IA (lC).

ope ratien.

normally c;bn.

4 fail closed i

523 Motor valve 1A MC coil Hot' Closes valve 1A (lC). Overload '

CRI for' valve Degrades System I redundanc5 Valve IC (lA) remains oper..

Cperator Actuator is ener-Short device will function to protect fron 1/2 to 1/1.

i 1A (lc gized actuator t'otor.

Chancel C)

M0 coil Hot Prevents valve 1A (lC) frem being Periedic Ter.t Does not. affect System I is ener-Short closed mnually. Overloed device LI operation.

gized will function to protect actuator notor.

t Itevision 1 dated 7-15-75 P

e I

,4:

CORE S? RAT SYSTTM'

. Sheet 8 ef 15 #

l TAILERE EDE AICD EFFECTS ANALYSIS AFTER MODIFICATION l

i L

t reilure Svecters and Local Effects Method of No.-

Nane.

Timetion Made Cause Including Cepcedent Tailures retection'

Effeet on Syste=-

Remarks:

~

. 527.A -

' 306A' 1-nual Ope-Contact 1 5

Prevents nanual closure of vcive Periodic Test

.Ess no effect on Systes I Valve 5A is no= ally open.

(See ration of fails 5A.

operation.

also-Motor

.gos) operator valve 5A '

Contact 1 6

Closes valve SA.

CRI for valve Has no effect on System I Valve 5A will cpen when After fails op eration.

System I is actuated since Racking closed MO contactor hae pricrity in Motcr and KlC6A and/cr K106C.

Operator contacts will epen.

3 i

Contact 2 5

Prevents e.anual opening of valve Periodic Test Has no effect on System I fails 5A s-ith both 6A and 6C closed.

operation.

open Contact :

6 Prevents manual closure of valve Periodic Test Has no effect on Systen I fails SA with both 6A and 6C closed.

operation.

closed 325A Motor hotor

C coil Hot Closes valve 5A.

Overload device -

CRI for Valve.

Metor Operator Racked out System II available during I

(See Operster Operator.

is ener-Short vill function to protect actuator LI (open position) during nor-testieg of System I.

aise SA valve SA gized coter.

mal operation. No affect on ECA)

Actuator system.

!O coil Rot Prevents valve 5A fron being close(. L1 Does not affect System I is ener-Short - Crcrload device vill function to Periodic Test operation.'

gized protect actuator ector.

326A Test Dis" Motor Oper

  • Contact 5

Prevents nanual opening of valve Periodic Test Has no effect on Sys'tes I 7alve 13A is normally charge ator open fails 13A.

operation.

closed.

t Valve Valve 13A epen Svitch After l

t (Local Racking Test in Motor.

Contact 6

Opens valve 13A.

CRI for Yalve.

Has no effect on Systes I valve 13A vill close when Station) Operator fails

. operation.

Systen I is actuated since closed MC contacter has priority and K101A and K101C cen-tacts vill open.

SI7A Test Dis'Close Contact 5

Prevents nanual closure of valve Periedic Test Has no effect on fystem I chstge Valve 13A fails 13A.

_ operation.

i d

Yalve After open i

j '

Svitch Racking (Local in Motor Temt Operator Station) i

~

\\

Revision 1 dated 7-15-75 i

w,

.c Co1E SPRAY STSID!

Shert 9 cf 16 TAILUT2 EDE AND ETTECTS ANALYSIS AHER MODITICATICN Tailure Synctets cnd Local Effects Method of

'"o.

Name Tunction Mode Cause Including Le;eMeat failures retection Effect on System Remarks i

i l

Contact 6

Prevents proper eperation of valve Periodic Iest Pas no effect en System I fails during System I test.

operation.

closed 528A Motor 7alve 13A MC coil Hot Closes valve 13A. Overload device Periodic Test Does not affect System I Cperator Actuator is ener-Short will function to protect actuator LI operation.

Valve 13; gized motor.

MO coil Hot opens valve 13A. Overload device CRI for valve.

Motor operator racked out System II available during is ener-Short vill function to protect actuator LI in closed position. No testing of System I.

gized riot o r, affect to system.

329 307A Manual ope-Contacts 5

Prevents manual openina, of Valve Periodic Test Does not affect System I Valves NZO2A and ::ZO2C are ration of 1 and/or NZO2A and/or NZO2C.

operation.

rever operated check valves.

valve NIO2A 2 fail valves can only be Fevered and NZO2C open open.

Contacts 6

Opens Valve NZO2A and/or NZO2C, CRI for valve Does not affect Syetem I Isolation valves 6A and 6C 1 and/or operation.

iso!,ates CS System I from 2 fails reactor pressure.

closed 530 308A Manual ope-Contact 5

Prevents manual tripping of CS Periodic Test Does not affect System I (305C) ration of 1 or 2 System I purp OlA (Olc, C3A. 03C).

operation.

'If required.

(310A)

CS System I fails pu::p can be stopped by turn--

(310C)

Purp OlA open ing off power to the pump.

(01C. 03A, 03C).

Contact 6

Trips or prevents start of CS CRI for' pump e Degrades System I redundanc:' Second CS or booster pucp 1 and 2 Systen I pump 01A (or Olc, or 03A, from 1/2 to 1/1.

available to perfor=

fails or 03C).

closed function.

Contact 5

Prevents eznual start of CS System Periodic Test Does not affect System I 3 or 4 I pu p 01A (Olc, c3A. 03C).

operation.

fails j

open i

Contact?

6 Starts CS Systen I pu p OlA for CRI for pump Mas no effect on System I 3 and 4 OlC, or'03A, or 03C).

ability to respond to i

fails closed.

legiti-ute actuation signal l

Revision 1 dated 7-15-75 l

CO1E SPFAY SYSTc1

' Shett 10 af 16

~'

FAILURE 20DE AND ETPECTS ANALYSIS AFTER MCDIFICATION-'

Failure Sympters and local Effects Methed of No.

Na:e Tunction Mode Cause Includi g Dependent F.tilures Cetectien Effect on System -

Re= arks 542 CP. 62-65 ~ Chennel A Open Removes 125 VDC from Chanel A Annuncia tor Degrades Systes I redundancy Channel C is available to Fanel D Centrol logic circuit.

from 1/2 to 1/1.

start Syste= I.

Fever 543 cs62-125 Channel C Open Removes 125 VDC from Channel C hmunciater Degrades System I redundancy Channel A is available to Panel E Control legic circuit.

from 1/2 to 1/1.

start Systen I.

