ML20101H110

Safety Evaluation Rept for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station for 1991

ML20101H110
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	12/31/1991
From:	Cottle W ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
GNRO-92-00019, GNRO-92-19, NUDOCS 9206290145
Download: ML20101H110 (75)

Text

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W ENTERGY- ""'5"""""""*'

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W. T. Cottle

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June 22, 1992 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stat;on P1-137 Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Document Control Desk

Subject:

Grand Gulf Nuclear Statiot Unit 1 Docket No. 50-416 License No. NPF-29 Report of 10CFR50.59 Safet.y Evaluations - January 1, 1991 through December 31, 1991 GNRO-92/00019 Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.59(b), Entergy Operations, Inc. is reporting those changes, tests, and experiments under the requirements of 10CFR50.59 for the period of January 1, 1991 through December 31, 1991. A summary of these changes, tests, and experiments is contained in the attachment. If further information is required, please contact this office.

Yours truly,

t. o r c z a x -

WTC/GWR/mte attachment: Table of Contents of 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluations cc: (See Next Page) 2bbb [b 9206290145 911231 PDR /

R ADOCK 05000416 pop //' E t 7 ,(, i I l

G9206181/SNLICFLR - 1 j/

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June 22, 1992' GN20-92/00019

- Pags 2 of 3_

cc: 'Mr. D. C. Hintz (w/a)

'Mr. J. L. Mathis (w/a)

Mr. R. B. McGehee (w/a)

Mr ~N. S. Reynolds (w/a)

Mr. H. L. Thomas (w/o)

Mr. Stewart D. Ebneter (w/a)

Regional Administrator _

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II

101 Marietta St., N.W., Suite 2900

. Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Mr. P. W. O'Connor,_ Project 'sanager (w/2)

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 13H3 Washington, D.C. 20555 i-r l

l u.

G9206181/SNLICFLR - 2

Attachment to GNSO-92/00019

. TABLE OF CONTENTS OF 10CFR50.59 SAFETY EVALUATIONS FOR Tile PERIOD JANUARY 1, 1991 TilROUGil DECEMBER 31, 1991 SRASN DOCUMENT 1%GE NPE-91-001- MCP-9071047-S00-R00 1

.NPE-91-002 MCP-90-1074-S00-R00 2 NPE-91-003 HCP-90-1121-S00-R00 3

'NPE-91-004 MCP-90-1010-S00-R00 4 NPE-91-005 MCP-89-1086-S00-R00 5 NPE-91-006 .MCP-89-1070-S00-R00 6

'NPE-91-007 CN-90-0182-500-R00 7 NPE-91-008 MCP-90-1021-S00-R00 8

-NPE-91-009 MCP-89-1096-S00-R00 9 NPE-91-010 MCP-90-1084-S00-R00 10 NPE-91-011 MCP-91-1006-S00-R00 11 NPE-91-012 MCP-89-1022-S00-R00 12 NPE-91-013 MCP-91-1013-S00-R01 13

-NPE-91-014 MCP-90-1108-800-R00 14

.NPE-91+015 DCP-87-3511-S00-R00 15 NPE-91-016 DCP-86-0121-S00-R00 16 NPE-91-017 DCP-83-0527-S00-R00 17 NPE-91-019 DCP-86-0035-S00-R00 18

.NPE-91-020 DCP-90-0084-S01-R00 19

-NPE-91-021 DCP-85-0129-S00-R01 20 NPE-91-022' DCP-89-0004-500-R00 21

-NPE-91-023 DCP-83-4095-S03-R00 22 NPE-91-024 CR-NPE-91-0008 23 NPE-91-025 CN-91-0052 24 NPE-91-026= MNCR-91-0038 25 NPE-91-027 MCP-90-1108 26 NPE-91-028 CN-91-0015 28 NPE-91-029 CN-90-0181 -29 NPE-91-030 CN.91-0012 30 NPE-91-031 CR-NPE-90-0041 31 NPE-91-032 MNCR-90-0256 32 1

.NPE-91-036 DCP-86-0112-800-R00 33 NPE-91-0371 DCP-87-3508-S00-R00 34 NPE-91-038 DCP-89-0030-S00-R00. 35 N PE 0 39 _. MCP 109 7- S00-RO&R 1 36 NPE-91-040 DCP-84-4018-S00-R00 37

NPE-91-041 QDR-213-91 38 NPE-91-042- CR-NPE-91-0069 39 NPE-91-043 CN-91-0159 40 NPE-91-044 CN-91-0182 43 NPE-91-045 GGNS-E-100.0, Rev. 5 45 G9206181/SNLICFLR - 4

Attachment to GNRO-92/00019-t TABLE-OF CONTENTS OF 10CFR50.59 SArrTY EVALUATIONS FOR Tile PERIOD JANUAPY 1,1991 TilROUGil DECEMBER- 31, 1991-SRASN DOCUMENT P_ AGE ,

NPE-91-046 GGNS-M-489.6, Rev. 0 48 NPE-91-047 GGNS-MS-25.,-Rev. 6 49

' NPE-91-048J -QDR-0336-90 51 NPE-91-049 CR-NPE-90-004 52 NPE-91-050 CR-NPE-91-059 53 NPE-91-051 QDR-0208 54 NPE-91-052 NPEFSAR91-0043 55 NPE-91-053- QDR-0028-91. 56 NPE-91-054 CR-NPE-91-016 57 NPE-91-055 CN-91-150 58 NPE-91-056 -NPEFSAR91-0041 59 NPE-91-057 NPEFSAR91-0042 60 NPE-91-058 NPEFSAR91-0044 61 NPE-91-059 CR-NPE-91-0048 -62 NPE-91-060 NPEFSAR91-0045 63 NPE-91-061 DCP-88-0016-800-R00 64 NPE-91-062 DCP-88-0058-S00-R00 65 NPE-91-063 DCP-88-0052-S01-R00 66 NPE-91-064 DCP-86-0130-S00-R00 67 L

NPE-91-065 DCP-90-0144-S00-R00 68 NPE-91-066- CFR88-0051-R00 69

- NPE-91-067 DCP-82-0371-S00-R00 70 NPE-91-081_ GGNS-M-183.3-R00 71 NPE-91-082 ~EER-91-6310 73

- NPE-91-083- CR-NPE-91-040 74 NPE-91-084- CR-NPE-91-039 76 NPE-91-085 CR-NPE-91-038 77

-NPE-91-086~ CR-NPE-91-036 78 NPE-91-087- CR-NPE-91-035 79 i

NPE-91-088 CR-NPE 0 31 -- 80

! - NPE-91-089 'CR-NPE-91-030 81 NPE-91-090 CR-NPE-91-009 82 L NPE-91-091 Temp Alt 91-0019 83 L NPE-91-093 MNCR-0048-90 85 l - NPE-91-094 CN-91-0094- 86 i-l ' PLS-91-001 W.O. #51068 87 PLS-91-002 CR-PLS-91-001 88 L - PLS-91-003 -TCN 91 to SOI 04-1-01-E12-1 89 i

Rev. 46 l

PLS-91-004 W.O. #41544 19 0 PLS-91-005 Temp Alt 91-0007 91 G9206181/SMLICFLR - 5

-T +-a+ met y m--9 as- - > - e -rwe --e a wsh- e+

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At t achmerit to GNRO-92/00019 TA111.E OF CONTENTS OP 10CPR50,.59 SAFETY EVALUATIONS FOR Tilr. PERIOD JANUARY 1,1991 TilROUGli DECEMBER 31, 1991 SRASN DOClLHJNT PAGE Pl.S-91-006 W.O. #43886 92 PLS-91-007 Temp Alt 91-0012 93 Pl.S-91-008 CR-PLS-91-004 94 -

P1,5-91-009 TSTI- 1 P4 /-91-007-0-N 95 Pl.S-91 010 EER-91s6258 97

- Pl.S 011 Temp Alt-91-0015 98 PLS-91-012 TST1-1W20-91-001-0-N 99 Pl.S-41-013 Temp Alt 91-003 100 PLi 014 .OpCon 1, 2 or 3/TS Act 21 of 101

-TS 3.3.2 _

Pl.S-91-015 S.I. to W,0. #30542 102 Pl.S 016 04-1-01-E12 1 103 Pl.S-91-017 CR-PLS-91-006 104 P.'; 018 CR-PLS-91-*007 107 PLS-91-019 W.O. #53587 108 PLS-91-020 CR-PLS-91-010 109 i PLS-91-021 Disulfito Addit ion to PSW 111 PLS-91-022 Bisulfito Addition to PSW 111 PLS-f' $3 CR-P1.5-91-009 113 Pl.S-9 's UPSAR 12.5.2.2.5.1.S1 114 PLS-91 i GNRO-91/00167 115 PLS-91 s 6 W.O. #55233 117 Pl.S-91-027 W.O. #45949- 118 NSP-91-001 NSAP SP-N-6, Rev. 7 119 N1.5 001 CR-NL-91-023 120 N!.G 91-002 CR-NI.-91-020 121 N!.S-91-003 CR-Ni,-91-018 122 NLS-91-004 OpCon 1, 2, 3 in TS 3.6.6.2 123 N!.S- 91 ' -"0 5 CR-NL-91-003 125 4'

09206181/SNLICFLR - 6

Attachment io UNRO 92/00019 l

l SRASNt NI'E 001 DOC NO: MCP 104 7- S00- R00 l i

l l

DESCRIPTION OF CllANGE' Providen P. A. system cnpabilit y t o t he  !

Con t ra ct or/Ou t age f acility. A separnte power source wan provident i for t he ow P. A. 's. Cnid renders and door locks are niso added by l thin change. i REASON FOR CllANGE: To enhance commttnication capabilit ies nnd I

accessibility to nrens utilized during outagem. I SAFT.TY TNAl.UAT10N

The changen mndo are to systems that are not i l governed by the GGNS Technical Specifications. All changen nro  !

a isolated f rom and have no ef fect on any safety relat ed systems.

1 The inntn11ations have been evnlunted ogninst Seismic 11/1 i requirement s and sciamic raceway f 1pporta were added, if required.  !

All added cabling in DOP nnd was installed to the acpo rn t ion l requirement s of Regulatory Guide 1.75. Safety reinted penetration l denign van used to ensurn cont inued adequacy of all penet rnt lona. i I

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h M9206161/SNI.1Crl,R - 1

At tachmetit to GNkb 92/00019 SRASN: NPE-91-002 DOC Not McP 1074 500-R00 DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE: Sever al vent or ilt alti valves were lenking by their seats t" clean radwnste (CRW) ilrain hubs. These valven were pntt of the en t e r Vent *, anil Drains system, the Holstuto Separator /Rehent er Vent a niul Dra Ins avat om or t he l'xt rnet ion St enm system. The vnives were replaced niul the linen to t he CRW were capped to prevent any reentrence of the sent lenknge.

REASON FOR CilANGE' To prevent syst em lenknge t o t he CRW.

SAFETY EVA1,UAT10N: These syst ems are not govertied by the GGNS Technical SpecificatJons. These systems serve no safety function and failure of these systems will not compromise any safety _

reinted system or prevent renetor shutilown. All piping supports rnen t ANSI 1131.1 code requirements. No effect on the operntion or funct inn of nny synt om in prrxtuced by t his chnnge.

I M9206161/SNLICPI,R - 2

q At t achment to GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: NPE-91-001 1100 NO: HC P 1121 - 800- R00 DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE: tlc primo comput er unit was replaced wit h a new unit. This change upgraded thn power supply to handle thn additional lond requirements of the new comput er.

REAX r* CilANGE: To provide an adequat e power supply for t he new e. .omputer.

SAFETi EVALUATION: This change dona unt chnnge the dealgn function of the primo computer system or the function of the power supply. This change will not impact the CGNS Technical Specifications. The system is non-safety related and the power supply is from n BOP UPS pinel. in f lurn of t he pr imo comput er or -,

the BOP UPS panel will have no effect on any snfety related Class 1E equipment. -The trann former added by t hlm chnnge will bn supported as Seismic 1t/1. Separat ion requirements of Regulatory Guida 1.75 will be maintained.

N H9206161/SNI.1CFLR - 3 I

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Attachment to CNHO 92/00019 SRASN: NPE-91-004 110C NO: MCP-90-1010-800-R00 DESCRIPTION OF CllANGE: l'es sonnel bar riers were installed at various locations in containment.

REASON FOR CllANGCt To prevent unauthorized ent ry into high radiation arenn.

SAFETY EVAL,UATION: The changen to be implemented are not. governed by the GGNS Technical Specifications. The barriers are designed an Seismic Category 11/1 and therefore will not affect any safety related components in the aten. The installation of the barriers will not adveracly af fect the containment st ruct ure since t hn-design utilizen lightweight membc N nilowing the strncture to maintain its original ficxibility. The barriers are mnde of expanded metal mesh and will not enune nny major flow obst ruct ions nnd will not require any cow inotherms to be gennrnt ed for the hydrogen control program.

i H9206161/SNIlCFhR - 4

Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: N!'E 005 DOC NO: HCP 89-1086-800-K00 DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE: Key-locked handswitchen were installed into the low suction pressurn t rip circuit of t he condensat o pumps. The handswitches will allow hypassing of the low suctton pressurn signal when the suct ion st rainers are not installed.

REASON FOR CllANGE: The change will prevent inadvertent tripping of a condensat o purnp dun t o failure of the pressure switch. There is no requirement: for the pressurn switchen when thn suctton strainess arn not installed.

SATETY EVAL,UATION: Thn swit ches nro not used for any technical specification basis nor nrn they used t.o verify any technical -

spncification. These switches nrn not terpif red to of fect or support t he saf e shutdown of the reactor or to perform in the operat ion of reactor sa fety fontures. No credit for these switches in taken in any nccident. analysis as described in thn til'S AR .

M9206161/SNI.!CFhR - 5 i

-m. _ _

Attnchment to GNWO-97/00019 SRASN: NPE-91-006 DOC NO: MCP-89-1070-500-R00 DESCRIPTION Of CilANGE: This chnngn added varinble time dninys of 4-60 seconds for the high lenkage flow annunciator for thn Standby Servien Water (SSW) 1. oops. Intorlocks wnre niso added to the annunciator circulta to prevent spurious alarms when the associat ed SSW pumps are not running.

REASON FOR CilANGE: To prevent spurious alat mn whic h presently result f rom SSW starLup flowrnt e t annient s.

SAFETY EVALUATION: A<hlition of the time delny will provent spurioun alorms during system sinttup and wl!1 not prevent the ninrm function if n lenk occurs. Ionk detection is only needed when the system-in in operation. Therefore, the addition of the pump run interlock will not prevent the alarm from performing its required lenk nlarm function. The n'inuncintor and BOP comput er point circuitry is electrienlly isolated from the SSW system logic nnd control nystems. SSW systnm initiation nnd control is not dependent. on the annocinted high lenknge flow rntn annuncintor and BOP computer point circuit ry. The added equipment in of the same quality as the associated electrical circuitry and have been evnlunted with respect to the electrical londing of the power suppl ten required fot their oparntlon.

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3-M9206161/SNLICFLR - 6

Attnehment to GNRO-92/00019 SHASN: Npt-91-007 Doc NO: CN-90-0182-800-R00 DESCRlrT10N OF CilANGE: The redundnnt stop check volven (configured an vacuum brenkot s) used on t he r.upply and ret urn linen to the spent fuel pool were designed to provide niphon protection. These valves were replaced with redundnnt, self clearing pannivo ant 1-miphon vent s.

REASON FOR CllANGE: The old stop check valven were ident i fied an n high maintenance item.

SAFETY EVALUATION: GGNS Technical Spncificalione. do not specifically addrenn niphon prot ection for t he r, pent f un t pool init.

doen establish minimum pool level. All linen to the spent fuel -

poci that terminate below the minimum levnt of 202'51/4" (en defined in scetion 5.6.2 of the Technical Specificat ions) require ant (-niphon protectlon. The pannivn vent nystem providen thn required protect ion but. does not rely on act ivo component and thun incrennes tho inlinbility of the system. Thin in a chango only in the method of providing niphon protect r and does not. chnnge the design funct ton of the spent fuel pool a phon pr otect.f on. All of the limitn for stored. funi shielding, cooling, and *enctivity control an doncribed in the USAR (subsec' ion 15.7.5) nrn unnffected by this changn. All applienble design and installnLion crit erin as wnll an operat ional requirement s worn maint ained.

Thnne vents nro located below thn normal water Invol nnd would only_bn uncovered during a pool dralndown.

119206161/SNLICFLR - 7

Atinchment to GNRO 47/00019 SRASN: NPE-91-008 DOC NO: MCp-90-1021-800-R00 DESCRIPTION OF CllANGE: The setpointa of the rirn Water Supply system pumps worn changed to account for t he uncertainty inhnrent l In the pressure switches used to start the pumps.

REASON FOR CllANGE: The chnngo enr .ns tbn proper start sertuento of thn pumps. The pumpn st art on low water prr.ssurn and the start  !

snquenco could bn affected by the inhnrent uncertainty of the pump start instrumentation.

SAFETY EVAL.UATION: Tho jockey pump in designed to keep the system  ;

full and pressurized during normn1 conditlons. Thn setpoint was  !

increased by 5 psi. This has thn effect of rnising thn maximum shutof f pressurn of the jockey pump and thn normal static pressurn of the system by 5 psi. The new maximum normni stntic pressure in 174 psig. All piping and system compononts have been determined to be acceptable for n normal static pressurn of 174 psig. All piping system components havn been reviewed to ensure that no advorno effects on the structural integrity of thn system will  ;

result. The change in operat ing pressurn will not nf fect t he design requirements for t he system.

r The sntpoint to start the motor driven pump was changed f rom 125 psig to 129 psig. The two dicaci driven pumps worn changed from 125 psig to 123 pnig and 117 psig. The time delays of the two diosnl driven pumps wern chnngnd from 15/30 seconds to 5 seconds. The chnngen will not provont any system or component f rom performing its safnt y function under any condit ions. Thorn is no rnduction in the fire fight ing capacity of the system. -

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M9206161/SNhlCrl,R - 8

m Attachment to UNKO-92/00019 l - SRASN: NPE-91-009 DOC NO: HCP-89-1096-800-R00 DESCRIPTION OF CilANGF.: This chnngo replac<ul piping damagnd dun to water barnmer in thn rndwnsto system. A new high point vent was also added to aid in hydrontatic testing. The change also provided instruct ions to determiro t he necept ability of a dont in a pipo spool.

REASON FOR CilANGE: To cepn i r damny,n caused by water hammor. i SAFETY EVALUATION: No opnration or functional changes were mndn to the system. The piping changon nre designed in nccordnnen with l all applicabin standards.

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e M9206161/SNLICFLR - 9  ;

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wvw+t-w eT+=s y w

• m &. es-, ~ *' - *m w -=r - earv e sry eer4w---= w=e v ere s v wve-e sw e+ne se a, w e s -- w -eewe=-we ew-w_ *--vv++ww=--~~--*w---*'= * - = * * - * " - - * * - ' ' ' - * - + * * - " ' ' -

• At tachmerit t o GNRO 92/00019 SRASN: NpE-91-010 DOC N0? MCp-90-1084-800-R00 DESCRlpTION OF CllANGE: Vnive and hent trace set point modificntions were made to the offgns pretreatment panel. One valve was repinced with n Iniger valvo and n new valve was addnd.

Tha setpoltit for associat ed heat tracing was lowered.

REASON FOR CilANGE: To incrnann relinhility of the of fgas pretreatment sample low flow nlarm by preventing water build-up in the sampic panni.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Thorn arn no safety rnlated pressure boundarios offected by the modificntion. The chango does not af fect the performance of any system, structure, or component -

rolled upon to mitignte the consequences of any transient or accident. The equipment modifications are not governed by thn technten1 specif!cntions nor do they interact with cristing espiipment in such n-way na to af fcct comptinnen with any technical specificntion. .

M9206161/SNI.TCFI.R-- 10 l

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Att achmerit t o GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: N PE O l l DOC NO: HCP-91-1006-800-R00 DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE: This chnnge replacen certain plant public address (P.A.T system jack boxes with P. A. handset st at ions neul speakers. Spenkers were added to cert ain exist ing st at ions.

REASON FOR CHANGE: To improve pinnt communientlonn.

SAFETY EVA1,UATION: The system ja not incimled in t hn technicn1 specificat ions nor in it connect ed elect rically or mechniiically to any system important to safety as described in the UFSAR. The added speaket s will Jenprove communlentions wit hin the a f fect ed arens without changing the function of the system.

W M9206161/SNI,1CFLR - 11

l At t achment to GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: NPE-91-012 DOC NO: 11CP 102 2- 800-R00 DESCRIPTION OF CllANGE: The chlorine analyzer on the Plant Servico Wnter system was abaruloned in pinco and won no longer being used.

This change revised design drnwings nud instructions for abnndoning this instrument. in pince.

REASON FOR CllANGE: To updato drawings and Inst ructionn t o inflect.

netunt plant conditions.

SAFETY EVAIUATION: This irwtrument neul its Indient.Jon is not.

nddressed by the Technical specifications. Thn nnnlyzor was used when chlorino wns ndded to the Plant Servico Water (PSW) system and since chlorine in not normnlly added to PSW, t he annlyzer serves no unoful function.

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MP206161/SNhlCFlR -' 12 m . - , _ _ , _ , . _ _ . . . . . _ ~. . __ _ . . _ . . - _ _ _ _ - . _ . . . _ . _ _ ~ _ _ _ . ~ . . _ _ . . . = . . _ . . _ . _ _ . . ~ . _ -

1 Atinehment I o GNRO-92/00019 SRARN: NPl: 91-01:1 DOC NO: HCI' 1013- 800- R01 1

DESCRIPTION OF CllANur.: This chnnge installed n local harulswitch 1 I

for each rndini well pump to provide the optton of enabling or l dinnbling the telemnt r y port ion of t he st ni t /st op cont rol f or cach <

pump. Addit lonal cont act s were added t o the locnl Statt/Stop l handswitch for ench pump on wolls I, 3 niel 5 to prevent n control room alarm from coning in overy timn a pump is stopped lorn 11y.

REASON FOR CilANGl;: rn!!nto of t hn t clemet ry syntom could ennse l otratic starting and atopping of the pumps niel prevent local '

operation of t hose pumps. 4 i

SArrTY EVAh0AT10N: The rndini well syctem hns no snfoty relat ed funct ion an defined in the til SAR, rn flute of t he system will not  !

comprominn any nnfoty related syntom or component nnd will not provent. safe ronctor shutdown. Elect rical separat ion f or t he ,

portionn of t he system modif ied worn dono in accordnnco with thn '

requirements of Regulatory Guldo 1.75 to ensure that the ability of nnfety rninted systems to perform their intended funct ions will bn mnintained.

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, _ _ . . _ _ _ , , _ _ , , , , . . . _ . . _ . . - . . _ - _ . _ . _ . _ _ - _ . ~ - _ . . . _ . _ . . _ . - _ _ _ _ . ~ . - _ _ _ . ~ - . ~ - . - _ . - _ . - - -

Attnthment to GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: NPE-41-014 DOG NO: HCP-90-1108-800-R00 Dr. SCRIPT 10N OF CilANGF: 1hree pornllel exhnust. muf flera (in lieu of the original single muf fler) were fiint olled on the inntrument air compressor dryorn. Air metering valven and flow inte indication were added for t he exint ing in-line dew point mon i t or s .

REASON FOR CHANGE: The inst rument air dew point hnd degraded on two sepnrnt e occoslons prior to and during Rr04. 1hle chnnge was made to preclude recurrence.

SAFETY EVAh0AT10N: The GGNS technical apecificnt lonn do not addresa dew point tequirements, the configuration of the instrument air hender and branch line pfptng, or any other port ion of the system being a f fected by thin modifient inn. Fn f lute of t he modified muf fler by bronking will not nf fect the ability of the dryer to deliver dry air. This change will allow the mnintenance of the relative humidity to lens thnn 2?, in the instrument nir system. Thin will enhnnce the reliability of ennentint components and subsystemn and entahllmh on air gunlity that. In commennutnte with tlic denign intent of safety related components.

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119206161/SNhlCrhR - 14

_ -- . _ . , _ . _ _ . . . . . _ _ _ . . . . _ , _ , ~ . _ . _ _ . _ _ , . _ . _ _ _ _ , _ _ . _ _ . - , _ _ _ , _ . _ . . _ . _

Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: NPE-91-Ol$ DOC H9: DCP-87-3511 DESCRIPTION Of CilANGE: Various chattges worn made t o the control room pannIs an a requit of t he Detni ted Control Room Design Rnview (DCRDR). This changn involves only n inbeling and the addit.f on of demarcation 1ines to separat o cont rols.

REASON FOR CilANGE: To incorporate human factors considorntions into the control room environment.

S AFT,TY TNAl,UATION + The changes made involved inbeling and demntcation changes only and do not offect system operations. Thn panni seinmic nnd combustibin londs are not n f fected by t hese mculi f f ent ions. Fire protection critorin for thenn pnneln nrn not affected. The changes will reduce thn probability of human error whila opernting pinnt equipment.

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i M9206161/SNLICFLR - 15 t

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)

l Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 l 1

SRASN: NpE-91-016 DOC NO: DCp-86-0121-800-R00 DESCRIPTION OF CllANGE: Three t emporary air condit ioning units J were inst alled in the comput er room and t bn installat ion of two permanent units was completed.

-REASON FOR CIIANGE: To provido an environmont conducive to computer operation.