Fever 544 CB 12-344 Valve Act:a Open Emeves 450 VAC frem valve actuator Periodie Test Degrades System I redundancy Valve 6C is available for ter 6A 6A so that valve fails in cle' sed frca 1/2 to 1/l.

cperation.

Power position.

545 CB 12-385 Valve Actua Open Receves 460 VAC frem velve actuator Periodic Test Degrades System I redundar.tyg valve 6A is available fer tor 6C 6C so that sive failes in closed fren 1/2 to 1/1.

operation.

Power pocition.

Periodic Test itas no effect on Systen I -

Each valve is acreally in 546A C3 12-416 Valve Actua Open Recoves 460 VAC frem valve actuator also

-331,

for IA position.

position required fer (See (Y.CCIA21A) tor Power so that cach valve failes in "as is operation.

System I operation.

816)

(MCC1521A)

IC

-411.

(MCCIA21A) 5A

-413 (MCCIA215) 13A 547 Ca 14-16 CS Pep 01A Open Prevents CS pump 01A from Periodic Test Degrades System I redundancy Pump Olc it available.

Emer.Sugr.

Power operating.

fren 1/2 to 1/1.

1C 548A C3 Emer.

CS Pu=p 01C *Open Prevents Cs pur.p 01C from Periodic Test Degrades System I redundancy Pump 01A is svailable.

14-38 Power operating.

from 1/2 to 1/1.

l Svgr. ID Revision 1 dated 7-15-75

CORE SPRAY SYSIIM Sheet 11 d 16 FAII,URE 2cDE AND EFFECTS ANA1,TSIS APTER 2CDITICATICN Failure Svecte s end local Effects Method of W.

h=e Functica Mode Cduse

  • ncluding h;endent, railures etection Iffect on Syste=

Rearks 549 CB Unit Loester.

Open Prevents booster pu p 03A from Periodic Test Degrades System I redundancy Pump 03C is available.

Substa-Fump 03A operating feca 1/2 to 1/1.

tion IA2 Power 55CA C3 Unit Booster Open Prevents booster pump 03C from Periodic Test ' Degrades System I redundancy Pu:p 03A is available.

Substa-Pump 03C operacing.

from 1/2 to 1/1.

tion 132 Power 551A 416CV CS Fump Open Prevents CS pu ps CIA and 01D from Annunciator Degrades System I and II Ener.

Power operating.

from 1/2 to 1/1.

Swgr 1C 552A 460V Booster Open Prevents Booster pumps 03A and Annunciator Degrades System I and II Unit Sub-Pump 03D from operating.

from 1/2 to 1/1.

station Power lA2 553A 460 MCC Valve 6A Open Prevents valve 6A from opening.

Annunciator Degrade System I from System II available.

lA2 Power 1/2 to 1/1.

554 460 MCC valve 6C Open Prevents valve 6C from opening.

Annunciator Degrade System I from System II available.

lA2 Power 1/2 to 1/1.

555 302AT Keylock open 3

Prevents synchronization of channel Annunciator Does not prevent auto System I and II available, Channel A and B.

Prevents actuation of state of either channel.

Interlock channel B by channel A.

Switch Closed 6

Prevents testing of channel 2 with-Periodic System I and II available, out actuating both systems.

356 ID-A UV aux FD Prevents backup peps frem Annunciator Degrades System I frem Trip operating 1/2 to 1/1.

FE Allows timing sequence to start Periodic No effect on system for backup pump ir.raediately af ter operation.

actuation signal.

I

- Revision 1 dared 7-15-75 :

i

CORE S? RAY CTS!CI Sheet 12 af l5 FAILURE SCDE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS AFTER MODIFICATION railure Sye:: s and local Effcets Methed of No.

Na e T= action Mode Cause Including E= pendent Failures Octection Effect on Systen Re= arks 8

362 K101C Auto Start FD 1.

Prevents channel C from starring Periedic Test Degrades Systen I redun-hannel A is available to

~

all 5 stem I pumps. opening System dancy frem 1/2 to 1/1.

gtart Systes I.

Talves 7

I valves 6A 6C SA, lA. 1C and 5A, LA and IC are ner ally closing valve 13A. Prevent = start cren. Valve 13A is nor ally of diesel fl free Channel C.

closed.

TE 2

Starts CS pu=p (OlA or CIC). Closes Annunciato'r Has no effect en System I 3ypass lines are provided CS valve 13A. Opr.ns CS valves lA, ability to respond to legit-so that purps can be epera-IC.

Starts Diesci fl.

inate actuation signal.

ted without da: age.

563 K102" Auto Start TD 1

Prevents Channel C from starting Periodic Test Degrades System I redundancy Channel A is available to Systen I beester pumps. Systen I from 1/2 to 1/1 start-Systee I.

initiation is not sesled in by Channel C.

TE 2

Energizes K101C. Starts CS pump Annunciator Has no effect on System I Sypass lines are provided (OLA or CIC). Closes CS salve 13A.

ability to respond to se that pe=ps can be Opens CS valves lA 3C.

Starts legitimate actuation signal. operated without ds= age.

bcoster pump (03A or 03C).

564 K193C Start Pump TD 1

Channel C cannot start CS pump OLA.

Periodic Test Degrades logic redundancy Channel C is available to OLA to start CS puno GIA fres start CS pu=p ClC. Channel 1/2 to 1/1 but does not A is available to start affect System I cperation.

sither CS pump OLA or 01C.

FE 2

Starts CS pump OlA.

Annunciator-Eas no effect on System I ability to respond to legit-icate actuation signal.

l 565A K104C Seq. Start FD 1,

Prevents stert of backup CS pu,p Period.ic Test Degrades logic redundancy te channel C can start pumps Pu=p 01C 01C and Booster Pump 03C by start CS purp 01C and Booster 0lA and 03A. Channel A Channel C.

Pump 03C from 1/2 to 1/1 but can start all CS pu=ps.

does not affect System I operation.

FE 2'

Permits CS pump 01C to start. CS Periedic Test Degrades Systen I redundancy pu?p OlA and Booster Pump 03A fren 1/2 to 1/1.

I prohibited from starting because I

of trip signal from K105C and K113C.

Therefore, backup punos are not available in System I.

I l

l Revision 1 dated 7-15-75:

l l

i' t

1 e

c>. -

Sheet 13 of 16 CcEE SPRAY SYSTIF.

i FAILURE E DE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS AFTER E DIFICATION Fa11 tire Sv=;::rs :nf S cal ?ffe:ts Met!ed of Nc.