SAFETY EVAL.UATION: Tha unita are nnn snfety related supplied by l non-Cinns lE power and the p8 ping in designed in accordat:ce with the requirements of the appropriate standards. No penetrations associnted with this change breach any exterior walls or the l control room envelope. Thn addition of the three air conditioning l units'was reviewed naninet t.he potential hnznrds required to be i considered in design, including fire, flooding, water jet.

impingement,. missile gennration and noismic 11/1 concerns. These air conditioning units serve no safety functton and thnir failure will not. compromise the safety funct ion of safety relatnd systems or prevent a safe rrnctor shutdown. 1 i

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Attnchment to GNKO-92/00019 SRASN: NPE-91-017 IniC NO: DCP-83-0527-500-R00 DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE: The line size of varmiu nample sink drains una increnned from 1/2" to 1". The ninks nre located in the Turbino liullding. Auxiliary Dullding and Circulating Water Pump lionso.

1 I

i REASON 10R CilANGE: To nilow propor drainnge when snmples nro )

being tnken.  ;

l sal'ETY EVA1.lfATloN: No operationni or funct lonal chnnges will ,

result an a consequencn of this chango. The modifications arn  ;

performed in accordance with applienble emles ami design i standards / specifications. All r4T the drain linns modifled by this l chango nro non-an fnty relat ed c.nd are not interconnected with any i nnfety reinted systems.

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t M9206161/SNI.1CFIR - 17

- --ves .- -- , ,v.v , , , , ,_,--,wr,.,-,,.-... --,e.,,--.b,w..,.-wms.,,,..-,r. .,~~v._,.. . . , . , , - , - - - - - . , , - , , , --, * .w. vi.p,-wr,e-,=,w.e.y,--

At t richment to GNRO-92/00019 l 1

SRASN: ' NI'E-91-019 DOC NO: DCp-86-0035-S00-R00 l

DESCRIPTION OF CilANGF,- A drain futinel was inst nlled under the fuel pool drnitt tank vent in order to route any liquhl ef fluent to the floor drains.

REASON FOR CilANGE: When thn drain tank icvnt was high, air entrained in the tank would enuse some water to hn expelled onto l the floor. This change was offected to provent thn sprend of l contaminntion to the floor aren. l SAFETY t'/4 LtfAT10N: No operationni or functfonal change was mndo -

to the fuel pool cooling and clennup system.. All piping and pipe support designs meet ANSI 1431.1 code requirements anti nrn  !

qun11 Clod as seismic cntegory 11/1. All add 1t lons madn by t his I changn arn non-snfaty relatnri, i

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j At t nehmerit. t t, GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: NPE-91-020 linC NO: DCP-90-0084-801-Rt1 DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE: Varinns safety hnndrn f is niul saf ety cables were Installed along t he perinent er of t he Containment Ibil ld i ng funi pools.

REASON FOR CllANGE: To prevent personnel performing rofueling reinted activities from fnllfog into thn pools.

SATETY EVAI,UATION: All handrails and anfet y enble designs are in accordance with applicahic codes. The structutos~to which the personnel-snfety devices worn att.nched nrn adoqunt o or worn reinforced to be adeqnnte for all design lond tasos. The chango doen not Arnpair the function of any saf ety reinted systems or cornpon en t s . Thnre is no impact on the operation of any pinnt equipment. nn a result of this change.

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Attnchment to GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: NPE-91-021 DOC NO: liC P- 8 5 - O l ? 4 - S00- R01 IIESCRIPTION OF CllANGE* The wat er supply for ihn C i rculn t t og h'n t er (CW) pump vantor bearing coolers anti bearings pieviously consirtod of two sources: thn Pinnt Service Watni ( l'SW ) syst em nml the Domentic Wnt er (DW) system. 1)CP-85-0129-800-K01 rapincert t he supply of water from t he pSW system wit h n supply of water f rom i the Make-up Water Trentennt (!!WT) system. This design change i pnckage also inclueled thn enpping of t hn oxisting piping from the  ;

PSW system.

REASON FOR CilANr;E: The chnngn provides a clean, rnitable backup water supply. .

SAFETY EVA!.UATION: The DW, CW, atul PSW syst oms nre not addrnssed in, or govnrned by, the techntent specificntions. System vnives forming a pntt of containment boundary nro not nffocted. Thn

-design change does not affect any safety rnlated f unct ions atul the modifient .lon is const ruct ed in accordance with applicable codes ntui st andards.

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M9206161/SNI,1CFl.R - 20

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Attachment t o GNRO-92/00(

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SRASN: NPE-91-022 DOC NO: DCP-89-0004-S00-R00 DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE: The two 15,000 gp<l Unit I and two 15,000 gpd construction sewnge trentment pinnts were replaced wit h n new 100,000 gpd site newnge tient ment pinnt.

The new newnge pinnt treats the newnge from the plant, ESC, and contractor facilitten.

REASON FOR CilANGE: The change inciennem the sewnge t t o n t men t.

capnhility of GGNS.

SAFETY EVAL.UATION: Thn chnnge does not n f f ect t he t echnical specifications because there are un technical specificatlons -

governing the use of the sewage t reat ment f acilit y. The change also does not af fect any safety-reinted equipment beenuso there are no plant components or equipment dependent upon thn operation of the new newnge treatment plant. The new sewnge pinnt utflizes the snan treatment process that was previously uncil, using similar equipment to perform the snme functlonn. Thn use of chlorine at this new sownge pinnt 19 in compilance with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.95.

H9206161/SHLICFLR - 21

At t achment to GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: N1'E 02 3 1100 NO: DCI'-83-4095-803-R00 DESCRIPTION OF CllANGE: This change provided for thn installation ,

of on alkalizat(on unit for the goberator primary wat er syntom, l REASON roR CllANGE: To ensure relinbility and avnilability of the generator by assuring that the pr { mary wat er synt om opernt es at a pil o f 8. 0 t o R . S .

SAPTY EVA1,tfATION: The n1kn11xnt ion unit will rednen corronlon and the format ion of conduct iva deposit s in thn generator cooling system. The unit installntion including power supply, controls, and instrumentation will not havn nny of fect on safet y provf ously evalunted in the UFSAR nnd w{1l not create any ponnihiljty for an accidnnt or- mnIfunction of a dI f forent type than pteviously nvalunted in the UFSAR. The affeeted generator cooling nnd T14CW systems are not addrosnod in t he t echnical specificnt ions, i

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Attnehment to GNRO-9?/00019 SRASN: NPE-91-024 110C NO: CR-NPE-41-0008 DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE: Three administrative ohnnges to Gratul Gul f design engineer itig or gan t ent loti nie being made to the (trSAR:

-(l) Chnnge of tit le of depnt t ment head for Demign Engineering at Grnnd Gulf Nuclear Sint inn f rom Director, Nuclent Pinnt Etigineering to Director, Design Engineering - GGNS; (2) Clarification of functional arens for which Vice President.

Engitieering is responsible t nod (1) Change in description of Quality Engineering function from group to singin todividual.

REASON FOR CilANGE: To reflect new ronsolldnied engineering orgnniention and to more correctly itidicate scope of job functions.

SAFETY EVALUATION: (1) The chnoge is a purely administrntivn change and involves a je>b t it le change only; responsibilit ies of the position are not altered. (2) Thn functinnol aren being removed f rom responsibility of Vice President Engineering (UFSAR-13.1.1.2.1.3) is assigned to the Vice President, Ope rn t. f ons Support. (UTSAR Sect ion 13.1.1.2.1.4). Thnrefore, tio responsibility or commitment is being deleted. (3) Thn change of Quality Engineering f rom a group t o a single individunt was necomplished primarily by realignment of responnihility for certeiin production rnlated functions, such as procedurn development, from Quality Engineering to the groups responsiblo for the work covered by the procedures. The Quality Enginent retnins review responsibility for all Nucient Plant. Engineering (NPE) procedures; thus ettsuring ngnitist nny reduction of commitments. There is no change in the exist"g facility or its operation.

M9206161/SNI.TCPI,R - 23

Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: NPE-91-02$ DOC NO: CN-91-0052 DESCRIPTION OF CllANGE: This changn consists of three new personnel barriers installed in the Radwnstn Building. Two barriera consist of a structural stent f ramn and/or door with expanded metal. A security lock is provided on onn side of tbn door. One other barrier consistn of miscellaneoun 1/4" thick steel pinten.

REASON FOR CilANGEt New personnel barriers are required to prevent unnuthorized personuni entry into very high radiation nrnan.

SATETY EVAbOATION: The barriers are dnsigned and installed as non-safety related, BOP. The barrinra precludn crent ion of 11/1 -

hazards on the basis of the locationn at which thny arn installed.

The barriern do not create nny major ventflation flow obstructions. Avnlinble fire protection mensuren nrn not affected by installation of tbc barriern, since they are constructed of mesh and allow smake .nnd wat er to pnsa through. Thn barrints do not af fect the r eismic design of thn rndwnnt.n building since smn11 flexible membors ut ilized for their const ruction doen not allow a t ransfer of tonding between floors other t han previously analyzed.

The design of the barriers climinnten fire concerns by utilizing non-combustible materials. Tbc barricts nro used for personnel anfety only,- and nrn not considered. in a bnnis of any technien t specification, therefore thn original margin of safety will not bo reduced.

M9206161/SNIlCTI.R - 24

Attachment to GNRO 92/00019 SRASN: NPE-91-026 DOC NO: HNCR-91-0038 DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE- Va l n s N23r007C 1008C nnel 1008C have experienrod a steam lenk through the sentn. T1e valves nie located in drnin lines f rom rectlwnt er llent ers T101420C nad 11004C and are piped to the control rod witirirnwnl drainnge system. The vn]ves could not be isointed wit h t he syst em in servien, therefore, an on-line lenk repnir effort was made t o t empornrily control the stenm lenk until the valves could bn permanently repaired. It was determined that theno vnives were st 111 lenking af t er inject ing the lenk repnir compound. This line is being copped of f to stop the lenknge.

REASON FOR CilANGE: This line is heing capped of f t o pt event thn lenknge through the Isointion valve sentn from entnring int o the drainnge system.

SAFETY EVAIUATION: Thn piping meet s ANSI 1931.1 code r equ i rernen t s .

The piping is support ed for dead weight and thermal londs only sincn it is installed in the Turbine fluilding which is a non-seismic building. This system serves no safety fonction.

Failure of this system will not compromise nny safet y ralnt ed system or prevent reactor shutdown. The operation or funct.Jon of this system, ns deserthed in the PSAR, is not nf fected by the change. - No nccident precursors evaluated in t he FSAR are affected I by.this, change. Add ing the enp t o t his rystem will not change the {

function or opernt ion as defined by t he bases of any technical  !

specification, therefore, the margin of snfety is not reduced. '

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Atinehment to GNR0+92/00019 SRASNt NPE-91-027 DOC NO: HCP-90-1100 DESCRlpT10N Of CllANGE: This change inst alled t hree exhnust muf fler arrangements on (Init I and linit 2 insteumont nir dtying towers. This change also innt nlled a metering valve and flow indicntor on the dischnrge of bot h linit i nnd Unit 2 dew point motors.

REASON FOR CllANGE: Thn mufflers wore installed to reduce regeneration back-pressurn f or mnint n ining propnr dew point . The subject entering valvos nnd flow Indicators were installed for proper operat ion of t hn dnw point met ors.

SAFETY' EVALUATION: hoss of inntrument nir as nn inItinting ovent is evaluated Jn UF3AR Sect ion 14.2.10, which nasumes a major pipo break, and a mechnnien) or elect rien t fn f lurn of t hn instrumnnt air supply and the backup snrvico nir sourco. This t ransient disturbance is evaluat ed as an incident of modernto frequency.

During this translent, all equipment using instrument. air is designed to inil to a position thnt is consistent wit h t he nnfn shutdown of the plant.

This chnngo provides for a more rapid depressurixnt lon of t he I regenerating dryor. A rapid clopressurizat ion is essent in) to propor dryor operation. This chango provides flow inst rument at ion ,

and valves to ensurn the accurncy of the existing dow point .

mon i t ors . Those modificatlens will enhanen thn ability of the i dryer to providn dry air and will bottnr nonble pinnt Stnf f to i monitor instrument air dew point .

i This change holps to maintain a high levnl of air quality for air l snrvicing sa fet y related componnnt s. More reliabin air drying i

- nquipment and improved monitoring of clew point support thn instrument nir evninntion assumption that upon loss of instrument nir, all equipment will fall to n position thnt is consistent with snfo shutdown of the plant. Failure of modified mufflers by breaking will not nffect the nhility of the dryer to deliver dry air. The prohnbility of failurn of the muf flers by clogging in reduced by implementation of t his change. Thn prohnhility of a l

mnjor pipe failure in the instrument nir system in decreased by the implomont nt ion of t his changn. By maintnining n rnlativo humidity of less t han 2% in the inst rument air system, oxidation of iron or st eel components in contact. wit h compressed a ir is arrnst ed thus decrnasing the possibility of cor rosion wenkening i pipe wnfis. Implementat ion of t his chango enhances the ability of  ;

the inscrument air dryers to maint.nin the requirod_ dew point in order t o maint ain t he 2% relat ive humidity.

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Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 NPC-91-0??

Pngo 2 Implement at ion of t his change will augment t he nhilit y of tim inst rument nir system tn meet the nIr qun1ity requiromerits thnt is cornenensut ate with t he des ign int eitt of sa fet y r elat ed component s, atul with the UFSAR evalttat lon assumpt lon that the n.lr quality is sufficient t o ensure thnt the components opninto as designert.

Therefore, impicmentat ton of this change does not retince the matgin of safety as defined iti the hnsin for atiy t echnical apectffratfon.

m M9206161/SNLIGFl.R - 27

Attachment, to GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: -NPE-91-028~ DOC NO: CN-91-0015 DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE: This change made permannnt the changes mado in a temporary alteration which disconnected the 111-111 RAD trip of:the Radwastn Building exhaust filt er t rain fans.

REASON FOR CilANGE: The purpose of this change in-to allow the fans to be restartnd af ter the radiation conditions have been assessed and deemed acceptable. Thn fans must be resta rt ed to establish air flow through thn vent to clear t he condit ions which caused the 111-111 RAD trip.

SAFETY d.t " 10N: Tha accident analyses reported in the UFSAR do p not tak c: Nit for the high-high radiation trip of the Rndwastn -

• ~ Building oxhaust filter train f ans. Failure of any component, system or st.ructure added or modified by this changn will not initiate any evaluated tranninnt or accident. Delellon of thn high-high radiation trip of thn Radwante Bui2 ding exhaust filter J*

train fans will not change the design Intent of the system. The high-high radiation trip of the Radwaste Building exhaust filter t rain fans is not required to support. the safe shutdown of the reactor or to perform in the operation of reactor safety features.

No' credit-for this trip is taken in the accident analysis for an of fgas or radioact ive liquid wasto system leak or failurn as' '

described in the UFSAR. The area radiation monitors, the operational Indicators and annunciators in the control room, which are used in thn nvent of an of fgas or radioactivn liquid wanto system. leak or failure as described in the UFSAR are not affected by this chag a.

The margin of safoty as def fund in the bases for the techn(ca1 specifications are not changed by the deletion of t his trip. The -

radiological conditions will st.ill he assessed to ensurn -

compliance with 10CFR20 as described in Technical Specification I. 3/4.11.2. The bases for this technical specification requirement are not dependent oa 1" Radwaste Building exhaust vent trip.

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M9206161/SNLICFLR - 28

Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: NPE-91-029 DOC NO: CN-90-0181 DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE: This changn provides for the installation of a lightning dissipation system on the radial well enclosurn  ;

hulldings, REASON FOR-CllANGE: The now syst.nm provides greater prot ection from lightning strikes than'the old system.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The buildings with attached lightning protection _are non-seismic, non-category I designed to tho- samo Universal Building Codo (UBC) requirements as the Rannoy Wolls.

The buildings do not contain any equipment whosn loss or malfunction would create an initiating event as described in the UFSAR. Loss of the Wells has alrnady been postulated and is not required for safe renctor shutdown. The buildings do not house any' equipment important to safety and are physically isolated from any equipment important to safety. The margin of safety will not bo reduced by- the addition of 1ightning prot ection to the Enclosure Buildings, 4

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ALtachment'to GNRO-92/00019 SRASNt NPE-91-030 DOC NO: CN-91-0012 ,

DESCRIPTION OF CllANGE: This changn provided instructions to replace portions of the floor tiin and wall base mold.ing in the control cabinnt area.

REASON FOR CllANGE: Portions of the old floor tile, carpet squares, and wall base molding were damaged and needed to be replaced under_the Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR).

Since the tiin originally speciflod for this' location is no longer -

available, an alternato is approved for installation.

-SAFETY EVALUATION: The alternative floor tile has been tested in accordance witJ. ASTM E-648 and ASTM E-662. Test results show tho - -

alternato tilo to possess acceptable fire performanco characteristics with respect to flamn spread and smokn development. The wall-base molding has not been sub}ncted to flamn spread and smoke dnvelopment tests;' however, it represents an insignificant portion of-the combustibles located within this-area and is therefore acceptabin. The floor is not a fire boundary for this fire zone and is therefore not required to.bn fire rated. This change does not impact any margin of safety in the technical specification.

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~ Attachment to'GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: NPE-91-031 110C NO: CR-NPE-90-0041 DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE: This chango deletes the implied reference to a 12 second-analytical strokn Limo for t his liPCS inject ion i valve, E22-F004, in UFSAR Subsection 6.3.2'.2.1.

REASON--FOR CHANGE: The 12 second analytical opnning timo for the llPCS injection vaIvo is incorrect. Based on_the sequenen of

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events provided in UF6AR Tabic 6.3-1 for a design bases accident ,

the llPCS system is sigtialed ~ to st art at . 3 seconds and has completed startup at 30: seconds. Therefore, an analytical strokn time for this valve is not specified.

SAFETY EVAhUATION: .The llPCS injection valve analytical stroke time -is unrelated- to the probabilit.y of occurrenco of any accident L previously evaluated in the FSAR. The accidents previously cvaluated in the.UFSAR arn based on a llPCS system analytical responst t.imn of 27 seconds as indicated in UFSAR-Tables 6.3-1 and 6.3-2. The deletion of the incorrect itPCS injection valve analytical stroke time of 12 seconds from Subsection 6.3.2.2.1 will not incroasn.this analytical system response timn. Nonn of the references reviewed require na analytical stroke time of 12 seconds for the llPCS injection valvo. Thornfore, this change has no impact on the UFSAR accident analyses and does not incrnase the consequences of any accident provinasly _ evaluated in the FSAR.

This changn has no physical impact on any eqaipment and does not-af fect any design basis accident analysis. Since this change will not result in any relaxation in the performance requirements of any components or systems _ or increase the consequences of any .

- accident previously evaluated, it does not reduce the margin of safnty-as definnd in~the basis for any technical specificat.fon.

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SRASN: -NPE-91-032- DOC NO: MNCR90-0256 DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE: This change modifled the reactor protection system (RPS) logic to onn-out-of-two t aken twice for the scram discharge instrument volume level instrumentation.

REASON FOR C11ANGE: The existing design provided redundnnt and

,r . diverse instrumentation arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic for the entire scram discharge volume and a two-aut-of-two logic for each instrument volume. It is desired to have a one-out-of-two taken twice logic for the instrument volume per original General Elect ric (GE) design.

SAFETY EVAhUATION: .Thn Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) level scram is an anticipatory t rip which is not assumed in any accident analyses. The GGNS instrumentation arrangement provides redundant and diverso level monitoring of the SDV volume. No single failure of the SDV level Instrument.ation will initiate an event which would challenge the integrity of thn reactor or any Engineered Safety Feature (ESP) system. No single failure of the SDV level inntrumentation will allow the undetected buildup of water in the scram discharge volume or affect the ability of the reactor to scram. The SDV level instrumentation does not provide input into any ESP system and will not af fect the ability of any ESF system to perfora its design function.

The SDV level instrumentation has been evaluated for the of fcct of a blocked instrument volume drain in conjunction with the single failure of an RPS scram contactor. This event would result in an initia1 scram of two out of the four control rod groups. However, due to t.he arrangnment of the control rods within the core, half of the scrammed rods would discharge water into the unblocked SDV.

This would result in a scram signal from the unblocked SDV which would scram the remaining two rod groups. A trip in the blocked SDV with a single failure will result in an indirect full core scram. An indirect scram under t.hese conditicus will_ meet the GGNS anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) requirements.

This ' instrument configuration dons not affect the RPS setpoint requirements as stated in the technical specifications.

Therefore..the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any technical specification will rema in unchanged.

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Attachment to'GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: NPE-91-036 DOC NO: DC P 0112-S00-R00

DESCRIPTIOM OF CllANGEi This chango upgrados programmable controls hardware in panels G36-P002, Reacto.r Water Cleanup (RWCU)

Filter /Demineralizer, and G46-P002, Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup

- (FPCCU) Filter /Demineralizer.

REASON FOR CHANGE: The old controllers are a sclete and spare parts are not available.

SAFETY EVALUATION: No accident evaluation in the UFSAR or malfunction of equipment important to safety is predicated on a-failure of the filter /demineralizar potion of nither_ RWCU or FPCCU.- Nor in-the RWCU or FPCCU used to mitigate the consequences -

of an-accident. The function and operation of the filter /demineralizer portion of neither RWCU or FPCCU is affected by this change. No margin of safety as dof tned in the Technical Specification bases is predicatnd on thn operation of the filter /deminnreliznr portion of either RWCU or FPCCU.

M9206161/SNLICFLR - 33

At t achment to CN RO- 4 ' ' Y 019 SRASN: NPE-91-017 DOC No: DCP-87-3508-SO9-koo DESCRIPTION OF CilANGi; ibis change makes humqn f att nrs mod i f ic a t ions to the li l 3 - P60 0, P 6 0 's , P844 nrul P845 panols by doing the following: 1) Add paramotor Inbols to the lil 3- P844 ni an indiat ion mon it ors ; 2) Arld cor rec t scales and labol- (nor I;S- 17 Appondix Al t o a ll Ill3-P600 and P844 rocerders; 3) h. 3-P844 D21 Rnd Moni t or met or rono markinns from the ginss to tho motor face; 4) Inhol process Rai Monitors which provido a trip function;

5) Roword tho Of f-Gns and Radwnsto Illdg and CTMT Vent label to clarify the control function; 6) Place recordet Inho l on lil 3-P844 for D21-R600C above the recorder; 7) Movo functlonal group labels as approprinte to ensure proper cont rol/ labeling relat f onship; 8)

Replaco oporntor nid mimic wit h panel mimics on lil 3-P845 and 9 )

Add instromont ID numbers to labels of those instruments wit h no ident. i f f ers for Pnnols lil 3- P600, P604, P844 and P845.

REASON POR CilANGP. These changes fulfill commitments modo in AECM-86/0226 ( DCRDR Fina l Summa ry Report ),

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,a SAPETY EVALUATION: Thir channo doos not affect tho opornt ion of

,g any assoc int ed sys t ems. Solsmic qualification, safo shutdown, g fIro protoctJon and environmontai crit erin a re not n f foct od by t bo mod i f i ca t ions .

This changos does not inciense the combustiblo or snismic loads oa the panels. These modificntions decronso tho prohobi1ity of human i error while opornt ing plant eq u i pm o n t. . The mod i f ied equ ipment l monts all design requirements and doos not chnne,o in function or operation.

Those change modifications incronse the opera t or ma rg in of so f ot y by reducing the prohobilit y of human error l

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M9206161/SNhICPhR - 14

Attnchmnnt to GNRO-92/00014 i SRASN: NPE-91-038 110C NO: 11C P 00 30- S 00 - R 00 l

DESCRIPTION OF CliANGE: This chnnge modifies the lube water piping to the circulating water pumps to replace the deeper basket strainer. With two single basket strainers installed in parallel lines with individual isointlon.

REASON FOR CHANGE: During the swit ching process of this deeper strainer from one basket t o the other, a momentary loss of flow to t he circulat ing water pumps can result. This momentary loss of flow could result in a circulating water pump trip. This change allows the switching process to isolate a basket st rainer and service it w i t hout interrupting the lube water flow.

SAFETY EVAL.UATION: The modification provides ior two basket strainers in parallel in the circulating water pump lube water supply. The piping and pipe supports designs meet ANSI B31.1 code requirements. The piping is supported to dead weight londs only since it is installed in the circulating water pump house, which is a non-seismic building cont aining no sa fety related equipment .

The Circulating Water system serves no safety function. Systems analysis has shown that fnilure of the CW sy: em will not compromise nny safety related systems or prevent reactor shutdown.

The operation or function of the CW system, as annlyzed in the FSAR, is not a f fected by the addit ion o t he basket strainers.

Therefore, this change will not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evalunted in the FSAR.

The proposed changes do ant modify any equipment used in mitigating the consequences of an accident as nnalyzed in the FSAR, nor do t. hey a f fett any actions taken to mItignte nn accident as analyzed in the FSAR.

The nddition of the basket stralners to the Circulat ing Wat er system will not change the function or operation as defined by the bases of thn technical specifications, therefore, the mnrgin of safet y is not reduced, i

M9206161/SNhlCFhR - 35

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Attachment t.o GNRO-92/00019- ,

SRASN: NPE-91-039 DOC NO: MCP 109 7-800-R0 & R1 -;

DESCRIPTION OF CllANGE: This change routes the discharge from valves P42F215/F213, in the Component Cooling Water (CCW) syst.cm to a Chemical Radwnste (CliRW) drain with a new valve instnlied at a location suitable to name thn vnnting operat. ion.

REASON FOR CilANGE: The venting of the component cooling water (CCW) discharge and suction headers are performnd daily. To perform this venting, valves P42F215 and F213 must be operated.

These vent valves are located approximat_nly 20 font from the floor, thereby requiring a ladder to per form the venting.