Na:e Functirr.

.tde Cause inclu:=; ;.pe:::e.t Tai.lurez

c tec tier.

Effect on Syste=

Rc= arks

.i66 K'05C Start Pu p TD 1

Prevents starr of baciar CS punp Periodic Test Degrades logic redundancy-Channel C can start CS-Olc OlC and trip cf purp OlA.

to start CS pump OlC from pu p OlA. Channel A can 1/2 to 1/1 but does not af-start either CS pump CIA feet Systen 1 operation,

or Olc.

FE 2

Starts backup CS pump Olc and trips CRI for pump.

Degrades System I redundancy or prohibits start of CS puep 01A.

froml/2 to 1/l.

367 K106C Readies FD 1

None Periodic Test Does not affect autenatic CS Degrades canual valve cen-Valves operation of valves and trol ekt (clesing directien therefore does not affect redundancy.

Systen I cperation.

FE 2

Prevents manual closing of valves Periodic Test Does not affect eutematic CS 5A, 6A and 6C (valves 6A and 6C are operation cf valves and normally closec).

therefore does not affect System I operation.

563 K107C Readies D

1 Prevents Channel C from opening Periodic Test Degrades Systen I redundancy Chan~.el A is available to Valves CS discharge valves 6A. 6C (and f rom 1/2 to 1/1.

epen System I valves, opening 5A if required).

Etnual Operation of valves 6A. 6C and 5A is available FE 2

Opens CS discharge valves 6A. 6C CRI for valves Does not affect Systen I Iselatien valves %202A and (and SA. if closed). Provides Event Recorder Operation. System I depends 2 02C will isolate CS autocatic interruptien of closing on two parallel check valves Systen I from reactor ekt for valves lA. IC.

to isolate icv pressure pressure.

oiping from reactor pressure.

569 K108C Reactor m

1 Preven:s Channel C from opening Periodic Test.

Degrades System I redundancy Channel A is available to or Pressure org CS discharge valves 6A. 6C (and from 1/2 to 1/1.

open System I valves.

n178 Keactor fit 3

opening SA. if required).

Pressure (open)

Sensor K108C FE.

2 Permits CS discharge velves 6A.

Annunciator Ibes not affect System I Isolation valves 20 A and or 6C (and 5A if closed) to be operatien. System I depends n-2C vill isolate CS Sys-1E175 FL 4

cpened when Channel C starts CS on two parallel check valves ten I fres reacter pressure closed) punp regard 1=vs of reactor pres-to isolate low pressure until pressure is reduced i

sure. Also permits CS valve 6A.

piping from reactor pressure. to point where MC2A/ :02C 6C or SA to be opened ma".ually re-(povered check valves) gardless of reactor pressure.

open.

Revisien 1 dated 7-15-75

~

pg

.s

~ CCRE SPRAY SYSTIM Sheet 14 of 15 -

FAILURE EDDE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS AFTER MODIFICATION Tailtre Sv; t :s : d Iecal !!fects

?.ethef of

. To.

Nace Tu=cti6-

- oce Caese Incluir.g Is;cndent Failur cs Octcctire Effett en Syste:

Re= arks i570 K109C Systes I FD l-

?revents Channel C from starting Periodic Test Degrades System I redundancy Channel A is available to l

Discharge Systen I booster pu ps fres 1/2 to 1/l*

start System I boester Pressure pu ps.

or or RV29C System I FL 3

Discharge (cpen)

Pressure Sensor K109C TE 2

"ystem I starts booster purp simul-Annunciator Booster pu=p 03A may cavitate Backup booster purp 03C is taneously with CS pump 013.

I until CS pump OlA is up to ava11ahle if 03A cannot or speed. Short term cavitatier, develop pressur?. CS u:p RV29C FH 4

Frevents CS pump Olc fros being will not affect System I CIA is available for (closed) cperated by either Channel A or.

Operation. Degrades System I actuation by either Channel Channel C.

redundancy frem 1/2 to 1/1.

A er C.

571A -

r1100 Reactor FD 1

Prevents Channel C and D from Periodic Test-Degrades Channel CIdifersity. Channel C is available to vessel starting on Low-Low-Level signal Does not affect System I start System I and II on Low. Level from Channel C sensor

  • operation for Low-low-Level High Dryvell pressure.

or or or High Dryvell Pressure.

Channel A is available to RE32C Reactor Low FH 3

Level (open) start Systes I and II en Sensor ~

Lew-Lew-Level and/or High Dryvell Pressure K110C FE 2

Energizes K101C, K102C. Starts CS Annunciator '

Has no effect on System I Relay provides interlocks-or pump (OlA. or OlC), closes CS valve ability to respond to legit-to Energency Cendenser and R002C FL 4

13A (if not closed), opens CS valves imate actuation signal.

Centainment Spray.

(closed) 1 A,1C starts b coster purp (03A or 03C). Starts Auto System II (Channel D).

Revision 1 dated 7-15-73

CORE SPRAY SYSTDI Sheet 15 of 16i n

FAILURE MO::E AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS AFTER EDIFICATION Teilure Sv ;:te s :nd Lecal Iffetts Methed of 59..

are Function Mode Cause intlu:in; hpendent Failurcs retectiec

_ Effect oti Syste.

' RearN 5 72.

n11C Start Pump ~

03A.

FD 1

Channel C cannot start Booster pump Periodic Test Degrades logic redundancy to Channel C can start Zooste 03A

~

start Booster pu p 03A fren pu p 03C. Channel A can 1/2 to 1/1 but does not af-start either Seester pu :p feet System I operation.*..

03A or 03C.

FE 2

Starts Booster pump 03A.

Annunciator It s no effec't on System I ability to respond to legit-imate actuation signal.

373 Kll2C Seq. Start FD 1

Prevents start of backup Booster' Periodic Test Degrades logic redundancy to Channel C can start Oceste g

Pue:p 03C pump 03C by Channel C.

start Becster pump 03C fro =

pump 03A Channel A cas 1/2 to 1/1 but does not af-start either Beoster pump feet System I operation.

03A or 03C.

FE 2

Permits Booster pump C3C to start.

CRI Degrades Systen I redundancy Booster pump 03A vould not star-frem 1/2 to 1/l.

because of trip sig.nal from Kil3C.

Therefore a backup Ocester pdmp is not available.