Additionally, it is necessary to use a hose to dirnet thn water from the venting process t a drain. This change mnkos tho vent operation simpler and caster.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The modifications providn process lines to allow easier venting of thn CCW suction and dischargo header. The piping and pipe supports designs meet ANSI B31.1 codo requirements and are qualified as Snismic Category il/I. The installation is non-safety related and will not af fect the snfety reinted portions of this system. For the affected system, only these portions of the system which penetrates t.he containmnnt or provido system isolation from the Fnni Pool Cooling and Clean-up (FPCCU) system are safety related. Failurn of the af fected system will not compromisn and safety related system or component and will not '

prevent reactor shutdown.

The operation or function of the a f fected syst em, as analyzed in 1

the FSAR, is not af fect.ed by the addition of those process lines.

Penetration AP-127C will hn closnd to provido a fire rating equivalent to the_barrior through which it. is installed.

Thereforn, this changn will not incrnaso the probability of occurrence of an . accident previonsly evaluated in the FSAR.

The proposed changen do not modify any equipment used in 3 mitigating the consequences of an accident as analyzed in the-FSAR, nor do they af fect any actions tnken to mitigato an accident as analyzed in the FSAR.

Technical specifications ensure that fire damage will bn limited and minimize the possibility that a singin fire would involve more than onn fire area prior to detection and extinguishment.

Penntration AP-127C will be closed to provido a firn rating equivalent to the floor through which it will bn installed.

Consequently, the effectiveness of the barrier is_not reduced.

The addition of the process lines to the CCW system will not changn the function or operation as defined by t he bases of the technical specifications; the rn fo re , the margin of safnty is not reduced.

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Attachment to GNRO-92/00019-SRASN: NPE-91-040 DOC-NO: DCI' 4 018- 800-R 00 DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE: -The existing high pressurn process linen of ~ dif ferential pressure transmitters which measure thn_differenen in air pressurn between the outsido air _and the fool handling area air-have no wind deflecting capability. _This change replaces the existing Fisher Vent Assemblies, Type.Y602-9 with Fisher Vent Assemblics, Type Y602-10.

REASON FOR CilANGE: This new vent comes equipped with a wind deflecting cap.

' SAFETY EVAT,UATIONi This change insures that the original dnsign intent of the fuel. handling area llVAC system is maintained._ No new failure modes are created and the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification is thn same.

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Attnchment to GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: NEE-91-041 DOC NO: QDR-213-91 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE: Unit 2 fire prot ect ion piping which is incomplete and not connected to the fire protect.fon water system is being removed from the Unit 1 Piping and Instrumentation Drawings (P&lDs) and corresponding UFSAR figures.

REASON FOR CHANGE: This change is being accompiinhed to provide Unit 1 P& ids which ciently depict piping and facillt les which are connect ed to the firn protection water system.

SAFETY EVAI.UATION: This change will revise fire protection P&lD drawings (UFSAR figures) to more clonrly depict piping, systems and facilities connect ed to and suppi f ed f rom the Unit I fire ___

protection water system. This change does not mod ify any plant fire protection systems or components and does not adversely affect tha nbility of the fire protection system to confinn and extinguish postulated ffres. Furthermore, this change does not {

affect any system or component required to mitigate radiological l rnlensns and no new relonsn mechanisms are created. Consequent ly ,

this changn does not incronsn t he probnbilit.y of occurrence or thn consequences of an accident or mal funct ion of equipment important to safety previously evalunted in thn safety annlysis report.

This change removes Unit 2 fire protection systems supplied by the construction water system from thn UFSAR figures to improve operator perception of fire protection systems available and/or rnquired for Unit 1. No f i re prot ect. ion sys t em shall be a f fect ed and no new accident initintors are being created. Thornfore, the possibility of an accident or mnifunct ion of a di f ferent type than any evalunted previously in the safety analysis report is not created.

The ability of thn firn protection system to confinn and extinguish postulated fires will not be adversely af fected. As directed in the Bases for Techn(ca1 Speci ficat ions 3/4.6.6 and 3/4.7.2, Standby Gas Treatment and Control Room Emergency Filtration charconi absorbency will not be ndversely af fected by this change. Valves within the firn protection system and performing secondary containment isolation funct ions , as 1isted in Technical Specification Table 3.6.6.2-1, will not 'mn affected.

Addit ionally, primary conta inment. penetration conductor overcurrent irotective device 72-llE-36, as listed in Technical Specification Table 3.8.4.1-1, will not be adversely a f fect ed.

Thereforn, the margin of sa fety as defined in the basis for any technical specification vill not be reduced.

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Attachment. to CNRO-92/00019 SRASNi NFE-91-042 DOC NO: CR-NPE-91-0069 DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE: Revise wording in UFSAR Section 8.3.2.1.6, St ntion Bat teries and Batt nry Chargers, Gennral Considnrations, concerning the design of the physical connection of thn battery chargers and thn suitability for use with or without the battery physically connected. The Division I and 11 battery chargers are

- designed for use with or without the battery physically connected and the Division III battery charger la physically connneted such that operation without the battery is not possible. The UFSAR

_ description is reversed for t he dif ferent divisions. This chnnge does - not af fect _ normal opera tion of thn 125V DC systems.

REASON FOR CilANGE: The UFSAR description of t.he physical -

connection between the battery chargers and the batt ories is incorrect. This change is to correct the description of thn UFSAR to agree with the existing design of thn 125V DC systems.

SAFETY EVAT.UATION: The change described does not affect the normal operation of the battery chargers or the hatt cries. The design of the battery chargnrs _ for use with or without thn hattery physically connectnd has no adverse affect on the DC power system.

The battery chargers are of sufficient capacity t operate system loads as described in the UFSAR. The physical connection of the

. battery chargers and batteries is shown on design drawings included in the UFSAR, The battery chargnrs are Class IE -

equipment and are designed and sized in accordance with applicable IEEE standards for battery chargers. The capabilities of the DC system will not be af fected by Ihe physica1 connection of the battery chargers.

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t Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 i SRAhN: hPEa91-043 DOC NO: CN-91-0159 DESCRIPTION OF CllANGE- This safet y evaluation was originally prepared for. DCP 87/4018, Rev. I and reported in AEC'i-89/0098. It is being revjsed to delete the discussion on atmospheric domin flush capabilitjos (in the descript ton of change sect lon) because CN 91/0159 delntes this capability. This cr.pability is not needed. The capnbility was provided as n convenient way to removn radioactive contamination from thn condensate port ion of t he system. Flushing will seldom be needed and can still be accomplished by tempor arily connect ing t ubing between the capped of f domin water line and the plugged ten above the sample coolnr.

DCP.87/4018 installs a new atmospheric sampling system in a separato panel totally dndicated to atmospheric sampling. The new panel is being located in the PASS room adjacent to the existing lp33-p001 pannl.

The existing atmospheric grab sample point is designed such that the operator is exposed to approximately 36" of unshielded sample 1.i n e . These lines are the samplo inlet and outlet line between the cask and panel. To reduce opernt.or exposure, the method for taking an atmospheric- grab samplo is hning modified. Thn existing atmospheric grab sample point, will be eliminated. Thn new atmospheric grab sample point consists of a replaceable septum located behind a removable Innd plug in a lead block shield wall.

This lead plug is being fitted with a guide tube to allow the opnrator access to the septum vin a long needle and syringe. The sample will be drawn into a lead shielded sy:Inge attached at one end of a two foot mechanical arm. The syringe will be opened and closed by thn opera tor f rom t he oppos it e end.

Twenty-four hours following the onset .of an accident , a drywell and containment-atmospheric sample is required to be taken via the PASS (reference AECM-91/0332), per Environmnntal Specification 15026-E-100.0, Rev.-4, at the t i tr < the first sample-is required the drywnll saapin will be saturated steam at 250 F and 30 psia.

-The atmospheric sample inlet lines arn heat traced to minimize condensation and the loss of particulate sample, llowever, because the sample is saturated it is 1ikely t. hat some minimal condensation will occur. Any condensation that could occur for whatever reason will collect in the samplo panel since the panel

.is the low point in the system. At present, the system providna no means for removing condensate. A sufficient buildup of condensate would ef fectively render the system inoperable.

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Att achment. t o GNRO-92/00019 MpE-91-043 page 2-The new-atmosphnric sample system design includes a sample cooler, a condensate diversion ten, and condensate collection tank. The sample will be cooled from 250 F to approximatnly 105'F downstrnam '

of the grab sample point. The diversion Lee will separate the condensate-from the atmospheric sample. The collection tank includns a level switch and local alarm to make the operator nwnre when the condensate tank should be pumped down. The condensate will be pumped to the suppression pool via the existing liquid system return line. The atmospheric sample return line in presently heat traced to 125 F. This will further reduce the possibility of condensate forming in the atmospheric sampling -.

system.

The sample cooler is being added to reduce the power consumption of the heat tracing on thn sampin return livies necessary to prevent condensation from occurring. Connections provided by DCP 87/4006 in the component cooling water (CCW) system arn available for providing cooling water for the sample cooler.

llent tracing is presently installed on the drywell and containment sample inlet lines and on the common sample return line. Each line has different temperature requirements. The new atmospheric "

sample panel and affected sample lines arn hcIng heat traced by splicing into the existing heat. tracing circuit s, The overall beat tracing circuit lengths do not excend thn maximum circuit lengths as specified by the vendor, provisions are bning provided to purge the sampin inlet and outInt.

lines with instrument air. -

NUREG-0737, Item II.B.3, criteria 1.la and t hn clarificat ion of lla addresses the need for heat tracing and purging of sample lines.

The clarification also states that purge velocities should be considered. This DCP finalizes modifications required to the heat.

tracing system. The hnat tracing system has been designed to minimize the loss or distortion of thn atmospheric sample to ensure that grab samples are representative. Air purging of the sampin-lines is accomplishnd via the instrument air system with ti system pressure of approximately-100 psig.

, -The atmosphnric sampling subsystem, the solenoid banks and the liquid pump starter are being removed from the PASS samplo pannl-(Ip33-p001) to elfminate thn overcrowded condition of the panel and thus better accommodate maintenanen activities.

Drip pans are _heing installed in the bott om of the lp33-p001 panel to collect and contain any minor system leakage and thus, restrict

-any possible contamination due to leakage into the panel.

119206161/SNLICFLR - 41

Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 N1'E 04 3 '

Page 3 The in-line instrumentation in the liquid sampling subsystem, conductivity, pil and oxygen monitors, arn being replaced with new and improved instrumentation. A hydrogen monitor is niso being added to the in-line inst rumentation to provido additional sampling capabilities for dissolved gases.

REASON FOR CilANGE: The 1Iquid and atmospheric sampling subsystems of t.he Post Accident Sampin System (PASS) are installed in the-PASS grab sampin panni (N1P33-P001). Itoth subsystems require modifications to improve the overall system's ability to meet the requirements of NUREG-0737. This panni, in its present condition, -

is a significant maintenance issun due t o its overcrowded condition and poor A1. ARA design.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The technical specifications are not a f fneted.

PASS is addressed in the administrative controls snction of the GGNS Technical Specifications (Section 6.8.3.c). This section requires that the PASS program include training of personnel, -

procedurns for sampling and analysis and provisions for maintenance. This DCP provides enhancements to the PASS system in order to better fulfill its design requirements as dictated by the GGNS Technical Specifications, the operating license and as committed to in thn UFSAR.

The implementation of this DCP will not increase the probability or consequences of an evaluated accident / malfunction. PASS has been designed in accordance wit.h thn requirements of tin GGNS operating licenso, the technical specifications and as commit ted to-in the--UFSAR. This DCP provides enhancements to PASS which ,

l' will enable the system to better perform its design functions.  !

j The design has considornd and incorporated those pertinent design features which will prevent the failure of PASS from af fecting systems required for safo shutdown of the plant following an accident. Thn PASS design hns also incorporated design featurns ,

for ALARA considerations and for meeting the personnel exposure ,

guidelines of NUREG-0737.

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, The implementation of this DCP will not create- thn possibility of an accident / malfunction of a dif ferent type than any a1rnady nyaluated in the UFSAR. Thn design has bnen evaluated and it was dotormined that no now failin n modes worn int roduced .

-M9206161/SNhlCFLR - 42 mm

Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 SRASNi . N pF 04 4'- DOC NO: CN-91-0182 P

DESCRIPTION OF CllANGE: The outdated Westronics M!1E analog recorder E31R608' will be replaced with a state of the art Westronics series 3200 digital recorder and the sotpoint of E31R608 point 21 (E31N015D) will be ralsnd. The outdated .

Westronics MSE analog recorder E31R611 will be replaced wit h a state of t.he art Westronics series 2400 digi t a l recorder. The 10 nmp fuso in thn power circuit of each recorder will be replaced with two 3 amp fuses in series. This will adequately isolate thn non-Q recorders from Class IE power. This DCP, vin CN-91/0182, will also rninbnl annunciator window lill3-P680-II A, insert 1-4, for annunciator IE31-TAH-L616D, to rnnd "RWCU llent Exchanger Valve Nest Aren".

REASON FOR CllANGE: Annunciator E31-Tall-1.619ft (Drywell Ambient Temp ..lligh ) stays in alarm beenuse thermocoupin E31-TE-N015D is operating at the 145"F sotpoint. This const ant alarm condit ion is masking the status of seven other drywell thermcwuples which arn assor inted with the same contact output of the recorder E31-TJRS-R608. The setpcInt of E31-TE-N015D could be raised if thn recordor had a spare contact output.. E31R608, however, is a Westronics MllE recorder which has only 6 contact outputs and nonn are sparn.

Annunciator E31-Tall-L620B (RWCU Equipment Area Differential Temp liigh) is being activated when a high delta T condit ion (31 F A tf ference between E31NO35A and E31NO36A) does not exist. Raising tao setpoint would prnvent this, but the problem is caused by the in.3e dendband of the obsolete and unreliable Westronics M5E recorder IU1R611.

In addit,fon ts che above described probinms, an annunciator angraving change has been 1:len t i f i ed . Annunciator 1E31-Tall-L616D

,d thn associated instrumentat ion monit or t he temperature in thn

.WCU heat exchanger valvo nest aren and not the valvn nest room.

Safety Evnluntion CFRMISC0090R00 was w.ritten to evaluate the changns to bn mndo to the UFSAR. The temperaturn instrumentation being-locnted in the RWCU hnnt exchanger valve nest aren and not in the RWCU valve nest room was part of this evaluation.

SAFETY: EVALUATION: Tempernture recordor E31R608 and delta T recorder E31R611 monitor--various arens of the p]nnt for lenk detoction' purposes. Each recorder has six contact out puts which power control room annunciators when a setpoint is exceeded. This alnrts the opnrntors to potentini st.oam leaks. These rncorders arn non-safety related, however and perform no active safety related function. They are also not required for Regulatory Guide 1.97 Indication and no credit is taken in the UFSAR for opernt or act ions based on information taken from the recorders or their annunciators. The ex ist ing recorders a re connncted to Class lE power. ne new recorders will be adequately isolat ed f rom the M9206161/SNLICFLR - 43

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-Attachment-to-GNRO-92/00019-NPE-91-044' Pagn 2 Class 1E' bus. -

Both recorders are fed from the same Class IE bus.

The load on this bus is not inctnased because the combinnd load of the new recorders (155 VA) is less than the combined load of the old recorders (200 VA). The seismic qualification of the safety related panni in which thn recorders are mounted will be maintained. No panel mcxlification will be required.

The changes of this DCP will not compromise any existing safety related system, st ructurn or componnut nor Will t hey prevent safn reactor shutdown. No evaluated accident is predicated by a failurn of the af fected recorders. This design change will bn an improvement in terms of reliability and monitoring capability.

The changes of this DCP wi11 not compromise any 'tisting safety related system, structure or component. The fai uro of the -

recorders will not initiate any ovaluated transi at or accident.

The E31 (henk Detect f on) system operation and f- ction will not change. The recorders are not required to miti6nte-the consequenens of any nyaluated t ransjont or accident.. No new

'nterfaces are created and no new failurn modes are introduced.

This change will therefore not introducn an unreviewed sa fety question. The recordnrs are not currently addressed in thn toch spec and this change will not requirn that they be added to the technical specification.

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Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 SRASNE NPE-91-045 DOC NO: GGNS-E-100.0, Rrv. 5 DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE: This is an update (change) to the Environmental Parnmet. ors for Equipment Qun1ification for vartous safety-related structures under normal operat lou and accident conditions. Such structures include the d rywel l, cont a inment ,

auxiliary building, control building, diesel building and standby service water pumphouse. These environmental parameter changes updat.e Bechtel Specification 15026-E-100.0, Rev. 4, to Grand Gulf Standard GGNS-E-100.0, Rev, 5 Updat ing 15026-E-100.0 included performing t hn following objectives:

1. Review the current. environmental parametnrs to verify thn appropriateness and accuracy of identi fied values.

2. Review the source rnference documents fc" identifying any impact to environmental parameters.

3. Prepare and issue an engineering standard on environmental parameters for a11 10CFR50.49 environmenta1ly qua1iffed electrical equipment.

The F3AR environmental parameters section for equipment qualificalion will'also be revised as a consequence of u: 4 ting the E-100.0 standard to current plant specific data.

REASON FOR CllANGE: This update (change) is prepared in support of resolving inconsistencies regarding dntection and isointion of-leaks in Reactor Wnter Cleanup (RWCU) piping:

1. The existing RWCU isolation circuit contains no room temperature or della temperature isolation s_ignals for rooms normally having RWCU piping with water at t emperatures of less thnn 120'F. The requirement for these sigonis was deleted from technical specifications:in 1984. However. - t bn mass and energy blowdown calculations used in the FSAR annlyses for these remms are based on RWCU isolation occurring within 50 seconds using the high room tempernture and delta temperature (except lA_443) but no automatic RWCU i s o l a t. lon . Without the high temperature trips, RWCd isolation _will occur af ter 80 seconds using the delta flow I. t. rip instrumentatlon.

2, Alt. hough all rooms containing RWCU equipment for which failures must he postulated worn originally interided to he continuously monitored via temperature instrumentation, the RWCU valve nest room 1 A443 has no temperat ure moni toring instruments. During initial const ruct lon, the t hermocouples

-intended for this room were inadve rt cully installed in the RWCU heat exchanger room (;nppa rent ly due t o the pliysical similarities of these rooms).

M9206161/SNf,1CFhR - 45

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Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 NPE-91-0'5 Page 2 A QDR identified that Bechtel Specification 15026-E-100.0 must. bn r" vised for new accident temperature profiles in the applicable '

areas. Revising environmental parameters in GGNS-E-100.0 also resulted in required chnnges to the equipment qualification packages and Engineering Standard ES-21.

QDR 237-89 required a changn to the FSAR for pressure and temperature curves (NFEFSAR 89/0042 and CFRMISC0090R00). The GGNS-E-100.0 update required a change for INGU toom tempernture curve sets and parameters. The pressure response curves for the GGNS-E-100.0 update do not. change because thn related RWCU pressure curves are bounded by enveloping conta.inment pressure curves. From Attachment 1 of GDR 237-89, the affected design margins are the accident t.emperature profiles used for equipment in several of the compartments adjacent to the postulat ed RWCU 1 inn break areas (e.g., rooms IA419 and 1A447). A review of thn environmental qualificat.lon records for the equipment- in these

( rooms indicates that there is_ no env ironment ally qual.i fied I

equipment in room 1A419 and that all of the environmentally qualified components in room 1 A447 (e.g. , t he sa fety related himitorque valve actuators, instrumentation, hydrogen igniters, and enble) are quali fied for the higher tempernt"res resulting from this postulat.ed eve t.

This revision removes the FSAR as a primary reference for l environmental parameters in GGNS-E-100.0 because this engineering is standard is a do, ment that updates the Environmental Qualification-of f,quipment sect. ion in the FSAR.

This revision updates and verifies t.he drywell, containmert (excluding drywell) and anxiliary building environmental total integrated doses and dose rates -to be Grand Gul f/BWR-6 specific

!- for normal and accident conditions. .

I SAFETY EVAhUATION: This Environmental Parameter Design update changes environmental parametera and the Tot al Integrated Dose (TID) for the drywell.

This revision also updates and removes the FSAR as a reference for L such environmental parameters as temperature, prnssure and l relativt humidity for normn1 environments. The revised rnmeters

-were compared to Technical Specification Table 3.7.8-1 and none of the changed GGNS-E-100.0, Rev. 5 vnlues exceeded Table 3.7.8-1 values. A preliminary review of environmentally qualified equipment a f fected by the change in environmental parameters concluded that no of fect on quali fied li fe wi'll result.

M9206161/SNI.ICFl.R - 46

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At tachment . t n GNRO-92/0001'l NPE-91-045 l'n ge 3 llochtel Specification 15026-E-100.0 was revised icr accident temperatiire profilen in the applicable arens. During the revision process for temperature profiles, the total drywell integrnted doses were nIso revised. Thesn revised tota 1 int egrat ed doses ,

.have niso been identified for revision of equipment qual.ification documentation packages and Engineering Standard ES-21. The updated total integrated doses identified are niso evaluated for tbn non-10CFR50.49 applicat ions in Engineering Report GGNS-E-100.0, Rev. 5 which has been reviewed and verified making

- this doctment n Grand Gulf specific environmental parameter sLandard for equipment qun 1i f tent lon.

-This revision of E-100.0 has been evnlunted and no change in Grnnd Gul f's Technical Speci ficat ion is required nor will any new technieni specification limits be required. This chanan will not result. -in failure of any safety rnlated component or system from performing their intended funct ion as previously _ nun tyzed nor will it result in an increase in the consequences of any accident.

119206161/SNLICFLR - 47

Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: NPE-91-046 DOG NO: GGNS-M-489.6, Rev. O DESCKlPTION OF CHANGE: This safety evaluntion is performed as a resul t. o f t he initial issue of st anda rd GGNS-M-489.6 and t he referenced UFEAR change. The standard provides requ i r ement s for the performance of renet or vessel mat er in t surveillance testing and adjustment oi the pressu re/ t empernt u te curve opernting iimits for GGNS. The pressute/tempert 'a r e curve operating 1imits ptavide protection against nonductile failure of the reactof pressure vessel. The UFSAR change identifies the status of the reactor vessel materints surveillnuce program based on the methods irnplemented by t he standard. Implement at ion of the standard and the UFSAR change does not physically change the pinnt.

REASON FOR CliANGE: The stnndard was developed to implement the requirements for prediction of renctor vessel mat eria l toughness properties and development of pressure / temperature limit curves.

Generic I,etter 88-11 required tno implement at ion of Regulat cry Guido 1.99, Rev. 2. Sect ion 5. 3.1. 6. 5 o f t he UFSAR requited verif f ent ion of the fluence to t.hermal power output relationship.

The results of implementat ion of t he generic letter and the determination of the revised end-of-life neutron fluence are incorporated in the standard. The UFSAR change is required for consistency with the standard.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The standard implements t_ h e requirements for predict ion of reactor vessel material toughness propert les and e development of pressure / temperature limit curves as mandated by NRC Generic Letter 88-11, 10CFR50, Appendices G and 11, and Regulatory Guide 1.99, Rev. 2. The standard does not physically change the pinnt. Also, the standard includef the results of revised neutron fluence predictione. The revised fluence y pred ict ions are based an data fiom dos imet ry which was removed L from the reactor vessel a f t er thn first cycle of operation.

. The results of the Regulatory Guide 1.99, Rev. 2 calculation methods and the revised fluence predictions are included in Amendment #75 to GGNS Technical Specifications. Implementat_fon of the standard does not require a change to Technical Specifications. The pressure / tempe ra t ure curves and the support ing information in t he UFSAR nre based on the calculation methods of Regulatory Guide 1.99, Rev. I and the initial fluence predictions. Therefore, a change to the nFSAR is required.

The revised fluence values are bounded by other neut ron flux valuen that are used to assess environmental effects of nrat ron radintion. The requirem<ats of the s t anda rd a re in accordance c it h NRG me t hnds . The st#.vlard provides nssurance that fracture safe pressure / temperature limits are est ablished for the GGNS reactor vesse1 as requ i red by NRG Gener ic hetter 8b i1, 10GFR50, Appendicas G niid 11. and Regulat ory Guide 1.99, Rev. 2. No unroview.d s, ;ner t ion ex is t r 119?n6161/ SNhlGF1,R - 48

Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 9RASN: nit-91-0 4 7 DOC NO: GGNS-MS-25., Rev. 6 DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE: Mechanical Standard MS-25, Rev. 6, Appendix J contains the values for Maximum Expect ed Dif ferential Pressure (MEDP) for various snfety-rninted vnives which were used as inputs into calculations-for required valve thrust ca lcu la t. f ons , in some cases, these MEDP values di f f er f rom MEDP values listed in the UFSAR. These differences are summarized as follows:

8 NPE_ Calculated Valve Function UFSAR MEDP MEDP B33-F023A/B Recirc Pump Suet.fon 50 psid 34 psid B33-F067A/B- Recirc Pump-Disch 400 psid 34 psid E22-F004 IIPCS Injection 1575 psid 1441 psid E51-F010 CS1 Tank Isol Viv 75 psid 38 paid E51-F013 RCIC Pump Discharge 1400 psid 1391 psid E51- F019 $11n Flow Bypass 1437 psid 1396 psid E51-F022 Test Return Valve 1412 psid 1395 psid

, E51-F031 Supp Pool Suction 75 psid 39 psid E51 F045 Steam' Supply Valve 1177 psid 1080 psid (close)

E51-F046 Clg Loop Shutoff 1408 psid 1396 psid E51-F059 Test Return Valve 1412 psid 1395 psid E51-F063 RIIR/RCIC Steam Supp 1177 psid 1080 psbl E51-F064 RilR/RCIC Stnam Supp 1177 psid 1080 psid REASON FOR CllANGE: NRC Gennric Letter 89-10 (Sa fety-Rolated Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillanen) discusses the NRC assessments of the rnliability of all safety-rnlated MOVs based on extrapolations o r then currently availabin results of test ing performed'in response to IEB-85-03. As a result of these -

assessments,-the NRC determined that f ailurn of sa fety-relat ed and

" position changeable" valves would occur much more of t en than had previously been estimated. GL 89-10 thereforn provided'a v 2ber of recommended actions for licensees to perform for improving the reliability of the applicabin MOVs. Dun to incrnases in thn conservatisms in the methodology for calculating requirnd valve thrust values (notably the requirement for the use of a - valvo factor of 5 rather than .3 for gate valves), a morn realistic MEDP value must be used rather than the original bounding (i.e.,

-conservative) M 1ve MEDPs as st.ated in the original design specifications and/or UFSAR. The MEDP valuea were determined by NPE calculations for compliance with the rAquirements of NRC Generic Letter 89-10 (Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valvo Testing and Surveillance). Thoso calculations evaluated nach MOV on a case-by-caso basis for accident or operator mispositioning scenarios . identified as " worst-case" by engineering revinv.