574 K113C Start Pump FD 1

Prevents start of backup b ooster Periodic Test Degrades logic redtindatey to Channel C can star:3 eeste 03C pump 03C by Channel C.

start booster pump 03C f ree pun? 03A. Channel A can 1/2 to 1/1 but does not af-start either 3ooster pu :.

feet System I operation.

03A or 03C. -

FE 2

Starts backup Booster pump 03C and CRI for pinsp Degrader System I redt.mdancy trips or prohibits start of booster frem 1/2 to 1/1.

pump 03A.

375 -

Kil4C Booster FD 1

None Periodic Test Degrades logic redundancy Channel A relay K114A vill Pt.r:p Dis-which sequences booster pumps perform required pu=p se-charge f roml/2 to 1/1 but does cet quencing.

Pressure af fect System I operation.

or or IV40C Bcoater FL 3

Pump Dis-'

(open)

Charge Pressure Sensor Revision 1 dated 7-15-75 i

i

y.,

1 COPI SPRAY SYSTEM Sheet'16 of 16 k

FAILL*RE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS AFTER NCDIFICATION Tsilure Sv:r:::s :sf *vc.:1 Iffe:ts Methef of No.

Na:e Functire.

12 m 1:ch:1.;; !..;cs:ent F.aihres retectiot Iffett en Syste Rearks 375 nl4C FE 2

Prevents booster run 03C from beint Am ucciator Degrades Systen I redundancy Booster pump 03A is avail-(cent'd) operated by either %cenel A or from 1/2 to 1/1.

able fer actuation by or Channel C.

W40C FM.

4 either Channel A or C.

Relay provides interlocks (closed) to ADS (16K2 CIA 2C2A 20'EA 207A).

375A st115C Eigh Dryvel D

1 Prevents Channel C and D from start-Periodic Test Degrades Channel C diversity Channel C is available to

?ressure ing en High Dryvell Pressure signal Does not affeet Syste= I start System I ar.d II on or frem Channel C sensor.

cperation for either low-low-low-lev-level.

K46E' Eigh Dryvel:

FL 3

level or High Dryvell Pres-

?ressure (open) sure.

Channel A is ava.lable to.

Sensor st:rt System I on either low-Isv-level or high dry-well prerture.

G15C TE 2

Energizes Klolc, K102C, starts Annunciator Has no effect on System I or Relay provides interlock h

or CS pu:sp (01A or 01C)

& Event l! ability to respond to to Ars (16F.21*.A).

~

E45B FH closes CS valve 13A (if not closed)

Recerder legitimate actuation signal.

(closed) opens CS valve 1A IC starts ooster pump (03A or 03C).

Auto Starts System II (Channel D).

577

. ul6C Control D

1 None Annunciator None Systes Pever Tail-g ure i

FE 2

None Periodic Test Wne 578A 102C Reset Codtact 5

Prevents " seal in" of K102C.

Periodic Test Fas no effect on System I Channel A vill previde 1 fails operation.

required seal in".for open System I.

Contact 6

Prevents reset of channel C follow-Annunciator IIss no effect on System 1 1 fails 1::g either test or operation.

cperation.

closed Revision i dated 7-15-75 m

TABLE 2 CCEE SFRAY STSIEF. OCCCICAL)

Sheet 1 ef 6

' FAILt'RE EDE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS AFTER EDIFICATION Failure Sy=ptoms and Local Effects Method of No.

Name Function Mode Cause Including Oependent Failures Detection Effect on System Re= arks 801 V-20-17

!solate core Open Locked None - Nor:ul positica incked open VPI Noce (V-20-23) spray inside open Core spraycentainment isolation for a int.

valve (canual inside valve) contain-sent Closed Manu-Blocks flow through one core VP1 Loss of one of two 100%

Administrative procedures ally spray train flow paths preclude i= proper valve closed position.

for P.sint.

802 NZO2A Satisfy con-Open Test None VPI Reduces low pressure portion (NZ32C) tainsect air of systes to single valve Core isolation suppl.

isolation pectection spray inside con-contain-taintent zent (Air assist-isolation ed open for chec's test.sprin'g valves assisted shut)

Closed Mech.

locks flow through that portion of VPI None Flov available through fail-warallel lines.

parallel check valve.

ure i

1 1

i Ravinten 1 dated 7

=

r CORE $? RAY SfSTIM O'ECHANICAL)

Sheet 2 sf 6 TAILI;RE MODE AND ETTECTS ANALYSIS ATTER 3CDITICATION Tailure S-tete s and local Effects Method cf Na.-

Na e Function Mode Cause Iceluding Dependent Tailteres Detectien Effect on System Remarks E07 %203A.C 2evelop ade-Off

1) Loss Starts redundant pt=p in train.

Alternate pep Nene. 100 redundant in Core quate dis-ef start, run eacn system.

2 pray charge pres" power lights in C.R.

Soster sure for

2) Logic

~.szp s effective fault core spray 3): tech.

failurt i

1 808 L*-20-16 Prevents Open Mech.

Reduces effective flow from pump.

1) Low suction Lov flow in one system.

. L'-2 0-3 Sackflow failurc May cause idle pur:p to fail, pressure to Spray

.through booster pt=ps P ::::p dis- ' idle pump

2) Fill pt=p ir -

charge unable to esin-6.eck tain shutdcten calve pressure I.

209 T01A.C Provides Off

1) Loss Starts redundant pimp in system.

Run light eff.

None. 100% redundant pump

~ re spray core spray of Alternate pump in system a

pt=ps flow from power running.

suppressien

2) Logic pool to fault booster
3) Mech.

pu=p suctiot, failurr s

Revision 1 dated 7-15-75 m

. u.

w

~

_w_

g..

CCRI SPRAY SYSTet CCCHANICAI.)

Sheed3sf5*

FAILt'RE NODE A*.3 EFFECTS ANALYSIS AFTER HODIFICATION

~

Failure Sva;te s ced local Effects Metbed of ifo. -

Name Function

-Mode Cause Includi g rependen: Failures Oe: action-Effect en Systc=

~

Recarks 805 V-20-50 Pecvent teoster heckflew otry through discharge bypens check icg valve-Closed Tech.

Prevents bypass of cere spray Eedundant pep Nene.

Valve only i=portant if failure discharge d(rectly into core.

start both booster.pu.ss fail -

8 and rede: dant CS system is unavailable.

806A V-20-92 Provides Open Loss of None VPI rene.

Scocter

=inimun

  • ir pu p
nep flov minia m path fer recire.

ecte spray valve and beoster pu:r.pe Closed '

1) Test Redundant Minimum flow valve VPI No effect on system 2)Logie V-20-94 provides flow p'ath.

Periodic Test fault

3) Sol-enoid failure to. vent air 824 Y-20-52, Prevent 53 3coste backflow pu=p through discharge idle check booster valve pe: p Closed Mech.

Blecks flov from ene boester pump. Low flow indica-None. Redundant pump failure redundant punp starts tion FI-RV27A available.

1 Revision 1 dated 7 751 i

(

vu CORE.SPPAT SYSTIM C"dCH/l:ICAL)

Sheet & of 6 FAILt!RE N00E AND EFFECTS A::ALYSIS AFIER MODIFICATICS Tzilure S preers

.d k cal U fects Method of No.

Kate function Mode Cause Ir.:ledi g

;e den: F.n ilure s Octectien Effect en Syste

Rc= arks YPI Reduce low pressure pertion CC3 7-20-15 atisfy con-Open 1)Shor-gene, of system to single valve (50e 7-20-40

ain=ent out to isolation protectien a'so Core side con-
so tor 520 spray

);strent

2) Man.

"21)

Outside j(eater ever-isolation prerated) ride valves

, opens on CS

3) Test ictuaticn 4)Legir at 225 psig failure in reactor closed
1) Loss Blocks flow through that portien of VPI None Have 100% flew throesh of parallel lines.

Periodic Test parallel valve for ECCS Power function.

2)Legi:.

failur.-

3) Mech fault 804A 7-20-12

?revide Open 1)::or-None VPI Kone Motor operator racked out (See second valve nally Periodic Test in open position during normal operation does not also

est Iso-5errier when open 524.A lation testiig,
2) Loss affect Systen II operation 525)A valves V-20-15.etc.

cf except during test (retor n NZ C2 power operated)

Closed 1)Shor ; No flow in System II.

VPI. High Blocks all flev'in System II. Redundant System I must to booster puep be available during test.

j i

totor pressure

2) Loss (PI-RV42) low of spray flev i

indicated power during (FI 2V27) testin ;

3) Men-ual over-ride YPI = Yalve Position Indication.

Revision 1 datea 7-15-75

m.

~

~

CORE SPRAT STCTEM (S CEANICAL)

Sheet 5 62 6

  • TAILURE IDDE AND EFFECTS /JALYSIS AFTER MODITICATION Tsilure Sv= ore s and kesl Effects Method of No.

- Name' Tu.ction Mode Cause Including Le;:endent Failures Oetectien Effect en System Re-tarks 810 J-20-3, 32 Supply ccre Open

!oss of Nene.

VPI Nene.

(fee pprsy spray water emer Periodic Test

.also ru p frc= sup-0 ors.

sag, suction pressien posi-i
522, valves pool tion) 523)
_.eter sperated)

Cicsed

1) Mech.

Causes associated purrp to fail due VPI Nene. 100% redundant in over--

to loss of sectien.

system, ride 2)Ect short
3) Logic fault 816'A E-20-27 Open for open
1) Logic Bypasses core spray flow to V?I 6" line allows high per-Valve racked out in (Sce F.ecircu-routine failurr suppressien pool.

centage of flow to bypass closed position during core,, reducing effective normal operation. No also lation core spray 2)Elec.

core spray in one system.

effect on system.

5f.6)Apest punp short valves functional

3) Loss (Keylock*

tests of closed) pecer during test closed Normal None VPI Kone.

Periodic Test e

Revision 1 dated 7-15-75 4

e'*

CCRE SP2AY SYSTEM 7.ECFE ICA!)

$heet 6 gf 6

~.

TAILERE ICOE AP;D EFFECTS ANALYSIS AITER MODITICATICN Failure Sv ste s med ~ocal Effects Methed of

50. '

Tz=e Function '

Mode Cause Includi-- Ocendent Failures Cetecticu Effect on Systen Renark.s I

822 Fill pe=p Provide Off

1) Loss Systen cay drain through leakage Low pressure Could cause water ha==er en Kot required after core

~ vater to of to icvel of suppressica pool.

indicated at systes startup.

systes initiatten.

sprsy-system to power various points system keep 21P.ctor in systen.

filled and failure prevent 3)P.en-vater ual hancer on wer-startup ride On

1) Logic Kone.

None.

failure

2) Man-ual over-ride 8'23 V-11-119 open None.

Kone. Check valve prevents G*-11-118 i flow

  • cut of system.

15 psig pressure regulatir. ;

valve Revision 1 dated 7-15-72 l

m m.

m.-

s m

s i

~

TA3LE 3 j

AUTD DEFRESSURIZATIGN SYSTCt Sheet 1 of 6 FAILURE ICOE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS AFTER MDIFICATION 1

Failure Symptoms and Local Effects Method of No.

Kane Function Mode Cause Including Dependent Failures Detection Effect on System Re= arks 300

' K2OlA ADS Sub-FD 1

Contact remains open. System I is

?criodic Test system II re=ains for each channel inoperative. MS trip ceincidence calve.

Trip Relay changes frca 2/2 or 2/2 to 2/2.

FE 2

contacts remain closed. ADS trip Event Recorder I. css stringent trip icgic in coincidecce reduces from 2/2 or 2/2 system I.

System II un-to 1/1 er 2/2.

Annunciater chstged.

K207A ADS Sub-FD 1

Contact rc=ains cpen. Systen I is Periodic Test System II rezains for each E207AI channel inoperative. ACS trip coincidence valve.

Trip Relay changes fren 2/2 cr 2/2 to 2/2.

Less strin'ent trip logic in FE 2

Ccatact closes. ADS trip Event Recorder g

coincidence reduces from 2/2 or System I.

System II un-2/2 to 1/1 or 2/2.

Annunciator changed.

301 K202A Time Delay FD l'

contact remains open. System I Periodic Test system II ge= sins for each Circuit inoperative. ADS trip valve.

Interlock coincidence changes from 2/2 or Relay 2/2 to 2/2.

FE 2

Contact closes. ADS trip Periodfe Test Less stringent trip logic.

coincidence changes from 2/2 or System II unchanged.

2/2 to 1/1 or 2/2. Relay K201A energized.

302 K206A Timer FD 1

Contact rew ins open. If initiatio Periodic Test Systes II recains for each No effect until initiatica Lcck in signals clear. ADS trip coinci-valve.

signals clear.