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-Attachment to GNRO-92/00019

-NPE-91-047-Page 2 l

SAFETY EVALUATION: Uso of the MEDP values contained in MS-25, Rev. 6. Appendix J that differ from the values identified in the UFSAR will have no adverso ef fect on plant safety. The MEDP values 'n MS-25, Rev. 6, Appendix J are all based upon conseru.ivo individual calculations and thnrefore represent.

cons n rva t.: vo bounding values.

M9206161/SNLICFLR - 50 r - ._

Attachment t o GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: Npt-ni-048 DOC NO: QDR-0336-90 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE: Revise UFSAR Tables 4.3-3 and 11.5-3 to clarify the purposn of ra< lint ton monitoring and snmpling provisions and make an edItorinI change t o UFSAR Sect ion 11.1-3 to clarify thnt condensnte storage supplies water to the condonsnte system.

REASON FOR CHANGE: QDR 0336-90 was wr it t en t o document discrepancies in UFSAR Table 9.3-3 and the actual plant conditions. The UFSAR indicntes that there is t rit ium monit oring instrumentation for the SSW and PSW systems. This instrumentation does not exist. The UFSAR also specifies radiation monitoring instrumentat ion for the Fuel Pool Cooling and Clennup System which does not exist. An evnluation was performed to ensure the acceptability of the plant condit ions with respect to the design bases for rod f ation monit oring and snmpling provisions. This evaluntion is documented in Engineering Report GGNS-91/0018.

During this evaluation other discrepancies were identified in {

UFSAR Tables 9.3-3 and 11.5-3 and an editorial change r e<pi i r ed in Section 11.1-3. These changes ensure 'M 4- armation provided in UFSAR Tables 9.3 3 and 11.5-3 conform with present station procedures, design and practices which meet current licensing and d regulatory requirements.

SAFETY EVAh0AT10N: This QDR identifies discrepancies in the UFSAR and tbc actual plant c ond .i t i on s . The chnnges were reviewed to ensure that the plant condit ions nre acceptable wit h respect to the design bases for radintion monitoring and sampiing. The changes identified by this review do not a f fect Grand Gulf's compliance with NUREG-0737, item II.B.3 and Appendix A of 10CFR50, Criterion 13, 61, 63 and 64. Therefore, these changes will not -

increase the probability of occurrence of an accident . These changes are st.111 hounded by the exist ing accident analysis in Chapter l' of the UFSAR. The changes trade by this QDR do not prevent any equipment relied upon to mitigate the consnquences of a malfunction of equipment important to safet y or any evaluat ed transient or accident from performing its safety functlon.

Therefore, the consequences of a malfunction of equipment importaut to safety or an nccident previously evnlunted in the FSAR is not increased. No new interface is created which would affect components, equ.ipment or systems which perform safety functions. These changes will create no new failure modes not already enveloped by present. UFSAR analyses. No new accident precursors are being introduced by this change.

M9206161/SNLICFhV - 51

L Attachment _to GNRO-92/0001'9 SRASN: NPE-91-049 - DOC NO: CR-NPE-90-004 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE: Change " Active Function for Valves

'1P41-F074A/B and 1P41-F189 from " Required Open" to " System Isolation".

REASON-FOR CilANGE: Safety function listed for these valvns in Table'3.9-3C is incorrect.

~

SAFETY EVALUATION: The change in the active function designation for valves 1P41-F074A/B and 1P41-F189 on UFSAR Table 3.9-3C from

" Required open" to " System Isolat ion'_' will have no ef fect on plant safety. The change will bring the table into agreement with UFSAR Sections 9.2.1 nnd 9.2.8 and actual plant configuration. No design nr analysis _ change is involved. The change is only to correct an error in the table.

l M9206161/SNLICFLR - 52

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. Attachment to GNRO-42/00019 SRASN: = NPE-9l-050 DOC NO: CR-M PE 0 54 DESCRIPTION OF CllANGE: Revise wo-ding in UFSAR Section 8.2.4 concerning 115KV line capacity computer and annunciator alarms-which are discussed, but not present.ly in t he syst em. The UFSAR revision-will reflect plant conditions as tested and "As-Built".

REASON FOR CHANGE:- To correct wording con m rning computer and

- annunciator alarms being socnded if the 115KV line capacity decreases below the UFSAR stated limit, while no such alarms exist in the plant. It was determined during startup test that the IISKV Port Gibson line has suf ficient. capacit-y to start and operate the required loads with either the South Vicksburg or Lorman line out of service. Consequently there was no need for a capacity monitoring system for the 115KV line, however this was not updated Jn Sect ion 8.2.4 of t he UFSAR.

SAFETY EVALUATION: UFSAR Section 8.2.4 discusses system operating ifmits for the 115KV lines. Paragraph 2 (Bases for t he selection of the operating limits), Part 3 discusses the system capacity.

It notes that the 115KV line has a minimum capacity of 609 MVA and computer and annunciator alarms are sounded if the capacity decreases below this limit. The 115KV Port G!bson line was tested wIth the South Vicksburg line (the stronger of the two lines feeding the Port Gibson substation) out of service and being fed by the'I.orman-line only. It was found that tha 11un has sufficient capacity to start and operate the required loads for-Unit 1.at. GGNS. A line monitoring system was originally designed

. and purchased but a f ter the test was conducted, it was determined that the system would not be needed because the 115KV Port Gibson

- line has the required capacity. The MP&L dispatchers monitor line

- integrity and load flows rather than capacity. All switching done on the line by MP&b is cleared with GGNS operators. GGNS opera t. ors a re kept Informed of the line status by MP&L dispatchers verbally. The 115KV Port Gibson line minimum short circuit system

- capability.is 609 MVA with both - t ransmiss ion - lines to Port G.ibson in service. The operation of the ll5KV line will not be changed as- a result of this change. In . add it ion , no new interfaces or capabilities are created by t.his change. Thus, equivalent capability has been established by test, and no unroviewed safety qunstion has been Introduced.

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.u , . -- . , - . - . - - . . - - - - - _ . - _ - _ . . . _ _ - - . . ~ .

Attachment to GNRO-92/00019~

l l

SRASN: NPE-91-051 DOC.NO: QDR-0208-90 DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE: Revise UFSAR Snction 12.3.4.1,3.h to delete the reference to laboratories cont.aining area radiat ion monitors. Also rev2so UFSAR Figure 12.3-12 (Radiation Zonn Drawing A-0550, Rev. 11) to dolote the symbol for an airborne radiation monitor at the dnor t o room 0C101. Thesn changes are required to provide clarificat ion of the existing facility conditions.

REASON FOR CilANGE: QDR 0208-90 was written to document a discrepancy in UFSAR Section 12.3.4,1.3.h and the actual plant conditions. The UFSAR indicates that there are area radiation '

monitors (ARMS) installed in all laboratories. There arn no ARMS installed in the Chemistry Laboratories. A review was performed to ensure the acceptability of the plant conditions with respect to the design bases for area radiatiot nonitoring. This review is documented in Engineering Report GGNS-91/0017. During t.his review a discrepancy was-identified in UFSAR Figure 12.3-12 (Radiation Zone Drawing-A-0550, Rev. 11). The symbol for an aftborne radiat.lon monitor at. the ' door to. room 0C101 on this drawing should -

be de'icted.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This QDR ident ifies discrepancies in t.he UFSAR.

and the actual plant conditions. The changes were reviewed to ensure that the plant conditions are acceptabin with respect to the design bases for area radiat ion monitoring. The changes

-ident.ified by this' review do not af fect Grand Gulf's compliance with 10CFR20, 10CFR50, 10CFR70, and Regulatory Guides 8.2, 8.8 and 8.12, as described in Section 12.3.4. I of the UFSAR. Therefore,

'4ese changes will-not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident, -These changes are still bounded by the existing accident analysis in Chapter 15 of the UFSAR. The changes made by 4

'this QDR do not prevent any equipment relied upon to mitigate the consequences of a malfunction of equipment. important to safety or any- evaluated transient or. accident.- f rom performing -its sa fety function. Therefore, the consegnences .of a mal function of equipment important to safety or an accident previously evaluated-in the FSAR is not increased. No new interface is created which would a f fect components, equipment or systems which perform sa fety

' functions. 'These changes will create no new failure modes not already~envnloped by present UFSAR analyses. No new accident precursors are being introduced by this change.

l M9206161/SNLICFLR - 54

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Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: NPE-91-052 DOC NO: NPEFSAK91-0043 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE: The UFSAR is being changed to eliminate the discussion of two unit operat ion as it pertains to the Ultimatn Hnnt Sink and to reflect that there is only one Circulat ing Wat er Syst em Basin nynilable for use as an a lt ernat e makeup water source for the Standby Service Water Unsins due to the fact that Unit 2 has been canceled.

REASON FOR CilANGr. In December of 1979, const ruct ion of Grand Gulf Unit 2 was dnferred in order to concentrat e resources on tbn complet ion of Unit 1. After Unit I had received its Commercin!

Operating hiconse, Ent ergy Opernt ions, Inc. formally tequested the NRC to revoke the Const ruct ion Permit and of ficinIly ennce1 thn -

second unit nt the Grand Gulf Nuclear St at ion. Now that Unit 2 has been canceind, the ann ly- a for t wo unit operation is not applicabin and the use of tts tin i t 2 Circulating Water System Cooling Tower Basin as a future alteinnte water source will not be available.

SAFETY EVAL,UAT10N: The changn to the UFSAR rnflects ningle unit operation of thn plant as it pertains to the Ultimato llent Sink (Standby Service Water Unsins) rat her t han for two unit operntion (single unit operation was previously analyzed and incorporated into the UFSAR). The change to the UFSAR does not mod i f y Un i t 1 equipment. Thn volumn of water available from only the Unit 1 Circulating Water System Basin, instend of both thn Unit I and 2 basins, decreases the stated amount of alt ernate makeup water available from the Circulat ing Water Syst em t. o the Ultimnte lien t Sink by 50 percent, even though thn actual existing volume remains the same since the Unit 2 Circulating Water basin has never bnnn constructed, llowevn r , the alternate makeup water available from other existi.ng sources (such as the drainage basins, construct ion -

water wells) can still provide the add itional 60-day water supply discussed in UFSAR Appnndix 3A Section Regulatory Guide 1.27.

Thereforn, since thn Unit 2 Circulating Wat er basin was to be only one of the possible alternate sources for makeup to the Ultimate lion t Sink , th- requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.27 remain sntisfied.

The revision (which reflects singic unit operat ion only and t hn nlimination of the Unit. 2' Circulating Water Basin as a future source of nitnrnnte makeup to the Ult Nate llent Sink) will not require a change to the GGNS Technical Specifications nor will it create nn unreviewed safety question.

M9206161/ SNI,ICFLR - 55

Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: NPE-91-053 DOC NO: QDR-0028-91 DESCRIPTION OF CilANUE: UFSAR Table 7.5-2 in to be revised to show hydrogen annlyzer 1P33-N147, with nn effective rnnge of 0 to 99 ce(STP)/kg, as the instrum ,nt dedicated to the measurement of dinnolved hydrogen or total gas concentration in the primary reactor coolant.

REASON FOR CllANGE: At picannt, UFSAR Tahlo 7.5-2 does not accurately reflect ns-built configua nt ion with respect to pont accident mensurement of dinnolved hydrogen or total gas concentration in the primary reactor coolant.

SAFETY EVAh0AT10N: The donctihnd UFSAR revinfon will specify tho -

componnnt dediented to thn measurement of dissolved hydrogen or total gna concentration in thn primary react or coolant , and will document the effective rangn of thin component. Although the effectlyn rango of the nuhject hydrogen analyzer (0 to 999 cc/kg) in significantly lens than the minimum off*4ctivo range rnquired by =

Feguintory Guide 1.97 (0 to 2000 cc/kg). the monnutement enpabilities of the alsnolved gas snmpling nyntem ato acceptnhin.

The acceptanen of the CONS instrument rango in-based on nonly In performed by Gennral Electric, and accepted by thn NRC,t.hich demonstrates that the mnximum post nccident concentration of dinnolved ganen which would he present in thn BWR react or coalant in 400 cc/kg.

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M9206161/SNIICFI,R - 56

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r Attachment to GNRO 92/00019 SRASN: NPE-91-054 DOC NO: CR-NpE-91-016 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE: Remove t he ref er ences t o equni spacing of the hond stud tensioners on the reactor head st rongback/cas ousel from section 9.1.4. 2. 5. 7. b nnd upda t e figure 9.1-32 with the current revision of t hn source design drawing.

REASON FOR CilANGE: Thn hoists for the renctor hond stud tensluners are susperided f rom t rolleys which travel along a circular monornil. To maintoin the spacing betwoon thn tensioners and to move them simult aneously, the trolleyn are linked together nnd tied to an air powered t ractor. These links nro shown on the outlino drawing for t he st rongback carousel (767E693) which is thn source of UFSAR figure 9.1-32. Section 9.1.4.2.5.7.b nnd figurn -

9.1-32 currently state that, thesn links keep thn tensionnts equally spaced. The outline drawing describes ten models of reactor hee.J strongback/carousnl (pnrt numbarn) for various J

reactor vessel sizes and with varying numbers of head stud tensjoners. Thn model applienbin to Grnnd Gulf Unit 1 is part number 1. eleference to the assembly drawing for t.ho head strongback/ carousel and its nssociated part list (767hS72 nnd Pb767ES7'!) shows that the head stud tensioners are not equally spnced.

SAFETY EVAL.UATION: The removal of references to equal spacing of the head stud tensionnrs on the rnnetor hond strongback/casousel from section 9.1.4.2.5.7.h and the updating figurn 4.1-32 are nceeptable. Thn chnngo in spacing of thn hond stud tensioners will not requirn a change in the GGNS Unit 1 Technical Specifications and-it wi'.! not reduen ihn mnrgin of safety as unfined in the basis for any technical specification, it will not incronsn the probability of occurrence or the consequencns of any previously-ovalunted accident or a malfunction of equipment -

important to safety and it- will not. crnate the possibility for nu necidnnt or n trilfunciinn of equipment important to snfety of a different type.

M9206161/SNLICFhR - 57

Attnchment to CNRO-92/00019 SRASN: NFE-91-055 000 Nth rN-91-140 DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE: Precont filters are used in thn 11rp!id radionctive wantn (radwnste) systems at GGNS for t he t u cat ment of i equipment and f loor drain wast es. Ihn spent filter nid materInl l dischntged from this equipment const it ut en n strAoln frnetion of the low level radioact ivn wast es which must he packaged and shipped to a low level waste disponni site. The modiflentlona modo to piping and instrumentation provido for the addit ion of st andby body feed pump (NSG17C011C) wit h suct inn f rom the solid radionctivn waste holding tank (NSG18A001C).

~EASON FOR CilANGE: The modifientions made are intended to improvn the performance of the oxisting liquid rndwnsto filtration 1 s ubsy s t.nm . The addit ion of st andby body feed pump (NSG17C0110) i with suct.fon from the solid rndionctivn waste holding tank (NSG18A0010) will allow injection of new filt er nid mat erini ir a  ;

the floor drain or equipment filter influent stronms through 1 injectors NSG17D016B nnd NSU17D036A. rnspectively. This modificat ion will enhnnce the performnnen of t hn liquid radwnste filtrat ion subsystems by maintaining unint errupt ed syst em operntfoti in thn ovent of fnilure or maint ennoce of olthor of thn nxisting body feed pumps (NSG17 Colla nnd NSG17C0llP) or thnir nasocinted subsystem. The nddition of thn standby body feed pump will n1so allow injection of the spent filter nid material discharge from thn equipment drain filter into thn floor denin  ;

filtar i.nfluent st ronm t hrough injector NSG17D036B. This modification will enhanre the pntformance of the liquid indwnsto filtrat. ion subsystem by maint aining t he porosit y of t hn suspended solids contaminnnt layer deposited during thn floor drain flitration cycin with spent filtor nid mnterial discharged from thn equipaent drain filter. Consistent with Entergy sustnining priorities and federal guidelines, this efficient utilizat.lon of npent filter aid materin t discharged from thn liquid radwnste ,

equipment-drain filter will result in nn overall rodnetion in low level radianctivn waste generation rates. -

SAFETY EVALUATION: Updated Finni Safety Annlysis Report (UFSAR) s n r. on 3.2 classifies the indwnnte syst ems (system denignators G17 and G18) and all thnir components ns "Other" meaning that loss of syst em function would not af fect sa fe shutdown of tbn pinnt .

Fet UFSAR Tale 3.2-1, the rndwnst e syst ems a re coasidered Non-Q.

Non-Sn fet y Related. Non-Scismic. and NRC Quality Group D. Thn modi f.itat ions mndo by this CN t o piping and instrumentation will not change thnsn crit eri . for the l quid and solid rodwnste i systems. Fu rt hna more, the postulated worst casn (nilures (rndwnstn tank rupture and piping lenks) annlyzed in (IFCAR sections 15.7.2 (relense to at mosphere) and - 15.7.3 t rolense to ground water) envelope thn occurrence and consequences of postulat ed accidents dun to any failure nanociat ed wit h the mod I f icnt ions of t his CN.

119206161/SNhlCFLR - 58

i At inchment to GNRO-92/00019 i SRASN: NpE-91+056 DCP NO: NPEFSAR91-0041 l

l UFSAR Tabin 3.9-28 Note (2)h, which DESCRIPTION OF CllANGE:

addressed the applienbility o ASME Codo Cann N 242 to the Unit 2 ADS nir receivers, is being detet ed to reflect thn concellntion of Unit 2.

REASON FOR CilANGE: In December of 1979, construct 100 of Ornnd Gulf Unit 2 wns deferred in order to concentrato resources on thn compintion of Unit 1. Af ter Unit. I had received its Commercial Operating Licenan, Entergy Operationn. lac. formally requested the NRC to rnvoke the Construction Permit and officially ennent the reccond unit at the Grnnd Gulf Nuclear Station. Dun to canc.nllation of Unit 2 Notn (2)b in UFSAR Tabla 3.9-28 no longer l npplins. 1 SAFETY EVALUATlo.'h Thn change to the UFSAR deleton the reference to ASME Codo Cnse N-242 which wrin applicable to the purchnse of j thn Unit 2 ADS Air Receivors. Now that Unit 2 has been ennceled, L

t here is no necessity for UFSAR Tnbin 3.9-28 to montain this referenen. The reference to the cmin case did not nrply to thn Unit 1 ADS nir receivers. furthermore, thn Unit 1 ADS nir '

recnivers are to bn replaced in necordancn with Specificat ion SERI-H-908.0. ASHE Code Case N-242 has been annulled and is not applienble to Specification SERI-H-908.0. The change to the UFSAR ,

is a sof tware chanan only in thnt it does not modHy Unit 1 equipment.

Thn dnletion of the noto pertaining to ASME Code Case N-242 in UFSAR Table 3.9-28 will not require a change to thn GGNS Technient Specificnt.fons nor will it create an unroviewod safety question.

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Att nchment. t o GNRO-92/00019 l

SRASN: NPE-91-057 DOC NO: NprFSAR91-0042 DESCRIPTION OF CllANGE: UFSAR Sections 3.11.4.5, 3C.3.4, 9.4.5.2.3 and 9.4.5.5.2 describe _ the configurat ion of the Unit 1 and 2 components in the A nnd B Standby Service Wator Pumphouses. Now  :

that. Unit 2 has been ennenled, the reference to Unit 2 is no ,

-longer appropriate, therefore the descriptions arn being revised accordingly.

REASON FOR CilANGE: In December of 1979, construction of Grand Gulf Unit 2 was deferred in order to concentrate resources on the completion of Unit 1. After Unit I had received its Commercini Operating License. Entergy Operations, Inc. formally requested the .

NRC to revokn t.hc Construction Permit and officially concol the second unit at thn Grand Gulf Nucinar Station. Due to cancellation of Unit 2 the descr.iption of components located in l the Standby Servico Water Pumphouses is being revised. The Unit 2 components not in use by Unit 1 (i.e., Unit 2 SSW Pumps, Unit 2 IlPCS service watnr Pump, the Unit 2 SSW Cooling Tower Fans, and .

-the B Unit 2 SSW Pumphouso-vent fan in SSW Pumphouse B) nrn categorized as ahnndoned in pince, if thny are actually installed.

In _of fnct. t.hn ohnudoned In pinen component.s are treated an a part of the SSW Basin /Pumphouse structure rather than active companents, thoroforn their stntun is not required to be addressed 1n thi(D'SAR.

SAFETY EVAh0AT10N: The change to thn UFSAR reflects the configurnt.Jon of the Standby Sntvice Wator Pumphouses for Unit 1 operation _ alone rather than for two unit operation. The change to the UFSAR is a software changn only in th6t. It does not modify Unit 1 equipment. The use of some of thn Unit 2 equipment for support of Unit. I was previously addressed by other Safety Evalunt.fons and UFSAR Chango Not. ices.

The revision of tho doncription of the Standby Servico Water Pumphouses configuration will not require a chango to the GGNS

-Tochnien) Speciffentions nor will it. create an unrnviewed safety questfon.

t

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SRASN: Ni'E 0 5 8 DOC NO: NPEFSAR91-0044 IV. SCRIPT 10N OF CilANGE- The UFS AR is bning chnngert t o eliminat e t he discusslon of two unit operation na it pertnins to t he Tuihine Building Vent ilation System's pressut e cont rol system eine to t he fact that Unit 2 has been ennreled.

REASON 10R CllANGE. In December of 1979, const ruction of Grnnd Gulf Unit 2 was deferred in nt der to concent rnt e resources on the complet ion of Unit 1. Af ter Unit I had received Its Commercini Operating bicense. Entergy Operntions, Inc. formally requested the NRC to return the Const ruct f on Permit and of ficinlly enncel thn second unit at the Gratul Gu l f Nuc len t Station. Now that Unit 2 has been enncolo.1, t he discussion of two unit ope r n t. .l on is not ~

applienble except t o the extent to explain why the Unit 1 Turbine Building Ventilation System psessure control syst em has n Unit. 1/

Unit 2 selector swit ch in t he cont rol room.

SAFETY EVAL.UATION: The changn to thn UFSAR reflects single unit opernt. ion of t he pinnt ns it portnins to the Turbine Building Ventilation System's pressure control system rather than for two unit operntlon. The chnnge to the UFSAR does not modify Unit I nquipment. The Turbine BuiIding Vent ilat.lon Syst om's pressure control system is current ly administ r atively maint nined in the UNIT 1 mode of operntlon, thotofore no equipment or proi.ednini changn will be required as a result of t his UFSAR chnnge.

The rev!sion will not require a change to the GGNS Technfrni Specifications nor will it create nn unreviewed safety question.

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-Attnchment to GNRO-92/00019 I SNASN: NPE-91-059 DOC NO: CR-NPE-91-0048 DESCHIPTION OF CllANGE: This change oliminntes thn position of Hannger, Nuclear Des #gn from the Nuclent Plant Engineering organizat ion and eliminat es a sepnt atn Administrat ivo Support Group.

REAFON FOR CllANGE: This channn is being mndo to increnso the offIctency and of fcctiveness of the Nucionr Plant Engineering organization by climinnting an unnecessnry levnt of manngement and a redundant organinntional group.

SAFETY EVAL.UATION: The changn is adminisirntIvo in nnture and has no.ndynrso affects on the funct tonliig of the design enginenting orgnnization as the functions and responsibilities provinusly performed by the finnnger, Nacionr Design will bn performed by t he three Principal Engineers for thnir respect ivo disciplines. This change will improve offectiveness by allowing ench of the disciplino Principal Enginners greater control over the functioning of their respective discipllno as well an providing increased officiency by eliminntinn one levn1 of required approva1 for documents and actions ennbling t he design engineering organization to better provido technical support to the operating organizntlon.

Thorn will be no nfitet on thn functioning of the design i engineer.ing organiznt ion from the n11minnt.lon of the Administrativo Support Group ns all necessne y funct lons nro hning absorbed by other gronps with some redundant functions being climinated. All functions of this group were administrativo in naturn and has no direct bearing on the safe funct ioning of GGNS.

119206161/SNI,ICFlR - 62

Attnchment to GNko-42/00019 SRASN: N I'F n 60 lloC NO: N PITS AR91 - 004 5 IW.SCR1 PT ION OF Cil ANGF,- Revision of the riest i i pt lon . In UFSAK Section 10.4.5.3 runreining the <hlorinntion of the Clirulating Wnter Systetn nnd the pot ont in ) of (' vling itom the Cit r ulot ing Wate System to refler t r anro l la t I, *. if t't. i t ?.