Relay dence changes from 2/2 or 2/2 to 2/2 FI 2

Contact closes. ivo minute ti=cr Annunciation Less stringent trip logic, is energized. After two minutes.

System II unchanged.

I ADS actuation icgic changes from l

2/2 or 2/2 to 1/1 or 2/2 when relay K202A is energized.

~

Revision 1 dated 7-15. u2

g TABLE 3 AUTO CEPRESSCRIZATION SYSTC*

Sheet 2 of 6 FAILURE FEDE AND EFFECTS ALU.YSIS AFTER FDDIFICATION Failure Sy.pce:s end Local Effects Method of No.

Nace Function

.'iede Cause Including tepen. tent Failures Cetec tion Effect on System temarks

.-303 K214A or High Dry-FD 1

Contact re= sins open. ADS trip Periodic Test System II rc:ains for each 1215A well Pres-coin:idence reduces from 2/2 er 2/2 valve.

sure Relay to 2/2. Systes I inoperative.

FE 2

Contact closes. System I logic Annunciation Less stringent trip legic in changes from 2/2 to 1/1 for high Systes I.

Systes II dryvell pressure.

unchanged.

304 -

K216A DC Power FD 1

Contact crens. Power to AOS logic Annuacistica Auto:stic transfer of pcver

'*:rmal TC power supply is

Supply, Systen I and valve control circuit source. Systecs I & II from Panel "D".

Transfer "A" is supplied from DC panel "E".

unchanged.

s Contact re= sins closed. Pever to Periodic Test Alternate power sourcc Tg<

2 105 Icgic and/or valve control (Fanel **E") not available circuit is unchanged.

Systens I & II unchanged.

305 K217A or Reactor FD 1

Centact remains open. ADS trip Periodic Test System II.recains for ea:h K217C Iriple Lov coincidence chsnges from 2/2 er 2/2 valve.

, Water Level to 2/2. Systes I inoperative.

Relay FE 2

Contact closes. System I triple Annunciation Less stringent trip legic icw reactor vessel vster level

& Event in System I.

System II logic chsn;es fron 2/2 to 1/1.

Recorder unchanged.

305 M232A Timer FD 1

Timer contact remains open. Syste Per' iodic Test System II retains for each I inoperative. AOS trip coincidenc.

valve.

reduces frcs 2/2 or 2/2 to 2/2.

FE 2

Tiser contact closes.

Annunciation No time delay associated with ADS actuation.

7 1

=

+

r

=

w mm. m m

i-m.

m

-m

r

.=

IA3LE 3

~*

AUTO DETRESS3I2ATION SYSTD!

Sheet 3.cf 6 FAILURE EDDE AND ETTECIS ANALYSIS ATIER EODIFICATICN Esilure ivretets nnd Local Effects

fethod of No.

Tane Functie Y. de Cause

nciactn; Lepentent Tatlures 24tectirc Iffect en Syste=

Recarks 307 RE18A or Reactor rn 5

Level switch contect remains open.

Periodic Test System II remains for each RE16C Triple Low (open)

System I inoperative.

AOS trip valve.

L'ater Level coincidence reduces from 2/2 or Switch 2/2 to 2/2.

FL 6

Level switch contact closes. Systen Annunciation Less stringent trip logic (Closed)

I legic ceincidence changes from

& Event in System I.

System II 2/2 to 1/1 for triple lev reacter Recorder enchanged.

vessel water level.

30S S230A Reset FD 5

Reset switch contact opens. K201 &

Periocic Test System II remains unaffected Switch K 07 relays prevented f rom closing for each valve.

~

when auto depressurizatien signal exists. Systen I inoperative.

FC 6

Reset ruitch retains closed in Periodic Test Unable to reset System 1 System I.

Does not allev channel af ter trip. System II re-to be reset after tripping on auto esins unaffected for each depressurization signal.

valve'.

309 5231A Reset TO 5

Reset switch contact opens. K214A 6 Periodic Test System II remales unchanged Switch K215A relays prevented from elesing for each valve.

on high drywell pressure. Systen I inoperative.

FC 6

Reset switch contact remains closed Periodic Test Unable to reset System I in System I.

Does not allev channel after trip. System II

~

to be reset af ter tripping on high unchanged.

dryvell pressure.

310A 125VDC 125VDC FD 7

K216 relay will autenatically trans-Annunciator Automatic transfer of power Panel "D" is the nornal j

Power Fover fer the ADS valve control circuit te supply.

supply for ADS valves Panel "b' Supply the standby 125'JDC scurce.

A. C & E throtrh Panel ERISA. Panel "E" is the j

backup suonly.

'4 g

Relay coils fer K115A & Kil5B in System I fails. System II l 4 core spray systen both fall de-available.

energized; this prevents r.214A &

.e K215A from energizing on high dry-vell pressure; therefore System I fails.

i

!\\

s TA2LE 3 AUTO OIPRESS!II2ATIC5 SYSm' Sheet G-ef 6 1

FAILURE 2CDE AND EFFICTS ANALYSIS AFTER MODIFICATION Tailure 3v ::::s :nd Lecal Effa::s Me:ted cf No.

Name Tu=ctics Made Cau3e

._cir.; lerenten: Tailures 2etecti t Effec: en Srste:

Re= arks 011 62-69 or 125VDC FO 7

K216A relay will autematically Automatic transfer of power C3 62-6? (P:nel "3") &

62-91 Pr.e r transfer the ADS valve contrcl Cir-supply. Trip Syste=s I & II C3 62-91 (P:nel "I" Supply cuit to the standby 125V;C source.

remain unaffected. '

feed racel ERISA.

Circuit C352-79 (Fanel C")

Ereaker C3 62-132 (?snel "I")

fee'd panel.EllE3.

312 F301A or Centrol F0 K216A relay remains on its normal Periodic Test Alternate power source 7204A Circuit-source (Panel D) as long as it is (Panel E) is not available Tuses available.

for Systen I.

313 F302A or Control F0 K216A relay vill autematically Annunciater Automatic transfer of power F303A Circuit transfer the ADS valve "A" and trip supply.

Fuses System I to alternate source.

314 52103A Valve &

Talve ADS valve "A' does not open when Periodic Test ADS valve "A" does not open

~

or P re~s sure.

closed required by auto depressurization when required. Remaining 4 NR1063 Cont roller signal.

ADS valves are operabic.

er

& Control NRIOSC Station Valve ADS valve "A" opens when auto YPI No effect on System's abilit" or or open epressurization is not required.