RI.ASON l'OR Cll ANGr. In December of 1979, r onst i or t ion of Gt nnd Gul f Unit 2 was deferred in order t.o conr.entrate ree;outres on the completlon of Unit 1. Af(et l' nit I hn<l :creived its Commoirini Opeinting 1,icense, f.nteigy Opetntlons, Inc. foimally sequested the NRC to tevoke the Construction Petmit ntnl offir.intly enntel the seceivl unit at t he Gintut Gul f Nuclear St at ion. Now that Unit 2 has been enneeled, the discuss ion of t wo unit opei nt lon is not appllenble.

SAITTY 1 VAhUATION: Changes nie be ing innde to UI'S A R Section 10.4.5.2 lu t he d iscuss 10n of chlot innt lon of the Cit culat ing Wat er Syst em. 'i h n exist inn woidlng incinlos the Un i t 2 Circulnt ing Wat er Synt em which is no longer approprinte due .

to the ennco'i la t ion o f Un i t 2.  :

9 Changes are being made to ult AR Sect ion 10.4.5.2 in the dist.ussion o f f lood ing pot etit in l from the Circulating Water System. The exinting wotding includes the Unit 2 Ci culot ing Wat er Syst em navi the Unit 2 Turbine Iniil,litig.

The iticlusion of t he Unit 2 Circulating Water System nn nn nthll t ionn i souten of floodinr. for linit 1 is no longer approprinto sincn the system doesn't presently exist otul Unit 2 hns been conceled.

The Unit 2 Turbinn luillding ntnl the security walls botueen it niui -

t hre Unit 1 Turbine Building nre nt111 npplicable since the security wall would net to retnin the wnter l os t, fiom the Unit 1 Circulnting Wnter System and the Unit 2 Turbine linilding would bn f looded i f t he ser.ur i t y wn l l was to be temoverl or if it iniled.

The tovision does not modify any plant orpi i pm e n t or changn the mode of opernt ion of nny nn f et y reint ed erpiipment niel t here fore will not r ecpi i r e a rhnnge to thn GGNS technical specifications nor will it crente an unreviewed snfety questfon.

M9206161/SNI,1CI'I.R - 63

Attachmont to GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: NPE-91-061 DOC No: DCP-88-0016-800-R00 DESCRIPTION-Or CllANGE: Replace nittight door at clovnlion 166' of the Turbine liu11 ding / Auxiliary linilding interface wall.

REASON FOR CllANGE: To incronse relinhility nnd to reduce the frequency of repair act tvtt f em which adversely nf feet plant opnrat/ons.

SAFETY EVAL.UATION: The new door was count ructed in a manner which meets Uh inhni const ruct(on for 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> hnrrinrn nn required by thn UFSAR. The dnsign meets or excends all npplienhin structural, nittight, and fire protection requirements. The door hon heen designed to withstand dj f f erent int prensures and noinmic londs in _

accordance with the UPSAR nnd Civil Design Critnrin. The new door will perform its function an nn nittight secondary enntninmnnt barrier in accordanen wit h technical specif tention requirements.

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Attnehment to GNRO-92/00019 SRASNt NpE-91-062 DOC NO: DCp-88-0058-800-R00 I

DESCRIPTION OF CilAN00: The nintm setpoint for the drywell equipment drain mump temperature was increamed f rom 120 to 130 degtnes Fahrenheit.

REASON FOR CllANCE: The nnuunciator was not at. the same setpoint j na t hn pump recirculation init int lon. Onn of the two snap pumps starts at the 120 degree setpoint to recirculnte the sump water through a heat exchanger to reduce the sump water temperature to n ynlun no great er than 120 degreen. The identical temperature-setpoints for the nintm nnd the sump pump racirculnt f on initint ion caused the alarm to annunclnto a normal operating condition in addition to annunciating a sump tempornture condition requiring.

operntor netfor.

SAFETY EVALUATION: .Thn setpoint chnngn for thn high sump tempornture alarm eliminates a nuisanco nlarm and establis N s n l meaningful . function for the nintm. The alarm has no active l control function. The ninrm is not. Intended to he umed for lenk i d e t.ec t ion . .Thn alarm provides informat. ion indicating potentini failure or degradat lon of the sump temperaturn control equipment. i The alarm function in not. nddressed by thn technical specifications.

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Attachment to GNRO 92/00019 SRASN - NPE-91-063 110C NO: DCP-88-052-801-R00 i l

DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE The access corit rol nren and adjacent portions of the control building at clovation 93' worn renovated.

The work results in t he conveision of locker room spnen to offices and opens thn necesa control aren to provide for batter visual 4 control by llenlth Physics pernonnel.

REASON FOR CifANGE: To provido a more usable work npace.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Firn boundaries nre not modified by the design. Floor drain modifications will not affect the abilit y of the system to remove flow from possibin pipe breaks at highnt elevations of the building as described in the (1FSAR. -No nssentint equipment exists iri the nf fectnd aron sind no 11/1 bar.ard has been created with respect to safety reinted condult. The annlysis of snfn shutdown in the event of a ftre is not ndvntsely ,

' affected by this change. No parameters nddressed by thn technical '

specifientions are affected by this chnnge. The room nnmn identified in Technical Specification Tnbin 3.3.7.9-1 was chnnged by Amendmnnt 68. ,

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t M9206161/SNI,ICFl.R.- 66

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Attnehment to GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: NpE-91-064 DOC NO: DCl%A6-0130-800-R00 DESCRil' TION OF CilANGE' A Zonn Statun Display (ZSD) wan installed in the Central Alarm Station (CAS) and the Secondary Alarm Stat.lon (SAS). Tlin Zonn Status Dispinyn are composed of low level light ing driven by surf ace mount ed comput er components.

REASON FOR CilANGE: To enhanen zone polnt monitoring.

SAFETY EVAL.t!ATION: Thn security and fire protection system computer is not safety rotated and has no direct int erfaco with safety related systems. The 11/1 seismic hn: ords havn heen reviewed nnd no new hnznrds orn crented. Hatorints .ind construct son standards npp1(cabin to tha system worn adhered to. ._

Requirement s for sepa rat ion crit erin , Appendix R, and soinmic supports were adhered to. The ZSDS are pannivn devices and will not affect the computorn nhility to provide warning to t he control room.

M9206161/SNI.iCFl.R 67

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Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: NPE 065 DOG NO: DCP 0144 - 500- R00 DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE: rxisting instrumentation ul11 be used to monitor the ambient t emperat ure of one of the Retrtor Prot ect ion System (RPS) Motor Generator (MG) set rooms. An annuncint or is added by this change to alarm in the control room when the amhtent  ;

temperature of t he room increases above the netpoint.  !

REASON FOR CilANGE: liigh temperat ure in the NPS MG set rooms hnd been identified ns a problem. The Elect rical Protect ion Assembly (EPA) brenkers are sensit Ive to nmblent tempointure above approximately 100 degrecs Fnhrenheit causing t hem to t rip operi.

The high t empnrature conditions occur during any 10,9 of cooling j in the room. Thn cooling for both RPS MG set rooms is provided by I onn fan coil unit, thornforn only one room will be monitored.

This 'chnnge will provide the control room operators with indient.f on of potential t.emperature problems and allow them to take the necessary act Jon to cool the rooms before the EPA brenkers trip open.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The addition of the annunciator does not i change any intended design function for any components, systems, 1 or s t.ructures. No new interface is created which would af fect component s , equipment , or systems which per form sa fet y funct ions.

The=nnnuncintor is not usnd for nny . technical specificntinn basis and Js not essential in monitoring compliance with any technten) specification.

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-M9206161/SNLICFLR - AP

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Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: NPE-91-066 DOC NO: CPR88-0051R00 DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE: The class IE uninterrnptible power supply (llPS) system 19 separated into four divisions with one inverter nasigned to enca division. UPS divisions 1 ntul 3 n t e power ed by ESP division I and UPS divisions 2 and 4 nie powered by ESF division 2. This change replaces the exist ing four class 10 ,

invnrters with four new c bss 1E inverters and four new alternate j sources (voltngo regulating transformer), each with a stntic transfer switch and n aninteunnee hypnss switch pnr UPS division.  !

REASON FOR CilANGE: This changn reduces the pot ent ini for scrnms  !

due to loss of inverters. St atn of t he art. . inverters wit h a synch circuit will allow maintenance without deenergizing lands, thus improving inverter reliability.

SAFETY FNAh0AT10N: This denign is repIncing the existing class 1E ,

UPS system with a new class in UPS system. This replacement will incrensn_the rolinbility of the c1nsa lE UIS system by providing a ntatic transfer switch and an niteruntn source which the UPS loads will transfer it if its inverter develops trouble. Also thn new system will provide n means for performing prnvent.ntIve maintenance on the system, without interruption of power to it s lands. Thn new class 1E invetters and clnss IE n1ternatn sources nie both snismically qualified per IEEE 344-1975. They are also qualified to operntn within the envirenment that they will be exposed to, per IEEE 323-1974. Thn function of the class 1E UPS system is to providn 120VAC pownr to control and instrumentation circuits. Thesn control and instrumentatfon circuits that receive pownr from thn clasr in UPS system will not be modified by this design.

Proper isointion will be mnintained por Pag. Guida 1.75.

The enbles to bn routed for this DCP will mnet Reg. Guide 1.75 separation criterin.

This change will not add any addit.lonni loads to the UPS distribution-panol. This dnsign will not add any addit ionni -londs to the existing ESF hattery lond profiles found in thn GGNS unit one technical specifications.

H9206161/SNLICFLR - 69

Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 i

a SRASN: NPE-91-067 DOC NO: DCI'-82-0371-S00-E00 DESCRIPTION or CilANGE: This design change to the security system Installed a pownr switch for each wupervise>l lino honrd to ,

climinate the need to turn of f power to a full multJplexer cr.rd tack when replacing a supervised lina board that han inited.

i REASON FOR CllANGE: In the pant when the power was turned off, npproximately 80 diffetent ninrm monitoring point s wes e mnde inopernble. With thin change the toimber of inop monitoring points in reduced to 8 SAFF.TY EVAL.lfATION: This chriage provides nu enhnocement to pinnt ,

nacurity system design. Addition of the power switch for each supervised line board lessons the number of poirts without nInrm monitoring for any given in fled honrd repIncoment. Accident avnluntions included in the PSAR do not consider plant accurity systems na part of t he evaluntions. The plant security system is not safety reinted and this change does not nf f ect nuy snfety reinted equipment evnlunt ed in t he PSAR. The mntgin of safety is not reduced.

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Attnehment. to GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: NPE-91-0al por NO: GGNS-M-183.3-R00 DI:SCRIPTION OF CilANGE: Spec i f icat . ion GGNS-M- 183. 3 was wr i t t en t o previde the crit.orin for the chemical clenning and decontamination of port ions of t he Recirculation Syst em (ib33), thn Renctor Water Cleanup Systems (G-33 and G-36) and the Fuel Pool Cooling nnd Glennup System (G-41). This safety evnluntion provides the basis for relense of this spncificntion for bid but does not'providn a complete basis for the chemient cienning. After selection of vendor nrd ident ification of vendor procndures nnd equipment , this

$0.59 must be augmented by ndding required information covnring items which cnnnot. bn addressed unt.11 vendor informat ton is known.

Exampics of r.uch items nrn material review for compat Ibility with the cleaning chemicals nwl heavy load annlysis. They ennnot be _

completed unt il thn chemienin to bn used and t hn weight of the vendor equipment are known.

Thosn portions of thn Recirculation System. Rnactor Water Clennep System and Fuel Pool Cooling and Cinanup System to be cicaned and decontaminated ate specified in Specificntion CGNS-M-183.3.

REASON FOR CilANGE: Chemical cinnning and decontaminnt ica of these systems arn needed to reducn thn rndintton oscposurn of pnruonnel wor 1 ring in thn vicinity of these systems.

SAFETY EVAh0AT10N: The scope of this safety evnlunt too is limited to Specification GGNS-N-183.1 which specifies thn crit orin which must be met by the vendor, in order to prevent any negntive impact on thn design basis and thn funct ional cnpobilit ies of the systems to be decontaminated, the vendor is required by this speciftention to demonstrate that thn chemicals to be used and the procndures to bn followed will not result in unneceptable -

degradat ion (n.g. , excessivo pipe wall t hinning) of thn affected -

systems. Other relat ed issues which must bn addressed bnfore ch M eal clnnning can proceed, but which are outside thn scope of this specification are:

• Rndiological and chemical spills e llenvy lond annlysis

• Disposal of liquid and solid wnsens

• I,ond path analysis for prot ect ion of Engincored Rnf ety items

• These t olnted issues will bn nddressed eithnr in n Intnr revision of this snfety evalunt ion or in a separate sa fety evalunt f on.

M9206161/SNLICFLR - 71 tum

Atinchment t o GNKO 'l?/0001')

NI'I' 'l l - n 81 l'n g e 2 Bancel c.n thn ci it erin included in Specificatfon GGNS-H-lR1.3, 9ny c' ,ning nnel decontaminntion process meet itig suc h cr it or ia on<l selectad for implementntton at Grnn:t Gnif will hnve no impact on tto des igti bases, f unct inna1 enpnbi1i t low , and i eqnIi ed closinn innrgins of t he Recircuint ion Syst om. React or Wat er Glennup Syst om, and l'oel Pool Cooling and Glennup System. Therefoto, it is cenclnded thnt this specifiention does not increase thr prohnbility or the co n s e<pt o n c.e s of any nccident evolutood in t he SAR. does not trente the possibilit y of a new accident or enifunctinn, and does not reduce nny margin of safety defined in any t echnien t spec t f f rat lens. _

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Attnchment to GNRO-9//00019 SRASN: NpE-91-082 1100 NO EER-91-6310 DESCR1pT10N OF Cl!ANCE: This evnluntion will assess the impact to 9 nicty of Renct or Wa tes Cleanup (RWCU) operat ion wit h vnive Q1G33r406A closed duricg all modes of operatlon. Valve T406A is current ly closed only during low power operat ion. The change in valve pos it ion will cr Ante a cimnge in the normal RWCU injection flow path. kWCU return flow through the "A" foedwatnt line will he inointed wIth F406A closed.

REASON FOR CilANGE: HNCR 0714-89 ident if ied a problem wit h reverse flow through valve QlB21r06sA being stuck in the closed position.

A root enuse evaluation determined that the condition was due to hent ing of the valve L tem by high t nmperature RWCU return flow which is injacted n short dist ance downst ream of F065A. The HNCR dispositlon proponnd severn1 notions to prevent recurrence of the problem, including isointton of tbe RWCP eturn 1ine when F065A is closed and RWCU temperaturt signi f icnnt ly excoad,. f eedwa t er ljne inmperature.

SAFETY EVAh0AT10N: Pinot operation with vnive F406A cloud in n11 modes represents a new valve lineup for normal power operation, j The new lineup will result in RWCU flow ret urning to the vessel ,

through thn "11" feedwnter line only. Therefore nnnlyses hnve been performed ta ensure the new operating condition will have no .

adverse impact. on plant operat lon. Cniculntinn HC+QlG33-91116, Rev. O hn* cynlunted the effect of the new valve lineup on RWCU system flow rate. The reduction in RWCU flow was shown to be ne,!igible.

r aniculat lon HC-Q1033-90116, Rev. O has evnlunt ed t he ,~

effect of the new valvo lineup on pipe stress levels. This cniculation s'iows that st resses will remain within t he ASME Section 111 code allownbles.

The change in volve linenp f or RWCll will hnvo no imp tet on Technical Specifications 3/4.3.2, 3/4.6.4, or any M'.or t echnical spectficatlon. Thn T/S Bnses are niso unaffoctw 8 The change '

will not alter the function of the RWCU s>atem or its nhility to perform i ts snfety funct. ion of maintnining the -integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. No acw system interfaces or accident precurnors nre create.1 by the change.

The chango will n o t. Impact the limiting conditions for operatiori ot surveillance requirement s of any techninnt spec 3 ficot.lon nnd will not r edir.e _

any me gins of safety. Therefore, this change will not require any ch . ige to the technical specification nor will it crente nn unroviewed sa f ety qiicst Ion.

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M9206161/SNh1Crl.R 73

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Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: NI'fM 1- 08 3 1100 NO: CR - N I'd 040 I)ESCRIPTION OF CilANGC- The following changes to the UrSAR are mndo by this changn request:

1. Reviso Subi.ections 3.8.1.6.4.n and 3.8.3.6.4.n to delete ASME subsoction NF requirement s for RPV nnchor bolts for Unit 2.

2. ' Revise Subse :t ion 3.8.4.4.5 *.o dnlete t hn ref erence t o ongoing Unit 2 construction activitlos.

3. Dalate the Unit 2 specific informat ton on f act ors of snfety ngninst sliding, overturning and buoyanc, from Teblo 1.8-1.

REASON FOR CilANGE:

, 1. AstlE subsection Nr requirements for RPV anchor bolts are only applicnbin to Unit 2. Sincn Unit 2 hns been ennuelled, theso l requirements should be deleted. 1 1

2. Sinco Unit 2 has been cancelled, discussion of ongoing Unit 2

construction netivities is no longer approprinte. Therefore, this paragraph (s revised to remove th6 referenco to ongoing Unit 2 construction. 1

3. The factors of safety for thn Unir 2 Auxiliary building ngninst sliding, overturning and buoynticy should be dnleted from Table 3.8-1 for the following reasons:

n. Unit 2 has boon cancelled.

b. d'milar fnetors of safety fer other Unit i buildings arn not provided in thn current. revision of this UFSAR tabin.

SAFETY ": VALUATION: The abovo changes havn no safety impet on Unit 1 for the following reasons:

1. ASME subsection NP requirements arn not applicabin t o l'a i t 1.

The delot ion of these requi rement s af fects only- Unit 2 which has been cancelled.

2. The revision to Subsection 3.8.4.4.5 deletes the reference to ongoing Unit 2 const ruct ion act (vitins. Although-n select number of penet rations mn> be left open for cabin pulling operations. they nro neceptable becnonn the tornndo dept nssuriantion efincts resultIng f rom such open penetrations havn been nonlyzed and thn results were used fa the design of internal walls in the Control Building.

- H9206161/SNLICrlR - 74

At tachment to GNRO-92/00019 NIT-91-083 Page 2

3. The change to inble 3.8-1 dnleton t he inctors of safety for the 11 nit 2 Auxiliary Building ngtin%L aliding. overturning, and buoyancy. No change in the values of these factors of snicty will result from this UFSAR chnnge request. Dolotion of thenn dnta f rom Table 3.8-1 la justifind on thn basis of Unit 2's canenllation and the fact that similar datn have not been included in the current revision of this tabic for other Unit 2 buildings. Thorn will be no nnfety impact on Unit 1.

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M9206161/SNLICFLR - 75 I

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Attachment. to GNRO-92/00019 SRASih NPE-91-084 DOC NO: CR-NPE-91-039 F

DESCRIPTION OF CIIANGE: This change is n UFSAR change which indientes Unit 2 has been concelled and that updates the ,

discurision of turbinn missiles to reflect ann turbinn instend of ,

two.

REASON FOR CilANGE: The reason for the changn is to mnkn the UFSAR discussion reflect the cancellnt ion of Unit 2.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The current plant construct ion and oporating condition (ono plant turbine) was evalented and the results reported in thn refnrence. The results indicatn that t.hn UFSAR discussions on turbine missiles must bn undnted in Ifght of the ennenllation of Unit 2. The plant turbines are nnn-safety grade  ;

and serve no snfety functfon. The proposed changn indicates the probability of a damnging missiln is by the deletion of the second -

plant turbine. This changn does not increase the consnquences of an accident already evaluated in the UFSAR. The plant turbines are not. rolled upon to mitigate thn effects of postuinted accidents. The overspeed devicen are ralled upon to funct ion to .

prevent turbine damngo, but thnit functioning is not a f fect ed by i this changn. Thereforo, the change does not increase thn probability of an equipment malfunction at consnquences of equipment. malfunction for equipment important to s8fety. The change does not creatn the possibility of an accident. or an equipment. malfunction different.from those n1 ready cynlunted in tho.UFSAR. Tho margin of safety discussed in the SAR is not rnduced by deletion of the second turhine, A

M9206161/SNh1CFI.R - 76

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Attachment to GNRO 92/00019 SRAfN: NPE-91-085 DOC NO: CR-NPE-91-038 l 1

DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE: UFSAR Subsection 3.1.2.1.5 is revised by -!

this UFSAR change request 'o reflect the cancellation of Unit 2. l This subacction contains n discnnsion of General Design l Criterion 5 - Shnring of Structures, Systems, and Componente. l Since tinit 2 has bocn enncelled, thin criterion is not applicabin.

The proposed UFSAR chango repinces the entire discussion on General Design Criterion 5 with the following: " Unit 2 has bocn

-concolind. Therefore, thin critorion J$ not app)lenble."

REASON FOR CilANGE: Unit 2 construction has been terminated and  !

Unit 2 concalled.

SAFETY EVA!.UATION: Thie change han no snfnty-impact bnconsn it only revisen= Subsection 3.1.2.1.5 of thn UFSAR to reflect that' General Design Criterion 5 is not applienbin to GGNS following thn cance.lation of Unit 2. Thereforn, it does not incronnn the probnbility or the consequences _of any accident evalunted in the SAR, does not crnate thn possibility of n new nccident or malfunction, and dans not reduen any-margin of-safety defined in any technien) specification.

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Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 I

i SLASN: NPF-91-086 DOC NO: CR-NI'E-91-036 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE: This change is a UFSAR change only which dolotes reference to "ef thor unit" since Unit 2 lins been canen11ed.

REASON FOR CHANGE: The reason for the change is la delete referencn to canen11cd Unit 2.

SAFETY EVALUATION: A-review was conducted of the cniculations which den 1 wit.h atmospheric disporsion factors used for the evaluation of the offects on cont rol room occupants resulting from accidental releases of radionctivity. The review found that the accidnnt analyses use atmosphoric dispersion factors which reflect tho current statn cf plant construction (partially completed .

Unit 2) or remain conservativo in light of t he enncollation of Unit 2. Thnreforo, the proposed chango does not increnso the probability of n accident nor-Increase thn consequences of nn I accident alrondy evaluated in the UFSAR. Thn chn4mn does not involve the functioning of pinnt equipment in any way. Thereforo, the chango doca not incronse the probability of an accident nor incrensn the consequences of an accident alrondy evnlunted in the -

UFSAR. Thn changn does not. ii.'olyn thn functioning of pinnt equipment in.nny way. Thereforo, the changn does not increase thn probability of an equipment malfunction or consequnnces of equipment malfunction for equipmeat important. to sa fet y. The chnngo does not create thn _possibilit y of an accident or nu equipment malfunction dif ferent from those already evalunted in the UFSAR. The margin of safety is not reduced.

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l-M9206161/SNLICFLR - 78 l

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Attachment to ONRO-92/00019 SRASN: NPE-91-087 DOC NO: C K - NIT. 0 35 DESCRIPTION OF CllANGE: This change is n UFSAR change only which indicates Unit 2 has been enucelled and that the cooling tower plume discussion for two townrs is still conservative for one tower.

REASGN TOR CilANGE: The reason for t he chnnge is to make the UTSAR discussion rnflect the cancellnt f on of Unit 2.

SAFETY EVAhUATION: The current plant constructJon and opernting condition (onn operating cooling townr) was evalunted and the ,

results reported in the reference. The results indicate tin ' the I

'UFSAR-discussions on cooling tower plumn length and other j motnorologien) varinbles remain conservativo in ligitt of the l cancellat.Jon of Unit, 2. In addition, the natural drnf t cooling towers are non-safety-grndo and serve no unfoty function.

Thereforn, the proposed changn does not arrect the probability of an accident nor _incrnese the consequences of an accident nirondy evalunted in the UrSAR. The cooling towers arn not relind upon to mitigate the offects of postulated accidents. Therefoen, the chnngn does not incrone.n the prohnbility of an equipment ,

malfunction or consequences of equipment malfunct ion for equipment ,

important to safety. The change does not create the possibility

_f an accident. or an equipment mal function different f rom thoso altendy-evaluated in thn UFSAR. Thn margin of.cafety is not induced, s

M9206161/SNh1CFhR -79

Attavhment to GNRD 92/00019 SRASN: N i'E 0 8 8 DOC NO: C R - N IT. 0 31 DESCRIPTION or GilANGE: USAR Tnble 9.5-10, which cutrently r,pecifies that both the engine driven lubo oil purnp nnd t he nuxi1inry 1ubo oil pump must be oper at f onn1 in order for n Stnrutby I)iesel Genorntot to bc ( ons ide red OPERAltl.E , is ha8ng revised to indicate that the noxiliary tube oil pump is not required to be ope r a t i otoil in order for n Statulby Diosol Gnn 'rator to be considermi OPERARI.E REASON FOR CilANGE: The auxiliary tube oil pump is a redundant full capacity backup for ihn enginn driven lobe oil pump and in not required t o bn operaticoal for the St andby liinsol G.*nornt or to ho OPERAB1,r SAFETY EVAL,UATION: Thn chango being mndo to Table 9.5-10 by PSAR Changn Roquent NPEFSAR91/0031 in no way changes or alt on s the design or nny of the opornt ing pnrnmet ers nssociated wit h the Standby Diesel Generator Lubn Oil System, thotofore thn probability of occurronce or the consequoncos of an accident previously ovnlunted in tho SAR nrn not incronsnd. Revising Tabin 9,5-10 to rnflect that the auxilinry lubo oil pumps nre not required to be operational in order for thn Standby Diesel Generntors to be considered OPERABI.E in no way af fect s the nynilability or capability of thn Standby Diosci Generators to pntform t heir saf ety funct ion, therefore the change in no way increnses the probability of oce.urrence or thn consequences of a malfunction of equipment i m po r t.a n t to nnfoty previonnly evalunted in thn SAR. No new fnllurn modes ato being crnated, the onsito electrical sourens can still sustain a singin failurn and perform t heir sn fot y funct inn, The change being mndo to Table 9.S-10 w111 not require a change to the GGNS Unit 1 Tnthnical Spncificntions or reduce the margin of safety nn dnfined .in the basis for nny -

technical specification.

d M9706161/SNI,1Crl,R - 80

l At t achment to GNRO-92/00019 i

SRASN NPE-91-089 DCp NO: CR-NPE-41-030 DESCRIPTION OF GilANCE: TSAR Tnble 4.5-8, which currently '

specifies that both thn engine drive jacket. water pump and the auxilinry jncknt water pump must be operational in order for n Standby Dienel Generntor to be considen ed OPERABI.E, 19 being revised t.o indicate that the auxiliary Jacknt water pump in not  !

requirnd to be operntionni in ordnr for n Standby Dinsol Generator to be considered OPERAllt.E.