Torus tempera-to respond to ECC conditions ER103D Pressure ture increase or Swit ches NR108E er Valve Solenoid l

Assechly or M cual l

Control l '.

Switch

l It Ie

[ 87 4

1 #

lc r

l

g.

TA3LE 3 AUTC DEFEESSURIZAIICS SYSTD:

Sheet 5 of 6 FAILURE WDE RQ EFFECTS ANALYSIS AITER MDITICATION Tailure Sy pters :cd Iccal Effects Method of No.

Nace Function P. ode Csuse In..luir.g Ovpendent Ts11eres Cetectica Effect en Syste=

Rc= ark.s 513 K114A core Spray

. n) 1 Contact re=ains coen. System I -

Periodic Test More stringent trip logic in Centacts supplied frc Booster pump dischstge prccsure coincidence Systes I.

Syste:s II'un-core spray legic.

Pu=p Dis-changes from 1/2 to 1/1.

changed.

charge Pres sure Reisy TE 2

Contact closes. System I pump Annuncia tion Less strinsent trip logic.

Contacts supplied fres dischstge pressure logic circuit System II unchanged.

core spray logic.

is satisfied.

375 Kil4C Core Spray FD 1

Contset re ains open. Systen I Periodic Test More stringent trip Icgic in Contacts supplied fres Booster pump discharge pressure coincidence System I.

System II un-core spray logic.

Pu=p Dis-changes fron 1/2 to 1/1.

changed.

charge Pres sure Relay

,FE 2

centset closes. System I psrmp Annunciation Less stringent trip logic Contacts supplied from discharge pressure logic circuit in S)-sten I.

System II un.

core spray legic.

is satisfied.

changed.

$14 Kil5A High Dry-TD 1

Contsets reesin open. Systen I Periodic Test System II remains for each Contacts supplied fras well Pres-inoperative. AOS trio coinci-valve.

core spray logic.

sure Relay dence chan;;es from 2/2 or 2/2 to 2/2.

TE 2

contset closes. Reisy K214A is Event Recorder Less stringent trip logic in Centacts supplied fres energized. System I coincidence System I.

System II'un.

core spray logic.

fror dryvcll pressure trip changes Annunciator changed.

f rom 2/ 2 to 1/1.

576A K115C P.igh Dry-FD 1

Contsets reesin open. System II Feriodic Test System I remains for each Centacts supplied fren well Pres-inoperative. At$ trip relsy valve.

core spray legie.

sure Relay coincidence changes from 2/2 or 2/2 Kil5C changed to ADS

  • to 2/2.

Systes II.

TE 2

Contact closes. nelay K214B is Annunciater Less stringent trip iccic in energized. System II coincidence System II.

System I un-fros dryvc11 pressure trip Event, Recorder changed.

changes from 2/2 to 1/1.

-m m

w -.

A G

T/.3LE 3 AUTO DETRESSLRIIATION STSTEM Sheet 6 of 6 TAILURE M00E AND ETTECTS AN/J.YSIS ATIER MODITICATICN Failure Syn;ters.ted Local Ef fects Methed of No.

Na e Function Moda Cause In-lu: n; De;(n=ent Failurcs retectics Effect en Systen Rensrks 676 Kil5B.

High Dry-TD 1

Contacts rersin epen. Systes I.

Feriodic Test System II renains for cach Centacts supplied fren vell Pres-inoperative. AOS trip relay valve.

core spray legic.

sure Relay coincidence changes frcs 2/2 er 2/2 to 2/2.

TE 2

Contacc closes. telsy K215A is Annunciater less stringent trip 1cgic in Centacts supplied froc energized. Systes I coincidence Systes I.

Systes II un-core spray legic.

fres dryrc11 pressure trip Event Recorder changed.

changes fres Ii2 to 1/1.

Revision 1 dated 7 **-

m y.+

e. *

.e

.t

. TABLE 4' TMLE 4 (CORRESPONDS TO TMLE 6 CF PRE->2DIFICATION ANALTSIS)

' SUWART RESULTS OF NODIFICATICN k'ITH RESPECT TO PREVIOUS SINGLE

' FAILURES 'dHICR RESULTED IN LESS THAN MINIMiri ECCS AVAILASILITY'

'N-SYMPTCMS AND LOCAL EFFECTS INCLL71NG DEPENDENT REF. NO.

FAILURE FAILURES AND EFFECT CN ECCS SYSTEMS

~

REwARKS 542 Less of Power to DC Panel D See Table I. Attachment II, Item 542A No degradation of minimum-EOCS availability results*

310 See Table III, Attachment II. Item 310A No degradatien cf niel um ECCS availability results*-

543' Loss of power to DC Panel E Sane as for Item 542 Fo degradation ef minimum ECCS availability results*

3; -

211 Loss of power to motor control See Table 5. Attachment II. Items 211A and.212A-

- No degradation of minimum 212 center MCC-DCl

' ECCS availability results* _

804

' Spurious closure of motor See Table 2, Attachment II, Item 804A No degradstien of minimus operated test isolation valve ECCS availability results*

V-20-12 816- ^

Spurious opening of motor See Table 2. Attachment II, Item 816A No degradation of minimum -

operated recirculation line ECCS sveilability results*

valve V-20-26 806 Failure of minimum flow valve to See Table 2, Attachment II. Item 806A No degradation of minimum open V-20-92 ECCS availability results*'

. 317 Undervoltage relay 27X-1C See Table 1 Attachment II. Item 517A '

No degradation of minimum fails deenergized ECCS availability results*

518 Undervoltage relay 27xi-lc See Table 1. Attachment II.' Item 518A

- No degradation of minimum fails deenergized ECCS availability results*

553 Loss of.MCC 1A2 See Table 1. Attachment II, Item 553A No degredation of minimum ECCS availability results*

Revision 1 dated 7-15-75 t

7 m

m m

..- ~.. -

m

~-

~

y 2,

t-i g.

TABLE $

e

, DERGENCY CCNDEKSER Sheet 1 ef 4 FAILURE MDE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS AFTER EDIFICATION Failure Symptoms and Local Effects Method of =

No.

Same-Function Kode Cause Including Dependent Failures Detectics -

Effect on Systes Renarks

~

200 16K110A or ?.enctor FE 2

Associated tine delay on Annunciator Makes trip 1/2 vs 1/2 twice.

Contacts supplied fres' 16K110C Vessel Lov dropout relay deenergized (6K9 or Less stringent trip logic core spray legic. Affects

~

Low Level 6K10) coincidence.

logic for both systems.