REASON FOR CilANGE: Thn nuxiliary jncliet water pump, which in redundant full capacity backup for t he engiao driven incket water -

pump, is not required to be operational for the Stnin ay Diesni Generator to be OPERABl.E.

SAFETY EVAIAIATION: Thn change being made to UFSAR Tnble 9.5-8 in no way changes or altnrs thn design or any of the operat ing parameters associated with thn Standby Diesel Generator Jncket Watnr System, therefore thn prohnbility of occurrence or thn consequences of nn accidnnt previously evnlunted in thn SAR nrn not inernased. Rnvising Tabin 9.5-8 to reflect that the nuxl.liary Jacket. water pumps are not. reoutred to be.opernt.lonni in ordnr for the Standby Dinsel Generators to be considered OPERAlti,E in no way affects the nynfinbility or cnpability of the Standby Diesel Generators to perform their safet y funct in'.. thereforn the change in no wny incronsns the probability of occurrence or the consequences of a mal funct ion -of equipment importnnt ta safety previously evaluated in thn SAR. No new failure modes are being crented, thn onsite elect.rleni sources can still sustain a single failurn and perform their safet y function. The change being made to Table 9.5-8 will not require a changn to thn GGNS Unit 1 Technical Specifications or.redunn the margin of safet y as defined in the basis for any t echnical specificat lon.

119206161/SNhlCPI.R - 81

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Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 )

SRASN: NPE-91-90 DOC NO: CR-NPE-91-009 DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE: A Procurement Enginnering Group was ,

recently formed in the Nuc1 car Pinnt Engineering (N1'C) i organization. The group is under the direction of the Hannger of .

Engincaring Support. Thn group is responsii.:a for innking independent engineering neul design bonin judgements related to i procurement matters in the Nucient Plant Engineering organization nnd thoso namocinted with the pinnt.  ;

Formation of the Procurement Eneineering Group will reqalto revision of the Hinngement and fechnical Organizations Section i

13.1 of the UFSAR to ident ify the existenen of and functionn) responsibilities fnr the group.  ;

REASON FOR CllANGE: Section 13.1 of the UPSAR needs to be rnvised i to make it consistent with thn prnment organizntion configuration  !

of Nucient Plant Enginenring.

SAFETY EVALUATION The Procuremont Enginnering Group will ensurn ,

the design basin of the plent by providing n qunllt-y cost ,

offectivn, engineering basis for the procurement of materinis  !

required for thn operation of thn plant .- The addition of thn Procuremont Engineering Group into the NPE organization constitutes n purely ndministrative change only to thn UFSAR nnd

• will not havn n direct nf fect on sn6 'y or the opernt ion of the pinnt.

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M9206161/SNh1CFLR - 82' i-

Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: NPE-91-091 DOC NO: TEMP AbT 91-0019 DESCRIPTION OP CllANGE: A thermal performance test will be conducted on the Circulat ing Wat er (CW) system nnt urni draf t caoling t ower. 'the test will be cowtucted with the main turbinn, condenser, and cooling tower in service and with the plant operating at or near rnted renctor thermal power.

A pitot tubn will be inserted into the CW lines where the existing vortex shedding device is located in order to accurntoly mnnnure the CW flowrntn. Resistance Temperature Detectors (RTDs) will be pinced as noted below:

1. Tower basin at the entranen to the CW supply lines to manure -

CW cold temperaturn.

2. Tower distribution cannis to measurn CW hot temperaturo.

3. Inside the cooling tower stack at the approximate levnt of-thn throat. arca to mensure exit nir temperaturn.

Inclined manometers wlli be used to measure the Differential Pressure (DP) across the fill.

Hochanient driven psychrometers will be located at four locations around the base of the tower to rnensure the inlet air t emperature (dry bulb & wet bulb).

Thn thermal performance dat a will be used to qunntify the extent of thermal performanco degrndntlon dun to:

1. Incronsed DP neross thn fill motorini due to plugged fill passages. -

-2. Increased ternperature dif fnrential between thn CW side and the air sido of the tower indientive of fouling on thn fill motorial.

3. possible matnrial damage to nozzles or fill material which could cont ribute to fill bypass.

4. Possible reduction in CW flowrnte.

REASON FOR CHANGE: Temp Alt 91-0019 is being issund to facilitato thermal parformance testing of the' nntural dra f t cooling tower.

The thermal performanco of the cooling tower has bnen slowly but continuously degrading over thn past 18-months, except for a brinf improvement noted immediately after the fourth refuelJng outage (RF04).

M9206161/SNbidPhR - 83

Attachment. la GNRO-92/000'19 NPE-91-091 Page 2 SAFETY EVALUATION: The CW system is t ot addressed in the GGNS technical _ specifications; however, the condenser vacuum.setpoint is addressed. The thermal pnrformanen test does not alter or a f fect the condenser vacuum low setpt.ht as addressed in Technical Specification 3/4.3.2 for main steam linn isolation. The test will not otherwise af fect plant opniation as descrlhed by the technical specifications.

An increase in reactor pressure as a insult of a turbine trip is evaluated in SAR-Chapter 15. Loss of the CW system may rnsult in a turbine trip through the loss o/ condenser vacuum. The test-will use existing isolation valves to remove the vertex shedding devices and to insert a pitot t u'ie into tbn CW piping to prevent disrupting the.CW supply to the condenser. Removal of the vortex shedding devices will therefore not adversely af fect the CW supply i- to the condenser and will therefore not adversely affect condensor Vacuum.

The test described in this saf ety evaluation will maintain all controls normally depended upon to respond to changes in CW system operation, except that the CV low flow control room. signal will be nrronnons and the automatic acid food isolation based on low CW flow will bn defeated during the test. Manual closure of the acid fned injection valves and other control room indications of CW pump trip will be available and must bn rolled upon during the test.

The test will not alter or affect the operability of existing safety related equipment. In addition, a CW system analysis has '

shown that f ailure of- the CW system will not compromise any safety rnlated systm or prevent safn shutdown. The CW system is described as sqfety clasu '.'other" The dnscribed test w.ill not altnr the design, function, or operat ton of any equipment importaut. to safety as evaluated in the SAR. The CW system norvas no sa fety related function. The test

, will not compromise any safety related system or provent safe shutdown since the test will not create any new interface with equipment important to safety or prevent such equipment from operating an designed.

Turbine building flooding by a gross failure of the CW piping has j been evalunteo h the SAR. No additional modes of failure are postulated by conducting thn thermal performance test, thornfore the existing evaluations are considered bounding for the system.

The technical specifications do not contain any margins of safety for the operation or design of thn CW system. The descrlhed test does not a f fect or provent safn shutdown of the reactor vessel.

M9206161/SNLICFhR - 84

Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: NFE-91-093 I)OC NO: MNCR-0048-90 DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE- According to the UFSAR, theio will be r.o building-to-building int eract ion bet ween t he con t a i nment and the '

nuxiliary building during a seismic event beenuse a 2-inch separntton is prov ided a long n 11 bounda r les betwoon t hose st ruct ures. Consequently no seismic int eract ion between these structures hns been considered in their design or in the preparat len of seismic fin,r response spectra for those struct res, in addition, the 2- inch sepa ra t ion e l lows unencumbered difforentini set t lement between theno structures.

Water stops are insteiled across those gaps to limit the sprend of flood water in order to prevent flood damage to equipment required for achieving safe plant shutdown. _

According to this Mat erin O >

m formance Report (MNCR), .e required 2" gap has not -

ovided at all of the structural boundaries b, r the cont i.nment and the nax!!inry building.

The effects of this deviation on the st ruct ura l design and the integrity of the embedded wat er stops have been evaluated and determinnd acceptable.

\ REASON FOR CllANGE: This eva lunt inn document s the acceptability af having no gaps at 9 out of 15 locations where the auxilinry butlding wnIls extend above the contninment building foundotinn ninb.

SAFETY EVAL,UATION: The impact of t he lack of a seismic gap on the actun1 performance of t he conta inment. and noxilinry bu t ldlugs

bring normal operation as well ns during a seismic event is negl!qible and will not preven- those buildings from performing their des ign safety funct ions. It does not require any changes in -

the exist ing st ructura l and f unct ional design bas is of either one -

of these structures. The seismic design and floor response spectra for both structures are maintained and the embedded wnter stops will not. be adversely affected following a Safe Shutdown Earthqunke (SSE). Therefore, the existing conditi will not increase thn probability of occurrence o f an acc io. ..t. previously evalunt.ed in t he UFSAR nor increase the consequences of any nccident. Also, there is no increase in the pt bilit y of a mal funct ion of equipment import ant to sa fe' y prt c tously evaluated in the UFSAR. Ne i t her i t, there n reductlen in the mntgin of safety as defined in the basis for any technicai specificotlon.

M4706161/SNI.ICFI,R - 85 1

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Attachment to'GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: NPE-91-094 DOC NO: CN-91-0094 DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE: This changn removes thn design requisite on Minor' Change.Packagn-(MCP) 90/1059 for installation of a squarn root extractor'and installs square root indicator scalo to Instrument 1E22-FI-R603 in the instrument loop containing transmitter 1E22-FT-N005 and flow indicator '1E22-F1-R603.

REASON FOR CIIANGE: Re-nvaluation of tho.dnsign requisite for a linear scale on flow Indicator 1E22-FI-R603 has resulted in acquinition of additional information (Reference 7) which justifies eliminntion. Removal of this dnsign requisite permits installat. ion of a squarn root. scaln and' nliminat ion of t he nond to install square root. nxtraction instrumentation.

SAFETY EVA1.UAT10N: Removal of the design requisite to install square root extraction instrumentation to the inutrument loop containing Instruments 1E22-FT-N005 and IE22-F1-R603 wil'1 savn

. installation costs and will maintain the relatively simple it.strument loop that. present ly exists. installation of a square root scale to maintain dirnet indication of flowrate by 1E22-FI-R603 will also improve indicator readability at the upper end of the-indicator scain which includes the normal system flowrato.

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M9206161/SNLICF1.R - 86 l

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Attachment to GNROE9'2/00019 SRASN: PLS-91-001 DOC NO: W.O.-#51068 DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE: . Somn primary watnr system main generator trips woro temporarily bypassed to support maintenance

--troubleshooting activities.

REASON FOR CilANGEt To support maintenance troubleshooting of problems with the primary water' system tank Invel circuits.

-SAFETY EVALUATION: The bypassing of primary water generator trips could not-Init. fate any action.or event that would increase thn

. probability of a main generator trip. The non-safety reinted main generator is not used in mitigating the radiological consequences of an accident. The bypassing of primary water system generator trips will'only affect the performanen of thn gennrator trip system and not affect any safety systems or limits as described in the FSAR.

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M9206161/SNLICFLR - 87

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Attachment to.GNRO-92/00019._

li'_

-SRASN: ;PLS-91-002 DOC NO: -CR-PLS-9l-001 DESCRTPTION OF CllANGE: This change provides for the appointment of the Coordinator, Operations Staff Support as PSRC chattman instead of the Manager, Plant Support.

REASON FOR CliANGE: This UFSAR revision was.made to reflect the new PSRC chairman.

SAFETY EVALUATION: These changes are administrative in nature only. Technical Specification l'SRC membership requirements are-maintained. The qualifications and experience requirements for the PSRC chairman will remain unchanged. This change has no'- -

bearing-on the probability of occurrence of an accident and has no effect on plant design or operation of the plant . The margin of safoty as defjned in the bases for any technical specification has

.not been reduced.--

M9206161/SNLICFLR - 88

Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: Pl.S-91-003 DOC NO: TCN 91 to S01 1-01-E12- 1 Rev. 46 4

. DESCRIPTION OF-CilANGE: This proceduro change provides for stop check-valves 1E12F103A&B and F104A&B to be changed f rom the

" handwheel open" position to the " handwheel closed" position. The purpose of these valves is to provide vacuum relief for the Steam Condensing mode of RilR system operation and to provido cont.ainment isolation with a closed system outs.ido containment for Penetrations 48 and 77.

REASON FOR CilANGE: The "as tested" configuration for 1E12F103A&B and 1E12F104A&B per specificnLions is in the revnrso direction

~

with the handwheel in the closed position. This gives added -

confidence to the isolation capabilities of the subject valves.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The position of these valves will have no ef fect on the Shutdown Cooling mode, LPCI mode, CTMT Spray modo, or Supprossion Pool Cool!-;g modo of the RilR system. These are the only safety modes of the RilR system.

Closing of these valves will only of fect the Steam Condens ing modo of the RilR/RCIC systems which por commitments is not currently licensed to be used at Grand Gulf. By placing these valvns in the handwheel closed position on a permanent basis, they will be put in thair required position to protect primary containmant integrity. In addition to ensuring containment-isolation at Penetrations 48 and 77, added insurance will be obtained thet the closed system integrity backing up the single isolation valve for Penetration 75.w111 he maintainnd. This configuration will ensure the "as described"

, design intent for Penetration 75 is met by tested components.

Thornfore the margin of sa fety as defined in the technical specifications is not reduced.

M9206161/SNLICFLR - 89 l

Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: pl,S 004 DOC NO: W.O. #41544 DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE: Special fustructions to the subject work order (WO) include temporary removal of dnsign snismic rsstraints for the normal storage configuration of the dryer / separator strongback and the drywell head lifting framn (hnteir, reforred to as a strongback also). The twn strongbacks wf11 be moved f rom their normal storage location and placed on temporary cribbing m the concrete slab due north of the reactor cavity on El, 208'-10".

Temporary seismic restraints will be installed and a temporary tent or portable building will be crocted around both strongbacks ,

to cont.ain airborne contaminants.

REASON FOR CilANGE: This activity is necessary to accompiish -

preventive maintenance required per GGNS heavy loads commitments prior to each fifth refueling outage for all "Special Lifting Devices". The removal of existing seismic restraints and installation of temporary restraints for the durat ion of the activity represents a change to the facility as described in the UFSAR.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Thern arn no UFSAR accidents in which the .

probability of occurrence is related in any way to the soismic storagn of the subject strongbacks in any plant operational mode.

Any of the UFSAR ovaluated accidents could be seriously complicated by load drop consequences if nithnr (or both) of the affect 6' strongbacks worn postulated to fall into the upper containment pool or down the containment hatchway to the suppression pool below, lioweve r , the UFSAR does not address consequences of such load drops concurrently with any of thn UFSAR accidents because both strongbacks arn adequatnly restrained by design-during normal storagn on El 208'-10" of the containment for all applicable loading conditions in all piant operational -

modes. This temporary storagn of the subject strongbacks will be likewise restralrod adequately by use of bolting and shackling to existing seismic lugs intended for normal scismic storage of the drywell head st.rongback and the conta.inment dome access lift

( CDAI.) . Thus-the consequenens of a previously evaluated U! JAR accident is - not increased. Also, no credibin possibility of an accident of a dif ferent type than previously evaluated in created.

None of the plont equipment important to safoty is affacted by this temporary storage configuration. Since the intent of" these temporary restraints is identical to the normal restraints, the

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consequences of equipment malfunctions in thn UFSAR arn not increased. The margin of safety of all technical specifications

-is maintained because-thn. subject strongbacks will be restrained for all-applicabin loading conditions in all plant operationni modes and no technical specification.is adversely affected.

M9206161/SNLICFLR - 90

Attachment t o GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: pLS-91-005 DOC NO: Temp Alt 41-0007 DESCPIPTION OF CilANGE: This temporary change is for the removal of the conductivity element and the installation of a thrended plug in its place in the discharge header of thn condnnsato pumps.

REASON FOR CilANGE: Thn replacement parta are not available for the broken conductivity element. and the thinnded plug will prnvent Inakage unt 1.1 thn nlome nt is replaced.

SAFETV EVALUATION: Th- removal of the conductivity element will causn the continuous roldout for the " Condensate Pump Discharge Conductivity" to ho inopnrable. No'requirnments are speciffed in-the techr.ical specificat.lons for continuous monitoring of thn condensate pump discharge conductivity. This will not affect tho operation of the Condensatn system or the ability to mcnitor thn

(

conductivity at this point in thn system. Chemistry will obtain

- grab samples to monitor the condensato pump discharge conductivity-as part of their normal monitoring program. This changn does not incre.ase the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluatnd in the UFSaR. The Condensate system provides no safety functions and failurn of t.hn system will not compromise the plant's ability to shutdown sa fely. This change does not create the pcusibility of an accident of dif ferent type than evaluated in the UFSt.R. Also, t.his change doen not. incronse thn probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the-UFSAR. This chanan does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any technical ,,

specification.

119206161/5NhlCFLR - 91

Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: PhS-91*006 DOC NO: W.O. 43886 DESCRIPTION OF CllANGE: This changn provided for the Jnstallation of a garlock /staininss stool backnd. temporary plug in a Component Cooling Water (CCW) pressuro relief valvn on thn recirculation pump monitor.

REASON FOR CilANGE: This change was madn to prevent valve leakagn.

SAFETY EVAh0ATION: The plugging of a CCW relief valve's exhaust line in this portion of the system will not affect or degrndo the operational capacity of the system. All other relief valves in the affected part of the system will remain unisolated and- thornby provide a path for over pressurization. The sotpoint of all _.

remaining rollof valves are the same and a rufficient invol of protection will be provided. Thnrefore, this chnngo will not increann the probability of occurrenen of an accident previously evaluated in thn UFSAR. The failure of the affected system will not compromise any safnty reinted system or component and will not.

prevent reactor shutdown. No new failure modes are created by this work. _ Tim possibility of -an accident of a dif ferent typn

-than already evaluated by the UFSAR is not created. The piping

for the CCW system is routed such that a pipe break will not flood or damage any safety related equipment thus, the plugging of this rollef valve's exhaust line will not increase t.hn consequences of n malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated-in the UFSAR. The plugging of a CCW roller valve's exhaust line on the recirculation pumps will not change the function or operation as dnfined by thn bases of the tnchnical specifications, therefore, the margin of safety is not reduced.

M9206161/SNhICFLR - 92

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Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: -'PLS-91-007 DOC NO: Temp Alt 91-0012 DESCRIPTION OF CllANGE: This temporary change defeats the rotor

'tamperature .intntlock in the trip circuit for circulation water pump N71C001A. This interlock will be defeated by lif ting a wirn from the normally open contact s of the temperat ure monitor.

RE/. SON FOR CilANGE: Defeating this interlock prevents spurious motor thermal trips during the first thirty saconds af ter a pump start command is initiated.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This change does not increase the probability of occurrence of-an accident previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

This trip interlock only a f fects the operation of the pump during t.hn firat-thirty seconds of run timn. Af ter the thirty snconds, this ' trip function could be initiated at any time and the pump would remain in operation. Losing a circulating water pump, either with one pump running or-noun running, during the first thirty seconds would not increase the possibility of a loss of vacuum accident as discussnd in the UFSAR. Other trip funct.fons remain-unchanged. This chango does not increase the consnquences of an accident previously evaluated in the UFSAR. The possibility of :lo_ sing thn pump af ter thirty seconds remains unchanged as would bn the consequences of the loss of vacuum accident specified in the UFSAR. This changn does not create the possibility of an accident of a dif fnrnnt type than evaluated in thn UFSAR. Loss of a circulating water pump affects only the plant's ability to condenso steam and maintain a suitable vacuum in thn condensnr.

This change does not increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment :important to safety previously evaluated in the.UFSAR. The circulating water pumps perform no function related to the safe shutdown of this plant, Defnating this trip

' function will have no affect on any equipment important to sa fety.

The rotor temperature monitor trip- only a f fects a circulating-water pump which has no margin of safety specified in the technica1 speciiications.

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' M9206161/SNh1CFLR - 93 4

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l Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 l

'l l

SRASN: PLS-91-008 DOC NO: CR-PLS-91-004 DESCRIPTION OF CllANGE: This change updates the UFSAR to reflect current company policy regarding prenatal exposure.

.. REASON FOR CilANGE: A change in company policy was. brought about by the recent Supreme Court opinion in review of United Auto Workers , et .nl . vs. Johnson Controls, Inc. FSAR Appendix 3A states that GGN3 complies with Regulatory Guide 8.13, Rev. 1, 14ovember 1975. Iloweve r , the NRC published Regulatory Guide-8.13,

.Rev. 2 in December 1987. Revision 2 states that a prenatal program will be_ voluntary. New company policy reflects the views of the recent Supreme Court opinion and Regulatory Guide 8.13 Rev. 2.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This change is an administrative chnnge and does not affect plant safety or plant equipment.

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M9206161/SNLICFLR - 94 y , w y,, , . . , , , , . . - _ . , - . . , . . . ~ , -

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Attachment-to GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: PLS-91-009 DOC NO: 1 ST l + 1 P4 7 00 7-0-N

-DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE: 'This change installs valves, pumps, and piping to allow injection of sodium hypochloritn.and addit ional dispersant (Lo the Plant Servicn Water (PSW).

REASON FOR CllANGE: This change was made for the control of biological fouling.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Chlorination of PSW/Ranney Wells is addressed as a part of original plant design at a chlorine residual of 0.5 ppm; this activity raises the residual level to 1.5 ppm.

Onsite testing uaing PSW and test heat exchangers determined corrosion rates for carbon steni, stainless steel, and 90/10 ,

copper / nickel piping. The use of sodium hypochlorite did not lucrease corrosion rates for the three metallurgies above the rates _ f or unt reated- PSW. Based on a review of literaturo copper alloy 122 (drywell chiller exchanger tubes) is not expected to show any adverse offects from these residuals. Copper alloy 122 test coupons will be used during this activity to monitor corrosion rates. This activity does not change the control or response of the PSW system except-for cooling tower makeup / level-control, which will be controlled using blowdown. These systems and their operation are not involved-in any accident evaluations .g in the UFSAR. This activity will not increasn-the probability of an accident previously evaluntnd in the UFSAR.

The PSW/Rannoy Well systems have no safety related function to mitigate the consequences of an accident. However, some PSW valves serve as part of the secondary containment boundary and as PSW/SSW (Standby Servien Water) crosstle isolations. .The onsite testing demonstratnd these salves would not be adversely affected

=by these residuals. These components will' continue to perform -

their designated functions. The addition of chlorinated PSW.to SSW will not adversely af fect SSW water quality which is routionly. _

- chlorinated to a higher residual chlorine level. The addition of

, ~ chlorinated water to the system storage tanks or use in thn fire protection system will have no adverse affect on system operation.

No increase in the consequences of an accident previously-cvaluated in the UFSAR will occur.

Chlorination was addressed in the original plant design usIng liquid sodium hypochlorite. No chlorine gas will be generated

-during this. activity even in the event'of a. sodium hypochlorite spill. Sodium hypochlorite will be fed from 55 gallon drums at the rate of approximately one drum per day.

-M9206161/SNLICFLR - 95

Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 PLS-91-009 Page 2 Approximately_a one week supply will be stored at the warehouse and reordered as necessary. - No new hazard to control room habitability is -introduced by the use of sodium hypochlorite onsite as documented in Bochtel Calculations which state that sodium hypochlorito has no OSilA established threshold level value.

Sodium hypochlorito is non-flammable. ' Operation of the PSW/Rannny Well system is unaffected except for tower Invel control which will be controlled using blowdown. Level perturbations in the

. tower basin would not af fect the ability to safely shut down _the plant. - Af f acted components will function as designed. This activity does not create the possibility of- an accident of a dif ferent type than any evaluated in the UFSAR. -The probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluntnd-in the UFSAR will not be increased.

No change to the'hasis concerning chlorino detection is rnquired.

Reactor water chemistry including chlorides will not be af fected by this activity. No significant increase in chlorino-Invels in circulating water which might affect the hotwell in the event of a tube leak-will occur as a result of PSW chlorination. Structural' integrity and responsa _ times of valvos which are a part of the secondary containment boundary wl11 not be affected. The ability of the SSW system to remove heat and system makeup wi11 not be altered. 1This activity does not affect the operability or avallability of the fire suppression system. _ This activity does 1,ot reduce the margin =o) safety as definnd in the bases for any technical specification, s

DL n

ti9206161/f>NLICFLR - 96

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i Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 l i

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SRASNi PLS-91-010 DOC No: EER-91-6258 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE: Yalves Q1P81F056 and Q1P81F057, valves in the IIPCS Diesol Generatot Starting Air System, will be inft open during normal operations. . Plant. procedures specify the closed posithn for these valves during normal operation. These valves connect receivers Q1P81A004A nnd QlP81A00411 and Q1P81A003A and Q1P81A003B, rnspectively.

REASON FOR CilANGE: Tho existing valve linn-up requires the QlP81F056 and QlP81F057 valves to bn .in thn closed position.

Opening these valves during normal operations will permit the motor driven air compressor to start -automatically due to low air pressurn in any rocniver. Clt. sing these valves provides additional, but unnecessary, system redundanc.y and prevents proper compressor operntion.

SAFETY EV*i,UATION: This safety evaluation concluded that opening the Q1P81F056 and QlP81F057 valvns does not rnpresent an unreviewed safety quest.lon or change the GGNS technical specifications. The safnty evaluation addressed the potential for new and-increased failuros and detnrmined that opening the Q1palF056 and Q1P81F057 valves does not potentially add to or worsen previously evaluated failures or events. Opening valves P81F056 and P81F057 dons not chango GGNS technical

~

4 specifications or UFSAR.

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,T Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: P1,5-91-011 DOC NO: Temp Alt-91-0015 DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE This t emporary al; erat ion increases t he close set points of temperature sw it ches IP81N044A and IP81N0448 for the jacket water system on the llPCS Diesel Generat or from 125 F to 130"F until implementation of pnrmanent changes in RF05.

REASON FOR CllANGE: The close set; oint for jacket wator heater temporature switches IP81N044A&B is 125*F. Temperature switches ,

P81N006A5B, that provide temperature alarm annunciatlon, have a low alare setpoint of 95'F. A large water t emperature contrast exists during atandby periods between P81N044A&B and P81N006A&B due to physical distance between their respective mounting locations. Nulsanto alarms occur because water temperature drops below thn low alarm setpoint for P81N006A&B beforn P81N044A&B reset and energize che jacket water heaters. This chnngn eliminates nuisance alarms by energizing the jacket water heaters at a higher temperature, maintaining the jacket wat er temperature above the low alarm setpoint for P81N006A&B ta perature switches.

SAFETY EVAIUATION: This safety evaluation concluded that raising temperature switches IP81N044A&B c'ose setpoints from 125"F to 130 F does not represent an unrev iewed sa fety qaention or change thr GGNS technical specifications. The safety evalua;1on addressed the potential for new and incrensed failures and determined that raising t emperat ure switches IP81N044A&B closn setpoints from 125"F to 130"F does not add to or worsen previously evaluated failures or event s. Temporary Altc ration 91/On ,5 changes the close setpoint for PS-44A and PS-44B 1isted in thn UFSAR. The open setpoint for PS-44A and PS-44B is not alternd by the temporary alteration and will remain at its design setpoint rf 155 F.

M9206161/SNhlCFI.R - 98

Attachment to GNRO-92/00019-5' ISRASNn PLS-91-012- . DOC NO: -TSTI-lW20-91-001-0-N-DESCRIPTION O .OllANGE:

This Technical Special Test Instruction (TSTI) addres;es- chemical cinaning of the Circulating Water System -

_ Cooling Tower fill medium. "

-REASON FOR CilANGE: -The cooling tower fill medium has become partially plugged due to biological fouling, Plygging of the fill.

prevents proper heat transfer across the cooling tower and is

' degrading plant officiency. Chemical c1 caning will help climinato this plugging and improvo plant nfficiency. -

SAFETY EVAI.UATION: Cleaning is accomplished per the TSTI using-hydrogen peroxide at 50% concentration. Ilydrogen peroxide is _

injected into each cooling tower. flume, whnre it is equa lly dispersed across the fill medium by the normal circulating water flow.

The hydrogen peroxido cleaning is performed in a minimum of 6 q phases. Results of the first phase is evaluatnd to determino

)

effects and effectiveness of the cleaning prior to proceeding to the next phase. The c.tenning process is cont rolled to minimize the im,inct of solids released . from the cooling townr to the circulating water system.

This clnaning is performed with both circulating water pumps in service and can be done' in Operational Modes 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.

-No change is required to the normal operation of the circulating water system-to perform this cleaning.- l'owever, additional precautions are implemented to ensure.tnern are no adverse effects due to the solids released-from'the fill. _

The hydrogen percxido had been evaluated - for compatibility with materials'of' construction in the circulating water system. This -

evaluation concluded no adverse effects would be incurred to the materials or components of the circulating water system at the specified maximum feed rates and concentrations. No unroviewed- ,

sa fety or environmental questions worn identified as a result of this sofoty evaluation.

M92061dl/SNLICFLR -99

Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: P1,5-41-013 DGC NO: Temp Alt-91-vu3 DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE: This temporary alteration provides for changes to the sulfuric acid storage and transfer subsystem within the tiakeup Water Treatment system. These changes:

• Provide an additionn1 drain path for sulfuric acid durfug transfer from vendor tanknr to permanent. plant storage tanks e improve depressurization of t he vendor's tanker through the new drain path e Add new piping and va lves , consistent with the design criteria stated in the UFSAR, to provide the new drain path -

• Utilize the existing reinforced concrete dikn for collection and neutralization of accidental acid spills e Provide double isolation drain valves to prnvent accidental acid draining Juring acid t ransfer REASON FOR CilANGE: The changes contained in this tempori 3 ,

alteration are being made to enhance personnel safety duru a c id transfer. )

SAFETY EVAh0AT10N: The changes do not affect the operation or diminish the quality of the tinkeup Water system. The temporary alteration does not af fect the environmen' a1 plan because the new drain points une the existing diko for spill containment and neutralJzation. The changes contained in the temporary alteration lessen the potential fot accidental discharge of sulfuric acid to the environment without accompanying neutral.tzation. No -

unresolved safety quest ions have been identified and the margin of -

safety has not been reduced as defined in any bases of the technical speci f f. cations, ti9206161/SNLICFI,R - 100 1

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k l1 Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 l i

i SRASN: phS-91-014 DOC NO: l'pCON 1, 2 or 3/TS Act 21 of TS 3.

3.2 DESCRIPTION

OF CllANGE: This safoty evaluation documents thn analysis.of entry into Opnrational Conditions 1, 2, or 3 when the Containment and D~ywell Ventilation Exhaust Rndintion - liigh liigh instrumentation is inoperable and the plant is in compliance with Act ion 21 -of _ Technical Speci ficat ion (TS) Table 3.3.2.1.

REASON FOR CllANGE: The Containmnnt and Drywell Ventilation Exhaust Radiation - Iligh Illgh instrumentation will be inopnrable when it is desired to change operationni condit. ions.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The Containment and Dryw s11 Ventilat ion Exnw.et %diation - liigh liigh instrumentat.Jon is designed to ,

provido inpus a ,rimary containment isolation. Ptimary  ;

containment isolation provides protection against the relense of radioactive materints to the environment as a retult of nccidents '

occurring to thn nuclear boilnr system, auxilinry systems and support systems. This protection is af fordnd by automnt ic isolation of the appropriate lines which penetrate tha drywell and containment. The trip function provided by this particular instrumentation is the closure of valves in the Containment and Drywnll_ purge System and thn Combustible Gas Control System, Containment integrity is assurnd and thern is no increnso in the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evalunted in thn UFSAR.

The UPSAR considers accidents which may potentfally result in a radioactive release. The releasn is minimized through appropriatn isointion functions which detect high radiation in the ventilation exhaust. Since the isolation function will bn assured by manuni action, prior to entry into thn OpCON requiring the isolation function, containment isolation will bn providnd. Thn associated safety function of the isolated systems will be preserved by the operchility requirements of their respective technical specifications. Thornfore, this application of TS 3.0.4 will not increase the consequences of any accident analyzed in the UFSAR.

The appl f eat ion of TS 3.0.4 does not increase the prohnbility of t.be_mnifunction of equipment important to safety. Thern is no increase in the consnqunnces of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evalunted in the UFSAR.

The bases for Technical Specification 3/4.3.2 states that this specification ensures the ef fectiveness of the instrumentation usedL to mitigate thn consequences of accidents by presnrving the opetability_ trip setpoints and rnsponse times for isolation of the reactor systems. 11y having the valves manually closed and red tagged, the safety function of thn subject instrumentation will be assured and the margin of sarnty as defined in the bases will not be reduced.

M9206161/SNLICFLR - 101

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Attachment to.GNRO-92/00019 4

SRASN: Phs-91-015 DOC NO: S1 ,o W.0, 30542

-DESCRIPTION'0F CllANGE: This change is for the chemical cleaning-

= . of the Alternate Decay llent Removal' System ( ADIIRS) air conditioning (A/C unit IT41B014 and of the ADliRS Ilent Exchangers IE12B003A and IE12B003B..

REASON FOR CilANGE: Chemical cleaning.is periodically required to remove buildup of deposits on the tubes. interior surfaces.

Removal of these deposits is necessary to ensure optimum heat removal and design flow through these heat exchangers.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The corrosion rates identified.by the testing are insignificant.

Since the total number of acid flushes is limited to 25, chemical cleaning of the ADilRS hnat exchangers and-the- A/C ADilRS unit will not adversely af fect the operabil:ity of these components nor compromise the structural integrity of the

' piping to these component.s. As a result, chemical cleaning of these components will not Increase the probability of. an accident previously evaluated in the UFSAli. Chemical cleaning of the Plant Servico Water (PSW) side of ADilRS does not increase the consequences of an accident previously' evaluated in the UFSAR.

ADliRS is comp 1e'tely isolated during the chemical cleaning process.

There are no hazards from high energy line breaks nor from the spray effects of pipe cracks to ot.her plant. systems during the cleaning process. Ilence, the possibility of an accident of a

.different type than evaluated in-the UFSAR ts not created during the chemical process. Chemical cleaning the ADliRS does not i..nrease the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to na fety.

Since the-amount of metal loss from thn ADilR System ASME Class III 11 ping and safety related components will be insignificant, the structural integrity of_'the ADHRS will not be compromised. It follows that the chemical c1 caning process does not reduce the margin of safety as defined -in the bases for any technical specification.

M9206161/SNLICFI.R - 102

At t nehment to GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: PhS-41-016 1)OC NO: 04-1-01-E12-1 DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE System Operating lustruction (801) 04- 1-01-E12- 1, "Res idun 1 lion t Removn1 System" provides instructions for filling / vent ing, flushing, warming and opor nt ing hoops A and B in thn shut down cool ing modo. Instructions for filling / venting, flushing and oporat ing hoops A and B are relatively the same. Iloweve r , instructions for warming hoop A require the flowpath to include the Res idun i llent Reduction (RiiR) hnat exchangers wherens the hoop B instruntions bypass the hont exchangers during the warming process.

It is proposed t o mod i fy t he descript ion of operat ing of shutdown cooling in FSAR Section 5.4.7.2.6.n and revise 801 04-1-01-E12-1 _

to modify the 1ineup for t he A loop to allow bypassing t he hont exchangers during the wntming procedure.

REASON FOR CHANGE: FSAR Section 5.4.7.2.6.a describes operation of t he RilR system in the shutdown cooling modo. Specifically, this TSAR section states that the systom will he flushed via va lvos F040 and I'049 t o radwns te. It also statns that thn system will be warmed with flow through t he hont exchangers and discharged to radwnste through the same valves. This conflicts with the physical design arrangement of the system on the B side.

No referenen is mndo to the design dirfoiences hotwoon hoops A and B in this sectton of the FSAR.

SAFETY EVAhUATION: The manuni for thn RHR hont exchangor (83820) does not require pre-wntming of the RilR hont exchanger but cautions to start operat ion gradually to prevent hot fluid f rom 5 heing suddenly admit tod t o the heat exchangers when they are" empty

% or cold. Shutdown cooling operation is begun by first opening tho -

F048 bypass around the hont exchangers. Af ter pump st art , thn -

F003 valvo is slowly jogged opennd which result s in grnduni admission of t he renctor coolant while n normal cooldown rate for thn reactor is being established.

This change ta the shutdown cooling warmop instructton wi1i not increase thn probabilit y of occurrence of a malfunction of equipmnnt important to safety. GGNS's current met hod of slowly opening t he F003 (hent exchanger outlet valve) adequat ely limits the suddnn introduction of hot fluid to the hnnt exchanger in con formance wi t h the RhR heat exchanger manual. Thesn hont exchangers are designed to withstand the introduction nf steam at 50 ps ig during st eam condens ing modo. The thermal cond.itions experienced w.ith GGNS's current method of introducing fluid to these hont exchangers during shutdown cooling is much smaller in magnitude thnn that of the steam condensing mode. Therefore, the structural integrity of the heat exchangers will not be compromised with the implementation of the chnngo to the S0[.

There is no degradation of t he ahi.lity of the RHR system to perform its sa fet y f unct inn and thereforo, no ro<luction in t he ma rg i- of sa fety r19206161/SNhfCFhR - 103

Attachment-to GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: PLS-91-017- DOC NO: - CR-PI.S-91-006 -

DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE: This change modifins UFSAR Table'6.2-49 ns follows:

1. It adds the llorizontal Fuel Transfer System '(llFTS) tubn bellows assembly to the table for Penetration 4.

2. It makes administrative changes to the arrangement of the barrier listings for the conta inment personnel a ir locks ,

Penetrations 2 and 3.

3. It adds the equalizing valves for the outboard end walls on the containment. pe sonnni air locks. These valves apparently were inadvertently omittod f rom the listing at some timn in the past.

4. It adds a descriptive adjective to clarify thnt spare penetrations have caps welded to them.

5. It d,letes re.forences to Notes 6, 7, 11, 21 and 22 for valves IE12-F103B and IE12-F104B (Penetration 48) and for valves 1E12-F103A and'1E12-F104A'(Penetration 77). Notes 6, 7, 11, 2? and-22 are not applicable to those valves bect.use they could bn exposed to a.1r-through Penetration 75.

Penetration 75 is the exhaust vacuum breaker for the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Pump Turbinn.. The effect of this change is to require those-valvns to be tested with -

(pneumatic test), instead of receiving a local leak rate ..st of t.hn system with water (system hydrostat le test).

6. It adds reference to Note 3 for valves 1E12-F103R and IE12-F104B (Penetration 48) and for valves lE12-F103A and 1E12-F104A'(Penetration 77). These valves cannot be leak rate tested -in the correct direction without installing a

. plug in the rol.8ef valve dischargn pipe in thn suppression pool.

7. It deletes the test connection valves on the guard pipe Jnspection ports.from the listing._

8. It revises Note 1 to include the double inflatable seals on the containment personnel air locks. . These seals ~are neither 0-ring seals nor gasket snals, even though Note 1, which .is refnrenced by Penetrations 2 nnd 3 listings, covered only 0-ring' seals and gaskets.

9. It adds a new Note 5 to describe the UPTS tube bellows

-assembly and-its testing method.

10 '. It ~ revIsns Note 12, basnl on ovaluation of Pratt butterfly valves.

M9206161/SNb!CFI,R - 104

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r Attachmnnt to GNRO-92/00019 PbS-91-017  ?

Page 2

11. It deletes Note 21, which is not applicable to valves 1E12-F103A&B and IE12-F104A&B, as noted in Change 5 above.

12. It makes minor editorial changes in the t est type column for consistency.

REASON FOR.CilANGE: To update UFSAR Table 6.2-49.

SAFETY ~ EVALUATION: The Appendix J leakage testing requirements are intended only to. minimize leakage of radioactivity f rom the containment during and following an accident. None of these changes nor the underlying Appendix J-testing requirements affect t;e probability that an' accident will occur. The changes do not affect the physical design or operational condition of any plant components or systems.

The responsn of the plant and its equipment to an accident requiring containment isolation is based on meeting the design and testing requirements in regulatory documents such as 10CFR50, Appendices A and J.

Changes 2, 4 and 8 through 12 make administrative changes only.

They do not change any testing requirements or affect the physical design or operational condition of any components that are tested.

Therefore, these changes do not affect the consequenens of an accident prevfously evaluated in the FSAR.

Change I adds the llFTS tube bellows assembly to the list of components to be tested. If the testing detects leakage and t.rfggers repairs to reduce the leakage, this change could actually d.el;rease the consequences of an accident by reducing t.he probability of_ containment leakage.

Change 3' adds the equalizing valves-on the outboard end walls of the containment personnel air locks to the list of components to be. tested. This change is-actually an administrative change becanse the equalizing valves on both the inboard and outhcard end walls of the -air locks have been leak rate tested per Appendix J since the plant was originally started up. This change does not affect the physical dnsign or operational condition of the air locks or their components. Therefore, this change does not a f fect the consequences of an accident evaluated in the FSAR. ,

M0206161/SNLICFLP - 105 l

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, r

E - Attachment t o GNRO-92/00019

. PLS-91-017 Page 3 Changes 5 and 6 change the requirements for leak rate testing valves lE12-F103D and IE12-F104B (penetration 48) and IE12-F103A and 1E12-F104A (Penetration 77). The local leak rate test previously performed on these valves along with othnr system valves with water (system hydrostat ic test) will be replaced by a reverse local leak rate t est with air (punumatic test). If testing these valves with air rather than water detects leakagn and triggers repairs to reduce the leakage, this changn will actually decinaan the consequences of an accidont by reducing the probability of containment leakage. ,

Change 7 delntns test connection valvns on the guard pipe inspection ports from the listing of components t o be tested. The leakage through these valves has been considered in loss of containment integrity accidents that have already been analyzed in j the FSAR. Chango _7 does not phys (cally add, modify or delot e any component required to bn leak rato tnsted.

The test connection pipe and valves are sized according to Regulatory Guide 1.11 (Safety Guide 11) to minimine the . leakagn

, from any break in the pipe or valves. Regulatory Guide 1.11 requirns-that flow restrictions in instrument linns be sized to rnduce leakage through the restrictions to the minimum practical amount. The test connection orifices in the out er covers of each inspection port are limited to 1/8-inch diamnter.

Thereforn, Change 7 does not incrensn the consequences of an accident previously nvaluated in thn FSAR and does not reduen the margins of sa fety defined in thn bases. for Tech Specs 3/4.6.1.1 and 3/4.6.1.2. .

M9206161/SNhlCFI.R - 106

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' Attachment. to GNRO-92/00019.

SRASN: PLS-91-0.18 DOC'N0i CR- pl.S 00 7 _ .

DESCRIPTION OF CilANCE: This safety nvaluation provided for changes to the' organizational reporting structure of the Radiation Control depart ment.

REASON FOR CilANGE: All of t he changes 'are administrative in nature, reflecting organizational changes-or providing minor clarifications in the descriptions of licalth Physics programs.

SAFETY EVALUATION: All duties performed by Radiation Control personnel will_ continue to be performed in the event of an accident.

'These. changes do not create the possibility of an accident of a different-type than any evaluated in the PSAR. The changes in positions and responsibilities do not in any way lossen the <

effectiveness of the-Radiation Protection program.

These changes do not increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR,.

nor do they create the possibility of a malfunction of a different type than any~cvaluated previously in the FSAR, All of the proposed changes are~ administrative in nature, reflecting organizational changes or providing minor clarif.lcations in the -

descriptions of Ilealth Physics programs. -The level of. oversight provided to the RadiationLControl program has not been decreased

=by-these changes.

-These changes do not -reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis = for any technical specification. The changes have no effect on the limit-ing conditions for operation, applicability, action or strveillance requirements as defined in any technical specifications.

M9206161/SNI;ICFI.R - 107

. Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: PLS-91-019 DOC NO: W.O. 53587-DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE: This work package installed temporary fuses to isolate and troubleshoot a fault in the React or Water Cleanup (RWCU) circuit.

REASON FOR CilANGE: This change is intended to aJd in the location and correction of an electrical fault which is causing f requent loss of the ' A' Reactor Water Cleanup (RWC'J) filter domineralizers

~

(F/D's). ,

SAFETY EVALUATION: Insi.nllation of the temporary alteration will-notfintroduce any new failure mechanisms into the RWCU F/D system.

This change is intended to aid in the location and correction of an electrical fault which is causing frequent loss of the 'A' RWCU F/D. This change could not initiate any action or event that could af fect an accident previously evaluated in the SAR.

The installation will not increase the consequences of the failures that have or can occur in this electrical circuit. The fuses to be installed will serve to limit the impact of a short on the portion of the RWCU system affected.

A loss of the 'A' RWCU F/D during installation and removal of the Temp Alt will not challenge TS chemistry limits. No adverse effects are possible (with respect to safety),

i-l M9206161/SNLICFLR - 108

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Attachment to UNRO-92/00019 SRASN: pLS A 91-020 _ DOC NO: CR-Pl.S-91-010 DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE: The subject of this FSAR change request was - t o accurately describe the test configuration of thn high pressure core spray (llPCS) system whi'n performing surveillance activities in accordance with GGNS Technical Specifications 3.5.1.c_and 4.5.1.c l.

REASON FOR CilANGE: -The inccmplete content of the FSAR was realized as part of sa fety system funct ional assessments performnd in 1991. The PSAR stated that the periodic test was performed using condensato storage tank water. This contradicted the surveillance procedoro which= used the suppression pool flow path.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Functional testing of the llPCS pump .is mandatory per; existing Technical Specifications. IIPCS is designed to be tested via tbc condensate storage tank (CSTT flow path or via the suppression pool flow ith. The present testing configuration utilizes the sup, rnssion pool flow path. No new fu ' ire mechanism will be-introduced to the system or any cmp nont as a . consequence of the UFSAR changn.

Proper testing of the IIPCS pump in the proposed configuration dons not_ impose unduo stress on its safety related equipment. Improper performance of_ testing can result in water hammer events which can potentially impact operation of the rPCS system. Ilowever, such events can occur with the previous lineup to the condensatn storagn-tank as well. The discharge piping is maintained full and administrativo controls are in place to minimize occurrence of

-such events.

Neither the performance of 'the ilPCS pump. functional test nor the

-resultant .ilPCS system configurat ion adversely impact operation or standby condition of the IIPCS system. The safety related function

-of-IIPCS is not impeded by the test configuration. The system configuration during pump testing is aligned t.o t hn suppression :

pool which_ is a normal sourco of water for ilPCS operation during emergency events.

No new failuro mechanism will be introduced to the system or any-component as a consequence of the UFSAR change. Considerations for- dynamic of fects. of _ test return 1ine; rupture would not be any dif ferent than that performed previously.

IlPCS system configuration during the llPCS pump _ test does not adversely impact .the operation or standby condition of the ilPCS -

system. -The most -limiting break size and _ location of reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) analyses are not impacted by the proposed-change. IIPCS system is a-redundant emergency core cooling system (ECCS). GGNS satisfies the single f a ilure criterion for ECCS.

M9206161/SNLICFLR - 109 l

l Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 PLS-91-020 -

Page 2 The margins of safety will not decrease due to thn chango.

Neither the performance of the IIPCS pump functionni test nor thn resultant ilPCS system configuration adversely impact opn* tt lon or standby condition of the ilPCS system. With itPCS system inoperable, adequate corn cooling is assured by redundant ECCS subsystems-(i.e,, I,PCS, and ADS).

l M920616.1/SNLICFLR - 110

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Attachment to GNRO-92/00019_--

SRASN: PLS-91-021 DOC-NO: BISUI.FITE ADDITION TO PSW PLS-91-022 DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE: This change _(PI.S-91-021) allows injection of Sodium Bisulfite to the Plant Servjco-Water system. This activity (PLS-91-022) installs tanks, valves, pumps and piping for this service.

REASON FOR CilANGE: Iron bacteria in the PSW is the most significant biofoulant at GGNS. Years of onsite experience havn shown that during the summer months when PSW oxygen concentrations are <25 parts per billion, iron bacteria are easily and economically controlled by a-non-oxidizing blacide, lloweve r ,

during the winter months when oxygen concentrations in Plant h Servico Water (PSW) exceed 100 pph, iron hacteria control is marginal at best. The purpose of feeding a bisul fit o oxygnn scavengnr is to keep oxygen levels at summertimo lows, thus ensuring year-round iron bacteria control.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This activity _does not change the-control or response of the Plant Service Water system or the PSW Radial Well system. Those systems and their cporation are not involved in any accident cause evaluations in the UFSAR. This activity will not increase the probability of an accident previously mentioned in the UFSAR.

6' .The Plant- Servien Water and PSW' Radial' Well systems have no sa fety

- related - function to mitigate the causes of- an accident (UFSAR Sections 9.2.8.3 and 9.2.10.3). Ilowever, some PSW valves serve as part of the secondary containment-boundary and as PSW/SSW (Standby

, Service Water) cross-tio isolations. None of thesn valves would be adversely affected by SO :reshluals at die 5 ppm of less dosage levels. Corrosion testing of_3 carbon sten 1, type 304 stainless _ _

steel, and 90/10)_ cupronickel has shown _that corrosion rates arn e ithe r_. una f f ec t o.

,r actually reduced in the presence of bisul fito. Valves listed in Table 3.9-3C of the 1FSAR as ASME Section III-Code classes 2 and 3 which may be exposed to these S0 3 residuals will not he adversely-affected. These components will continue .to perform their: designated functions.

The addition of PSW containing residual .Soyto the Standby Service Water system will not adversely affect SSW water quality. The addition of-PSW containIng residual 80 to- Go B ro. Pro ucu an-3 system storage tanks for uso in the Fire Protection system will have no adverse af fect on. system operation.

No increases in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the UFSAR will occur.

M9206161/SNLICFLR _111 m

At t achtuent t o GNRO-92/00019 Pl.S-91-021 PLS-41-022 Pngo 2 The bisulfito in t o im f o<l from por t able nt or ngo bins, or f om a bulk storngo innk insido thn beim nt the PSW Chemical injectton facility locatort in the parking lot, l'enil r a t es nro expoct o<l t o rang' from '90 gallons per day (unmmor mont hs) to ~640 gallons por day fwinter months). lortablo stiinge bins riny be stonerl at the worohouse nort r n-ordot ed as necessa ry. linik <lelivei los wou bt be mndo direct ly t o thn bulk tonk in thn pnrking lot.

No SO 2 gns will ho genornt e<l dun t o t his act ivity , even in the event ni a spill. No new hazniet to conttol ronm hnbit nbility is -

introduced.

4 Sorlium llisul fi t e is non-finmtonblo nt nmbient yont-round t ornpo r n t u r ns . Its only renet ivit y is eit h st rong ox idizing ngent s >

or minern) acids, none of which wou bt be stored inside the pntking lot berm.