FD 1

Associated TDDO remains energized Periodic' test Makes trip 1/1 + 1/2'vs.

Affects logic for bcth-1/2 twice. More stringent systees.

trip logic.

201 RE15A or Reactor FC 4

Associated TDDO remains energized Periodic test Makes trip 1/1 + 1/2 vs Does not affect logic for RE153 high Pres-1/2 twice fot high pressure initiation for ECCS e

sure Sensor initiation.

function 70 3

Associated TDD0 deenergiies Periodic test Makes trip 1/2 vs 1/2 twice.

Affects logic for both Less stringent trip logic.

systens. ~

202 6K9 or E.C. Isol.

FE 2

Associated contacts remain open Periodic. test Makes trip 1/1 + 1/2 vs Affects legic for both 6K10 Valve 1/2 twice. More stringent systecs.

System I trip logic.

Time Delay Trip Relay FD 1

Associated contacts close Periodic test Makes trip 1/2 vn 1/2 twice.

Affects logic for both Less stringent' trip logic systees.

coincidence.

203 3KSA or E.C. Reset FE 2

Defeats lockout of 6K9 and 6Kil Periodic test Valve would open and shut as Affects both Systen I and 3K55 System I level cycled around low lov System II ccadensers level.

FE

~2 For automatic isolation circuitry.

Periodic test For a break in the IC line System II not affected.

the valves would reopen when high outside containment, valves flow signal cleared would cycle open and shut FD 1

Periodic test Would not be able to reset Does not affect ECCS logic circuitry function.

P e

Bewietna 1 AmeeA bi b74 m

r

.a*

'o 4

TABLE 5 U ERCENCY CONDERSER

' Sheet 2 of 4 FAILUPI MDE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS AFTER }ODIFICATION Failure Syspters and Local Effects Method of No.

Keme Function Mede Cause Including rependent Failures Detection Effect on Sysees Remarks 204 6K73 or Syste= I FE

~2 High flow sensed by associated Periodic test More stringent trip legic Does not affect ECCS 6K7A line break sensors would not isolate coincidence for isolation.

function, time delay Emergency Condenser high flow trip relay isolation logic changed frca 1/4 to 1/2 FD 1

EC System I not available.

Valve All valves associated with System II not affected.

~

indication System I would be closed 205 6K5A or System I FE 2

Periodic test More stringent logic to cime Does not affect ECCS 6K3A line rup-isolation valves in the function. 5 5 tem II not 7

tures aux.

event of a line break.

affected.

relay FD 1

Annua _ciator System I E.C. isolates.

System II not affected.

v-14-34 vill not open automatically 206 6K53 or System I FE 2

Periodic test More stringent logic to Does not affect ECCS 6K3B line rup-close isolation valves in function. System II not tures aux.

the event of a line break.

affected.

relay FD 1

Locks in false high flow signal-Valve System I E.C. isolates System II not affected.

^

position indication i

207 IE05-Al e: High flev FO 3

Gives false high flow signal Periodic test System I E.C. isolates Systen II not affected.

IS05-A2 switches or IB11-Alon FC 4

Periodic test Makes logic to close valves Does not affect ECCS 1311-A2 fer line break 1/3 vs 1/4-function. System II not More stringent trip logic affected.

fer isolation.

~

Revision 1 dated 7-15-75

c.

v 4

~

TME 5 D!ERCINCT CONDENSER Sheet 3 of &

TAILUltZ MDDE AND ETTEC*S ANALTSIS ATTER }CtIFICATION Teilure Sympte s and Incal Effects Method of

!;o.

Na:e Function Mede Cause IncludinC Dependent Tailures Detection Effect on Systes Rccarks 208 6K57 or 6K57 Lock-FE 2

6K57 deenergizes 6K9 and 6K11.

Periodic test Makes logic to open 1/2 Affects legic for both 6K58 out 6K9 &

6K58 deenergizes '6K10 and 6K12.

vs 1/2 twice systems.

6K11 6K58 Inck-FD 1

6K57 defeats lockout of 6K9 Periodi: test If System I initiated be-System,II not affected.

out 6K10 and 6Kll. 6K58 defeats lockout cause of lev level or h15h

& 6K12 of 6K10 and 6K12.

pressure.V-14-34 would cycle as pressure cycled or level cycled 209 355 Reset F0 5

Periodic test Unable to reset system Does not affect switch initiation FC 6

Energizes 3K5A and B defeats Periodic test If System I or II initiated Affects both System I lockout of TDDo's for both because of lov level or and II condensers System I and System II hirh pressure V-14-34 or -

V-14-35 would cycle as pressure or level cycled 210 Valve Open valve TC Coil is Hot Valve won't open Periodic test System I won't initiate System II not affected.

actuator energized short Y-14-34 O Coilis Fot Yalve opens.

Valve posi-System I initiated.

System II not affected.

energized short position indication 211A MCC Power Ioss Valve V-14-34 won't open Less of valve System I fails to initiate.

System II not affected.

DCl supply to of position V-14-34 Power indication 212A

~ Auto Power Ioss Valve V-14-34 won't open loss of valve System I fails to initiate.

System II not affected.

transfer supply to of position switch F.CC-D C-1 Power indication to MCC DCl Revision 1 dated 7-15 I

e e*a C

Tra! 5 NOM NME Sheet 4 of 4.

FAILURE NCDE AD EFFECTS ANALISIS AITER 10DITICATION Failure 5 7tces and locs1 Effects Method of 3

Fo.

Ka e Itaction Mode Cause Including Lependent Tsilures Detectica Effect on System Remarks-

~

213 655 Control or 5

Valve open Yelve position System I initiated System II cet affected.

switch for Posit m indicetion V-14-34 Closed 6

Valve won't open Periodic test System I won't initiate System II not affected.

' Position 214 6F1 Fuse for yo High flow logic circuitry and 6K9 Valve position System I isclates Makes 6F2 high flow deenergized.

indication trip for System II 1/2 vs logic cir-1/2 twice. Less stringent EK9 trip logic.

euitry and 215 671A Fuse for' FO 6K10 deenergized.

Periodic test Makes trip 1/2 vs 1/2 twice.

Affects logic for both 6F2A 6K10 Degraded trip logic.

systems.

310 125v DC 125V DC FD logic circuitry deenergized Valve position System I isolates.

Power Fover indication System II initiates.

Panel D supply to logic Revision 1 dated 7-15-75 m

m L

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