Opoint ion of t he Plant Servicn Water el PSW Rndini Well systems will be unn i f oc t ed . Systnm com3, . n t a, will fonetton as designed.

This activity does not crente the poss ibil .i t y of nn nctident of a  ;

different type than any eva lun t eri in the UPSAR.

Sod lum 111sul f i t e does not pioducn S0 gns. No bnsis concnrnIng h 7

SO,, detection.,Is required. Ronctor wat er chemist t y including sul f at es (SO ' ) will not by,affetted by Ihis nctivity, No ,

significnntkncronse levnis in the Circulnting Water systom which might affect t in50[hehotwolI in t hn event of a t abo lenk will o cur as a result of this net ivit y. St ruc t urni intentity and -

response timo of vnIven whi< b nie n part of Ihn secondnty -

contninment boundary will not be nffected. Thn ability of the SSW system to remove boat anel system mnkeup will not be n1 tere <l. This net Jvit y dons not nffect t he opernbilit y or availnbilit y of t hn ,

firn suppression system. This act tvity dons not reduce the margin of snfoty as definerl in thn hnses of t ho nehnicnl specificotion.

M9206161/SNLICPl.R - 112

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Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: P!,S-91-023 DOC NO: CR- Pl.S 009 DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE: T'ils revision of t he UFSAR clari f f es implementat ion of RC 1.75 requirements vin divisionni separation and permits thn implementnLion of sepnrntion requirements based on safety function.

REASON FOR CilANGE: Separation of equipment has been implemented at GGNS by a divishnal me1ns as imposed by design and construction specifications. This st rategy was consnrvativo in ansuring compilance with RG 1.75 requirements.

SAFETY EVAhU5.fl0N: Separation requiremouts for safnty fonction equipment ;ontinue to be satir.f f ed in cornpilanen with RG 1.75.

Redm. dant safety function equipment contJnues to antisfy single fallnrs critnrin. Inst rument ation and cont rol system installations comply with descriptions in UFSAR Section 7.1.2. No i new or dif ferent type of failure mechanism is introduced to any component or system as n consequence of impicmentat. ion of this UFSAR charge. Divisional separation of enginected safety fonturn groups for Cinna 1E 120 vnit inst.rumentation and power supply is maintained as described in Sect,f on 8.3.1 of NUREU-0831. The change clarifles implementation of existing criterin which address separation of redur-innt safety-function e.quipment and systems.

Implementat ton of separation criterin for snfety function ,

components at GGNS has been more conservative than required.

Sainty function equipme.it of dif fertnt divisions which performs or supports rodundant sniety fun <.tf on will continun to he separated l

in order to conform to industry standards and requirements. This will not creatn a common failure modo of redundant safety function equipment. As such. malfunctions of safety function equipmont nrn bounded by existing nnalyses.

The margins of safety .wlli not decrnnse due to the change.

Operation and opernhilitr of redundant safety function will not he impacted by implementation of thc, change. Safe shutdown capability of the facility and mitigation and control of accident conditions within thn facility will'not be hampered due to implementation of thn change.

b e

i M9206161/SNI.ICFLR - 113 a

Attnehment to GNRO-92/00019 1

.SRASN: plS-91-024 DOC NO: UFSAR 12.5.2.2.5.1.81 j i

l DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE: This CONS IffSAR change in issued to delnto the reference to nobin gns sampling by llen1t h physics Continuoun

- Air Monitors (';AMa).

REASON FOR CilANGE: Thron-channel CANS ptovido no means of quantitativo support for noble gan, icviinn , or particulatn ana ly's is . Singlo-channel CAMS can be net up fantor and provid<4 the beta, gamme" annlysin specified in Tnbin 12.5-1.

Operationally, the ningin-channel units nro superior in perfo4 nance and reliability.

' UFSAR Reference 12.5.2.2.5.1.81 in being changed to: "CAHn will normally bn-utilized et GGNS to provido monitoring for a rt icula t n or f odinn activity separnt nly, and/or simultaneously ' Desiden nchieving a more nfficient and cost of fectivn llen t th Physics.

continuona nir monitoring program at GGNS, thin change would further align Grand Gulf with othe- Entergy siten proceduren and l' practicen.

SAFETY EVALUATION: No accident nynlunted in thn SAR in based on thn operat!on, malfunction, or failurn of portable CANS. They are used for qualitat ivn trnnd information only- ,

Replacing portable three-channel CAHn with singin-channol units will not introduce new accidents or the possibility of nn accident of a different typo thnn evaluated in the SAR.

Thoso port ahin CAMS operato in remotn locations with honen routed to specific work nrons. Safo and deliberato pincoment of thesa monitorn decreanon interact f on with other nquipment. Thus, replacing portable _threo-channni CAMS with single-channel units

-will not. incronna the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously cynlunted in the SAR.

Portable CAMS arn not required to mitignto the connoquences of a malfunction of equipment important to anfoty. Instnlled airborno raijonctlvity monitoring instrumentation provides environment ,

me.iitoring as specified in the SAR. Thus, repincing partnblo ,

three-chnunni CAMn with single-channel units will not increnne the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in thn SAR.

Neither thrno-channel nor singlo-chnnnel portable CAMS are nddressed in the t echnical specifications. Thnir une in for - q' qualitative trend information only and therefore doon not af fect the margin of safety defined in anses for any technical spec i fica t ion.

1 l H"iO6161/SNhlCFLR - 114

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At1ochment io GNKO-92/00019 SRASN: Pl48 07 5 DOC NO: GNRO-91/00167 DESCRIPTION OF CllANGE: In ACCM-81/04M, Mississ lppi Pownr and I.ight stated thnt a s ignori agreement had been obtained with Dak Ridge Nat tonni I.nborat or y (OkNI.) to perform the offsitn nnnlyses.

ORNb af, reed to racN ve and perform nnnlyses of Post Accident Samples (t M S) ti Qinnt ing at Grand Gulf Nuclear Stat ion (GGNS) in tha overa of G Nk experiencing at 1% or greater fun) fnflore.

This changn in for the withdrnwnl of the c omm i t.oe n t mndo in paragraph 4 of AECM-83/0465 to maintain an agreement with an offsite vendor for thn per formance of (PASS) analyses as a backup nnd verification to Granri Gulf's (GGNS) onsite PASS annlysis program.

REASON POR CilANGC: GONS was not t fled in May 1987 t hat ORNb would no longen hn nble to provide this nervicn as they worn not allowed to duplicate services offered by n private industry source, Inn bcox and Wilcox (D&W). The ngrnement wan forced to be termlunted.

GGNS thnu initinted a contrnet with 116W in Augut.t of 1987 for offsite PASS nnnlysis services.

SATETY EVALUATION: Thn PASS system is part of thn process Samp_ ling System - Instrumentation nnd Controls, listed and described in Section 7.7.1.11.4.2 of t he UFSAR. All of the plant systems described in UFSAR Section 7.7, including PASS, are Cpnt rpl Syst.cmrtnoLRequi reil f or Sn foty. Thn UPSAR Sect ion 7-. 7.1 st at es, "This subsect ion d iscusses instrumentntion and controls of systems whose functions are not ennential for the safety of the plant. . ." Operation of, and functions of, thn process snmpling system (including PASS) nro not precursors of, nor used in mitigntion of, an accident.

The PASS system and its operation, ns described in thn UPSAR, arn unn f fe tnd by thn wit hdtnwnl of t his commit ment . No credit for, nor mention of, an of fsit e PASS nonlysis program is included in thn UPSAR.

PASS sampling and analyses nre per formed a f t er a renct or accident t o determine t hn ext ent of reactor cor n dnmagn. This program is t hornforn an a f t cr-accident evolnt .lon and is evnlunted t o not contribute to nor cnnse nn accident cond it ion t o occur.

Withdrawal of this commitment could result in fewer PASS samples needing to bn drawn in an accident , possibly resulting in an-enhnneed rnlinbility of the PASS panel through reduced use cycles and a potentini reduction of the possibility of a spill and subsequent relense of radionctivn materials which could result-f rom a ma l funct ion o f ' t hn PASS panol .

M9206161/SNh1CFhR - 115

Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 l 1

j l l

PLS-91-025 Pagn 2 l

-Shipment of n PASS sampin offsite would not bn considered n i radioactive rnlense from a renctor accident nor have any affect on done rat es/ exposure to the public following n reactor accident. ,

Onsite PASS annlysns would be performed with or without nn offsito j analysis program. Delet ion of t hn requirement to ship n PASS sample to an of fsite Inboratory would not constitut o any hnzard or increased hnznrd of exposure or dnnger to 3 general public and could enhancn public safety by preventing t he shipment of a highly rndioactivn snmpin over public t rnusport ation routes.

The operat ion of the PASS system is unchanged by wit hdrawing t hn '

of(s1to annlysis requiremont . The resulting condition is exactly erptivalent to that now exist ing in t egard t o of fect s to the plant and its operation. That is, no different offect will exist or occur. Analysis of PASS snmples will bn performed in GGNS's onsite inhorntories exactly the somn whether samples are shipped

.of fsite or not . Laborat ory snmpin nnnlysis is not and does not const itut o an initiator or precursor of any renetor accideht.

The intent of the 1 f.4 rad /gm in the test matrix in NUREG 0737 II.B.3, was to test installed in-line process int,t r umenta t.f on.

Per the GGNS UFSAR, the primary mnnns of PASS samp1.ing is grab sampling. All of thn process instruments installed in the PASS panel and the in-linn analyses they perform nrn, or can he, backed up or duplicated by grnb sampling at GGNS. As hnckup annlysis espobility exists onsite for thn in-line instrumentation in the PASS panni, thn offsite PASS annlysis program is not nncessary.

The mntgin of safet y as defined for any t echnical specificat ion is unchanged. PASS is only addressed in the ndminintrative controls sect ion of GONS's technical specificat ions in Sect ion 6.3.8.c.

This _tochnical_spactfiention and its implementation will bn unaffected. No other technient specifications will be affected.

Operation of the PASS system will continun to bn performed in accordanen with the GGNS operating license, the commit ment s in tbn UFSAR and applienble station opnrating instructinna- Technical specifications do not require, consider nor t dn credit for

, of fsit e annlysis of PASS samples.

M9206161/SNLICFLR - 116

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At t achment to GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: Pl.5-91-026 DOC NO: W. O. %233 DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE: This chango provides work instructions to remove door 1M110 f rom it s hinges and removn the door frame and correct door / frame problems. The work order niso requires installation of sandbngs across the full width of the door opening, 16 inches above floor level, before performing any work on the door or door f rame. The work instructions requiro that sandbags remnin in place unt 11 the door is returnnd to its design condition, wit h the Propnble Maximum Pninipitation sen) Intact. l l

REASON FOR CHANGE: Maintennnce pntsonnni cannot correct the condition without removing the door from its fromn. Maintonnnce has exhausted other options for correcting door and f rnme

f. rob l em s .

SAFETY EVALUATION: The safety evaluation concluded that removing door 1M110 from the f ramn does not represent an unreviewed snfoty l question or change GGNS technlent speciffentions. The safety I evaluntion addressed thn potential for now and incronsed fnflures and determtnnd that thn controls contained in Work Order M 233 adequately address flood protection rnquirements in the PSAR. '

Installing sandbags 16 inches above floor lovel across the entirn width of the door opening will prevent entry of rainwater into the SSW "A" pump room during n PMP ovent. A sandhng height of 16 inchns is well in excess of the 9-inch height requirement in thn FSAR. Door 1M110 is not exponnd to rain and is susceptibin onij to exterunt flooding f rom accumulated rninwnt er at ground lovel. Consequently, removal of the door does not create new extnrnni flooding concerns from rain entering the open nron created by door removal.

M9206161/SNI,1CFl.R - 117

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At t a chtnen t to GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: l'LS 02 7 DOC NO: W. O. 45949 Di' SCRIPT 1DN UP CllANGE: The t urbine/ generator trip for low primary wat er ' ntik level are to be bypassed during instrument monitoring.

REASON FOR CilANGE: This change is needed to ennure that n generator t rip will not occur while troubleshooting primnry water tntik level instrumentntion.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The main ne< Ident of concern when dealing with i thn turbine /gonerntor is the generator load inject with f allut o of bypass flow. This event is categorized as an incident of modernto l frequency. The low primary water tank level trip is used to l protect the non-safety related generator from equipment damnge.

This chango bypasses one of the genntator trips and relics on thn five system flow alarms / trips for protection. This changn could no t. Initiato any action or event that, would litetense the probability of a generator t. rip, therefore would not increnso the probability of an accident as previously evalunted in the SAR.

This changn only of fects t he generator and will not int roduen n

, new modo of gonntat or t.rlpping/ f ailure. The five flow trips described in SAR Section 10.2.2.5.1 present ly used with thn tank low levnl t rip will supply adequat.n protect ion to the gennrator.

The non-sa fnty reinted renorntor will not enusn any nccidents of a different typn than already evalunt ed in t he SAR.

The result. of this chango would only af fect the generator and no technical specification limits would be offected. This chanan will only effect system performance of thn gnnerator trip funct fon and not. effect any safety systems or limits as described in thn SAR. Since this chango will not nfrect the limit s of any systems as described in the SAR then it will not reduen the mart;in of safety as defined in the bnsis for any technien1 specifications.

l l

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M9206161/SNLICFLR. 118 L

I y r-ne--w-gy,--,- - mar %ge y,5-e,w -- w vyw e r w -e r w- y e s-- e w -Tw = -, e ve *ea n- mei-***%-ww-e-cre ve s 'e t--- ^-wt=*re==-*e+, me i - ~--tMrs rwm--+ **w=- * - - - = ' = - = - = - * - * ' ' ' ' * ' ' * ' * * - - " - - " * ' ~ " * * - " -

Attr.chment. to GNRO-92/00019 l

SRASN: NSP-91-001 000 NO: NSAP 9P-N-6, Rev. 7 DESCRIPTION or CilANGE: Incorporated regional wnll monitoring f rnm procedure NSAP 5.7 luto procedurn NSAP SP-N-6, and changed regional wn11 monitoring-frequency from bi weekly to twicn annually on UFSAR Tnbin 2.4-29.

REASON TOR CilANGE: The suonitorl'ig f requency list ed in UFSAR Tnbic 2.4-29 enmo from the GGNS Construction Permit which was  ;

enncelled on August 21, 1991 (GNRI-91/00176), and monitoring '

fregunney for regional wells as specified in llFSAR text 2.4.13 is required twlen per ynnt.

SAFETY EVAttfATION: Change in the procedurn NSAp SP-N-6, Revision 7, which incorporates regional-well monitoring into the perchnd well monitoring procedurn (duo to cancellation of construction permit) does not increase the probabilit.y of occurtnnce or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to mainty previously evaluated in thn l!FSAR, and dons not crente thn ponnihility for nn accident or mnifunction of a different typn than previously nvalunted in the UTSAR, and dons not reduco the margin of safety as defiend in the basis for any technical specification; thernforn, it does not involvn nn unrnviewed safety question.

1

M9206161/SNLICFLR - 119-E .__ ._. . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ - - . . - - - _ _ . - . _ _ . _

Attnehment to GNRO-92/00019 SRARN: NI.S 0 01 DOC NO: CR-NI 91-023 l

i DESCRIPTION Or CilANr;E: The description of main generator hydrogen and enthon dioudo purging and filling before and following maintennnen in the UlSAR is bning changed. This change removes the requirement to disconnect the hydrogen supply piping from thn l main gennrator when hydrogen .is being purred and removes thn i requirement to perform n leakage test nfter purging the hydrogen.

This change also changes the required hydrogen concentratton in the mnin generator followin4 filllug operat=tocs from 90% hydrogen in enrbon dioxide to 98% hydrogen in nir. This change performs no plant mod i ficalions.

Rr,ASON FOR CllANGE: Current TSAR description requires modification to allow for the removal of nnnecessary requirements of removing the hydrogen supply piping during purging and performing a leakago t est af t er purgitig the hydrogen f rom the main gennrntor. Changing the required mensured parameter from 90% hydrogen in carbon dioxide to 98?. hydrogen in nir allows the filling operation to bn controlled on a morn accurate scale which provides indient.Jon to-thn control room and insures hydrogen concentration is within it s normal operation allownble volun (> 95% hydrogen in nit),

SAFETY EVALUATION: Thn proposed change does not inodify any plant system / component. The purging and f f i1ing procedurns described only af fect the moln generator and hydrogen nnd carbon dioxidn systems. When thn unit is shutdown and the turbine is not rotnLing or is being rotated by t hn turning gnar, the only time thn dnscribed procedures are performod, thnso systems are not import 9nt to safety.

The proposuu change does not pinco combustibles in nny new

-locations or incronse thn amount of combustibles present. Thnso changes do not. incronsn the probability of hydrogen in the generator igniting or hydrogen 1enking from thn system and resulting in a firn. The required hydrogen concentration of 98%

hydrogen in air.nusures that the hydrogen to air mixture is not at explosivo levnis while providing indiention in the control room.

Lenving the piping in placo between the isolatlug valves nnd the main generat or only nf fects the locnLion t he hydrogen is potentin1ly released and dons not affoct the probabi1ity of t he -

.lsointing valves not functinning properly, The potential relense of hydrogen into the main generator inst end of thn turbine build.ing increases the probability that any significant relense would be detected sinen the hydrogen content in the generntor is mensured during the hydrogen purging with carbon dioxide, Removing the requirement to perform a leakagn test after purging the hydrogen f rom the generator with carbon dioxide does not.'

lucrease t hn prohnbilit y of n firn. Since, the generator is not-opened until hydrogen levels are "elow flammable icvels and a lenknge test is performed prior .o refilling the generator with hydrogen, f

d H9206161/SNhlCPLR - 12n

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Attachment t o GNRO-9'//00019 j SRASN: NLS-91-002 DOC NO: CR-Nh-91-020 DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE: This chr.ngn performs no pinnt modifications. ..ie changn ndds a description of Souten Range

.Honitor (SRM) oparat ion during refueling operat ions to t he FSAR.

REASON FOR CHANGE: Technieni specifications require two opernblo SRMs, onn in the quadrant whern corn alterat ions are taking pinen and the other in nu adjacent quadrant. BWRs typically, dnfine a quadrant by arbit rarily assuming four 90 degree axis on a N-S-E-W orientat lon with ono SRH located approximately in the center of oc h quadrant. Grand Gulf is unique in the number and Inyout of ,

its SRHn. Grand Gulf has 6 SRHs Instead of 4. Hencn, this  !

nrrangement pinces the SRMs approximately 60 degrees apart. An l SRH can be inopnrable wit hout comprising the original intent of i the Grand Gulf design if the qundrants are not arbitrarily defined using the four major nxis. By adding this changn to the UFSAR allowing the flexibility of dnfining the four quadrants starting at any azimuth, thn qundrants can bn designat ed such that the two ,

SRH operability requirement of TS 3.9.2b can be mot with an SRM inoperable and still meet the design intent of maintaining adoqunte neutron monitoring during corn alterations.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The SRMs nrn not assumed to opernte to mitigate the _ consegunnces of any accident which is postuint ed to occur during thn refueling operntions described by this FSAR chnogo. The location and number of opernhin SRHn described is in accordanen with the current technical specifications and the associated basis as discussed in thn GE bas.la review dnted 10/03/90. This changn dons not af fect thn corn's design to be subcritient at any timo during its operatirig history with any onn control rod fully withdrawn or af fect the refunling intntlocks which-control fuel movemnnt and control rod withdrawal. The restrictions on core alterations describnd by this chnnge are consistent with thn guidance provided in UE PRC 89-01 and RfCSIL 039. The proposed change dons not modify any plant system / component or af fect the operating condit ions of any plant system / component.

H9206161]SNL1CFLR --121

Attnuhment to GNRO-92/00019

-SRASN: N1.S-91-003 DOC NO: CR-NI,-91-0 DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE: The changes to the UFSAR consist of r +vinions to MP&L transmission line outagn dat a. Informntion on i outnges for thn period from June 1, 1990 to liny 31, 1991 is bning n<lded to Chnpt er 8. The UFSAR change aIso includes a new 11P6L mop which reflects complet lon of certain 230kV transmission lines.

REASON FOR CllANGE: Stat ist ics on thn t.rnosmiss ion line outage rata arn updated based on the new datn. In addition, dntn for previoun yents is corrncted bnned on informatton recnived from MP6L.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The change is to statist (cal dnta only nod does not constitute n physical chango to thn facility or to t.he I operation of the facility. Therefo.e thn changn does not constitute nn unreviewed sn rnt y quest inn, A dncronso in the overall pntformance of thn 500kV system was really.ed fn n'. t .

0 . 9 '1 outages / year /100 miles). The 115FV transmic. ion line has >

experienced nn ovnrall outage rate of 1.65 outages / year /100 miles compared to an overn11 ratn of !.79 currently in the UFSAR.

P l

L M9206161/SNLICFLR - 122 -

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Attachment to GNRO-92/00019 SRASN: NLS-91-004 DOC NO: Ops. Cond. 1, 2 , 3, in TS 3.6.6.2, Act tons b nnd/or c DESCRIPTION OF CilANGE: This evaluation addresses thn safety irnplications of entering OPERATIONA1. CONDITIONS 1, 2, or 3 with secondary containment penetrations alrendy isointed by an acceptable method as allowed by TS 3.6.6.2, Actions b nud/or c as '

compared to taking ihose netions a f ter entnring OPERATIONAb CONDITIONS 1, 2, or 3.

RF.ASON FOR CilANGE: Technical Specificatton 3.6.6.2 identifles opernbility requirements for secondary containment automatic isolation vnives and dampers in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3 -

and at other tiens including during core alterations and when handling irradinted funi in the primary or secondary containment.

Vnrious isolat ion valves and/or dampers mny become inopernble don to maintennnen, t.o kurveillance t ests and Inspect ions, to imploment design changes or for some other reason. TS 3.0.4 nilows the plant to nnter OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, or 3 without having all required isointion vnives/ dampers OPERABLE provided that the requiremerts of the app 11 cabin net ion statements are met.

_ SAFETY EVALUATION: The function of the secondary containment isointion valves and dampere is to isolate secondary containment penetrations when necessary. This function, niong with that of the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS), ensures that secondary contninment integrity is maintained when required. Secondary containment integrity assures that environmental relenses of radianctive material are minimized, thereby preventing of fsite does from exceeding those determined by pinnt safnty analyses.

During-OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3, all secondary containment isoint.f on valves and dampers are required- to be OPERABLE to mitigate radionctive relenses-which might occur. The UFSAR considnrs numerous events which may potentinlly result in a radioactive release during OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS-1, 2, or 3.

These include LOCAs, failures of various plant systems and components and loss of of fsitn power. s Should isolation valves and/or dampers become inopnrnbin during OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, or 3, Actions b nud/or c may be enternd to indefinitely provido an equivalent invn1 of protection by isolating the affected secondary containment penetrations.

Under TS~3.0:4. Action b and/or c will bn taken' prior to entering OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, or 3 for those penetrations with y inoperabin isolation vn]ves or dampirs.

Taking t hese actions at (Lat t ime as compared t o taking t hen afterwards does not impact any of thn abovn cons iderat io'ns regarding the margin of safety. Sincn the isointion is already M9206161/SNLICFLR - 123-

l Attachment. to GNRO-92/00019 l

l N1,5-91-004 l'nge 2 necomplinhed, the safety function of t hn isolation valvos nnd dnrpers is fulfilled.

Thern are no changes to pinnt procedures, controls, or interlocks that could result in n Intger rnloose of mnterial insido thn -

primary or secondary containment than previously enicninteel.

Thus, t he margins of sofoty are not reduced by the npplication of TS 3.0.4 as npplied to TS 3.6.6.2.

P M9206161/SNLICFl.R - 124

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~ .- - .. - - - _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . - . _ . ~ - _ _ .

Atinchmnnt to GNko-92/00019

-SRASN: NLS-41-005 DOC NO: CR-NL-91-003 DESCRIPTION OF Clll AGE: This change dnletes the positlon of "Hanager, Pinnt bi.pport" and crent.es the position of "Mannger, Materin1s, Purchasing and Contrnet s." In addition, this changn reflects t hn crent.lon of a corporat e Mat erials, Purchasiny, 9nd Contracts department and thn i ssociat ed t rans fnr of responsibi1Itins.

REASON FOR CllANGE: The new corpornto organinntion wf11 providn oversight, plant support an,i tnko advantage of synergins that exist. betwnen the three sites opnratnd by Entorgy Operations.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Tnese changes arn nJministrative in nnturn and havn'no 'of fnet on the assumptions of any necident annlyses or on i the design or oporation of thn plant.

The duties and responsibilit los beinn forformed in the previous organizational structurn continue to bn pntformed in the new organizntlonni structure.

The specific sit e functiot.s are maintainnd under the responsibility of the GGNS Goretal Mnnnger. The Hannger, Plant t Support in being deleted from the lino of authorit y, responsibility nnd succession insido nnd outsido the Cont rol Room.

Thoro are'no specific requirements for this position and it does r not of f ect t he minimum shif t. crew requirement s of Technical Specification 6.2.2.

l Thn re fo rn , there will bn no incrnnso in the prohnbility of occurrence or consequences of accident s previously nynlunted in the UFSAR; nor will thorn be any increase in the probability of occurronen or consequence of ~ n ma1 function of eqiilpuent. Important to safety previously nynlunt.ed in- the UFSAR; nor will thern he created the possibllity of an accident. or malfunction of equipment import.nnt to safoty dif ferent than previously evaluatnd in tho  ?

UFSAR. Thnse changes arn administrat.tve and do not. reinto to or modi fy any sa fety margins ident.i fied in thn basis for any tnchnical specification.

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